Multiple asymmetries in the way people endorse positive and negative "belief in a just world" statements for the past and the future that concern the self or other people

Symmetries and asymmetries in the belief in a just world. Mariia Kaliuzhna. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 161, July 15 2020, 109940. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.109940

Abstract: Despite evidence to the contrary, people have a need to represent the world as a just and fair place where prosocial behaviour is rewarded and negative acts are punished. This cognitive bias is termed the Belief in a Just World (BJW). Previous research assumes the BJW to be symmetrical, i.e., one believes to the same extent that a negative action will be punished and that negative events in one's life are punishments for previous negative actions. Similarly, good deeds are expected to be rewarded and positive events are interpreted as rewards for previous positive actions. The present work tests this symmetry assumption. We show multiple asymmetries in the way people endorse positive and negative BJW statements for the past and the future that concern the self or other people. The results are discussed in terms of the interaction of BJW with other cognitive biases.

Keywords: Belief in a Just WorldJust dessertsKarmaOptimism biasSelf-serving bias

11. Discussion

In the present paper we explored the symmetry of the Belief in a Just World, summarised by the assertion that people not only get what they deserve but also deserve what they get (Bartholomaeus & Strelan, 2019; Hafer & Sutton, 2016; Lerner, 1965, 1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978; Sabag & Schmitt, 2016; Schindler et al., 2019). In four surveys, we studied BJW about positive and negative events in the past and in the future for self and others.

One robust finding across all the surveys is the asymmetry between negative prospective and retrospective questions. Thus, participants more readily made the connection between doing a bad deed and getting retribution than between a negative event in one's life and a previous bad deed. Previous research shows that recollected memories are more detailed than imagined events (D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Johnson et al., 1988), and that imagining the future requires a constructive and, possibly effortful, process (Schacter & Addis, 2007; Szpunar et al., 2007). One could thus hypothesise that the retrospective link would be easier to construct and we would observe the opposite pattern. However, when making the prospective link (i.e., do a bad deed – be punished) one does not necessarily have to imagine specific details for the future (i.e., what kind of punishment one would incur as a result of a negative deed), thus no additional cognitive effort is solicited. When in the retrospective condition, on the other hand, one needs to make a link between a negative event and a specific negative act that could have caused it (i.e. go through memories of one's behaviour). It is then possible that the cognitive load of recollecting instances of past behaviour and their differing accessibility resulted in participants’ judging the retrospective condition as less plausible. Indeed, as mentioned in the introduction, previous research shows that ease of information retrieval and processing fluency lead to higher statement endorsement and confidence in them (Bonnefond et al., 2014; Cummins, 1995; Oppenheimer, 2008; Weingarten & Hutchinson, 2018).

The retrospective/prospective asymmetry for negative events could additionally reflect a self-serving bias. Previous research shows that positive autobiographical memories are reported twice as often as negative autobiographical memories (Berntsen et al., 2011; Seidlitz & Diener, 1993; Walker et al., 2003). This memory bias could result in a representation of oneself as a positive person, making it difficult to recollect (or imagine, as in our task) a negative deed in the past. Thus, one would more readily concede that a negative deed could bring about a negative event, than that negative events represent one's past negative acts, as the person represents themselves as a good person. The impact of the self-serving bias is particularly evident when comparing baseline positive and negative questions (questions 5 & 6 in Experiment 1 & 3, and questions 3 in Experiment 2). Indeed, participants rated the probability of positive events as higher than that of negative events, and this distinction was even more pronounced when the questions were framed in terms of deservingness – a result consistent with the optimism bias (Sharot, 2011; Sharot & Garrett, 2016).

These interpretations, however, do not appear plausible for our Experiment 4, where specific negative deeds and events were presented to participants, precluding memory search, and we still observed the same asymmetry. Similarly, Experiment 3 which tapped into BJW for others, should not have triggered a self-serving bias. However, the wording of the questions in Experiment 3 (“somebody”, “this person”) might have led participants to include themselves in the interpretation, engaging the self-serving bias (thus the only “clean” other BJW condition would be in Experiment 4). Similar ambiguity has been reported for BJW-general vs BJW-self questionnaires, as the general BJW includes both oneself and other people (Bartholomaeus & Strelan, 2019; Lipkusa et al., 1996; Wenzel et al., 2017).

The second result of the present experiments concerns the symmetry between positive prospective and retrospective conditions. Similar to the negative asymmetry, across experiments participants tended to give higher scores in the prospective than in the retrospective condition. This result, however, was less pronounced and consistent than for negative asymmetry: a significant difference in the mentioned direction was only observed in Experiment 2 and 3. A similar explanation as for the negative asymmetry could be invoked: the cognitive load of retrieving past instances of good behaviour that could be rewarded resulted in lower endorsement ratings for the retrospective condition, compared to the prospective condition. This result might be less pronounced than for the negative questions because the self-serving bias is not involved – that is, the questions did not provoke a need to foster a positive image of oneself (Bradley, 1978; Mezulis et al., 2004).

The third asymmetry we observed showed that participants tended to give higher scores for positive than negative statements (especially retrospective questions), a result that could again be due to the self-serving bias (i.e., the desire for a positive representation of oneself (Bradley, 1978; Mezulis et al., 2004), as well as the optimism bias – the overestimation of the probability of encountering positive events (Morewedge et al., 2005; Sharot, 2011; Sharot & Garrett, 2016) and biased recollection of positive events (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992; Mischel et al., 1976; Seidlitz & Diener, 1993). Interestingly, this result was absent in Experiment 4. We believe this result might highlight the implicit (irrational, preconscious)/explicit (rational, conscious) distinction in the BJW literature. Lerner (1998) draws this distinction emphasising that most adults do not actually believe that the world is just, but have the need to reduce the anxiety of living in an unpredictable world by re-establishing justice through cognitive scripts (Lerner, 1998). Thus, when the impact of the self-serving bias (implicit effect) is reduced (due to the use of situations not involving the self as in our Experiment 4) it is the prospective negative situation (do a bad deed – get punished) that is endorsed the most. In line with previous studies showing increased cognitive processing and significance of negative events ( HYPERLINK \l "bib6" Baumeister et al., 2001 ), the negative statements in Experiment 4 would thus appear more representative of the way participants perceive the world (i.e. as harbouring an increased probability for negative events).

Interestingly, the above asymmetries are represented in folk psychology by the notion of “karma” (that appears to have a predominantly negative connotation) and prospectively formulated proverbs (also appearing predominantly negative): he who digs a pit will fall into it; old sins cast long shadows; you reap what you sow; before you begin the journey of revenge, dig two graves; every man's sin falls on his own head; harm set, harm get; what goes around comes around; etc. It is unclear whether participants’ responses in our surveys were driven by the exposure frequency to such sayings, resulting in higher endorsement of similarly phrased prospective statements, or whether a common mechanism explains the preference for prospective moral representations. Importantly, although previous research shows that karma beliefs and BJW are distinct phenomena, it has also been reported that karma beliefs were specifically associated with perceived causality for negative events following bad behaviour ( HYPERLINK \l "bib74" White, Norenzayan & Schaller, 2019 ), i.e. our prospective condition. Although we did not explicitly measure karma beliefs in our participants, this could explain why in this experiment they scored the highest on this prospective condition.

Finally, the asymmetry for BJW between self and other is difficult to interpret based on our results. Previous work shows a pronounced asymmetry between self and other BJW, which relate to different aspects of behaviour and personality (Bartholomaeus & Strelan, 2019; Lipkusa et al., 1996; Schindler et al., 2019; Wenzel et al., 2017). As mentioned above, Experiment 3 might not be considered as solely representing judgements for other people, but also includes implicit judgement about the self. Comparing Experiment 1 and Experiment 3, we find that participants scored higher in Experiment 3 (other) in the deservingness survey for positive prospective, retrospective and baseline questions. Interestingly, Experiment 4, which we consider to be a “cleaner” other condition, yielded the lowest endorsement rates for all the questions, as compared to the other three experiments. This is consistent with previous work that shows that participants report higher scores for self BJW than for general BJW (reviewed in Bartholomaeus & Strelan, 2019; Lipkusa et al., 1996; Wenzel et al., 2017), meaning that self-relevant questions are endorsed to a higher degree than questions concerning others.

In accordance with previous research, our results indicate an association between BJW and religiosity (Dalbert & Katona-Sallay, 1996; Kunst, Bjorck & Tan, 2000; Szmajke, 1991; White et al., 2019): most questions in our surveys positively correlated with the belief in God. Disentangling the relationship between BJW and religiosity was not the primary aim of the present research; however, it confirms the previously reported association between the two.

