Lab, Brauer G. 2020. “Self-reported Compliance and Attitudes About Social Distancing During the COVID-19 Outbreak.” OSF Preprints. April 13. doi:10.31219/osf.io/bv28d
Abstract: We studied self-reports of social distancing in a nationally representative survey of U.S. adults. We found that younger, less educated individuals who do not see social distancing as effective or the norm are currently less likely to fully comply with social distancing recommendations. Barriers such as not being able to tolerate social distancing for a long time prevent individuals from doing so, while seeing how distancing can help one's family and others is a potential benefit that could be made salient to encourage compliance. Communication campaigns aimed at increasing social distancing should use trusted sources such as public health officials and should work through national news networks and social media, as these are the media most used by the individuals whose behavior we need to change to address the current public health crisis.
Saturday, April 18, 2020
Educational attainment & being Democrat is positively related to reduction in distance traveled & non-essential visitations, but the opposite effect is observed for human encounters (selectively engaging)
Im, Hohjin, Christopher Ahn, Peiyi Wang, and Chuansheng Chen. 2020. “An Early Examination: Psychological, Health, and Economic Correlates and Determinants of Social Distancing Amidst COVID-19.” PsyArXiv. April 13. doi:10.31234/osf.io/9ravu
Abstract: With the exponential spread of COVID-19 across the United States, federal and local government agencies have issued numerous orders and recommendations for residents to practice social distancing. This study utilizes data collected from Unacast Inc. spanning observations of 3,142 counties across 50 states from March 8, 2020 to April 5, 2020 (N = 83,944) in a 3-level multilevel model to examine the correlates of social distancing behavior, as measured by the proportional reduction in 1) distance traveled and 2) nonessential visitations, as well as, the absolute value reduction in 3) human encounters made, compared to pre-COVID-19 times. Results indicate that the proportion of Democrats and educational attainment is positively related to reduction in distance traveled and non-essential visitations, but the opposite effect is observed for human encounters, suggesting that Democrats and educated individuals may be selectively engaging in certain social distancing behaviors but not others. Average personal income and proportion of older residents were generally positively related to engagement in social distancing. State-level variables for health and economics show little relation to engagement in social distancing, suggesting that communication of health and preventative behavior information may prove more fruitful at the local level than state level. Implications and interpretations of findings are discussed.
Abstract: With the exponential spread of COVID-19 across the United States, federal and local government agencies have issued numerous orders and recommendations for residents to practice social distancing. This study utilizes data collected from Unacast Inc. spanning observations of 3,142 counties across 50 states from March 8, 2020 to April 5, 2020 (N = 83,944) in a 3-level multilevel model to examine the correlates of social distancing behavior, as measured by the proportional reduction in 1) distance traveled and 2) nonessential visitations, as well as, the absolute value reduction in 3) human encounters made, compared to pre-COVID-19 times. Results indicate that the proportion of Democrats and educational attainment is positively related to reduction in distance traveled and non-essential visitations, but the opposite effect is observed for human encounters, suggesting that Democrats and educated individuals may be selectively engaging in certain social distancing behaviors but not others. Average personal income and proportion of older residents were generally positively related to engagement in social distancing. State-level variables for health and economics show little relation to engagement in social distancing, suggesting that communication of health and preventative behavior information may prove more fruitful at the local level than state level. Implications and interpretations of findings are discussed.
Cross-cultural analysis illustrated that the relationship between infectious diseases and authoritarianism was pronounced for infectious diseases that can be acquired from other humans
Zmigrod, Leor, Tobias Ebert, Friedrich M. Götz, and Jason Rentfrow. 2020. “The Psychological and Socio-political Consequences of Infectious Diseases.” PsyArXiv. April 11. doi:10.31234/osf.io/84qcm
Abstract: What are the socio-political consequences of infectious diseases? Humans have evolved to avoid disease and infection, resulting in a set of psychological mechanisms that promote disease-avoidance, referred to as the behavioural immune system (BIS). One manifestation of the BIS is the cautious avoidance of unfamiliar, foreign, or potentially contaminating stimuli. Specifically, when disease infection risk is salient or prevalent, authoritarian attitudes can emerge that seek to avoid and reject foreign outgroups while favoring homogenous, familiar ingroups. In the largest study conducted on the topic to date (N>240,000), elevated regional levels of infectious pathogens were related to more authoritarian attitudes on three geographical levels: across US metropolitan regions, US states, and cross-culturally across 47 countries. The link between pathogen prevalence and authoritarian psychological dispositions predicted conservative voting behavior in the 2016 US Presidential Election as well as more authoritarian governance and state laws, in which one group of people imposes asymmetrical laws on others in a hierarchical structure. Furthermore, cross-cultural analysis illustrated that the relationship between infectious diseases and authoritarianism was pronounced for infectious diseases that can be acquired from other humans (nonzoonotic), and does not generalize to other infectious diseases that can only be acquired from non-human species (zoonotic diseases). At a time of heightened awareness of infectious diseases, these findings are important reminders that public health and ecology can have ramifications for socio-political attitudes, and this can shape how citizens vote as well as how they govern and are governed.
