Negative communication between spouses can be difficult to change, does not necessarily lead to more satisfying relationships when it is changed, & does not always predict distress in the first place

Research on Marital Satisfaction and Stability in the 2010s: Challenging Conventional Wisdom. Benjamin R. Karney  Thomas N. Bradbury. Journal of Marriage and Family, January 5 2020. https://doi.org/10.1111/jomf.12635

Abstract: Although getting married is no longer a requirement for social acceptance, most people do marry in their lifetimes, and couples across the socioeconomic spectrum wish their marriages to be satisfying and long lasting. This review evaluates the past decade of research on the determinants of satisfaction and stability in marriage, concluding that the scholarship of the past 10 years has undermined three assumptions that were formerly accepted as conventional wisdom. First, research exploiting methods such as latent class growth analyses reveal that, for most couples, marital satisfaction does not decline over time but in fact remains relatively stable for long periods. Second, contrary to predictions of behavioral models of marriage, negative communication between spouses can be difficult to change, does not necessarily lead to more satisfying relationships when it is changed, and does not always predict distress in the first place. Third, dyadic processes that are reliably adaptive for middle‐class and more affluent couples may operate differently in lower income couples, suggesting that influential models of marriage may not generalize to couples living in diverse environments. Thus, the accumulated research of the past 10 years indicates that the tasks of understanding and promoting marital satisfaction and stability are more complex than we appreciated at the start of the decade, raising important questions that beg to be answered in the years ahead.

Do Conclusions About Marriage Generalize?


Income as a Moderator

Twenty-five years ago, the vast majority of
research on marriage had been conducted on
samples composed primarily of middle-class,
college-educated, mostly White couples (Karney & Bradbury, 1995). In the intervening years,
the profile of the typical sample in marital
research has expanded, but samples of convenience continue to dominate, reflecting a
widespread assumption about the dynamics of
marriage: What is true for the narrow slice of
couples that have been studied extensively is
likely to be true for the more diverse couples that
lie outside the sampling frame of most studies.
During the past decade, this assumption has
been questioned by burgeoning lines of research
on Hispanic marriages (e.g., Orengo-Aguayo,
2015), African American marriages (e.g.,
Cutrona, Russell, Burzette, Wesner, & Bryant,
2011; Stanik, McHale, & Crouter, 2013), and
most recently same-sex marriages (e.g., Chen &
van Ours, 2018) to mention only a few dimensions of diversity that the field has explored. To
illustrate the consequences of broader sampling
for deepening our understanding of marriage,
we devote this section to reviewing one dimension of diversity that was examined at length
during the past 10 years: income.
The possibility that marital process may vary
at different levels of income is worth highlighting because, a decade ago, this possibility was
distinctly overlooked. When the federal government launched the Healthy Marriage Initiative
in the early 2000s, the goal of the program
was to promote stronger, more stable relationships among lower income couples (Office of
Family Assistance, 2012). Yet at the time data
on the relationships of lower income couples
were scarce. Nevertheless, the development
and implementation of skills-based relationship
education programs proceeded apace, guided
by the assumption that the conclusions of prior
research on relationship processes among relatively affluent, mostly White couples would
generalize to the lower income, more diverse
communities targeted by the new initiative.
Within the past decade, the results of nationwide, multisite, longitudinal evaluations of
these programs were released, and they were
not encouraging. Despite their great cost and the
sincere efforts of well-intentioned administrators and educators across the country, the impact
of relationship education on the well-being and
stability of lower income couples proved to
be negligible (Lundquist et al., 2014; Wood,
Moore, Clarkwest, & Killewald, 2014). Abandoning the assumption that the foundations
of satisfying and stable marriage are common
across income groups, leading observers called
for research directly examining how basic processes contributing to successful intimacy may
in fact vary among different segments of society
(Johnson, 2012; McNulty, 2016).


Empirical advances

Research heeding this call during the past
decade has revealed numerous ways that
basic marital processes vary across levels of
socioeconomic status. What does not vary
is the value of marriage itself. Although
rates of marriage are substantially lower in
lower income communities than in more
affluent communities, marriage remains
a cherished goal across income groups
(Garrett-Peters & Burton, 2015; Scott, Schelar,
Manlove, & Cui, 2009; Trail & Karney, 2012).
Instead, income groups can be distinguished by
the sorts of challenges couples face in attempting to reach that goal. Lower income couples,
similar to lower income individuals, report
greater mental health problems, higher stress,
and, not surprisingly, more financial strain than
their higher income peers (Maisel & Karney,
2012). When asked directly about challenges
in their marriages, lower income couples are
more likely to identify finances and substance
abuse, rather than communication and household chores, as their most salient sources of
conflict (Jackson et al., 2016; Trail & Karney,
2012). To the extent that the problems of lower
income couples are more severe, their marital
interactions are likely to be more difficult as
well (Williamson, Hanna, Lavner, Bradbury, &
Karney, 2013). Indeed, Cutrona et al. (2003),
drawing on observer ratings of videotaped interactions between spouses, showed that couples
living in more disadvantaged neighborhoods
expressed less warmth with each other than
couples living in higher income neighborhoods.
Do their greater challenges mean that lower
income couples are less satisfied with their
relationships than more affluent couples? In
fact, lower income couples are not less satisfied
with their relationships on average, despite their
higher divorce rates and the more severe difficulties they encounter. Although perceptions of
greater financial strain have been consistently
associated with lower relationship satisfaction
(e.g., Conger & Conger, 2008), household
income and relationship satisfaction are unrelated (Hardie & Lucas, 2010; Maisel & Karney,
2012). Yet poorer couples do experience their
marriages differently than wealthier couples.
Longitudinal research tracking marital satisfaction across the first years of marriage reveals
that, although levels and slopes of marital
satisfaction do not differ between more and
less wealthy couples, poorer couples report
significantly greater variability in their marital
satisfaction across time (Jackson, Krull, Bradbury, & Karney, 2017). In other words, lower
income couples experience their relationships
as more turbulent than affluent couples, whose
greater resources presumably buffer them from
stressful events and crises (cf. Henry, Sheffield
Morris, & Harrist, 2015).
To the extent that income has direct associations with constructs central to influential
models of successful marriage, such as mental
health, stress, marital interaction, and trajectories of marital satisfaction, then the associations
among these constructs are likely to vary across
levels of income as well. During the past decade,
analyses of diverse samples that directly compare patterns of associations among more or
less affluent couples confirm this prediction. For
example, analyses of survey data from Florida,
Texas, California, and New York reveal that
stress and mental health account for significantly
more variance in the relationship satisfaction of
poorer couples than wealthier couples (Maisel
& Karney, 2012). When couples with more
access to resources confront stress or struggle
with mental health problems, they have options
for protecting their relationships (e.g., by paying
for assistance or counseling) that poorer couples
facing the same challenges do not.
Ross, Karney, Nguyen, and Bradbury (2019)
went further, showing that even basic marital
processes considered fundamental to successful marriage can have categorically different
implications for more or less affluent couples.
Their focus was the demand-withdraw pattern
of marital interaction in which one partner, seeking change, makes a request, while the other,
favoring the status quo, deflects or avoids. The
ensuing cycle has been consistently associated
with declines in marital satisfaction in numerous
studies (e.g., Eldridge, Sevier, Jones, Atkins, &
Christensen, 2007) and across multiple cultures
(Christensen, Eldridge, Catta-Preta, Lim, &
Santagata, 2006). Yet the negative implications
of the demand-withdraw pattern rest on the
assumption that, when this pattern arises, the
change at issue is possible. What makes the
pattern so aversive for both sides is the idea that
the partner requesting change can reasonably
expect the other partner to give in and that the
partner resisting change could accede to the
other partner’s request but chooses not to. What
if the requested change is impossible, as it may
be for lower income couples with less control
over their circumstances? A response (withdrawal) that is maladaptive for the middle-class
couples that comprise most of the samples in
research on marital satisfaction may be adaptive
for lower income couples with fewer options
and resources. Indeed, across two longitudinal
studies that included observational assessments
of marital interactions, Ross et al. (2019) found
that, whereas engaging in the demand-withdraw
pattern predicts lower marital satisfaction for
wealthier couples, the same pattern predicts
more stable marital satisfaction for poorer
couples.
Such findings begin to make sense of the
failure of programs guided by research on upper
income couples to improve the outcomes of
the lower income couples to which they were
targeted: The specific challenges and constraints
that confront lower income couples may moderate or negate the impact of interventions
that might be helpful in other circumstances.
Analyses of data from the Building Strong
Families study, an evaluation of interventions designed to encourage marriage among
unmarried lower income parents, support this
perspective. Although the evaluation showed
that the programs had no effects on relationship
quality or rates of transitioning into marriage
(Wood et al., 2014; Wood, McConnell, Moore,
Clarkwest, & Hsueh, 2012), Williamson,
Karney, and Bradbury (2017) reasoned that
programs that included job training and professional education, in addition to relationship
education, might have benefited couples, as
these programs targeted the specific problems
that lower income couples name as obstacles
to marriage (e.g., Edin & Reed, 2005). In fact,
programs that included these elements did have
unique effects, but in the opposite direction:
Men who received professional education were
less likely to transition into marriage. Further
analyses revealed that men receiving additional hours of education from these programs
spent less time at home with their children and
contributed less money to their households,
accounting for their lower marriage rates. Such
unexpected findings highlight the need to understand couples’ experiences—the demands they
are facing, the constraints on their time and
resources, and the particular dynamics that
are adaptive or maladaptive in their specific
context—before attempting to develop policy or
implement interventions to improve their lives.

