An Evolutionary Perspective on Sexual Assault and Implications for Interventions. Mark Huppin, Neil M. Malamuth, Daniel Linz. Handbook of Sexual Assault and Sexual Assault Prevention pp 17-44, October 19 2019. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-23645-8_2
Abstract: Interventions to reduce sexual assault at institutions of higher learning often have not been shown to be effective and may actually do more harm than good with men at high risk for sexual aggression. We argue that to design more effective interventions, it is essential to incorporate knowledge about the risk factors increasing the likelihood of sexual aggression. The single best predictor of risk for being a perpetrator is being a male and the best predictor of being a victim is being a female. Understanding why this is so may be aided by an approach incorporating evolved psychological mechanisms calibrated by cultural, social, and developmental factors. We consider hypotheses regarding evolved mechanisms for both males and females. We review evidence supporting the hypothesis of specialized mechanisms in women designed to avoid or limit the costs of forced sex. There is also some supportive evidence for the possibility that for males, evolved mechanisms may be calibrated by factors such as perceived negative experiences with women to increase the likelihood of committing sexual aggression. We illustrate such a mechanism by focusing on sexual arousal to forced sex, which may serve as an approach emotion facilitating sexual aggression. In using both evolutionary and proximate analyses, we address not only the question of what characteristics predict male sexual aggression but also why are these the risk factors. Finally, we outline a series of recommendations for improving the effectiveness of sexual assault prevention programs, including exercises to reduce the possibility of hostile/reactive aggression in high-risk men.
Keywords: Sexual assault Sexual aggression Evolution Psychology Rape Adaptations Specialized mechanisms Hostile masculinity Psychological reactance Prevention programs Interventions
Sexual Aggression in Other Species
Also relevant to EP theories of sexual coercion is evidence of sexual aggression in other species. In fact, physical force, harassment, and other intimidation to obtain sex have been reported in many species. Based on a review of the literature on forced copulation among nonhumans, Lalumière, Harris, Quinsey, and Rice (2005) identified specific characteristics in those species that exhibit sexual coercion. Across all nonhuman species, forced copulation is always perpetrated by males on females. Despite the tendency of females in some species to be assertive in the mating process, the authors could not find one instance of a female forcing sex on a male. Further, males are more likely to target fertile than infertile females for forced copulation, and forced copulation does occasionally result in insemination, fertilization, and offspring. Also, males of most species tend not to engage solely in coercive sexual behaviors. Most males that engage in forced copulation at other times court females. Finally, Lalumière et al. (2005) recognized the role of individual differences in sexual coercion. Certain males are more likely than others to engage in forced copulation, and some males are more successful at sexual coercion than others. They conclude that sexual coercion (particularly in the form of forced copulation) "is a tactic used by some males under some conditions to increase reproduction" (p. 59).
A particularly interesting species to consider is the orangutan, one of the few nonhuman primates for which sexual coercion is common. There is evidence for two distinct classes of orangutan males: large or flanged males, who develop secondary sexual characteristics such as cheek pads and large throat sacs, and small or unflanged males. Both types are sexually mature, though the onset of sexual maturity can be highly variable. Large males typically weigh over 80 kg in the wild, about twice the size of the small males (Knott, 2009; Knott & Kahlenberg, 2007). Although both types resort to forced copulations, they are significantly more often used strategically by small males, who force more than 80% of their total copulations at some orangutan sites (although only about half or fewer of their copulations are forced at other sites, suggesting the role of environmental contingencies such as population density and sex ratio in the incidence of sexual aggression) (Knott, 2009; Knott & Kahlenberg, 2007).
In a study of chimpanzees, our closest genetic relatives, sexual coercion as long-term intimidation was positively associated with paternity, particularly among high-ranking males, suggesting that it is a strategy used to increase reproductive fitness (Feldman et al., 2014). Sexually coercive tactics toward a female also provide delayed mating benefits in chacma baboons, due in part to the fact that male aggression preferentially targets fertile females (Baniel, Cowlishaw, & Huchard, 2017). As the authors explain, .By repeatedly attacking females in the weeks preceding ovulation, males appear to increase their chances of monopolizing sexual access to females around ovulation, which in turn increases their probability of successful reproduction. (p. 2166). The authors were able to rule out several competing hypotheses for male sexual violence perpetration (e.g., cycling females are more aggressive than noncycling females; females prefer to mate with aggressive males).
Summary and Recommendations for Sexual Assault Interventions
7. Interventions that are effective for women and most men may show .boomerang. effects with high-risk males. In order to effectively change the behavior of these men, prevention programs should consider introducing exercises likely to reduce the possibility of hostile/reactive aggression.
To the extent that recurrent ancestral conditions existed such that for some men sexual coercion contributed to overall reproductive success, the psychological architecture of men today who have experienced relevant developmental adversity may be calibrated in a way that helps motivate sexual assault to obtain sex from an unwilling partner. What.s more, there is a real possibility that many current sexual assault prevention programs may be interacting with the psychological makeup of these high-risk males to create boomerang reactance effects.
Many high-risk men may experience current programs on college campuses as both manipulative and provocative. To these young men such intervention efforts are directed at supporting more positive treatment for a group, undergraduate women, who seem to them to already "get all the breaks." These programs may therefore threaten these men.s self-concept and perceived freedoms. Especially if they see intervention messages as condescending and therefore insulting, they may respond in anger and with greater support for aggression. From an EP perspective, if we conceive of sexual strategies within the framework of a coevolutionary "arms race" between men and women, it is unsurprising that messages suggesting or dictating to sexually coercive young men how they should behave toward women will be ineffective, especially if these men feel that they have something to lose from this (Mealey, 2003).
The evaluations of current sexual assault programs generally have not examined the impact on sexually aggressive men. If currently effective programs work at all for such men, they may do so only indirectly. For example, bystander intervention programs may reduce the ability of high-risk men to carry out an assault by changing the responses of the low-risk, less violent people around them. Any net positive effect, however, is most likely due to a change in the environment in which some assaults occur rather than by having an effect on the high-risk male himself.
An extensive critical review of the scientific literature on prevention efforts on U.S. college campuses was recently published by Newlands and O'Donohue (2016). In order to facilitate improvement, the authors made some recommendations for developing more rigorous research programs. Among them is the idea that attending to "differences between participants can elucidate what factors influence or moderate treatment success or failure" (p. 10). In light of growing evidence of boomerang reactance effects described below, whereby interventions may result in an increased probability that relatively high-risk males will endorse sexually violent attitudes and be willing to behave more aggressively after the intervention compared to before, attending specifically to men's individual risk profiles appears highly important.
For many years, based on repeated findings in various areas (e.g., alcohol consumption, home energy use), reviewers of public health campaigns have called attention to the possibility of adverse boomerang effects. As some reviewers have noted, "An obvious implication is that boomerang effects should be taken into account as one of the potential costs of launching a mass communication campaign" (Ringold, 2012, p. 27). Most relevant to the current focus, boomerang effects have been well documented in areas of interventions designed to change antisocial behaviors, including sexual and nonsexual violence (see, e.g., Byrne & Hart, 2016; Wilson, Linz, Donnerstein, & Stipp, 1992). For example, an analysis of the consequences of a domestic violence campaign that included multiple television and newspaper advertisements demonstrated such unintended effects (Keller, Wilkinson, & Otjen, 2010). One of the stated goals of the program was to change the attitudes and behaviors of potential perpetrators. Only women.s perception of the severity of domestic violence (e.g., "Domestic violence is a serious issue that requires government or police involvement") increased after the campaign, however. Perceptions of the severity of domestic violence actually substantially decreased for the men in the study.
Cardaba, Brinol, Brandle, and Ruiz-SanRoman (2016) conducted research on the effects of anti-violence campaigns in different countries with different age populations. In one study, they found that individuals with relatively higher scores in trait aggressiveness showed a boomerang effect of anti-violence messages since they actually increased their favorability of attitudes toward violence. In contrast, the anti-violence campaigns were effective for those with relatively lower trait aggressiveness. In a second study, the intervention campaign again worked for the low trait-aggressive individuals but not for the high trait-aggressive participants. Another study reporting boomerang effects in the area of violence was conducted by Rivera, Santos, Brandle, and Cardaba (2016). The authors randomly assigned a large number of Italian students to participate in an intervention campaign designed to reduce participants. acceptance of violent video games. Participants were classified according to their relational lifestyle, consisting of four groups: e.g., "communicative" adolescents were more highly engaged in "civic values duties! in their communities than other groups; "meta-reflexive" adolescents had the lowest probability of seeking parents. support; whereas .fractured. adolescents had a higher probability of taking drugs than other groups and of engaging in other relatively delinquent behaviors. The group with a "fractured" or problematic lifestyle showed a boomerang effect, increasing their intent to play violent video games, whereas the other participants reduced their desire as a result of the intervention or there was a null effect. This finding is noteworthy as it is consistent with the idea in EP that sexually aggressive men can be "generalists" or "specialists," with implications for how different men might be expected to respond differently to the same sexual assault prevention program based on group membership.
We could not find any studies that specifically examined the impact of any elaborate interventions on high-risk males. The studies we did find all involved some form of intervention of less than one or two hours. One of these was a systematic experiment using a well-validated laboratory analogue of sexual aggression. In a community sample of American men, Bosson, Parrott, Swan, Kuchynka, and Schramm (2015) found that men low in sexism showed less aggressive tendencies following exposure to messages emphasizing norms of gender equality (e.g., most men approve of "men doing half of the housework and childcare"). Conversely, men high in hostile sexist attitudes showed a boomerang effect of increased sexually aggressive tendencies.
In a study of undergraduate men, Stephens and George (2009) examined the impact of a rape prevention intervention on low- vs. high-risk men. Risk level was determined by whether individuals had reported previously engaging in sexually aggressive behavior. The researchers found that men in general showed reductions in rape myth acceptance and an increase in victim empathy at a 5-week follow-up. Subgroup analyses, however, indicated that low-risk men were responsible for these findings. High-risk men showed no reliable attitudinal changes from the intervention. More alarmingly, high-risk men in the intervention group were more likely at follow- up to report higher sexually coercive behaviors than were high-risk men in a control group, although the sample size was small.
In another study that presented men a bystander sexual violence prevention program consisting of multifaceted training and skills development, outcome measures of rape myth acceptance and sexually coercive behavioral intentions were reduced among low-risk men (Elias-Lambert & Black, 2016). The program was relatively ineffective with high-risk men, however, leading the authors to conclude that .high-risk males may require a different type of prevention program that can help change the stubborn attitudes and habits they have developed. (p. 3229).
In order to avoid the possibility of boomerang effects, prevention programs should consider introducing exercises likely to reduce the perception of women as out-group threat. Using techniques such as self-affirmation and identity verification may be effective in this regard. These could be incorporated as part of a more comprehensive program for high-risk males, prior to the introduction of specific educational interventions. By moderating perceptions of out-group threat, these experiences can serve to mitigate hostile reactance.
According to self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), individuals have a fundamental motivation to protect their personal image. Self-threatening information is likely to elicit defensive responses such as rejecting the information, presenting counterarguments, or expressing resistance to change in order to restore one.s self-integrity. When one.s self-integrity is supported via self-affirmation, however, one can more carefully consider views and information that otherwise would be too threatening to accept (Cohen & Sherman, 2014; Sherman, 2013).
Self-affirmations have been found to increase positive other-directed feelings (Crocker, Niiya, & Mischkowski, 2008). They have been shown to have physiological bases for their desired effects by buffering neuroendocrine and psychological stress responses (Creswell et al., 2005) and by activating relevant brain-reward systems (Dutcher et al., 2016). By reducing defensive information processing, self-affirmations can increase the effectiveness of educational campaigns (Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000) via how campaigns are framed and embodied. To our knowledge, existing efforts to educate undergraduate students, and high-risk men specifically, about sexual violence prevention have not included these self-image maintenance processes. Because of this, these programs are more likely to have unintended, counterproductive consequences.
Similarly, research on identity verification has found that when the set of meanings in a situation does not match people.s internal standards, and someone else does not confirm or verify their identities, they can experience negative emotional arousal such as hostility (Cast & Burke, 2002). If the lack of verification persists, an individual ultimately may resort to tactics of physical or sexual aggression over others in order to reassert control over the environment (Stets, 1992).
Many current sexual assault prevention programs contain admonishments that may create hostility and lead to a diminished sense of control for high-risk men, such that a resort to sexual violence to compensate for this loss is possible. Identity-verification can serve to reduce or eliminate such backlash responses by creating feelings of positive arousal including high self-esteem and mastery (Burke & Stets, 1999; Cast & Burke, 2002), setting the stage, e.g., for approach behaviors to programmatic information such as increased perspective taking. Research from identity theory suggests that verifying high-risk men in areas affiliated with their aggressive personality, such as masculinity, athletics, or a personal identity related to the degree to which they see themselves as more or less controlling may be most likely to create the conditions for attitudinal and behavioral change (Stets & Burke, 1994), as part of a comprehensive educational program for change.
Thursday, November 21, 2019
Bayesian brain theories suggest that perception, action and cognition arise as creatures minimise the mismatch between their expectations and reality
Yon, Daniel, Cecilia Heyes, and Clare Press. 2019. “Beliefs and Desires in the Predictive Brain.” PsyArXiv. November 18. doi:10.31234/osf.io/hv4bs (osf.io/hv4bs)
Abstract: Bayesian brain theories suggest that perception, action and cognition arise as creatures minimise the mismatch between their expectations and reality. This principle could unify cognitive science with the broader natural sciences, but leave key elements of cognition and behaviour unexplained.
Check also Yon, Daniel, Carl Bunce, and Clare Press. 2019. “Illusions of Control Without Delusions of Grandeur.” PsyArXiv. November 21. doi:10.31234/osf.io/zk4vg
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Why do we do anything at all? In everyday life we tend to explain the behaviour of ourselves and other creatures in terms of beliefs and desires. For example, we might say that a rat pulls a lever or a scientist runs an experiment because they believe that certain outcomes will ensue (i.e., a piece of food or a piece of data) and because these are outcomes they desire (e.g., because they are hungry or curious).
The idea that action is motivated by belief-like and desire-like representations – respectively defining which states of the world are most probable and most valuable (see Box 1) – is also a deep feature of many programmes of work across the cognitive sciences. For example, cognitive models suggest goal-directed action depends on separate associations between actions and outcomes (instrumental beliefs) and outcomes and values (incentives)1,2. A similar distinction is fundamental to models of economic choice, where decisions are thought to reflect a combination of utilities (how good is this option?) and probabilities (how certain am I to obtain it?)3.
However, in recent decades cognitive scientists have been enticed by the possibility that the familiar double act of beliefs and desires can be replaced by theories that explain behaviour using only one kind of internal state – ‘prediction’ (see Fig. 1;4). These predictive processing accounts5 assume that the brain acts as a model of the extracranial world, optimised to fit information arriving at the senses. According to this view, the brain is structured in a hierarchical way such that ‘higher’ cortical areas embody hypotheses about the activity expected in ‘lower’ areas, which in turn send information up the processing hierarchy signalling the mismatch or ‘error’ between prediction and reality. This structure allows the brain to optimise its fit to the outside world through two kinds of process or ‘inference’. The first is perceptual inference, where incoming sensory signals are used to adjust hypotheses at higher levels, such that the hypotheses more closely match the outside world. The second is active inference, where strong top-down predictions engage muscles and organs to drive action, changing states of the body and the world such that they conform with the prior predictions. More simply put, the brain can either revise its predictions to match the world or change the world to make the predictions come true.
Proponents of this view4 suggest that these models leave us with a ‘desert landscape’ view of cognition, where mental states once thought to be crucial in explaining behaviour – such as goals, drives and desires – are boiled down to predictions. Under this view “desired outcomes [are] simply…those that an agent believes, a priori, it will obtain”6. Here, the hungry rat presses the lever because it expects itself to press, since it expects not to be hungry in the future.