Abstract: What are the socio-political consequences of infectious diseases? Humans have evolved to avoid disease and infection, resulting in a set of psychological mechanisms that promote disease-avoidance, referred to as the behavioural immune system (BIS). One manifestation of the BIS is the cautious avoidance of unfamiliar, foreign, or potentially contaminating stimuli. Specifically, when disease infection risk is salient or prevalent, authoritarian attitudes can emerge that seek to avoid and reject foreign outgroups while favoring homogenous, familiar ingroups. In the largest study conducted on the topic to date (N>240,000), elevated regional levels of infectious pathogens were related to more authoritarian attitudes on three geographical levels: across US metropolitan regions, US states, and cross-culturally across 47 countries. The link between pathogen prevalence and authoritarian psychological dispositions predicted conservative voting behavior in the 2016 US Presidential Election as well as more authoritarian governance and state laws, in which one group of people imposes asymmetrical laws on others in a hierarchical structure. Furthermore, cross-cultural analysis illustrated that the relationship between infectious diseases and authoritarianism was pronounced for infectious diseases that can be acquired from other humans (nonzoonotic), and does not generalize to other infectious diseases that can only be acquired from non-human species (zoonotic diseases). At a time of heightened awareness of infectious diseases, these findings are important reminders that public health and ecology can have ramifications for socio-political attitudes, and this can shape how citizens vote as well as how they govern and are governed.
Religiosity, shared identity, trust, and punishment of norm violations: No evidence of generalized behavioral prosociality, only of self-reported prosociality
Galen, L. W., Kurby, C. A., & Fles, E. H. (2020). Religiosity, shared identity, trust, and punishment of norm violations: No evidence of generalized prosociality. Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, Apr 2020. https://doi.org/10.1037/rel0000320
Abstract: Previous research has suggested that religion is associated not only with self-reported prosociality, but also with observable behaviors as manifested in standard economic game interactions. However, such studies have often left key elements uncontrolled, leading to incomplete interpretations of the influences of religiosity. The present article includes two studies in which prosocial behavior was assessed as a function of the religious identity (Christian or nonreligious) and intrinsic religiosity of the participant and the religious identity of the game partner (Christian or atheist). In Study 1, although participant religiosity and religious identity were related to greater self-reported agreeableness, they were inversely related to behavioral trust in a partner (i.e., amount forwarded) regardless of the partner’s religious identity. In Study 2, a third-party paradigm allowed participants to address an unequal exchange between partners (either Christians or atheists) by either punishing the perpetrator or compensating the victim. There was no overall effect of participant religiosity on the tendency to punish or compensate unequal exchanges. However, religiosity was related to relatively greater fairness ratings of the objectively unequal exchange. In sum, religiosity was predictive of self-reported but not behavioral prosociality.
Abstract: Previous research has suggested that religion is associated not only with self-reported prosociality, but also with observable behaviors as manifested in standard economic game interactions. However, such studies have often left key elements uncontrolled, leading to incomplete interpretations of the influences of religiosity. The present article includes two studies in which prosocial behavior was assessed as a function of the religious identity (Christian or nonreligious) and intrinsic religiosity of the participant and the religious identity of the game partner (Christian or atheist). In Study 1, although participant religiosity and religious identity were related to greater self-reported agreeableness, they were inversely related to behavioral trust in a partner (i.e., amount forwarded) regardless of the partner’s religious identity. In Study 2, a third-party paradigm allowed participants to address an unequal exchange between partners (either Christians or atheists) by either punishing the perpetrator or compensating the victim. There was no overall effect of participant religiosity on the tendency to punish or compensate unequal exchanges. However, religiosity was related to relatively greater fairness ratings of the objectively unequal exchange. In sum, religiosity was predictive of self-reported but not behavioral prosociality.
Political humility: engaging others with different political perspectives
Political humility: engaging others with different political perspectives. Adam S. Hodge,Joshua N. Hook,Daryl R. Van Tongeren,Don E. Davis &Stacey E. McElroy-Heltzel. The Journal of Positive Psychology, Apr 16 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2020.1752784
ABSTRACT: As the current political environment in the United States and around the world becomes more polarized, it is important to better understand the intrapersonal and interpersonal effects of engaging political discourse with political humility. Across two studies, we explored the predictors of political humility (Study 1), and how political humility might impact engagement with different viewpoints (Study 2). In Study 1 (N = 311), political humility was positively related to openness, but negatively associated with political commitment. In Study 2 (N = 194), controlling for political commitment, political humility was positively associated with identifying positives in the opposite political perspective, identifying the results of a neutral essay as inconclusive, and having more favorable ratings of a political essay contrary to their own views. On the other hand, political humility was negatively related to experiential avoidance. We conclude by discussing limitations and suggestions for future research.
KEYWORDS: Intellectual humility, politics, commitment, personality, relational humility
ABSTRACT: As the current political environment in the United States and around the world becomes more polarized, it is important to better understand the intrapersonal and interpersonal effects of engaging political discourse with political humility. Across two studies, we explored the predictors of political humility (Study 1), and how political humility might impact engagement with different viewpoints (Study 2). In Study 1 (N = 311), political humility was positively related to openness, but negatively associated with political commitment. In Study 2 (N = 194), controlling for political commitment, political humility was positively associated with identifying positives in the opposite political perspective, identifying the results of a neutral essay as inconclusive, and having more favorable ratings of a political essay contrary to their own views. On the other hand, political humility was negatively related to experiential avoidance. We conclude by discussing limitations and suggestions for future research.
