Menopause may be the result of the accumulation of infertility mutations in older women due to men’s preference for younger mates;it can de-evolve, be delayed and even disappear, in theory

Is menopause still evolving? Evidence from a longitudinal study of multiethnic populations and its relevance to women's health. Rama Shankar Singh, Shirley Chan, Alyssa Gomes. BMC Women's Health, Dec 26 2019 (under review). DOI:10.21203/rs.2.19623/v1

Abstract: To reflect on the impact of changing patterns of delayed marriage and reproduction and to seek evidence as to whether menopause is still evolving, characteristics of the menopause transition were investigated within and between ethnic populations in this study. A cross-sectional analysis was conducted using data on 747 middle-aged women obtained from the Study of Women’s Health Across the Nation (SWAN) from 1996 to 2008. The ethnic groups included: Afro-American, Chinese, Japanese, Caucasian, and Hispanic. Perimenopause age and duration, menopause age, and hormonal indicators of menopause were examined across five ethnicities. We found a similar window of menopause age within populations, but no significant difference in perimenopause and menopause age between populations. The rate of increase of follicle-stimulating hormone and testosterone differed significantly in Hispanics and African-Americans during the menopause transition period. The broad window of variation in age at menopause within the population (45-60 years) and the absence of significant differences between populations, in combination with population variation in menopause symptoms, suggest that menopause is a relatively recently evolved and still evolving trait. Under the mate choice theory of menopause, menopause is the result of the accumulation of infertility mutations in older women due to men’s preference for younger mates. We propose a shifting mate choice-shifting menopause model which posits that, as the age of mate choice/marriage shifts to older age, so will the age at menopause, and that menopause is a transient phase of female fertility; it can de-evolve, be delayed and even disappear, in theory.

KEYWORDS: Mate choice, menopause, perimenopause, sex-hormones, menstruation

Discussion

Insight into the association between ethnic diversity and the characteristics of a woman’s menopause transition may provide evidence for the timing of the appearance of menopause in human evolution. In this study, we evaluated perimenopause and menopause age, perimenopause duration, and the associated reproductive hormonal changes in a longitudinal, multi-ethnic sample from the cross-sectional study SWAN⁹. While the results of this study revealed lack of a consistent ethnicity-specific difference in the timing of the menopause transition, there were significant changes in the associated hormones which, together with variations within populations in the menopause “window” and population-specific variation in menopausal symptoms, are suggestive of menopause as a recently evolved and still evolving trait in human evolution.

Before discussing the significance of these results, it is important to state the rationale for this study. From the women’s health point of view, it is important to know if menopause is still evolving and, if so, can it de-evolve, i.e. can it be delayed or even eliminated. To be able answer this question, we need to know the nature of variation in menopause. The SWAN study (and many others reviewed by Gold et al.⁹) looked into the effect of lifestyle factors on menopause. Controlling for sociodemographic, lifestyle, and health factors affecting the final menstrual period (FMP), Gold et al.⁹ found that “racial/ethnic groups did not differ in age at the FMP. Higher educational level, prior oral contraceptive use, and higher weight at baseline, as well as being employed, not smoking, consuming alcohol, having less physical activity, and having better self-rated health over follow-up, were significantly associated with later age at the FMP”. These results suggest that menopause is a complex trait, but it is interesting to note that, in spite of the effect of socioeconomic factors, the onset-age “window” of menopause remains more or less stable from population to population (Fig. 2). Our reduced data set was designed to increase the chances of discovering ethnic differences in the onset age of menopause; we found it to vary significantly in Hispanic population only. In the following, we review our findings and use them to propose a model of “shifting mate choice-shifting menopause” and predict that there is population variation in the onset age of perimenopause and that the shifting patterns of mate choice and marriage will lead to a shift, a delay in the onset age of menopause.

Ethnic variation in perimenopause age

At present, this is the first assessment of the age of perimenopause onset in a multi-ethnic sample. This study has identified a significantly earlier perimenopause onset in women of Hispanic descent compared to women of Caucasian, African-American, Chinese, and Japanese descent. Hispanics experience perimenopause approximately two years earlier, which suggests that changes in the reproductive systems are still taking place and that menopause has not stopped evolving separately in each population. While this result may be suspect because of small sample size and heterogeneity among samples originating from different Central American countries, as we show below, other studies have reported similar results.

Previous perimenopause literature is highly limited. Mentions of perimenopause age in other literature are either not quantified or they refer to the mean age of women in the perimenopause cohort, rather than onset age. Of the feasible literature, McKinlay et al.²⁷ has reported the inception of perimenopause to be 47.5 years, earlier than determined in our study (51.8 years). It should be noted that McKinlay et al.’s²⁷ perimenopause age was not specific to any ethnicity and was limited to women in Massachusetts. Sammel et al.²⁸ also examined the menopause transition across ethnicities, albeit limited to Caucasians and African-Americans. The specific age was not listed, but it was found that African-American women entered perimenopause earlier than Caucasians, a finding that was not observed in this study²⁸. Differences in the reported age in McKinlay et al.’s²⁷ study and the variation in African-American and Caucasian women perimenopause age of onset in Sammel et al.’s²⁸ study can be attributed to definition bias introduced in our study. Other studies define perimenopause onset using early perimenopause (menstrual irregularity). In contrast, we used late perimenopause (3 to 11 months of amenorrhea) due to a change in the questionnaire following the 1997–1999 follow-up (SWAN), which led to overestimation of perimenopause onset age. It is likely that a change in perimenopause definition will yield results similar to other studies, as our results are consistent with Sammel et al.’s²⁸ finding that entry into late perimenopause did not differ significantly between African-American and Caucasian women. Although it is probable that the definition of perimenopause influenced observed trends, it is likely that an ethnic variation in perimenopausal age exists. Perimenopause age in Indian women was reported to be 44.69 years, which is prominently earlier than any reported perimenopause age for US women as a whole and thus suggestive of differential biological timing of perimenopause present among populations²⁹. More studies with diverse population samples are needed.

Ethnic variation in menopause age

In agreement with wide variation in menopause age across women worldwide, heterogeneity in menopausal age among ethnicities was found only in Hispanics in our study. Hispanic women experienced menopause two years earlier than women of other ethnicities, which mimics the results found for perimenopause age. Again, this result may due to small sample size, but several studies have reported a two year difference in menopausal age between Hispanic and Caucasian women^{30 − 32}. Age of menopause in Hispanic populations has been reported at 48.5 years for 15 countries across Latin America and 47.9 years in Mexican women, whereas Caucasian populations experience menopause at 50 years^{33, 34}. Despite the higher menopausal age recorded in this study (51 vs. 53 years; Fig. 2), which was attributed to differences in methodology, our findings support previous literature. Furthermore, we suggest this difference is unlikely to be the result of lifestyle factors such as smoking prevalence, which accelerates menopause by 1–2 years^{27, 32, 35}. Previous analysis of SWAN participants have shown that smoking frequency was lower among Hispanics than Caucasians and African Americans, which was consistent with other studies^{36, 37}. Hence, the earlier onset in Hispanic women may be due to a different biological clock for the timing of menopause onset compared to other ethnicities.

Studies of candidate gene polymorphisms affecting menopausal age have found that the rs16991615 SNP in MCM8 locus, a gene involved in the repair of double-stranded DNA breaks reduces age at menopause by 2.3 years for Hispanic women³⁸. The samers16991615 SNP exerts the opposite result in Caucasian women, increasing menopausal age by 0.82 years³⁹. The effect of an SNP may vary according to ethnicity, which suggests that menopause may have co-opted different genes in ancestral Hispanic populations.

Whether a difference in menopausal age between African-Americans and Caucasians exists is unclear. Bromberger et al.³⁵ proposed that African-American women experience menopause six months to a year earlier than Caucasian women. This seems plausible given that studies of African women, specifically from Ghana and Nigeria, determined that menopause occurred at 48–49 years, which is earlier than Caucasian women^30,32,34. In contrast, several studies did not report differences in menopausal age between Caucasians and African-Americans^28,30,31. Our findings support the latter, as both the mean and median menopausal age in both ethnicities was similar. It is possible that the small African American sample size (n = 19) and high percentage of smokers could have contributed to Bromberger et al.’s³⁵ observations.

The similarity in menopausal age observed in both African-American and Caucasian women led us to expect similar evolution of menopause in their ancestral populations. Interestingly, however, many of the Caucasian associated SNPs studied in candidate gene polymorphisms associated with menopause age were poorly replicated or not replicable in African-Americans in GWAS studies, which suggest that African-Americans are not as similar to Caucasians as initially believed^39,41. Given the high linkage disequilibrium, African-Americans were suggested to have a variant of the SNP at the associated loci, although it was not identified^{39, 41}. If variants exist in African-Americans, it is possible that the effect of the variant would be similar to the Caucasian SNP to result in the similar phenotype (i.e. menopause age) observed between these two ethnicities. This seems plausible since the SNP findings were able to be replicated in African Americans, such as the rs365132 SNP at the UIMC1 locus, with effects similar to Caucasians (i.e. increased menopausal age by ~ 0.4 years)⁴¹. Further research is required to determine the variation between Caucasians and African-Americans, as SNPs associated with menopause onset in African-Americans have not been well-studied.