Children in same-sex households experience similar health, behavioral, & educational outcomes when compared with children in different-sex households

Sexual‐ and Gender‐Minority Families: A 2010 to 2020 Decade in Review. Corinne Reczek. Journal of Marriage and Family, January 5 2020. https://doi.org/10.1111/jomf.12607

Abstract: This paper critically reviews research on sexual and gender minority (SGM) families, including lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, asexual, intersex, and other (LGBTQAI+) families, in the past decade (2010–2020). First, this paper details the three primary subareas that make up the majority of research on SGM families: (1) SGM family of origin relationships, (2) SGM intimate relationships, and (3) SGM‐parent families. Next, this paper highlights three main gaps in this decade's research: (1) a focus on gay, lesbian, and same‐sex families (and to a lesser extent bisexual and transgender families) and a lack of attention to the diverse family ties of single SGM people as well as intersex, asexual, queer, gender non‐binary/non‐conforming, polyamorous, and other SGM families; (2) an emphasis on white, socioeconomically advantaged SGM people and a failure to account for the significant racial‐ethnic and socioeconomic diversity in the SGM population; and (3) a lack of integration of SGM experiences across the life course, from childhood to old age. Future research should refine the measurement and analysis of SGM family ties with novel theory and data across the methodological spectrum.


SGM-Parent Family Effects on Children

Child well-being in SGM-parent families captured the attention of the scholarly, legal, and policy communities during the past decade, with research attempting to find consensus regarding whether children raised in SGM families are “worse off” than those raised in cisgender heterosexual families. Studies using new nationally representative population-based survey data put this question to rest, consistently showing that children in same-sex households experience similar health, behavioral, and educational outcomes when compared with children in different-sex households (Calzo et al., 2019; Farr, 2017; Patterson, 2017; Reczek, Spiker, Liu, & Crosnoe, 2016, 2017; for reviews, see Adams & Light, 2015; Manning, Fettro, & Lamidi, 2014). When differences are found across groups they are accounted for by variables other than sexual-minority status, including lower SES and family transitions (Potter, 2012; Potter & Potter, 2017). Notably, most studies in this area deploy household rosters and thus are only able to capture children in households with parents of the same-sex, not households with a parent who identifies as a gender or sexual minority. In one of the first large-scale surveys using such data, Rosenfeld (2010) examines U.S. Census data to show that children of same-sex couples are as likely to make typical progress through school as children of other family structures; any advantage for heterosexual married couples’ relative to other groups was explained by SES. Similarly, Reczek, Spiker et al. (2016, 2017) analyzed the National Health Interview Survey data to show that children raised in same-sex married families had overall similar health and behavioral outcomes relative to children in different-sex married families, and children in same-sex cohabiting families had overall similar outcomes to those in different-sex cohabiting families. In a study using the American Community Survey Waves 2008 to 2015, Boertien and Benardi (2019) showed that children living with a same-sex couple were likely to exhibit worse achievement outcomes relative to their peers in different-sex households in the past, but that this gap disappeared during the study period. A study of psychological adjustment after adoption found no differences in outcomes across children in gay, lesbian, and heterosexual families (Goldberg, 2013). In contrast, Regnerus (2012) showed that children who were older than 18 years who reported a parent had a same-sex relationship at some point during their childhood reported worse well-being outcomes than children raised in long-term heterosexual married households. However, Cheng and Powell (2015) reanalyzed Regnerus’s data to reveal that these negative effects were the result of inappropriate comparison groups (e.g., comparing married to divorced families). Moreover, although not viewed as a negative outcome for children, Goldberg and Garcia (2016) reported that children in lesbian families had less gender-typical behavior than children in heterosexual and gay families. Several recent studies attempt to move beyond comparing children in same- and different-sex households and articulate the unique contextual experiences of being a child in a SGM family. Lick, Tornello, Riskind, Schmidt, and Patterson (2012) used county-level social climate data to analyze the psychological well-being of children raised by same-sex parents and found better psychological outcomes for children in areas with antidiscrimination laws, suggesting it was institutional factors—not something inherent in the same-sex family—that would cause any negative child outcomes. In addition, in a study of 84 adult children with gay fathers, Thomeer, Donnelly, Reczek, and Umberson (2017) found that children feel closer to fathers when their fathers disclosed their gay identity earlier in the life course; those who report closer relationships with their fathers report greater well-being, suggesting that it is the context and content of the parent–child tie that shapes child well-being outcomes, not simply being from a gay family. Calzo et al. (2019) further showed that children of bisexual parents had higher rates of externalizing behaviors (e.g., physical aggression) than children of heterosexual parents, but that parents’ psychological distress accounted for this difference. Moreover, some research suggests benefits to being in SGM families; Prickett, Martin-Storey, and Crosnoe (2015) showed that there was an increase in parenting attention for children in gay and lesbian families, which may benefit later life outcomes such as educational attainment and employment. Although the vast majority of research focuses on children in same-sex households, a small number of studies, primarily qualitative, examine child well-being in gender-minority parent families (for a review, see Stotzer, Herman, & Hasenbush, 2014). For example, Pyne et al. (2015) showed that when a parent with minor children transitions, the child’s well-being was strongly shaped by whether the cisgender parent was transphobic and rejecting or accepting of the transgender parent. Tabor (2018) used 30 in-depth interviews with adult children of transgender parents to document the unique negotiation of role ambiguity children experience when a parent transitions. Significantly more research is needed on children in families other than same-sex, gay, or lesbian family structures.


Critiques and Future Research

Research on SGM family-of-origin relationships, intimate relationships, and parenthood
have proliferated in the past decade. Yet important limitations in research on SGM families
persist. Next I provide an account of the following three overarching limitations in SGM family
research: (a) a lack of focus on the diversity of
SGM family types such as bisexual, transgender,
asexual, and polyamorous families as well as
single SGM people; (b) a lack of racial-ethnic
and socioeconomic diversity; and (c) a failure
to account for the life course of family ties. I
outline how future research on SGM families
should address these three deficits. I also discuss
data and practical constraints that contribute to
these limitations.

