Women of color experience significantly more incivility than men of color but less than white women; women are more likely than men to experience incivility in departments where women constitute the majority of the workforce

Gender, Race, and Experiences of Workplace Incivility in Public Organizations. Amy Smith et al. November 2019. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337567005

Description: Workplace incivility can have deleterious effects on individuals and organizations, but few studies have examined predictors of incivility in public organizations. This study explores how public employees’ incivility experiences vary across social categories, specifically by gender and race. Data were collected with a survey from all employees of four local governments in North Carolina. The results of hierarchical linear modeling show that women experience more incivility than men, and that men and women of color experience fewer incidences of incivility than white men and women. We also find that race moderates the relationship between gender and incivility such that women of color experience significantly more incivility than men of color but less than white women. Finally, women are more likely than men to experience incivility in departments where women constitute the majority of the workforce. Implications of these results for human resource management in public organizations are discussed.

Discussion and Conclusion

Relatively few studies have examined the prevalence of workplace incivility within public sector organizations. Filling this gap is important for several reasons. Although public management scholarship is increasingly focused on the behavior of public employees, there is still a great deal that we do not know about what goes on between employees as they navigate their organizational life (Vickers, 2006). In many ways this prevents us from fully grasping the complete and sometimes complex range of public employees’ interactions and experiences at work. This gap is especially important because workplace incivility can have wide-ranging effects not only for the employees themselves, but also for the public they are meant to serve (Vickers, 2006). Additionally, when individuals of demographic subgroups disproportionately experience incivility, it becomes a subtle form of discrimination and further marginalizes historically disadvantaged groups such as women and people of color. Our data allow us to identify how individual-level characteristics and group-level characteristics can determine the extent to which the local government employees from our survey experienced incivility.  In particular, our results offer insight into what some consider a modern form of workplace discrimination – selective incivility (Cortina, 2008, Cortina et al., 2013; Gabriel, et. al., 2018). 

At the individual level, we find that women experience more incivility than men, white employees experience more incivility than employees of color, and that the difference in incivility is greater between women and men of color than between white women and men. Our findings also indicate that employees in the early or late stages of tenure with the organization as well as those in managerial positions tend to experience less incivility.  In addition to the individual-level factors that impact experience with workplace incivility, we also find that women experience more incivility when there are more women in the immediate workgroup/department on a whole.  We discuss the implications for each of these findings next.

As expected, we find that women experience more incivility than men. We join other studies in suggesting that incivility can be selective, often targeting individuals from particular demographic groups (Cortina, 2008; Cortina et. al., 2013). In this way, incivility can be considered a form of modern discrimination in the workplace further disadvantaging already marginalized groups (Cortina, 2008; Cortina et. al., 2013).  In addition, while there are channels for reporting and addressing explicit forms of discrimination, the subtle and ambiguous nature of incivility make it difficult to articulate its extent in an organization.  Thus, our findings might also suggest that workplace incivility may be underreported in general and even more so by members of marginalized groups. Experiencing incivility, even if not reported, increases turnover intentions; this can have adverse career consequences particularly if it results in a silent exit of women from public organizations (Cortina et al., 2013).

Somewhat surprisingly, we find that employees of color experience less incivility than other racial groups. While theory would suggest employees of color would experience more incivility in the workplace, we join other studies that have also found mixed support for this assertion (Lim & Lee, 2011; Welbourne, Gangadharan, & Sariol, 2015; Kern & Grandey, 2009). 

One explanation for this unexpected finding might be that groups traditionally marginalized because of their race have been conditioned to tolerate uncivil acts by isolating themselves within their organizations. Critical race theorists have suggested that employees of color working in predominately white organizations often participate in avoidance coping strategies following an instance of misbehavior from a colleague (Decuir-Gunby & Gunby, 2016). These coping strategies may involve employees ignoring the situation and distancing themselves from their colleagues (Decuir-Gunby & Gunby, 2016; Evans & Moore, 2015). If employees of color are regularly using avoidance coping strategies this implies they may experience less incivility because they are avoiding interactions that could result in incivility. In short, while employees of color may not be experiencing incivility to the same extent as other racial groups, that could be the case because they are instead experiencing isolation.  

While employees of color report less incivility than white employees, the women of color in our sample reported higher incivility than the men of color. This result is similar to that reported by Cortina and colleagues, in which African American women reported higher levels of incivility than the men of color (2013). The setting for that study was the military, leading the authors to speculate that norms of hyper-masculinity jibed with stereotypes of African American men, leading them to experience a belonging that held incivility at bay. While cities and counties are not necessarily hyper-masculine, they are indeed gendered organizations (Guy 2017) that may advantage men over women of color. This finding suggests a slightly different take on intersectionality in line with Crenshaw’s (1989) work, where multiple identity categories simultaneously can influence one’s experience with workplace incivility. While this is a modest finding with regards to intersectionality dynamics in public administration, it supports Bearfield’s (2009) assertion that the future of PA research on social equity demands an intersectional approach.

While not the primary focus of our study, we also find that those who have been employed for either just a few or for many years as well as those in managerial positions report less experiences of incivility.  Newcomers may not entirely realize that what they are experiencing is a form of incivility, especially if it is subtle and low in intensity. Or, not yet inculcated into the norms and culture of the organization, they may assume such behaviors are normal and thus not consider them to be problematic.  They may also be less willing to speak up even when they do feel they are the subject of misbehavior.  For seasoned organizational members, possibly towards the end of their career, tolerance for incivility might increase simply because they see it as a temporary condition (until they retire) or because it is “the way things have always been around here.”  While subordinates may experience incivility from both managers and peers, managers may be less likely to be the targets of uncivil behavior due to their status and formal power within the organization.

As our data allow us to examine both individual- and group-level effects on incivility, we also find that when there exists gender parity in a department, women, on average, report higher experiences with incivility than men. And interestingly, in departments where women constitute the majority, there is a sharp difference in incivility experiences for men and women.  In such departments, men report significantly fewer experiences with incivility than women.  This finding may be indicative of the dynamic found by other studies that women experience more incivility and interpersonal conflict instigated by women than by men (Gabriel, et al., 2018; Sheppard & Aquino, 2017), thus rendering moot any protection from incivility they may gain from being the majority group. The root of this dynamic may be women’s perception of increased competition for scarce organizational resources or opportunities for advancement when there are more women (Gabriel, et al., 2018; Sheppard & Aquino, 2017). To stave off this competition, women may seek to alienate other women through various mechanisms and behaviors, including incivility (Gabriel, et al., 2018; Derks, et al., 2016).