KEYWORDS: Intellectual humility, politics, commitment, personality, relational humility
Friday, April 17, 2020
Rethinking the concept of capitalism: a historian’s perspective
Rethinking the concept of capitalism: a historian’s perspective. Youngsoo Bae. Social History, Volume 45, 2020 - Issue 1, Pages 1-25, Feb 7 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/03071022.2020.1694771
ABSTRACT: This essay seeks to rethink the concept of capitalism by focusing on power relationships. Conventionally, capitalism has been treated as being essentially an economic or socio-economic system, whereas recent scholars have highlighted the political process and other underappreciated aspects. I propose that capitalism be redefined as a type of civilization: in essence, as a power structure, in a very wide sense, which is established by a group of people who organize themselves and allocate available resources. It presupposes polity, citizenship, and political process, which, along with property rights, contractual safeguards, and other institutions supporting the market economy, may be called the political foundation of capitalism. As such, capitalism has a highly distinctive feature in that economic power is almost independent of political authority, religious command, or physical violence. This redefined concept has significant implications for understanding the history of capitalism. Above all, it assists in rethinking the framework of interpretation and observing the changing dynamics of international relationships in the modern world. Furthermore, it advances fresh perspectives on American history, specifically on such issues as the transition to capitalism, the fate of the ruling class, the nature of slavery in the antebellum South, and gender in the history of capitalism.
KEYWORDS: Concept of capitalism, capitalist civilization, power structure, political authority, economic power, history of capitalism, varieties of capitalism
ABSTRACT: This essay seeks to rethink the concept of capitalism by focusing on power relationships. Conventionally, capitalism has been treated as being essentially an economic or socio-economic system, whereas recent scholars have highlighted the political process and other underappreciated aspects. I propose that capitalism be redefined as a type of civilization: in essence, as a power structure, in a very wide sense, which is established by a group of people who organize themselves and allocate available resources. It presupposes polity, citizenship, and political process, which, along with property rights, contractual safeguards, and other institutions supporting the market economy, may be called the political foundation of capitalism. As such, capitalism has a highly distinctive feature in that economic power is almost independent of political authority, religious command, or physical violence. This redefined concept has significant implications for understanding the history of capitalism. Above all, it assists in rethinking the framework of interpretation and observing the changing dynamics of international relationships in the modern world. Furthermore, it advances fresh perspectives on American history, specifically on such issues as the transition to capitalism, the fate of the ruling class, the nature of slavery in the antebellum South, and gender in the history of capitalism.
KEYWORDS: Concept of capitalism, capitalist civilization, power structure, political authority, economic power, history of capitalism, varieties of capitalism
From 2017... Class struggles we may not like are those provoked by cholera, with riots of 10,000, murdering state officials & doctors, destroying hospitals, town halls, & in the case of Donetsk, an entire city
From 2017... Cholera revolts: a class struggle we may not like. Samuel Kline Cohn Jr. Social History, Volume 42, 2017 - Issue 2, Pages 162-180, Apr 19 2017. https://doi.org/10.1080/03071022.2017.1290365
Abstract: Few have studied cholera revolts comparatively, and certainly not over the vast terrain from Asiatic Russia to Quebec or across time from the first European cholera wave of the 1830s to the twentieth century. Scholars have instead concentrated on the first European cholera wave in the 1830s and have tended to explain cholera’s social violence within the political contexts of individual nations, despite these riots raging across vast differences in political landscapes from Czarist Russia to New York City but with similar fears and conspiracy theories of elites inventing cholera to cull populations of the poor. Moreover, the history of cholera’s social toxins runs against present generalizations on why epidemics spawn blame and violence against others. Cholera riots continued, and in Italy and Russia became geographically more widespread, vicious, and destructive long after the disease had lost its mystery. The article then poses the question of why historians on the left have not studied the class struggles provoked by cholera, with riots of 10,000, murdering state officials and doctors, destroying hospitals, town halls, and in the case of Donetsk, an entire city. Finally, the article draws parallels between Europe’s cholera experiences and those in West Africa with Ebola in 2014.
KEYWORDS: Cholera, epidemics, conspiracies, riots, class struggle, Karl Marx, comparative history
Abstract: Few have studied cholera revolts comparatively, and certainly not over the vast terrain from Asiatic Russia to Quebec or across time from the first European cholera wave of the 1830s to the twentieth century. Scholars have instead concentrated on the first European cholera wave in the 1830s and have tended to explain cholera’s social violence within the political contexts of individual nations, despite these riots raging across vast differences in political landscapes from Czarist Russia to New York City but with similar fears and conspiracy theories of elites inventing cholera to cull populations of the poor. Moreover, the history of cholera’s social toxins runs against present generalizations on why epidemics spawn blame and violence against others. Cholera riots continued, and in Italy and Russia became geographically more widespread, vicious, and destructive long after the disease had lost its mystery. The article then poses the question of why historians on the left have not studied the class struggles provoked by cholera, with riots of 10,000, murdering state officials and doctors, destroying hospitals, town halls, and in the case of Donetsk, an entire city. Finally, the article draws parallels between Europe’s cholera experiences and those in West Africa with Ebola in 2014.