SGM Diversity
Research in the past decade focuses primarily on
cisgender gay and lesbian identified people and
individuals who live in same-sex households. A
smaller but important body of research examines bisexual and transgender partnered families,
although research has not kept up with the rapid
growth of both of these family forms during
the past decade. Comparing cisgender gay
and lesbian families to cisgender heterosexual
families was an important first intervention to
a historically cisgender heterosexual-dominant
field. Yet there has been very little empirical
research on the families of other SGM populations, including intersex—people born with a
range of intersex traits normatively presumed
to be exclusively male or female (e.g., physical
genitalia or gonads incongruent with sex chromosomes; Davis, 2015); pansexual—someone
attracted to all genders; asexual—someone
who does not experience sexual attraction or
sexual interest to people of any gender (Carroll,
2019); bisexual—someone who is attracted to
more than one sex; or polyamorous—someone
who rejects the monogamous imperative and
is romantically involved with more than one
person at once. These gaps neglect the full range
of SGM minority families, especially those
who may be the most stigmatized as well as
those who offer the most robust challenges to
paradigms of monogamy, the gender binary, and
heteronormativity. Consequently, family forms
outside of the limited cisgender, gay, lesbian,
and same-sex scope are marginalized—this
exclusion has important implications for our
ability to fully understand SGM family life.
Importantly, research on family life has almost
exclusively focused on partnered SGM people
and has failed to articulate the family dynamics
of single SGM people. Demographic profiles
show that more than 50% of SGM people are
single (Jones, 2017), yet virtually no research
explicitly engages the family lives of SGM
single people.
The lack of inclusion of diverse SGM populations is in part due to data limitations given
the relatively small number of individuals in
these groups, although this is not the case for
bisexual people, who are among the fastest
growing sexual-minority group today (Bridges
& Moore, 2018). These data limitations are
especially prevalent in demographic and survey
research but also in qualitative research. The
majority of population-based research is reliant
on a few national surveys of same-sex household
rosters that do not ask sexual or gender identity
(e.g., U.S. Census) or rely on questions on sexual
or gender identity that are limited (e.g., identifying oneself as gay, lesbian, straight, bisexual,
or “other”; e.g., National Health Interview Survey). We need better data—especially nationally
representative survey-based data—that account
for the range of identities, behaviors, and attractions in the SGM community. Although recent
surveys have added sexual identity questions or
questions on sex at birth and transgender status,
reliable and valid survey questions that account
for all SGM populations are relatively rare in
datasets that also include comprehensive measures of family relationships. Moreover, because
some SGM groups are small proportions of the
population, analyzed data can be untrustworthy.
Future data collection efforts should oversample
smaller SGM groups to allow for greater analytical power.
Qualitative research has been more effective
at providing high-quality, in-depth data on SGM
families today and will be an important aspect
of SGM family research in the next decade. Yet
qualitative studies, too, should be stretched to
include more marginalized and less-studied populations within the SGM group to develop new
theoretical approaches to understanding family
life (Compton, Meadow, & Schilt, 2018). Qualitative approaches are especially primed to fill the
dearth in research on relatively small subpopulations (such as intersex, pansexual, polyamorous,
and asexual individuals). Future research on
these populations will lead to new theoretical
advances that will influence the broader field of
family studies. Moreover, qualitative studies are
imperative in articulating the meaning of sexuality and gender identities as they change across
the next decade.
In the context of family-of-origin ties, better data with more comprehensive questions on
gender identity and sexuality and the oversampling of SGM subpopulations would allow us to
examine the nature of family-of-origin ties and
the effects of those family ties on well-being
for all SGM youth and adults. This is especially important as more youth are identifying in
non-cis, non-hetero categories than ever before,
and a continued exclusive focus on gay, lesbian, and bisexual identities will prevent us from
understanding the full range of sexual and gender diversity in the next generation of SGM
families. Questions could include the following:

How do SGM youth and adults experience and
reframe family violence, rejection and disownment, ambivalence, and support? What are the
processes through which people with different
SGM identities cope and thrive in less supportive environments? How do parents perceive and
negotiate ties with their SGM children across the
diversity of SGM statuses? How are intergenerational ties renegotiated as SGM statuses change?
How do single SGM people conceive of their
intergenerational relationships, and how does
being single shape disclosure, identity maintenance, and family relationships?

These are just some of the questions that might emerge when
we broaden the range of SGM diversity within
the realm of family of origin.
In the context of intimate ties and parenthood,
scholars continue to reify cisgender different-sex
or heterosexual couples as the gold-standard
reference category from which to compare
dynamics and outcomes of cisgender same-sex
or gay or lesbian couples. To move beyond a
focus on this comparison, future research must
explore the marital and parental decisions of
partners across sexual (e.g., polyamorous, asexual) and gender (e.g., transgender, genderqueer)
categories and include multipartner and single
families across the SGM spectrum. In doing
so, new questions and insights will arise, such
as the following: How do people of different SGM identities understand intimate and
parenthood relationships and make decisions
about entering into these relationships? For
example, polyamorous relationship formation
is notably absent from current research (Shippers, 2016). Bisexual people are more likely
to be in different-sex marriages than same-sex
marriages, yet we do not know how bisexuals understand their identity as a SGM within
different-sex relationships. Moreover, do various
SGM groups of young adults today retreat from
marriage due to queer or feminist principles,
or seek marriage to access the legal and social
protections afforded to cisgender heterosexual
individuals? How does relationship quality and
predictors of divorce vary across the SGM spectrum? How do more marginalized SGM family
configurations challenge and redefine how we
measure the division of labor? In addition, do
all SGM groups experience health benefits with
marriage, or is this benefit found only for those
that are in monogamous same-sex long-term
relationships? How do dissolution processes differ across the SGM spectrum and what can we
learn about this dissolution? How do single SGM
people conceive of the prospect of intimate relationships, and do friends become more important
as sources social support when not in an intimate
relationship? Finally, studies of parenthood must
definitively move away from proving children
in same-sex couples are equally well-off to their
heterosexual counterparts to thinking more creatively about how SGM parents across the spectrum are negotiating their parental roles in ways
dependent on socio-institutional and political
contexts. How do single SGM parents negotiate
their SGM identity and find social support and
cope with strain in both SGM and cisgender
heterosexual communities? These are just a few
of the ways in which the next decade of research
can further advance science on diverse SGM
family life.


Integration of Racial-Ethnic and Socioeconomic Diversity

There are intersecting aspects of inequality
that shape SGM people’s lives, including gender, race-ethnicity, and SES. Yet attention to
multiple, intersecting forms of inequality has
not been systematically integrated into SGM
family research (Acosta, 2018). Racial-ethnic
minorities make up a larger percent of the SGM
population than the general population (Gates,
2014), yet research on SGM families lacks racial
diversity as well as thoughtful racial analyses
with consistent and robust considerations of how
family processes are always already racialized
regardless of sample racial-ethnic composition
(Acosta, 2018). Furthermore, there is a lack of
focus on cross-cultural comparisons as well as
non-U.S. or non-Western contexts, limiting our
ability to understand the global landscape of
SGM families.
Moreover, this body of work pays inadequate
attention to socioeconomic diversity within the
SGM population. Despite assumptions of gay
affluence, recent research that suggests SGM
people are socioeconomically disadvantaged
relative to their cisgender heterosexual counterparts (Gates, 2014). Given the racial-ethnic and
socioeconomic diversity of the SGM population
and the clear importance of race-ethnicity and
SES in every facet of family life, our conclusions thus far provide limited, primarily White
and socioeconomically advantaged views of
SGM family life. Data limitations prohibit our
ability to study SES and race-ethnicity by SGM
status; most national data sources have variables for race and SES but the sample sizes of
racial-ethnic minority and SES sexual-minority
groups are small. Future data collection efforts
should oversample SGM racial-ethnic groups
to allow scholars to examine racial-ethnic and
socioeconomic variation. Notably, even qualitative and smaller-scale research in this area
fails to adequately account for racial-ethnic and
socioeconomic diversity; future studies of all
kinds need to collect a great deal of data from
non-White, non-middle-class populations to
drive research forward.
A small body of research on family-of-origin
relationships reveals the importance of examining race-ethnicity variation. In a qualitative
study with 90 parents and 90 LGB children (ages
15–24), with 59% of the sample an ethnic minority, Black, Hispanic, and Latino parents report
more parental rejection of their children and
more homonegativity than White parents, with
children corroborating these results (Richter,
Lindahl, & Malik, 2017). In an ethnographic
and in-depth interview study with 40 lesbian,
gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer youth,
Robinson (2018) showed how families who
were already economically disadvantaged experienced additional instability when a child was
gender nonconforming, leading to increases in
adolescent and young adult poverty and homelessness. Considerably more research needs
to address what might be unique stressors—or
sources of resilience—for SGM youth and adults
of color and across the socioeconomic spectrum
within their family-of-origin relationships.
Questions stemming from an intersectional
approach may include the following: How do
the interpretations, experiences, and consequences of family-of-origin support, strain,
and ambivalence vary across race-ethnicity
and SES? How do negotiations of rejection or
ambivalence depend on racialized and classed
experiences? How are our conceptualizations
of what family of origin is or should be dependent on White, middle-class SGM notions of
family? How do sibling and extended family relationships differ across racial-ethnic and
socioeconomic groups, and how does this matter
for health outcomes? What are unique adaptive
pathways taken when SGM of color across
SES are faced with family-of-origin rejection
or strain? Overall, greater theorizing of the
racial-ethnic and socioeconomic experiences
of the family of origin must be addressed to
fully understand the nature of family-of-origin
relationships.
Research consistently shows that intimate
relationship dynamics are also racialized and
vary by SES. As such, race-ethnicity and SES
are likely central to family relationships among
SGM populations. For example, research suggests that SGM people are more likely to
date and marry individuals of a different race
than themselves relative to heterosexual and
cisgender people. Due to the lower levels of
marriage and higher rates of parenthood among
racial-ethnic and socioeconomically disadvantaged people in the United States today,
racial-ethnic minority and working-class SGM
individuals may experience a lower likelihood
of marriage and a higher likelihood of parenthood, yet previous research has not explored
this possibility nor its implications. Once in
an intimate relationship, research suggests that
relationship quality, division of labor, and dissolution may operate differently by race and
class (Moore, 2011), and thus work is needed
to address how relationship patterns—and the
predictors of these patterns—differ across race
and class across SGM groups.
With regard to SGM parenthood, although
the past decade confirmed that children with
same-sex parents fair equally well as children
in different-sex families, the next decade should
turn to how interlocking systems of oppression
including homophobia, racism, and classism
at the individual and institutional levels matter for children’s well-being across the SGM
spectrum. Scholars should also examine the
resilient characteristics of children who experience these multiple vectors of inequality. For
example, an intersectional approach should be
used to examine how racial-ethnic minority
parent families experience increased stress and
resiliency as both SGM and racial-ethnic stigma
as well as the specific ways in which SGM parents who have fewer socioeconomic resources
negotiate parenting intentions and parenting
dynamics.