Our results yield several implications. First, the assumed symmetry of the BJW, reported since Lerner first introduced the phenomenon, and up to the most recent papers in 2019 (Armstrong, 2019; Schindler et al., 2019; Westfall et al., 2019), does not hold. Participants appear to endorse the prospective BJW “do -> get” more than the retrospective “got -> did” BJW. It would be of interest to examine what influences this asymmetry, and how it interacts with other domains, affected by the BJW, for example, life satisfaction (Ucar, Hasta & Malatyali, 2019), antisocial behaviour (Schindler et al., 2019; Wenzel et al., 2017) or social judgements of value (Alves, Pereira, Sutton & Correia, 2019).

Specifically, the finding that the retrospective negative condition was endorsed the lowest among the other target conditions may have some hope for the adverse effects of BJW, such as victim blaming. Making people's retrospective BJW explicit might help reduce their perceptions that someone else's apparently arbitrary misfortunes are caused by some previous misdeeds (Landström et al., 2016; Vonderhaar & Carmody, 2015).

Second, the above has larger implications for the information processing theories, which invoke implicational molecules (Kruglanski, 2013; Loken & Weyer, 1983; Wyer, 2019; Wyer & Carlston, 2018; Wyer, 2006). Our direct survey approach shows that beliefs bound together by psychological implication are not necessarily all endorsed to the same degree, thus calling for a refinement of the theory.

Third, BJW seems to be asymmetrically affected by religiosity and the belief in karma (i.e. the prospective negative condition is more endorsed than others). Future research could test whether the asymmetries we observed are present across different cultures that endorse the karma belief to a different extent.

Finally, BJW is a complex belief that interacts with other cognitive biases and personality traits. Previous research in the latter domains has used computational modelling to identify the circumstances under which participants’ behaviour departs from optimality (Eil & Rao, 2011; Mobius, Niederle, Niehaus & Rosenblat, 2011). A similar normative approach could be beneficial to represent the complexity of BJW, an approach that surprisingly has not been applied in this field. Hierarchical Bayesian models could be used to formalise participants’ predictions about future events based on their prior knowledge, and how new information (confirming or disconfirming the priors) is integrated. Such an approach will shed new light on the debate about whether belief formation and change in neurotypical individuals follows the rules of Bayesian optimality (Tappin & Gadsby, 2019).

Keeping a smartphone in hand and frequent checking is linked to extraversion and poorer performance on tests of sustained attention and general intelligence, particularly semantic reasoning

Pluck, Graham. 2020. “Cognitive Ability, Reward Processing and Personality Associated with Different Aspects of Smartphone Use.” PsyArXiv. March 24. doi:10.31234/osf.io/sqfu2

Abstract: Smartphone use has become ubiquitous. Keeping smartphones close and always on, with alerts for new messages, etc., means that users experience unprecedented levels of distracting and reinforcing stimulation, with wide-ranging psychological implications. We interviewed 121 students to record aspects of smartphone use, personality, psychological distress (depression/anxiety), cognitive, social-cognitive, and reward processing. We found that questionnaire-measured problematic phone use is linked to poorer academic performance and to higher psychological distress, neuroticism, psychometric impulsivity and image management. Social media use is linked to neuroticism. Keeping a smartphone in hand and frequent checking is associated with extraversion and poorer performance on tests of sustained attention and general intelligence, particularly semantic reasoning. The number of messenger services used is associated with sensitivity to financial rewards and responses to social reinforcement in an instrumental/operant conditioning task. However, the later result links messenger use to resistance to reinforcement, implying a goal-directed association driven by demand characteristics. Overall, the current results, and review of extant literature, suggest that there are generally negative impacts of smartphone use on psychological health, including cognitive function. Furthermore, variation in responses to reward and reinforcement is an important individual differences factor linked particularly to social communication with instant messaging services.

Los Angeles & SARS-CoV-2 restrictions: Significant decrease in robberies (-23%/-24%), shoplifting (-14%/-15%), thefts (-9.1%/-9.6%), and overall trend of crimes (-5.4%/-5.6%)

Campedelli, Gian M., Alberto Aziani, and Serena Favarin. 2020. “Exploring the Effect of 2019-ncov Containment Policies on Crime: The Case of Los Angeles.” OSF Preprints. March 23. doi:10.31219/osf.io/gcpq8

Abstract: The global spread of 2019-nCoV, a new virus belonging to the coronavirus family, forced national and local governments to apply different sets of measures aimed at containing the outbreak. Los Angeles has been one of the first cities in the United States to declare the state of emergency on March 4th, progressively issuing stronger policies involving (among the others) social distancing, the prohibition of crowded private and public gatherings and closure of leisure premises. These interventions highly disrupt and modify daily activities and habits, urban mobility and micro-level interactions between citizens. One of the many social phenomena that could be influenced by such measures is crime. Exploiting public data on crime in Los Angeles, and relying on routine activity and pattern theories of crime, this work investigates whether and how new coronavirus containment policies have an impact on crime trends in a metropolis. The article specifically focuses on eight urban crime categories, daily monitored from January 1st 2017 to March 16th 2020. The analyses will be updated bi-weekly to dynamically assess the shortand medium-term effects of these interventions to shed light on how crime adapts to such structural modification of the environment. Finally, policy implications are also discussed.

The Emotional Path to Action: Empathy Promotes Physical Distancing During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Pfattheicher, Stefan, Laila Nockur, Robert Böhm, Claudia Sassenrath, and Michael Bang Petersen. 2020. “The Emotional Path to Action: Empathy Promotes Physical Distancing During the COVID-19 Pandemic.” PsyArXiv. March 23. doi:10.31234/osf.io/y2cg5

Abstract: The COVID-19 pandemic presents a major challenge to societies all over the globe. To curb the spread of the disease, one measure implemented in many countries is minimizing close contact between people (“physical distancing”). Engaging in physical distancing is a prosocial act in the sense that it helps protecting other individuals, especially those most vulnerable to the virus. Building on this notion, we tested the idea that physical distancing can be the result of a genuine prosocial motivation—empathy for those most vulnerable to the virus. In three pre-registered studies that include samples from the US, the UK, and Germany (total N = 2,192‬) collected at the beginning of the outbreak, we show that (i) empathy is indeed a basic motivation for physical distancing, and (ii) inducing empathy for those most vulnerable to the virus promotes the motivation to adhere to physical distancing. In sum, the present research provides a better understanding of the basic motivation underlying the willingness to follow one important measure during the COVID-19 pandemic. We further point to the potential for policymakers to use empathy to promote physical distancing – in this way to increase the chance of saving lives.

Money does not stink: Analyses using prospect theory show that participants were less sensitive to probabilities when gambling with odors than when gambling with money

Money does not stink: Using unpleasant odors as stimulus material changes risky decision making. Bettina von Helversen  Géraldine Coppin  Benjamin Scheibehenne. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, March 23 2020. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2178

Abstract: Odors are strong elicitors of affect, and they play an important role in guiding human behavior, such as avoiding fire or spoiled food. However, little is known about how risky decision making changes when stimuli are olfactory. We investigated this question in an experimental study of risky decision making with unpleasant odors and monetary losses in a fully incentivized task with real outcomes. Odor and monetary decisions were matched so that monetary losses corresponded to the amount of money participants were willing to pay to avoid smelling an odor. Hierarchical Bayesian analyses using prospect theory show that participants were less sensitive to probabilities when gambling with odors than when gambling with money. These results highlight the importance of taking the sensory modality into account when studying risky decision making.

5 DISCUSSION

To reach a better understanding of how decision making changes when outcomes are affect rich, unpleasant, olfactory stimuli compared with monetary losses, we asked participants in a laboratory experiment to make a series of decisions involving real consequences (monetary losses or smelling unpleasant odors) that were matched in subjective value. On a behavioral level, participants were more likely to choose the more risky option in the monetary gambles than in the odor gambles, suggesting that participants were less sensitive to differences in probabilities with odor gambles. In line with these findings, modeling participants' choices with CPT using a Bayesian hierarchical approach showed a more strongly curved probability weighting function for odors than for monetary gambles. These results correspond to the literature on the changes in decision processes when outcomes are affect rich (e.g., Lejarraga et al., 2016; Pachur et al., 2014; Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001; Suter et al., 2016). They suggest that in decisions involving affect‐rich odors, participants' decision processes are less sensitive to probabilities. This result extends previous findings by Stancak et al. (2015) that unpleasant odors can increase loss aversion by showing that olfactory outcomes can also affect the subjective weighting or perception of probabilities. These insights are of direct importance for situations in which outcomes are olfactory. Furthermore, they support the initial findings by Ditto et al. (2006) showing a change in decision making when outcomes included an olfactory dimension. This suggests that odors will also affect risky decision making in situations in which odors are an integral and important feature of the outcomes, as in partner or food choice, for instance, when deciding whether food is still edible past its expiration date.

