He is a Stud, She is a Slut! Meta-Analysis on the Continued Existence of Sexual Double Standards for decades - but the effect is small

He is a Stud, She is a Slut! A Meta-Analysis on the Continued Existence of Sexual Double Standards. Joyce J. Endendijk, Anneloes L. van Baar, Maja Deković. Personality and Social Psychology Review, December 27, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868319891310

Abstract: (Hetero)sexual double standards (SDS) entail that different sexual behaviors are appropriate for men and women. This meta-analysis (k = 99; N = 123,343) tested predictions of evolutionary and biosocial theories regarding the existence of SDS in social cognitions. Databases were searched for studies examining attitudes or stereotypes regarding the sexual behaviors of men versus women. Studies assessing differences in evaluations, or expectations, of men’s and women’s sexual behavior yielded evidence for traditional SDS (d = 0.25). For men, frequent sexual activity was more expected, and evaluated more positively, than for women. Studies using Likert-type-scale questionnaires did not yield evidence of SDS (combined M = −0.09). Effects were moderated by level of gender equality in the country in which the study was conducted, SDS-operationalization (attitudes vs. stereotypes), questionnaire type, and sexual behavior type. Results are consistent with a hybrid model incorporating both evolutionary and sociocultural factors contributing to SDS.

Keywords: sexual double standards, meta-analysis, gender, sexuality, social cognitions

Discussion

In line with evolutionary theory (Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Trivers, 1972) and biosocial theory (Wood & Eagly, 2002, 2012), this meta-analysis demonstrated clear evidence for traditional SDS in studies assessing differences in people’s evaluation, or expectation, of men’s and women’s sexual behavior, although the effect was small. People expected behaviors associated with high sexual activity more from men than from women, and behaviors associated with low sexual activity more from women than from men. Similarly, people evaluated highly sexually active men more positively (or less negatively) than highly sexually active women, and low sexually active women more positively (or less negatively) than low sexually active men. In contrast, the overall set of studies using Likert-type-scale questionnaires for assessing SDS did not yield evidence of SDS.

We found some significant moderator effects in one or both sets of studies. First, existence of traditional SDS was behavior specific. Second, stereotypes about SDS were more traditional than attitudes about SDS. Third, studies using the “sexual double standard scale” (SDSS; Muehlenhard & Quackenbush, 1998) reported more traditional SDS than studies using the “double standard scale” (DSS; Caron et al., 1993) which demonstrated reversed SDS. Fourth, higher levels of gender equality in a country were associated with less traditional SDS. Participant gender and age, publication year, and study design were not significant moderators.

Behavioral Specificity of SDS

Regarding sexual behavior types, we found strongest evidence of SDS for being a victim of sexual coercion, followed by casual sex, and having an early sexual debut. SDS were less evident for sexual infidelity, level of sexual activity, other/mixed sexual behavior types, premarital sex, and being a perpetrator of sexual coercion. The findings for coercion and sexual encounters within a power or age hierarchy were partly in line with the predictions from biosocial theory that SDS would be most prevalent in sexual encounters where there is a power/status difference between men and women (Wood & Eagly, 2002, 2012). However, we only found double standards for victims of sexual coercion, and not for perpetrators. That we did not find differences in the evaluation of male and female perpetrators might be because both male and female perpetrators violate gender role expectations, with men violating chivalry norms, and females violating communal characteristics. Thus, male and female perpetrators might have been evaluated equally negative for their gender-role inconsistent behavior. Moreover, the double standards for victims of sexual coercion, found in person perception studies, indicate that sexual behavior within the context of a power hierarchy is evaluated more negatively (or less positive) for female victims (e.g., more condemned, more perceived damage to reputation) than for male victims (e.g., “positive” experience that will be evaluated by peers as cool; Zaikman & Marks, 2017). Thus, girls might be blamed for being a victim of sexual coercion (Weis, 2009), whereas boys’ experiences of sexual coercion might be trivialized (Weis, 2010). This is inconsistent with the idea that male victims of sexual coercion or rape might be perceived as powerless and not willing to have sex, which violates men’s (hetero)sexual agentic gender role (Weis, 2010). Because only a few studies examined the evaluation of both perpetrator and victim, replication of the existence and direction of SDS for coercion victims is necessary in future studies.

The finding that engaging in casual sex and having an early sexual debut were more expected and rewarded in men than in women, fits partly with predictions from evolutionary theory. In terms of reproductive fitness, men would benefit more than women from having casual sex and by having sex at an early age (Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Petersen & Hyde, 2010). However, similar beneficial effects would have been expected for sexual infidelity and high sexual activity with numerous partners, but for those sexual behaviors less traditional SDS were applied. The same was true for other sexual behaviors, such as premarital sex when engaged or when in love. Our findings are in line with previous narrative reviews concluding that premarital sex in particular has become accepted for both men and women (Bordini & Sperb, 2013; Crawford & Popp, 2003).

Cross-Cultural Differences in SDS

In line with predictions from biosocial theory (Wood & Eagly, 2002, 2012), and not with evolutionary theory’s perspective of obligate sex differences, SDS were less traditional in countries with higher levels of gender equality. According to biosocial theory, in cultures with bigger differences in the gender roles of men and women, men have more power than women, which translates in traditional SDS (Wood & Eagly, 2002, 2012). However, level of gender equality was only a significant moderator in the meta-analysis conducted on studies using Likert-type-scale questionnaires, and not in the meta-analysis on differential evaluation and expectation of the sexual behavior of men and women. This might be because there was less variation in level of gender equality in the latter meta-analysis, as most studies in that meta-analyses were conducted in the United States. The direction of effect, albeit nonsignificant, was in the same direction as the effect from the meta-analysis on Likert-type scales.

Changes in SDS Over Time

In line with evolutionary theory, and not with biosocial theory, time period in which the study was conducted was no longer significant when controlling for other moderators, which indicated that traditional SDS have existed for decades and are still present. This finding could indicate that stable gender differences in reproductive strategies are underlying SDS. Also, it appears that even though gender roles have become less strict in most modern Western societies (Eagly & Wood, 1999), this did not lead to less differentiation in the norms for the sexual behavior of men and women (Wood & Eagly, 2002, 2012). Possibly, it takes more time for egalitarian gender roles to permeate into the bedroom, than in other domains of life such as the work field, because sexuality is very much a private issue. Furthermore, the content of SDS may have changed over time, because most older studies focused on double standards in premarital sex in different relationship types, whereas newer studies more often focused on double standards in casual sex. Thus, changes in gender roles over time might only be reflected in changes in the behavior specificity of SDS.

Gender Differences in SDS

Regarding gender, we did not find differences between men and women in their cognitions about SDS. In light of male control theory and female control theory (Baumeister & Twenge, 2002), these findings could indicate that both male control and female control contribute equally to the existence of SDS. This means that SDS might provide evolutionary and sociocultural advantages for both genders that they would like to control. Advantages for men that arise from SDS could be improved certainty about paternity (Buss, 1994), patriarchal power over women, prevention of sexual chaos, and reduced male insecurity (Hyde & DeLamater, 1997). The advantages of SDS for women are the high value of sexual favors that they can trade for lower valued favors from men, such as economic provision, monogamous relationships, and parental investment.

Age Differences in SDS

Regarding participants’ age, we did not find support for the predictions of the gender-intensification hypothesis (Hill & Lynch, 1983). It appears that adolescence is not necessarily a period that is characterized by increased gender role pressure and intensification of people’s social cognitions about gender. However, it should be mentioned that most studies were conducted with high-educated college samples, mostly including emerging adults. It may be possible that the relatively small number of studies conducted with adolescents and adults, decreased the power to detect effects of age on SDS.

Implications for Evolutionary Theory and Biosocial Theory

In sum, some of the above findings are in line with evolutionary theory (Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Trivers, 1972) whereas others are in line with biosocial theory (Wood & Eagly, 2002, 2012). This converges with the findings of a recent theory-based narrative review, which demonstrated some support for predictions of both evolutionary theory and biosocial theory about the behavioral specificity of SDS, and for predictions of biosocial theory about cultural differences in SDS (Zaikman & Marks, 2017). Each theory suggests a different mechanism that underlies SDS, but these mechanisms might be intertwined. We therefore propose that a hybrid model explaining SDS from the interplay between biological predispositions and sociocultural pressures is most appropriate (Lippa, 2009). According to biosocial theory, different norms for the behavior of men and women may have arisen from societies’ division in gender roles that expects men to be assertive, dominant, and powerful, and women to be submissive, caring, and kind (Wood & Eagly, 2002, 2012). However, the division in gender roles may have a biological or evolutionary origin (Wood & Eagly, 2012), because there are gender differences in adaptive reproductive strategies leading people to view (sexual) behaviors in men and women differently. Also, the predictive power of evolutionary and sociocultural gender role pressures to explain SDS appears to depend on the sexual behavior or context under consideration. Gender roles may have more predictive power in a sexual context characterized by power/status differences. Yet, evolutionary processes might play a larger role in sexual behaviors that increase successful reproduction.