Menopausal age for Chinese women from China and Singapore and Japanese women from Japan was roughly 50 years in both populations, which resembles the Caucasian menopausal age^34,41,44. Concurrent with our results, similarity in menopausal age between Caucasian, Chinese, and Japanese women have been reported in the literature^42,45−47. Several SNPs associated with menopausal age in Caucasians were replicated to the same effect and direction in Chinese women from Shanghai, suggesting that there are some shared menopausal evolutionary traits between these two ethnicities⁴⁸.

Recent studies have suggested that Japanese women entered menopause at later ages than Caucasian women^28,30,31,37. While the mean menopausal age did not differ significantly between Caucasian and Japanese women in our study, we did observe a higher percentage of Japanese women entering perimenopause and menopause later than other ethnicities, which supports past findings^28,30,31,37. If differences in menopause age exist between the two ethnicities, this may indicate differences in menopause affecting loci. One study reported several SNPs associated with menopause age in Caucasians could not be replicated in Japanese women in GWAS studies; however this was a very small study³⁹. Further research is needed to determine whether or not Caucasian SNPs can actually be replicated in Japanese women or whether other variants exist.

Ethnic variation in the duration length of perimenopause

This is also the first study reporting the duration of perimenopause among different ethnic groups. In spite of the heterogeneity in the timing of the menopause transition, our findings show that the length of perimenopause was consistent across all ethnicities (Fig. 4). The duration of perimenopause appears negatively correlated with the age of menopause. This result presents the possibility that the intrinsic mechanisms underlying the progressive loss in ovarian function from the perimenopause to menopause stage is shared among individuals. Combined with the data for timing of the menopause transition, it is hypothesized that the timing of onset is what separates the menopause phenotype between ethnicities, as opposed to the duration. Future research can be directed to understanding why and how the timing of menopause has been shifted in different populations over the course of human evolution to result in the current ethnic variation in the onset of the menopause transition. One evolutionary theory explores the idea that women of ancestral populations with lower female biased dispersal would experience earlier menopause, although the required information about ancestral ecologies in these populations is lacking⁴⁹.

McKinlay et al.²⁷ determined the length of perimenopause to be 3.7 years, which was markedly higher than the 1.3 years reported in this study. Again, this can be partly attributed to the definition bias of perimenopause, which would have led to an underestimation of the perimenopause duration in this study (Fig. 4). Alternatively, the methodological differences used to determine the duration was also a factor. For example, McKinlay et al.²⁷ determined duration by subtracting the mean age of menopause from perimenopause onset. This could lead to under/overestimation of the duration since it was not representative of the duration in individuals. There is individual variation in duration of perimenopause; hence, the duration should be determined by averaging the duration in each individual, which was done in this study. Future studies in perimenopause length are encouraged to average individual duration for greater accuracy of the duration. Additionally, further research is needed to determine if the similarity in duration in ethnic groups still exists when early perimenopause is used to define perimenopause onset, as opposed to late perimenopause.

Ethnic variation in hormone concentrations

Across all ethnicities, E2 concentrations declined over the menopause transition, as expected. As the menopause transition progresses, there is progressive loss of ovarian follicles, which produces E2, leading to overall reduced E2 levels³². Consistent with studies conducted by Randolph et al. [50] and Kim et al.⁵¹, mean E2 levels did not differ significantly across ethnicities. Similarities between E2 levels across ethnicities may be linked to earlier observations of the perimenopause duration. Klaiber et al.⁵² noted that women with lower E2 levels had shorter menopause transition duration. Since all ethnicities were similar in E2 levels, the duration was not expected to differ between ethnicities, which are consistent with our results.

Since changes in E2 are correlated to changes in FSH, we did not expect differences in serum FSH across ethnicities either. However, we found a significantly lower FSH increase in Hispanics and African-Americans compared to other ethnicities during the menopause transition. These ethnic differences in FSH levels were thought to be linked to ethnic variation in pituitary-ovarian feedback during the menopause transition, such as variation in estrogen sensitivity^{53 − 55}. Greater sensitivity to estrogen decline is associated with higher FSH levels, as estrogen is a negative regulator of FSH. Examination of polymorphisms in ESR1, which codes for an estrogen receptor, has shown that the rs2234693 polymorphism was significantly associated with Caucasian women menopause onset, although further research is needed for other ethnicities⁵⁶. In contrast, other studies have reported higher FSH levels in Hispanics and African-Americans, regardless of menopausal status^50,53. This was attributed to the lack of adjusted BMI hormonal values in our study and different hormonal collection times. Fundamentally, both our results and Randolph et al.’s^50,53 have consistently noted an ethnic difference in FSH levels.

Similar to FSH levels, there was an ethnic difference in the increase of T levels across the menopause transition. Premenopausal T concentrations did not vary among ethnicities, but in menopausal women, T was significantly higher in Hispanic and African-American women compared to other ethnicities, suggestive of ethnic differences in T metabolism over the menopause transition. Literature to support this observation is scarce because T assays have difficulties reporting the low T concentrations in women, making it challenging to study in menopausal women⁵⁷. A study by Luckey et al.’s⁵⁸ provides a possible indicator of ethnic differences in T metabolism by examining rates of bone loss during the menopause transition, as lower T levels are suggested to contribute to greater bone loss. In Luckey et al.’s⁵⁸ study, African-American women were found to have lower rates of bone loss than white women, suggestive of higher T levels in African-Americans, which is consistent with our findings in this study. Other studies have found lower T levels for African-Americans and Hispanics compared to other ethnicities, which was attributed to BMI adjusted values^50,51. Overall, we can affirm that ethnic variation for T levels exists.

Several studies have correlated changes in SHBG to changes in T, which may suggest that ethnic differences in T could be attributed to ethnic differences in SHBG during the menopause transition^59,60. This was unlikely given that ethnic differences in SHBG in menopausal women and SHBG rate of increase over the menopause transition were not observed, which was consistent with findings from Burger et al.⁵⁹. Alternatively, studies have found associations between DHAS and T, which may also suggest ethnic differences in DHAS as a factor for ethnic differences in T^60,61. While ethnic differences were noted in DHAS levels in both premenopausal women and menopausal women, no ethnic differences were found in the rate of DHAS increase. Similar findings have also been reported in other studies⁵⁹. It thus seems that ethnic differences in DHAS changes are not specifically associated with the menopause transition, and is unlikely to be the cause of ethnic differences in T during the menopause transition, so other factors are likely responsible for the ethnic differences in T changes. One possibility involves androstenediol, which is secreted similarly to DHAS during the menopause transition⁶². Its concentrations are thought to affect the balance of androgens over the menopause transition, hence research determining if ethnic differences exist for androstenediol, along with other possibilities for the ethnic differences in T, would be beneficial⁶².

As mentioned before, there are several limitations to this study. The first is regarding the participants. The age of participants was limited to 42–55 years, which may have biased the perimenopause and menopause age to older ages. This may not be a significant limitation, given that, in a study done by Luborsky et al.³⁷, they reported ethnic variation in premature menopause (menopause age < 40 years) consistent with our study. The exclusion of women with inconsistent bleeding patterns in this study could also have biased the results. Although not shown, we retested our findings with these exceptions added, but overall the findings remained the same. Secondly, late perimenopause was used to define perimenopause onset, leading to an overestimation of perimenopause age, underestimation of menopause duration, and irregularity in premenopausal hormone values. Additionally, use of BMI adjusted hormonal values could have altered our findings, as BMI has been shown to affect hormonal values significantly, positively for T and negatively for all other tested hormonal values⁵³. It is also possible that hormone therapy could have interfered with our findings; however, as explored by Kim et al.⁵¹, hormone therapy does not deviate from the results comparing ethnicities; rather, it only reduces the differences between groups.

A “shifting mate choice-shifting menopause” model of female fertility

The main results regarding variation in age of menopause, from this study as well as others, can be summarized as follows. Firstly, all human populations, regardless of socioeconomic status, show a roughly 15-year window of menopause^{45 − 60}, which means that there is plenty of variation within populations. Secondly, many lifestyle factors are known to affect the age of menopause, but with the exception of premature menopause, the menopause window persists in all populations. Thirdly, there are no significant ethnic differences in the onset age of perimenopause, presumably because there has not been sufficient time since the origin of menopause to produce such differences. Furthermore, as we show below, the absence of variation among populations may indicate the role of similar mate choice mechanisms (i.e. male preference for younger mates) operating in all human populations. Fourth, there are significant changes in the levels of associated hormones within as well as between populations. Finally, different populations show ethnicity/race-specific menopause symptoms; for example, vasomotor symptoms were more common in Afro-American and Hispanic women than in other ethnicities⁶³. This suggests a role of both biological and cultural factors. We take these results to mean that menopause is a relatively recent trait, and most variation in the trait is present within populations with relatively little variation between populations. This is not surprising in view of what is known about human genetic variation in general¹⁹.