Moreover, our study provides clear evidence that affect‐rich outcomes change sensitivity to probabilities even when outcomes are real and decisions consequential. By using choices with real consequences, we were able to investigate whether the choices participants made with money and odors differed in “quality” in the sense that they affected the likelihood of losing. Participants chose the gamble with the higher expected value less frequently in the odor gambles than in the monetary gambles. Furthermore, participants for whom the payout gamble was an odor gamble were more likely to incur a loss than participants for whom the payout gamble was a monetary gamble. Thus, participants may be less able to choose options that maximize their earnings when decision outcomes contain affect‐rich outcomes such as unpleasant odors.

Although our results dovetail with those of previous studies using affect‐rich outcomes (e.g., Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001), there were some noteworthy differences from studies that used real affect‐rich outcomes: Specifically, Krawczyk (2015) and Berns et al. (2007, 2008) did not find a decrease in sensitivity for the probabilities of affect‐rich outcomes. Krawczyk used vouchers in his study and measured affect richness with how excited participants were about receiving the voucher. Possibly, the observed differences between affect‐rich and affect‐poor vouchers in this study reflected differences not only in affect but also in perceived utility.

For the differences from the studies by Berns et al. (2007, 2008), there are at least two possible explanations. First, Berns et al. investigated risky decisions using real affect‐rich outcomes (i.e., electric shocks) but did not have a monetary control group and thus compared their findings with parameter estimates for gamma parameters within CPT reported in the literature (e.g., Abdellaoui, 2000; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). In our study, we found differences in probability weighting, but the average probability weighting function estimated for the odor gambles actually resembled the parameter estimates reported in the above‐mentioned studies more closely than the probability weighting function in the monetary gambles. 7 Thus, it is possible that in the studies by Berns et al., differences in probability weighting would have appeared if the same gambles had been presented with matched monetary outcomes. Second, in Berns et al.'s studies, participants received immediate feedback after each choice, whereas in our task, participants experienced the odor at the beginning but then did not receive feedback until the payout gamble selected at the end of the experiment. Perhaps differences in probability weighting diminish over time when participants experience real affect‐rich outcomes repeatedly.

In addition, there are some limitations of our study. First, we had to exclude 20% of our participants because they did not perceive the odors as unpleasant enough to be willing to spend money to avoid smelling them again. Although we tried to include only participants with a normal sense of smell, we used a self‐report measure. Thus, it is possible that these (or some of these) participants had a reduced sensitivity to odors that they were not aware of or not willing to disclose. Regarding the generalizability of our results, it could mean that the overall influence of odors on decisions is less strong than our results indicate. Second, we equated monetary losses and unpleasant odors based on participants' WTP judgments. This relies on the assumption that participants are able to accurately price smelling an unpleasant odor. Difficulties in setting a price for smelling an unpleasant odor might have driven the differences in choices, suggesting an alternative explanation for why odors or affect‐rich outcomes in general lead to different choices than monetary outcomes (see also McGraw et al., 2010). What speaks against this explanation is that people's evaluations of unpleasant odors do not seem to change much over time and are not affected by familiarity (Delplanque et al., 2008; Delplanque, Coppin, Bloesch, Cayeux, & Sander, 2015), and participants' WTPs in our study were highly correlated with their odor ratings. Third, we used a combination of choice data and mathematical modeling to understand the changes in risky taking. However, to fully understand the cognitive processes underlying the observed changes in choices, we would need to use process‐tracing methods, such as eye tracking or mouse tracking, which would allow us to investigate whether the observed differences in risky decision making can be traced to information processing, such as the attention allocated to outcomes (e.g., Lejarraga, Schulte‐Mecklenbeck, Pachur, & Hertwig, 2019; Pachur, Schulte‐Mecklenbeck, Murphy, & Hertwig, 2018). Finally, in our study, outcomes were odors, whereas in many decisions such as when evaluating food items, a new car, or clothes that still smell of the chemicals used for dying, odors will be just one attribute of the outcome. Here, it will be important in the future to test whether odors still affect the sensitivity to probabilities when other attributes also influence the overall utility of an option.

In conclusion, our study shows a qualitative change in decision processes for affect‐rich olfactory outcomes, leading to a reduced sensitivity to probabilities. These results highlight the importance of taking olfactory stimulus dimensions into account when studying risky decision making. Furthermore, by using consequential decisions with real outcomes, the present study provides solid evidence that the affective intensity of outcomes is an important factor in risky decision making that should be taken into account to better understand the underlying cognitive processes.

Individual Differences in Accepting Personal Restrictions to Fight the COVID-19 Pandemic: Results from a Danish Adult Sample

Zettler, Ingo, Christoph Schild, Lau Lilleholt, and Robert Böhm. 2020. “Individual Differences in Accepting Personal Restrictions to Fight the COVID-19 Pandemic: Results from a Danish Adult Sample.” PsyArXiv. March 23. doi:10.31234/osf.io/pkm2a

Abstract: Political authorities are working hard on fighting the spread of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). Corresponding interventions often address cooperative behavior, because they pose restrictions on the individual level (e.g., limiting one’s physical contacts) with the aim to serve the greater good (e.g., not overtaxing the health systems). In a sample of Danish adults (N = 799) randomly drawn from a representative sample, we link different personality characteristics to people’s willingness in accepting personal restrictions for fighting COVID-19. When simultaneously considering all characteristics including the basic traits from the HEXACO personality model, we find that, next to people’s age, Emotionality as well as the Dark Factor of Personality (D) explain who is more willing to accept restrictions. D further explains acceptance based on whether restrictions aim to protect oneself rather than others. The results show the importance of individual differences for following large-scale interventions that should serve the greater good.

We devote disproportionate attention to already-known positive information about the performance of individual stocks within our portfolios

Attention Utility: Evidence from Individual Investors. Edika Quispe-Torreblanca, John Gathergood, George Loewenstein, Neil Stewart. CESifo Working Paper No. 8091, Feb 2020. https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp8091.pdf

Abstract: Attention utility is the hedonic pleasure or pain derived purely from paying attention to information. Using data on brokerage account logins by individual investors, we show that individuals devote disproportionate attention to already-known positive information about the performance of individual stocks within their portfolios. This aversion to paying attention to unfavorable information, through its effect on logins, has consequences for trading activity; it reduces trading after recent losses and increases trading after recent gains. Attention utility is distinct from models of belief-based utility and information aversion (in which information not sought is not fully known), and implies that the pleasure and pain of attending to known information may be important for individual behavior.

JEL-Codes: G400, G410, D140.
Keywords: information utility, attention, login, investor behavior.

Psychological Correlates of News Monitoring, Social Distancing, Disinfecting, and Hoarding Behaviors Among US Adolescents During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Oosterhoff, Benjamin, and Cara palmer. 2020. “Psychological Correlates of News Monitoring, Social Distancing, Disinfecting, and Hoarding Behaviors Among US Adolescents During the COVID-19 Pandemic.” PsyArXiv. March 23. doi:10.31234/osf.io/rpcy4

Abstract
Importance: As COVID-19 spreads across the globe, it is critical to understand the psychological factors that influence pandemic-related behaviors (i.e., news monitoring, social distancing, hygiene/disinfecting, hoarding). This may be especially important to study among youth, who are less likely to experience severe symptoms but contribute to the spread of the virus.

Objective: To examine psychological correlates of adolescents’ behaviors during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Design: Self-report survey conducted between March 20th and March 22nd, 2020.

Setting: This is an online survey study of youth from the United States.
Participants: A population-based sample of adolescents were recruited via social media to complete an anonymous survey. Youth were eligible if they had internet access, lived in the United States, and were between the ages of 13 and 18.

Main Outcomes and Measures: Outcomes included COVID-19 news monitoring, social distancing, disinfecting, and hoarding behaviors over the 7 days after the US declared a national emergency. The correlates measured were attitudes about COVID-19 severity, values related to social responsibility, social trust, and self-interest. The a priori hypotheses were that attitudes about the severity of COVID-19, along with greater social responsibility and social trust, would be associated with greater news monitoring, social distancing, and disinfecting, whereas greater self-interest would be associated with more hoarding.

Results: The final analytic sample included 770 adolescents (Mage = 16.34, 72% female). The majority of teens reported not engaging in pure social distancing (70%), but were monitoring the news (75%) and engaging in at least one disinfecting behavior multiple times per day (88%). Some teens reported engaging in hoarding behavior (19%). Greater attitudes about the severity of COVID-19 were associated with more social distancing, disinfecting, and news monitoring, but also more hoarding. Greater social responsibility was associated with more disinfecting and news monitoring, and less hoarding. Participants who reported valuing their own self-interest over others reported less social distancing and more hoarding. Greater social trust was associated with less hoarding.