Integrating a Life Course Approach

Scholars have long articulated the accumulating
effects family ties play across the life course.
Yet to date research has narrowed in on specific
family ties within certain life course moments,
most notably family of origin during youth and
adolescence and romantic ties and parenthood
during mid-life. Yet what is missing is an understanding of how family relationships unfold and
accumulate across the life course as well as
how cohorts and historical periods shape the
life experiences of SGM families. A holistic
approach to SGM families requires longitudinal studies of SGM people from childhood to
later life, with attention to cohort and historical period. To answer questions that explore
life course processes, we need more qualitative
and quantitative longitudinal datasets that trend
across time, with attention to how age, period,
and cohort effects may have significant consequences for SGM individuals’ understanding of
their own family lives. Even if data cannot be
prospective over decades, scholars should work
to account for these important contextual processes retrospectively. Data should also capture
the period and cohort effects and the historical events that shape the lives of SGM people,
including marriage equality, SGM-related laws
and policies, and political change such as new
presidential administrations that likely influence
SGM family life. A nuanced account of these
historical events will be key in understanding
changes in family patterns as we continue into
the next decade.
In terms of family-of-origin ties, significant
gaps remain in understanding how early life
experiences with parents translate into midand later life relationships. Future scholars may
ask the following: How do family-of-origin
ties change during the transition to adulthood,
and do they become more or less salient for
health and well-being? How do family-of-origin
ties continue to matter for the everyday lives
of SGM long after adolescence and into old
age? Do adaptive strategies used to cope with
family conflict change over time? Does strain
in adolescence, emerging adulthood, and young
adulthood shape educational outcomes, poverty,
and occupational status later in life? Moreover,
virtually no research examines intergenerational ties in later life, yet this is an especially
important life course moment given increased
longevity, increased stigma in old age for SGM
people, the rising of “gray divorce,” and potential loneliness of SGM adults. In later in life, we
may ask the following: Do elderly SGM adults
in need of care have family-of-origin members
to support their health needs? How is the provision of care for SGM older adults shaped by
earlier life experiences with family of origin?
Do siblings and other family members step in to
care for aging SGM adults, or do chosen family
members play this important role?
In the context of intimate relationships, a life
course approach suggests that understanding
intimate relationships in midlife is dependent
on one’s relationship biography in adolescence
and young adulthood. For example, the timing and dynamics of a first sexual-minority or
heterosexual relationship will likely have an
impact on subsequent relationship timings and
dynamics. Thus, we need the full relationship
history—including a full history of sexual
identities, behaviors, and attractions—to gauge
the meaning and consequences of intimate ties
across the life course. Moreover, a life course
approach requires better understanding of historical (i.e., period) context and cohort effects,
which means taking into account the recent
legal, social, and political changes including
marriage legalization and high-profile court
cases on discrimination (Baumle & Compton,
2015). For example, due to changes in marital
law, today’s SGM adolescents have grown up in
an environment where marriage between individuals of the same sex or gender is possible;
a unique position relative to other generations.
Yet we know very little about how different generations negotiate questions of legality in their
intimate ties based on these different cohorts
and periods. In addition, because relationship
quality changes over time, the next step of
research is the use of longitudinal data—both
qualitative and quantitative—to examine how
relationship biographies (e.g., moving in and
out of relationships) and relationship quality
changes across the life course. Longitudinal
type of data would allow for the identification
of predictors of SGM divorce and dissolution,
articulating, for example, whether being in a heterosexual relationship earlier in the life course
shape the risk of sexual-minority relationship
dissolution?
Similarly, the majority of research on the division of labor is in midlife, but we know very
little about the nature of household labor practices both in adolescence or in later life. Because
the division of labor appears to be related to
cohort, it may be that younger cohorts have
very different labor negotiations than older SGM
cohorts, perhaps due to period changes. For
example, Giddings, Nunley, Schneebaum, and
Zietz (2014) compared the division of labor of
couples with and without children across generations including the baby boomers, Generation X,
and Generation Y and found that same-sex couples were less likely than different-sex couples
to exhibit specialization overall. However, this
gap narrows across cohorts, wherein the division
of labor appears more egalitarian for heterosexuals in later cohorts and potentially less so among
same-sex couples. Future research should facilitate a greater understanding of how and why
such changes have shifted over time. Finally,
health in later life is of key importance to the
aging SGM population, and intimate ties may
serve as one protective factor for early mortality
and morbidity. Yet very little research examines
how SGM intimate relationships protect—or
undermine—health during times of illness and
injury in later life (see Fredriksen-Goldsen et al.,
2016). This research could include a study of
caregiving processes when a spouse is sick as
well as how relationship conflicts shape health
over time. Thomeer et al. (2017) showed that gay
and lesbian couples were much more likely to
plan for their end of life (e.g., wills, family planning) than were heterosexual couples. Yet we
know virtually nothing about end-of-life experiences among SGM families (see Marsack &
Stephenson, 2018).
In relation to parenthood, a life course
approach suggests that the processes of becoming and being a parent may differ across the life
course, by age, cohort, and period (i.e., historical
context), yet few studies consider these events
in research on SGM parenting. For example,
parenthood pathways constraints mean that
some SGM adults become parents later in life
than their cisgender heterosexual counterparts,
but what is unknown is how this shapes parenting practices and subsequent parent well-being?
Who becomes parents at any given point in
the life course, and who wants to parent but
is unable earlier in the life course? How does
becoming a parent shift SGM relationships with
their own aging parents and family of origin?
Does becoming parents at different life course
stages influence the parent–child relationship
later in the life course, including caregiving processes? How would cohort and period changes
in parenting intentions and approaches alter
the nature of SGM parenting today? Attention
to unfolding individual and collective history
will provide new insights into being a SGM
parent today.

The Dark Tetrad in Tinder: hook-up app for high psychopathy individuals, and a diverse utilitarian tool for Machiavellians?

The Dark Tetrad in Tinder: hook-up app for high psychopathy individuals, and a diverse utilitarian tool for Machiavellians? Minna Lyons, Ashleigh Messenger, Rebecca Perry & Gayle Brewer. Current Psychology, January 6 2020. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12144-019-00589-z

Abstract: Location-based on-line dating applications are a popular tool for initiating short and long-term relationships. Besides seeking for partners, people use these applications for a myriad of other reasons. We investigated how the Dark Tetrad of personality, controlling for sex, age, and trolling tendencies, related to different motives for using Tinder. Current or former Tinder users (N = 216) completed online scales for Tinder use motivations, trolling, sadism, and the Dark Triad (Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy). Using Tinder for acquiring sexual experience was related to being male and being high in psychopathy. Psychopathy was positively correlated with using Tinder to distract oneself from other tasks (e.g., procrastination). Higher Machiavellianism and being female were related to peer pressure as a Tinder use motivation. Using Tinder for acquiring social or flirting skills had a negative relationship with narcissism, and positive relationship with Machiavellianism. Finally, Machiavellianism was also a significant, positive predictor of Tinder use for social approval and to pass the time. Results indicate that individuals high in Machiavellianism use Tinder for a number of utilitarian reasons, whereas the main motive for high psychopathy individuals is hook-up for casual sex.