We use these results to extend the mate choice theory of menopause¹⁰, which holds that menopause is the result of men’s preference for younger mates, leading to the accumulation of deleterious mutations affecting fertility in women deprived of reproduction. We propose (1) that the present menopause window (roughly 45–60 years) is directly related to the “mate choice window” in the present-day human population (roughly 15–30 years); (2) that the lack of between-variation in perimenopause is the result of a similar mate choice system operating in all human populations; and (3) that changing patterns of mate choice/marriage will ultimately lead to a shift in the onset age of menopause. This shift will not occur immediately as the pressure from the shifting mate choice will only have its effect if women of premenopausal age will choose to engage in reproduction. Under the mate choice theory, menopause is a transient phase of male-imposed female fertility and it will be delayed with changing patterns of delayed mate choice/marriage and reproduction.

Older Brothers and Male Homosexuality: Antibodies as an Explanation

Older Brothers and Male Homosexuality: Antibodies as an Explanation. T.S. Sathyanarayana Rao, Chittaranjan Andrade. Journal of Psychosexual Health, August 9, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/2631831819855199

The familial nature of homosexuality in men has been known for decades.1 The finding is gender-specific; homosexual men have a higher proportion of homosexual brothers than heterosexual men, but not a higher proportion of homosexual sisters.2

It has also been known for decades that homosexual men have a lower birth order, on average, than heterosexual men.3, 4 More specifically, homosexual men have a greater number of older brothers but not older sisters, younger brothers, or younger sisters.5

The evidence for the fraternal birth order effect is strong. There is a very large number of studies on the subject, and these studies have been subjected to meta-analysis. In this meta-analysis,6 the strength of the effect in persons from small versus large families and in homosexual males with masculine gender identities versus those with feminine gender identities were compared.

The meta-analysis included 30 homosexual and 30 heterosexual groups from 26 studies. The pooled sample included 7140 homosexual and 12,837 heterosexual males. The outcome variable of interest, the older brothers odds ratio (OR), was calculated as follows:

First, an older brothers ratio was calculated for homosexuals and heterosexuals separately. This value was the number of older brothers divided by the number of all other siblings.

Next, the older brothers OR was calculated as the older brothers ratio in homosexuals divided by that in heterosexuals. This OR is interpreted in the conventional way; a value of 1 indicates no fraternal birth order effect and values >1 indicate support for the fraternal birth order hypothesis.

Important findings from the meta-analysis are presented in Box 1. In summary, the meta-analysis found that having a larger number of older brothers was associated with a significantly increased risk of homosexual orientation, especially feminine or transgender homosexual orientation. This fraternal birth order effect was unrelated to family size. Of interest, the meta-analysis also found that only about 15% to 29% of men in any given homosexual group could attribute their sexual orientation to the fraternal birth order effect.

Why should having (more) older brothers increase the risk of homosexuality in men? A superficially plausible explanation is that fraternal sexual exposure or experimentation in childhood may behaviorally prime individuals towards a homosexual orientation. This explanation fails because it does not explain why having younger brothers does not predispose to male homosexuality or why the same-sex sibling effect does not exist for women.

The fraternal birth order effect has therefore led to a search for biological explanations, and an in utero maternal immune response has been suggested.7, 8 In this context, Bogaert et al.9 examined plasma from mothers of male offspring about half of whom had a gay son, and controls, comprising men as well as women with no sons. They used immune assays to study whether mothers develop antibodies against two Y-linked proteins that are important in male brain development in utero, and whether this effect strengthens with succeeding male gestations. The proteins that they studied were protocadherin 11 Y-linked (PCDH11Y) and neuroligin 4 Y-linked (NLGN4Y; isoforms 1 and 2).

Important findings from the study of Bogaert et al.9 are presented in Box 2. In summary, the findings suggested that the maternal immune response against a Y-linked protein (that is important in male brain development in utero) is associated with homosexual orientation in sons. This protein, the NLGN4Y protein, is a cell-adhesion protein that plays a vital role in cell-cell interactions, specifically in the process of synapse formation, during in utero neurodevelopment.7

At the risk of stating the obvious, it must be noted that the development of sexual orientation is multifactorial and depends on biological and social influences from the womb through early life. Nevertheless, if an antibody response can be confirmed as an etiological factor, might primary prevention interventions be possible?

There is a positive relation between the personal importance that subjects attribute to a moral issue and the objectivity they bestow to it; presenting moral demands as objective may be instrumental to the function of choosing sides in moral debate

Hopster, Jeroen and Klenk, Michael, Evolution and the Objectivity of Moral Judgments (December 9, 2019). SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3500683

Abstract: Can findings from experimental and evolutionary psychology help to adjudicate the debate between moral realism and moral antirealism? In this article we address this question from two angles. First, we present the results of an experiment in moral psychology we have conducted, which shows that there is a positive relation between respondents’ ratings of the ‘personal importance’ and the ‘objectivity’ attributed to moral issues. Second, we discuss these results in the context of a recent hypothesis from evolutionary psychology, according to which objectifying moral issues serves a signaling function: agents present moral issues as objective to flag that they find these issues important. Does this hypothesis, if correct, have any metaethical implications? We acknowledge some of the pitfalls in drawing robust metaethical conclusions from this body of work, but argue that it is metaethically relevant nonetheless: it overturns a key desideratum of metaethical analysis in a realist-unfriendly way.

Keywords: Metaethics, moral psychology, experimental psychology, folk objectivity, evolutionary debunking arguments, social consensus, personal importance, signalling, choosing sides


4. General Discussion: The Psychosocial and Evolutionary Functions of Objectifying Morality

In the previous section we presented experimental evidence which suggests that personal
importance is one of the determinants of regarding moral statements as objective. In this section
we turn to the question of what psychosocial function objectifying moral issues might serve,
and what this function might tell us about morality’s evolutionary origins. Objectifying moral
demands may serve multiple psychosocial functions; here we will highlight some of the
functions that we think are particularly prevalent. While these proposals are not directly
implied by our experimental work, they have a good fit with our experimental findings.

4.1 What Is the Function of Externalizing Moral Demands?
Perhaps the first metaethicist to suggest that objectifying moral judgments serves a
psychosocial function was John Mackie (1977). According to Mackie, it often serves
interpersonal relations well to behave as morality requires: ‘We need morality to regulate
interpersonal relations, to control some of the ways in which people behave towards one
another, often in opposition to contrary inclinations. We therefore want our moral judgments
to be authoritative’ (1977 p. 43). Think of situations which involve a tragedy of the commons:
to coordinate action by referring to common moral values might help to solve social
predicaments.
Why should moral values be regarded as objective to serve this function? Followers of
Mackie, such as Joyce (2006), have argued that objectifying moral demands has a motivational
upshot: feeling an internal sense of moral obligation motivates us to behave as morality
requires. Perhaps this is part of the explanation, but as Stanford (2018) has recently argued, it
cannot be the full story. We are also motivated by subjective experiences, such as the
experience of pain or hunger, which we do not cast in terms of having an external authority.
What additional function is served by supposing moral demands to be objective?
Wright et al. (2013; 2014) have formulated a hypothesis about the psychosocial
function of moral objectivism that may answer this question. Building on experimental findings
which suggest that subjects’ attitudes towards regarding moral issues as objective is quite
flexible and diverse, they suggest that a capacity to modulate the objectivity ascribed to moral
issues helps to coordinate dialogue and action both within and between sociocultural groups
(Wright, McWhite, Grandjean 2014 p. 31):
Viewing a moral issue as objectively grounded removes it from the realm of legitimate
personal/social negotiation (…). Viewing a moral issue as non-objectively grounded,
on the other hand, allows people to acknowledge its moral significance (…), while at
the same time maintaining room for choice, dialogue, and debate.
We think that Wright et al.’s hypothesis is along the right lines: presenting a moral
demand as objective typically signals an unwillingness of the agent making the demand to
easily change her mind about it. But we disagree that objectifying moral issues removes them
from the realm of legitimate negotiation. More plausibly, we think, an ascription of objectivity
serves to signal on which topics agents are willing to stand their ground in moral discussion.
This function, in turn, is at least partly modulated by what issues agents find important, as our
experimental results suggest. Presenting an issue as objective typically signals that agents are
willing to stand their ground in moral debate, often with regard to issues which they judge to
be of specific personal importance.

4.2 Moral Objectification: A Signalling Hypothesis
Our signalling hypothesis contrasts with the view that the function of objectifying moral
judgments serves the function of moral persuasion. As Mercier, Sperber (2017) argue,
discussions typically do not serve to grasp truths but to persuade other parties. We grant that
the same might typically be true for moral discussions, but we do not think that this is the main
function of presenting moral issues as objective. Rather than dialectical effectiveness – i.e. an
ability to efficaciously change other people’s minds – we think that objectifying moral issues
typically serves to signal that agents care about an issue and are not easily prepared to change
their minds about it. In doing so they give others a choice: on this issue you’re either with me,
or against me. Hence, presenting moral issues as objective may be an effective means to form
moral alliances, to enhance in-group cohesion and to demarcate the out-group.
Our signalling hypothesis also contrasts with the view that moral objectification is
mostly due to conformity bias. We do not deny that conformity bias may play a role in moral
decision-making, but hypothesize that when issues are presented as objective, this is typically
not due to an agent seeking conformity. Rather than siding with the majority, presenting a
moral issue as objective serves to signal agents’ personal commitment to the issue and their
willingness to stand their ground, even in the face of contrary moral viewpoints and regardless
of the consensus view. Perhaps signalling this commitment is specifically beneficial if a moral
stance is a minority view: it allows fellow activists to rally support for specific moral issues
irrespective of what the majority says.