Conclusions and Relevance: Emphasizing the severity of COVID-19 and the social implications of pandemic-related behaviors may be important for teens, particularly for those who are not following recommended preventative health behaviors or who are engaging in hoarding.

In 2012, two independent groups demonstrated that intuitive mindset enhances belief in God; replication failed to provide support for the intuitive belief hypothesis in our non-WEIRD sample

Does intuitive mindset influence belief in God? A registered replication of Shenhav, Rand and Greene (2012). S. Adil Saribay, Onurcan Yilmaz, Gülay Gözde Körpe. Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 15, No. 2, March 2020, pp. 193–202. http://journal.sjdm.org/18/18412/jdm18412.pdf

Abstract: In 2012, two independent groups simultaneously demonstrated that intuitive mindset enhances belief in God. However, there is now some mixed evidence on both the effectiveness of manipulations used in these studies and the effect of mindset manipulation on belief in God. Thus, this proposal attempted to replicate one of those experiments (Shenhav, Rand & Greene, 2012) for the first time in a high-powered experiment using an under-represented population (Turkey). In line with the intuitive belief hypothesis, a negative correlation between reflectiveness and religious belief emerged, at least in one of the experimental conditions. In contrast to that hypothesis, however, the results revealed no effect of the cognitive style manipulation on religious belief. Although a self-report measure (Faith in Intuition) provided evidence that the manipulation worked as intended, it did not influence actual performance (Cognitive Reflection Test), suggesting a demand effect problem. Overall, the results failed to provide support for the intuitive belief hypothesis in our non-WEIRD sample, despite generally following the predicted patterns, and suggest that using stronger manipulation techniques are warranted in future studies.

Keywords: intuitive thinking, belief in God, replication, analytic cognitive style, reflection, intuition

The Macroeconomics of Epidemics: there is an inevitable trade-off between the severity of the short-run recession caused by the epidemic and the health consequences of that epidemic

The Macroeconomics of Epidemics. Martin S. Eichenbaum, Sergio Rebeloy, Mathias Trabandtz. March 20, 2020. https://fb8280a8-a-62cb3a1a-s-sites.googlegroups.com/site/mathiastrabandt/home/downloads/EichenbaumRebeloTrabandt_EpidemicsMacro.pdf

Abstract: We extend the canonical epidemiology model to study the interaction between economic decisions and epidemics. Our model implies that people ís decision to cut back on consumption and work reduces the severity of the epidemic, as measured by total deaths. These decisions exacerbate the size of the recession caused by the epidemic. The competitive equilibrium is not socially optimal because infected people do not fully internalize the effect of their economic decisions on the spread of the virus. In our benchmark scenario, the optimal containment policy increases the severity of the recession but saves roughly 0.6 million lives in the U.S.

JEL Classiffication: E1, I1, H0
Keywords: Epidemic, COVID-19, recessions, containment policies

6 Conclusion

We extend the canonical epidemiology model to study the interaction between economic decisions and epidemics. In our model, the epidemic generates both supply and demand effects on economic activity. These effects work in tandem to generate a large, persistent recession.

We abstract from many important real-world complications to highlight the basic economic forces at work during an epidemic. The central message of our analysis should be robust to allowing for those complications: there is an inevitable trade-off between the severity of the short-run recession caused by the epidemic and the health consequences of that epidemic. Dealing with this trade-off is a key challenge confronting policy makers.

Finally, we note that our model abstracts from various forces that might affect the long-run performance of the economy. These forces include bankruptcy costs, hysteresis effects from unemployment, and the destruction of supply-side chains. It is important to embody these forces in macroeconomic models of epidemics and study their positive and normative implications.

The spatial concentration of cutting-edge technologies has increased since 1850, suggesting a reinforcing cycle between the increase in the complexity of activities and urbanization

Complex economic activities concentrate in large cities. Pierre-Alexandre Balland, Cristian Jara-Figueroa, Sergio G. Petralia, Mathieu P. A. Steijn, David L. Rigby & César A. Hidalgo. Nature Human Behaviour volume 4, pages 248–254. January 13 2020. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-019-0803-3

Abstract: Human activities, such as research, innovation and industry, concentrate disproportionately in large cities. The ten most innovative cities in the United States account for 23% of the national population, but for 48% of its patents and 33% of its gross domestic product. But why has human activity become increasingly concentrated? Here we use data on scientific papers, patents, employment and gross domestic product, for 353 metropolitan areas in the United States, to show that the spatial concentration of productive activities increases with their complexity. Complex economic activities, such as biotechnology, neurobiology and semiconductors, concentrate disproportionately in a few large cities compared to less--complex activities, such as apparel or paper manufacturing. We use multiple proxies to measure the complexity of activities, finding that complexity explains from 40% to 80% of the variance in urban concentration of occupations, industries, scientific fields and technologies. Using historical patent data, we show that the spatial concentration of cutting-edge technologies has increased since 1850, suggesting a reinforcing cycle between the increase in the complexity of activities and urbanization. These findings suggest that the growth of spatial inequality may be connected to the increasing complexity of the economy.

Universal Sex Differences in Mate Preferences Are Robust: Men, more than women, prefer attractive, young mates, and women, more than men, prefer older mates with financial prospects

Sex Differences in Mate Preferences Across 45 Countries: A Large-Scale Replication. Kathryn V. Walter et al. Psychological Science, March 20, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797620904154

Abstract: Considerable research has examined human mate preferences across cultures, finding universal sex differences in preferences for attractiveness and resources as well as sources of systematic cultural variation. Two competing perspectives—an evolutionary psychological perspective and a biosocial role perspective—offer alternative explanations for these findings. However, the original data on which each perspective relies are decades old, and the literature is fraught with conflicting methods, analyses, results, and conclusions. Using a new 45-country sample (N = 14,399), we attempted to replicate classic studies and test both the evolutionary and biosocial role perspectives. Support for universal sex differences in preferences remains robust: Men, more than women, prefer attractive, young mates, and women, more than men, prefer older mates with financial prospects. Cross-culturally, both sexes have mates closer to their own ages as gender equality increases. Beyond age of partner, neither pathogen prevalence nor gender equality robustly predicted sex differences or preferences across countries.

Keywords: mate preferences, sex differences, cross-cultural studies, evolutionary psychology, biosocial role theory, open data, preregistered

At all ages, women have longer happy and unhappy lives than men, but the proportion of life spent in a happy state is greater among ment than among women

Subjective Well-being: Long and Happy Lives. Aïda Solé-Auró. In: Jagger C., Crimmins E., Saito Y., De Carvalho Yokota R., Van Oyen H., Robine JM. (eds) International Handbook of Health Expectancies. International Handbooks of Population, vol 9,  Springer Mar 19 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37668-0_19

Abstract: While longevity is important, most people want to live lives that are healthy and happy as well as long. This chapter concentrates on links between the length of life and quality of life including subjective well-being, life satisfaction and happiness. The chapter reviews the determinants of happiness across places, particularly among high-income countries, and across time with the aim of elucidating how individual, social and contextual characteristics are linked to the length of life with well-being and happiness.

Keywords: Quality of life Subjective well-being Happiness Longevity

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At all ages, women have longer happy and unhappy lives than men, but the proportion of life spent in a happy state is greater among ment than among women

Motivated misremembering (to see oneself more generous than really is) occurs chiefly for individuals whose choices violate their own fairness standards, irrespective of how high or low those standards are

Carlson, Ryan W., Michel Marechal, Bastiaan Oud, Ernst Fehr, and Molly Crockett. 2018. “Motivated Misremembering of Selfish Decisions.” PsyArXiv. July 23. doi:10.31234/osf.io/7ck25

Abstract: People often prioritize their own interests, but also like to see themselves as moral. How do individuals resolve this tension? One way to both pursue personal gain and preserve a moral self-image is to misremember the extent of one’s selfishness. Here, we test this possibility. Across five experiments (N=3190), we find that people tend to recall being more generous in the past than they actually were, even when they are incentivized to recall their decisions accurately. Crucially, this motivated misremembering effect occurs chiefly for individuals whose choices violate their own fairness standards, irrespective of how high or low those standards are. Moreover, this effect disappears under conditions where people no longer perceive themselves as responsible for their fairness violations. Together, these findings suggest that when people’s actions fall short of their personal standards, they may misremember the extent of their selfishness, thereby potentially warding off threats to their moral self-image

Children can employ genetic explanations in principled ways as early as 7 years of age but such explanations are used to account for a wider range of features by adults

Meyer, M., Roberts, S. O., Jayaratne, T. E., & Gelman, S. A. (2020). Children’s beliefs about causes of human characteristics: Genes, environment, or choice? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. Mar 2020. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000751

Abstract: To what extent do our genes make us nice, smart, or athletic? The explanatory frameworks we employ have broad consequences for how we evaluate and interact with others. Yet to date, little is known regarding when and how young children appeal to genetic explanations to understand human difference. The current study examined children’s (aged 7–13 years) and adults’ explanations for a set of human characteristics, contrasting genetic attributions with environmental and choice-based attributions. Whereas most adults and older children offered an unprompted genetic explanation at least once on an open-ended task, such explanations were not seen from younger children. However, even younger children, once trained on the mechanism of genes, endorsed genetic explanations for a range of characteristics—often in combination with environment and choice. Moreover, only adults favored genetic explanations for intelligence and athleticism; children, in contrast, favored environment and choice explanations for these characteristics. These findings suggest that children can employ genetic explanations in principled ways as early as 7 years of age but also that such explanations are used to account for a wider range of features by adults. Our study provides some of the first evidence regarding the ways in which genetic attributions emerge and change starting in early childhood.