KEYWORDS: Cholera, epidemics, conspiracies, riots, class struggle, Karl Marx, comparative history
Humans & primates’ reactions to death-related threats highlight a general tendency to “cling to the group” & to display increased social motivation in the face of death and deadly events
Adam-Troian, J., Bonetto, E., Varet, F., Arciszewski, T., & Dezecache, G. (2020). Explaining social behavior in response to death-related threats: The conspecific loss compensation mechanism. Evolutionary Behavioral Sciences, Apr 2020. https://doi.org/10.1037/ebs0000202
Abstract: Exposure to death-related threats, thoughts and cues (actual or anticipated death of conspecifics, including oneself) remain powerful stressors across primate species, including humans. Accordingly, a pervasive issue in psychology pertains to the kind of social–cognitive responses exposure to deadly threats generates. To this day, psychological models of reactions to death-related threats remain underspecified, especially with regards to modern evolutionary theory. Research on both humans and nonhuman primates’ reactions to death-related threats highlights a general tendency of human and nonhuman primates to “cling to the group” and to display increased social motivation in the face of death and deadly events (predator attacks, disasters, terror attacks. . .). Given the adaptive value of social networks, which provide individuals with resources, mating pool and support, we propose the existence of an evolved mechanism to explain these affiliative responses. In particular, we propose a “conspecific loss compensation mechanism” (CLCM) that actively keeps track of and compensates for threats to the integrity of one’s social network. In the face of death-related cues signaling a danger for one’s social network, or actual conspecific loss, CLCM triggers proportional affiliative responses by a process labeled compensatory socialization. After reviewing existing evidence for the CLCM, we discuss its plausibility, parsimonious character, and explanatory power of the diversity of responses observed among threatened and grieving individuals. We also formulate clear and novel predictions to be tested in future research.
Abstract: Exposure to death-related threats, thoughts and cues (actual or anticipated death of conspecifics, including oneself) remain powerful stressors across primate species, including humans. Accordingly, a pervasive issue in psychology pertains to the kind of social–cognitive responses exposure to deadly threats generates. To this day, psychological models of reactions to death-related threats remain underspecified, especially with regards to modern evolutionary theory. Research on both humans and nonhuman primates’ reactions to death-related threats highlights a general tendency of human and nonhuman primates to “cling to the group” and to display increased social motivation in the face of death and deadly events (predator attacks, disasters, terror attacks. . .). Given the adaptive value of social networks, which provide individuals with resources, mating pool and support, we propose the existence of an evolved mechanism to explain these affiliative responses. In particular, we propose a “conspecific loss compensation mechanism” (CLCM) that actively keeps track of and compensates for threats to the integrity of one’s social network. In the face of death-related cues signaling a danger for one’s social network, or actual conspecific loss, CLCM triggers proportional affiliative responses by a process labeled compensatory socialization. After reviewing existing evidence for the CLCM, we discuss its plausibility, parsimonious character, and explanatory power of the diversity of responses observed among threatened and grieving individuals. We also formulate clear and novel predictions to be tested in future research.
Participants considered harm to a pedestrian more permissible with an autonomous car as compared to self as the decision agent in a regular car, driven by the attribution of responsibility to the autonomous one
Blame It on the Self-Driving Car: How Autonomous Vehicles Can Alter Consumer Morality. Tripat Gill. Journal of Consumer Research, ucaa018, April 11 2020. https://doi.org/10.1093/jcr/ucaa018
Abstract: Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are expected to soon replace human drivers and promise substantial benefits to society. Yet, consumers remain skeptical about handing over control to an AV. Partly due to the uncertainty about the appropriate moral norms for such vehicles (e.g., should AVs protect the passenger or the pedestrian if harm is unavoidable?). Building on recent work on AV morality, the current research examined how people resolve the dilemma between protecting self versus a pedestrian, and what they expect an AV to do in a similar situation. Five studies revealed that participants considered harm to a pedestrian more permissible with an AV as compared to self as the decision agent in a regular car. This shift in moral judgments was driven by the attribution of responsibility to the AV and was observed for both severe and moderate harm, and when harm was real or imagined. However, the effect was attenuated when five pedestrians or a child could be harmed. These findings suggest that AVs can change prevailing moral norms and promote an increased self-interest among consumers. This has relevance for the design and policy issues related to AVs. It also highlights the moral implications of autonomous agents replacing human decision-makers.
Keywords: morality, autonomous vehicles, control, responsibility, harm
Abstract: Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are expected to soon replace human drivers and promise substantial benefits to society. Yet, consumers remain skeptical about handing over control to an AV. Partly due to the uncertainty about the appropriate moral norms for such vehicles (e.g., should AVs protect the passenger or the pedestrian if harm is unavoidable?). Building on recent work on AV morality, the current research examined how people resolve the dilemma between protecting self versus a pedestrian, and what they expect an AV to do in a similar situation. Five studies revealed that participants considered harm to a pedestrian more permissible with an AV as compared to self as the decision agent in a regular car. This shift in moral judgments was driven by the attribution of responsibility to the AV and was observed for both severe and moderate harm, and when harm was real or imagined. However, the effect was attenuated when five pedestrians or a child could be harmed. These findings suggest that AVs can change prevailing moral norms and promote an increased self-interest among consumers. This has relevance for the design and policy issues related to AVs. It also highlights the moral implications of autonomous agents replacing human decision-makers.