Conceptualization and Measurement of SDS

We also looked at the effects of moderators related to conceptualization and measurement of SDS. Regarding SDS conceptualization, effect sizes were significant for both stereotypes and personal attitudes. This suggests that both stereotyped beliefs about the sexual behavior of men and women and people’s personal attitudes in response to sexual behavior that violates expectancies are underlying SDS. Yet, traditional SDS were more prevalent in collective or personal expectations about the sexual behavior of men and women (i.e., stereotypes) than in people’s personal evaluation of the sexual behavior of men and women (i.e., attitudes). This finding is in line with the idea that people can have knowledge of collectively shared stereotypes with regard to SDS or personal stereotypical expectations about the sexual behavior of men and women, although they do not apply these stereotypes personally when evaluating other people’s sexual behavior (Milhausen & Herold, 2001; Signorella et al., 1993). It has been argued that knowledge of collective stereotypes is strong, stable, and does not depend on one’s experience with other people, but on culturally shared and generalized social beliefs (López-Sáez & Lisbona, 2009). Indeed, research in children as well as adults showed that content of collective gender stereotypes has not changed over time, whereas gender attitudes did become more egalitarian (e.g., Ruble, 1983; Signorella et al., 1993).

However, our findings with regard to social cognition type need to be interpreted with caution, because the vast majority of studies examined personal SDS attitudes or a mix of stereotypes and attitudes. In studies examining a combination of stereotypes and attitudes, evidence for a reversed double standard was found, a finding that is difficult to disentangle because of the muddled operationalizations of SDS in these studies. Furthermore, in the small number of studies examining stereotypes, it was not possible to distinguish between descriptive and prescriptive aspects, or between personal stereotypes and knowledge of collective stereotypes. Yet, these distinctions are important for future research. For example, knowledge of collectively shared stereotypes is less predictive of one’s own behavior toward men and women than personal stereotypes (Stangor & Schaller, 1996). Furthermore, prescriptive stereotypes (e.g., perceptions of how men and women should behave sexually) might be particularly relevant in the context of SDS as they have been associated with negative evaluations and backlash for people who behave in stereotype-inconsistent ways (Burgess & Borgida, 1999). Indeed, gender stereotypes in general are highly prescriptive in nature (Prentice & Carranza, 2002) and more predictive of people’s personal evaluation of men and women (i.e., attitudes) than descriptive stereotypes (Gill, 2004).

As expected from dual-process models of social cognition (Gawronski & Creighton, 2013), studies using explicit Likert-type-scale questionnaires did not yield evidence for traditional SDS. Yet, studies using more implicit within- or between-subjects designs did yield evidence for SDS. The Likert-type-scale questionnaires often include items such as “It’s worse for a woman to sleep around than it is for a man” in which male and female sexual behavior is explicitly contrasted to each other (Muehlenhard & Quackenbush, 1998). Therefore, in studies using such questionnaires it might have been more clear to participants that personal cognitions about SDS were assessed, leading to social-desirable responding (Greenwald et al., 2009). In between- and within-subjects designs, the focus on SDS is more implicit than in explicit self-report questionnaires. This is because in a between-subject design researchers assessed cognitions about women’s and men’s sexual behavior with separate items or vignettes that they randomly assign to participants, who are generally unaware of the presence of other vignettes presented to other participants. Or in a within-subject design researchers administered separate vignettes or items about women’s and men’s sexual behavior in a counter-balanced way to participants (Jonason & Marks, 2009; Reid et al., 2011; Weaver et al., 2013). Thus, this finding suggests that traditional SDS might only be present at a more implicit level. Previous research indeed showed that implicit assessments are less prone to social-desirable responding (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006) and more likely to suggest existence of traditional gendered cognitions (Endendijk et al., 2013).

However, SDS were not different between studies using between- or within-subjects designs, or between studies using extensive vignettes/scenarios versus studies using questionnaires with different items about the sexual behavior of men and women. This indicates that social desirability and demand characteristics might not necessarily play a larger role in within-subject research on SDS than in between-subject research (Marks & Fraley, 2005; Milhausen & Herold, 2001). Also, this finding suggests that study designs that have only a slightly less explicit focus on SDS (i.e., not contrasting male and female sexual behavior in the same items) can yield evidence for the existence of traditional SDS. This argument is consistent with one study that specifically examined differences in implicit (i.e., under divided attention) and explicit (i.e., under full attention) SDS-cognitions, showing that traditional SDS were only present at an implicit level (Marks, 2008). However, between-subjects designs, like the study by Marks (2008), have been criticized for measuring single standards (because there is no comparison with how an individual would rate another target) instead of double standards (i.e., contrasting evaluation of male vs. female target; Crawford & Popp, 2003). Therefore, using IATs might be a fruitful direction to take to examine SDS at an implicit within-subjects level (see, for example, Sakaluk & Milhausen, 2012).

Our findings regarding questionnaire type indicated that questionnaires differ in the extent to which they yield evidence for SDS, which might also explain the nonequivalent findings in studies using these methods. Studies using the DSS (Caron et al., 1993) reported reversed double standards, whereas studies using the SDSS (Muehlenhard & Quackenbush, 1998) reported more traditional double standards, which might be explained by differences in content and scoring of the questionnaires. In the DSS all but one items are formulated in the direction of a traditional double standard (e.g., “It is up to the man to initiate sex.”) and participants answer the items on a scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Such a questionnaire design cannot distinguish between people with reversed and egalitarian sexual standards, because both groups of people will (strongly) disagree with the traditional items. Therefore, we cannot be completely sure that the negative combined mean found in studies using the DSS actually reflects reversed double standards, or an egalitarian view about the sexual behavior of men and women instead. In contrast, the SDSS consists of 20 items occurring in pairs, with parallel items about men’s and women’s sexual behavior (e.g., “A [girl/boy] who has sex on the first date is easy”). In addition, six items contrast men’s and women’s sexual behavior, with some items formulated in the direction of traditional SDS (e.g., “A man should be more sexually experienced than his wife.”) and others formulated in an egalitarian way (e.g., “A woman’s having casual sex is just as acceptable to me as a man’s having casual sex.”). Participants answer all items on a scale ranging from disagree strongly to agree strongly. Difference scores are computed between the 10 male and female items and the six individual item-scores are added to these difference scores. The design of the SDSS makes it possible to assess a more complete range of reversed to traditional double standards than with the DSS. However, the SDSS score range is asymmetrical (−30 to 48). Thus, the more traditional double standards appearing in studies using the SDSS might have been an artifact of the possible range of scores.

Limitations and Future Directions

Some limitations of this meta-analytic study need to be addressed. First, the available body of quantitative research on SDS is highly homogeneous in terms of participant age, ethnicity, and educational level. According to biosocial theory, these factors are important in the social construction of gender roles, and more specifically for the social construction of SDS (Wood & Eagly, 2002, 2012). Therefore, future studies should examine SDS in more diverse samples in terms of ethnicity, age, and educational level.

Second, almost all studies included in this meta-analysis measured SDS in a relatively explicit way, by using self-report questionnaires, even though implicit measures, such as IATs or priming tasks, are less prone to social-desirable responding than explicit measures of stereotypes, and are often better predictors of behavior (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Thus, researchers should make use of more implicit tasks to assess SDS. Relatedly, previous research has used many different conceptualizations of SDS, sometimes combining attitudinal aspects with stereotypical aspects within one questionnaire. We advise future researchers to be more theory-driven in their conceptualization, operationalization, and predictions regarding SDS. For example, dual-process models (Gawronski & Creighton, 2013) or social cognition frameworks (e.g., Greenwald et al., 2002) could be used to further conceptualize different aspects of people’s SDS-cognitions, that is, implicit, explicit, attitudes, stereotypes, knowledge of stereotypes, prescriptive versus descriptive aspects, and personal versus collective aspects. New measures need to be developed and validated before we can examine the interplay between different double standard components.