Female Orgasm and Overall Sexual Function and Habits: A little less than half of the women reported that penis size is important, whereas more than a third reported that it is not

Shaeer O, Skakke D, Giraldi A, et al. Female Orgasm and Overall Sexual Function and Habits: A Descriptive Study of a Cohort of U.S. Women. J Sex Med 2020;XX:XXX–XXX. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsxm.2020.01.029

Abstract
Introduction: Few studies have investigated women's experiences with orgasm and the factors that they cite as important for their orgasmic function and sexual behavior related to foreplay and sexual stimulation.

Aim: To investigate and describe overall sexual function in a cohort of North American women, with a special focus on orgasmic function, satisfaction, triggers, risk factors, and sexual behavior.

Methods: A total of 303 women aged 18–75 years completed a 100-questionnaire survey, which included the Female Sexual Function Index (FSFI) questionnaire and questions on orgasmic function, duration of sexual activity, sexual behaviors and relationship, and the partner’s sexual function. Statistical analysis was performed using SPSS to illuminate factors affecting sexual function.

Outcomes: The main outcome measures are FSFI score, satisfaction with sexual life, ability to reach orgasm, orgasm frequency, preferred sexual stimulation, and sexual habits.

Results: FSFI scores, which were calculated for the 230 women who reported having had a steady male sex partner in the preceding 6 months, showed that 41% of the 230 women were at risk for female sexual dysfunction (a cutoff less than 26.55) and 21% were dissatisfied with their overall sexual life. Almost 90% of the overall cohort reported good emotional contact with their partner, that their partner was willing to have sex, satisfaction with the partner’s penis size (wherever applicable), and good erectile function and ejaculatory control of their partner (wherever applicable). 81% of the overall cohort claimed to be sexually active. Around 70% (70–72) did reach orgasm frequently, but around 10% never did so. Vaginal intercourse was reported by 62% of the overall cohort as the best trigger of orgasm, followed by external stimulation from the partner (48%) or themselves (37%). External stimulation was reported to be the fastest trigger to orgasm.

Clinical Implications: The knowledge on how women reach orgasm and how it is related to the partners' willingness to have sex and other factors can be incorporated in the clinical work.

Strengths & Limitations: The use of a validated questionnaire and the relative large number of participants are strengths of the study. Limitations are the cross-sectional design, the lack of a sexual distress measure, and a possible selection bias.

Conclusion: Most women in the overall cohort were satisfied overall with their sexual life and partner-related factors, even though 41% (of those who cited a steady sex male partner) were at risk for female sexual dysfunction. Most women did reach orgasm through different kinds of stimulation. Correlation was good between preferred and performed sexual activities and positions.

Key Words: Female Sexual FunctionFemale Sexual DysfunctionFemale OrgasmFemale Sexual Function Index (FSFI)Orgasm Risk FactorSexual Stimulation

Being fun: An overlooked indicator of childhood social status

Being fun: An overlooked indicator of childhood social status. Brett Laursen  Robert L. Altman  William M. Bukowski  Li Wei. Journal of Personality, March 7 2020. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12546

Objective: The present study concerns an overlooked trait indicator of childhood peer status: Being fun. The study is designed to identify the degree to which being fun is uniquely associated with the peer status variables of likeability and popularity.

Method: Two studies of children in grades 4 to 6 (ages 9 to 12) are reported. The first involved 306 girls and 305 boys attending school in northern Colombia. The second involved 363 girls and 299 boys attending school in southern Florida. Students completed similar peer nomination inventories, once in the first study and twice (8 weeks apart) in the second.

Results: In both studies, being fun was positively correlated with likeability and popularity. In the second study, being fun predicted subsequent changes in likeability and popularity, after controlling for factors known to be related to each. Initial likeability and popularity also predicted subsequent changes in perceptions of being fun.

Conclusions: Anecdotal evidence suggests that children are intensely focused on having fun. The findings indicate that this focus extends beyond the immediate rewards that fun experiences provide; some portion of peer status is uniquely derived from the perception that one is fun to be around.

From 2018... Musically induced chills: Variously described as thrills, frisson, or skin orgasms

From 2018... A survey into the experience of musically induced chills: Emotions, situations and music. Scott Bannisterv. Psychology of Music, September 24, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1177/0305735618798024

Abstract: Musically induced chills, an emotional response accompanied by gooseflesh, shivers and tingling sensations, are an intriguing aesthetic phenomenon. Although chills have been linked to musical features, personality traits and listening contexts, there exists no comprehensive study that surveys the general characteristics of chills, such as emotional qualities. Thus, the present research aimed to develop a broad understanding of the musical chills response, in terms of emotional characteristics, types of music and chill-inducing features, and listening contexts. Participants (N = 375) completed a survey collecting qualitative responses regarding a specific experience of musical chills, with accompanying quantitative ratings of music qualia and underlying mechanisms. Participants could also describe two more “chills pieces”. Results indicate that chills are often experienced as a mixed and moving emotional state, and commonly occur in isolated listening contexts. Recurring musical features linked to chills include crescendos, the human voice, lyrics, and concepts such as unity and communion in the music. Findings are discussed in terms of theories regarding musical chills, and implications for future empirical testing of the response.

Keywords: chills, emotion, listening, meaning, peak experiences, qualitative

Dunning-Kruger & How to Know You Are Not One of Them

How to Tell If You’re a Dunning Cougar - We’re all at risk. Jessica Wildfire. Medium, Feb 5 2020. https://medium.com/swlh/how-to-tell-if-youre-a-dunning-cougar-5396a92c1581

There was this one guy at work, who I wanted to like. He was friendly and outgoing, when he was in a good mood. He had potential. But he couldn’t quit giving himself compliments. He paused mid-sentence to pay tribute to himself. He talked down to his students.

Sometimes he stopped class to talk about how great he was. He always used himself as an example of what to do.

It was painful to watch.

I was scared to give him advice. It always made him angry. His face turned lipstick pink. He clammed up. He got defensive. You had to back way down. One time he told me I didn’t know what I was doing.

This was a problem, given that technically I was his boss. The good news? I figured out how to get rid of my dunning cougar without firing him. I convinced him he was too good to work for me.

What’s a dunning cougar?

It’s something I made up. I got tired of describing arrogant idiots as “someone who suffers from the Dunning-Kruger Effect.”

That’s a chalky mouthful.

The Dunning-Kruger effect was developed by a Cornell psychologist and an NYU professor in the 1990s. They studied a phenomenon that’s plagued human history, and drug it out into the daylight.

Simply put:

             The less you know, the more you over-estimate your abilities.

But there’s a problem. The more confidence you show, the more risk you run of turning into what you despise.

So how do you know for sure you’re not one of them?

1. You don’t have to tell anyone how amazing you are

If you’re good at something, people will tell you. They’ll tell other people on your behalf. They’ll come to you for advice. They’ll ask for favors. It feels good to be appreciated for what you do well.

That’s not arrogance. It’s human.

2. You’re grateful for compliments

An honest compliment from someone you respect sustains you for a long time. It makes you want to do even better.

If you feel grateful for compliments you receive on your hard work, then you’re probably not a dunning cougar.

But if you are a dunning cougar, compliments have the opposite effect. They make you complacent and lazy.

They also whet your appetite for more compliments.

3. You feel true shame when you mess up

Shame is a powerful teacher. You feel it when you know you could’ve done better, and chose not to.

A truly good person doesn’t hide from their shame. They face it, and make a plan to change their behavior.

Dunning cougars run from accountability.

If you face the music, you’re not one of them. It actually feels pretty good to admit when you did something wrong, and face the consequences — without making a big production out of it.

4. You ask for advice from the right people

Dunning cougars hate advice. They want to pretend like they know everything already, which keeps them trapped where they are. They’ll pretend to ask for help, when they secretly want validation.

Asking for real advice means you’ve got the guts to listen to it, including some things you don’t want to hear.