One particularly attractive feature of this predictive processing scheme is its potential to integrate cognitive science with other life and social sciences through a common set of principles. For example, it can be shown that any plausible biological system – whether brain, bacterium or birch tree – behaves as though it possesses a predictive model of its environment, and acts in ways that improve the fit between this model and the outside world7,8. More recently, it has been suggested that the same mathematical principles can explain cultural evolution, with ‘cultural ensembles’ equipping their members with shared predictions about the outside world, the contents of which are adjusted in response to cultural prediction errors9. The idea that a range of natural phenomena, on a range of scales, can be understood as prediction-making, error-minimising systems commends predictive processing models to “unity of science” enthusiasts. These models are a boon for scientists who seek continuity between the principles explaining human and animal behaviour and those explaining the rest of the natural world.
However, the unifying potential of predictive processing models may come at a cost to explanatory power. There may still be good reasons for the cognitive scientist to retain concepts of belief-like and desire-like states in their theoretical arsenal. For example, predictive processing models of active inference assume that we act by generating (false) predictions about the states of our body (e.g., my hand is over there) and enslaving peripheral reflexes to make the prediction come true (i.e., move it). While this formulation provides an elegant account of how motor commands are generated and unpacked in the spinal cord, and there would be little dispute that goals are achieved through error minimisation processes, a key ingredient in this scheme is the assumption that agents suspend perception of their actions until their predictions are realised10. This assumption is required because one state plays the role of belief and desire – I cannot simultaneously represent with one state that my hand is by my side and that I would like it to be grasping the mug. Therefore, it would appear that these incarnations of the model are difficult to reconcile with evidence that agents can simultaneously act and perceptually monitor their actions as they unfold – for example, when adapting to unexpected perturbations in a visually-guided reaching movement11 . It is unclear that there is a straightforward solution to this problem. This kind of sensory-guided goal-directed action is compatible with there being some levels in the hierarchy that do not distinguish between belief-like and desire-like information1,11 but not with the absence of this distinction at all levels.
Retaining the distinction between belief-like and desire-like states may also help clinical scientists explain atypical aspects of action. For example, neuropsychiatric work has shown that addicts can expect drugs to be unrewarding, yet still feel strong compulsions to consume them – with expectations about the pleasantness of consumption (‘liking’) and about one’s future actions (‘wanting’) subserved by dissociable mechanisms12. A similar distinction may be important in obsessive compulsive disorder, where patients feel strong urges to perform actions they believe to be causally impotent13. Such experiences are difficult to explain without distinguishing desire-like and belief-like mechanisms (see Box 1).
Intriguingly, some recent predictive processing models may be suggesting rejection of the desert landscape view of cognition, by emphasising that agents like us can act in ways that minimise future prediction errors14. These temporally-deep models entail agents that have separate predictions about states of the world and predictions about plausible actions they could perform. This feature could allow for the reintroduction of the distinction between beliefs and desires. However, if doing so, proponents of predictive processing must also accept that the aim of unifying scientific explanation is only partially achieved. The desert landscape of cognition is not as bare as it seems, and we must accept that there is a discontinuity between different types of mental state, and between error-minimising systems that possess predictions about the future (e.g., animals) and those that do not (e.g., viruses).
In conclusion, prominent predictive processing models have suggested it is possible to do away with traditional concepts of belief and desire, explaining all cognition and behaviour in terms of predictions. This account holds promise for uniting the study of the mind with the study of the natural world, given the diverse number of natural systems that can be thought of as ‘error-minimisers’. However, abandoning these concepts may limit cognitive science’s ability to explain the subtleties of motivated action in health and disease. Though both beliefs and desires could be crafted from the sands of a desert landscape, the cognitive scientist may still find them to be as different as concrete and glass.
-----Full text, graphs, references, etc., at the link above
Abstract: Bayesian brain theories suggest that perception, action and cognition arise as creatures minimise the mismatch between their expectations and reality. This principle could unify cognitive science with the broader natural sciences, but leave key elements of cognition and behaviour unexplained.
Check also Yon, Daniel, Carl Bunce, and Clare Press. 2019. “Illusions of Control Without Delusions of Grandeur.” PsyArXiv. November 21. doi:10.31234/osf.io/zk4vg
Abstract: We frequently experience feelings of agency over events we do not objectively influence – so-called ‘illusions of control’. These illusions have prompted widespread claims that we can be insensitive to objective relationships between actions and outcomes, and instead rely on grandiose beliefs about our abilities. However, these illusory biases could instead arise if we are highly sensitive to action-outcome correlations, but attribute agency when such correlations emerge simply by chance. We motion-tracked participants while they made agency judgements about a cursor that could be yoked to their actions or follow an independent trajectory. A combination of signal detection analysis, reverse correlation methods and computational modelling indeed demonstrated that ‘illusions’ of control could emerge solely from sensitivity to spurious action-outcome correlations. Counterintuitively, this suggests that illusions of control could arise because agents have excellent insight into the relationships between actions and outcomes in a world where causal relationships are not perfectly deterministic.And Now you see it: Our brains predict the outcomes of our actions, shaping reality into what we expect. That’s why we see what we believe. Daniel Yon. Aeon Nov 2019. https://aeon.co/essays/how-our-brain-sculpts-experience-in-line-with-our-expectations
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Why do we do anything at all? In everyday life we tend to explain the behaviour of ourselves and other creatures in terms of beliefs and desires. For example, we might say that a rat pulls a lever or a scientist runs an experiment because they believe that certain outcomes will ensue (i.e., a piece of food or a piece of data) and because these are outcomes they desire (e.g., because they are hungry or curious).
The idea that action is motivated by belief-like and desire-like representations – respectively defining which states of the world are most probable and most valuable (see Box 1) – is also a deep feature of many programmes of work across the cognitive sciences. For example, cognitive models suggest goal-directed action depends on separate associations between actions and outcomes (instrumental beliefs) and outcomes and values (incentives)1,2. A similar distinction is fundamental to models of economic choice, where decisions are thought to reflect a combination of utilities (how good is this option?) and probabilities (how certain am I to obtain it?)3.
However, in recent decades cognitive scientists have been enticed by the possibility that the familiar double act of beliefs and desires can be replaced by theories that explain behaviour using only one kind of internal state – ‘prediction’ (see Fig. 1;4). These predictive processing accounts5 assume that the brain acts as a model of the extracranial world, optimised to fit information arriving at the senses. According to this view, the brain is structured in a hierarchical way such that ‘higher’ cortical areas embody hypotheses about the activity expected in ‘lower’ areas, which in turn send information up the processing hierarchy signalling the mismatch or ‘error’ between prediction and reality. This structure allows the brain to optimise its fit to the outside world through two kinds of process or ‘inference’. The first is perceptual inference, where incoming sensory signals are used to adjust hypotheses at higher levels, such that the hypotheses more closely match the outside world. The second is active inference, where strong top-down predictions engage muscles and organs to drive action, changing states of the body and the world such that they conform with the prior predictions. More simply put, the brain can either revise its predictions to match the world or change the world to make the predictions come true.
Proponents of this view4 suggest that these models leave us with a ‘desert landscape’ view of cognition, where mental states once thought to be crucial in explaining behaviour – such as goals, drives and desires – are boiled down to predictions. Under this view “desired outcomes [are] simply…those that an agent believes, a priori, it will obtain”6. Here, the hungry rat presses the lever because it expects itself to press, since it expects not to be hungry in the future.
One particularly attractive feature of this predictive processing scheme is its potential to integrate cognitive science with other life and social sciences through a common set of principles. For example, it can be shown that any plausible biological system – whether brain, bacterium or birch tree – behaves as though it possesses a predictive model of its environment, and acts in ways that improve the fit between this model and the outside world7,8. More recently, it has been suggested that the same mathematical principles can explain cultural evolution, with ‘cultural ensembles’ equipping their members with shared predictions about the outside world, the contents of which are adjusted in response to cultural prediction errors9. The idea that a range of natural phenomena, on a range of scales, can be understood as prediction-making, error-minimising systems commends predictive processing models to “unity of science” enthusiasts. These models are a boon for scientists who seek continuity between the principles explaining human and animal behaviour and those explaining the rest of the natural world.
However, the unifying potential of predictive processing models may come at a cost to explanatory power. There may still be good reasons for the cognitive scientist to retain concepts of belief-like and desire-like states in their theoretical arsenal. For example, predictive processing models of active inference assume that we act by generating (false) predictions about the states of our body (e.g., my hand is over there) and enslaving peripheral reflexes to make the prediction come true (i.e., move it). While this formulation provides an elegant account of how motor commands are generated and unpacked in the spinal cord, and there would be little dispute that goals are achieved through error minimisation processes, a key ingredient in this scheme is the assumption that agents suspend perception of their actions until their predictions are realised10. This assumption is required because one state plays the role of belief and desire – I cannot simultaneously represent with one state that my hand is by my side and that I would like it to be grasping the mug. Therefore, it would appear that these incarnations of the model are difficult to reconcile with evidence that agents can simultaneously act and perceptually monitor their actions as they unfold – for example, when adapting to unexpected perturbations in a visually-guided reaching movement11 . It is unclear that there is a straightforward solution to this problem. This kind of sensory-guided goal-directed action is compatible with there being some levels in the hierarchy that do not distinguish between belief-like and desire-like information1,11 but not with the absence of this distinction at all levels.
Retaining the distinction between belief-like and desire-like states may also help clinical scientists explain atypical aspects of action. For example, neuropsychiatric work has shown that addicts can expect drugs to be unrewarding, yet still feel strong compulsions to consume them – with expectations about the pleasantness of consumption (‘liking’) and about one’s future actions (‘wanting’) subserved by dissociable mechanisms12. A similar distinction may be important in obsessive compulsive disorder, where patients feel strong urges to perform actions they believe to be causally impotent13. Such experiences are difficult to explain without distinguishing desire-like and belief-like mechanisms (see Box 1).
Intriguingly, some recent predictive processing models may be suggesting rejection of the desert landscape view of cognition, by emphasising that agents like us can act in ways that minimise future prediction errors14. These temporally-deep models entail agents that have separate predictions about states of the world and predictions about plausible actions they could perform. This feature could allow for the reintroduction of the distinction between beliefs and desires. However, if doing so, proponents of predictive processing must also accept that the aim of unifying scientific explanation is only partially achieved. The desert landscape of cognition is not as bare as it seems, and we must accept that there is a discontinuity between different types of mental state, and between error-minimising systems that possess predictions about the future (e.g., animals) and those that do not (e.g., viruses).
In conclusion, prominent predictive processing models have suggested it is possible to do away with traditional concepts of belief and desire, explaining all cognition and behaviour in terms of predictions. This account holds promise for uniting the study of the mind with the study of the natural world, given the diverse number of natural systems that can be thought of as ‘error-minimisers’. However, abandoning these concepts may limit cognitive science’s ability to explain the subtleties of motivated action in health and disease. Though both beliefs and desires could be crafted from the sands of a desert landscape, the cognitive scientist may still find them to be as different as concrete and glass.
-----Full text, graphs, references, etc., at the link above
Higher (vs. lower) status decreased men's attraction to moderately-attractive women, whereas it increased men's attraction to highly-attractive women; women did not exhibit this pattern of reactions to either women or men
Ambivalent attraction: Beauty determines whether men romantically desire or dismiss high status women. Alexandra N.Fisher, Danu Anthony Stinson. Personality and Individual Differences, November 8 2019, 109681. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2019.109681
Abstract: We propose that physical attractiveness determines whether heterosexual men desire or dismiss romance with high-status women. We tested this ambivalent attraction hypothesis in three increasingly realistic experiments – one involving a hypothetical social interaction (N = 214) and two involving potential and actual interactions with confederates (Ns = 332 and 181). In each experiment, heterosexual men encountered a moderately-attractive or highly-attractive woman who aspired to (or held) a low-status or high-status job. Then they rated their attraction to the woman (Experiments 1 to 3) and were given the opportunity to initiate additional social contact with the woman (Experiments 2 and 3). As predicted, a meta-analysis across all three experiments revealed that higher (vs. lower) status decreased men's attraction to moderately-attractive women (d = -0.20), whereas higher (vs. lower) status increased men's attraction to highly-attractive women (d = 0.47). Women did not exhibit this pattern of reactions to either women or men. These results demonstrate the importance of ecological validity and interactive effects in attraction research.
Abstract: We propose that physical attractiveness determines whether heterosexual men desire or dismiss romance with high-status women. We tested this ambivalent attraction hypothesis in three increasingly realistic experiments – one involving a hypothetical social interaction (N = 214) and two involving potential and actual interactions with confederates (Ns = 332 and 181). In each experiment, heterosexual men encountered a moderately-attractive or highly-attractive woman who aspired to (or held) a low-status or high-status job. Then they rated their attraction to the woman (Experiments 1 to 3) and were given the opportunity to initiate additional social contact with the woman (Experiments 2 and 3). As predicted, a meta-analysis across all three experiments revealed that higher (vs. lower) status decreased men's attraction to moderately-attractive women (d = -0.20), whereas higher (vs. lower) status increased men's attraction to highly-attractive women (d = 0.47). Women did not exhibit this pattern of reactions to either women or men. These results demonstrate the importance of ecological validity and interactive effects in attraction research.
We anticipate greater intrasexual aggression toward women dressed revealingly versus modestly, especially if targets are attractive; & women strategically damp the display of those dresses when aggression risk is greatest
Women’s Strategic Defenses Against Same-Sex Aggression: Evidence From Sartorial Behavior. Jaimie Arona Krems, Ashley M. Rankin, Stefanie B. Northover. Social Psychological and Personality Science, November 20, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550619882028
Abstract: Women’s intrasexual competition has received significant attention only in the last decades, with even less work investigating women’s defenses against such aggression. Yet, we should expect that women can (a) grasp which perceptually-salient cues evoke same-sex aggression and (b) strategically damp the display of (some of) those cues when aggression risk is greatest, thereby avoiding the potentially high costs of victimization. Women selectively aggress against women displaying cues of sexual permissiveness (e.g., revealing dress) and/or desirability (e.g., physical attractiveness). We find that (a) women (and men) anticipate greater intrasexual aggression toward women dressed revealingly versus modestly, especially if targets are attractive. Employing behavioral and self-report measures, we also find (b) women create outfits baring less skin, select more modest clothing, and intend to dress less revealingly to encounter other women, flexibly damping permissiveness cues depending on individual features (physical attractiveness) and situational features (being a newcomer) that amplify aggression risk.
Keywords: evolutionary psychology, intrasexual aggression, female sociality, female aggression defenses
General Discussion
In four experiments, we find (1) women (and men) expect
women—and especially physically attractive women—to
evoke greater indirect (but not direct) intrasexual aggression
when revealingly versus modestly dressed; (2) women dress
more modestly for encountering same- versus mixed-sex
groups—across contexts (professional, social); (3) more physically
attractive women, who may be at greater risk of incurring
intrasexual aggression, demonstrate an exaggerated tendency
to do this; and (4) this effect is apparent only when such women
dress to meet a prospective (but not existing) female friend.
Findings are consistent with theorizing that women are not only
aware that certain perceptually-salient cues (e.g., revealing
clothes, physical attractiveness) render them more likely targets
of intrasexual aggression, but also that women might thus
seek to avoid such aggression by strategically manipulating
their appearance—specifically, by damping their outfit provocativeness.
Importantly, this damping is flexibly engaged when
aggression risk is highest: by individuals who may already be
frequent targets (physically attractive women), and in situations
when aggression is more likely (when women are
newcomers).