Due to the wide-ranging effects workplace incivility has on employees, it is important to consider how managers can address incivility in their organizations. While the literature has provided many explanations of how to manage incivility (Pearson & Porath, 2005; Crampton & Hodge, 2008), it fails to recognize that these solutions may not be effective for traditionally marginalized employees. Incorporating an intersectional perspective when addressing incivility promotes the recognition of marginalized identities and emphasizes the need for solutions that are beneficial to all employees.

Managers can operationalize an intersectional perspective to incivility in several ways. First, managers should train employees on incivility in a proactive manner (Cortina & Magley, 2009) that incorporates understandings of implicit bias. Instigators of workplace incivility need to know what types of behaviors are uncivil, and how their personal biases can lead to selective incivility. In addition, managers should create channels allowing employees to provide anonymous feedback on the organization’s management of incivility (Cortina & Magley, 2009; Pearson, Andersson, & Porath, 2000). This method allows managers to know how severe incivility is within their agencies and more effectively address the situation without requiring individual employees to jeopardize their positions. Attempting to incorporate an intersectional perspective will help ensure that employees holding traditionally marginalized identities are not overlooked when resolving issues of workplace incivility.

Animal cognition: Dogs have body-size awareness, and can adapt behavior accordingly

That dog won’t fit: body size awareness in dogs. R. Lenkei, T. Faragó, D. Kovács, B. Zsilák & P. Pongrácz. Animal Cognition, Dec 12 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10071-019-01337-3

Abstract: With very few exceptions, no coherent model of representing the self exists for nonhuman species. According to our hypothesis, understanding of the Self as an object’ can also be found in a wide range of animals including the dog, a fast-moving terrestrial predator/scavenger, with highly developed senses and complex cognitive capacity. We tested companion dogs in three experiments in which they faced three different variations of the same physical challenge: passing through an opening in a wall. We predicted that if dogs are capable of representing their own body size, they will react differently when faced with adequate or too small openings. We found that dogs started to move towards and approached the too small openings with significantly longer latencies than the suitable ones; and upon reaching it, they did not try to get through the too small openings. In another experiment, the medium-size (still large enough) opening was approached with latencies that fell between the latencies measured in the cases of the very large or the too small openings. Having discussed the potential underlying mechanisms, we concluded that our results convincingly assume that dogs can represent their own body size in novel contexts.