4.3 Choosing Sides
Two of the features of moral objectification outlined in the previous subsection – objectifying
moral issues often instigates third parties to choose sides, and often does so on the basis of the
contents of specific issues rather than majority consensus – are congruent with a recent
evolutionary hypothesis by DeScioli, Kurzban (2013), who have argued in detail in support of
the thesis that the main evolutionary function of moral judgment is choosing sides in conflict.
Choosing sides is a strategic interaction problem that involves a perpetrator, a victim and a
third-party condemner. Different solutions are possible, some which involve decision
procedures that would never be advisable in making individual choices, but may be beneficial
in multiplayer interactions.
One possible solution is to choose sides on the basis of pre-existing alliances. However,
this strategy has the downside of escalating conflicts, resulting in greater fighting costs. A
second solution is to choose sides on the basis of power: third parties side with the most
powerful party in the conflict. However, this strategy has the downside of concentrating power
in the hands of high-status individuals and may lead to authoritarianism and exploitation. A
third solution is to choose sides by focusing on the contents of an action. Some actions may be
flagged as never–to-be-done or categorically wrong; this public signal can subsequently
coordinate third-party judgment. This solution is characteristic of moral conflicts, in which
bystanders typically coordinate which side they choose not on the basis of the identities of the
disputants but on the basis of their actions. Indeed, some characteristic features of morality –
its impartiality, non-consequentialist characteristics and the categorical nature of moral
demands – can be explained by this strategic interaction framework.
Our hypothesis fits well with that of DeScioli, Kurzban (2013) and extends it to the
metaethical domain. We think that objectifying moral issues is instrumental to the function of
choosing sides. For parties engaged in conflict, presenting an issue as objective serves as an
effective instrument to force third parties to choose sides in the debate. By objectifying an
issue, members of the party engaged in conflict signal their intention to stand their ground, and
force bystanders to choose: on this issue they are either with them, or against them.

5. A Challenge for Moral Realism from Evolutionary Psychology?

In this article we have highlighted recent experimental findings from moral psychology,
including those of our own, as well hypotheses from moral psychology concerning the
psychosocial and evolutionary functions of moral objectivism. Let’s assume that they are along
the right lines. Do they have any implication for metaethics? More specifically, do they give
rise to a challenge for moral realism, which does not face the same objections as Ruse’s EDA
(subsection 1.2)?
We think they do – not by debunking realism, but by challenging the presumptive
assumption of realism based on the phenomenological claim. Recall that realists typically
support their position by appealing to the seeming objectivity of moral demands (e.g. Brink
1989; Enoch 2015).7 As noted, recent experimental findings do not straightforwardly vindicate
the assumption that moral demands are conceived as objective in the realist’s sense. Moreover,
to the extent that moral demands are conceived as strongly objective, we have provided
evidence that this is plausibly regarded as an artefact of our psychology, and that our tendency
to objectify moral demands can be understood in evolutionary terms. This does not establish
that the objectivity of moral demands is merely an illusion, as Ruse argues, but it does serve to
undercut the presumptive support that our moral phenomenology bestows upon moral realism
– which, as mentioned, is one of the main arguments that realists have traditionally provided
in support of their view.

Differently put, the findings we have presented serve to undercut the validity of the
desideratum that metaethicists should vindicate the ‘objective seemings’ of our moral
experience. To the extent that this objectivist phenomenology is real, debunkers can argue that
our perceived sense of moral objectivity can be explained in evolutionary terms. The upshot is
that, whether or not moral realism is ultimately tenable, it need not be regarded as the default
position in metaethics, as its defenders typically suggest (e.g. Enoch 2015). For those who think
that realism is the ‘view to beat’ in metaethics, our conclusion provides an important change
to the dialectic of the debate.
In closing, let us point out exactly how the relation between scientific findings and their
metaethical implications should be understood, in the context of the case-study we have
presented. Underlying the presumptive assumption of moral realism is an inference to the best
explanation: a realist metaethics provides the best explanation for the ‘datum’ that moral
demands are typically regarded as strongly objective (a datum that was originally assumed
from the armchair, and that has subsequently been partly corroborated by experimental work).
Realists present a metaethical explanation to account for this datum: we think of moral
demands as objective, because we have some intuitive grasp of a stance-independent moral
reality. This is not the only kind of explanation that could be advanced, however. For instance,
the datum could also be explained in scientific terms. Indeed, in this article we have argued
that a convincing explanation for the flexible objectivism found in experimental research
comes from evolutionary psychology: that some (but not all) moral issues are associated with
a strong sense of objectivity has to do with the psychosocial benefits of objectifying them,
specifically those moral issues that are of personal importance to agents.
Our alternative explanation does not establish that the realist’s metaethical explanation
is false. However, given the good fit our alternative explanation has with findings from
experimental metaethics, and given its evolutionary plausibility, we do think that realists lose
their presumptive entitlement to claim that they have the better explanation. As far as our
argument goes, it is an open question which explanation will ultimately be better – but realists
will have to argue for a claim to superiority. An appeal to the apparent objectivity of moral
experience no longer suffices to think that the starting point of moral realism is more intuitive
than the starting point of antirealist positions. This conclusion may have ramifications for the
success of EDAs against moral realism, insofar as some argue that those EDAs can be resisted
if assumptions about the truth of moral realism are granted.
Interestingly, in the foregoing discussion two different kinds of explanation have been
pitted against each other: the psychological explanation favoured by antirealists, versus
the metaethical explanation favoured by realists. We think that not too much weight should be
attached to these classifications, however: in the present context both of them refer to
descriptive explanations, albeit with different metaphysical postulates. It would be a fallacy to
think that one kind of explanation should be favoured over the other in principle. This fallacy
is reminiscent of the flaw of Ruse’s EDA: as noted in section 1.2, Ruse wrongly assumed that
his evolutionary explanation for the characteristics of our moral phenomenology automatically
renders the metaphysical postulates of realism redundant.
Hence, in explaining the nature of our moral phenomenology, it cannot simply
be assumed that either a psychological or a metaethical explanation will be superior.
Nonetheless, to the extent that these are explanations of the same phenomenon, they may
justifiably be regarded as rivalling explanations. Since this condition is met in the case-study
we have presented, and since moral realists previously assumed to be uniquely able to account
for the objectivist features of moral experience, the psychological findings we have discussed
in this article overturn an important argument in support of moral realism. However, they do
not debunk moral realism as such. Even if an explanandum originally explained in terms of a
realist metaethics is actually better explained in psychological terms, there might still be other
grounds for defending moral realism as the preferred metaethical framework. The burden-of-proof, however, has now shifted to realists to demonstrate this.


6. Conclusion
We presented experimental findings which indicate that there is a positive relation between the
personal importance that subjects attribute to a moral issue and the objectivity they bestow on
this issue. Subsequently, we discussed these findings in the context of the psychosocial and
evolutionary functions of moral objectivity, and proposed that presenting moral demands as
objective may be instrumental to the function of choosing sides in moral debate. This
evolutionary account helps to explain the objectivist phenomenology of moral demands, and
its flexibility depending on different moral issues. The ability to provide such an explanation,
in turn, has implications for the metaethical debate: it serves to undercut the presumptive
assumption of moral realism.

Young people tend to be more liberal than older people; half of the change to conservatism occurs after being 45

Peltzman, Sam, Political Ideology over the Life Course (December 9, 2019). SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3501174

Abstract: Young people tend to be more liberal than older people. This paper goes beyond that generality to describe more precisely how self-described political ideology varies with age. I distinguish period (across people of different ages at a moment in time) from cohort (changes in people as they get older) characterizations of this age-ideology gradient. Data are from General Social Surveys from 1974 through 2018, including synthetic cohorts formed from 5 year subsamples of the data. Ideology is measured on a {-1, 1} scale: liberals (conservatives) are -1 (+1) and moderates are 0. The average of this measure (Libcon) generally increases with age both within every 5-year sub-period and among all available cohorts; the shape of these gradients varies considerably across these sub-periods. However, the longer run central tendency is a very well defined concave gradient that rises over the whole life course. The period and cohort versions of this gradient essentially overlap. The change in mean Libcon from early adulthood (25) to old age (80) is substantial (over. 20 on the -1, 1 scale), and around half of this occurs after age 45. I discuss implications for “purple America” characterizations of political ideology and for the strain of literature emphasizing ideological “persistence.”