Furthermore, studies assessing SDS via questionnaires sometimes used questionnaires that did not distinguish between people with reversed and egalitarian sexual standards. With such questionnaires, it is impossible to study predictors of individual differences in SDS-cognitions. When researchers would like to use a questionnaire in future studies on SDS, they should use questionnaires with symmetrical scales to assess the complete range of SDS from reversed to traditional (e.g., 20 item-pairs of the SDSS; Muehlenhard & Quackenbush, 1998) or develop new questionnaires that can assess the complete range.

Last, most studies included in this meta-analysis focused on SDS in behaviors associated with high sexual activity and only a few studies have been conducted specifically on behaviors associated with low sexual activity. However, further study of differences in the strength of traditional SDS between behaviors associated with high sexual activity (more male-typical) and behaviors associated with low sexual activity (more female-typical) is important. Such research can test whether boundaries for male-typical (sexual) behavior are more strict than for female-typical behavior (Hort et al., 1990). Also, research on how people acquire traditional SDS-cognitions now is essential for designing future interventions that foster egalitarian sexual standards and sexual equality for men and women.

Cognitive & affective wellbeing: Commonly cited events had little effect on wellbeing (promotion, being fired, friends passing), others had profound impacts (financial loss, death of partner, childbirth)

The differential impact of major life events on cognitive and affective wellbeing. Nathan Kettlewell et al. SSM - Population Health, Volume 10, April 2020, 100533. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmph.2019.100533

Highlights
• We study the effect of 18 major life events on wellbeing.
• We use a large population-based cohort and fixed-effect regression models.
• Effects on affective and cognitive wellbeing are compared.
• Effects generally smaller when conditioning on other events.
• Events sometimes have different impacts on affective versus cognitive wellbeing.

Abstract: Major life events affect our wellbeing. However the comparative impact of different events, which often co-occur, has not been systematically evaluated, or studies assumed that the impacts are equivalent in both amplitude and duration, that different wellbeing domains are equally affected, and that individuals exhibit hedonic adaptation. We evaluated the individual and conditional impact of eighteen major life-events, and compared their effects on affective and cognitive wellbeing in a large population-based cohort using fixed-effect regression models assessing within person change. Several commonly cited events had little, if any, independent effect on wellbeing (promotion, being fired, friends passing), whilst others had profound impacts regardless of co-occurring events (e.g., financial loss, death of partner, childbirth). No life events had overall positive effects on both types of wellbeing, but separation, injury/illnesses and monetary losses caused negative impacts on both, which did not display hedonic adaptation. Affective hedonic adaptation to all positive events occurred by two years but monetary gains and retirement had ongoing benefits on cognitive wellbeing. Marriage, retirement and childbirth had positive effects on cognitive wellbeing but no overall effect on affective wellbeing, whilst moving home was associated with a negative effect on cognitive wellbeing but no affective wellbeing response. Describing the independent impact of different life events, and, for some, the differential affective and life satisfaction responses, and lack of hedonic adaptation people display, may help clinicians, economists and policy-makers, but individual's hopes for happiness from positive events appears misplaced.

Keywords: Life eventsAffective wellbeingCognitive wellbeingHedonic adaptation

Discussion

The present study confirms what people know; that not all life events are equal and many are concurrent with other events. In some respect, this may seem to be a self-apparent conclusion to anyone who has ever lived but epidemiological research often ignores this by using summed checklists to assess impact, or just evaluates the impact of one event (Dohrenwend, 2006; Gray et al., 2004; Wethington et al., 1997). Our results also quantify the difference and allow us to infer the average effect in the population. Other studies have noted differences between events in the magnitude or duration of effect on wellbeing (Frijters et al., 2011; Luhmann et al., 2012), however we focus on the total impact (both magnitude and duration). Previous longitudinal studies following individuals across time also indicate health shocks (the duration of disability) (Lucas, 2007), and separation (divorce) (Lucas, 2005; Lucas, Clark, Georgellis, & Diener, 2003) have long-term negative effects but unlike Lucas (2005), we found that the impact of the death of a spouse seemed to diminish by 2 years. The evidence for long-term effects of marriage and unemployment is mixed, with some studies showing that they continue to influence wellbeing long after they have occurred (Lucas, Clark, Georgellis, & Diener, 2004), while others report adaption to these same events (Clark et al., 2008; Frijters et al., 2011) as we found. Fig. 5 provides a comparison of the total impact (magnitude and duration) of each event on wellbeing. For instance, on average the impact of a major financial loss on both types of wellbeing was the greatest whilst health shocks, losing a loved one (widowed), separation or divorce tended not to have as much negative impact on both. Conversely, getting married, a major financial gain, retirement and childbirth had positive effects on cognitive wellbeing with little overall positive effect on affective wellbeing. These data demonstrate that the practice of treating life events as comparable is untenable.

The impact of some events is negligible after accounting for the impact of concurrent events. In general, the conditional effects of life events were a little closer to zero than the unconditional effects, but in almost all cases this was minimal, reflecting how uncommon co-occurrence actually was. However the unconditional positive effect of pregnancy on cognitive wellbeing was all but reversed once concurrent events (childbirth) were accounted for.

These results also challenge the notion of many of the identified life events as being intrinsically “stressful”, the implication of which is that they should have some negative effect on wellbeing. Holmes and Rahe's Social Readjustment Scale (Holmes & Rahe, 1967) weights marriage as the sixth most stressful event yet we found no negative impact on affective wellbeing and a profound anticipatory and subsequent positive effect on life satisfaction. Conversely people's wellbeing in the lead up to some positive events was impaired, the most notable being reconciliation which most likely demonstrates the effect of relationship difficulties just prior to the event.

The differential impact of events on the components of affective and cognitive wellbeing supports their distinction as separate constructs, although both show hedonic adaptation. A novel aspect of the present study is the comparative differences of the affective and cognitive wellbeing response to certain events. For instance, some positive events had a substantial impact on cognitive wellbeing while eliciting relatively little impact on affective wellbeing or “happiness” (e.g., Married, Retired, Childbirth, Pregnant). In contrast, negative events tended to have comparable and untoward effects on both cognitive and affective wellbeing, with the exception of Separated which again elicited a greater (negative) impact on cognitive wellbeing, and Moving which had no affective response but reduced life satisfaction. The differential impact of events on the components of affective and cognitive wellbeing supports the distinction between wellbeing components and their treatment as separate constructs. It also implies that, on average, hoping for happiness from positive events appears misplaced.

Limitations

A few general issues are worth discussing in large, longitudinal models and studies of this kind. Such studies preclude the use of the experience sampling method of assessing affective wellbeing which many consider the best method for assessing short term intra-individual variation in affective wellbeing. The fixed effects models exclude anyone who did not experience the event in the time window of interest. This means that in any particular event, such as marriage, average differences in subjective wellbeing between married people and unmarried people may be present, however these between-group differences will not be revealed by the fixed effects model which estimates within-subject changes in the sample of interest. As a result, these population estimates can reveal what to expect once an event has occurred, but cannot be used to predict whether an event such as marriage will increase or decrease wellbeing in any particular case. That is, the effects of marriage may be specific to the kinds of people who get married and should not be offered as evidence or a reason to get married.

We used an unbalanced panel, which means a slightly different set of individuals may contribute to the pre- and post-event coefficients (although there is considerable overlap). A balanced approach (Clark et al., 2008) only includes people with measurements before and after the event, which ensures the same cohort is followed over time. However, balancing reduces efficiency and risks inducing potential selection effects, so other researchers have taken a more liberal approach and included anyone with more than one consecutive observation, regardless of when those observations occurred (Frijters et al., 2011), which we follow in this study. In a sensitivity analysis we restricted the sample to a balanced panel observed pre- and post-event (see Balanced Models in Supplementary Materials) which did not materially change the overall results or inferences.

We also note some causes of potentially non-random measurement error inherent in any dynamic model of this sort. First, due to censoring issues we do not know at time $t=1$ if a life event occurred before that first year (e.g., 2002). Similarly, at time $t=T$ we do not know whether an event occurred after the final year (e.g., 2016). We do not expect this to significantly bias our estimates since many events occur infrequently and this only affects years close to the endpoints of our data. A similar issue arises in the case of missing life event information‚ either because the respondent did not complete that part of the questionnaire or because they are missing from the sample in a particular year. In both cases, we assumed no life event occurred in the missing year when constructing pre- and post-indicators. Again, we expect any bias to be small given that most life events are infrequent and more than 65 percent of people are responding year-to-year (see Table S2 in Supplementary Material). In a follow-up analysis (Uncontaminated Models in Supplementary Materials), we excluded from the sample any observations within three years of missing life event data to estimate an uncontaminated (as well as balanced) model. This means we only estimated effects for the years 2005–2012, and so after balancing and de-contamination this was our most restricted sample. As a result, our estimates became less precise and, while generally qualitatively similar to the main results, some effects became statistically insignificant (particularly for the positive events).