Discussion

In a series of experiments where dogs had to pass through a single opening presented on a wall, we found that the size of the opening affected dogs’ behavior both before and during their approach to the opening, and also whether they attempted to get through it. In Experiment 1, similarly to the cognitive bias paradigm (Pogány et al. 2018), dogs were repeatedly exposed to either a too small or a large opening, then at the end they faced a mid-size opening (still large enough to pass through). We found that dogs approached the too small opening significantly later than the large one, and the latency to approach the mid-size opening fell in between. In Experiment 2 the opening was gradually downsized from a comfortably large to a too small opening at which point the dogs did not go through. We found that dogs started to move towards and reached the large enough openings sooner than the one that eventually was proven to be too small. In the final trial, where the opening was enlarged to the last big enough size, significantly more dogs attempted to pass through than in the previous (too small opening) trial. Finally, in Experiment 3 we found that such anatomical features that mostly affect the body proportions, but not the weight of a dog (i.e. achondroplasia), had no effect on how dogs assess the suitability of an opening to pass through. Namely, when we provided dogs with the same size (large enough) rectangular opening in a vertical or horizontal arrangement, we did not find that short-legged dogs approached the horizontal (hence for them still comfortable) opening sooner than the long-legged dogs did.
At this point we know of only one publication where body size awareness (or any sort of body awareness) was tested in dogs (Maeda and Fujita 2010). In that paper the door choice paradigm was used (simultaneously offering two, differently sized doors, both were large enough for the dogs) and authors found a clear preference for the larger door. Those results, therefore, did not indicate body size awareness in dogs, but a possible preference for the more convenient (larger) opening. In the case of human infants, the development of body awareness as a cognitive capacity is usually tested through such erroneous decisions that indicate that children in a given age cohort have more or less difficulty with the representation of their own body as an ‘obstacle’, or they have no clear representation of their own body size (Moore et al. 2007). Brownell et al. (2007), for example, showed that toddlers between 18 and 26 months show a decreasing frequency of the aforementioned errors when trying to pass through an impossibly narrow opening on a wall; meanwhile, they could use a short (0.3 by 0.3 m) opening at this time. In that article, based on the results from four other tasks with the same children, the authors concluded that body awareness develops step by step during the first years of life. We must note, however, that when conclusions are drawn on the basis of only one behavioral parameter (frequency of errors), the resolution of a study is rather low regarding the difficulties of ruling out the alternative explanations. For example, in case of the study of Brownell et al. (2007), it is not known whether the infants made a choice before or during their approach to the openings, or they simply used a trial-and-error strategy. In our experiments with dogs we used multiple parameters that may provide finer details of decision making. By measuring the latency of starting to move towards, and the latency of arriving to the opening, we tackled the possible differences in the a priori decision making of our subjects. Our results are in line with the results of the cognitive bias paradigm where subjects approach the reinforcing stimulus faster than the not reinforcing one and later when they are facing with the ambiguous stimulus they hesitate and the mean latency of approaching falls in between (Mendl et al. 2009, 2010; Pogány et al. 2018). Consequently, when dogs approached a (too small) opening with longer latency, we can conclude that they found it less likely suitable to pass through, and because of the experimental setup, this decision was most probably made by relating the apparent opening size to the mental representation of their own body size. We should remember that ‘too small’ openings except in the habituation phase of Experiment 1 in these experiments were still reasonably ‘big’, calculated by formulas based on the actual size of each individual subject. Additionally, by comparing the attempts to get through the opening in Experiment 2, this showed that when dogs were facing a slightly larger opening after their trial with the too small opening, they did not hesitate to pass through the large enough door. This fact again underlines that dogs decide about the suitability of the individual opening sizes on a case by case basis, likely by using their own body size representation as a template. We must also add at this point that when we mention a ‘template’ of the body size, it is obviously such a mental construct that develops in dogs through a priori encounters with various obstacles beginning from their early ontogeny. However, just because the creation of this template requires experience, it does not mean that the dog has to re-learn each obstacle (i.e. opening size) again and again; on the contrary, the template about its own size makes these types of decisions fast and easy. It is also worthy to mention that the possible connection between experience and the formation of body awareness (i.e. the mental ‘template’) is still unclear even in the case of human infants (see, e.g. Filippetti et al. 2014; Samuels 1986).
In this study our goal was to find evidence in dogs for one of the fundamental building blocks of so-called objective self, body awareness (Moore et al. 2007), while preferably excluding simpler mechanisms for solving the experimental tasks. By providing only one opening at a time, we excluded the option of simply choosing the larger (more convenient, or safer) door (dogs: Maeda and Fujita 2010; children: Brownell et al. 2007), and we did not base our analysis on the number of attempts or the latency of passing through, as we argue that these are mostly dependent on the motivation level of the individual subjects. Similarly, in Experiment 2, we gradually downsized the opening till the subject itself decided that the particular opening size is too small to go through thus we could eliminate the possible differences in the motivation level of the subjects. One could argue that dogs may approach the too small opening with longer latencies because they lost interest in the task towards the end of the experiment; however, we did not find this type of slowing down in the case of the repeated trials with the large enough openings in Experiment 1.
Of course, it is possible that the subjects could try to force themselves through each opening size, and only where they cannot prevail would they give up the attempt. However, we found that this was not the case in Experiment 2, where significantly less dogs even tried to get through the too small opening; meanwhile most of them attempted (and succeeded in) getting through a somewhat larger one. As Franchak and Adolph (2012) underlined, in case of the original door choice tasks, the so-called ‘error’ (i.e. trying to get through the too small opening) has no real, high cost to the individual; consequently, they are not really motivated to avoid it. In children, they found that when the cost was not just getting entrapped in the too narrow opening, but also possibly falling down behind it, the subjects did not try passing through the too small openings. Although in nature entrapment could result in the death of the animal while it tries to squeeze itself through a too narrow opening, there is also the possibility of turning back without serious injury. The results of Franchak and Adolph (2012) supported ours, as dogs did not even attempt to go through if the opening appeared to be too small for them, although the cost would be very low. Furthermore, the latencies of leaving the start point and arriving at the opening showed that dogs distinguished between suitable and unsuitable opening sizes well ahead of actually trying them.
Another possible mechanism that could help the dogs to find out which opening was large enough or too small for them would be the a priori experience with the doors. On the one hand, we could argue that none of our experimental devices were familiar to the dogs; therefore they could not have any knowledge about the suitability of the individual openings. On the other hand, in Experiment 2, where we used all but one opening size only once—except in the last trial dogs did not even have the opportunity to use their freshly gained experience for any of the particular opening sizes coming from the previous trial. Still, it is possible that they would develop some sort of memory-based preference for the ‘conveniently’ sized openings along the serial exposures to the smaller and smaller openings of the actual test; however, this is unlikely because it would result in a steadily increasing latency of approaching. Instead, what we found was a sharp decline of willingness to approach and use the ‘too small’ door in Experiment 2.
Also, one could argue that instead of comparing the size of an actually seen opening to its own body size, dogs with a mechanism different from body-size awareness could somehow estimate the absolute size of an opening and based on that, they could make a decision before they reached the opening in question. The results of Experiment 3 contradict this explanation. Here, dogs faced four times the same size opening, where only the alignment of the opening changed from vertical to horizontal in the last trial. If dogs would mostly rely on a representation of a particular opening size, they would recognize that the two variants are equally large, and they would approach the horizontal opening with the same speed as the vertical ones. However, we found that dogs arrived to the horizontal opening later than to the vertical ones. Another alternative mechanism could be that instead of the size of the opening’s surface, dogs base their decision on the height and width of the opening, and when we ‘rotated’ the vertical opening to the horizontal alignment, the height of the new opening fell into the less suitable category resulting in a slower approach from the subjects.
Another possible explanation is that dogs might simply learn about particular opening sizes during their everyday interactions with their physical environment; thus in our experiments they could rely on their positive or negative experiences from the past and when they go through a new opening they compare its size with the previously learned sizes. Although learning from the experiences of interactions with the physical environment is plausible during the development of the own body size template, based on our results we argue that in our case not only external cues, i.e. learning about the particular openings during the tests shaped the decision making of the dogs. In Experiment 3, we found that short-legged dogs arrived to the horizontal opening later than the long-legged dogs. If dogs’ responses would mostly depend on previous experiences regarding suitable openings, we would expect just the opposite: short-legged dogs would remain similarly fast regardless of the alignment of the opening (as the horizontal opening was still comfortably high for them); meanwhile long-legged dogs would slow down due to the ungainly alignment of the horizontal opening. As our results showed the opposite, the theory of previous experience-driven decision making is less likely; instead, the later arrival to the opening in both groups can be rather explained with the effect of surprise (i.e. the alignment of the opening had been changed), and also with the possibly slower locomotion of the short legged dogs. Similarly, in Experiment 2 during the last trial when the door size was enlarged again one could expect that dogs should have been as fast as when they were facing that particular size for the first time. In other words, if dogs would rely only on their past experiences regarding the opening sizes, they would pass through the large enough door sooner in the last trial than in the too small one just before. However, we found that there was no difference between the latencies in the case of the last two trials probably because of the negative experience of facing a too small opening in the previous trial. This hesitation may also support the existence of a priori decision making of the dogs before they actually approach an opening.

Opposites Attract: Assortative Mating and Immigrant–Native Intermarriage

Opposites Attract: Assortative Mating and Immigrant–Native Intermarriage in Contemporary Sweden. Annika Elwert. European Journal of Population, Dec 2019. https://link.springer.com/journal/10680

Abstract: This paper studies how immigrant–native intermarriages in Sweden are associated with individual characteristics of native men and women and patterns of assortative mating. Patterns of educational- and age-assortative mating that are similar to those found in native–native marriages may reflect openness to immigrant groups, whereas assortative mating patterns that indicate status considerations suggest that country of birth continues to serve as a boundary in the native marriage market. The study uses Swedish register data that cover the entire Swedish population for the period of 1991–2009. The results from binomial and multinomial logistic regressions show that low status of natives in terms of economic and demographic characteristics is associated with intermarriage and that intermarriages are characterized by educational and age heterogamy more than are native–native marriages. The findings indicate that immigrant women as well as immigrant men become more attractive marriage partners if they are considerably younger than their native spouses. This is particularly true for intermarriages with immigrants from certain regions of origin, such as wives from Asia and Africa and husbands from Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Gender differences in the intermarriage patterns of native men and women are surprisingly small.

Background and Previous Research on Immigrant–Native Intermarriages in Europe and Sweden

Intermarriage between immigrants and natives has increased in most European countries in past decades and is closely related to the proportion of immigrants in the country (Lanzieri 2012). This general increase in intermarriage in Europe is largely related to a substantial increase in intermarriage with spouses from countries outside the EU (de Valk and Medrano 2014). Intermarriage rates in Sweden have risen continuously since the 1970s, and the increase is somewhat steeper for men than for women. Figure 1 displays the proportions of immigrant–native intermarriages (defined here as marriages between a native Swede^{Footnote 4} and their foreign-born spouse) and native–native marriages (defined as marriages between two native spouses) of all newly contracted marriages made by native Swedes from 1969 to 2009. As of 1991 the register extracts used in this paper contain an identifier for non-marital cohabitations with common children, which makes it possible to report the shares of native–native cohabitation and immigrant–native cohabitation.