Our focus on women’s interactions with other women was,
in part, to address the fact that the majority of research on
women’s clothing and consumption has focused on women’s
male audiences and the possible benefits associated with
attracting such audiences (e.g., Buss, 1988; Durante et al.,
2011; Elliott et al., 2013; Haselton et al., 2007; Padza, Elliott,
& Greitemeyer, 2012; Saad, 2013; Sacco, Bermond, & Young,
2016; but see Blake, Fourati, & Brooks, 2018; Hudders, De
Backer, Fisher, & Vyncke, 2014). We would not argue that
other women are always the sole intended audience for
women’s sartorial cues and/or signals, and even when other
women are the intended audience, we would not expect that
women’s sartorial choices are always calibrated only toward
avoiding intrasexual aggression. Rather, because attracting and
maintaining same-sex friends can confer numerous important
benefits for women (e.g., Campbell, 2002), future work could
benefit from exploring how women might manipulate their
appearances to establish and maintain same-sex friendships—
as well as to avoid same-sex aggression. For example, donning
the baggy sorority t-shirts and short shorts common to young
women on some college campuses may communicate not only
the wearer’s on-campus status but also her dedication to her
coalition.
Similarly, we do not assume that attracting the attention of
male audiences yields only opportunities (and not also threats).
Our data imply that women are attuned to the possible benefits
and costs of male attention, damping provocative dress when
encountering prospective male friends (but not romantic partners),
whose unwanted sexual interest could be threatening.
In all, findings suggest that women’s sartorial behavior is
attuned to multiple factors, including women’s own attractiveness,
the social context, and several audience features (e.g.,
audience gender composition, familiarity with their audience).
Future work might further investigate these and other nuances
(e.g., Glick, Larsen, Johnson, & Branstiter, 2005).
This work adds to literature suggesting that features cuing
women’s intentions to attract men (e.g., provocative dress) can
evoke aggression, but so too can features cuing women’s ability
to attract men (e.g., physical attractiveness). This implies
that some women might attract intrasexual aggression without
having engaged in behavior to prompt it. That is, women might
be aggressed against for being competitive (e.g., for desirable
romantic partners), even if those women were not actively
competing. One might speculate that, in contrast, men are
unlikely to evoke intrasexual aggression without having
actively provoked it. Whereas past work has uncovered sex differences
in tactics of intrasexual aggression, future work might
benefit from systematically exploring possible sex differences
in what features evoke intrasexual aggression.
We also note some limitations. One might speculate that stimulus
effects drove the results of Experiment 1. This is
possible; Experiment 1 used one stimulus per condition, and
this can be problematic for issues of validity and generalizability.
Perhaps somewhat mitigating these concerns, findings were
consistent with previous research examining actual aggression
toward those stimuli (Vaillancourt & Sharma, 2011); women
were more indirectly aggressive to an average-weight, revealingly
(versus modestly) dressed target, and we find that people
expect the average-weight, revealingly dressed target to
receive heightened intrasexual indirect aggression. Additionally,
we knowingly confounded sex composition and social
context in Experiment 2, which could also have suffered from
demand characteristics given its within-subjects design. To
address this, Experiment 3 conceptually replicated Experiment
2, setting sex composition orthogonal to social context,
and using a between-subjects design.
Check also Women made more negative attributions about, & experienced diminished desire to affiliate with, female targets wearing (vs. not wearing) cosmetics. This penalty was specific to female observers, mediated by decreases in perceived trustworthiness, & driven by less desirable women.
Abstract: Women’s intrasexual competition has received significant attention only in the last decades, with even less work investigating women’s defenses against such aggression. Yet, we should expect that women can (a) grasp which perceptually-salient cues evoke same-sex aggression and (b) strategically damp the display of (some of) those cues when aggression risk is greatest, thereby avoiding the potentially high costs of victimization. Women selectively aggress against women displaying cues of sexual permissiveness (e.g., revealing dress) and/or desirability (e.g., physical attractiveness). We find that (a) women (and men) anticipate greater intrasexual aggression toward women dressed revealingly versus modestly, especially if targets are attractive. Employing behavioral and self-report measures, we also find (b) women create outfits baring less skin, select more modest clothing, and intend to dress less revealingly to encounter other women, flexibly damping permissiveness cues depending on individual features (physical attractiveness) and situational features (being a newcomer) that amplify aggression risk.
Keywords: evolutionary psychology, intrasexual aggression, female sociality, female aggression defenses
General Discussion
In four experiments, we find (1) women (and men) expect
women—and especially physically attractive women—to
evoke greater indirect (but not direct) intrasexual aggression
when revealingly versus modestly dressed; (2) women dress
more modestly for encountering same- versus mixed-sex
groups—across contexts (professional, social); (3) more physically
attractive women, who may be at greater risk of incurring
intrasexual aggression, demonstrate an exaggerated tendency
to do this; and (4) this effect is apparent only when such women
dress to meet a prospective (but not existing) female friend.
Findings are consistent with theorizing that women are not only
aware that certain perceptually-salient cues (e.g., revealing
clothes, physical attractiveness) render them more likely targets
of intrasexual aggression, but also that women might thus
seek to avoid such aggression by strategically manipulating
their appearance—specifically, by damping their outfit provocativeness.
Importantly, this damping is flexibly engaged when
aggression risk is highest: by individuals who may already be
frequent targets (physically attractive women), and in situations
when aggression is more likely (when women are
newcomers).
Our focus on women’s interactions with other women was,
in part, to address the fact that the majority of research on
women’s clothing and consumption has focused on women’s
male audiences and the possible benefits associated with
attracting such audiences (e.g., Buss, 1988; Durante et al.,
2011; Elliott et al., 2013; Haselton et al., 2007; Padza, Elliott,
& Greitemeyer, 2012; Saad, 2013; Sacco, Bermond, & Young,
2016; but see Blake, Fourati, & Brooks, 2018; Hudders, De
Backer, Fisher, & Vyncke, 2014). We would not argue that
other women are always the sole intended audience for
women’s sartorial cues and/or signals, and even when other
women are the intended audience, we would not expect that
women’s sartorial choices are always calibrated only toward
avoiding intrasexual aggression. Rather, because attracting and
maintaining same-sex friends can confer numerous important
benefits for women (e.g., Campbell, 2002), future work could
benefit from exploring how women might manipulate their
appearances to establish and maintain same-sex friendships—
as well as to avoid same-sex aggression. For example, donning
the baggy sorority t-shirts and short shorts common to young
women on some college campuses may communicate not only
the wearer’s on-campus status but also her dedication to her
coalition.
Similarly, we do not assume that attracting the attention of
male audiences yields only opportunities (and not also threats).
Our data imply that women are attuned to the possible benefits
and costs of male attention, damping provocative dress when
encountering prospective male friends (but not romantic partners),
whose unwanted sexual interest could be threatening.
In all, findings suggest that women’s sartorial behavior is
attuned to multiple factors, including women’s own attractiveness,
the social context, and several audience features (e.g.,
audience gender composition, familiarity with their audience).
Future work might further investigate these and other nuances
(e.g., Glick, Larsen, Johnson, & Branstiter, 2005).
This work adds to literature suggesting that features cuing
women’s intentions to attract men (e.g., provocative dress) can
evoke aggression, but so too can features cuing women’s ability
to attract men (e.g., physical attractiveness). This implies
that some women might attract intrasexual aggression without
having engaged in behavior to prompt it. That is, women might
be aggressed against for being competitive (e.g., for desirable
romantic partners), even if those women were not actively
competing. One might speculate that, in contrast, men are
unlikely to evoke intrasexual aggression without having
actively provoked it. Whereas past work has uncovered sex differences
in tactics of intrasexual aggression, future work might
benefit from systematically exploring possible sex differences
in what features evoke intrasexual aggression.
We also note some limitations. One might speculate that stimulus
effects drove the results of Experiment 1. This is
possible; Experiment 1 used one stimulus per condition, and
this can be problematic for issues of validity and generalizability.
Perhaps somewhat mitigating these concerns, findings were
consistent with previous research examining actual aggression
toward those stimuli (Vaillancourt & Sharma, 2011); women
were more indirectly aggressive to an average-weight, revealingly
(versus modestly) dressed target, and we find that people
expect the average-weight, revealingly dressed target to
receive heightened intrasexual indirect aggression. Additionally,
we knowingly confounded sex composition and social
context in Experiment 2, which could also have suffered from
demand characteristics given its within-subjects design. To
address this, Experiment 3 conceptually replicated Experiment
2, setting sex composition orthogonal to social context,
and using a between-subjects design.
Check also Women made more negative attributions about, & experienced diminished desire to affiliate with, female targets wearing (vs. not wearing) cosmetics. This penalty was specific to female observers, mediated by decreases in perceived trustworthiness, & driven by less desirable women.
DelPriore, D. J., Bradshaw, H. K., & Hill, S. E. (2018). Appearance Enhancement Produces a Strategic Beautification Penalty Among Women. Evolutionary Behavioral Sciences, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/03/women-made-more-negative-attributions.html
Wednesday, November 20, 2019
Common, nonsexual masochistic preferences (enjoying the burn of spicy food, disgusting jokes, pounding heart, painful massage) are positively associated with antisocial personality traits
Common, nonsexual masochistic preferences are positively associated with antisocial personality traits. Christina Sagioglou, Tobias Greitemeyer. Journal of Personality, November 16 2019. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12526
Abstract
Objective: Based on prior research linking masochism and antisocial behavior to sensation seeking, we hypothesized that masochistic and antisocial preferences are positively correlated. Besides sensation seeking, we tested whether disgust sensitivity (due to its inhibitory function) and shared social values (e.g., stimulation) accounted for the masochistic‐antisocial link. We additionally examined the link in relation to broad personality factors.
Method: Six online and laboratory studies (N = 2,999) with U.S. American and European samples.
Results: We consistently found positive correlations between masochistic enjoyment (e.g., enjoying the burn of spicy food, disgusting jokes, pounding heart, painful massage) and antisocial traits such as subclinical psychopathy, everyday sadism, and low Honesty‐Humility. We observed behavioral correlations in that experienced pleasure of a painful event was positively related to causing another person to feel pain. Shared sensation seeking, low disgust sensitivity, and endorsement of social values such as social power, hedonism, and a stimulating life partially accounted for the masochistic‐antisocial link.
Conclusion: The extent to which a person enjoys threatening stimuli on the self is reliably related to how much a person enjoys and evokes others’ suffering. Future research could explore the common core that underlies common masochistic and antisocial preferences beyond the mediators tested here.
Discussion
In six studies with large samples from different countries and populations, we provided consistent evidence for a positive association between the enjoyment of negative sensations on the self and a tendency to enjoy and cause suffering in other people. We repeatedly confirmed the masochistic-antisocial link with regard to the Dark Tetrad constellation and the traits related to antisocial behavior of the HEXACO and Big Five models for broad personality factors. Largest correlations were observed for everyday sadism and psychopathy, but masochistic preferences were also consistently correlated with Machiavellianism, narcissism, and Honesty-Humility. We further extensively validated trait masochism with behavioral choice and preferences measures, lending further validity to the trait construct and its empirical distinctiveness. At behavioral level, we see that masochistic expressions such as bitter taste preferences and aversive movie preferences, but not enjoyment of pain, are positively correlated with antisocial traits. Yet, these behavioral preferences are best predicted by trait masochism. Masochistic preference is thus not merely a manifestation of antisocial tendencies turned against the self. It is empirically related to but distinguishable from both antisocial traits and broad personality factors. Neither trait constellation (i.e., the Dark Tetrad or HEXACO) sufficiently captures such self-directed aversive affinity. Examining masochistic and antisocial behavior within the pain domain showed that irrespective of pain sensitivity, more masochistic pleasure is associated with more antisocial behavior.
In addition, we identified three constructs that account for some of the overlap between masochistic and antisocial preferences. First, we found that a need for arousal and stimulation partially manifests in self-exposure to negative stimuli, but also in antisocial behavior towards other people. Second, two studies confirmed that being sensitive to disgust-evoking stimuli keeps individuals from exposing themselves to aversive experiences and from behaving hostile towards other people. More disgust-sensitive individuals also reported less pleasure when experiencing ice-water induced pain. Third, pursuing a challenging, daring, and exciting life, gratification of desires, self-indulgence, social power, and authority are shared motivational characteristics of masochistic and antisocial traits. Yet, we see that despite this varied overlap, the common core persists when controlling for these constructs. Methodologically, it is important to note that in four of the six studies, masochism was assessed differently (by typing a number into a textbox) than were the dark traits (on Likert-type scales). It is thus unlikely that the correlations were inflated by response-biases.
Limitations and future directions
We measured sensation seeking via a combination of differently weighted HEXACO facet scores (de Vries et al., 2009) and found that it partially accounted for the masochistic-antisocial link. Using the original sensation seeking scale (Zuckerman, 1979) as did Rozin and colleagues (2013) may shed more light on its role in the masochistic-antisocial link. The original scale contains the facets thrill seeking, experience seeking, disinhibition, and boredom susceptibility, of which disinhibition revealed a moderate correlation with both benign masochism (r = .35; Rozin et al., 2013) and Honesty-Humility (r = -.33 to -.41; de Vries et al., 2009), whereas boredom susceptibility was uncorrelated with benign masochism but reliably negatively correlated with Honesty-Humility. Focusing on the nuanced similarities and differences of masochistic and antisocial tendencies in sensation seeking may reveal more about when one person does and does not unite both self-directed and other-directed harmful tendencies within herself.
A further limitation is that there is high empirical overlap of everyday sadism assessed with the ASP and psychopathy measured with the SD3, which applies to four of our studies. In fact, correlation coefficients range from .57 to as high as .85. Accordingly, masochism reveals similarly large and reliable correlations with both sadism and psychopathy. Yet, in trying to understand the link between masochistic and antisocial tendencies, it is crucial to empirically differentiate between different antisocial constructs. Future research may thus employ improved measures of psychopathic and sadistic tendencies that have better discriminatory power. This would more clearly reveal whether masochism is more strongly linked to psychopathic or sadistic tendencies or similarly to both.
One approach to better understand the connection between masochistic and antisocial tendencies may be by exploring their psychological function. Most notably, Baumeister (1988) offered a social psychological theoretical framework for understanding the paradox of sexual masochism. He argued that sexual masochism is a means by which people escape self-awareness, just as they do through alcohol consumption or other recreational activities (Baumeister, 1991).
Although self-awareness can lead to positive states such as when individuals feel proud of a personal achievement, it often confronts individuals with mistakes and deviance from their ideal self. Indeed, escaping self-awareness was argued to be a common human desire (Wicklund, 1975). The present and past research on masochism (Rozin et al., 2013) lend empirical support to Baumeister.s theory in that people who enjoy one form of aversive activity are more likely to prefer other such activities. Yet, whether and how a desire to escape self-awareness is also related to increases in antisocial behavior remains an open empirical question.
Put simply, both masochistic and antisocial preferences are characterized by an affinity towards aversive states. Future research could investigate the extent of positive evaluative reactions that they are associated with. Implicit measures that detect underlying, possibly unware preferences with reaction times may shed more light on a possible contra-hedonic conditioning of aversive stimuli. Indeed, Rozin et al. (2013) argued that masochistic pleasures are essentially hedonic reversals in that we grow up disliking most of the stimuli (e.g., bitterness, pain) and learn to like them throughout our lives. Possibly, dark traits are characterized by a parallel form of moral-evaluative reversals. The common core of the traits. overlap could become most evident at such an implicit level.
There are a variety of activities that are potentially related to the present construct of benign masochism. Whereas we focused on nonsexual experiences, the original, prototypical form of masochism refers to gaining sexual pleasure from pain and humiliation. It is conceivable that they are positively related, because both provide a way to escape self-awareness. At the same time, sexual masochism is less prevalent and more confined than, for example, enjoying sad art or eating spicy food (Baumeister, 1989; Spence, 2018). Possibly, many sexual masochists also gain nonsexual pleasure from intense negative stimuli but not vice versa. Moreover, the present experiences are essentially harmless, simulating threat or danger while involving a very low actual risk level. Yet, particularly in the fear domain there are other activities that have a higher inherent level of danger. For example, engagement in arousal-inducing extreme sports such as wingsuit flying or mountaineering carries a realistic death risk through participation. Whether preferences for activities involving actual danger are an extreme expression of the benign masochism studied here, or whether they are a qualitatively distinct phenomenon remains for future research to discover. Nevertheless, due to their link to sensation seeking (Kerr, 1991), it seems likely that such preferences are also positively associated with antisocial tendencies.