Discussion

Our results suggest that darker aspects of personality are related to unique motivations for using a real-time, location-based dating application. Sadism did not predict Tinder use motivations, suggesting that Dark Triad rather than the Dark Tetrad is significant for this online behaviour. For psychopathy, we replicated the findings of Timmermans et al. (2018), showing that those high in psychopathy were more likely to use Tinder to gain sexual experience. The high sex drive and short-term mating orientation associated with psychopathy (e.g., Book et al. 2016) clearly translates into using online dating applications for sexual gratification. Other significant finding with regard to psychopathy was the use of Tinder for distracting oneself from other tasks. Previous research has found that especially the impulsive secondary psychopathy facet is related to procrastination in order to avoid completing other tasks (Lyons and Rice 2014). Perhaps high psychopathy individuals procrastinate by focussing on tasks that are more intrinsically motivating, such as finding short-term sexual partners online. The associations between psychopathy, and distraction and sexual experience motivations are interesting, and could have links with the overall impulsive, hedonistic, and procrastinating lifestyles of high psychopathy individuals.

The long-term strategic and flexible nature of Machiavellianism (Jones and Paulhus 2009) was evident in the Tinder use motivations. Machiavellianism had a positive relationship with using Tinder for social approval (i.e., to get validation from others about one’s attractiveness), when travelling, as a consequence of peer-pressure, to pass time or provide entertainment, and to practise social skills and flirting. All motivations could reflect the use of social and online environment to reach long-term objectives (Bereczkei 2018). For instance, Machiavellianism has been associated with the use of social media for self-presentation (Abell and Brewer 2014) and impression management tactics (Hart et al. 2019). Our findings extend self-presentation to the dating environment. Using Tinder for social approval and conforming to peer pressure could all be part of a façade that makes Machiavellian individuals more socially desirable partners.

The relationship between Machiavellianism and the use of Tinder to pass time or provide entertainment is consistent with a recent study that failed to find a connection between Machiavellianism and a wide range of movie and music preferences (Bowes et al. 2018). It is possible that Machiavellian individuals have a more utilitarian approach to their entertainment and use tools that also provide real-life benefits (e.g., acquisition of a partner). Additional research is required to explore Machiavellianism and this aspect of human behaviour.

Narcissism predicted the use of Tinder to improve flirting and social skills only. Those high on narcissism display a sense of superiority and entitlement (Emmons 1984), for example believing themselves to be more desirable than their romantic partners (Campbell et al. 2002). The relationship between narcissism and this motivation may, therefore, reflect the tendency of high narcissist’s to believe that they already excel in this field and do not need to develop their flirting or social skills.

This study has some limitations. For example, participants who did not conform to a binary gender identify were not represented in the sample, nor did we ascertain the sexual orientation or relationship status of participants. Sexual orientation is likely to influence the motivation of finding out information about sexual orientation of others but is unlikely to have an impact on other Tinder motives (Timmermans and De Caluwé 2017b). Around 15–20% of Tinder users report being in a committed relationship (Orosz et al. 2018; Timmermans and De Caluwé 2017b), but it is currently not clear how the motivations of individuals with different levels of Dark Tetrad may be influenced by their relationship status. This is certainly something that future research should take into consideration.

In addition, it is important to note that current findings are reliant on the honesty and accuracy of participant responses to self-report questionnaires. Socially desirable responding is positively related to narcissism and negatively related to Machiavellianism and psychopathy (Kowalski et al. 2018). In order to counteract this, future research should include objective measures of Tinder activity rather than rely only on self-reports. Also, our study included a short Dark Triad measure, which fails to capture the multidimensionality of the construct, and provides a weak differentiation between psychopathy and Machiavellianism (Miller et al. 2019). The study would benefit from replication with longer measures, which would allow investigations into how different components of the Dark Triad relate to on-line dating motivations.

Finally, it is unclear what real-life implications the Tinder use motivations have. Do high psychopathy individuals successfully acquire sexual partners on Tinder? Does Tinder use influence the status, likeability, or social influence of individuals high on Machiavellianism? The present study is hopefully a starting point for investigating whether the Dark Tetrad relates to Tinder use motivations because these motivations lead to some form of social or sexual success.

In summary, we investigated the relationship between socially malevolent personality traits, and the motivations to use a popular real-time, location-based dating application, Tinder. Beyond the identity and enjoyment in trolling, sadism may have little relationship with Tinder use motivations. Those high in psychopathy were motivated by sexual experience and distraction. As a testimony to the flexibility of Machiavellianism as a trait, we found that it correlated with a myriad of reasons not directly associated with short-term sexual hook-ups. Online dating may, therefore, provide an opportunity to develop skills that of use in future situations, something that long-term strategists (i.e., high Machiavellian individuals) may be oriented to.

From 2007... Statutory sex crime relationships between juveniles & adults: How to prevent youth from becoming involved & how to prevent adults from entering relationships

From 2007... Statutory sex crime relationships between juveniles and adults: A review of social scientific research. Denise A. Hines, David Finkelhor. Aggression and Violent Behavior, Volume 12, Issue 3, May–June 2007, Pages 300-314. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2006.10.001

Abstract: This paper reviews the social scientific literature about non-forcible, voluntary sexual relationships between adults and juveniles, what we have termed “statutory sex crime relationships” or “statutory relationships.” In the available literature, the topic is poorly defined and the research weak, but there are clearly a diverse variety of contexts and dynamics to such relationships. We detail a wide-ranging set of issues on which more research is needed to guide social policy and practice.

Keywords: Sexual abuseStatutory rapeCompliant victimJuvenile victimRape

6. Research agenda

Public policy on the topic of statutory relationships could clearly benefit from a considerably more detailed understanding of the nature of these relationships as well as from an understanding about the capacities of youth. What follows is a discussion of some of the research that might benefit some of the various policy issues that confront this topic.

6.1. Setting statutory parameters

Some may feel that the prohibitions and legal restrictions that apply to statutory relationships flow from moral principles that are not open to empirical investigation. For those open to considering an empirical perspective on the matter, the age of consent laws appear to be based on presumptions about several possibly researchable issues. These concern the developmental progression of a person's ability to consent to sex: (1) what young people of different ages know and understand about sexual behavior and sexual relationships; (2) how young people of different ages make decisions in general and particularly about sex; and (3) what the power and influence dynamics are in relationships between persons of different ages, and in particular relationships that become sexual; that is, under what conditions (age being a central one) youth are easily manipulated, or have difficulty acting as full decision-making parties in their own interest.

Knowledge. Some research exists about young people's sexual knowledge. For example, the average young adolescent has poor knowledge regarding sex: In one national survey, 13-year-olds did not know the most effective pregnancy prevention method, and only 10% of girls and 7% of boys understood the female fertility cycle and its effects on the likelihood of getting pregnant (Albert, Brown, & Flanigan, 2003). Thus, only a small minority of younger adolescents have the knowledge that is necessary to make informed decisions regarding sexual behavior, particularly sexual relationships with adults. However, to our knowledge, there are no studies that track the developmental progression of this knowledge in a detailed way. Studies also need to look not just at the average level of knowledge, but the level of knowledge among those with the least knowledge, and perhaps, as well, among some of the groups who might be most vulnerable to exploitation, such as youth who were sexually abused at an earlier age. As Guerrina (1998) has argued, some adolescent girls who are involved in adult/adolescent sex have had previous sexual experiences, which should give them the ability to make informed decisions regarding sexual activity. However, she further argues that a girl's sexual knowledge may not be a good proxy for her maturity. For example, a girl with a history of sexual abuse may have knowledge of sex that increase her capability to make an informed decision regarding sexual relations; however, her history of sexual abuse may also make her extremely vulnerable and may cause her to act in a sexually provocative manner in order to attain affection, love, and attention, a situation which makes her too immature to make such decisions (Guerrina, 1998).

Decision-making ability. There is some literature concerning the ability of youth to make decisions at different stages of development. For example, some research has established that there is a delayed development of the prefrontal cortex, a seat of decision-making, in adolescents (Segalowitz & Davies, 2004). In other research, adolescents who have sex often do not perceive it as a decision that they made, merely something that “just happened” (BrooksGunn & Furstenberg Jr., 1989; Chilman, 1983), suggesting perhaps difficulties in projecting sequences of activity into the future (Brooks-Gunn & Furstenberg Jr., 1989; Coley & Chase-Lansdale, 1998).