So if you actually want to get better at what you do, it means you know you’re not brilliant. That’s a good sign.

5. You consider other things more important than yourself

We all have our selfish moments. But dunning cougars can’t see past them. They think they can run the show. Everything’s about them.
They should be in charge, but they can’t explain why.

Someone with only the minimum training and skills suffer from an inflated sense of self. If they could stop broadcasting their own prowess for a second, they’d see a much bigger universe.

A healthy mind puts themselves second or third sometimes. They put their entitlement and pride in the backseat.

6. You look up to someone else

Dunning cougars might pay lip service to the idea of role models and influence. But they just talk the talk, because they know it makes them look good. They draw their heroes from a hat.

Why not? They’re already the best.

They might look up to someone who’s dead, because they think they already are that person.

They think they’re a reincarnation of someone great.

They find someone famous who exhibits some of the traits they claim to have, and then compare themselves to that person.

That’s not how role models work….

Anyone who doesn’t suffer from this effect actually knows they aren’t the best at what they do. They always consider someone else slightly better, even if it’s only at a few things.

7. You never tell yourself “That looks easy…”

Maybe that’s ambitious. It’s better to say you catch yourself when you start looking at someone else’s job and think it must not be that hard or complicated. It’s always harder than it looks.

Someone who’s great at their job makes it look easy. Failing to grasp that is the signature move of dunning cougars.

Hopefully, you see something that looks super easy and think, “There has to be something I’m not catching…”

8. You double-check yourself

There’s a difference between second-guessing yourself and double-checking yourself. Second-guessing implies a lack of confidence.

Double-checking means you know what you need to do, and you’re just making sure you didn’t make a dumb mistake.

You know those happen to everyone.

You’re confirming your original perceptions. You think you did something the right way, but you want to make extra sure.

Dunning cougars lack this trait entirely. They assume they did everything right the first time, because they’re amazing.

It’s a real pain to deal with…

9. You hesitate to throw around superlatives

Dunning cougars love phrases like “the absolute best,” and “the best you’ve ever seen,” and “top of my field.”

They always compare their skills to someone else.

Someone with an accurate sense of their abilities never describes themselves that way, even if others do.

They prefer phrases like, “very good,” and “sufficient.” They want to be known for consistent quality and dependability. They know that being “the best” usually involves a level of personal taste and preference.

10. You’re curious about things

Dunning cougars never get better at their jobs because they think they don’t need do. The opposite of that is someone who realizes they can always get better at what they do.

If they run out of challenges, they start doing something else. They rarely sit back on their throne and preen. If you’re excited about learning and improving, then you’re not a dunning cougar.

We all have our moments

Just about everyone has their Dunning-Kruger moments. We underestimate the difficulty of a new skill. We overrate our intelligence.

It’s fine. Effective people quickly learn the limits of their skill and start working, leveling up as they go. Every notch in your confidence should carve another one in humility.

Dunning cougars remain trapped.

They can’t break out of the prison of their egos. Their brash overconfidence might get them far in life, but never as far as they could’ve gone if they’d just listened to someone for a second.

Missed connections & embarrassing confessions: Using big data to examine sex differences in sexual omission (men regretted more lost opportunities) & commission regret (women regretted more commission)

Webster, G. D., Smith, C. V., Orozco, T., Jonason, P. K., Gesselman, A. N., & Greenspan, R. L. (2020). Missed connections and embarrassing confessions: Using big data to examine sex differences in sexual omission and commission regret. Evolutionary Behavioral Sciences, Mar 2020. https://doi.org/10.1037/ebs0000199

Abstract: Error management theory (EMT; Haselton & Buss, 2000) draws on parental investment theory (Trivers, 1972) and signal detection to make novel predictions about human cognitive biases and their adaptive implications. EMT predicts that heterosexual men overperceive sexual interest from women, whereas women underperceive honest signals of relationship commitment from men. In turn, sexual strategies theory (Buss & Schmitt, 1993) predicts that men may experience more regret over romantic or sexual omission (missed opportunities), whereas women may experience more regret over romantic or sexual commission (regretting past decisions). We tested these predictions using craigslist’s missed connections (personal ads posted by people on craigslist.org seeking to contact someone they saw briefly in public) and FMyLife.com’s (FML) love and intimacy sections (embarrassing incidents that people experience and choose to share online anonymously). We recorded missed connections for men seeking women and women seeking men in all 50 U.S. states at 3 time points (N > 61,000). We also recorded FMLs posted by men and women over a 3-year span (N > 3,500). Consistent with EMT, parental investment theory, and sexual strategies theory, men were more likely to post missed connections (sexual or romantic omission regret), whereas women were more likely to post in FML’s love and intimacy sections (sexual or romantic commission regret). We discuss EMT’s broad theoretical implications for psychology.

Engagement in social distancing/handwashing was most strongly predicted by the perceived likelihood of personally being infected, rather than likelihood of infection transmission or its severity

Wise, Toby, Tomislav D. Zbozinek, Giorgia Michelini, Cindy C. Hagan, and Dean Mobbs. 2020. “Changes in Risk Perception and Protective Behavior During the First Week of the COVID-19 Pandemic in the United States.” PsyArXiv. March 19. doi:10.31234/osf.io/dz428

Abstract: By mid-March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic spread to over 100 countries and all 50 states in the US. Government efforts to minimize the spread of disease emphasized behavioral interventions, including raising awareness of the disease and encouraging protective behaviors such as social distancing and hand washing, and seeking medical attention if experiencing symptoms. However, it is unclear to what extent individuals are aware of the risks associated with the disease, how they are altering their behavior, factors which could influence the spread of the virus to vulnerable populations. We characterized risk perception and engagement in preventative measures in 1591 United States based individuals over the first week of the pandemic (March 11th-16th 2020) and examined the extent to which protective behaviors are predicted by individuals’ perception of risk. Over 5 days, subjects demonstrated growing awareness of the risk posed by the virus, and largely reported engaging in protective behaviors with increasing frequency. However, they underestimated their personal risk of infection relative to the average person in the country. We found that engagement in social distancing and handwashing was most strongly predicted by the perceived likelihood of personally being infected, rather than likelihood of transmission or severity of potential transmitted infections. However, substantial variability emerged among individuals, and using data-driven methods we found a subgroup of subjects who are largely disengaged, unaware, and not practicing protective behaviors. Our results have implications for our understanding of how risk perception and protective behaviors can facilitate early interventions during large-scale pandemics.

Possibility that individual groups of dopamine cells make a unique contribution to the processing of reward and aversion: Non-canonical dopamine pathways are excited in response to aversive stimuli

Aversion hot spots in the dopamine system. Jeroen P H Verharen, Yichen Zhu, Stephan Lammel. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, Volume 64, October 2020, Pages 46-52. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2020.02.002

Highlights
• DA neurons show high levels of anatomical and functional heterogeneity.
• Role for projection-defined DA neurons in processing aversive stimuli.
• Identification of aversive hot spots in vNAcMed, TS, mPFC, BLA.

Abstract: Through the development of optogenetics and other viral vector-based technologies, our view of the dopamine system has substantially advanced over the last decade. In particular, progress has been made in the reclassification of dopamine neurons based on subtypes displaying specific projections, which are associated with different features at the anatomical, molecular and behavioral level. Together, these discoveries have raised the possibility that individual groups of dopamine cells make a unique contribution to the processing of reward and aversion. Here, we review recent studies that have identified non-canonical dopamine pathways that are excited in response to aversive stimuli, including dopamine projections to the ventromedial shell of the nucleus accumbens, prefrontal cortex, tail of the striatum, and amygdala.

Decision-making competence may tap not only into fluid intelligence but also into motivation, emotion regulation, and experience (or crystallized intelligence)

Decision-Making Competence: More Than Intelligence? Wändi Bruine de Bruin, Andrew M. Parker, Baruch Fischhoff. Current Directions in Psychological Science, March 18, 2020
https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721420901592

Abstract: Decision-making competence refers to the ability to make better decisions, as defined by decision-making principles posited by models of rational choice. Historically, psychological research on decision-making has examined how well people follow these principles under carefully manipulated experimental conditions. When individual differences received attention, researchers often assumed that individuals with higher fluid intelligence would perform better. Here, we describe the development and validation of individual-differences measures of decision-making competence. Emerging findings suggest that decision-making competence may tap not only into fluid intelligence but also into motivation, emotion regulation, and experience (or crystallized intelligence). Although fluid intelligence tends to decline with age, older adults may be able to maintain decision-making competence by leveraging age-related improvements in these other skills. We discuss implications for interventions and future research.