Abstract
Objective: Based on prior research linking masochism and antisocial behavior to sensation seeking, we hypothesized that masochistic and antisocial preferences are positively correlated. Besides sensation seeking, we tested whether disgust sensitivity (due to its inhibitory function) and shared social values (e.g., stimulation) accounted for the masochistic‐antisocial link. We additionally examined the link in relation to broad personality factors.
Method: Six online and laboratory studies (N = 2,999) with U.S. American and European samples.
Results: We consistently found positive correlations between masochistic enjoyment (e.g., enjoying the burn of spicy food, disgusting jokes, pounding heart, painful massage) and antisocial traits such as subclinical psychopathy, everyday sadism, and low Honesty‐Humility. We observed behavioral correlations in that experienced pleasure of a painful event was positively related to causing another person to feel pain. Shared sensation seeking, low disgust sensitivity, and endorsement of social values such as social power, hedonism, and a stimulating life partially accounted for the masochistic‐antisocial link.
Conclusion: The extent to which a person enjoys threatening stimuli on the self is reliably related to how much a person enjoys and evokes others’ suffering. Future research could explore the common core that underlies common masochistic and antisocial preferences beyond the mediators tested here.
Discussion
In six studies with large samples from different countries and populations, we provided consistent evidence for a positive association between the enjoyment of negative sensations on the self and a tendency to enjoy and cause suffering in other people. We repeatedly confirmed the masochistic-antisocial link with regard to the Dark Tetrad constellation and the traits related to antisocial behavior of the HEXACO and Big Five models for broad personality factors. Largest correlations were observed for everyday sadism and psychopathy, but masochistic preferences were also consistently correlated with Machiavellianism, narcissism, and Honesty-Humility. We further extensively validated trait masochism with behavioral choice and preferences measures, lending further validity to the trait construct and its empirical distinctiveness. At behavioral level, we see that masochistic expressions such as bitter taste preferences and aversive movie preferences, but not enjoyment of pain, are positively correlated with antisocial traits. Yet, these behavioral preferences are best predicted by trait masochism. Masochistic preference is thus not merely a manifestation of antisocial tendencies turned against the self. It is empirically related to but distinguishable from both antisocial traits and broad personality factors. Neither trait constellation (i.e., the Dark Tetrad or HEXACO) sufficiently captures such self-directed aversive affinity. Examining masochistic and antisocial behavior within the pain domain showed that irrespective of pain sensitivity, more masochistic pleasure is associated with more antisocial behavior.
In addition, we identified three constructs that account for some of the overlap between masochistic and antisocial preferences. First, we found that a need for arousal and stimulation partially manifests in self-exposure to negative stimuli, but also in antisocial behavior towards other people. Second, two studies confirmed that being sensitive to disgust-evoking stimuli keeps individuals from exposing themselves to aversive experiences and from behaving hostile towards other people. More disgust-sensitive individuals also reported less pleasure when experiencing ice-water induced pain. Third, pursuing a challenging, daring, and exciting life, gratification of desires, self-indulgence, social power, and authority are shared motivational characteristics of masochistic and antisocial traits. Yet, we see that despite this varied overlap, the common core persists when controlling for these constructs. Methodologically, it is important to note that in four of the six studies, masochism was assessed differently (by typing a number into a textbox) than were the dark traits (on Likert-type scales). It is thus unlikely that the correlations were inflated by response-biases.
Limitations and future directions
We measured sensation seeking via a combination of differently weighted HEXACO facet scores (de Vries et al., 2009) and found that it partially accounted for the masochistic-antisocial link. Using the original sensation seeking scale (Zuckerman, 1979) as did Rozin and colleagues (2013) may shed more light on its role in the masochistic-antisocial link. The original scale contains the facets thrill seeking, experience seeking, disinhibition, and boredom susceptibility, of which disinhibition revealed a moderate correlation with both benign masochism (r = .35; Rozin et al., 2013) and Honesty-Humility (r = -.33 to -.41; de Vries et al., 2009), whereas boredom susceptibility was uncorrelated with benign masochism but reliably negatively correlated with Honesty-Humility. Focusing on the nuanced similarities and differences of masochistic and antisocial tendencies in sensation seeking may reveal more about when one person does and does not unite both self-directed and other-directed harmful tendencies within herself.
A further limitation is that there is high empirical overlap of everyday sadism assessed with the ASP and psychopathy measured with the SD3, which applies to four of our studies. In fact, correlation coefficients range from .57 to as high as .85. Accordingly, masochism reveals similarly large and reliable correlations with both sadism and psychopathy. Yet, in trying to understand the link between masochistic and antisocial tendencies, it is crucial to empirically differentiate between different antisocial constructs. Future research may thus employ improved measures of psychopathic and sadistic tendencies that have better discriminatory power. This would more clearly reveal whether masochism is more strongly linked to psychopathic or sadistic tendencies or similarly to both.
One approach to better understand the connection between masochistic and antisocial tendencies may be by exploring their psychological function. Most notably, Baumeister (1988) offered a social psychological theoretical framework for understanding the paradox of sexual masochism. He argued that sexual masochism is a means by which people escape self-awareness, just as they do through alcohol consumption or other recreational activities (Baumeister, 1991).
Although self-awareness can lead to positive states such as when individuals feel proud of a personal achievement, it often confronts individuals with mistakes and deviance from their ideal self. Indeed, escaping self-awareness was argued to be a common human desire (Wicklund, 1975). The present and past research on masochism (Rozin et al., 2013) lend empirical support to Baumeister.s theory in that people who enjoy one form of aversive activity are more likely to prefer other such activities. Yet, whether and how a desire to escape self-awareness is also related to increases in antisocial behavior remains an open empirical question.
Put simply, both masochistic and antisocial preferences are characterized by an affinity towards aversive states. Future research could investigate the extent of positive evaluative reactions that they are associated with. Implicit measures that detect underlying, possibly unware preferences with reaction times may shed more light on a possible contra-hedonic conditioning of aversive stimuli. Indeed, Rozin et al. (2013) argued that masochistic pleasures are essentially hedonic reversals in that we grow up disliking most of the stimuli (e.g., bitterness, pain) and learn to like them throughout our lives. Possibly, dark traits are characterized by a parallel form of moral-evaluative reversals. The common core of the traits. overlap could become most evident at such an implicit level.
There are a variety of activities that are potentially related to the present construct of benign masochism. Whereas we focused on nonsexual experiences, the original, prototypical form of masochism refers to gaining sexual pleasure from pain and humiliation. It is conceivable that they are positively related, because both provide a way to escape self-awareness. At the same time, sexual masochism is less prevalent and more confined than, for example, enjoying sad art or eating spicy food (Baumeister, 1989; Spence, 2018). Possibly, many sexual masochists also gain nonsexual pleasure from intense negative stimuli but not vice versa. Moreover, the present experiences are essentially harmless, simulating threat or danger while involving a very low actual risk level. Yet, particularly in the fear domain there are other activities that have a higher inherent level of danger. For example, engagement in arousal-inducing extreme sports such as wingsuit flying or mountaineering carries a realistic death risk through participation. Whether preferences for activities involving actual danger are an extreme expression of the benign masochism studied here, or whether they are a qualitatively distinct phenomenon remains for future research to discover. Nevertheless, due to their link to sensation seeking (Kerr, 1991), it seems likely that such preferences are also positively associated with antisocial tendencies.
The Interplay Between Cognitive Intelligence, Ability Emotional Intelligence, and Religiosity
The Interplay Between Cognitive Intelligence, Ability Emotional Intelligence, and Religiosity. Paweł Łowicki, Marcin Zajenkowski, Dimitri van der Linden. Journal of Religion and Health, November 20 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10943-019-00953-0
Abstract: The negative association between cognitive intelligence (CI) and religiosity has been widely studied and is now well documented. In contrast, the role of emotional intelligence (EI) in this context has been poorly investigated thus far. Some available data indicate that EI, unlike CI, correlates positively with religiosity. To date, however, no study has explored the relationship between religiosity and both intelligences simultaneously. In current studies (Ns = 301 and 200), we examined the interplay between all three constructs. The results showed that CI was positively correlated with ability EI and negatively with some measures of religiosity. EI, on the other hand, revealed no direct, significant relationship with religiosity. However, when combined into a single regression model with CI, EI became a significant positive predictor of religiosity. Moreover, Study 2 revealed that the link between EI and religiosity was mediated by empathy. Interestingly, we also found a reciprocal suppression between CI and EI, since both predictors increased their influence on religiosity when analyzed together. Although the suppression was present in both studies, it was observed for different religiosity measures in each case, indicating that this effect is probably dependent on various factors, such as sample structure or type of religiosity.
Keywords: Religiosity Belief Cognitive intelligence Emotional intelligence Empathy
General Discussion
In the present research, we examined the relationship between ability EI, cognitive intelligence, and religiosity. Hypothesis 1 stating that cognitive intelligence
would be negatively related to religiosity was confrmed for some of the religious
scales (e.g., centrality of religiosity in Study 1 and religious fundamentalism in
Study 2). It is worth noting that the associations between religious fundamentalism
and intelligence tests were more pronounced than correlations observed for other
religiosity measures—both in our research and in previous studies (e.g., Lewis et al.
2011). Therefore, it seems that this particular type of religiosity is the most difcult to reconcile with high cognitive abilities. Interestingly, it is usually believed that
intelligence infuences (or at least precedes) religiosity (Zuckerman et al. 2013). For
instance, some authors argue that intelligent individuals are less willing to engage
in more instinctive, evolved types of behavior (Dutton and Van der Linden 2017;
Kanazawa 2012). In contrast, they tend to favor some counter-instinctive behaviors—e.g., they undertake nocturnal activities or have a taste for complex instrumental music. In those evolutionary accounts, religion is also considered an evolved
and adaptive pattern that enhances a sense of community and provides stress relief.
Thus, assuming that religion is a relatively old universal instinct, intelligent individuals are more likely to be atheist (Dutton and Van der Linden 2017). However,
in the case of religious fundamentalism, it has been also argued that this religious
feature might actually exert an efect on intelligence by opposing secular knowledge
and education (Sherkat 2010, 2011). Thus, the direction of the causal relationship
between these two constructs remains unknown and should be established using longitudinal research.
Hypothesis 2 concerning the positive link between EI and religiosity was not supported since none of the positive zero-order correlations between EI and religiosity
dimensions were statistically signifcant (with the exception of public practice subdimension in Study 1). Additionally, we found that EI was positively associated with
Cattell’s score in Study 1 and general intelligence factor in Study 2, which supported
Hypothesis 3.
Next, Hypothesis 4 received a partial support. Specifcally, in Study 1 EI became
a signifcant and positive predictor of centrality of religiosity when analyzed jointly
in a single regression model with cognitive intelligence. In Study 2, we did not
directly replicate this efect on the exact same measure, but we found a similar suppression efect for the scale measuring belief in God/Higher Power. Furthermore, the
suppression, albeit weak, did occur also on pooled data from Studies 1 and 2. Thus,
from this pattern of fndings, it seems reasonable to conclude that cognitive intelligence indeed acted as a suppressor of the EI–religion relationship. This fnding suggests that ability EI constitutes a blend of rational and intuitive mechanisms (both
inversely related to religiosity) and may explain, to a certain extent, why zero-order
correlations between religiosity and EI are not signifcant in some studies (including
current ones). It is possible that removing the variance related to abstract reasoning
reveals the intuitive, empathetic part of EI (see Mayer and Geher 1996) and this part
shows a more pronounced association with religiosity. In fact, this notion was also
supported in Study 2 which showed that empathy mediated the EI–belief link.
Finally, the current study revealed also some interesting fndings regarding cognitive intelligence. First, we found evidence for cooperative suppression: In all cases
where EI became more strongly associated with religiosity, the cognitive ability
(negative) relation to religiosity was also more pronounced in regression models. It
seems then that removing the EI aspect from cognitive ability increased its negative
association with religious belief. It is possible that this remaining part of cognitive
ability refects “cool” and rational reason, not infuenced by afect or empathy. Such
an analytic cognitive approach may signifcantly hamper beliefs in religious tenets
since they often defy logic or violate the laws of nature (cf. Pennycook et al. 2012).
The current research has several limitations. First, the present studies had a crosssectional character, which did not enable us to establish causal relationships between
investigated variables. Although in the research literature there are some suggestions
regarding the direction of the cognitive intelligence–religiosity link (Zuckerman
et al. 2013), the causality is not yet clear in the case of the relationship between
EI and religion. Clearly, then, more work in this context—including longitudinal
research—is needed to deepen our understanding of the interplay between religiosity, EI, and cognitive intelligence. Moreover, although we extended the scope of
previous research by examining the potential mediating role of emotional empathy,
it might be desirable to also examine an impact of other variables that have been
found to have signifcance for both intelligences and religion, such as time perspectives (see Łowicki et al. 2018; Stolarski et al. 2011; Zajenkowski et al. 2016). Next,
it should be emphasized that both current samples were mostly composed of Roman
Catholics and included Polish participants only. To increase the generalizability of
the obtained results, future work should examine other denominations, preferably
in non-Western societies. Finally, it needs to be acknowledged that we failed to replicate the main fnding using the exact same measure of religiosity across the two
studies. Instead, we found the suppression efect on diferent instruments measuring religiosity. As suggested above, this might be due to various factors such as the
weak magnitude of the observed efects or sample specifcity (cf. Webser and Dufy
2016). Nevertheless, our research provides some observations that might be helpful in future studies exploring the interplay between cognitive and emotional intelligence and religiosity. First, one needs to carefully consider the structure and size
of the sample. It seems that the efects of both intelligences on religiosity are rather
small, and therefore an adequate statistical power is required to detect them. Second,
taking into consideration some signifcant diferences between measures of religiosity, various aspects of religious phenomena (e.g., belief in God, fundamentalism,
interest in religion) should be included in the studies on cognitive and emotional
intelligence.
Abstract: The negative association between cognitive intelligence (CI) and religiosity has been widely studied and is now well documented. In contrast, the role of emotional intelligence (EI) in this context has been poorly investigated thus far. Some available data indicate that EI, unlike CI, correlates positively with religiosity. To date, however, no study has explored the relationship between religiosity and both intelligences simultaneously. In current studies (Ns = 301 and 200), we examined the interplay between all three constructs. The results showed that CI was positively correlated with ability EI and negatively with some measures of religiosity. EI, on the other hand, revealed no direct, significant relationship with religiosity. However, when combined into a single regression model with CI, EI became a significant positive predictor of religiosity. Moreover, Study 2 revealed that the link between EI and religiosity was mediated by empathy. Interestingly, we also found a reciprocal suppression between CI and EI, since both predictors increased their influence on religiosity when analyzed together. Although the suppression was present in both studies, it was observed for different religiosity measures in each case, indicating that this effect is probably dependent on various factors, such as sample structure or type of religiosity.
Keywords: Religiosity Belief Cognitive intelligence Emotional intelligence Empathy
General Discussion
In the present research, we examined the relationship between ability EI, cognitive intelligence, and religiosity. Hypothesis 1 stating that cognitive intelligence
would be negatively related to religiosity was confrmed for some of the religious
scales (e.g., centrality of religiosity in Study 1 and religious fundamentalism in
Study 2). It is worth noting that the associations between religious fundamentalism
and intelligence tests were more pronounced than correlations observed for other
religiosity measures—both in our research and in previous studies (e.g., Lewis et al.
2011). Therefore, it seems that this particular type of religiosity is the most difcult to reconcile with high cognitive abilities. Interestingly, it is usually believed that
intelligence infuences (or at least precedes) religiosity (Zuckerman et al. 2013). For
instance, some authors argue that intelligent individuals are less willing to engage
in more instinctive, evolved types of behavior (Dutton and Van der Linden 2017;
Kanazawa 2012). In contrast, they tend to favor some counter-instinctive behaviors—e.g., they undertake nocturnal activities or have a taste for complex instrumental music. In those evolutionary accounts, religion is also considered an evolved
and adaptive pattern that enhances a sense of community and provides stress relief.