Fig. 1

Shares of native–native unions and immigrant–native unions of all unions of native Swedish men and women in Sweden 1969–2009

For native women, the shares of immigrant–native marriage and cohabitation are close in size and have changed only marginally since the 1990s; for native men, there is a wider gap with immigrant–native cohabitation displaying lower rates with little increase over time and immigrant–native marriages displaying higher rates with a more pronounced increase over time.
In earlier decades, intermarriage between native Swedes and immigrants was dominated by intermarriage with other Nordic citizens, particularly Finns (Cretser 1999). In more recent years, the increase in intermarriages can be largely accounted for by the increased number of marriages with partners from outside Europe, and Thailand has replaced Finland as the most frequent country of origin for intermarried immigrant women (although Finland remains the most common country of origin for intermarried immigrant men; Haandrikman 2014).
Most of the previous research on intermarriage has a strong emphasis on immigrant integration (Kulu and González-Ferrer 2014). Intermarriage in this regard is thought to indicate social integration (Kalmijn 1998). Studies in this line of research largely focus on the intermarriage rates of different immigrant groups, since these are understood to be a measure of group closure and social distance. Individual characteristics that are associated with immigrant–native intermarriage are typically contrasted with those that are associated with endogamous immigrant marriage (for example, González-Ferrer 2006; Kalmijn and van Tubergen 2006; Dribe and Lundh 2008 on Sweden). Studies that take into account the native side of intermarriage are comparatively rare. They often show that native men who intermarry are more often lower educated and have a lower income (Guetto and Azzolini 2015; Haandrikman 2014), are older (Glowsky 2007; Guetto and Azzolini 2015; Niedomysl et al. 2010), and may encounter difficulties in finding an attractive partner in the native endogamous marriage market—difficulties that could be related to their age (Glowsky 2007) or to local shortages of native women (Östh et al. 2011).
As Kulu and González-Ferrer (2014) note, patterns of intermarriages are gendered. In many countries, more foreign-born women than foreign-born men are intermarried (and the reverse applies to natives). Such patterns can be explained by selective immigration and the structural constraints of the marriage market or by selective marriage patterns of the native majority population. In contrast to other European countries, these patterns in Sweden’s case can be partly explained by gendered patterns of marriage migration; i.e. native men (and to a lesser extent native women) marrying women (men) from economically poorer countries. Marriage migration to the native majority is a growing phenomenon particularly in Sweden, although it does exist elsewhere as well (de Valk and Medrano 2014). Niedomysl et al. (2010) show that assortative mating patterns in marriages of marriage migrants and natives deviate from the Swedish norm. While both the opportunity structures and individual characteristics may be related to the likelihood of marrying a marriage migrant, individual characteristics such as age and income appear to be of greater importance (Östh et al. 2011).

Conclusion

Since marriage is one of the most intimate relationships in life, marriage between different social groups has the potential to reveal the social distance between them. Theoretically speaking, if marriage means accepting one another as equals, intermarriage can be an indication of openness towards other social groups (Kalmijn 1991). Since marriage is also always related to status (Kalmijn 1998), adopting the openness perspective would mean that immigrant–native marriages are not expected to differ from native–native marriages with regard to status homogamy, or, if they do, this is in a random fashion. If intermarriage is related to low individual attractiveness in the marriage market or if there are systematic differences in assortative mating patterns, this can be seen as an indication that status considerations are important determinants of intermarriage. Accordingly, members of different social groups do not regard each other as equals.
This study focuses on marriages between immigrants and natives in Sweden and in particular on assortative mating patterns by education and age. Marriage market status both in terms of economic and demographic characteristics of native Swedes is associated with intermarriage. The findings show that—broadly speaking—native Swedish men and women with lower status in economic and demographic characteristics are more prone to intermarry, which is similar to the findings of Östh (2011) and Haandrikman (2014). While these patterns support the idea that individuals of lower status in the marriage market suffer from a competitive disadvantage and are hence more likely to marry immigrants (Fu 2001; Gullickson and Torche 2014), the patterns found among native men also support the idea that the highly educated are more likely to be open towards immigrants (Hello et al. 2002; Wagner and Zick 1995).
Moreover, the findings of this study show that there are systematic differences in assortative mating patterns between native endogamous marriages and intermarriages, which would support a status exchange interpretation. With respect to educational-assortative mating, intermarriages display higher levels of educational heterogamy across immigrant groups with different levels of status in society, but the patterns appear to be more random than systematic. With respect to age, however, age-assortative mating patterns display systematic differences that indicate the existence of age status exchange in Swedish intermarriages. Intermarriages are generally more heterogamous with regard to age as well. The patterns of age hypogamy with a substantial gap for native Swedish men and women along the lines of a hierarchy of immigrants nonetheless indicate that for some immigrant groups intermarriage with natives is more achievable when they have other attractive characteristics to offer in return. These associations are particularly pronounced for intermarriages with marriage migrants, where these patterns closely follow the theoretically predicted hierarchy of immigrants. Marriage migrants can be regarded as a different category to resident immigrants because the union with a Swede gives them the opportunity to be given secured residence, which is likely to make them more receptive to status exchange.
Sweden often appears to be a comparatively open society with low levels of educational homogamy and high levels of gender equality. Similarly, intermarriage between immigrants and natives has been thought of as indicating the openness of natives towards immigrants and accepting them as “equal lifetime partner[s]” (Kalmijn 1991). The findings of this study challenge this view and support the notion that country of birth serves as a boundary in the native marriage market. This study illustrates the fact that this boundary manifests itself not only by excluding immigrants of certain immigrant groups from the pool of marriage partners but also by allowing them in if they have something to offer in return. In the Swedish case, this is likely to be age.

Breastfeeding and offspring’s compassion and empathy in adulthood: No association

Breastfeeding and offspring’s compassion and empathy in adulthood: A study with an over 30‐year follow‐up. Aino I. L. Saarinen et al. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, December 10 2019. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjop.12600

Abstract: This study investigated whether breastfeeding predicts offspring’s dispositional compassion and empathy from early adulthood to middle age. The parents of the participants (N = 1,394) of the Young Finns study answered questions about breastfeeding in 1983, and the participants’ compassion and empathy were evaluated in 1997‒2012 (participants were aged 20‒50 years). Breastfeeding did not predict the course of compassion or empathy in adulthood at the age of 20‒50 years. The associations remained non‐significant, when adjusted for age, gender, socioeconomic factors, and a wide range of characteristics of the family environment (including mother’s gestational age; premature birth; birth weight; number of other children at home; parental mental disorder; parental relationship status; parental postnatal smoking; parental postnatal alcohol use; parenting behavior; and child’s externalizing behavior). In conclusion, breastfeeding seems not to predict offspring’s compassion or empathy in adulthood. The findings may present a hopeful perspective for children growing up with non‐breastfeeding caregivers.