Keywords: decision-making competence, individual differences, cognitive ability

Cuijpers and colleagues conducted a meta-analysis to answer the question whether psychotherapies (primarily CBT) for depression have comparable outcomes in all age groups across the life span

The Age of Depression and Its Treatments. Stefan G. Hofmann. JAMA Psychiatry, March 18, 2020. doi:10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2020.0158

Full text, references, etc., at the DOI above.

Depression is a serious and common mental health problem. Although a number of psychological and pharmacological treatments are available for this serious psychiatric condition, there is still a lot of room for improvement. As is true for virtually all mental disorders, the most common and comparatively most effective form of psychological treatment for depression is cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT).1

To advance and understand the treatments for this disorder, it is important to know when, how, and for whom a treatment works. In line with such a personalized approach to therapy, in this issue of JAMA Psychiatry, Cuijpers and colleagues2 conducted a meta-analysis to answer the question whether psychotherapies (primarily CBT) for depression have comparable outcomes in all age groups across the life span. Based on a meta-analytic review of 366 randomized clinical trials, this study found that treatments were less effective in children and adolescents compared with adults. The authors called for better psychological treatments in children and adolescents.

What might account for the observed results? What factors might have accounted for these findings aside from age? If age was in fact the primary reason for the results, why is psychotherapy in children and adolescents less effective? Is it possible that depression in children and adolescents is more severe and treatment resistant than the other age groups? These are the questions I will address in this commentary.

As is true for all meta-analyses, decisions have to be made that might have influenced the results. The study2 allowed different treatment formats, including individual sessions, group therapy, telephone consultations, and guided self-help treatments through the internet. It is quite reasonable to assume that the treatment formats are not used to the same extent by all age groups. Children are unlikely to use self-help guides, and very young children and older adults might be less likely to use the internet for their treatments than young adults, for example. We also know that some of these treatment formats are not as effective as others. Self-help guides, for example, may not be as effective as face-to-face treatments. This difference in treatment use might be an alternative explanation for the pattern of results.

There is also a well-known age-by-sex difference in the prevalence of depression.3 Until age 13 years, depression is equally common among boys and girls. After that age, depression becomes a lot more common in women and girls than men and boys. Therefore, any differences in the treatments between different age groups could also be attributable to differences in sex proportions between these groups. Similar arguments could be made for differences in socioeconomic status, social support, and even culture.

Finally, the number of studies included in the various age-group categories differ dramatically, with 242 studies examining middle-aged adults and only 13 studies examining children and 10 studies examining older adults.2 Not surprisingly, the 95% CI was a lot smaller for the treatment effect size for studies of the middle-aged adults compared with the treatment effect sizes of studies of the children and older adults. This may have also contributed to the pattern of results. Meta-analyses are powerful tools that need to be handled with great care.

Assuming that the findings2 are not explained by an artifact of some other variable, such as treatment use or sex, what could the results mean? Is it possible that depression is not the same disorder for all age groups? The DSM-5 distinguishes major depressive disorder, persistent depressive disorder (dysthymia), disruptive mood dysregulation disorder, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, substance/medication-induced depressive disorder, depressive disorder due to another medical condition, other specified depressive disorder, and unspecified depressive disorder. For all of these categories, age is a factor, and children with mood disorders have posed a number of diagnostic challenges. Perhaps one of the most controversial issues during the development of the DSM-5 was the diagnosis of bipolar disorder in children. To attempt to avoid the overdiagnosis of and treatment for bipolar disorder in children, the DSM-5 created a new diagnosis: disruptive mood dysregulation disorder. This diagnosis typically describes children 12 years or younger who show persistent irritability and frequent episodes of extreme behavioral dyscontrol.

There are other obvious age-associated differences in mood disorders. Children are much less likely to use substances of abuse than adults. Yet, we know that a large number of substances of abuse, such as some prescribed medications, as well as several medical conditions, can be associated with depressionlike phenomena. This fact is recognized in the diagnoses of substance/medication-induced depressive disorder and depressive disorder due to another medical condition. These patients will obviously require an intervention that also addresses the substance or medication to effectively target the depression. It is unclear how many patients in the meta-analysis met criteria for a substance-associated depression. Those patients were unlikely to be children.

The DSM-5 recognizes that in children and adolescents, the mood may be irritable and cranky rather than sad.4 A more chronic form of depression is diagnosed when the mood disturbance continues for at least 2 years in adults but only 1 year in children. Age further defines different subtypes of dysthymia, based on whether the onset is early (before age 21 years) or late (after age 21 years). These differences in age at onset and time course are fairly arbitrary, but they emphasize the importance of age when making a diagnosis.

Of particular relevance in the context of the study is the onset specifier. This specifier was in large part the result of studies conducted by Akiskal,5 who proposed that early-onset dysthymia is a low-grade characterological form of depression that develops gradually, whereas late-life dysthymia is an acute and more severe form of the disorder.

Although the early-onset vs late-onset specifier was not included for major depressive disorder, it has been suggested that a similar distinction should also be made for this disorder.6 Accordingly, early-onset chronic major depression might be a more severe form and associated with greater comorbidities than the late-onset subtype. This would explain why treatments are less effective in early-onset subtype of the disorder and therefore also in children and adolescents.

It is unclear why age appears to distinguish different forms of depressive states. It is quite possible that hormonal changes, and especially the influence of estrogen and testosterone on brain function and development among girls around puberty, might explain some of the results.7 Other possible explanations might be associated with the physical changes that occur during sexual maturity and the associated social conflicts and stress around gender roles.3 Whatever the reason, age (and sex) is a critical factor that needs to be considered for the diagnosis and treatment of depression. It is quite possible that we are dealing with different disorders, depending on the age and sex of the patient.8 Therefore, the same treatment might not be equally effective for all individuals at all ages. This questions the idea that depression is a monolithic entity and supports the call for a paradigm shift toward precision medicine in psychiatry.

Women rate sin stocks as less morally appropriate investment propositions and feel considerably less comfortable investing in controversial (but not conventional) stocks; sex differences are substantial

Niszczota, Paweł, and Michal Bialek. 2020. “Women Oppose Sin Stocks More Than Men Do.” PsyArXiv. March 18. doi:10.31234/osf.io/7a4cq

Abstract: We experimentally test whether men and women differ in their propensity to hold morally controversial (“sin”) stocks. Participants (N = 335) were recruited via Mechanical Turk and rated the moral appropriateness and level of comfort resulting from holding controversial and conventional stocks. Results show that women rate sin stocks as less morally appropriate investment propositions and feel considerably less comfortable investing in controversial (but not conventional) stocks. Sex differences in sin stock tolerance were substantial (d = .60) and remained significant after accounting for differences in investment knowledge and risk tolerance. We propose differences in deontological inclinations in men and women as a likely explanation for the observed effect, and discuss two important outcomes of these differences.

Does having children increase environmental concern? Testing parenthood effects with longitudinal data from the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study

Does having children increase environmental concern? Testing parenthood effects with longitudinal data from the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study. Taciano L. Milfont ,Wouter Poortinga,Chris G. Sibley. PLOS , March 18, 2020https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230361

Abstract: Having children is a transformative experience and may change the way people think about the future. Parents invest time, energy and resources to ensure the survival and reproductive success of offspring. Having children may also induce environmental concerns and investments in actions aimed at guaranteeing the quality of natural resources available to offspring. However, there is limited empirical support for this parenthood effect, and little is known about how environmental attitudes and behaviour change over time following the birth of a child. This pre-registered study uses data from the first seven waves (2009–2015) of the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study—a longitudinal national probability study of social attitudes, personality, and health outcomes—with multilevel interrupted time series analysis. Respondents’ belief in the reality and causes of climate change, sacrifices to standard of living to protect the environment, and changes in daily routine to protect the environment did not change significantly following the birth of a child; and nor were there changes in the underlying trends of attitudes or pre-birth anticipation effects. The study further found no gender differences in the attitudinal effects of childbirth. Additional exploratory analyses suggest that becoming a parent for the first time may increase beliefs in the reality of climate change but does not appear to change other environmental attitudes. Overall, our findings provide little empirical evidence for parenthood effects on environmentalism.

Discussion

Past correlational research has demonstrated that greater levels of pro-environmental engagement is associated with generativity and legacy concerns [16, 18], and higher levels of future thinking and endorsement of other-focused personal values [20, 21]. Experimental studies have also shown that priming individuals to envision their everyday life in the future [19], or to describe what they want to be remembered for by future generations [18] led to an increase in pro-environmental engagement. One logical extension of these findings showing an effect of other-focus and future-focus on environmental protection is to examine whether becoming a parent would influence one’s pro-environmental engagement. Parental investment in offspring should include considerations of the availability and quality of the natural environmental necessary for the survival and reproductive success of offspring.