Keywords: morality, autonomous vehicles, control, responsibility, harm
Thursday, April 16, 2020
News consumption of any sort is heavily outweighed by other forms of media consumption; fake news comprises only 0.15% of Americans’ daily media diet
Evaluating the fake news problem at the scale of the information ecosystem. Jennifer Allen et al. Science Advances Apr 3 2020, Vol. 6, no. 14, eaay3539. DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.aay3539
Abstract: “Fake news,” broadly defined as false or misleading information masquerading as legitimate news, is frequently asserted to be pervasive online with serious consequences for democracy. Using a unique multimode dataset that comprises a nationally representative sample of mobile, desktop, and television consumption, we refute this conventional wisdom on three levels. First, news consumption of any sort is heavily outweighed by other forms of media consumption, comprising at most 14.2% of Americans’ daily media diets. Second, to the extent that Americans do consume news, it is overwhelmingly from television, which accounts for roughly five times as much as news consumption as online. Third, fake news comprises only 0.15% of Americans’ daily media diet. Our results suggest that the origins of public misinformedness and polarization are more likely to lie in the content of ordinary news or the avoidance of news altogether as they are in overt fakery.
Abstract: “Fake news,” broadly defined as false or misleading information masquerading as legitimate news, is frequently asserted to be pervasive online with serious consequences for democracy. Using a unique multimode dataset that comprises a nationally representative sample of mobile, desktop, and television consumption, we refute this conventional wisdom on three levels. First, news consumption of any sort is heavily outweighed by other forms of media consumption, comprising at most 14.2% of Americans’ daily media diets. Second, to the extent that Americans do consume news, it is overwhelmingly from television, which accounts for roughly five times as much as news consumption as online. Third, fake news comprises only 0.15% of Americans’ daily media diet. Our results suggest that the origins of public misinformedness and polarization are more likely to lie in the content of ordinary news or the avoidance of news altogether as they are in overt fakery.
DISCUSSION
Summarizing, we note that according to Google Scholar at the time of final submission, 2210 English language publications with “fake news” in the title had appeared since January 2017, compared with just 73 in all the years leading up to and including 2016. Not only has interest in fake news clearly exploded in the past 2 years, but it has also far outstripped attention to TV news: A comparable count yielded just 329 articles published since 2017 containing either “television news” or “TV news” in their titles, while 708 articles contained “online news,” 394 contained “Twitter” or “Facebook” and “news,” and 556 contained “social media” and “news.” Restricting further to studies that explicitly connect misinformation to a particular platform, Google Scholar yielded 99 results containing both “misinformation” and one of “online” or “social media” or “web” in the title since 2017, but just 1 result for “misinformation” and “television” or “TV”—an article about the unrealistic survival rates of cardiopulmonary resuscitation on TV shows. This evident focus of the recent research literature on online sources of fake news and misinformation is directionally and proportionately inconsistent with our results in three ways. First, whereas the research treats news consumption as the issue of primary importance, we find that most media consumption, whether online or on TV, is not news related. Second, whereas research on online news—and even more specifically news on social media platforms—markedly outweighs research on TV news, we find that TV news consumption dominates online by a ratio of 5:1 (where the ratio is even more extreme for social media sites). Third, whereas the topic of fake news outstrips all other news-related research, we find that fake news itself is only 1% of overall news consumption, substantially lower for Twitter alone (8). Instead, news consumption is heavily dominated by mainstream news sources both online and on TV.
We emphasize that our results do not imply that fake news is not a problem worthy of attention. Arguably the deliberate circulation of false information with the objective of creating confusion and discord is intolerable in principle and should be combatted at any prevalence greater than zero. Moreover, it is possible that news consumed online could have more impact per minute of exposure than news consumed on TV, or that fake news could have an outsized impact compared with regular news, or that it could have large impacts on certain subpopulations. Last, we note that our definitions of news and fake news are—with the exception of YouTube—dependent on site or program-level classifications. News-relevant content on social media that is not tied to a particular URL, or false or misleading information that is promulgated by generally reliable news sources, would therefore be misclassified by our scheme. We hope that future work will address all of these areas of uncertainty. We note, however, that our methodology was designed to be consistent with previous work, which also has used list-based classification and relied on prevalence (i.e., not impact) to assess importance. On those terms, our finding that fake news is extremely rare, comprising only about one-tenth of 1% of Americans’ overall daily media diet, suggests that concerns regarding possible threats to democracy should be much broader in scope than deliberately engineered falsehoods circulating on social media. In particular, public ignorance or misunderstanding of important political matters could also arise out of a combination of (i) ordinary bias and agenda setting in the mainstream media (23–25)) and (ii) the overall low exposure of many Americans to news content in general, especially in written form. We conclude that future work on misinformation and its potentially corrosive effects on democracy should consider all potential sources of problematic content, as well as the absence of relevant content, not simply the type that is most easily identified and least associated with conventional media interests (19).