DISCUSSION
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to
investigate whether breastfeeding predicts offspring’s compassion
or empathy in adulthood. Our results revealed that neither having
received breastfeeding, nor the duration of breastfeeding
predicted the course of compassion or empathy from ages 20 to
50, that is from early adulthood to middle age. The associations
of breastfeeding with compassion and empathy remained nonsignificant
over the whole follow-up, when adjusted for age and
gender, when adjusted also for socioeconomic factors in
childhood and adulthood, and when additionally adjusted for a
wider range of characteristics of the child, home environment,
and parenting (i.e., mother’s gestational age; premature birth;
birth weight; number of other children at home; parental mental
disorder; parental relationship status; parental postnatal smoking;
parental postnatal alcohol use; parenting behavior; and child’s
externalizing behavior). Moreover, the effect of breastfeeding on
compassion and empathy remained non-significant also in the
multiple imputed dataset, indicating that the non-significant
associations were not accounted for by some attrition biases over
the follow-up. Taken together, our study provided evidence that
breastfeeding does not predict the development of dispositional
compassion or empathy of the offspring in adulthood.
It has been suggested that the previous null results regarding
breastfeeding and socioemotional outcomes might be at least
partly accounted for by a limited range of control variables
(Jansen, de Weerth & Riksen-Walraven, 2008). That is, there
might be some selection bias between breastfeeding and nonbreastfeeding
mothers with regard to other qualities. For
example, non-breastfeeding mothers may be more career-oriented
(Stewart-Knox, Gardiner & Wright, 2003) and more likely able
to provide a favorable home environment with regard to
socioeconomic factors. In the present study, however, we
controlled for a relatively comprehensive range of the
characteristics of the child and home environment. Nevertheless,
all the associations of breastfeeding with offspring’s compassion
or empathy remained non-significant. Hence, this implies that
breastfeeding may not predict offspring’s compassion or
empathy in adulthood indirectly via other qualities of the family
environment.
Another explanation for the previous results, which have
found no link for breastfeeding to offspring’s socioemotional
development in childhood, might potentially be that compassion
may not be fully developed yet in early childhood. Several
studies have investigated socioemotional outcomes among
children aged as young as 1–3.5 years (e.g., Borra et al., 2012;
Oddy et al., 2011). It has been suggested that there might be
cognitive requirements for being able to feel compassion: for
example one must be able to imagine himself or herself to the
same situation and to imagine how it would feel like (Cassell,
2002). Our study demonstrated that there exist no association of
breastfeeding with compassion after childhood and cognitive
maturation.
Compassion and empathy are generally regarded as
cornerstones of one’s socioemotional development. Deficits in
compassion or empathy constitute a central feature of a range of
psychiatric disorders, for example, antisocial personality disorder
and paranoia (APA, 2013). Hence, our results, which showed no
association of breastfeeding with empathy or compassion,
tentatively suggest that non-breastfeeding does not predispose the
child to socioemotional deficits or to psychiatric disorders through
them. This is in line with a previous study demonstrating that
breastfeeding is not linked with violent behavior in adulthood
(Caicedo, Gonc alves, Gonz alez & Victora, 2010).
In our study, there were some limitations that are necessary to
be taken into consideration. Breastfeeding was evaluated by
asking parents whether the child had received breastfeeding and
for how many months breastfeeding had occurred. It was not
assessed, however, whether the child had been exclusively or
non-exclusively breastfed, that is whether the child had received
also complementary food or other nutritions during breastfeeding.
However, breastfeeding has been commonly assessed this way in
previous studies (e.g., Belfort et al., 2016; Narvaez et al., 2013).
Moreover, such studies that have differentiated between exclusive
and non-exclusive breastfeeding have found no differences
between the effects of exclusive vs. non-exclusive breastfeeding
on socioemotional outcomes in childhood (e.g., Kramer et al.,
2011; Lind et al., 2014).
Moreover, breastfeeding was evaluated retrospectively.
Previously, the length of recall period is found to positively
correlate with recall bias (Horta et al., 2013). In this study, we
aimed to minimize potential recall bias by asking parents about
breastfeeding in 1983 (i.e., in the first follow-up measurement).
Further, it has been highlighted that the duration of breastfeeding
should be checked from many sources if possible (Horta et al.,
2013). We advised the parents to check this information from the
child’s personal record cards obtained from well-baby clinics.
Finally, there is evidence that high parental socioeconomic status
is related to underestimation of the duration of breastfeeding
(Huttly, Barros, Victora, Beria & Vaughan, 1990). In this study,
we controlled for a variety of childhood covariates, including
parental socioeconomic status.
Finally, the rate of non-breastfed children was comparatively
low in the present study (7.5%). Also, previous studies have
found that the rate of non-breastfed children varies between 0.5
and 26% in Europe (Clements et al., 1997; H€ornell, Aarts,
Kylberg, Hofvander & Gebre-Medhin, 1999; Michaelsen et al.,
1994). Hence, no firm conclusions can be made about the effects
of non-breastfeeding on the course of compassion and empathy.
Nevertheless, there was a higher frequency of participants who
had been breastfed over a comparatively short time period (e.g.,
4 months) and they did not differ from others in their compassion
or empathy levels. Overall, previous studies have suggested that
the potential association of breastfeeding with compassion and
empathy might go indirectly via close and supportive parent-child
relationship (Bystrova et al., 2009; Cernadas et al., 2003) and
secure attachment (Britton et al., 2006). In the light of previous
evidence, that kind of mediating socioemotional factors are
unlikely to develop over a short period of breastfeeding.
The present study had a variety of substantial strengths. First, we
had a prospective follow-up of over 30 years and a comparatively
large population-based sample consisting of six different age
cohorts. Second, our data enabled us to investigate the course of
dispositional compassion and empathy from ages 20 to 50, that is,
from early adulthood to middle age. Third, we used multilevel
models for repeated measurements that have comparatively strong
statistical power (Gelman & Hill, 2006), so that also modest
associations between the study variables could be obtained. Fourth,
we replicated all the analyses in a multiple imputed dataset in order
to ensure that the results were not accounted for by certain attrition
biases in our sample. Finally, we could control for a range of
potential confounding variables, such as age, gender,
socioeconomic factors in childhood and adulthood, and also a
range of characteristics of the child and family environment. Taken
together, our data provided exceptional possibilities to investigate
whether breastfeeding predicts the course of compassion and
empathy of the offspring in adulthood.
Suboptimal breastfeeding is common not only in developing
countries (Huffman et al., 2001; M€uller & Krawinkel, 2005) but
also in Western countries. In the United States, for example, only
about one third of mothers continue breastfeeding the infant for
the first 6 months (McDowell, Wang & Kennedy-Stephenson,
2008), although the WHO has recommended exclusive
breastfeeding for the first 6 months of life (WHO & UNICEF,
2003). There are a variety of reasons for suboptimal
breastfeeding, including experiences of restricted freedom,
conflicts between motherhood and pursuing a career, sexualityrelated
feelings, and perceived social isolation (Stewart-Knox
et al., 2003; Van Esterik, 2002). Importantly, many mothers are
also forced to introduce formula-feeding because of hormonal or
nutritional reasons (Goldman, Hopkinson & Rassin, 2007; Jansen
et al., 2008). Still, however, breastfeeding is considered even as
an aspect of morality or a measure of the quality of motherhood
in some populations (Lee, 2007). Consequently, a review
concluded that mothers who introduce formula-feeding frequently
experience feelings of guilt, uncertainty and failure (Lakshman,
Ogilvie & Ong, 2009). In many cases, formula-feeding mothers
have to defend their feeding methods when visiting child care
services, which may lower their trust toward health-care
professionals (Lee, 2007).
In the context of child health-care services, it is necessary to
clarify the precise arguments for breastfeeding for mothers. There
is a great amount of evidence that breastfeeding is linked with
better somatic health of the child, including properties from blood
pressure to respiratory diseases and allergies (e.g., Friedman &
Zeiger, 2005; Owen et al., 2002; Wold & Adlerberth, 2002). On
the other hand, previous meta-analyses have concluded that
breastfeeding does not predict higher intelligence or cognitive
abilities of the offspring (e.g., Horta, Loret de Mola & Victora,
2015; Walfisch, Sermer, Cressman & Koren, 2013). Moreover,
most previous studies have found no evidence for a link for
breastfeeding to prosocial behavior, sociability, or emotional
difficulties in childhood (e.g., Kramer et al., 2008; Lind et al.,
2014; Oddy et al., 2011; Tanaka et al., 2009). In line with these
findings, the present study showed that breastfeeding does not
predict compassion or empathy of the offspring in adulthood. Our
findings may present a hopeful and encouraging perspective for
children growing up with non-breastfeeding caregivers.
This study was supported financially by the Academy of Finland (M.H.,
grant numbers 308676 and 258578); Signe and Ane Gyllenberg
Foundation (M.H.); the Jenny and Antti Wiguri Foundation (L.P.-R.); and
Mannerheim League for Child Welfare’s Research Foundation and Finnish
Cultural Foundation (E.O.). The Young Finns Study has been financially
supported by the Academy of Finland: Grants 286284, 134309 (Eye),
126925, 121584, 124282, 129378 (Salve), 117797 (Gendi), and 41071
(Skidi); the Social Insurance Institution of Finland; Competitive State
Research Financing of the Expert Responsibility area of Kuopio, Tampere
and Turku University Hospitals (grant X51001); the Juho Vainio
Foundation; the Sigrid Juselius Foundation; the Yrj€o Jahnsson Foundation;
the Paavo Nurmi Foundation; the Finnish Foundation of Cardiovascular
Research and Finnish Cultural Foundation; the Tampere Tuberculosis
Foundation; the Emil Aaltonen Foundation; and Diabetes Research
Foundation of Finnish Diabetes Association. The funding source had no
role in study design, data collection, data analysis, data interpretation,
writing of the report, or in the decision to submit the article for publication.