Thus, assuming that religion is a relatively old universal instinct, intelligent individuals are more likely to be atheist (Dutton and Van der Linden 2017). However,
in the case of religious fundamentalism, it has been also argued that this religious
feature might actually exert an efect on intelligence by opposing secular knowledge
and education (Sherkat 2010, 2011). Thus, the direction of the causal relationship
between these two constructs remains unknown and should be established using longitudinal research.
Hypothesis 2 concerning the positive link between EI and religiosity was not supported since none of the positive zero-order correlations between EI and religiosity
dimensions were statistically signifcant (with the exception of public practice subdimension in Study 1). Additionally, we found that EI was positively associated with
Cattell’s score in Study 1 and general intelligence factor in Study 2, which supported
Hypothesis 3.
Next, Hypothesis 4 received a partial support. Specifcally, in Study 1 EI became
a signifcant and positive predictor of centrality of religiosity when analyzed jointly
in a single regression model with cognitive intelligence. In Study 2, we did not
directly replicate this efect on the exact same measure, but we found a similar suppression efect for the scale measuring belief in God/Higher Power. Furthermore, the
suppression, albeit weak, did occur also on pooled data from Studies 1 and 2. Thus,
from this pattern of fndings, it seems reasonable to conclude that cognitive intelligence indeed acted as a suppressor of the EI–religion relationship. This fnding suggests that ability EI constitutes a blend of rational and intuitive mechanisms (both
inversely related to religiosity) and may explain, to a certain extent, why zero-order
correlations between religiosity and EI are not signifcant in some studies (including
current ones). It is possible that removing the variance related to abstract reasoning
reveals the intuitive, empathetic part of EI (see Mayer and Geher 1996) and this part
shows a more pronounced association with religiosity. In fact, this notion was also
supported in Study 2 which showed that empathy mediated the EI–belief link.
Finally, the current study revealed also some interesting fndings regarding cognitive intelligence. First, we found evidence for cooperative suppression: In all cases
where EI became more strongly associated with religiosity, the cognitive ability
(negative) relation to religiosity was also more pronounced in regression models. It
seems then that removing the EI aspect from cognitive ability increased its negative
association with religious belief. It is possible that this remaining part of cognitive
ability refects “cool” and rational reason, not infuenced by afect or empathy. Such
an analytic cognitive approach may signifcantly hamper beliefs in religious tenets
since they often defy logic or violate the laws of nature (cf. Pennycook et al. 2012).
The current research has several limitations. First, the present studies had a crosssectional character, which did not enable us to establish causal relationships between
investigated variables. Although in the research literature there are some suggestions
regarding the direction of the cognitive intelligence–religiosity link (Zuckerman
et al. 2013), the causality is not yet clear in the case of the relationship between
EI and religion. Clearly, then, more work in this context—including longitudinal
research—is needed to deepen our understanding of the interplay between religiosity, EI, and cognitive intelligence. Moreover, although we extended the scope of
previous research by examining the potential mediating role of emotional empathy,
it might be desirable to also examine an impact of other variables that have been
found to have signifcance for both intelligences and religion, such as time perspectives (see Łowicki et al. 2018; Stolarski et al. 2011; Zajenkowski et al. 2016). Next,
it should be emphasized that both current samples were mostly composed of Roman
Catholics and included Polish participants only. To increase the generalizability of
the obtained results, future work should examine other denominations, preferably
in non-Western societies. Finally, it needs to be acknowledged that we failed to replicate the main fnding using the exact same measure of religiosity across the two
studies. Instead, we found the suppression efect on diferent instruments measuring religiosity. As suggested above, this might be due to various factors such as the
weak magnitude of the observed efects or sample specifcity (cf. Webser and Dufy
2016). Nevertheless, our research provides some observations that might be helpful in future studies exploring the interplay between cognitive and emotional intelligence and religiosity. First, one needs to carefully consider the structure and size
of the sample. It seems that the efects of both intelligences on religiosity are rather
small, and therefore an adequate statistical power is required to detect them. Second,
taking into consideration some signifcant diferences between measures of religiosity, various aspects of religious phenomena (e.g., belief in God, fundamentalism,
interest in religion) should be included in the studies on cognitive and emotional
intelligence.
Those who are younger, male, and have higher incomes generally have higher car pride; less developed countries exhibit higher car pride
Measuring Car Pride and its Implications for Car Ownership and Use across Individuals, Cities, and Countries. Joanna C. Moody. PhD Thesis, Civil and Environmental Engineering Dept, MIT, May 2019. https://mobility.mit.edu/sites/default/files/MoodyDissertation_electronicversion.pdf
As the world recognizes that its growing reliance on private, fossil fuel-based vehicles is unsustainable, understanding how to avoid growth in car ownership and how to shift current users towards more efficient, environmentally-friendly, safe, and inclusive alternatives is acritical vision for meeting sustainable (transportation) development goals. Policy makers looking to shift consumer behavior away from cars need a more rigorous understanding of how different attitudes play a role in influencing car ownership and use and how this might vary by people and place. In this dissertation we provide deep insight into one of the many symbolic and affective motives behind car consumption: “car pride” or the attribution of social status and personal image to owning and using a car. Using data collected from individuals in two U.S. cities and in 51 countries around the world, we develop and demonstrate the reliability, validity, and invariance of polytomous (12, 7-point Likert-format statements) and dichotomous (9, dichotomous statements) survey measures for car pride using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). With these measures, we explore variations in car pride across individuals, cities, and countries using Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). Across individuals, we find that those who are younger, male, and have higher incomes generally have higher car pride. Controlling for individual characteristics, we find that car pride is influenced by context. Between U.S. cities, we find that Houston has higher car pride than New York City. Across countries, we find that less developed countries exhibit higher car pride. We also disentangle the bidirectional causal relations between car pride and car consumption using instrumental variable (IV) techniques. We find that car pride strongly predicts car ownership, while no statistically significant relation exists in the opposite direction. Car pride additionally predicts car use, but only through itsrelation with car ownership (mediator). In the reverse direction, car use strongly reinforces car pride. While the directions of these relations appear almost universal across contexts, their strengths differ by country, emphasizing the importance of taking national context into account when measuring and interpreting symbolic motivations for car consumption.
7.1 Main Findings
In this section, we summarize the main findings from our empirical investigations into car prideand its relations with car consumption (Chapters 3-6). While each of these chapters includes morein-depth discussions of its results, here we summarize the key findings from across the different chapters. While we cannot directly compare model estimates between our two survey measuresof car pride and our two samples, we do identify overarching findings that are supported by both cases. Therefore, here we integrate findings from across our chapters, synthesizing what we havelearned generally about car pride and its relations with car ownership and use.
7.1.1 Measuring Car Pride
In this dissertation, we develop and test multiple ways of measuring car pride. In a sample of commuters from the New York City and Houston metropolitan areas, we investigate the reliability,validity, and invariance of an explicit measure of car pride derived from a polytomous survey scale(see Chapter 3) using a series of confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) models. Based on these results, we propose our 12-item, 7-point Likert-scale measure of the attribution of social status and personal image to driving and owning a vehicle as a new, standard measure for car pride that is reliable, valid, and invariant between cities and across individuals with different car consumption.For the U.S. cities sample, we also derive an implicit measure from a car vs. bus social status Implicit Association Test (IAT; see Chapter 4). Comparing the psychometric properties of our explicit and mplicit measures of car pride in our U.S. sample, we find that our explicit measure is a more valid measure. Comparing their correlations with actual car ownership and use, we further find that our explicit measure of car pride is more interpretable and useful than our implicit measure derived from the IAT. These results might suggest that explicit rather than implicit cognitive pathwaysdominate car consumption, including decisions of car ownership and use. The results also suggest that traditional (explicit) survey scales, if carefully developed and well-validated, are likely adequate for probing many attitude-behavior relations.In our international sample of 41,932 individuals in 51 countries, we test a dichotomous versionof the car pride scale, composed of 9 agree-disagree survey items designed for mobile phone-based data collection. Using multilevel CFA, we find that this measure also exhibits reasonable convergent validity, reliability, and invariance across countries and propose it as an alternative, standard measure particularly useful for cross-cultural comparison. However, the dichotomous version of the car pride scale is less able to differentiate among individuals who disagree with statements associatingsocial status and personal image to owning and using a car. Therefore, the polytomous version ofthe car pride scale should be preferred unless, as in our international survey, data collection will bedone via small-screen devices that make display of Likert-format scales difficult. Together this measurement development and validation provides standard, quantifiable survey scales of car pride that can be compared across people, providing consistent, specific, and actionable information for future transportation planning and policymaking. It also provides thefoundation needed for the empirical explorations of car pride and its relations with car ownershipand use in Chapters 5 and 6.
7.1.2 Variations in Car Pride
Equipped with well-validated survey measures of car pride, we can visualize and model variations in car pride across individuals, cities, and countries. For individuals in our U.S. cities, we findhigher car pride among those who are younger, male, white, students, and from higher-incomehouseholds. For individuals in our international sample, we find that those who are younger, male, highly educated, full-time employed, who live in larger towns or cities, and from higher-income households have higher car pride, no matter the country they live in. Therefore, acrossboth samples we identify age, gender, and income as significant sociodemographic predictors ofcar pride. However, we also find that individual sociodemographics are limited in their capacityto explain observed variation in car pride, suggesting that many other factors not explored in thisdissertation contribute to the formation of different levels of car pride among different individuals. Next, we compare car pride across cities and countries. Using multigroup and multilevel modeling techniques, we first control for any differences in car pride related to the individuals in the subsamples. Comparing between cities in the U.S., we find that an equivalent individual living in New YorkCity is likely to have lower car pride than one from Houston. While future work would be neededto explore what characteristics of these cities contribute to observed differences, we speculate thatcar pride may be related to car dependency; individuals living in cities like Houston—where urbanform and transportation infrastructure provide little alternative to owning and using a car—mayform greater symbolic attachment to their vehicles.
Similarly, after controlling for the types of people living in different countries, we find that developing countries—with lower national wealth, greater income inequality, and lower rates of carownership and use—report higher values of car pride. This suggests that the effect of nationalcontext on car pride is related to the stage of economic development and motorization of a given country. Again, explaining this observed variation across countries is left for future research.
7.1.3 Car Pride and Car Consumption
Next, we explore how car pride relates to car consumption. We begin by comparing car pridebetween car-owners and non-car owners and car-users and non-car-users. In almost every city andcountry examined, we find that individuals who own and use cars have significantly higher car pride than others. Applying multivariate structural equation modeling techniques, we find thatthese observed relations between car pride and car consumption remain significant after controlling for sociodemographics of the individuals in our U.S. and international samples. Unlike much of the literature that assumes attitudes influence behavior, we explore bidirectional relations between car pride and car ownership and use in our U.S. sample. We find that bidirectionalrelations exist between car pride and car ownership as well as between car pride and car use. However, the relative strengths of these bidirectional attitude-behavior relations depend on thedimension of car consumption. We find that car pride strongly predicts car ownership, which inturn predicts car use; in the reverse direction, car use strongly reinforces car pride (see Figure 7.1).In other words, an individual with higher car pride is more likely to own a vehicle, and, enabledwith this ownership, use it more frequently. In the reverse direction, we find that owning a car hasno statistically significant impact on car pride, but using a car more (in terms of frequency or milesdriven) contributes to greater car pride. All together, these relations create a feedback loop amongcar pride, car ownership, and car use. We find that the directions of car pride-car consumption relations depicted in Figure 7.1 hold onaverage across a diverse set of individuals living in different cities in the U.S. In fact, betweenNew York City and Houston, we do not find a statistically significant difference in the strength of these relations. We then impose these same directions when modeling car pride-car consumptionrelations across individuals in different countries around the world. In our international sample,we see significant variation across contexts. In particular, we find that the per-unit impact of anindividual’s car pride on the likelihood of owning a vehicle varies by country. Therefore, our work emphasizes the importance of taking the social and cultural context into account when measuringand interpreting symbolic and affective motivations for car consumption.
As the world recognizes that its growing reliance on private, fossil fuel-based vehicles is unsustainable, understanding how to avoid growth in car ownership and how to shift current users towards more efficient, environmentally-friendly, safe, and inclusive alternatives is acritical vision for meeting sustainable (transportation) development goals. Policy makers looking to shift consumer behavior away from cars need a more rigorous understanding of how different attitudes play a role in influencing car ownership and use and how this might vary by people and place. In this dissertation we provide deep insight into one of the many symbolic and affective motives behind car consumption: “car pride” or the attribution of social status and personal image to owning and using a car. Using data collected from individuals in two U.S. cities and in 51 countries around the world, we develop and demonstrate the reliability, validity, and invariance of polytomous (12, 7-point Likert-format statements) and dichotomous (9, dichotomous statements) survey measures for car pride using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). With these measures, we explore variations in car pride across individuals, cities, and countries using Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). Across individuals, we find that those who are younger, male, and have higher incomes generally have higher car pride. Controlling for individual characteristics, we find that car pride is influenced by context. Between U.S. cities, we find that Houston has higher car pride than New York City. Across countries, we find that less developed countries exhibit higher car pride. We also disentangle the bidirectional causal relations between car pride and car consumption using instrumental variable (IV) techniques. We find that car pride strongly predicts car ownership, while no statistically significant relation exists in the opposite direction. Car pride additionally predicts car use, but only through itsrelation with car ownership (mediator). In the reverse direction, car use strongly reinforces car pride. While the directions of these relations appear almost universal across contexts, their strengths differ by country, emphasizing the importance of taking national context into account when measuring and interpreting symbolic motivations for car consumption.
7.1 Main Findings
In this section, we summarize the main findings from our empirical investigations into car prideand its relations with car consumption (Chapters 3-6). While each of these chapters includes morein-depth discussions of its results, here we summarize the key findings from across the different chapters. While we cannot directly compare model estimates between our two survey measuresof car pride and our two samples, we do identify overarching findings that are supported by both cases. Therefore, here we integrate findings from across our chapters, synthesizing what we havelearned generally about car pride and its relations with car ownership and use.
7.1.1 Measuring Car Pride
In this dissertation, we develop and test multiple ways of measuring car pride. In a sample of commuters from the New York City and Houston metropolitan areas, we investigate the reliability,validity, and invariance of an explicit measure of car pride derived from a polytomous survey scale(see Chapter 3) using a series of confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) models. Based on these results, we propose our 12-item, 7-point Likert-scale measure of the attribution of social status and personal image to driving and owning a vehicle as a new, standard measure for car pride that is reliable, valid, and invariant between cities and across individuals with different car consumption.For the U.S. cities sample, we also derive an implicit measure from a car vs. bus social status Implicit Association Test (IAT; see Chapter 4). Comparing the psychometric properties of our explicit and mplicit measures of car pride in our U.S. sample, we find that our explicit measure is a more valid measure. Comparing their correlations with actual car ownership and use, we further find that our explicit measure of car pride is more interpretable and useful than our implicit measure derived from the IAT. These results might suggest that explicit rather than implicit cognitive pathwaysdominate car consumption, including decisions of car ownership and use. The results also suggest that traditional (explicit) survey scales, if carefully developed and well-validated, are likely adequate for probing many attitude-behavior relations.In our international sample of 41,932 individuals in 51 countries, we test a dichotomous versionof the car pride scale, composed of 9 agree-disagree survey items designed for mobile phone-based data collection. Using multilevel CFA, we find that this measure also exhibits reasonable convergent validity, reliability, and invariance across countries and propose it as an alternative, standard measure particularly useful for cross-cultural comparison. However, the dichotomous version of the car pride scale is less able to differentiate among individuals who disagree with statements associatingsocial status and personal image to owning and using a car. Therefore, the polytomous version ofthe car pride scale should be preferred unless, as in our international survey, data collection will bedone via small-screen devices that make display of Likert-format scales difficult. Together this measurement development and validation provides standard, quantifiable survey scales of car pride that can be compared across people, providing consistent, specific, and actionable information for future transportation planning and policymaking. It also provides thefoundation needed for the empirical explorations of car pride and its relations with car ownershipand use in Chapters 5 and 6.