Maliepaar's PhD Thesis... Bisexual Rhapsody: On the everyday sexual identity negotiations of bisexual people in Rotterdam and Amsterdam and the productions of bisexual spaces

Bisexual Rhapsody: On the everyday sexual identity negotiations of bisexual people in Rotterdam and Amsterdam and the productions of bisexual spaces. Emiel Maliepaard. PhD Thesis, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen 2018. https://www.academia.edu/37885148/

My doctoral thesis: a collection of six interlinked articles on bisexuality in geography, bisexual citizenship, and empirical work on bisexuality, coming out, disclosure, communities and space in the Netherlands.

9.3 Findings & conclusions

I believe that this study reveals four important findings (1) participants do contest the

coming out imperative, (2) they want to disclose their bisexuality when it is relevant to

them, (3) people find it difficult to express their bisexuality in doings and sayings, and

(4) research participants often passively pass as heterosexual or gay/lesbian because their

doings, sayings, actions, and possible material and visual clues are being read in binary

terms.

As Schatzki (2002, 2008) frequently stresses, practices are not just the manifold of doings

and sayings but organised activities that are governed by a practical understanding,

explicit rules, some general understandings, and a teleoaffective structure. To understand

the coming out practice, it is important to focus on both the practical understanding and

the teleoaffective structure of this practice. The coming out practice is, like every other

practice, a normative practice, however it seems to have, according to the participants, a

very clear-cut and heteronormative build-up. Coming out is mainly a linguistic practice in

which people position themselves, through specific speech-acts, on the sexuality spectrum

as non-heterosexual. In fact, this positioning is understood as the final stage of developing

and accepting one’s sexual identity. At the same time, it also means confessing one’s nonheterosexuality towards heterosexual people and, in the case of people who are bisexual, pansexual, or otherwise non-monosexual, also towards lesbians and gay men (also McLean,

2007, 2008). Confessing implies a hierarchy and the one who needs to confess is lower in

the hierarchy as compared to the ones people are confessing to. This means that bisexuality

is understood as a marginalised (and perhaps inferior) sexual identity as compared to

heterosexuality (and homosexuality). This confessing can be observed in phrases such as

“I need to tell you something”. Finally, the coming out practice means making a big deal

from one’s sexuality – a complete emphasis on one’s sexual identity – whereas there are

different ways to express one’s bisexuality without making it a big deal (see also Wandrey

et al., 2015).

As stated in the introduction of this manuscript, the most important question that framed this

study is “how do bisexuals negotiate their bisexuality in everyday (social) spaces, practices,

and activities?” This research shows that the majority of the research participants contest the

coming out practice or, at least, do not want to participate in this heteronormative practice.

They prefer to disclose their bisexuality instead of actually coming out towards others. In a

recently published article I define disclosing bisexuality as “more or less spontaneously or

reactively expressing one’s bisexuality without confessing it and/or making one’s sexuality

a big deal” (Maliepaard, 2018b, p. 19), and, “I do not conceptualize disclosing one’s sexual

identity as a practice (…) but as an action that takes place while participating in everyday

practices” (Maliepaard, 2018b, p. 19).

When focusing on when and where people actually disclose their bisexuality – in essence,

answering the question which factors and contexts are important in the sexual identity

negotiations of bisexual people – the research participants argue that it needs to be relevant

at that particular point in time. This relevance means that disclosing one’s bisexuality needs

to serve a purpose; it is a means to serve one or more ends. Theodore Schatzki’s notion of

teleoaffectivity and his conceptualisation of conditions of life are fruitful to understanding

bisexual people’s action intelligibility, including their ‘choice’ to disclose or not disclose

their bisexuality. Teleoaffectivity, or individuals’ orientations towards ends and how things

matter, puts participants’ sexual identity negotiations in a different perspective as compared

to most studies on sexual identity management strategies and stigma management. It is not

sufficient to focus on rational decision-making processes. Researchers need to focus on the

whole spectrum of conditions of life: people’s state of beings that include moods, emotions,

stances, principles, attitudes, and actions. As concluded elsewhere:

“Expressing bisexuality manifests a number of life conditions which need to be understood as

ends such as the desire to be valued as a human being, seen as an honest person, accepted as

a friend, family member, or lover, better connecting with others, and sharing one’s life with

other people. We should not read these manifestations as causing one’s expressions but as

actualisations of relating with others in practices. In fact, it is remarkable that most participants, 

when reflecting on situations in which they disclosed their bisexual desire and/or identity name

that this disclosure was part of building a stronger connection with people” (Maliepaard, 2018b,

p. 16).

Similarly, as detailed in the same article, not disclosing one’s bisexuality manifests a

number of life conditions besides the notion of ‘not being relevant’: “not in the mood for

drama, not wanting to explain oneself, fearing negativity, uncertainty, others are not ready,

aware of heterosexism and binegativity, not appropriate et cetera” (Maliepaard, 2018b, p.

16). While stereotyping is often mentioned as the primary reason for people to not disclose

one’s bisexuality (e.g. McLean, 2007), this dissertation concludes that only focusing on

binegativity, stereotypes, and harm reduction provides a rather partial picture of people’s

‘choice’ to not reveal their bisexuality. Stereotyping does play a role in people’s sexual

identity negotiations, however, there are more factors in play. For instance, people often

mention that they do not disclose their bisexuality because it is not appropriate to discuss

sexuality and relationships in particular (working) practices or because sexuality is never a

topic during conversations with people they do not have a strong bond with; it is undesirable

to, out of the blue, reveal one’s bisexual identity, desire, attraction, fantasies, et cetera.

Furthermore, research participants experience difficulties in expressing their bisexuality

in doings, sayings, and material and visual clues. They are not aware of specific bisexual

behaviour or doings outside the bedroom. It has been noted in a few studies that bisexual

people suffer from the binary organisation of sex, gender, and sexuality in our contemporary

Western society as bisexual people and their doings, sayings, actions and more are interpreted

in binary ways (e.g. Yoshino, 1999). I believe that heteronormativity, mononormativity, and

compulsory monogamy, as three core discourses (or general understandings), play important

roles in the misinterpretation of bisexual people and their doings, sayings, actions, and

more (chapter three). Because the research participants do not often explicitly disclose their

bisexuality towards others, they are interpreted in binary ways: heterosexual by default and

gay or lesbian the moment they express same-sex desire, behaviour, intimacies, and more.

As shown in chapter five, people, thus, often passively pass as heterosexual, gay, or lesbian

in important parts of their everyday lives. Contrary to most studies, I do not understand

bisexual passing as a predominantly conscious strategy to prevent harm. Of course, people

may be scared of encountering binegativity, monosexism, and stereotyping, but it would be

wrong, as discussed before, to argue that these types of negativity are the main reason why

people pass as heterosexual or as gay/lesbian.

While passing is not necessarily a problem for the research participants, it does impact

people’s participation in practices that together constitute the organised bisexual community

in the Netherlands which are built on the conviction that being visible as bisexual is an

important aspect of living your live as a bisexual person. The emphasis of the Dutch 

organised bisexual community on being visible as bisexual individuals and as group

does not match the position of bisexuality in the lives of the research participants and the

everyday practices they are involved with. In chapter five, I show how Schatzki’s theory

of practice helps to understand how people relate with each other by participating in the

same practice and that not being involved in the same practice also has consequences for

relating with others. Bisexual participants find it difficult to relate with the Dutch organised

bisexual community and its members because they do not participate in the practices, e.g.

the bivisibility practice, that constitute this community.

As can be concluded from the different chapters and the above summary, the bisexual

research participants do not often disclose their bisexuality or come out towards others.

Explicit bisexual sayings, wordings, or phrases, but also doings, are mostly absent in most

everyday practices and spaces. There are, however, occasions on which people do disclose

their bisexuality – or their bisexual desire, fantasies, attraction, and/or behaviour – in

sayings. These situations can be best described as moments in which people talk about their

sexuality and/or relationships and give spaces a bisexual appearance. In these moments

it is relevant for people to talk about their bisexuality and these moments can last a few

seconds (brief disclosures) but may also have longer durations when people have more

extensive conversations about sexuality and/or relationships or other conversations in

which disclosing their bisexuality is relevant.