Overestimating One’s ‘green’ Behavior: Better-than-average Bias May Function to Reduce Perceived Personal Threat from Climate Change

Leviston, Zoe, and Hannah V. Uren. 2019. “Overestimating One’s ‘green’ Behavior: Better-than-average Bias May Function to Reduce Perceived Personal Threat from Climate Change.” PsyArXiv. December 12. doi:10.1111/josi.12365

Abstract: The actions of others, and what others approve of, can be a powerful tool for promoting pro-environmental behaviour. A potential barrier to the utility of social norms however are cognitive biases in how we perceive others, including the better-than-average effect. This effect describes the tendency for people to think they are exceptional, especially when compared with their peers. In order to investigate the role of the better-than-average effect in the context of climate-relevant pro-environmental behaviour, we administered questions as part of a larger online survey of 5,219 nationally representative Australians. Participants were asked to report whether they engaged in a list of 21 pro-environmental behaviours, and then asked to estimate how their engagement compared with the average Australian. Over half of our participants ‘self-enhanced’; they overestimated their engagement in pro-environmental behaviours relative to others. ‘Self-enhancement’ was related to reduced perceptions of personal harm from climate change, more favourable assessments of coping ability, less guilt, and lower moral and ethical duty to take action to prevent climate change. These relationships held when participants sceptical about anthropogenic climate change were removed from analyses. We discuss the implications of the findings for the use of social norms in promoting pro-environmental behaviour.


Discussion
The majority of our participants evidenced better-than-average tendencies. Our findings are consistent with previous literature from other domains and provide good initial evidence that better-than-average effects operate in the domain of climate-relevant behaviour. The bias was not restricted to people who perform poorly, or to those holding certain beliefs about climate change, but was evident across a spectrum of behaviour and attitudes. Moreover, distorted perceptions about one’s own behaviour was related to factors such as moral and ethical duty to respond to climate change, climate-related guilt, coping appraisals, and descriptive and injunctive norms. In each case we found that a self-other comparison that flattered the respondent tended to be accompanied by attitudes that function to reduce threats posed by climate change and reduce personal culpability. Taken together, the results suggest better-than-average effects might serve a palliative function for the individual.

The tendency for ‘self-enhancers’ to downgrade personal perceived harm from climate change and bolster personal coping ability relative to other groups might also be understood as ‘optimism bias’ – the belief that negative events are more likely to happen to others than to oneself (Radcliffe & Klein, 2002). This form of bias is itself functional, as it aids in restoring feelings of efficacy and control. Coupled with findings that self-enhancers reported lower feelings of guilt and moral and ethical duty, it is arguable that better-than-average assessments are not necessarily causative but one of an interrelated set of motivated cognitions to reduce both internal and external threat (Hornsey et al., 2015).