7.1.2 Variations in Car Pride
Equipped with well-validated survey measures of car pride, we can visualize and model variations in car pride across individuals, cities, and countries. For individuals in our U.S. cities, we findhigher car pride among those who are younger, male, white, students, and from higher-incomehouseholds. For individuals in our international sample, we find that those who are younger, male, highly educated, full-time employed, who live in larger towns or cities, and from higher-income households have higher car pride, no matter the country they live in. Therefore, acrossboth samples we identify age, gender, and income as significant sociodemographic predictors ofcar pride. However, we also find that individual sociodemographics are limited in their capacityto explain observed variation in car pride, suggesting that many other factors not explored in thisdissertation contribute to the formation of different levels of car pride among different individuals. Next, we compare car pride across cities and countries. Using multigroup and multilevel modeling techniques, we first control for any differences in car pride related to the individuals in the subsamples. Comparing between cities in the U.S., we find that an equivalent individual living in New YorkCity is likely to have lower car pride than one from Houston. While future work would be neededto explore what characteristics of these cities contribute to observed differences, we speculate thatcar pride may be related to car dependency; individuals living in cities like Houston—where urbanform and transportation infrastructure provide little alternative to owning and using a car—mayform greater symbolic attachment to their vehicles.
Similarly, after controlling for the types of people living in different countries, we find that developing countries—with lower national wealth, greater income inequality, and lower rates of carownership and use—report higher values of car pride. This suggests that the effect of nationalcontext on car pride is related to the stage of economic development and motorization of a given country. Again, explaining this observed variation across countries is left for future research.
7.1.3 Car Pride and Car Consumption
Next, we explore how car pride relates to car consumption. We begin by comparing car pridebetween car-owners and non-car owners and car-users and non-car-users. In almost every city andcountry examined, we find that individuals who own and use cars have significantly higher car pride than others. Applying multivariate structural equation modeling techniques, we find thatthese observed relations between car pride and car consumption remain significant after controlling for sociodemographics of the individuals in our U.S. and international samples. Unlike much of the literature that assumes attitudes influence behavior, we explore bidirectional relations between car pride and car ownership and use in our U.S. sample. We find that bidirectionalrelations exist between car pride and car ownership as well as between car pride and car use. However, the relative strengths of these bidirectional attitude-behavior relations depend on thedimension of car consumption. We find that car pride strongly predicts car ownership, which inturn predicts car use; in the reverse direction, car use strongly reinforces car pride (see Figure 7.1).In other words, an individual with higher car pride is more likely to own a vehicle, and, enabledwith this ownership, use it more frequently. In the reverse direction, we find that owning a car hasno statistically significant impact on car pride, but using a car more (in terms of frequency or milesdriven) contributes to greater car pride. All together, these relations create a feedback loop amongcar pride, car ownership, and car use. We find that the directions of car pride-car consumption relations depicted in Figure 7.1 hold onaverage across a diverse set of individuals living in different cities in the U.S. In fact, betweenNew York City and Houston, we do not find a statistically significant difference in the strength of these relations. We then impose these same directions when modeling car pride-car consumptionrelations across individuals in different countries around the world. In our international sample,we see significant variation across contexts. In particular, we find that the per-unit impact of anindividual’s car pride on the likelihood of owning a vehicle varies by country. Therefore, our work emphasizes the importance of taking the social and cultural context into account when measuringand interpreting symbolic and affective motivations for car consumption.
In the original studies, those of socioeconomic status have been shown to behave less prosocially across a variety of domains; we find that the generalizability of the original findings may be much more limited than suggested
Having Less, Giving More? Two Preregistered Replications of the Relationship Between Social Class and Prosocial Behavior. Angelos Stamos et al. Journal of Research in Personality, November 19 2019, 103902. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2019.103902
Abstract: In the present report, we describe two planned direct replications of studies on the relationship between social class and prosocial behavior. In the original studies, individuals with higher socioeconomic status have been shown to behave less prosocially across a variety of domains. This finding continues to influence both research and the public debate on the psychological correlates of social class. At the same time, the validity of the original findings has been contested. Against this background, pre-registered direct replication studies with sufficient statistical power are warranted to test the robustness of these influential findings. We conducted two replication studies to provide valuable diagnostic information with regard to the relationship between social class and prosocial behavior. Our results indicate that the generalizability of the original findings may be much more limited than suggested. In addition, they highlight the need for an increased reliance on psychometrically established measures to facilitate cumulative research on the relationship between social class and prosocial behavior.
Check also... Low subjective SES was related to increased aggression, and subjective SES was not negatively related to trait and state measures of prosociality:
Abstract: In the present report, we describe two planned direct replications of studies on the relationship between social class and prosocial behavior. In the original studies, individuals with higher socioeconomic status have been shown to behave less prosocially across a variety of domains. This finding continues to influence both research and the public debate on the psychological correlates of social class. At the same time, the validity of the original findings has been contested. Against this background, pre-registered direct replication studies with sufficient statistical power are warranted to test the robustness of these influential findings. We conducted two replication studies to provide valuable diagnostic information with regard to the relationship between social class and prosocial behavior. Our results indicate that the generalizability of the original findings may be much more limited than suggested. In addition, they highlight the need for an increased reliance on psychometrically established measures to facilitate cumulative research on the relationship between social class and prosocial behavior.
Check also... Low subjective SES was related to increased aggression, and subjective SES was not negatively related to trait and state measures of prosociality:
Does Low (vs. High) Subjective Socioeconomic Status Increase Both Prosociality and Aggression? Tobias Greitemeyer and Christina Sagioglou. Social Psychology (2018), 49, pp. 76-87. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/03/low-subjective-ses-was-related-to.html
Indonesia: Homosexual men displayed a higher number of older brothers than heterosexual men, even when sibship size was controlled for; men with older brothers seem also more feminine than those without older brothers
Male Homosexual Preference: Femininity and the Older Brother Effect in Indonesia. Sarah Nila et al. Evolutionary Psychology, November 19, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/1474704919880701
Abstract: Male homosexual preference (MHP) is an evolutionary enigma because it is partially heritable and imposes a fertility cost. In occidental societies, homosexual men are feminized at various levels and they have more older brothers than heterosexual men. To evaluate whether femininity and the fraternal birth order (FBO) effect are universal features of MHP or not, we collected original data from homosexual men, heterosexual men, and heterosexual women from Java (Indonesia). Facial photographs were used to test whether homosexual faces are feminized when compared with heterosexual ones. We found that faces manipulated to resemble the average face of homosexual men are perceived as facially feminized, suggesting that homosexual men are facially feminized compared to heterosexual men, although a higher facial femininity was not captured by morphological analyses. Then, family data were used to detect differences in siblings’ composition between homosexuals and heterosexuals. Homosexual men displayed a higher number of older brothers than heterosexual men, even when sibship size was controlled for, suggesting that the FBO effect exists in Indonesian populations. Independent of sexual orientation, men with older brothers seem more feminized than those without older brothers, consistent with the immune origin of the FBO effect. In conclusion, MHP in Indonesia is partially feminized and they have more older brothers. Such features are also associated with MHP in other cultural contexts, suggesting a cross-cultural effect of men homosexual preference. An evolutionary explanation is available for the feminizing effect, although the FBO effect remains unexplained even if proximal mechanisms start to be identified.
Keywords: homosexuality, sexual dimorphism, fraternal birth order effect, sexual orientation, facial morphology
Faces
manipulated to resemble the average face of homosexual men are
perceived as facially feminized, which indicates that homosexual men are
facially feminized compared to heterosexual men, although higher facial
femininity was not captured by the morphological analyses. Homosexual
men displayed a greater number of older brothers, which was also
associated with higher perceived femininity. They did not display a
greater number of other sib categories.
When the shape of photographed men’s faces was partially transformed using an average homosexual face, the resulting faces appeared more feminized compared to similar transformation using an average heterosexual face. As age and masculinity are positively related in men (Boothroyd et al., 2005), a different mean age between the two groups of men used to build the average faces could trigger an unwanted difference in femininity/masculinity. However, the average faces were constructed with homosexual and heterosexual men sampled to minimize the difference in the age distribution (mean and variance). The resulting difference in mean age was less than 2 months, which is probably too small to generate a perceptible difference in masculinity. It is, however, possible that another variable, independent of sexual orientation, generated masculinity/femininity differences between the two samples, although this variable was not salary, education level, or ethnic origin, as these variables were not significantly different between the two groups. When the morphological difference between males and females was maximized during the discriminant analysis, homosexual men were not distributed differently compared to heterosexual men. Thus, any feminization displayed by homosexual men is not readily captured by the set of point coordinates or by their linear combinations. In this data set, when homosexual men were removed, heterosexual men and females were significantly differentiated by the discriminant analysis, although ∼20% of individuals were not correctly assigned. Other studies in occidental populations using similar morphological procedures to sex assign individuals typically report incorrect assignation within a range of 3–19% (e.g., Lee et al., 2014; Scott, Pound, Stephen, Clark, & Penton-Voak, 2010). This suggests that the present morphological analysis did not fully capture sexual facial differentiation. Alternatively, a real overlap could exist between male and female facial shapes.
Homosexual men displayed a greater number of older brothers than heterosexual men, suggesting that the older brother effect exists in Indonesian populations. The greater number of older brothers was present independently of possible higher fecundity observed in the families of homosexual men, as sib number was controlled for. A greater number of older sisters were also found, although it was no longer significant when sib number was controlled for, suggesting that this older sister effect is possibly driven by higher fecundity associated with the families of homosexual men. However, overall sibship size was not significantly differing between homosexual and heterosexual men. In Samoa, an older sister effect has been reported, although it is unclear if it remains after taking sib number into account. Thus far, the older brother effect has been found in all the populations in which it has been looked for (Western countries, Turkey, Iran, Hong Kong, Samoa, and Indonesia), suggesting that it is a general feature associated with MHP, although there is perhaps one counterexample (Brazil).
Using an index of facial femininity, homosexual men with more older brothers were not more feminized. As this femininity index does not capture differences between homosexual and heterosexual men, this result is preliminary. It has been shown that homosexuals with more older brothers are more feminine, the measure of femininity being a preference for the receptive role in anal intercourse (Blanchard, 2018a, 2018c), although a replication was equivocal (Swift-Gallant, Coome, Monks, & VanderLaan, 2018). The link between number of older brothers and femininity of homosexuals is not settled.
Independent of sexual orientation, men with older brothers seem more feminized than those without older brothers, consistent with the known effect of maternal parity on life-history traits (Skjærvø & Røskaft, 2013) and the hypothesis of the immune origin of the older brother effect. The possible maternal immune reaction primarily alters the development of sexually dimorphic brain structures relevant to sexual orientation, although other direct or indirect feminization effects are possible (Bogaert & Skorska, 2011). For example, birth weight is lower for newborn males with older brothers, but not for newborn females with older brothers or older sisters (Côté, Blanchard, & Lalumière, 2003). The higher influence of previous brothers to reduce male birth-weight, compared to female birth-weight, has been repeated in large samples (e.g., Nielsen et al., 2008) and is consistent with a lower birth weight of homosexual men relatively to heterosexuals (Xu, Norton, & Rahman, 2019).
Taken together, these results suggest the presence of a feminizing factor associated with male homosexuality that is partially determined by male birth order. This is consistent with the findings from Western societies and, thus, argues for a common pathway that could apply to various populations. Indeed, there are several lines of evidence showing that some specific aspects of the MHP are found cross-culturally. For example, early cross-gender or atypical behavior has been retrospectively assessed among men showing MHP in Brazil, Guatemala, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and United States (Cardoso, 2005, 2009; Whitam & Mathy, 1986; Whitam & Zent, 1984). These behaviors are displayed early during childhood and are found in distinct cultures; thus, providing another argument for a biological basis of this sexual preference. The developmental pathway of MHP could, therefore, rely on the same biological basis in distinct populations.
A feminizing factor is only a proximate explanation for the presence of MHP, and a more global framework is required to understand why such a feminizing factor exists. Interestingly, a sexually antagonistic gene that favors MHP in males and promotes fecundity (i.e., the ability to have children) in females has been proposed (Camperio-Ciani, Corna, & Capiluppi, 2004; Iemmola & Camperio-Ciani, 2009, but see Blanchard, 2012). Several studies support this hypothesis, and other studies have provided results that are consistent with predictions from this hypothesis (for a review, see Barthes, Crochet, & Raymond, 2015). The nature of the antagonistic factor has not yet been identified, but it has been proposed that it proximally enhances femininity in both sexes, resulting in the opposite effect on expected reproduction in each sex (Barthes, Godelle, & Raymond, 2013). Thus, under the sexually antagonistic gene hypothesis, the higher femininity of homosexual men, including their feminized sexual orientation, is seen as a pleiotropic cost of selection for higher fertility in females. In women, femininity of various traits is associated with fertility and is considered attractive (Hill & Hurtado, 1996; Law-Smith et al., 2006; Manning, Scutt, Whitehouse, & Leinster, 1997; Pawlowski, Boothroyd, Perrett, & Kluska, 2008; Rhodes, Simmons & Peters, 2005; Singh, 1993; Sugiyama, 2005).
Similarly, the immune origin of the older brother effect remains a proximate explanation and a broader context is required to understand why male birth rank interferes with sexual orientation in men. Birth order is obviously not heritable; thus, this trait cannot evolve by natural selection. However, the ability to generate a birth order effect is potentially heritable. Curiously, it is unclear whether the FBO effect should be seen as a feminizing effect that increases with male birth rank or as an anti-feminizing effect that decreases with birth order. The former phenomenon would be consistent with a mechanism that decreases competitive ability in later-born offspring, which would be useful to reduce, for example, the cost of sib competition in males. The latter phenomenon could operate when the firstborn males have special reproductive importance, for example, in societies promoting primogeniture (eldest son as the primary heir). However, the present study does not confirm such an association: Primogeniture has not been described in traditional Indonesian culture, particularly on the island of Java (Gultom, 2017), despite a significant FBO effect. The same situation is found in Turkey, where primogeniture was not traditionally enforced, but a significant FBO effect has been described (Blanchard, 2018a). Whether such a feminizing effect according to FBO exists in other mammals or not has apparently not been investigated (to our knowledge), although this would help to better understand this phenomenon in humans.
Abstract: Male homosexual preference (MHP) is an evolutionary enigma because it is partially heritable and imposes a fertility cost. In occidental societies, homosexual men are feminized at various levels and they have more older brothers than heterosexual men. To evaluate whether femininity and the fraternal birth order (FBO) effect are universal features of MHP or not, we collected original data from homosexual men, heterosexual men, and heterosexual women from Java (Indonesia). Facial photographs were used to test whether homosexual faces are feminized when compared with heterosexual ones. We found that faces manipulated to resemble the average face of homosexual men are perceived as facially feminized, suggesting that homosexual men are facially feminized compared to heterosexual men, although a higher facial femininity was not captured by morphological analyses. Then, family data were used to detect differences in siblings’ composition between homosexuals and heterosexuals. Homosexual men displayed a higher number of older brothers than heterosexual men, even when sibship size was controlled for, suggesting that the FBO effect exists in Indonesian populations. Independent of sexual orientation, men with older brothers seem more feminized than those without older brothers, consistent with the immune origin of the FBO effect. In conclusion, MHP in Indonesia is partially feminized and they have more older brothers. Such features are also associated with MHP in other cultural contexts, suggesting a cross-cultural effect of men homosexual preference. An evolutionary explanation is available for the feminizing effect, although the FBO effect remains unexplained even if proximal mechanisms start to be identified.