Keywords: political ideology, liberal, conservative, age
JEL Classification: D72, D78, Z13

What If Companies Get Big Because They're Better? The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms

The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms. David Autor, David Dorn, Lawrence F. Katz, Christina Patterson, and John Van Reenen. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Forthcoming. Dec 2019. https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/lkatz/files/adkpv-superstars-qje-manuscript-accepted-20191028.pdf

Abstract: The fall of labor’s share of GDP in the United States and many other countries in recent decades is well documented but its causes remain uncertain. Existing empirical assessments typically rely on industry or macro data, obscuring heterogeneity among firms. In this paper, we analyze micro panel data from the U.S. Economic Census since 1982 and document empirical patterns to assess a new interpretation of the fall in the labor share based on the rise of “superstar firms.” If globalization or technological changes push sales towards the most productive firms in each industry, product market concentration will rise as industries become increasingly dominated by superstar firms, which have high markups and a low labor share of value-added. We empirically assess seven predictions of this hypothesis: (i) industry sales will increasingly concentrate in a small number of firms; (ii) industries where concentration rises most will have the largest declines in the labor share; (iii) the fall in the labor share will be driven largely by reallocation rather than a fall in the unweighted mean labor share across all firms; (iv) the between-firm reallocation component of the fall in the labor share will be greatest in the sectors with the largest increases in market concentration; (v) the industries that are becoming more concentrated will exhibit faster growth of productivity; (vi) the aggregate markup will rise more than the typical firm’s markup; and (vii) these patterns should be observed not only in U.S. firms, but also internationally. We find support for all of these predictions.

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What If Companies Get Big Because They're Better? Peter R. Orszag. Bloomberg, December 2, 2019. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-12-02/antitrust-zealots-beware-big-companies-are-more-productive

New research suggests that industry concentration just reflects the superior productivity of superstar firms. Are you listening, trust-busters?


Fewer U.S. companies are controlling more market share as industrial concentration has settled over the U.S. economy during the past two decades. That trend has provoked fierce debates among economists and politicians over whether the government should do more to break up big companies, especially the dominant technology giants.

But what if industries are concentrating because size confers real benefits to the economy rather than because of lax antitrust enforcement?

That’s where the evidence points in forthcoming research by a team of leading economists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard University, the University of Chicago and the University of Zurich. Their study gives reason to be cautious about the growing enthusiasm for inadequate enforcement as the explanation for increased concentration.

In 2015, the economist Jason Furman of Harvard and I took note of the emergence of growing disparities across U.S. companies, with the leading firms in each sector outpacing others in productivity, return on capital and market share. We highlighted the emergence of superstar firms that were earning high returns, enjoyed high productivity and paid high wages. But we weren’t able to tease out what was causing those trends, and thus were forced to admit that “our only real conclusion is thus that more attention needs to be paid to what is driving firm-level trends in the United States.”

In the years since, the topic has received increasing attention from economists, policymakers and presidential candidates. One view of the facts and causes is laid out in a new book by the New York University economist Thomas Philippon, who puts most of the blame on inadequate antitrust enforcement.

Quicktake
Q&A: Are U.S. Companies Too Big?

Philippon argues that U.S. markets were more competitive than European markets two decades ago, but that policymakers defended competition more rigorously in Europe than America since then (thus the title “The Great Reversal”). As the book summary argues:

Sector after economic sector is more concentrated than it was 20 years ago, dominated by fewer and bigger players who lobby politicians aggressively to protect and expand their profit margins. Across the country, this drives up prices while driving down investment, productivity, growth, and wages, resulting in more inequality. Meanwhile, Europe ― long dismissed for competitive sclerosis and weak antitrust ― is beating America at its own game.

That’s contradicted by the latest research, to be published in the Quarterly Review of Economics by economists David Autor, David Dorn, Larry Katz, Christina Patterson and John Van Reenan.  They focus on why the share of labor compensation in national income has been declining, but their exhaustive empirical work winds up clarifying the causes behind the rise of superstar firms. (My Bloomberg Opinion colleague Noah Smith also explored this literature in a column last week, emphasizing the potential role of technology in creating and perpetuating superstar firms.)

Autor and his team find support for a productivity-based explanation of increased market concentration. As they note, “If globalization or technological changes push sales towards the most productive firms in each industry, product market concentration will rise as industries become increasingly dominated by superstar firms.” This more benign view is supported in several ways.

First, the economists found clear upward trends in various concentration measures, with a smaller number of firms accounting for a larger share of U.S. industry sales. That’s consistent with Philippon’s research and with most other commentary on the topic, though there are some industrial-organization economists who agree with the general conclusion but quibble with the measures used to confirm it. Where Philippon and the Autor team diverge, though, is in the causes of those facts.

Second, the productivity-based view, but not the antitrust one, would predict that the industries concentrating fastest would be the ones with the fastest growth in productivity. The economists show that larger firms are more productive than smaller ones, that industries concentrating faster are ones with faster growth in patents, and that industries with bigger gains in labor productivity had larger increases in concentration. How can these observations be reconciled with the overall slowing of aggregate productivity growth? Either the effects aren’t that large, or they have been offset by the growing productivity gap between leading firms and others in each sector.

Finally and most crucially, if rising concentration is caused by the benign productivity explanation as opposed to the more troubling lax-antitrust one, the patterns should be similar across the globe despite varying antitrust laws and enforcement. And that’s precisely what the new research shows. As the economists note: “An alternative interpretation of these patterns is … that weakening U.S. antitrust enforcement has led to an erosion of product-market competition. The broad similarity of the trends in concentration, markups and labor shares across many countries that we document below casts some doubt on the centrality of such U.S.-specific institutional explanations. Indeed … antitrust enforcement has, if anything, strengthened in the European Union — and yet … industry concentration appears to have risen in the European Union despite this countervailing force.”

A productivity-based explanation for rising industry concentration would suggest dramatically different policies than the antitrust one does. The evidence uncovered by Autor and his collaborators buttresses the view that superstar firms are thriving because they are simply more productive than other firms, not because they have been given a special break by regulators.

Sleeping With Younger Men: Women’s Accounts of Sexual Interplay in Age-Hypogamous Intimate Relationships

Sleeping With Younger Men: Women’s Accounts of Sexual Interplay in Age-Hypogamous Intimate Relationships. Milaine Alarie. The Journal of Sex Research, Feb 22 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/00224499.2019.1574704

Abstract: Influenced by cultural representations of “cougars,” society commonly imagines women who date younger men as challenging some of the gendered expectations regarding appropriate sexual desire and behavior. Based on 55 semistructured interviews with women ages 30 to 60 who date younger men, I explore how having younger male partners relates to women’s desire and ability to reproduce/disrupt the traditional cultural script for heterosexual sex. I found that compared to their experiences of sex with men of their own age or older, women perceived age-hypogamous intimate relationships as a context in which they can more easily disrupt some facets of that script, namely those regarding (a) the expression of sexual desire, (b) sexual assertiveness, and/or (c) the importance of female pleasure. However, the participants reproduced certain facets of the cultural sexual script, such as the emphasis on penile–vaginal intercourse. In light of women’s experiences, I show that younger men’s stamina and erectile capacities influenced women’s ability to challenge certain facets of the script. Furthermore, I argue that women’s perceptions of younger men as fantasizing about sexually experienced women altered the gender power dynamics, ultimately facilitating the modification of interpersonal sexual scripts. This study contributes to improving our understanding of the way age, age differences, and gender interact and influence interpersonal sexual scripts.

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Discussion

In line with some aspects of common cultural representations of cougars (Alarie, 2018; Aoun, 2013; Barrett & Levin, 2014; Collard, 2012; Kaklamanidou, 2012; Montemurro & Siefken, 2014), the women in this study presented themselves as confident, sexually assertive women with strong sex drives. Based on their accounts of sex with younger men, it appears that the sexual dynamic within age-hypogamous intimate relationships departs, to some level, from the traditional cultural script for (heterosexual) sex.

Indeed, age-hypogamous intimate relationships were depicted as a context where women are encouraged to present themselves as highly desiring and sexually assertive, and where they can easily ensure that their pleasure will be attended to.

This study shows that women’s ability to destabilize the traditional cultural script for heterosexual sex was facilitated in part by younger men’s stamina and erectile capacities. Most women talked about younger men’s high sex drive, sexual endurance, and reliable erections as facilitating their efforts to present themselves as highly desiring, to act on their sexual desires, and to ensure that they could reach maximal pleasure. Indeed, many women described being at times uncomfortable with acting on their strong libido when partnered with men their own age or older, as they perceived the risk of being criticized for being highly desiring and/or the risk of hurting a partner’s masculinity to be higher than in age-hypogamous intimate relationships.

Older participants’ discussion of how older men experiencing erectile dysfunction affects their sexual satisfaction resonates with contemporary research on the topic. Indeed, research shows that many women report that their partners’ erectile dysfunction has a negative impact on their sexual satisfaction (Cameron & Tomlin, 2007; Chevret et al., 2004).  There is clear evidence that the likelihood of erectile dysfunction among men increases with age (Laumann, Paik, & Rosen, 1999; Rosen et al., 2004). However, one should note that only a minority (roughly 18% to 22%) of middle-aged men suffer from erectile dysfunctions (Laumann et al., 1999; Rosen et al., 2004). It is also worth reiterating that a man’s erectile capacities are not the sole factor contributing to women’s sexual pleasure (Armstrong et al., 2012; Hite, 1976; Koedt, 1973; Richters et al., 2006; Rostosky & Travis, 2000). In fact, studies show that not all women are happy to see penile–vaginal intercourse being reintroduced into their sex lives once their partners start using sexual enhancement drugs (Meika, 2004; Potts, Gavey, Grace, & Vares, 2003; Vares et al., 2007).