One of the main conclusions is, not surprisingly, that there are no spaces that are always

bisexual. Even participants’ houses or bedrooms may have no bisexual appearances because

of a variety of reasons. I initially proposed the term “pockets” to describe these bisexual

spaces to stress that these spaces are highly temporal, local, and often unplanned. Pockets,

however, may provide the impression that such spaces are isolated and not embedded in

everyday practices. To avoid confusion, and to better connect with existing literature in

the geographies of sexualities, the term “spaces with a bisexual appearance” is introduced

to identify bisexual spaces. This term also points to the idea that spaces have no natural

sexual coding but are constantly subject to both practices and individuals’ doings, sayings,

and actions. As such, it also contributes to further understandings of the sexualisation of

space as a research topic in the geographies of sexualities that goes beyond focusing on

people possessing certain sexual identities or the presence of a heteronormative discourse

that advocates that space is naturally heterosexual.

Told to cut back on her wide-ranging veggie buffets because it was unfair that students at other schools didn't have access to the unusually tasty offerings

From 2012... Lunch lady slammed for food that is 'too good.' The Local, Oct 6 2012. https://www.thelocal.se/20121006/43656

A talented head cook at a school in central Sweden has been told to stop baking fresh bread and to cut back on her wide-ranging veggie buffets because it was unfair that students at other schools didn't have access to the unusually tasty offerings.

Annica Eriksson, a lunch lady at school in Falun, was told that her cooking is just too good.

Pupils at the school have become accustomed to feasting on newly baked bread and an assortment of 15 vegetables at lunchtime, but now the good times are over.

The municipality has ordered Eriksson to bring it down a notch since other schools do not receive the same calibre of food - and that is "unfair".

Moreover, the food on offer at the school doesn't comply with the directives of a local healthy diet scheme which was initiated in 2011, according to the municipality.

"A menu has been developed... It is about making a collective effort on quality, to improve school meals overall and to try and ensure everyone does the same," Katarina Lindberg, head of the unit responsible for the school diet scheme, told the local Falukuriren newspaper.

However, Lindberg was not aware of Eriksson's extraordinary culinary efforts and how the decision to force her to cut back had prompted outrage among students and parents.

"It has been claimed that we have been spoiled and that it's about time we do as everyone else," Eriksson said.

She insisted, however, that her creative cooking has not added to the municipality's expenses.

"I have not had any complaints," she told the paper.

Eriksson added that she sees it as her job to ensure that the pupils are offered several alternatives at meal times.

The food on offer does not always suit all pupils, she explained, and therefore she makes sure there are plenty of vegetables to choose from as well as proteins in the form of chicken, shrimp, or beef patties.

From now on, the school's vegetable buffet will be halved in size and Eriksson's handmade loafs will be replaced with store-bought bread.

Her traditional Easter and Christmas smörgåsbords may also be under threat.

Parents and pupils alike find the municipality's orders distasteful.

Fourth-graders at the school have even launched a petition in protest against the decision to put a lid on Eriksson's passion for cooking.

The Local/nr

Twin Studies: Work incapacity as the total proportion of potential workdays lost due to sickness absence, rehabilitation and disability benefits

A Life Course Study of Genetic and Environmental Influences on Work Incapacity. Karoline B. Seglem et al. Twin Research and Human Genetics, December 26 2019. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/thg.2019.116

Abstract: Work incapacity is a major public health challenge and an economic burden to both society and individuals. Understanding the underlying causes is becoming ever more relevant as many countries face an aging workforce. We examined stability and change in genetic and environmental factors influencing work incapacity from age 18 until retirement, and sex differences in these effects. The large population-based sample comprised information from 28,759 twins followed for up to 23 years combined with high-quality national registry data. We measured work incapacity as the total proportion of potential workdays lost due to sickness absence, rehabilitation and disability benefits. Structural equation modeling with twin data indicated moderate genetic influences on work incapacity throughout life in both men and women, with a high degree of genetic stability from young to old adulthood. Environmental influences were mainly age-specific. Our results indicate that largely the same genetic factors influence individual differences in work incapacity throughout young, middle and older adulthood, despite major differences in degree of work incapacity and probable underlying medical causes.

Animals may sort among groups based on their personalities; group size can predict its personality composition in some species due to differential suitability of a personality for groups of certain sizes

Variation in neophobia among cliff swallows at different colonies. Stacey L. Hannebaum ,Gigi S. Wagnon,Charles R. Brown. PLOS One, December 23, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0226886

Abstract: Animal groups often represent nonrandom subsets of individuals, and increasing evidence indicates that individuals may sort among groups based on their personalities. The size of a group can predict its personality composition in some species due to differential suitability of a personality for groups of certain sizes, and the group itself may function more effectively if particular personality types are present. We quantified cliff swallow (Petrochelidon pyrrhonota) behavioral measures using linear and generalized linear mixed models to identify whether they: (1) varied among individuals within colonies and among colonies, (2) were related to reproductive success, and (3) predicted levels of parental care. Significant among-individual and among-colony site variation in a cliff swallow’s latency to enter its nest when presented with a novel stimulus was revealed. We also found significant among-individual variation in the number of attacks directed toward a novel stimulus at the nest and in the response to broadcast of a cliff swallow alarm call recording, but among site variation in these measures was not significant. We did not find evidence for behavioral syndromes linking the personalities measured. Differences among individuals in latency to enter the nest and the number of attacks were not significantly related to reproductive success or to the extent to which birds fed their nestlings. However, extent of nestling feeding was significantly predicted by the number of mist net captures. The limited evidence in general of systematic variation in the behavior we measured among cliff swallow colonies may reflect the different and sometimes opposing selection pressures on behavior in different social environments. Future work should perhaps examine variation in other behavioral traits, such as foraging, in cliff swallow colonies of different sizes.

Discussion

Our study revealed significant among-individual and among-colony site variation in a cliff swallow’s latency to enter its nest when presented with a novel stimulus. We also found significant among-individual variation in the number of attacks directed toward a novel stimulus at the nest and in the response to broadcast of cliff swallow alarm call recordings, but among site variation in these measures was not significant. The behavioral measures were not correlated with one another or with the number of times an individual was captured by mist net. Differences among individuals in latency to enter the nest and the number of attacks were not significantly related to reproductive success or to the extent to which birds fed their nestlings. However, extent of nestling feeding was significantly predicted by the number of mist net captures, with pairs that were captured more on average also making more frequent food deliveries to the nest.

Measures and correlates of personality

Despite evidence for relatively high repeatability in both behavioral measures that involved a reaction to a novel stimulus, we did not find support for a behavioral syndrome [5]. This suggests that Latency to enter nest and Number of attacks are independent facets of personality [55, 65, 66]. There is no consensus on which commonly identified personality axes are thought to be measured by behavioral tests involving novel objects or novel environments: some studies use novelty tests to measure personality along the avoidance-exploration axis [22, 67, 68], whereas others use novelty tests to measure personality along the shy-bold axis [65, 69–71]. In the case of novel item tests, the context in which the novel item is introduced may cause further inconsistencies in measured behaviors. For example, coyotes (Canis latrans) showed little avoidance toward a novel stimulus in unfamiliar surroundings but showed avoidance and neophobic reactions toward the same stimuli in familiar surroundings [35]. In our study, the novel stimulus was added to the focal bird’s own nest, a very familiar environment for the bird, and thus strong behavioral responses were expected. In this context, Latency to enter nest may be a measure of personality along the exploration-avoidance axis as the bird determines whether the novel stimulus is a threat, whereas Number of attacks may be a measure of personality along the shy-bold axis as the bird risks injury while responding to the novel stimulus. Number of attacks might alternatively reflect defensive aggression, which describes motor patterns exhibited by a socially aggressive animal but typically directed at a predator or threatening situation rather than a conspecific individual [72]. Regardless of which personality axes are represented, we can conclude that our measured behaviors are independent.

We were surprised that neither Latency to enter nest or Number of attacks were correlated with Number of captures, because the mist net, although perhaps less conspicuous, seemingly also acts as a novel stimulus or possibly a threat, at least after first capture (see [73]). After several successive days of netting at a colony site, cliff swallows learn to avoid mist nets, possibly because of the trauma associated with capture [73]. Active North American red squirrels (Tamiasciurus hudsonicus) were trapped significantly more frequently than less active squirrels [74]. Thus, Number of captures may be a measure of personality known as activity [22], which tends to generally describe an animal’s propensity to move.

Personality can affect both reproductive success and survival in some species [74–76, 60]. A meta-analysis found that exploration had a positive effect on survival and that boldness had a positive effect on reproductive success but a negative effect on survival [77]. The lack of an association in our study between Reproductive success and Latency to enter nest (possibly a measure of exploration) and Number of attacks (possibly a measure of boldness) may have been influenced by our sample size which was relatively small for a demographic study and may have reduced our ability to find a relationship between neophobia measures and reproductive success. For example, slight differences in fitness components (such as annual reproductive success), while evolutionarily significant over the long term, may often be indistinguishable empirically from null models due to a lack of power [78].