Drawing policy conclusions from such findings is not easy, however. The potential vulnerability to prejudgment on the basis of other values are illustrated by the contrasting conclusions of those concerned about consent to sex with those concerned about consent to abortion (American Psychological Association, 2000) or youth culpability for criminal behavior (Donovan, 1997; Lanning, 2002). Some of the same evidence marshaled to support youth capacity to decide to have an abortion might equivalently be cited in support of youth capacity to consent to sex with an adult. It may indeed be the case that decision-making capacity does vary from context to context. For example, the interpersonal pressures or likelihood of manipulation may be greater in the sexual relationship than in the abortion decision.  However, this illustrates how research about general decision making capacities may be inadequate to the problem, and research may need to look at how adolescents reason and decide about very specific domains of behavior.

Relationship dynamics, power, and influence. Some researchers and those who deal with statutory rape cases have described a seduction and grooming process to which adolescents presumably are subjected (e.g., Lanning, 2002).  They argue that the seducers treat the adolescents better than other adults in their lives have. For example, the adults listen to the adolescents' problems and concerns and fulfill their emotional, physical, and sexual needs. As testimony to the adults' skillfulness, the adolescents often willingly return for sex. According to accounts of other dynamics, adolescents (particularly boys) are typically sexually curious, rebellious, inexperienced, and easily sexually aroused.  This makes them targets for adults who wish to sexually seduce them, and once seduced, easily convinced to return.  Eventually, the adolescents may initiate sexual contact themselves, which may create the impression that they consented to this process. In addition, some adolescents are willing to trade sex for attention, gifts, and affection, and will deny that they are victims (Lanning, 2002).

Grover (2003) uses dissonance theory to explain why an adolescent who has gone through this seduction process nevertheless would argue that s/he freely consented to the relationship. She argues that adolescents perceive that they were compliant in the sexual acts because they were given cues by the adult to imply that they had a choice (i.e., no force was used). The adult gradually convinces the adolescent through steps over the course of time to “consent” to the sexual relationship. Because they falsely perceive that they have chosen the situation, they assert that they consented to the relationship.

Although many adolescents may be subjected to such a grooming process, there is evidence that not all are. In fact, some adolescents have sex with the adults during their first meeting (e.g., Sandfort, 1984), and a minority of adolescent girls who are involved with adults state that they sought out adults because they wanted to learn about sex from an older, experienced, more knowledgeable partner (Higginson, 1999); they believed that their first sexual experiences would be much more pleasurable this way, and many of these girls admitted to seducing reluctant older men to reach these goals. Other girls have reported that they and their female peers seek out older men because their male peers are not considered an acceptable dating pool; they feel that they are too mature to be dating someone their own age, and that older men would be able to provide for their sexual and other needs much better (Higginson, 1999). Additional research is needed to describe the full range of dynamics in the variety of statutory relationships.

Another issue that needs to be resolved empirically is the nature of the power differential in these relationships.  Some argue that the adults hold all power, which precludes the adolescent from making a free choice (Grover, 2003; Guerrina, 1998; Watkins & Bentovim, 2000); others argue that even if the adult does have the power, that does not mean that s/he will misuse the power (Sandfort, 1984), and still others argue that sometimes the adolescent has power over the adult (Money & Weinrich, 1983). No empirical studies have been done to our knowledge to resolve this argument concerning power perceptions and realities in these relationships and how the power differentials affect the ability of the adolescent to make decisions. Because these relationships tend to be furtive and stigmatized, their uncontaminated dynamics may be hard to study. Other things that need to be looked at concern how these dynamics differ depending on the age difference between the partners, itself an important matter that can be regulated in sexual consent statutes.

Conclusion. Even with considerably more information about the developmental progression of knowledge, decision-making ability and relationship dynamics, it might still be very difficult to apply this information to the practical problem of establishing age of consent limits. An example of the difficulty is posed by the problem of gender equity. Suppose it were to be found that younger boys were considerably less subject to manipulation in statutory relationships than younger girls. It seems unlikely and may be even constitutionally impossible that policymakers would craft laws that would then set different standards according to gender. Nonetheless, the policy obstacles should not inhibit the pursuit of more information on these topics.

7. Prevention/intervention research

7.1. How to prevent youth from becoming involved
Advocates have argued for a variety of programs and policies that would discourage young people from becoming involved in relationships with adults (Elstein & Davis, 1997). Two lines of research might be very useful to help build and enhance such initiatives. One would focus on understanding the main risk factors for and reasons why youth become involved in such relationships with a specific eye to trying to target vulnerable youth and meet their needs and deficits in an alternative way.

A variety of suggested risk factors and reasons need to be fully explored:
• Youth involved in conflict with their families who may be looking for alliances with adults to help them gain independence more completely than they could through relationships with other youth.
• Youth who are isolated from peers or have other barriers to peer involvement that may orient them more toward adult relationships.
• Youth who have extremely limited career or employment opportunities, for whom relationships with adults may provide a quicker route to motherhood or family formation.
• Youth who are sexually precocious, who may gravitate to adults for sexual opportunities not available among their peers.
• Youth who are gay, confused about sexual orientation or have other sexual concerns that may make them vulnerable to offers from adults to help mentor them around these concerns by engaging with them sexually.

A second line of research would try to discover what kinds of information or messages are most persuasive in discouraging positive attitudes about or openness to cross-generational relationships. For example, would it be useful to emphasize to young people that such relationships are illegal and may result in prosecution and incarceration for the adults? Or, does such a message fail to persuade because it seems authoritarian, reminds youth of their immaturity and even adds to the allure of such relationships? By contrast, would it be useful to emphasize that such relationships generally do not work out or may involve deceptions by the adult? Focus groups, surveys and evaluation studies of prevention efforts should all be directed at identifying the components of an effective prevention message.

7.2. How to prevent adults from entering relationships
The adults who become involved with youth in statutory relationships may well be a diverse group, if the research reviewed here and experience in regard to other sexual offenders is any guide (Lanning, 2002). Although there may be some statutory offenders who bear resemblance to child molesters, who have compulsive or predatory sexual patterns, and who use deception, there may likewise be others who are dissimilar to other categories of more conventional sex offenders. Nonetheless, there have been few, if any, studies of these adults to catalog their diversity and explore the question of whether there are important differentiable subtypes. Such studies would be useful to aid prevention efforts. As has been tried with other sex offenders against children, it may even be useful to talk with statutory sex offenders explicitly about factors that might have inhibited their behaviors (Conte, Wolfe, & Smith, 1989).

An issue of considerable potential for prevention concerns offenders who were frankly ignorant of the laws criminalizing adult–youth sexual behavior, that is, individuals for whom reinforcement or knowledge about laws and norms might have been a deterrent. Social surveys may also be useful to ascertain whether there are some groups in society among whom the norms are supportive of such behavior. As with prevention messages for youth themselves, it may be useful to test a variety of messages with adults in focus groups, surveys and evaluation studies, to investigate which may be most effective in discouraging a proclivity toward sexual involvement with youth. Such studies should look at different subcultural groups and adults of different ages. In addition, it is probably important to look at these issues with gay adults, who may have a different set of rationales and concerns, although such research obviously needs a great deal of sensitivity to avoid reinforcing the unsubstantiated stereotype that in comparison to heterosexual adults, gay adults are more predatory toward youth.

7.3. How to minimize iatrogenic impacts on youth
A policy issue of considerable interest is how to make sure that criminal justice interventions do not cause additional harm to victims. Some of the potential for iatrogenic harm that is widely acknowledged in the sexual assault area (Jones, Cross, Walsh, & Simone, 2005) would certainly be expected in regard to statutory victims. Because some of these youth may have considerable allegiance to the offenders, they may not see themselves as victims, may see the criminal justice system as agents for their parents and as limiting their own autonomy, and may experience interventions as highly coercive and hostile. Intervention may also create considerable stigma for the youth, including such humiliations as outing their sexual orientation, and may cause them to feel guilt and self-blame for actions taken against the offender. Observers have noted that adolescents who are brought into the judicial system as part of these investigations may embellish or change their stories to please the legal authorities (Berliner, 2002), to adhere to societal expectations and/or to avoid embarrassment (Lanning, 2002). Thus, “they inaccurately claim they were afraid, ignorant, or indoctrinated” (Lanning, 2002, p. 6). However, no systematic research has been conducted to verify whether and how often adolescents behave this way.