Based on women’s discourses, I also suggest that most women felt comfortable to disrupt certain aspects of the traditional script for (heterosexual) sex with younger men in part because they perceived younger men as preferring sexually experienced and assertive women with high sex drives. Indeed, many participants reported that their younger partners had complained about young women’s lack of sexual experience, lack of confidence, and/or passivity in bed. According to the participants, younger men often emphasized how pleasant it was for them to be with women who were confident in their own skins, who knew what they liked in bed and who were not afraid to say it.

Furthermore, a large portion of women felt that younger men were more open-minded with regard to sexuality, which made it easier for them to express their sexual desires and fantasies and to act on them. In comparison, many of the participants felt that men their own age or older were often uncomfortable or judgmental if women presented themselves as highly desiring, as having accumulated much sexual experience, and/or as interested in exploring unconventional sexual practices. With that in mind, most women felt it was easier to express their sexual desires and steer sexual interactions in ways that would increase their pleasure when they were with younger men.

The participants’ interpretations of younger men’s appreciation of sexually assertive women resonate with recent research on young men’s sexual desires and practices. Indeed, based on 32 interviews with young men aged 18 to 24 years old, Dworkin and O’Sullivan (2005) found that although the majority of young men tended to initiate sexual practices with their female partners, only some of them reported preferring male-dominated patterns of initiation. In fact, most young men indicated that their ideal sexual interaction would be one where the two partners shared the responsibility of sexual initiation, and one out of four young men actually preferred a female-dominated pattern of initiation. Other studies show that a large portion of young men wish their partners would take more initiative in signaling what they like in bed, such as asking them to perform clitoral stimulation or touching themselves if they wanted to (Salisbury & Fisher, 2014).

Overall, it appears that many younger men would prefer women to be more assertive in bed.  While the dichotomized view of older versus younger women presented by the women in this study is arguably an exaggerated portrait of how aging affects women’s sex performances, the literature on young adults’ sexual practices supports, to a certain extent, these participants’ perceptions of young women. Indeed, research shows that young women are often too shy to ask men to do certain sexual acts that they enjoy (i.e., manual stimulation of the clitoris, cunnilingus) or to take the matter into their own hands and self-stimulate, especially in the context of casual sex (Backstrom et al., 2012; Salisbury & Fisher, 2014).  Other research shows that most young women believe that it is men’s responsibility to physically stimulate women until they reach orgasm, and that they therefore often wait for men to provide them with pleasure (Salisbury & Fisher, 2014). Research on young women’s experiences of heterosexual sex also shows that many of them have insecurities about their physical appearance and that these body image issues influence their behavior during sex (Weaver & Byers, 2018). Ultimately, women’s (in)ability to assert themselves during sexual interactions with men has considerable impact on their sexual satisfaction, as communicating their desires and preferences plays an important role in maximizing their own sexual pleasure (Armstrong et al., 2012; Bridges, Lease, & Ellison, 2004; Ménard & Offman, 2009).

The participants’ depiction of younger men as particularly generous lovers also merits discussion. This result is particularly intriguing considering that previous studies depicted a rather disappointing portrait of young adults’ ability to reach an egalitarian dynamic with regard to female/male sexual pleasure. Indeed, many studies show that while young women often perform fellatio on men, it is much less common for young men to perform cunnilingus on their female partners (Armstrong et al., 2015; Backstrom et al., 2012; Lewis & Marston, 2016). There is in fact a well-documented gap between young men’s and young women’s frequency of orgasm during heterosexual sex (Armstrong et al., 2015; Richters et al., 2006). Therefore, one cannot conclude that younger men are inherently attentive and generous lovers in every context. Instead, based on women’s discourses, I argue that women’s perceptions of younger men as fantasizing about older women combined with women’s perceptions of young women as passive sex partners contribute to shifting the gender power dynamics at play during sexual interactions, ultimately facilitating women’s ability to renegotiate interpersonal sexual scripts with younger men. Women’s perceptions of younger men as fantasizing about older women provided women with more confidence in themselves, which then facilitated their ability to assert and enjoy themselves sexually.

It is worth highlighting that women’s appreciations of age-hypogamous sex was also influenced, especially in the case of women over age 40, by the perception of middleaged men as showing little interest in women in their own age bracket, a perception which is supported by empirical evidence (Alterovitz & Mendelsohn, 2009; Buunk et al., 2001; Conway et al., 2015; Pixley et al., 2007; South, 1991).  For those who had recently divorced or separated and had felt undesired in the last years of their marriage or cohabitational relationship, the perception of younger men as fantasizing about older women felt particularly empowering.

This study shows that in a culture where aging is depicted as having a much stronger devaluation effect on women than on men (Carpenter, Nathanson, & Kim, 2006; England & McClintock, 2009; Wolf, 1991), younger men’s enthusiasm for older women’s sexual experience, confidence, and high sex drive has a particularly positive effect on older women’s ability/desire to renegotiate the terms of the gendered sexual script.

It is difficult to speculate on whether the participants’ younger partner’s (perceived) appreciation for older women will last as they age. It is unclear whether young men today are less likely to internalize ageist conceptions of women’s worth as intimate partners and therefore less likely than men from previous generations to prefer younger women to women their age once they reach middle age. The current study adds to the conversation by suggesting that younger men’s appreciation of older women is partly influenced by their (disappointing) experiences with women their own age and by their desire to have sexually experienced and confident sex partners. Arguably, as they advance in age and accumulate new experiences, these men’s sexual desires, preferences, and expectations might evolve. This area of inquiry definitely deserves more attention in the future.

One should note that while the women in this study challenged certain aspects of the traditional cultural script for (heterosexual) sex when partnered with younger men, they also reproduced other aspects of the script. For instance, the women in this study placed a great value on men’s erectile capacities, reproducing the idea that penile– vaginal intercourse is the most important part of the sexual interaction (Fahs, 2011; Fishman & Mamo, 2001; GewirtzMeydan et al., 2018; Vares et al., 2007). Furthermore, many women—mostly women in their 40s and 50s—saw the careful filtering of potential younger sex partners as a crucial step they had to go through to find men who would provide them with a respectful and pleasurable experience, one where they would not feel reduced to a sex object of temporary value. This last discourse highlights how gender power dynamics influencing heterosexual sex are not automatically removed because of an age difference between partners, and that women often feel like they must deploy strategies to avoid being potentially “used” by younger men.

It is also important to mention that, during their interview, most participants talked about the stigma associated with being read as a cougar, and that many expressed a certain level of caution with regard to how sexual they wanted to be perceived by others. Navigating the sexist and ageist conceptions of women’s sexuality appeared to be particularly challenging for women in their 40s and 50s, as they often seemed torn between their desire to present themselves as sexually empowered women and their desire to avoid being associated with negative cultural representations of cougars. Arguably, older participants’ fear of stigmatization is influenced not only by the cultural taboo for age-hypogamous intimate relationships but also by the cultural representation of female sexuality as more acceptable for the younger, more physically attractive, or childless woman (Friedman et al., 1998; Montemurro & Siefken, 2012; Travis et al., 2000). That said, it can also reflect generational differences with regard to perceptions of acceptable sexual desire and conduct for women, as there have been significant changes in terms of gendered norms regarding sexuality over the past 60 years (Allyn, 2000; Kamen, 2000; Lévy, 2008; Thornton & YoungDeMarco, 2001).

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Interview Guide

Motivation for doing the interview:
⦁ Could you tell me what motivated you to participate in this study?
Perceptions of what “younger man” means
⦁ This study focused on women’s experiences with younger men. In your mind, how young does a man have to be for you to think you are dating a “younger man”?
Current love/sexual life
⦁ Could you tell me more about where you are right now with regards to your current love life and sexual life?

Love/sexual history
⦁ In order for me to have a general idea of who you are, could you provide me with a quick overview of the important intimate relationships you’ve had in your life?

Dating at midlife
⦁ How would you describe your experience being on the dating market at midlife?
Dating preferences
⦁ Thinking about the last years of your life as a single woman, what do you usually look for…
⦁ in terms of relationships?
⦁ In terms of personal characteristics in men?
⦁ How does age matter for you, if at all?
⦁ Have your preferences changed over time, and if so, how?

Experience with age-hypogamous intimate relationships- Overview
⦁ Is (NAME- current younger partner) the first younger partner you’ve ever had?
⦁ Who was the first younger partner you’ve ever had?
⦁ If not, how many younger male partners have you had in your life?
⦁ In your lifetime, would you say you’ve chosen mostly younger, same-age or older men?

Experiences with your FIRST younger partner (* if different from current younger partner)
⦁ How did you meet (NAME- first younger partner)?
⦁ (* if needed) Tell me more about the first interactions…
⦁ How did you feel about the age difference at first?
⦁ Has your feeling changed over time? How so?
⦁ At that time, were you looking specifically for a younger man?
⦁ What kind of relationship were you looking for when you met him?
⦁ Did the relationship evolved over time? How so?

Experiences with CURRENT younger man
⦁ How did you meet (NAME- current younger partner)?
⦁ (* if needed) Tell me more about the first interactions…
⦁ How did you feel about the age difference at first?
⦁ Has your feeling changed over time? How so?
⦁ At that time, were you looking specifically for a younger man?
⦁ What kind of relationship were you looking for when you met him?
⦁ Did the relationship evolved over time? How so?