Keywords: homosexuality, sexual dimorphism, fraternal birth order effect, sexual orientation, facial morphology
Discussion
When the shape of photographed men’s faces was partially transformed using an average homosexual face, the resulting faces appeared more feminized compared to similar transformation using an average heterosexual face. As age and masculinity are positively related in men (Boothroyd et al., 2005), a different mean age between the two groups of men used to build the average faces could trigger an unwanted difference in femininity/masculinity. However, the average faces were constructed with homosexual and heterosexual men sampled to minimize the difference in the age distribution (mean and variance). The resulting difference in mean age was less than 2 months, which is probably too small to generate a perceptible difference in masculinity. It is, however, possible that another variable, independent of sexual orientation, generated masculinity/femininity differences between the two samples, although this variable was not salary, education level, or ethnic origin, as these variables were not significantly different between the two groups. When the morphological difference between males and females was maximized during the discriminant analysis, homosexual men were not distributed differently compared to heterosexual men. Thus, any feminization displayed by homosexual men is not readily captured by the set of point coordinates or by their linear combinations. In this data set, when homosexual men were removed, heterosexual men and females were significantly differentiated by the discriminant analysis, although ∼20% of individuals were not correctly assigned. Other studies in occidental populations using similar morphological procedures to sex assign individuals typically report incorrect assignation within a range of 3–19% (e.g., Lee et al., 2014; Scott, Pound, Stephen, Clark, & Penton-Voak, 2010). This suggests that the present morphological analysis did not fully capture sexual facial differentiation. Alternatively, a real overlap could exist between male and female facial shapes.
Homosexual men displayed a greater number of older brothers than heterosexual men, suggesting that the older brother effect exists in Indonesian populations. The greater number of older brothers was present independently of possible higher fecundity observed in the families of homosexual men, as sib number was controlled for. A greater number of older sisters were also found, although it was no longer significant when sib number was controlled for, suggesting that this older sister effect is possibly driven by higher fecundity associated with the families of homosexual men. However, overall sibship size was not significantly differing between homosexual and heterosexual men. In Samoa, an older sister effect has been reported, although it is unclear if it remains after taking sib number into account. Thus far, the older brother effect has been found in all the populations in which it has been looked for (Western countries, Turkey, Iran, Hong Kong, Samoa, and Indonesia), suggesting that it is a general feature associated with MHP, although there is perhaps one counterexample (Brazil).
Using an index of facial femininity, homosexual men with more older brothers were not more feminized. As this femininity index does not capture differences between homosexual and heterosexual men, this result is preliminary. It has been shown that homosexuals with more older brothers are more feminine, the measure of femininity being a preference for the receptive role in anal intercourse (Blanchard, 2018a, 2018c), although a replication was equivocal (Swift-Gallant, Coome, Monks, & VanderLaan, 2018). The link between number of older brothers and femininity of homosexuals is not settled.
Independent of sexual orientation, men with older brothers seem more feminized than those without older brothers, consistent with the known effect of maternal parity on life-history traits (Skjærvø & Røskaft, 2013) and the hypothesis of the immune origin of the older brother effect. The possible maternal immune reaction primarily alters the development of sexually dimorphic brain structures relevant to sexual orientation, although other direct or indirect feminization effects are possible (Bogaert & Skorska, 2011). For example, birth weight is lower for newborn males with older brothers, but not for newborn females with older brothers or older sisters (Côté, Blanchard, & Lalumière, 2003). The higher influence of previous brothers to reduce male birth-weight, compared to female birth-weight, has been repeated in large samples (e.g., Nielsen et al., 2008) and is consistent with a lower birth weight of homosexual men relatively to heterosexuals (Xu, Norton, & Rahman, 2019).
Taken together, these results suggest the presence of a feminizing factor associated with male homosexuality that is partially determined by male birth order. This is consistent with the findings from Western societies and, thus, argues for a common pathway that could apply to various populations. Indeed, there are several lines of evidence showing that some specific aspects of the MHP are found cross-culturally. For example, early cross-gender or atypical behavior has been retrospectively assessed among men showing MHP in Brazil, Guatemala, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and United States (Cardoso, 2005, 2009; Whitam & Mathy, 1986; Whitam & Zent, 1984). These behaviors are displayed early during childhood and are found in distinct cultures; thus, providing another argument for a biological basis of this sexual preference. The developmental pathway of MHP could, therefore, rely on the same biological basis in distinct populations.
A feminizing factor is only a proximate explanation for the presence of MHP, and a more global framework is required to understand why such a feminizing factor exists. Interestingly, a sexually antagonistic gene that favors MHP in males and promotes fecundity (i.e., the ability to have children) in females has been proposed (Camperio-Ciani, Corna, & Capiluppi, 2004; Iemmola & Camperio-Ciani, 2009, but see Blanchard, 2012). Several studies support this hypothesis, and other studies have provided results that are consistent with predictions from this hypothesis (for a review, see Barthes, Crochet, & Raymond, 2015). The nature of the antagonistic factor has not yet been identified, but it has been proposed that it proximally enhances femininity in both sexes, resulting in the opposite effect on expected reproduction in each sex (Barthes, Godelle, & Raymond, 2013). Thus, under the sexually antagonistic gene hypothesis, the higher femininity of homosexual men, including their feminized sexual orientation, is seen as a pleiotropic cost of selection for higher fertility in females. In women, femininity of various traits is associated with fertility and is considered attractive (Hill & Hurtado, 1996; Law-Smith et al., 2006; Manning, Scutt, Whitehouse, & Leinster, 1997; Pawlowski, Boothroyd, Perrett, & Kluska, 2008; Rhodes, Simmons & Peters, 2005; Singh, 1993; Sugiyama, 2005).
Similarly, the immune origin of the older brother effect remains a proximate explanation and a broader context is required to understand why male birth rank interferes with sexual orientation in men. Birth order is obviously not heritable; thus, this trait cannot evolve by natural selection. However, the ability to generate a birth order effect is potentially heritable. Curiously, it is unclear whether the FBO effect should be seen as a feminizing effect that increases with male birth rank or as an anti-feminizing effect that decreases with birth order. The former phenomenon would be consistent with a mechanism that decreases competitive ability in later-born offspring, which would be useful to reduce, for example, the cost of sib competition in males. The latter phenomenon could operate when the firstborn males have special reproductive importance, for example, in societies promoting primogeniture (eldest son as the primary heir). However, the present study does not confirm such an association: Primogeniture has not been described in traditional Indonesian culture, particularly on the island of Java (Gultom, 2017), despite a significant FBO effect. The same situation is found in Turkey, where primogeniture was not traditionally enforced, but a significant FBO effect has been described (Blanchard, 2018a). Whether such a feminizing effect according to FBO exists in other mammals or not has apparently not been investigated (to our knowledge), although this would help to better understand this phenomenon in humans.
Basic science knowledge & cognitive sophistication contribute more to science beliefs than political ideology; limited evidence for identity-protective cognition (i.e., motivated reasoning)
McPhetres, Jonathon, and Gordon Pennycook. 2019. “Science Beliefs, Political Ideology, and Cognitive Sophistication.” OSF Preprints. November 19. doi:10.31219/osf.io/ad9v7
Abstract: Various mechanisms have been proposed to explain why individuals hold pro- or anti-science beliefs. Some models focus on the role of political ideology and motivated reasoning, arguing that greater cognitive sophistication enables individuals to interpret evidence in an identity-consistent manner. Other models focus on the roles of basic science knowledge and cognitive sophistication, arguing that more general science knowledge and greater cognitive sophistication facilitate pro-science beliefs. To test these competing accounts, we identified a large range of controversial issues that are ostensibly subject to ideological disagreement and examined the relative roles of political ideology, science knowledge, and cognitive sophistication. Our results, which are consistent across two different nationally representative samples of Americans (N = 1,709), indicate that a combination of basic science knowledge and cognitive sophistication contribute more to science beliefs about various topics than political ideology. Furthermore, we found limited evidence for identity-protective cognition (i.e., motivated reasoning). By investigating a broad array of science-related beliefs, our results adjudicate between four accounts of science attitudes and suggest that educators and policymakers should focus on increasing basic science literacy and critical thinking instead of focusing on the ideological factors that divide people.
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Anti-science attitudes represent a major roadblock for responsible public policy. Suitably, several competing mechanisms have been proposed to explain why people believe what they believe about science. Whereas some models focus on the potential roles of motivation and identity, others focus on the potential roles of science knowledge and information processing. Unfortunately, it is difficult to adjudicate between these competing accounts because past work has almost exclusively focused on a few specific issues, such as belief in climate change or evolution. This narrowed focus naturally limits the conclusions that can be drawn about why people hold anti-science beliefs–for example, because different topics may vary in their relation to identity or to the downstream benefit of basic science knowledge. Here we investigate a large number of science-related beliefs and examine a broad set of psychological correlates. This allows us to test the evidence for or against four specific accounts of science attitudes, each of which make different predictions about the roles of identity, basic science knowledge, and cognitive sophistication.
Perhaps the most prevalent account–the motivated reasoning account–argues that ideology playing a causal role in the formation of science-related beliefs. This account is commonly evoked to explain partisan differences in beliefs (or skepticism) about anthropogenic global warming, with conservatism being associated with an anti-science stance (Bohr, 2014; Gauchat, 2012; Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013a). The source of anti-science beliefs, according to the motivated reasoning account, is largely cultural. For example, global warming was politicized by conservative think tanks which was picked up by laypeople who are motivated to believe information that is consistent with their political ideology. Importantly, for other issues, it may be that liberals are motivated to reject science–such as with stereotypes that liberals are more likely to reject nuclear power. Other ideological factors, such as religiosity (McPhetres & Zuckerman, 2017; Rutjens, Sutton, & van der Lee, 2018), could also be implicated in the broad motivated reasoning account.
A related account, often referred to as identity-protective cognition, contends that cognitively sophisticated individuals are actually better able to use their reasoning skills to selectively conform their evaluation of evidence to their political ideology (Kahan, Landrum, Carpenter, Helft, & Hall Jamieson, 2017; Kahan, Peters, Dawson, & Slovic, 2013). Indeed, research has shown that polarization around scientific issues is stronger (not weaker) among individuals who are more cognitively sophisticated (Bolsen, Druckman, & Cook, 2015; Hamilton, Cutler, & Schaefer, 2012; Kahan et al., 2012) and/or educated (Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017a; Ehret, Sparks, & Sherman, 2017; Mccright & Dunlap, 2011). For example, concern for climate change decreases with increased numeracy among Republicans but the opposite association is evident for Democrats (Kahan et al., 2012), and those with greater science literacy are more polarized on beliefs about stem cell research, the big bang, and evolution (Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017a). However, the identity-protective cognition account has focused on a select number of issues which are known to be politically valanced, such as climate change and human evolution (Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017a; Gauchat, 2012; Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013b). Thus, it remains unclear if these few issues are the exception or the rule and therefore it is unknown if the identity-protective account can be extended to a wider variety of anti-science beliefs. This is important because it would be problematic for broad public policy on science education to be influenced by a few highly salient but exceptional cases.
In contrast to accounts that focus on motivation and identity, the knowledge deficit account suggests that people reject certain scientific claims simply because they do not possess enough (or the correct) basic scientific knowledge (e.g., Bak, 2001; Miller, 1998). Specifically, science knowledge is often considered in terms of the basic facts that one knows.for example, that electrons are smaller ["so to speak"] than atoms, or that antibiotics don't kill viruses. The knowledge deficit model implies that anti-science beliefs are prevalent primarily because science is difficult to understand without advanced training (Lombrozo, Shtulman, & Weisberg, 2006; Shtulman & Schulz, 2008). A key policy prescription from this model is that teaching people about science will straightforwardly lead to an increase in pro-scientific beliefs and attitudes.
Closely related is what we will call the analytic thinking account, which is that people simply do not think analytically enough about science issues. Whereas the knowledge deficit account suggests that having a strong core understanding of basic scientific facts is central to the formation of pro-science attitudes, the analytic thinking account argues that the disposition to think analytically and critically (over and above underlying science knowledge) is central. In support of this, studies have found that those who reason more analytically are more likely to endorse evolution (Gervais, 2015) and vaccination (Sarathchandra, Navin, Largent, & McCright, 2018), and to reject conspiracy theories (Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014) and paranormal beliefs (Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012). In contrast, individuals who are more receptive to pseudo-profound bullshit (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015) –randomly generated nonsense statements– are both less analytic and more likely to believe in the efficacy of non-evidenced based alternative medicines. As above, however, it is unclear if these results are specific to particular science-related beliefs.
In this study, we provide data that allows us to distinguish between these different accounts of science belief. To do this, we identified a large range of controversial issues that are likely to be subject to ideological disagreement. This allows us to ask which of the accounts explains more variance both among and across specific issues. The motivated reasoning account predicts that ideology will be a strong and consistent correlate of science attitudes and the knowledge deficit account makes the same prediction, but for basic science knowledge instead of ideology. Naturally, it is possible that both accounts are accurate – our goal here is to assess which explains more variance, and for which science topics. The identity-protective cognition and analytic thinking accounts do, however, make competing predictions: Whereas the former predicts that cognitive sophistication will be associated with increased political polarization, the latter predictions that cognitive sophistication will simply be associated with increased proscientific attitudes across the board. Although it is possible that each of the four accounts is the best explanation for single specific science-related beliefs, the goal here is to ascertain which account(s) hold the strongest broad predictive power. This will help guide informed public policy in addition to psychological theory.
Abstract: Various mechanisms have been proposed to explain why individuals hold pro- or anti-science beliefs. Some models focus on the role of political ideology and motivated reasoning, arguing that greater cognitive sophistication enables individuals to interpret evidence in an identity-consistent manner. Other models focus on the roles of basic science knowledge and cognitive sophistication, arguing that more general science knowledge and greater cognitive sophistication facilitate pro-science beliefs. To test these competing accounts, we identified a large range of controversial issues that are ostensibly subject to ideological disagreement and examined the relative roles of political ideology, science knowledge, and cognitive sophistication. Our results, which are consistent across two different nationally representative samples of Americans (N = 1,709), indicate that a combination of basic science knowledge and cognitive sophistication contribute more to science beliefs about various topics than political ideology. Furthermore, we found limited evidence for identity-protective cognition (i.e., motivated reasoning). By investigating a broad array of science-related beliefs, our results adjudicate between four accounts of science attitudes and suggest that educators and policymakers should focus on increasing basic science literacy and critical thinking instead of focusing on the ideological factors that divide people.
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Anti-science attitudes represent a major roadblock for responsible public policy. Suitably, several competing mechanisms have been proposed to explain why people believe what they believe about science. Whereas some models focus on the potential roles of motivation and identity, others focus on the potential roles of science knowledge and information processing. Unfortunately, it is difficult to adjudicate between these competing accounts because past work has almost exclusively focused on a few specific issues, such as belief in climate change or evolution. This narrowed focus naturally limits the conclusions that can be drawn about why people hold anti-science beliefs–for example, because different topics may vary in their relation to identity or to the downstream benefit of basic science knowledge. Here we investigate a large number of science-related beliefs and examine a broad set of psychological correlates. This allows us to test the evidence for or against four specific accounts of science attitudes, each of which make different predictions about the roles of identity, basic science knowledge, and cognitive sophistication.
Perhaps the most prevalent account–the motivated reasoning account–argues that ideology playing a causal role in the formation of science-related beliefs. This account is commonly evoked to explain partisan differences in beliefs (or skepticism) about anthropogenic global warming, with conservatism being associated with an anti-science stance (Bohr, 2014; Gauchat, 2012; Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013a). The source of anti-science beliefs, according to the motivated reasoning account, is largely cultural. For example, global warming was politicized by conservative think tanks which was picked up by laypeople who are motivated to believe information that is consistent with their political ideology. Importantly, for other issues, it may be that liberals are motivated to reject science–such as with stereotypes that liberals are more likely to reject nuclear power. Other ideological factors, such as religiosity (McPhetres & Zuckerman, 2017; Rutjens, Sutton, & van der Lee, 2018), could also be implicated in the broad motivated reasoning account.