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Supplementary material for this article is available at http://advances.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/6/14/eaay3539/DC1
Using femme theory, Foucault, and queer failure as analytical frameworks, the current paper demonstrates the role of feminine failure in resisting and subverting systems of oppression
Femme resistance: the fem(me)inine art of failure. Rhea Ashley Hoskin, & Allison Taylor. Psychology & Sexuality, Volume 10, 2019 - Issue 4, Pages 281-300, May 13 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/19419899.2019.1615538
ABSTRACT: Using femme theory, Foucault, and queer failure as analytical frameworks, the current paper demonstrates the role of feminine failure in resisting and subverting systems of oppression, subsequently providing the minute shifts in power necessary to expand the terms of patriarchal femininity. More specifically, the current paper draws on contemporary modes of art and aesthetics to examine the productive potential of failing to embody patriarchal femininity, positing this failure as a form of femme resistance. By hijacking cultural signifiers of adornment, femme and feminine failure celebrate that which is culturally shamed (queer, fat, disabled, variant, poor, and racially minoritised bodies), expose systems of erasure, challenge binary systems of meaning, and promote feminine growth. Examining each of these themes in turn, the current paper argues that feminine failure challenges the pillars of patriarchal femininity and discursive systems of normativity. To this end, femme as a theoretical framework demonstrates the freedom of failure by exposing the heterogeneous multiplicities of femininity, and offering possibilities that normativity never could. This critical discursive essay contributes to the emergent application of femme as a theoretical framework.
KEYWORDS: Femme, queer femininity, queer resistance, femininities, femme theory, critical femininities
ABSTRACT: Using femme theory, Foucault, and queer failure as analytical frameworks, the current paper demonstrates the role of feminine failure in resisting and subverting systems of oppression, subsequently providing the minute shifts in power necessary to expand the terms of patriarchal femininity. More specifically, the current paper draws on contemporary modes of art and aesthetics to examine the productive potential of failing to embody patriarchal femininity, positing this failure as a form of femme resistance. By hijacking cultural signifiers of adornment, femme and feminine failure celebrate that which is culturally shamed (queer, fat, disabled, variant, poor, and racially minoritised bodies), expose systems of erasure, challenge binary systems of meaning, and promote feminine growth. Examining each of these themes in turn, the current paper argues that feminine failure challenges the pillars of patriarchal femininity and discursive systems of normativity. To this end, femme as a theoretical framework demonstrates the freedom of failure by exposing the heterogeneous multiplicities of femininity, and offering possibilities that normativity never could. This critical discursive essay contributes to the emergent application of femme as a theoretical framework.
KEYWORDS: Femme, queer femininity, queer resistance, femininities, femme theory, critical femininities
The colors of love: facial thermal reactions of people thinking about their lovers
The colors of love: facial thermal reactions of people thinking about their lovers. Fabio Cannas Aghedu et al. Psychology & Sexuality, Apr 15 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/19419899.2020.1756392
Abstract: Romantic love involves peculiar psychological and neural processes that are closely connected with autonomic-visceral changes. The present study aimed at investigating the thermal response associated to the love induction task. The facial thermal imprints of forty-four people who were in love and in romantic relationships at the time of the experiment were recorded. Thermal signals were extracted from six regions of interest (ROIs), positioned on the tip of the nose, the upper nose and the perioral areas. The experimental protocol was composed of two conditions, randomized among the subjects: love and control conditions. In the first one, participants were initially asked to think about their partners, then to keep continuing this task while listening to a song related to their relationships; in the second one, they were asked to think about someone else’s relationship, then keep continuing this task while listening to positive-content song, unknown to the specific participant.
The results showed that, when experiencing the love condition, the temperature of the nasal tip of the subjects increased, compared to the control condition. Moreover, the data showed that music induced a far more intense peripheral response. Thinking about their partners whilst listening to the love song caused higher peripheral (nose temperature) and subjective responses than with the unknown happy song, which suggests that love induction task activates peculiar patterns that go beyond mere positive feelings.
Key words: Romantic love, Love induction task, Peripheral measures, Functional infrared thermal imaging, Emotions, Psychophysiology
Abstract: Romantic love involves peculiar psychological and neural processes that are closely connected with autonomic-visceral changes. The present study aimed at investigating the thermal response associated to the love induction task. The facial thermal imprints of forty-four people who were in love and in romantic relationships at the time of the experiment were recorded. Thermal signals were extracted from six regions of interest (ROIs), positioned on the tip of the nose, the upper nose and the perioral areas. The experimental protocol was composed of two conditions, randomized among the subjects: love and control conditions. In the first one, participants were initially asked to think about their partners, then to keep continuing this task while listening to a song related to their relationships; in the second one, they were asked to think about someone else’s relationship, then keep continuing this task while listening to positive-content song, unknown to the specific participant.
The results showed that, when experiencing the love condition, the temperature of the nasal tip of the subjects increased, compared to the control condition. Moreover, the data showed that music induced a far more intense peripheral response. Thinking about their partners whilst listening to the love song caused higher peripheral (nose temperature) and subjective responses than with the unknown happy song, which suggests that love induction task activates peculiar patterns that go beyond mere positive feelings.