Research could fruitfully be directed to identifying the most alienating and stressful components of criminal justice intervention for youth involved in statutory relationships. Such research could be the basis for designing interventions that mitigate such harms. Given that these youth frequently have additional problems, the research might suggest adjuncts to criminal justice interventions that may help the youth and improve cooperation with authorities.

There seems to be a genetic predisposition to following a vegetarian diet; & a link between vegetarianism and political ideology may exist because of a shared genetic predisposition

Where the Rubber Meats the Road: Relationships between Vegetarianism and Socio-political Attitudes and Voting Behavior. John B. Nezlek & Catherine A. Forestell. Jul 15 2019. Ecology of Food and Nutrition, Volume 58, 2019 - Issue 6, pp 548.559. https://doi.org/10.1080/03670244.2019.1641801

ABSTRACT: Previous research has found that omnivores are more hierarchical and more authoritarian than vegetarians. To examine if such differences extend to political behavior a sample of American undergraduates (N = 1211) described their diets, endorsement of social policies, political orientation, and voting behavior. Consistent with previous research, we found that compared to vegetarians and semi-vegetarians, omnivores favored conservative policies more strongly and liberal polices less strongly, identified more closely with the Republican party and less closely with the Democratic party, were less liberal, approved of Donald Trump’s performance more, and were more likely to have voted for Trump.

KEYWORDS: Vegetarianism, voting behavior, conservatism, liberalism, Trump

Discussion As expected, vegetarians and semi-vegetarians were more politically liberal than omnivores, differences that are consistent with previous research. Moreover, our results suggest that consumption of red meat is associated with these differences. Vegetarians and semi-vegetarians did not differ on any of the measures we analyzed. The power of this comparison was .67 for a medium (d = .5) effect size (Faul et al. 2009). Why was the consumption of (red) meat associated with more politically conservative attitudes and behaviors? We believe that the differences between omnivores and vegetarians reflect the operation of the processes described by Dhont and Hodson (2014): “Rightwing adherents do not simply consume more animals because they enjoy the taste of meat, but because doing so supports dominance ideologies and resistance to cultural change” (p. 12). For example, research has shown that relationships between speciesism and conservative attitudes are driven by dominance orientation (e.g., Costello and Hodson 2010; Dhont, Hodson, and Leite 2016). The differences we found between omnivores and vegetarians in the endorsement of various social policies were clearly consistent with omnivores being more resistant to change and more supportive of hierarchies than vegetarians. Such differences are also consistent with the possibility that vegetarians restrict their meat intake not because they dislike the taste of meat but because of there are concerned about animal welfare. Such concerns can go beyond issue of hygiene and methods of slaughter and can include beliefs that as sentient beings, animals should not be killed for food. The present results extend previous research in two ways. They expand the domain of attitudes and behaviors that are associated with the consumption of red meat. Compared to vegetarians and semi-vegetarians, omnivores both endorsed more conservative policies more strongly and endorsed more liberal policies less strongly, indicating that diet is associated with attitudes across the political spectrum. Perhaps more important, because voting is where the “rubber meets the road” in terms of politics, demonstrating that the voting behavior of omnivores is different than the voting behavior of vegetarians and semivegetarians extends existing research into a critical domain. Consistent with our results, Wrenn (2017) found that vegans were much less likely to vote for Trump than the norm (4% vs. 46% overall), but Wrenn did not study semi-vegetarians, a group whose intake has been shown to be motivated more by weight control or health reasons rather than ethical reasons compared to strict vegetarians (Forestell, Spaeth, and Kane 2012). This difference may explain why a lower (though not significantly lower) proportion of semi-vegetarians than vegetarians endorsed liberal attitudes. Whether vegetarians’ political attitudes and behaviors are associated with the degree to which their motivations are health- or ethically-based is a topic for future research. The present results also increase the diversity of the database describing relationships between vegetarianism and political beliefs. Much of the research on this topic has been done in Europe or Australasia. Although culturally the US has much in common with these countries, there are differences among them, and finding that relationships between diet and political orientation in an American sample are similar to the relationships found in other countries supports the validity of these relationships. Nevertheless, the sample examined in the present study may limit the generalizability of the results. As discussed by Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan (2010), the present sample came from a WEIRD culture (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic). Also, similar to previous research on this topic, the study was conducted in a society in which people are “vegetarians of choice” rather than “vegetarians of necessity” (Leahy, Lyons, and Tol 2010). The majority of the world’s vegetarians do not have the resources to buy meat, and so it is possible that the type of relationships we found are limited to individuals who choose to be vegetarian. Finally, a smaller percent of the present sample voted for Trump (17%) than the percent of college-educated voters in the general US population (36%, Pew Research Center 2018), and the sample consisted of young adults. Nevertheless, the present results comport with the results of previous research suggesting that the selective nature of the sample did not skew the results in a specific direction. Such questions can be resolved only by examining the same processes in larger, more representative samples. There is also the issue of the extent to which the results found in our sample of collegians can be generalized to people of other ages. Following Erik Erikson many believe that adolescence (and to some extent early adulthood) is a time when people search for their identities, at least in Western cultures. In terms of political ideology and voting behavior this is often referred to as the “impressionable years hypothesis,” which is accompanied by the “aging-stability hypothesis” (stability increases with age) (e.g., Alwin and Krosnick 1991). Support for these complementary mechanisms is mixed (e.g., Alwin and Krosnick 1991). For example, Markus (1986) found that the political attitudes of a sample of young adults was no more or no less stable over 17 years than the attitudes of their parents were. Perhaps the most intriguing perspective on this issue is the work of Verhulst and colleagues (e.g., Verhulst, Eaves, and Hatemi 2012). They suggest that political ideology reflects genetic predispositions (at least in part), and to the extent this is true, political ideology may be as stable in early adulthood as it is at any other stage of life assuming that genetic predispositions are stable. There is the issue of how well a distinction based upon dietary habit predicts the types of socio-political attitudes we examined. Although the differences in means for some measures were meaningful in terms of scale points (e.g., over a half point difference between omnivores and vegetarians for strength of identification with the Democratic party), for most measures, the ANOVAs that compared the three groups accounted for about 4–5% of the variance, certainly not large effects. This was due to the variance in these outcome measures within the groups. For example, although vegetarians identified more closely with the Democratic party than omnivores, 46% of omnivores identified with the Democratic party either closely or very closely. On the other hand, omnivores were approximately three times more likely than vegetarians to have voted for Trump. Although this ratio needs to be understood within the context of the number of participants who voted for Trump (77 of 468), it is possible that the individual differences that are associated with an omnivorous diet when considered collectively may have had a stronger influence on how people voted. This is perhaps because voting is a decision that is based on the collective influence of a set of individual factors that may vary in strength. The present study was intended primarily as an empirically focused extension of research on the socio-political correlates of following a vegetarian diet. We believe that we accomplished this goal, albeit with the limitations imposed by our sample. As noted previously, the available data suggest that vegetarians have a more pro-social orientation than omnivores (Ruby 2012). Such a pro-social orientation is probably the driving force behind the political ideologies and behaviors of vegetarians. Even so, such an explanation still begs the question of why vegetarians are more prosocial than omnivores.

Recent research suggests that there may be a genetic predisposition to following a vegetarian diet (e.g., Ye et al. 2017). If this is the case, then relationships between vegetarianism and political ideology may exist because of a shared genetic predisposition. This is similar to the argument Verhulst and colleagues have made regarding relationships between personality and political beliefs. Clearly, answering such questions requires research that is designed to address them specifically.