A related account, often referred to as identity-protective cognition, contends that cognitively sophisticated individuals are actually better able to use their reasoning skills to selectively conform their evaluation of evidence to their political ideology (Kahan, Landrum, Carpenter, Helft, & Hall Jamieson, 2017; Kahan, Peters, Dawson, & Slovic, 2013). Indeed, research has shown that polarization around scientific issues is stronger (not weaker) among individuals who are more cognitively sophisticated (Bolsen, Druckman, & Cook, 2015; Hamilton, Cutler, & Schaefer, 2012; Kahan et al., 2012) and/or educated (Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017a; Ehret, Sparks, & Sherman, 2017; Mccright & Dunlap, 2011). For example, concern for climate change decreases with increased numeracy among Republicans but the opposite association is evident for Democrats (Kahan et al., 2012), and those with greater science literacy are more polarized on beliefs about stem cell research, the big bang, and evolution (Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017a). However, the identity-protective cognition account has focused on a select number of issues which are known to be politically valanced, such as climate change and human evolution (Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017a; Gauchat, 2012; Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013b). Thus, it remains unclear if these few issues are the exception or the rule and therefore it is unknown if the identity-protective account can be extended to a wider variety of anti-science beliefs. This is important because it would be problematic for broad public policy on science education to be influenced by a few highly salient but exceptional cases.
In contrast to accounts that focus on motivation and identity, the knowledge deficit account suggests that people reject certain scientific claims simply because they do not possess enough (or the correct) basic scientific knowledge (e.g., Bak, 2001; Miller, 1998). Specifically, science knowledge is often considered in terms of the basic facts that one knows.for example, that electrons are smaller ["so to speak"] than atoms, or that antibiotics don't kill viruses. The knowledge deficit model implies that anti-science beliefs are prevalent primarily because science is difficult to understand without advanced training (Lombrozo, Shtulman, & Weisberg, 2006; Shtulman & Schulz, 2008). A key policy prescription from this model is that teaching people about science will straightforwardly lead to an increase in pro-scientific beliefs and attitudes.
Closely related is what we will call the analytic thinking account, which is that people simply do not think analytically enough about science issues. Whereas the knowledge deficit account suggests that having a strong core understanding of basic scientific facts is central to the formation of pro-science attitudes, the analytic thinking account argues that the disposition to think analytically and critically (over and above underlying science knowledge) is central. In support of this, studies have found that those who reason more analytically are more likely to endorse evolution (Gervais, 2015) and vaccination (Sarathchandra, Navin, Largent, & McCright, 2018), and to reject conspiracy theories (Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014) and paranormal beliefs (Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012). In contrast, individuals who are more receptive to pseudo-profound bullshit (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015) –randomly generated nonsense statements– are both less analytic and more likely to believe in the efficacy of non-evidenced based alternative medicines. As above, however, it is unclear if these results are specific to particular science-related beliefs.
In this study, we provide data that allows us to distinguish between these different accounts of science belief. To do this, we identified a large range of controversial issues that are likely to be subject to ideological disagreement. This allows us to ask which of the accounts explains more variance both among and across specific issues. The motivated reasoning account predicts that ideology will be a strong and consistent correlate of science attitudes and the knowledge deficit account makes the same prediction, but for basic science knowledge instead of ideology. Naturally, it is possible that both accounts are accurate – our goal here is to assess which explains more variance, and for which science topics. The identity-protective cognition and analytic thinking accounts do, however, make competing predictions: Whereas the former predicts that cognitive sophistication will be associated with increased political polarization, the latter predictions that cognitive sophistication will simply be associated with increased proscientific attitudes across the board. Although it is possible that each of the four accounts is the best explanation for single specific science-related beliefs, the goal here is to ascertain which account(s) hold the strongest broad predictive power. This will help guide informed public policy in addition to psychological theory.
Valuing Pain using the Subjective Well-being Method: The willingness to pay for pain relief is in the range of $56-145 per day, lower than previously reported
Valuing Pain using the Subjective Well-being Method. Thorhildur Ólafsdóttir, Tinna Laufey Ásgeirsdóttir, Edward C. Norton. Economics & Human Biology, November 16 2019, 100827. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1570677X19300656
Highlights
. Improved econometric methods provide new information on the value of pain
. We allow the trade-off between pain and income to vary across income ranges
. The willingness to pay for pain relief is in the range of 56-145 USD per day
. The monetary value of pain relief is lower than previously reported
Abstract: Chronic pain clearly lowers utility, but valuing the reduction in utility is empirically challenging. Here, we use improvements over prior applications of the subjective well-being method to estimate the implied trade-off between pain and income using four waves of the Health and Retirement Study (2008-2014), a nationally representative survey on individuals age 50 and older. We model income with a flexible functional form, allowing the trade-off between pain and income to vary across income groups. We control for individual fixed effects in the life-satisfaction equations and instrument for income in some models. We find values for avoiding pain ranging between 56 to 145 USD per day. These results are lower than previously reported and suggest that the higher previous estimates may be heavily affected by the highest income level and confounded by endogeneity in the income variable. As expected, we find that the value of pain relief increases with pain severity.
Discussion
By using improved econometric methods, we provide new information on the value of pain relief among people older than 50. Our results suggest a lower CV for pain than previously reported. More importantly, we contribute to the literature by using a PWL model as a more flexible method to express WTP across income ranges, instead of the traditional log transformation of income. Results from IV-models also yield CVs that are considerably lower than previous research suggests.
We compared our income coefficients to coefficients previously reported for lifesatisfaction equations from four different countries; Britain, Germany, Australia and USA (Clark et al., 2018) and found that our income coefficients correspond to the lower end of the range of coefficients. This is true after adjusting the income coefficients for different scaling of the life-satisfaction variable in the two studies (11/5), with our coefficients (times 2.2) closely reflecting those found using data from Britain (see Clark et al, Table 2.2). This comparison, although limited to model specifications where well-being is assumed to be linear in log income in OLS and FE models, is helpful to benchmark our income coefficients.
The two studies that use exogenous lottery wins to estimate the treatment effects of income on life-satisfaction . Lindqvist et al. (2018) and Apouey and Clark (2015) . have starkly different results. The treatment effect of $100K on life-satisfaction is estimated to be 0.037 SD units by Lindqvist et al. and 1.369 SD units by Apouey and Clark. We choose the former as an alternative for our income coefficient in Table 3 (column 1, OLS) because Lindqvist et al. use a larger sample size and have stronger internal validity. Lindqvist et al. approximate a lifetime income effect on life-satisfaction using lottery prizes annuitized over 20 years at a 2% interest rate. To calculate a CIV for our linear income model in Table 3, we take the estimate 0.062 from Table A10 in Lindqvist et al., which, after adjustment to different scaling of the life-satisfaction variable (0.062/2.2=0.028) and to USD prices between 2011 and 2015, we can apply an estimate of 0.028/1.0537=0.027. Using the income coefficient of 0.027 and our pain coefficient of -0.0563 that is adjusted for individual heterogeneity (FE model in Table 3), the corresponding CIV is 57 USD per day.
We did two additional sensitivity tests. First, instead of using a pain coefficient from an experimental setting, we used the pain coefficient from our estimate of the effect of pain on life-satisfaction through transitions into and out of arthritis status (see Table A5). Using the pain coefficient of -0.0793 from Table A5 and the lifetime income effect estimate from Lindqvist et al. (0.027) generates a CIV of 80 USD per day. Second, we compared the CIV by income coefficients across the two studies for the case of ln(income). The corresponding Lindqvist estimate (adjusted) is 0.16 (0.377 in Table A10 in Lindqvist et al.) and applying the FE coefficient of -0.0561 the estimated CIV is 54 USD per day. Both CIV estimates, 57 and 80 USD per day, are within our estimated range of 56-145 USD per day. The CIV using lifetime log-income effect from Lindqvist et al. of 54 USD per day is lower.
Because there is some variability across countries in the income gradient for life satisfaction equations (Clark et al, 2018), an income effect estimate based on a sample of Swedish lottery players may not apply to US data. Furthermore, there is inherent uncertainty in the annuity-adjustment parameter used to rescale the lifetime income gradient. However, the comparison is helpful and will hopefully stimulate similar research in other countries. This sensitivity analysis points towards the lower part of our estimated range of 56-145 USD per day as the most credible CIV estimate. We note that using income estimates from lottery studies instrinsically produces willingness to accept (WTA), whereas by using variation in household income the estimated CIV is between WTA and WTP.
Our paper has several limitations. Pain can be a consequence of neurological diseases, diabetes, or of musculoskeletal origin, but we did not have controls for those conditions that we found validated by a doctor´s diagnosis. However, any possibility of omitted-variable bias should be mitigated by controlling for age because neurological disease and diabetes likelihood (Type 2) increases with age. Furthermore, the numerous other health controls included should capture the effect of musculoskeletal conditions on pain and life satisfaction, in particular psychiatric problems, lung disease, cancer and arthritis. External validity may be limited by the age range used, in particular if the marginal utility of income for those over 50 is lower than in the younger population, which would result in higher CV-estimates than in a sample with lower mean age. Responses to life-satisfaction questions may be liable to situational influences, such as the site of the interview, the weather, one´s mood and the interviewer, but those differences can be considered as random error (Veenhoven, 1993). The value of pain is likely overestimated in previous research using the well-being valuation method, with our best approximation to a WTP estimate being in the range of 56- 145 USD per day. This range of estimates is derived from models where we take into account the effects of individual heterogeneity (by applying FE models), the leveraging effect of the highest income levels (by applying PWL models) and the endogeneity of the income variable with mother´s education as an instrument (by applying OLS-IV models). Those are issues that previous research and our analysis alike have highlighted as issues that should be taken into consideration when finding as reliable estimates as possible for the CIVs. Furthermore, the value of pain relief is positively related to severity of pain. Our research also has implications for the CV literature as a whole. We show the importance of controlling for the endogeneity of income and allowing the effect of income to vary flexibly across income levels. To this end, PWL models are promising because they perform well econometrically and allow for easier exploration of results across income groups than log transformations of income.
Highlights
. Improved econometric methods provide new information on the value of pain
. We allow the trade-off between pain and income to vary across income ranges
. The willingness to pay for pain relief is in the range of 56-145 USD per day
. The monetary value of pain relief is lower than previously reported
Abstract: Chronic pain clearly lowers utility, but valuing the reduction in utility is empirically challenging. Here, we use improvements over prior applications of the subjective well-being method to estimate the implied trade-off between pain and income using four waves of the Health and Retirement Study (2008-2014), a nationally representative survey on individuals age 50 and older. We model income with a flexible functional form, allowing the trade-off between pain and income to vary across income groups. We control for individual fixed effects in the life-satisfaction equations and instrument for income in some models. We find values for avoiding pain ranging between 56 to 145 USD per day. These results are lower than previously reported and suggest that the higher previous estimates may be heavily affected by the highest income level and confounded by endogeneity in the income variable. As expected, we find that the value of pain relief increases with pain severity.
Discussion
By using improved econometric methods, we provide new information on the value of pain relief among people older than 50. Our results suggest a lower CV for pain than previously reported. More importantly, we contribute to the literature by using a PWL model as a more flexible method to express WTP across income ranges, instead of the traditional log transformation of income. Results from IV-models also yield CVs that are considerably lower than previous research suggests.
We compared our income coefficients to coefficients previously reported for lifesatisfaction equations from four different countries; Britain, Germany, Australia and USA (Clark et al., 2018) and found that our income coefficients correspond to the lower end of the range of coefficients. This is true after adjusting the income coefficients for different scaling of the life-satisfaction variable in the two studies (11/5), with our coefficients (times 2.2) closely reflecting those found using data from Britain (see Clark et al, Table 2.2). This comparison, although limited to model specifications where well-being is assumed to be linear in log income in OLS and FE models, is helpful to benchmark our income coefficients.
The two studies that use exogenous lottery wins to estimate the treatment effects of income on life-satisfaction . Lindqvist et al. (2018) and Apouey and Clark (2015) . have starkly different results. The treatment effect of $100K on life-satisfaction is estimated to be 0.037 SD units by Lindqvist et al. and 1.369 SD units by Apouey and Clark. We choose the former as an alternative for our income coefficient in Table 3 (column 1, OLS) because Lindqvist et al. use a larger sample size and have stronger internal validity. Lindqvist et al. approximate a lifetime income effect on life-satisfaction using lottery prizes annuitized over 20 years at a 2% interest rate. To calculate a CIV for our linear income model in Table 3, we take the estimate 0.062 from Table A10 in Lindqvist et al., which, after adjustment to different scaling of the life-satisfaction variable (0.062/2.2=0.028) and to USD prices between 2011 and 2015, we can apply an estimate of 0.028/1.0537=0.027. Using the income coefficient of 0.027 and our pain coefficient of -0.0563 that is adjusted for individual heterogeneity (FE model in Table 3), the corresponding CIV is 57 USD per day.
We did two additional sensitivity tests. First, instead of using a pain coefficient from an experimental setting, we used the pain coefficient from our estimate of the effect of pain on life-satisfaction through transitions into and out of arthritis status (see Table A5). Using the pain coefficient of -0.0793 from Table A5 and the lifetime income effect estimate from Lindqvist et al. (0.027) generates a CIV of 80 USD per day. Second, we compared the CIV by income coefficients across the two studies for the case of ln(income). The corresponding Lindqvist estimate (adjusted) is 0.16 (0.377 in Table A10 in Lindqvist et al.) and applying the FE coefficient of -0.0561 the estimated CIV is 54 USD per day. Both CIV estimates, 57 and 80 USD per day, are within our estimated range of 56-145 USD per day. The CIV using lifetime log-income effect from Lindqvist et al. of 54 USD per day is lower.
Because there is some variability across countries in the income gradient for life satisfaction equations (Clark et al, 2018), an income effect estimate based on a sample of Swedish lottery players may not apply to US data. Furthermore, there is inherent uncertainty in the annuity-adjustment parameter used to rescale the lifetime income gradient. However, the comparison is helpful and will hopefully stimulate similar research in other countries. This sensitivity analysis points towards the lower part of our estimated range of 56-145 USD per day as the most credible CIV estimate. We note that using income estimates from lottery studies instrinsically produces willingness to accept (WTA), whereas by using variation in household income the estimated CIV is between WTA and WTP.
Our paper has several limitations. Pain can be a consequence of neurological diseases, diabetes, or of musculoskeletal origin, but we did not have controls for those conditions that we found validated by a doctor´s diagnosis. However, any possibility of omitted-variable bias should be mitigated by controlling for age because neurological disease and diabetes likelihood (Type 2) increases with age. Furthermore, the numerous other health controls included should capture the effect of musculoskeletal conditions on pain and life satisfaction, in particular psychiatric problems, lung disease, cancer and arthritis. External validity may be limited by the age range used, in particular if the marginal utility of income for those over 50 is lower than in the younger population, which would result in higher CV-estimates than in a sample with lower mean age. Responses to life-satisfaction questions may be liable to situational influences, such as the site of the interview, the weather, one´s mood and the interviewer, but those differences can be considered as random error (Veenhoven, 1993). The value of pain is likely overestimated in previous research using the well-being valuation method, with our best approximation to a WTP estimate being in the range of 56- 145 USD per day. This range of estimates is derived from models where we take into account the effects of individual heterogeneity (by applying FE models), the leveraging effect of the highest income levels (by applying PWL models) and the endogeneity of the income variable with mother´s education as an instrument (by applying OLS-IV models). Those are issues that previous research and our analysis alike have highlighted as issues that should be taken into consideration when finding as reliable estimates as possible for the CIVs. Furthermore, the value of pain relief is positively related to severity of pain. Our research also has implications for the CV literature as a whole. We show the importance of controlling for the endogeneity of income and allowing the effect of income to vary flexibly across income levels. To this end, PWL models are promising because they perform well econometrically and allow for easier exploration of results across income groups than log transformations of income.
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