Motivations to self-enhance may also have interpersonal underpinnings and benefits. For instance, Kurz and Prosser (this issue) argue that tightly defined behaviours, such as vegetarianism and cycling, implicitly signal moral judgements to those who do not partake in these behaviours. Our list of climate-relevant behaviours included both loosely and tightly specified behaviours. In order to restore moral worth, it is feasible that those whose inaction is made salient in specific behavioural areas become motivated to make downward social comparisons (‘I may not be perfect, but I’m better than most’). Self-enhancement may this have a moral licensing effect, allowing the assessor to concurrently admit to unstainable behaviours (driving a motor vehicle, regularly eating meat) while maintaining moral standing within the broader community. Further research might test whether better-than-average effects are heightened under conditions where indicating high behavioural engagement is made more difficult. Similarly, future research employing longitudinal or experimental designs might illuminate whether self-other assessments are dynamic or whether they reflect more general chronic predispositions toward bias.

Blacks were not more likely than whites to be fatally shot nationally; were more likely than whites to be shot at by police in California based on the benchmarks used

Considering violence against police by citizen race/ethnicity to contextualize representation in officer-involved shootings. John A. Shjarback, Justin Nix. Journal of Criminal Justice, December 11 2019, 101653. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2019.101653

Highlights
• Overrepresentation in officer-involved shootings is a function of the racial/ethnic benchmark being used for comparison.
• Violence against police by citizen race/ethnicity may be a better benchmark than others used previously (e.g., contacts).
• Research should move beyond fatal officer-involved shootings to also include non-fatal OIS and all firearm discharges.
• Blacks were not more likely than whites to be fatally shot nationally or shot and injured/killed by police in Texas.
• Blacks were more likely than whites to be shot at by police in California based on the benchmarks used.

Abstract
Purpose: The current study examined racial/ethnic disparities in officer-involved shootings, employing violence directed toward police by race/ethnicity as a benchmark for comparison.

Methods: Odds ratios comparing white and African-American as well as white and Hispanic differences were calculated using three separate datasets: The Washington Post's counts of fatal officer-involved shootings, fatal and injurious officer-involved shootings in Texas, and all firearm discharges by officers in California.

Results: African-Americans were not more likely than whites to be fatally shot nationally or shot and injured/killed by police in Texas based on the benchmarks used. However, African-Americans were more likely than whites to be shot at by California police.

Conclusions: Racial/ethnic overrepresentation (or the lack thereof) in officer-involved shootings appears to be a function of the specific benchmark for comparison as well as the outcome being examined. Studies focusing exclusively on fatalities represent an incomplete and non-random sample of all officer-involved shooting incidents. Data limitations may omit factors, such as place or departmental policies, that are cofounding the relationship between race/ethnicity and fatal police-citizen violence.

Keywords: PoliceOfficer-involved shootingsDeadly forceBenchmarksViolence

Svalbard temperatures were both warmer & colder than today in the Early Holocen: Temperatures were up to ~7C higher than now in response to high radiative forcing & intensified ocean heat advection

Early Holocene temperature oscillations exceed amplitude of observed and projected warming in Svalbard lakes. Willem G.M. van der Bilt  William J. D`Andrea  Johannes P. Werner  Jostein Bakke. Geophysical Research Letters, December 3 2019. https://doi.org/10.1029/2019GL084384

Abstract: Arctic climate is uniquely sensitive to on‐going warming. The feedbacks that drive this amplified response remain insufficiently quantified and misrepresented in model scenarios of future warming. Comparison with paleotemperature reconstructions from past warm intervals can close this gap. The Early Holocene (11.7‐8.2 ka BP) is an important target because Arctic temperatures were warmer than today. This study presents centennially resolved summer temperature reconstructions from three Svalbard lakes. We show that Early Holocene temperatures fluctuated between the coldest and warmest extremes of the past 12 ka, exceeding the range of instrumental observations and future projections. Peak warmth occurred ~10 ka BP, with temperatures 7°C warmer than today due to high radiative forcing and intensified inflow of warm Atlantic waters. Between 9.5‐8 ka BP, temperatures dropped in response to freshwater fluxes from melting ice. Facing similar mechanisms, our findings may provide insight into the near‐future response of Arctic climate.

4 Conclusions
Alkenone (𝑈37 𝐾) ) data show that Svalbard experienced summer temperatures both warmer and colder than today during the Early Holocene. Warmth was greatest around 10 ka BP, when temperatures were up to ~7 °C higher than present in response to high radiative forcing and intensified ocean heat advection. In agreement with a growing body of recent work (e.g.
Lecavalier et al., 2017; McFarlin et al., 2018), these findings indicate an earlier and warmer
Holocene Optimum in the High Arctic then previously suggested. Moreover, comparison with
model output shows that the amplitude of warming was on par with 21st century emission
scenarios, but that temperatures rose much slower than today. A denser and more evenly spread distribution of similar high-resolution reconstructions is needed to ascertain if this signal is representative for the wider region. Between 10-8 ka BP, temperatures declined in response to freshwater input into the North Atlantic from melting ice sheets. The sensitivity of regional climate to freshwater forcing is of relevance for a future Arctic, which will likely be impacted by increased melting of the Greenland ice sheet and enhanced runoff as the hydrological cycle intensifies (Bintanja & Selten, 2014; Shepherd et al., 2012).

When transgressors intend to cause harm: The empowering effects of revenge and forgiveness on victim well‐being

When transgressors intend to cause harm: The empowering effects of revenge and forgiveness on victim well‐being. Peter Strelan  Jan‐Willem Van Prooijen  Mario Gollwitzer. British Journal of Social Psychology, December 11 2019. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12357

Abstract: When people are transgressed against, they are usually motivated to restore personal power that was threatened by the transgression. We argue and test the new idea that while revenge and forgiveness responses are typically seen as opposites, both may be empowering, depending on the offender’s intent to harm. Across two studies, one experimental (N = 381) and one employing an autobiographical recall paradigm (N = 251), we tested a moderated mediation model. Notably, we found that revenge is empowering at high levels of intent and forgiveness is empowering regardless of intent. Importantly, we also demonstrate that empowerment provides an explanation for the process by which getting revenge and forgiving are each associated with improved affective outcomes for victims.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Revenge

We found, as hypothesized, a significant revenge 9 intent interaction on empowerment in both studies. In Study 1, when offender intent was high, taking revenge was less disempowering than doing nothing (the control condition), and avengers experienced more positive and less negative affect in that case. In Study 2, we observed a similar effect: The more participants reported that perceived offender intent was high, the more revenge was empowering. The differing methodological approaches that we employed may account for the nuanced difference in the direction of effects between Study 1 and Study 2. Study 1 used hypothetical scenarios, which (1) are comparably less emotionally involving, and in which (2) people are probably more aware of the fact that, usually, in Western societies revenge tends not to be socially acceptable (Yoshimura & Boon, 2018). Study 2, however, used autobiographical stories, which were more involving and also less prone to social desirability issues. Here, participants might have allowed themselves to experience and/or report the empowering effects of taking revenge more strongly than in Study 1. In any event, regardless of how revenge affected empowerment in the two studies, our theoretical argument is sustained: When victims perceive that offenders intended to cause harm, getting revenge is the more sensible tactic – compared to doing nothing (Study 1) or not getting revenge (Study 2) – at least in terms of empowering victims.