Age preference
⦁ When you think of the kind of partners you could be interested in, do you have a limit with regards to how young/how old a new partner could be?
⦁ Can you explain why you wouldn’t consider a man younger than (MINIMUM AGE) and older than (MAXIMUM AGE)?
⦁ How strict are you about those limits? Are there contexts in which you don’t mind going younger or older, and if so, what contexts?

Perceived benefits, disadvantages and risks associated with age hypogamy
⦁ Do you see any advantages to dating younger men? If so, what are they?
⦁ Do you see any disadvantages to dating younger men? If so, what are they?

Expectations with regards to the future
⦁ What do you expect out of your relationships with (NAME- current younger partner)?
⦁ How does the age difference influence the way you see the future with him?
⦁ If you were to imagine a long-term relationship with (NAME- current younger partner), would there be any risks or benefits that you associate to his age?

Younger men’s interest in older women
⦁ What do you think young men are looking for in older women like you?

Age identity
⦁ In general, do you mention your age when you meet a new partner?
⦁ When? Why/Why not?
⦁ Do you ask how old he is? When? Why/Why not?
⦁ With regards to disclosing your age, do you act differently with men your age/older men compared to younger men? Why (or why not)?
⦁ When on a date with younger men, do you feel like you have to adapt your look or your approach in order to look more youthful?  How so?

Power dynamics
⦁ Do you feel like the age difference influence the power dynamics between you and your younger partner(s)? And if so, how?
⦁ How does it differ, if at all, from your experience with men your age/older?

Children
⦁ Do you feel like having children/not having children influences your interactions or relationships with younger men?  And if so, how?
⦁ How does it differ, if at all, from your experience with men your age/older?

Money
⦁ Do you feel like money influences your interactions or relationships with younger men?  And if so, how?
⦁ How does it differ, if at all, from your experience with men your age/older?
⦁ Do you see any differences with regards to who pays for the bill?
⦁ Do you think your financial resources could be something that attracts younger men? Why/why not?

Sexuality
⦁ Do you see any differences with regards to sex when you compare you experiences with younger men with those with men your age/older?
⦁ How does dating younger (vs. older) men influence the way you feel in bed?

Body image
⦁ How does dating younger (vs. older) men influences the way you feel about your body?
People’s reactions and stigma management
⦁ Have you introduced (current younger partner) to your friends and family?
⦁ Why? Why not?
⦁ What have been their reactions?
⦁ Have you ever encountered reactions (positive or negative) from people outside of your friends and family? Tell me about it.
⦁ Do you have strategies to avoid negative comments or reactions?
⦁ If someone had an issue with you dating younger men, what would you say?

Feelings towards aging
⦁ How do you feel about aging?

Feelings towards cultural representations of older women
⦁ How do you feel about the way older women/older men are presented in the media?
⦁ How does that make you feel?

Feelings towards age hypergamy
⦁ How do you feel about men who date younger women?

“Cougar” and identity choices
⦁ I see you already know the term ‘cougar’ / Do you know the term ‘cougar’?
⦁ What does that term mean to you?
⦁ Do you see yourself as a “cougar”? Why? Why not?
⦁ Has anyone ever referred to you as a “cougar”? How did you react?

Advice for other women
⦁ If a friend of yours came to you, told you she was curious about dating younger men, and asked you for advice, what would you tell her?

Last words
Is there anything you would want the public to know about women’s intimate relationships with younger men? Or is there anything else would like to add before we finish up this interview?

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Popular press that mentions this paper: Why Older Women (Cougars) Seek Sex With Younger Men (Cubs) https://www.psychologytoday.com/intl/blog/all-about-sex/202001/why-older-women-cougars-seek-sex-younger-men-cubs

No Evidence for Social Genetic Effects or Genetic Similarity Among Friends Beyond that Due to Population Stratification: A Reappraisal of Domingue et al (2018)

No Evidence for Social Genetic Effects or Genetic Similarity Among Friends Beyond that Due to Population Stratification: A Reappraisal of Domingue et al (2018). Loic Yengo et al. Behavior Genetics, January 2020, Volume 50, Issue 1, pp 67–71. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10519-019-09979-2

Abstract: Using data from 5500 adolescents from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health, Domingue et al. (Proc Natl Acad Sci 25:256., 2018) claimed to show that friends are genetically more similar to one another than randomly selected peers, beyond the confounding effects of population stratification by ancestry. The authors also claimed to show ‘social-genetic’ effects, whereby individuals’ educational attainment (EA) is influenced by their friends’ genes. We argue that neither claim is justified by the data. Mathematically we show that (1) the genetic similarity reported between friends is far larger than theoretically possible if it was caused by phenotypic assortment as the authors claim; uncontrolled population stratification is a likely reason for the genetic similarity they observed, and (2) significant association between individuals’ EA and their friends’ polygenic scores for EA is a necessary consequence of EA similarity among friends, and does not provide evidence for social-genetic effects. Going forward, we urge caution in the analysis and interpretation of data at the intersection of human genetics and the social sciences.

Keywords: Genomic similarity Social-genetic effects Confound Kinship

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The availability of large samples of individuals with genomewide genetic data in combination with behavioural phenotypes and social outcomes has led to a resurgence in research
that addresses questions at the interface of genetics and the
social sciences. Some of that research is hypothesis driven,
while much of it is data-driven and hypothesis-generating.
The genetics and statistical analysis of human traits has a
solid underpinning theory in quantitative and population
genetics (Lynch and Walsh 1998; Walsh and Lynch 2018),
and rigorous benchmarking against these underpinnings is
essential—especially when novel or unexpected results in
human behaviour are reported. In this paper, we highlight
one example (and list others) where novel results and claims
are not justifed by the data presented and instead have alternative and more parsimonious explanations.
Using data from 5500 adolescents from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health, Domingue
et al. (2018) claimed to show that friends are genetically
more similar to one another than randomly selected peers,
beyond the confounding efects of population stratifcation
by ancestry. The authors also claimed to fnd evidence of
‘social-genetic’ efects, whereby individuals’ educational
attainment (EA) is infuenced by their friends’ genes. Here
we argue that neither claim is justifed by the data.

A Novel Model to Explain Extreme Feather Pecking Behavior in Laying Hens: New trait has a medium heritability of 0.35 & is positively correlated with the fear traits

A Novel Model to Explain Extreme Feather Pecking Behavior in Laying Hens. H. Iffland et al. Behavior Genetics, January 2020, Volume 50, Issue 1, pp 41–50. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10519-019-09971-w

Abstract: Feather pecking (FP) is a serious economic and welfare problem in the domestic fowl. It has recently been shown that the distribution of FP bouts within groups is heterogeneous and contains a sub-population of extreme feather peckers (EFP). The present study proposed a novel model to detect EFP hens. A mixture of two negative binomial distributions was fitted to FP data of a F2 cross of about 960 hens, and, based on the results, a calculation of the posterior probability for each hen belonging to the EFP subgroup (pEFP) was done. The fit of the mixture distribution revealed that the EFP subgroup made up a proportion of one third of the F2 cross. The EFP birds came more frequently into pecking mood and showed higher pecking intensities compared to the remaining birds. Tonic immobility and emerge box tests were conducted at juvenile and adult age of the hens to relate fearfulness to EFP. After dichotomization, all traits were analyzed in a multivariate threshold model and a genomewide association study was performed. The new trait pEFP has a medium heritability of 0.35 and is positively correlated with the fear traits. Breeding for this new trait could be an interesting option to reduce the proportion of extreme feather peckers. An index of fear related traits might serve as a proxy to breed indirectly for pEFP. GWAS revealed that all traits are typical quantitative traits with many genes and small effects contributing to the genetic variance.

Keywords: Laying hen Extreme feather pecking Fearfulness Genetic architecture Mixture distributions

Estimated heritability of coffee intake ranges from 0.36 to 0.58; factors that distinguish heavier vs. lighter drinkers (smoking, male sex) will likely manifest differences in estimated heritability

Quantile-Specific Heritability may Account for Gene–Environment Interactions Involving Coffee Consumption. Paul T. Williams. Behavior Genetics, Jan 3 2020. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10519-019-09989-0

Abstract: Estimated heritability of coffee intake ranges from 0.36 to 0.58, however, these point estimates assume that inherited effects are the same throughout the distribution of coffee intake, i.e., whether consumption is high or low relative to intake in the population. Quantile regression of 4788 child–parent pairs and 2380 siblings showed that offspring–parent and sibling concordance became progressively greater with increasing quantiles of coffee intake. Each cup/day increase in the parents’ coffee intake was associated with an offspring increase of 0.020 ± 0.013 cup/day at the 10th percentile of the offsprings’ coffee intake (slope ± SE, NS), 0.137 ± 0.034 cup/day at their 25th percentile (P = 5.2 × 10–5), 0.159 ± 0.029 cup/day at the 50th percentile (P = 5.8 × 10–8), 0.233 ± 0.049 cup/day at the 75th percentile (P = 1.8 × 10–6), and 0.284 ± 0.054 cup/day at the 90th percentile (P = 1.2 × 10–7). This quantile-specific heritability suggests that factors that distinguish heavier vs. lighter drinkers (smoking, male sex) will likely manifest differences in estimated heritability, as reported.