In some animals, more explorative individuals find food sources faster than less explorative individuals [79], and fast-exploration has been linked to increased nestling feeding rates and increased reproductive success [80]. However, Latency to enter nest was not a predictor of the number of food deliveries to a nest in cliff swallows. This lack of a relationship, as well as that for Number of attacks, may have resulted from pooling food deliveries by both parents to a nest and/or by using combined personality scores of both parents. This may have masked sex-differences in parental provisioning related to personality. For example, Mutzel et al. [80] found that fast-exploring female Eurasian blue tits (Cyanistes caeruleus) fed their offspring at higher rates, whereas exploratory personality of males was unrelated to nestling feeding rate. We found evidence in cliff swallows for a relationship between mean Number of captures and the number of parental food deliveries to a nest. Number of captures may be a measure of an individual’s activity personality such that individuals captured more often in mist nets are those that are most active near the nest. This may explain why these birds are also the ones that visit their nest more frequently with food if they are not traveling as far from the nest during foraging.

Personality and coloniality

We did not find significant repeatability at the colony-site level for Number of attacks, Number of captures, or Alarm call response, suggesting that cliff swallows may not sort among colonies based on these behavioral measures. Both the rank order of neophobia trials and the rank order of alarm call trials were significant covariates, suggesting habituation to the novel stimulus and the alarm call play back [81]. Such habituation could reduce our ability to detect repeatable behavior at the colony-site level should habituation lead to reduced variability in the measured behavior across colonies.

The significant repeatability at the colony-site level for Latency to enter nest suggests that cliff swallows may sort into colonies based on this measure of personality. Individuals at the much larger CR-1 and Junkyard colonies were generally quicker to enter their nests when presented with a novel stimulus than individuals at the smaller McDougals colonies (Table 1, Fig 3). Our result contrasts with that of Dardenne et al. [12], who found higher levels of neophobia among barn swallows in larger colonies. They suggested that neophobic barn swallows may benefit from occupying a large colony where they can rely on other, more explorative individuals to lead them to food (c.f. [82]). If this scenario applies to cliff swallows, we would expect neophobic individuals to make fewer food deliveries, as they must wait to be led to food; however, we observed more frequent feeding visits at the small McDougals colonies compared to the larger colonies at CR-1 and Junkyard.

Increased predation odds at small versus large colonies may explain why more neophobic cliff swallows were found at the McDougals site. It is widely believed that predation risk of an individual is decreased when it occupies a large group [23–27, 83]. Without the safety in numbers afforded by large groups, animals in small groups may need to be more cautious to minimize predation risk, possibly explaining the increased neophobia in smaller cliff swallow colonies.

In great tits (Parus major), slow-exploring (neophobic) individuals were less aggressive toward conspecifics whereas fast-exploring individuals were more aggressive [84]. This relationship may also explain why cliff swallow individuals tended to be more neophobic at the smaller colony site. Not only were the CR-1 and Junkyard colonies much larger in size than at McDougals, but the nests at the larger colonies were also more densely packed (Fig 1), making avoidance of social interactions among neighboring individuals more difficult. A socially non-aggressive individual would be at a disadvantage in such a crowded colony where it would frequently need to fend off intruding neighbors [37]. Thus, there may be an advantage for neophobic individuals to choose small colonies where there is less opportunity for frequent social interaction.

Although cliff swallows might sort into different colony sites based on where they fall within the exploration-avoidance personality axis (as measured by Latency to enter nest), we cannot rule out that the observed behavioral variation among sites was instead shaped by the social environment after birds had already settled within a colony [85]. Behavioral plasticity shaped by changes in the social environment has been described in several birds [86–92], and most show a decrease in individual neophobia when in a group setting. King, Williams, and Mettke-Hofmann [93] found that individual Gouldian finches (Erythrura gouldiae) adjusted their boldness behavior to be more similar to that of their partner. We did not make comparisons of neophobia at the partner level over time, but on several occasions, a neophobia trial at the McDougals colony site elicited an almost colony-wide response, with several colony members from nearby nests hovering in front of the focal nest to inspect the novel stimulus. This collective response often occurred when the nest resident alarm-called in response to the piece of marking tape, and was not observed at the larger CR-1 or Junkyard colony sites. Bystanders at the McDougals site were possibly influenced by the alarm-calling (neophobic) nest resident, making bystanders more aware of the stimulus and potentially less likely to respond later when their own nests were tested. However, if this were the case, we should have seen overall shorter latencies to enter nest at the McDougals site compared to other sites.

In the only other study relating personality to colony size in cliff swallows, Roche and Brown [14] found some evidence for among-colony variation in vigilance behavior, but there was no clear relationship between vigilance level and colony size per se. While higher levels of neophobia in smaller colonies (this study) might lead to greater vigilance at those sites, vigilance can also reflect awareness of neighbors and the need to be alert to defend one’s nest from conspecifics, of which there are more in larger colonies. Possibly for this reason no systematic relationship between vigilance and colony size was detected [14].

We acknowledge some limitations to the present study. For example, the removal of ectoparasites, while necessary to increase the number of completed behavioral observations because of high nest failure rates due to swallow bug parasitism [37], might have altered the natural behavior of individuals in unknown ways. Perhaps the time necessary for parents to forage to provision offspring was reduced when nests were freed from parasitism [94, 95]. The laborious nature of these observations precluded conducting them at more colony sites, and thus we could not rigorously test the effect of colony size on individual behavior. However, we selected colony sites that were quite different in size while at the same time similar in other ways (e.g., all were in box-shaped concrete culverts; Fig 1), increasing the likelihood that observed differences among sites were related to colony size. Finally, given the highly social nature of cliff swallows, neophobia tests could not be conducted in isolation. As such, individuals may have seen the novel stimulus being presented at another nest nearby, and this may have happened more often than the protocol assumed. We know this occurred repeatedly at the McDougals site. Such unintended exposure (and resulting habituation) would have made us less likely to detect an effect of the novel stimulus, but we found the opposite result at McDougals, where neophobia was greater among residents.

Conclusions

We were surprised to find only limited evidence in general of systematic variation in behavioral measures of neophobia and risk-taking among cliff swallows in different colonies. This may reflect the divergent and sometimes opposing selection pressures on behavior in different social environments. For example, bold (less neophobic) individuals could benefit in a larger colony by not fleeing at every alarm call and thus not frequently leaving their nest unattended and susceptible to theft of nesting material, egg loss, or brood parasitism from their many conspecific neighbors [37]. However, large colonies are also attacked by predators more often, to a degree that per capita predation risk is greatest in the very largest colonies [37]. Thus, bold individuals in a large colony, while minimizing interference from neighbors by not consistently reacting to alarm calls, might thus have a higher overall risk of predation. The result would be no net advantage for bold versus shy individuals in colonies of different sizes, and thus potentially no selection for bold or shy personalities in the first place. Future work should perhaps examine variation in other behavioral traits, such as foraging, in cliff swallow colonies of different sizes.

We find that meta-analytic effect sizes are significantly different from replication effect sizes; the differences are systematic & m-a effect sizes are almost three times as large as replication effect sizes

Comparing meta-analyses and preregistered multiple-laboratory replication projects. Amanda Kvarven, Eirik Strømland & Magnus Johannesson. Nature Human Behaviour, December 23 2019. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-019-0787-z

Abstract: Many researchers rely on meta-analysis to summarize research evidence. However, there is a concern that publication bias and selective reporting may lead to biased meta-analytic effect sizes. We compare the results of meta-analyses to large-scale preregistered replications in psychology carried out at multiple laboratories. The multiple-laboratory replications provide precisely estimated effect sizes that do not suffer from publication bias or selective reporting. We searched the literature and identified 15 meta-analyses on the same topics as multiple-laboratory replications. We find that meta-analytic effect sizes are significantly different from replication effect sizes for 12 out of the 15 meta-replication pairs. These differences are systematic and, on average, meta-analytic effect sizes are almost three times as large as replication effect sizes. We also implement three methods of correcting meta-analysis for bias, but these methods do not substantively improve the meta-analytic results.