Compatibility with and extension of existing theorizing about revenge

Previous experimental research suggests revenge can be satisfying when victims can see that their transgressor understands the reasons for revenge, or has learnt from it (e.g., Funk et al., 2014; Gollwitzer et al., 2011), but revenge is likely to be unsatisfying when it serves no clear function (e.g., Carlsmith & Darley 2008). Our findings fit with the idea that taking revenge can make avengers feel both good and bad (see Eadeh et al., 2017). Specifically, in Study 1, when intent was high, avengers felt more empowered than participants who did nothing, so that avengers were more likely to indicate positive affect. However, when empowerment was statistically controlled for, taking revenge was negatively related to positive affect. This suggests that the hedonic benefits of taking revenge can be explained by feelings of empowerment. These findings are novel and add another piece to the puzzle regarding the hedonic qualities of revenge. In Study 2, the empowering effect of revenge on affective outcomes under conditions of high intent was even more pronounced. In terms of direct effects, revenge was associated with higher levels of negative affect and clinical symptoms. However, to the extent that victims got revenge against deliberately hurtful transgressors, they felt empowered, so much so that the relations with negative affect and clinical symptoms flipped around: Getting revenge was now associated with less negative affect and fewer clinical symptoms. Interestingly, revenge was also associated with higher levels of positive affect, especially when offenders meant to hurt and avengers felt empowered. In short, we provide further evidence that if revenge is indeed to be ‘sweet’, it needs to be functional. As offender intent increases, revenge becomes an appropriate response (e.g., McCullough et al., 2013). One function of revenge under conditions of high intent, therefore, is that it serves to empower avengers, an experience which in turn helps make revenge ‘sweet’. Finally, we have extended previous research. Earlier studies on the functionality of revenge relied on an offender’s response for a victim to know if revenge was effective (e.g., Funk et al., 2014; Gollwitzer et al., 2011). However, in the present studies, the potential efficacy of revenge was under the avenger’s control (i.e., they only had to decide if the transgression was intentional or not).

Forgiveness

In both studies, there was a main (direct) effect of forgiveness on empowerment, indicating that forgiving is empowering. Notably, this relation was not qualified by an interaction with intent, indicating that forgiveness is empowering regardless of the extent to which victims perceive that offenders intend to cause harm. Furthermore, in Study 1, there was evidence that forgiving helps victims feel less negative and more positive because it is, to some extent, empowering. The direct effects on well-being are in line with a substantial literature indicating the benefits of forgiving for victims (Cheadle & Toussaint, 2015; Griffin et al., 2015; Larkin et al, 2015; McCullough, 2008; Witvliet & Luna, 2018). The indirect effect through empowerment is new, providing initial evidence for the process by which forgiveness leads to more positive and less negative affective outcomes. In Study 2, forgiveness was positively associated with revenge and negative affect and clinical symptoms – yet was also positively associated with empowerment and positive affect. Although these relations seem incompatible, there are at least two interrelated plausible explanations. One is that these findings reflect the reality of post-transgression turmoil, wherein victims need to navigate conflicting response repertoires particularly in good-quality relationships (as was the case in this study). For example, longitudinal research shows that emotional responses oscillate in the aftermath of transgressions, so that a person can indicate vengeful and benevolent motivations at the same time (e.g., McCullough et al., 2003). In addition, it is possible that the positive forgiveness–revenge correlation reflects that participants had acted vengefully, which in turn enabled them to forgive, consistent with research indicating that getting justice helps victims forgive (for a review, see Strelan, 2018). The other explanation is methodological in nature. Wellestablished measures of forgiveness require participants to indicate their current thoughts or feelings or motivations towards a transgressor, so that the classic forgiveness versus revenge dichotomy emerges. That is, if a person is currently positively disposed towards a transgressor, they cannot at the same time indicate that they are negatively disposed towards them; therefore, the conflicting responses typically seen posttransgression are not captured. However, this was the first study in which victims’ perceptions of their forgiveness and revenge behaviours have been measured and participants were asked to recall the extent to which they had acted vengefully or in a forgiving manner. As a measure of recalling what one did, it allows a respondent to be internally inconsistent, that is, to recall acting both positively and negatively towards a transgressor. When the empowering effect of forgiveness was taken into account (Study 2), the significant positive relation between forgiveness and each of negative affect and clinical symptoms disappeared, indicating a suppressor effect for empowerment. This suggests that a sense of empowerment helps to render moot the positive relation between forgiveness and those negative outcomes. Further, there was an indirect negative effect of forgiveness on negative affect and clinical symptoms via empowerment. These relations indicate that the less forgiving a person is, the less empowered they feel, and the more negative their affective responses. In short, there is some evidence that if empowerment plays a role, it is to explain why lower levels of forgiveness may predict higher levels of negative affect and clinical symptoms.

Compatibility with and extension of existing theorizing about forgiveness

Our findings speak to two aspects of the forgiveness literature. One is concerned with the costs of forgiving, which effectively suggests that if offenders do not deserve forgiveness (e.g., Strelan et al., 2016), then forgivers should experience forgiveness as costly. In the present studies, offenders who intended harm would not deserve forgiveness, and therefore, forgiving should prove to be a costly affective exercise for victims. Notably, in Study 2, we found similar effects to Strelan et al. for the forgiveness 9 intent interaction on the downstream variables: Forgiving was related to higher negative affect and lower positive affect when intent was high – in other words, when offenders did not deserve forgiveness (see footnote 2). However, in both our studies intent to harm did not affect the extent to which forgivers felt empowered – in other words, even when offenders did not deserve forgiveness, forgiveness was still empowering. These particular findings provide further support for Strelan et al.’s theorizing that undeserved forgiveness is a costly affective response, but they also suggest there may be nuances in the way undeserved forgiving is experienced. To that end, our findings for empowerment are consistent with another literature concerning the benefits of forgiveness, which suggests that forgiving is empowering despite an offender’s bad behaviour and possibly even because of it (e.g., Enright & Fitzgibbons, 2000).