Key words: Romantic love, Love induction task, Peripheral measures, Functional infrared thermal imaging, Emotions, Psychophysiology
Wednesday, April 15, 2020
What prevents people from making friends: The most important factor was “Low trust,” followed by the “Lack of time” and the “Introversion;” significant sex-differences were found for 3 out of the 6 factors
What prevents people from making friends: A taxonomy of reasons. Menelaos Apostolou, Despoina Keramari. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 163, September 1 2020, 110043. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.110043
Highlights
• Developed an evolutionary theoretical framework for understanding why people face difficulties in making friends
• Identified 40 reasons which prevent people from making friend
• Identified six factors which prevent people from making friends
• Found significant sex and age effect in the factors which prevent people from making friends
Abstract: Friendship constitutes an important aspect of human experience. Yet, it is not always easy to make friends, and the current research aims to understand the reasons which constrain people from doing so. More specifically, using qualitative research methods, we identified 40 reasons which prevented people from making friends. Using quantitative research methods, we classified these reasons in six broader factors. The most important factor was “Low trust,” followed by the “Lack of time” and the “Introversion.” Significant sex-differences were found for three out of the six factors, with the largest one being in the “Low trust,” where women gave higher scores than men. Finally, we found significant age effects for almost all factors.
Keywords: FriendshipEvolution of friendshipsDifficulties in making friendsMaking friendsEvolution of friendship
Highlights
• Developed an evolutionary theoretical framework for understanding why people face difficulties in making friends
• Identified 40 reasons which prevent people from making friend
• Identified six factors which prevent people from making friends
• Found significant sex and age effect in the factors which prevent people from making friends
Abstract: Friendship constitutes an important aspect of human experience. Yet, it is not always easy to make friends, and the current research aims to understand the reasons which constrain people from doing so. More specifically, using qualitative research methods, we identified 40 reasons which prevented people from making friends. Using quantitative research methods, we classified these reasons in six broader factors. The most important factor was “Low trust,” followed by the “Lack of time” and the “Introversion.” Significant sex-differences were found for three out of the six factors, with the largest one being in the “Low trust,” where women gave higher scores than men. Finally, we found significant age effects for almost all factors.
Keywords: FriendshipEvolution of friendshipsDifficulties in making friendsMaking friendsEvolution of friendship
Those religious (but not secular) that self-enhance saying they have more religious knowledge ("religious overclaiming") show more support for, and willingness to engage in, religious aggression
Religious Overclaiming and Support for Religious Aggression. Daniel N. Jones et al. Social Psychological and Personality Science, April 14, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550620912880
Abstract: Agentic self-enhancement consists of self-protective and self-advancing tendencies that can lead to aggression, especially when challenged. Because self-enhancers often endorse aggression to defend or enhance the self-concept, religious self-enhancement should lead to endorsing aggression to defend or enhance one’s religion. We recruited three samples (N = 969) from Mechanical Turk (n = 409), Iran (n = 351), and the U.S.–Mexico border region (n = 209). We found that religious (but not secular) self-enhancement in the form of religious overclaiming predicted support for, and willingness to engage in, religious aggression. In contrast, accuracy in religious knowledge had mostly negative associations with aggression-relevant outcomes. These results emerged across two separate religions (Christianity and Islam) and across three different cultures (the United States, Iran, and the U.S.–Mexico border region). Thus, religious overclaiming is a promising new direction for studying support for religious aggression and identifying those who may become aggressive in the name of God.
Keywords: violence, terrorism, aggression, overclaiming, self-deceptive enhancement
Abstract: Agentic self-enhancement consists of self-protective and self-advancing tendencies that can lead to aggression, especially when challenged. Because self-enhancers often endorse aggression to defend or enhance the self-concept, religious self-enhancement should lead to endorsing aggression to defend or enhance one’s religion. We recruited three samples (N = 969) from Mechanical Turk (n = 409), Iran (n = 351), and the U.S.–Mexico border region (n = 209). We found that religious (but not secular) self-enhancement in the form of religious overclaiming predicted support for, and willingness to engage in, religious aggression. In contrast, accuracy in religious knowledge had mostly negative associations with aggression-relevant outcomes. These results emerged across two separate religions (Christianity and Islam) and across three different cultures (the United States, Iran, and the U.S.–Mexico border region). Thus, religious overclaiming is a promising new direction for studying support for religious aggression and identifying those who may become aggressive in the name of God.
Keywords: violence, terrorism, aggression, overclaiming, self-deceptive enhancement
Third- (TPP) and second-party (SPP) punishment share neural patterns & cognitive functions; TPP loads more brain regions associated with social cognition & SPP brain regions associated with affective processing
The Emerging Neuroscience of Social Punishment: Meta-Analytic Evidence. Gabriele Bellucci et al. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, April 14 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.04.011
Highlights
• Third- (TPP) and second-party (SPP) punishment share neural patterns and cognitive functions.
• These neural patterns and cognitive functions are, however, differently engaged by TPP and SPP.
• TPP loads more on brain regions associated with social cognition.
• SPP loads more on brain regions associated with affective processing.
• Functional brain network organization for TPP and SPP shows both commonalities and specificity.