From the open version, OSF.io (17 studies then, 15 studies in the final version):

Discussion

To summarize our findings, we find that there is a significant difference between the metaanalytic effect size and the replication effect size for 12 of the 17 studies (70.6%), and
suggestive evidence for a difference in two additional studies. These differences are systematic
– the meta-analytic effect size is larger than the replication effect for all these studies- and on
average for all the 17 studies the estimated effect sizes are about 3 times as large in the metaanalyses. Interestingly, the relative difference in estimated effect sizes is of at least the same
magnitude as that observed between replications and original studies in the RP:P and other
similar systematic replication projects5,6,10. Publication bias and selective reporting in original
studies has been suggested as possible reasons for the low reproducibility in RP:P and other
replication projects, and our results suggest that these biases are not eliminated by the use of
meta-analysis.
To test further whether meta-analyses reduce the influence of publication bias or
selective reporting, we compare the average unweighted effect size of the original studies to the
meta-analyses. We were able to obtain effect sizes of the original studies converted to Cohen’s
D for all original studies except one where the standard deviation was unavailable.41 We were
additionally able to compute a valid standard error for 14 out of 17 original studies. The average
unweighted effect size of these 14 original studies is 0.561, which is about 42% higher than the
average unweighted effect size of 0.395 of the same 14 studies in the meta-analyses. These
point estimates are consistent with meta-analyses reducing the effect sizes estimated in original
studies somewhat, and in formal meta-analytic models the estimated difference between the
original effect and the summary effect in the meta-analysis varies between 0.089 and 0.166.
These estimated differences are not statistically significant but suggestive of a difference in all
three cases using our criterion for statistical significance. (see Supplementary Table 3 for
details). Further work on larger samples are needed to more conclusively test if meta-analytic
effect sizes differ from original effect sizes.
In a previous related study in medicine, 12 large randomized, controlled trials published
in four leading medical journals were compared to 19 meta-analyses published previously on
the same topics.24 They compared several clinical outcomes between the studies and found a
significant difference between the meta-analyses and the large clinical trials for 12% of the
comparisons. They did not provide any results for the pooled overall difference between metaanalyses and large clinical trials, but from graphically inspecting the results there does not
appear to be a sizeable systematic difference. Those previous results for medicine are thus
different from our findings. This could reflect a genuine difference between psychology and
medicine, but it could also reflect that even large clinical trials in medicine are subject to
selective reporting or publication bias or that large clinical trials with null results are published
in less prestigious journals.
Although we believe the most plausible interpretation of our results is that metaanalyses overestimate effect sizes on average in our sample of studies, there are other possible
explanations. In testing a specific scientific hypothesis in an experiment there can be
heterogeneity in the true effect size due to several sources. The true effect size can vary between
different populations (sample heterogeneity) and the true effect size can vary between different
experimental designs to test the hypothesis (design heterogeneity). If the exact statistical test
used or the inclusion/exclusion criteria of observations included in the analysis differ, this will
yield a third source of heterogeneity in estimated effect sizes (test heterogeneity). In the
multiple lab replications included in our study the design and statistical tests used is held
constant across the labs, whereas the samples vary across labs. The effect sizes across labs will
therefore vary due to sample heterogeneity, but not due to design or test heterogeneity. In the
meta-analyses the effect sizes can vary across the included studies due to sample, design- and
test heterogeneity. Sample, design or test heterogeneity could potentially explain our results.
For sample heterogeneity to explain our results, the replications need to have been
conducted in samples with on average lower true effect sizes than the samples included in the
studies in the meta-analyses. We find this explanation for our results implausible. The Many
Labs studies estimate the sample heterogeneity and only find small or moderate heterogeneity
in effect sizes7-9
. In the recent Many Labs 2 study the average heterogeneity measured as the
standard deviation in the true effect size across labs (Tau) was 0.048
. This can be compared to
the measured difference in meta-analytic and replication effect sizes in our study of 0.232-0.28
for the three methods.
For design or test heterogeneity to explain our results it must be the case that replication
studies select experimental designs or tests producing lower true effect sizes than the average
design and test included to test the same hypotheses in meta-analyses. For this to explain our
results the design and test heterogeneity in meta-analyses would have to be substantial and the
“replicator selection” of weak designs needs to be strong. This potential explanation of our
results would imply a high correlation between design and test heterogeneity in the metaanalysis and the observed difference in the meta-analytic and replication effect sizes; as a larger
design and test heterogeneity increases the scope for “replicator selection”. To further shed
some light on this possibility we were able to obtain information about the standard deviation
in true effect sizes across studies (Tau) for ten of the meta-analyses in our sample; Tau was
reported directly for two of these meta-analyses and sufficient information was provided in the
other eight meta-analyses so that we could estimate Tau. The mean Tau was 0.30 in these ten
meta-analyses with a range from 0.00 to 0.735. This is likely to be an upper bound on the design
and test heterogeneity as the estimated Tau also includes sample heterogeneity. While this is
consistent with a sizeable average design and test heterogeneity in the meta-analyses, it also
needs to be coupled with strong “replicator selection” to explain our results. To test for this, we
estimated the correlation between the Tau of these ten meta-analyses and the difference in the
meta-analytic and replication effect sizes. The Spearman correlation was -0.1879 (p=0.6032)
and the Pearson correlation was -0.3920 (p=0.2626), showing no sign of the observed
differences in effect sizes to be related to the scope for “replicator selection”. In fact, the
estimated correlation is in the opposite direction than the direction predicted by the “replicator
selection” mechanism. This tentative finding departs from a recent meta-research paper that
attributes reproducibility failures in Psychology to heterogeneity in the underlying effect
sizes.25Further work with larger samples is needed on this to more rigorously test for “replicator
selection”. It should also be noted that the pooled replication rate across Many Labs 1-3 is
53%, which is in line with the replication rate observed in three large scale systematic
replication project that should not be prone to “replicator selection” (the Reproducibility
Project: Psychology10, the Experimental Economics Replication Project5 and the Social
Sciences Replication project6
). This suggests no substantial “replicator selection” in the Many
Labs studies that form the majority of our sample.
Another caveat about our results concerns the representativity of our sample. The
inclusion of studies was limited by the number of pre-registered multiple labs replications
carried out so far, and for which of these studies we could find a matching meta-analysis. Our
sample of 17 studies should thus not be viewed as being representative of meta-analysis in
psychology or in other fields. In particular, the relative effect between the original studies and
replication studies for the sample of studies included in our analysis is somewhat larger than
the one observed in previous replication projects5,6,10 – indicating that our sample could be a
select sample of psychological studies where selective reporting is particularly prominent. In
the future the number of studies using our methodology can be extended as more pre-registered
multiple labs replications become available and as the number of meta-analyses continue to
increase. We also encourage others to test out our methodology for evaluating meta-analyses
on an independent sample of studies.
We conclude that meta-analyses produce substantially larger effect sizes than
replication studies in our sample. This difference is largest for replication studies that fail to
reject the null hypothesis, which is in line with recent arguments about a high false positive rate
of meta-analyses in the behavioral sciences20. Our findings suggest that meta-analyses is
ineffective in fully adjusting inflated effect sizes for publication bias and selective reporting. A
potentially effective policy for reducing publication bias and selective reporting is preregistering analysis plans prior to data collection. There is currently a strong trend towards
increased pre-registration in psychology22. This has the potential to increase both the credibility
of original studies, but also of meta-analyses, making meta-analysis a more valuable tool for
aggregating research results. Future meta-analyses may thus produce effect sizes that are closer
to the effect sizes in replication studies.

Religion quantified as affiliation, but not religiosity, was related to negative migrant attitudes; Muslims have more negative attitudes toward migrants than Christians

Religion and Prejudice Toward Immigrants and Refugees: A Meta-Analytic Review. Christine Deslandes & Joel R. Anderson. The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, Volume 29, 2019 - Issue 2, Feb 15 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/10508619.2019.1570814

ABSTRACT: Religion is often a driving force in negative attitudes; however, in the specific case of migrant-based attitudes, research has produced conflicting findings. That is, religion can paradoxically facilitate either tolerance or intolerance toward this group. In light of these inconsistent findings, we conducted a meta-analytic review to estimate the effect size of this relationship with two major aims—first, to explore differences as a function of how religion was operationalised, and second, to explore differences in the target migrant-type (e.g., differences in religion-based attitudes toward immigrants and refugees/asylum seekers). Our search strategy was applied to PsycINFO, EBSCO Psychology and Behavioural Sciences Collection, Web of Science, PsycEXTRA, and ProQuest Central for peer-reviewed English language studies and made calls for unpublished data through relevant professional bodies. This search strategy yielded 37 records (including 43 studies; N = 472,688). Religion was quantified in two ways: either as categorical religious affiliations (k = 60) or as individual differences in self-reported religiosity (k = 30). The meta-analyses revealed that religion quantified as affiliation, but not religiosity, was related to negative migrant attitudes. Specifically, religiously affiliated samples report more negative attitudes than nonreligious affiliated samples, and this effect was often stronger when the target groups were refugees rather than immigrants. In addition, analyses revealed that Muslims have more negative attitudes toward migrants than Christians. Religiosity was unrelated to negative attitudes. These findings are discussed in light of rising antimigrant attitudes.