Youth submissive behavior exerted a significant indirect effect on cyber bullying via cyber victimization and moral disengagement

Eraslan-Çapan, B. and Bakioğlu, F., 2020. Submissive Behavior and Cyber Bullying: A Study on the Mediator Roles of Cyber Victimization and Moral Disengagement. Psychologica Belgica, 60(1), pp.18–32. http://doi.org/10.5334/pb.509

Abstract: In order to prevent cyberbullying and cyber-victim behaviors that are very common among adolescents, it is important to investigate the factors that underlie these behaviors. The purpose of the present study was to examine the mediator roles of cyber victimization and moral disengagement in the relationship between submissive behavior and cyber bullying. The participants involved 370 Turkish adolescent (female: 47%; male, 53%). The age of participants ranged between 12 and 19 years (M = 15.92, SD = 1.87). Data were collected using the Submissive Behavior Scale, the Cyber Bullying Scale, the Cyber Victimization Scale, and the Moral Disengagement Scale. The data were analyzed using structural equation modeling. A bootstrapping analysis was conducted in order to determine any indirect effects. Structural equation modeling results provided evidence of indirect effects of submissive behavior on cyber bullying mediated by cyber victimization and moral disengagement. Bootstrapping showed that submissive behavior exerted a significant indirect effect on cyber bullying via cyber victimization and moral disengagement. The findings emphasized the role of youth cyber victimization and moral disengagement in explaining the relationship between submissive behavior and cyber bullying. The results of the study were discussed based on relevant literature, and suggestions for future studies were made.

Keywords: Submissive behavior, Cyber bullying, Cyber victimization, Moral disengagement, Adolescents

Discussion

With widespread and active use of the Internet, cyber bullying and cyber victimization have been a major problem in the world. Therefore, it will be helpful to reveal protective and risk factors of cyber bullying and cyber victimization. In this study, the mediator role of cyber victimization and moral disengagement in the relationship between submissive behavior and cyber bullying of Turkish adolescents was investigated. As expected, the results show that the cyber victimization and moral disengagement plays a mediator role in the relationship between submissive behavior and cyber bullying. Accordingly, moral disengagement was positively correlated with submissive behavior and cyber victimization, and submissive behavior positively predicted cyber victim. In short, it can be expressed that as the adolescents’ submissive behavior level increased, their moral disengagement, cyber victimization, and cyber bullying behaviors increased as well.
Studies are in parallel with the research findings. In studies on adolescents, it has been found that submissive behaviors were an important predictor and risk factor of cyber victimization and cyber bullying. (Atik, Özmen, & Kemer, 2012; Kowalski et al., 2014; Ogurlu & Sarıçam, 2018; Özkan & Özen, 2008; Peker, Eroğlu, & Çitemel, 2012). It has been found that adolescents who were unable to protect their own rights and behave according to others’ wills were kept on being exposed to negative behaviors by remaining passive rather than blocking individuals who were bullying themselves or taking necessary intervention and help behaviors (Peker, Eroğlu, & Çitemel, 2012). Moreover, it was asserted that these individuals had low self-esteem and more prone to become cyber victims (Brewer, & Kerslake, 2015). As it is seen, the finding that submissive behaviors leading cyber victimization were supported in our study.
The other finding of the study was the relationship among the moral disengagement strategies of adolescents, cyber victimization, and cyber bullying behaviors. The literature shows that high moral disengagement increased the relationship between cyber victimization and cyber bullying (Hood & Duffy, 2018, Johnson, 2015). This finding is supported by other studies concluding that individuals who became cyber victims started to think that the cyberbullies deserved aggression or cyberbullying behaviors were not that bad (Johnson, 2015). It is indicated that cyber victims might use moral disengagement strategies since they feel disappointment, sorrow (Raskauskas & Stoltz, 2007), anger (Beran & Li, 2005), suicidal feelings (Hinduja & Patchin, 2009), revenge feelings (Bauman, Toomey & Walker, 2013; Dioguardi & Theodore, 2006; Yaman & Peker, 2012), and thoughts that others deserve hostile behaviors (Diguardi & Theodore, 2006, Johnson, 2015). It was also found that cyber victims felt shame and revenge more (Dilber, 2013) and 72% of cyber bullies demonstrate harmful behaviors for revenge or retaliation (Mark & Ratliffe, 2011), which supported the findings of the current study. In their study, Mishna et al., (2012) found that some students were shy people who could not bullies or demonstrate aggression in real life, and that they committed cyber bullying behaviors to avenge what they experienced in real life by making use of the opportunity to disguise their identity in the virtual world, which also supported the findings of the current study. In short, adolescents who were victims of cyber bullying due to their passive and submissive personality traits commit cyber bullying behaviors in order to avenge the bullying they were exposed to and use moral disengagement strategies to justify their bullying behaviors.
As a result of the bootstrapping analysis, it was found that the relationships among all variables were significant. Firstly, the effect size obtained in submissive behavior predicted moral disengagement was found to be low (Cohen, 1988, Sawilowsky, 2003). Moreover, the value of effect size obtained from the cyberbullying predictions of moral disengagement was found to be low. These results showed that submissive behavior alone is not sufficient to explain moral disengagement behavior, and moral disengagement also explains low levels of cyber bullying. The upper limit of the magnitude of effect size, which is explained by the submissive behavior of moral disengagement and cyber bullying of moral disengagement, was found to be moderate. Cyber victimization of submissive behaviors, moral disengagement of cyber victimization and cyber bullying of cyber victimization were seen to have high effect size values (Cohen, 1988). Therefore, it can be stated for bigger samples that submissive behaviors predicted cyber victimization and moral disengagement, cyber victimization predicted moral disengagement and cyberbullying, and moral disengagement predicted cyberbullying directly. Moreover, it was found that the results of this study were confirmed in bigger samples, and moral disengagement and cyber victimization played a mediator role in the relationship between submissive behaviors and cyberbullying.

Neurobehavioral traits & intelligence are differentially associated with university-level grades, depending on the major; but mixed-handedness may prove to be a better general predictor of academic performance across disciplines

Differential associations of neurobehavioral traits and cognitive ability to academic achievement in higher education. Graham Pluck et al. Trends in Neuroscience and Education, Volume 18, March 2020, 100124. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tine.2019.100124

Abstract
Background People vary between each other on several neurobehavioral traits, which may have implications for understanding academic achievement.

Methods University-level Psychology or Engineering students were assessed for neurobehavioral traits, intelligence, and current psychological distress. Scores were compared with their grade point average (GPA) data.

Results Factors associated with higher GPA differed markedly between groups. For Engineers, intelligence, but not neurobehavioral traits or psychological distress, was a strong correlate of grades. For Psychologists, grades were not correlated with intelligence but they were with the neurobehavioral traits of executive dysfunction, disinhibition, apathy, and positive schizotypy. However, only the latter two were associated independently of psychological distress. Additionally, higher mixed-handedness was associated with higher GPA in the combined sample.

Conclusions Neurological factors (i.e., neurobehavioral traits and intelligence), are differentially associated with university-level grades, depending on the major studied. However, mixed-handedness may prove to be a better general predictor of academic performance across disciplines.

The sexually antagonistic gene hypothesis states that genes associated with male androphilia reduce reproduction when present in males but increase reproduction when present in their female relatives; study of the Istmo Zapotec

Offspring Production Among the Relatives of Istmo Zapotec Men and Muxes. Francisco R. Gómez Jiménez, Scott W. Semenyna & Paul L. Vasey. Archives of Sexual Behavior, Jan 2 2020. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-019-01611-y

Abstract: Male androphilia (i.e., sexual attraction toward adult males) is influenced by biological factors, reliably occurs across diverse cultures, and has persisted over evolutionary time despite the fact that it reduces reproduction. One possible solution to this evolutionary paradox is the sexually antagonistic gene hypothesis (SAGH), which states that genes associated with male androphilia reduce reproduction when present in males but increase reproduction when present in their female relatives. The present study tested the SAGH among the Istmo Zapotec—a non-Euro-American culture in Oaxaca, Mexico, where transgender and cisgender androphilic males are known as muxe gunaa and muxe nguiiu, respectively. To test the SAGH, we compared offspring production by the biological relatives of muxe gunaa (n = 115), muxe nguiiu (n = 112), and gynephilic men (i.e., cisgender males who are sexually attracted to adult females; n = 171). The mothers and paternal aunts of muxe gunaa had higher offspring production than those of muxe nguiiu. Additionally, the relatives of muxe gunaa had more offspring than those of gynephilic men, whereas no such differences were found between the families of gynephilic men and muxe nguiiu. Elevated reproduction by the mothers and, particularly the aunts, of muxe gunaa is consistent with the SAGH. However, the absence of group differences between gynephilic men and muxe nguiiu, and the group differences between the two types of muxes are not predicted by the SAGH. This is the first study to demonstrate reproductive differences between kin of transgender and cisgender androphilic males within the same non-Euro-American culture.