Despite the theoretical and intuitive appeal of parenthood effects on environmentalism, a recent longitudinal study testing whether parenthood would increase pro-environmental engagement did not provide empirical support [22]. In the present study, we employed a distinct longitudinal dataset to test the hypothesis over up to six years. Across six dependent variables, we did not observe a single significant attitudinal effect related to the birth of a child. That is, we did not find any change in pro-environmental tendencies from before to after the birth of a child, and there were no changes in the underlying trends in pro-environmental tendencies either. In addition, the study found no gender differences in the attitudinal effects of childbirth. That is, null results in mean-level and slope-level effects were found for both mothers and fathers. Additional exploratory analyses suggest that becoming a parent for the first time may increase beliefs in the reality of climate change, but no effects were found for the other five environmental measures; and these effects for new parents must be interpreted with caution, as they were rendered non-significant when correcting for multiple comparisons.

Our findings provide little empirical evidence for parenthood effects on environmentalism, supporting the findings observed by Thomas and colleagues [22]. Together, analyses of two large, high-quality longitudinal datasets explicitly testing whether having children increase pro-environmental engagement do not seem to confirm intuitive predictions of parenthood effects. However, there are still a number of methodological and theoretical considerations to be kept in mind when interpreting the results.

Testing for parenthood effects as outlined in this paper requires a properly-sized longitudinal dataset of sufficient length. While the NZAVS is a high-quality longitudinal dataset with a large sample size (the sample contains over 23,000 unique individuals and more than 78,000 measurement occasions), there were only a limited number of childbirths, in particular of firstborns (of the 1,522 childbirths, around 400 were firstborns). That may not be sufficient to detect what are most likely modest effects. Another consideration is the age of mothers and fathers. The median age of women giving birth to a child is 30 in New Zealand and range between 13 and 53 [35]. The average age fathers is slightly higher (33 years), and around one in 100 babies has a father aged 50 years or over [36]. The average age of our sample is relatively high (i.e., 43.5 years at the time of Wave 1), meaning that many women in the sample are beyond childbearing age.

In addition, while the dataset included multiple waves of data collection and therefore was able to not only detect sudden mean-level but also more gradual slope-level changes before and after childbirth, the analyses were constricted to a six-year period. It is possible that the effect of parenthood on pro-environmental engagement is delayed over a longer period, and that (even) more measurement points are required to detect effects. Environmental attitudes and behaviour following childbirth may also have a U-shaped pattern. Initially, the impact of childbirth on environmental engagement may be negative because of pressures of looking after a young child, which then is followed by an increase in pro-environmental intentions/behaviour to ensure an environmental legacy is left for offspring. Indeed, Thomas et al. [22] observed detrimental effects of having a new-born child in the frequency of three behaviours (i.e., ‘wear more clothes instead of more heating’, ‘use public transport instead of car’ and ‘carshare with others’) that are harder to perform when parenting efforts takes precedent over other concerns. As discussed by Thomas et al. in relation to other findings [12, 23, 37], the pressing concerns of new parents is to dedicate time, resources and energy for the immediate health and wellbeing of offspring, which should outweigh broader and longer-term concerns regarding environmental sustainability. It is possible that parental investment would start to include environmental considerations once the more immediate pressures of parenthood subside, and more measurement points are needed to capture longer-term patterns than were available in this study. Non-linear and delayed effects associated with having are a distinct possibility, as argued here, and should therefore be tested as part of future research using longitudinal datasets of sufficient length.

Major life events that are planned or at least can be anticipated may produce effects in preparation for the event. Indeed, childbirth has been associated with a number of anticipatory psychological and behavioural effects [24, 26, 27, 38]. Anticipatory effects may bias the findings and can be missed with an insufficient number of pre-event measurements. In this study we modelled anticipatory effects in environmental attitudes and self-reported behavioural changes. Limited evidence was found for pre-birth changes, although there was a small but significant negative effect in reported changes in people’s daily environmental routines. This may indicate that possible negative changes in environmental habits may already be initiated in advance of the birth of a child. These anticipatory effects need to be studied in more detail because they may dampen or mask changes that new parents may make in response to the birth of a child.

Another reason for the absence of parenthood effects in this study may be that they only occur in specific groups. For example, Thomas and colleagues [22] found that parents with already high environmental concern show a small increase in the desire to act more sustainably after the birth of their first child. In the current paper we examined possible moderators, such as gender and parenthood status (i.e., whether participants already had a child or not), but there are other socio-demographic, psychological, and situational factors to consider. It is possible that, for example, socio-economic status and (pre-existing) environmental values may moderate potential parenthood effects. Economic circumstances may prevent new parents from making pro-environmental changes, and effects may be the most pronounced for those who are already concerned about the environment, and climate change in particular. Future research could study this in more detail, although other analytical techniques may be needed to study moderation effects as noted below.

In relation to the previous point, parenthood effects on environmentalism is based on the idea that the birth of a child enhances a parent’s legacy motivation. This is a yet untested assumption, mainly because legacy motivation measures have not been available in longitudinal datasets. Previous research has shown that a motivation to leave a positive legacy can be leveraged to increase engagement with climate change and other environmental problems [18], but it is still unclear whether this is also happening in response to having a child. There has been a call to understand environmentally relevant behaviour from a multilevel perspective to examine individual and contextual factors [39], and we extend this call by employing a multilevel analysis to examine changes over the life course. We believe theorising in the field will benefit from datasets that allows examination of developmental trajectories of environmental attitudes and behaviour and how they change as a result of major life events and transitions.

In this study we used a multilevel interrupted time series approach to study abrupt and more gradual changes before and after childbirth. This design is increasingly used in public health intervention [30] and life transition [24] research, as it allows the explicit modelling of the time-dependent nature of outcomes. Our study illustrates the implementation of this analytical strategy in the environmental domain, and previous studies have also used interrupted time series analysis to evaluate intervention outcomes of “natural experiments” with environmental consequences [40, 41]. As with any analytical technique there are limitations. Life transitions are usually associated with a number of changes, and those who experience a transition may be different from those who do not. Parenthood is usually planned in advance, and previous studies have shown that people without children and parents-to-be differ in socio-economic, social, and psychological characteristics (e.g., in personality see [42, 43]). While we were able to control for anticipation effects and for the socio-demographic variables of gender, age, ethnicity and socio-economic deprivation, biases may still occur due to selection effects. Not all participants may have the same propensity to have a child in a particular period, and this may produce or obscure an effect [43, 44].

Different techniques can be used to control for potential selection effects. A propensity score matching approach [44] can be used to match prospective parents with non-parents that have similar baseline characteristics. Balancing characteristics that determine the propensity to experience a specific event or an intervention has become widespread in life transition research to avoid biased treatment effects [5, 24, 27, 45, 46]. It would be necessary to explore propensity effects with further moderation analyses and to increase confidence in the evidence so far that there are no changes in environmental attitudes and behaviour following childbirth.

In conclusion, we examined whether the birth of a new chid increased climate change beliefs and pro-environmental attitudes and behavioural intentions of parents. Overall, our longitudinal analysis shows no mean-level or rate-change effects in the environmental measures examined, disconfirming predictions of parenthood effect on environmentalism. There were no changes observed in either mothers or fathers, similarly disconfirming gender or ‘parental role’ interpretations of possible parenthood effects [1]. While there was a small effect indicating that becoming a parent for the first time may increase beliefs in the reality of climate change, these effects should be considered preliminary given the exploratory nature of those analyses and the fact this becomes statistically non-significant when correcting for multiple comparison. The study contributes to theoretical and methodological advances in environmental decision-making research but should be expanded upon with further analyses to address uncertainties about the specific temporal pattern of effects and potential selection and anticipation effects in becoming a parent. We hope possible parenthood effects on environmentally relevant variables continue to be explored in future studies.

#TheDress is perceived by some people as black and blue while others perceive it as white and gold. We have previously shown that the first encounter with #TheDress strongly biases its perception

How stable is perception in #TheDress and #TheShoe? Leila Drissi-Daoudi et al. Vision Research, Volume 169, April 2020, Pages 1-5. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.visres.2020.01.007

Abstract: #TheDress is perceived by some people as black and blue while others perceive it as white and gold. We have previously shown that the first encounter with #TheDress strongly biases its perception. This percept remained stable during the experiment, suggesting a role of one-shot learning. #TheShoe is another image that elicits similar bimodal color percepts. Here, we investigated how percepts change over time in both #TheShoe and #TheDress. First, we show that the important role of one-shot learning, which we found for #TheDress extends to #TheShoe. Similarly to our previous results with the dress, hiding large parts of the image with occluders biased the percept of the shoe. The percept did not change for the majority of observers when the occluders were removed. Second, we investigated if and how percepts switch over a time course of 14 days. We found that although some observers experienced percept switches, the percept was largely stable for most observers.

Keywords: #TheDress#TheShoeContextual processingOne-shot learningPerceptual dynamics