Check also Cowling, Misha M., Joel Anderson, and Rose Ferguson. 2019. “Prejudice-relevant Correlates of Attitudes Towards Refugees: A Meta-analysis.” OSF Preprints. January 16. doi:10.1093/jrs/fey062

Abstract: This paper meta-analyses the available data on attitudes towards refugees and asylum seekers, with the aim of estimating effect sizes for the relationships between these attitudes and prejudice-relevant correlates. Seventy studies (Ntotal = 13,720) were located using systematic database searches and calls for unpublished data. In the case of demographic factors, being male, religious, nationally identified, politically conservative, and less educated were associated with negative attitudes (Fisher’s zs = 0.11, 0.17, 0.18, 0.21, & -0.16, respectively). For ideological factors, increases in right-wing authoritarianism and socialdominance orientations correlated with negative attitudes, while the endorsement of macro (but not micro) justice principles were associated with positive attitudes (Fisher’s zs = 0.50, 0.50, -0.29, & 0.00 respectively). Perceptions of refugees as symbolic and realistic threats were the strongest correlates of negative attitudes (Fisher’s zs = 0.98, & 1.11, respectively). These findings have contributed to the growing body of knowledge that endeavors to understand the antecedents of refugee-specific prejudice, and are discussed in light of the global refugee crisis. 

In large part, the wish to change personality did not predict actual change in the desired direction; & desired increases in Extraversion, Agreeableness & Conscientiousness corresponded with decreases

From Desire to Development? A Multi-Sample, Idiographic Examination of Volitional Personality Change. Erica Baransk et al. Journal of Research in Personality, December 26 2019, 103910. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2019.103910

Highlights
• In large part, individuals’ volitional personality change desires did not predict actual change in the desired direction.
• Desired increases in Extraversion, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness corresponded with decreases in corresponding traits.
• Participants perceived more change than actually occurred.
• Decreases in Emotional Stability predicted perceptions of personality change.

Abstract: Using an idiographic-nomothetic methodology, we assessed individuals’ ability to change their personality traits without therapeutic or experimental involvement. Participants from internet and college populations completed trait measures and reported current personality change desires. Self-reported traits as well as perceptions of trait change were collected after 1-year (Internet) and 6-months (College). In large part, volitional personality change desires did not predict actual change. When desires did predict change, (a) desired increases in Extraversion, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness corresponded with decreases in corresponding traits, (b) participants perceived more change than actually occurred, and (c) decreases in Emotional Stability predicted perceptions of personality change. Results illustrate the difficulty in purposefully changing one’s traits when left to one’s own devices.

Keywords: Volitional personality changeIdiographic-nomotheticPersonality development


From Baranski's 2018 PhD Thesis https://escholarship.org/content/qt6pk2h81f/qt6pk2h81f.pdf?t=pexwxu:

Volitional personality change across 58 countries

First, on average across 58 countries, 61.38% participants report that they are
currently trying to change an aspect of their personalities. The sheer number of people
around the world that are trying to accomplish personality change goals is in and of itself
notable. Indeed only eight countries had percentages lower than 50%. Nevertheless, there
was substantial variation across countries in the percentage of individuals who were
attempting this change. Specifically, country proportion of volitional personality change
attempts ranged from 84.75% (Indonesia) to 28.07% (Israel).
In an attempt to explain this variation, I first related country-level variables to
countries’ proportion of volitional personality change. In countries with high employment
rates, a higher proportion of individuals report trying to change their personalities. It may
be the case that workplace demands inspire individuals to attempt to improve their
personalities in ways that would be beneficial to workplace success. In support of this
possibility, previous research in lifespan development indicates success in the workforce
(e.g., being detailed oriented and dependable) is related to high levels of
conscientiousness (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Tett & Burnett, 2003). It may be the case,
therefore, that individuals beginning a new job or adding new responsibilities to an
existing position may be intentionally increasing levels of conscientiousness to meet their
new workplace demands. Also, low levels of country-level subjective health was related
to high proportions of volitional personality change. One possible explanation for this
relationship is that individuals residing in countries with low averages of self-reported
health might be inspired to work towards feeling better in all areas of their lives. In other
words, in an attempt to improve low wellbeing evidenced by their subjective health
ratings, individuals may seek to be more emotionally stable (to improve psychological
well-being) or conscientious (to improve self-care).
I next investigated what predicted volitional personality change on the individual
level. Across the majority of countries, individuals with high levels of negative
emotionality and its facets (i.e., anxiety, depression and emotionality) and low levels of
both subjective and interdependent happiness tended to report currently trying to change
an aspect of their personalities. There was also a trend for individuals high in openness
(driven by intellect) to also report volitional personality change, albeit less consistently
across countries. These results imply that individuals who have negative emotions yet are
highly intellectual tend to want to change an aspect of their personalities. In other words,
individuals who are thinking deeply about their own negative personality traits or general
wellbeing, tend to be report changing something about their personalities.
 The aforementioned findings cue us in to who is trying to change their
personalities around the world. The next question to examine, then, is what exactly it is
people want to change. Similar to individuals across US states, the majority of
participants from our international sample indicated that they were trying to be more
emotionally stable, conscientious, extraverted and agreeable. Again replicating analyses
from our US sample, facet level analyses revealed that a proportion of responses that fell
in to each category, some categories varied more than others. For instance, the degree of
variation for increased emotional stability was nearly a fourth of that for increased
extraversion. Indeed, the lowest proportion of individuals with an volitional personality
attempt to increase emotional stability is 14.55% (Hong Kong), whereas the lowest
proportion for attempts to increase extraversion across countries was 3.37% (Croatia).
The latter finding may be explained by already high levels of extraversion for Croatian
participants – who had among the highest levels of this trait relative to the other countries
included in the analyses.
 Finally, I assessed the relationship between current personality traits and specific
volitional personality change attempts. For extraversion, agreeableness,
conscientiousness and negative emotionality, there were strong relationships between
current trait levels and corresponding volitional personality change traits. For instance,
individuals with low levels of extraversion tended to report that they were currently
trying to increase levels of extraversion (driven by attempts to increase levels of
sociability). Like analyses across US states, these patterns did not vary across countries.
The one exception, however, was negative emotionality which did vary in its relationship
to attempts to increase emotional stability across countries. Indeed, looking at these
relationships by country reveals that in some countries there is a positive relationship
between current levels of negative emotionality and the attempt to increase emotional
stability, and in others there is a strong positive relationship. For example, in Slovakia,
those who reported a current attempt to increase emotional stability tended to have low
levels of negative emotionality, whereas in New Zealand, individuals who report trying to
increase levels of emotional stability tend to be high in negative emotionality. It seems to
be the case that in some countries, negative emotionality prompts volitional personality
change in the same way it does with other traits (e.g., high negative emotionality
prompting attempts to be more emotionally stable), yet in others, low levels of negative
emotionality prompts individuals to be even more emotionally stable.

Sports: Tendency to attribute personal success to internal factors & personal failure to external ones, & a tendency to attribute team success to factors within the team & failure to factors outside the team

Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Self-Serving Attribution Biases in the Competitive Context of Organized Sport, Mark S. Allen et al. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, December 25, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167219893995

Abstract: This meta-analysis explored the magnitude of self-serving attribution biases for real-world athletic outcomes. A comprehensive literature search identified 69 studies (160 effect sizes; 10,515 athletes) that were eligible for inclusion. Inverse-variance weighted random-effects meta-analysis showed that sport performers have a tendency to attribute personal success to internal factors and personal failure to external factors (k = 40, standardized mean difference [SMD] = 0.62), a tendency to attribute team success to factors within the team and team failure to factors outside the team (k = 23, SMD = 0.63), and a tendency to claim more personal responsibility for team success and less personal responsibility for team failure (k = 4, SMD = 0.28). There was some publication bias and heterogeneity in computed averages. Random effects meta-regression identified sample sex, performance level, and world-region as important moderators of pooled mean effects. These findings provide a foundation for theoretical development of self-serving tendencies in real-world settings.

Keywords: group processes, judgment, meta-regression, self-serving bias, sport psychology