Check also Vegetarianism as a Social Identity. John B Nezlek, Catherine A Forestell. Current Opinion in Food Science, December 20 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/12/vegetarians-are-more-pro-social-than.html

And Gender Differences in Vegetarian Identity: How Men and Women Construe Meatless Dieting. Daniel L.Rosenfeld. Food Quality and Preference, November 28 2019, 103859. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/11/could-they-be-lying-vegetarian-women.html

And Taste and health concerns trump anticipated stigma as barriers to vegetarianism. Daniel L.Rosenfeld, A. JanetTomiyama. Appetite, Volume 144, January 1 2020, 104469. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/09/vegetarian-diets-may-be-perceived-as.html

And Relationships between Vegetarian Dietary Habits and Daily Well-Being. John B. Nezlek, Catherine A. Forestell & David B. Newman. Ecology of Food and Nutrition, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/10/vegetarians-reported-lower-self-esteem.html

And Psychology of Men & Masculinity: Eating meat makes you sexy / Conformity to dietary gender norms and attractiveness. Timeo, S., & Suitner, C. (2018). Eating meat makes you sexy: Conformity to dietary gender norms and attractiveness. Psychology of Men & Masculinity, 19(3), 418-429. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/06/psychology-of-men-masculinity-eating.html

And Baby Animals Less Appetizing? Tenderness toward Baby Animals and Appetite for Meat. Jared Piazza, Neil McLatchie & Cecilie Olesen. Anthrozoös, Volume 31, 2018 - Issue 3, Pages 319-335. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/05/presenting-images-of-baby-animals.html

Infection and Ideology: Perceived Vulnerability to Disease Predicts Political Conservatism

Jacob Appleby, Christopher M. Federico, Joseph A. Vitriol, Allison L. Williams. 2020. “Infection and Ideology- Perceived Vulnerability to Disease Predicts Political Conservatism.” PsyArXiv. January 4. doi:10.31234/osf.io/6ag92

Abstract: Recent research on the behavioral immune system suggests that perceived vulnerability to disease is associated with greater ingroup preference, conformity, and support for established cultural practices. However, little of this research has looked at the implications of perceived vulnerability to disease for an orientation linked to many of the above outcomes: ideology. In two studies, we test the hypothesis that perceived vulnerability to disease should be associated with greater political conservatism. In Study 1, we find a relationship between perceived vulnerability to disease and increases in conservatism over time. In Study 2, we use data from the World Values Survey to demonstrate that perceived vulnerability to disease predicts a stronger preference for the political right in a large sample of respondents from a wide variety of nations. Together, these results suggest that the consequences of the behavioral immune system may extend to abstract identifications like ideology.

General Discussion

In these studies, we extend prior work on the social implications of the behavioral immune system by examining the relation between subjective perceptions of disease vulnerability and ideological self-placement. Consistent with the expectation that the perceived prevalence of pathogens activates motivational goals and values congruent with conservatism, Study 1 found that perceived vulnerability to disease was associated with increases political conservatism over time and a stronger tendency to evaluate conservatives more positively than liberals net of baseline political beliefs. Extending this finding, Study 2 found that PVD was also related to a greater preference for the political right in a large representative survey of respondents from a wide variety of nations. In both cases, our results were robust to controls for relevant demographic characteristics and competing psychological determinants of ideology. Together, our findings address a major gap in our understanding of the behavioral immune system’s social implications. Although PVD has been shown to predict conformity (Murray & Schaller, 2012; Wu & Chang, 2012) and exclusionary outgroup attitudes (Faulkner et al., 2004), the current studies are the first to provide direct evidence for a relationship between PVD and ideological conservatism. Given the relatively abstract nature of ideology as an identification (Jost et al., 2009), they suggest that the operation of the behavioral immune system may also have consequences for outcomes less concrete and socially immediate than ingroup bias or conformity. Methodologically, they provide a more precise look at the relationship between the behavioral immune system and ideology than studies that rely solely on disgust sensitivity as an indicator of pathogen avoidance, which have yielded inconsistent findings (Tybur et al., 2009). By relying on a more direct indicator of pathogen avoidance that accounts for both the subjective perceptions of susceptibility to infection and related affective responses, our results help clarify the connection between the functioning of the behavioral immune system and ideology. Despite the strength of our evidence, our studies are not without their limitations. First, our correlational data cannot provide decisive evidence for a causal link between PVD and ideology. That said, our inclusion of a lagged indicator for our dependent variable does allows us to model change in conservatism across time as a function of PVD and overcome some of the bias potentially introduced by feedback effects (Finkel, 1995). Second, in Study 2, we were only able to use a simple proxy measure of PVD from the World Values Survey, rather than the validated scale employed in Study 1(Duncan et al., 2009). Nevertheless, the WVS items measure perceptions closely related to those included in the PVD scale, leaving us with confidence in their face validity; the similarity of our results across the two studies (and two very different samples) also testifies to the correspondence between the two measures. The evidence we present for a relationship between PVD and conservatism also has a number of broader implications, both for society as a whole and for future research. Like other threats (e.g., Jost et al., 2003, 2009), increased attention to public health concerns associated with infectious disease—both in communications from political elites and in media coverage—may have the potential to produce a conservative shift in public opinion and ideological sympathies. Such changes in the salience of disease threat may have both a main effect on conservatism, as well as a moderating effect in which they activate individual differences in PVD and produce especially large ideological shifts among those who feel chronically susceptible to infection. Given the tendency for pathogen prevalence to produce especially strong reactions against cultural outgroups and those who fail to conform to dominant social norms (e.g., Schaller et al. 2003; Thornhill & Fincher, 2012), we might also expect these effects to be especially strong when disease threats are associated with “foreign” groups (e.g., West Africans in the case of Ebola) or “non-normative” groups (e.g., gay men in the case of HIV). These questions await future research.

Increased Support for Same-sex Marriage in the US: Americans of all ages modified their beliefs about same-sex marriage over time

Increased Support for Same-sex Marriage in the US: Disentangling Age, Period, and Cohort Effects. Jean M. Twenge &Andrew B. Blake. Journal of Homosexuality, Jan 4 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/00918369.2019.1705672

ABSTRACT: Previous research established a substantial increase in support for same-sex marriage in the US, but it is unclear if this increase is due to cohort (a change that affects only the younger generation) or time period (a change that affects those of all ages). In a nationally representative sample of American adults (n = 13,483) in 1988 and 2004–2018, increased support for same-sex marriage was primarily due to time period (from 11.1% in 1988 to 66.7% in 2018). There was a smaller cohort effect, with a fairly linear increase between cohorts born in the 1960s and those born in the 1990s. Time period increases in support for same-sex marriage appeared among across gender, race, education levels, regions, and levels of religious service attendance, though differences in support still remain. The results suggest Americans of all ages modified their beliefs about same-sex marriage over time.

KEYWORDS: Same-sex marriage, cultural change, time period, cohort, lgbt rights, gender differences, regional differences

Discussion

Increased support for same-sex marriage between 1988 and 2018 appears to
be primarily a time period effect, with those of all ages increasing in support,
rather than a generational phenomenon. Thus, increased support for samesex marriage is not primarily due to generational shifts. Instead, Americans
of all ages changed their beliefs about same-sex marriage. The trends also
appeared across all demographic groups. Differences based on gender, race,
education, region, and religion remain, but all groups are now substantially
more likely to support same-sex marriage. Thus, the increased support for
same-sex marriage was pervasive, appearing across ages and generations as
well as across demographic groups.
The results suggest that some attitudes may be malleable after young
adulthood under the right historical and political conditions. The extraordinary cultural shift toward embracing LGBT rights, including the right to
marry, apparently impacted older people as well as younger ones. Future
research should explore whether other attitudes may be changed later in life,
or if LGBT attitudes are the exception.
This analysis is limited to the data available. First, support for same-sex
marriage was measured only once before 2004 (in 1988), and it is possible
this year had unique cultural influences that could skew the results. However,
the numbers are consistent with other measures of LGBT attitudes in the GSS
in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Twenge, Sherman, & Wells, 2015). Data from
Gallup asking about same-sex marriage suggest that support continued to
increase between 1996 (27%) and 2004 (42%; McCarthy, 2019), suggesting
that there was a fairly linear trend during the 16 years when the GSS did not
field the same-sex marriage question. Second, the GSS does not include data on
all cohorts at all ages, which limits our ability to discern (for example) the
young adulthood responses of the earlier cohorts and the midlife responses of
the later cohorts. Third, the analysis is based on a self-report survey question
that may be subject to social desirability bias; perhaps people express support
for same-sex marriage because they believe this is what they should say.
However, one study found that support for same-sex marriage was similar
even when respondents were afforded more anonymity, suggesting social
desirability bias does not have much effect on survey questions about support
for same-sex marriage (Lax, Phillips, & Stollwerk, 2016).
In summary, the extraordinary increase in support for same-sex marriage
appears to have occurred for an extraordinary reason: Those past young
adulthood altering their views as the culture shifted to embrace LGBT rights.
The fight for same-sex marriage not only won the hearts of the younger
generations but the hearts of many in older generations as well in a pervasive
wave of cultural change.