Abstract: Social punishment (SOP)—third-party punishment (TPP) and second-party punishment (SPP)—sanctions norm-deviant behavior. The hierarchical punishment model (HPM) posits that TPP is an extension of SPP and both recruit common processes engaging large-scale domain-general brain networks. Here, we provided meta-analytic evidence to the HPM by combining the activation likelihood estimation approach with connectivity analyses and hierarchical clustering analyses. Although both forms of SOP engaged the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and bilateral anterior insula (AI), a functional differentiation also emerged with TPP preferentially engaging social cognitive regions (temporoparietal junction) and SPP affective regions (AI). Further, although both TPP and SPP recruit domain-general networks (salience, default-mode, and central-executive networks), some specificity in network organization was observed. By revealing differences and commonalities of the neural networks consistently activated by different types of SOP, our findings contribute to a better understanding of the neuropsychological mechanisms of social punishment behavior––one of the most peculiar human behaviors.
Keywords: social punishmentsecond-party punishmentthird-party punishmentactivation likelihood estimationmeta-analytic connectivity mappingresting-state functional connectivity
Highlights
• Third- (TPP) and second-party (SPP) punishment share neural patterns and cognitive functions.
• These neural patterns and cognitive functions are, however, differently engaged by TPP and SPP.
• TPP loads more on brain regions associated with social cognition.
• SPP loads more on brain regions associated with affective processing.
• Functional brain network organization for TPP and SPP shows both commonalities and specificity.
Abstract: Social punishment (SOP)—third-party punishment (TPP) and second-party punishment (SPP)—sanctions norm-deviant behavior. The hierarchical punishment model (HPM) posits that TPP is an extension of SPP and both recruit common processes engaging large-scale domain-general brain networks. Here, we provided meta-analytic evidence to the HPM by combining the activation likelihood estimation approach with connectivity analyses and hierarchical clustering analyses. Although both forms of SOP engaged the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and bilateral anterior insula (AI), a functional differentiation also emerged with TPP preferentially engaging social cognitive regions (temporoparietal junction) and SPP affective regions (AI). Further, although both TPP and SPP recruit domain-general networks (salience, default-mode, and central-executive networks), some specificity in network organization was observed. By revealing differences and commonalities of the neural networks consistently activated by different types of SOP, our findings contribute to a better understanding of the neuropsychological mechanisms of social punishment behavior––one of the most peculiar human behaviors.
Keywords: social punishmentsecond-party punishmentthird-party punishmentactivation likelihood estimationmeta-analytic connectivity mappingresting-state functional connectivity
Subjective well-being: Users with a tendency to engage in social comparison are especially likely to be negatively impacted by social networking sites
Social comparison on social networking sites. Philippe Verduyn et al. Current Opinion in Psychology, Apr 14 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2020.04.002
Abstract: Due to the rise of social networking sites (SNSs), social comparisons take place at an unprecedented rate and scale. There is a growing concern that these online social comparisons negatively impact people’s subjective well-being (SWB). In this paper, we review research on (a) the antecedents of social comparisons on SNSs, (b) the consequences of social comparisons on SNSs for SWB and, (c) social comparison as a mechanism explaining (mediator) or affecting (moderator) the relationship between SNSs and SWB. The occurrence of social comparisons on SNSs depends on who uses the SNS and on how the SNS is being used with passive use in particular resulting in increased levels of social comparison. Moreover, social comparison on SNSs may occasionally result in an increase in SWB but typically negative effects are found as people tend to engage in contrasting upward social comparisons. Finally, several studies show that social comparison is a key mechanism explaining the relationship between use of SNSs and SWB and that users with a tendency to engage in social comparison are especially likely to be negatively impacted by SNSs. The dynamic, cyclical processes that result from this pattern of findings are discussed.
Abstract: Due to the rise of social networking sites (SNSs), social comparisons take place at an unprecedented rate and scale. There is a growing concern that these online social comparisons negatively impact people’s subjective well-being (SWB). In this paper, we review research on (a) the antecedents of social comparisons on SNSs, (b) the consequences of social comparisons on SNSs for SWB and, (c) social comparison as a mechanism explaining (mediator) or affecting (moderator) the relationship between SNSs and SWB. The occurrence of social comparisons on SNSs depends on who uses the SNS and on how the SNS is being used with passive use in particular resulting in increased levels of social comparison. Moreover, social comparison on SNSs may occasionally result in an increase in SWB but typically negative effects are found as people tend to engage in contrasting upward social comparisons. Finally, several studies show that social comparison is a key mechanism explaining the relationship between use of SNSs and SWB and that users with a tendency to engage in social comparison are especially likely to be negatively impacted by SNSs. The dynamic, cyclical processes that result from this pattern of findings are discussed.
Trigger warnings failed to reduce anxiety to distressing content, reliably causing small increases in anxiety
Bellet, B. W., Jones, P. J., Meyersburg, C. A., Brenneman, M. M., Morehead, K. E., & McNally, R. J. (2020). Trigger warnings and resilience in college students: A preregistered replication and extension. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied. Apr 2020. https://doi.org/10.1037/xap0000270
Abstract: Trigger warnings notify people that content they are about to engage with may result in adverse emotional consequences. An experiment by Bellet, Jones, and McNally (2018) indicated that trigger warnings increased the extent to which trauma-naïve crowd-sourced participants see themselves and others as emotionally vulnerable to potential future traumas but did not have a significant main effect on anxiety responses to distressing literature passages. However, they did increase anxiety responses for participants who strongly believed that words can harm. In this article, we present a preregistered replication of this study in a college student sample, using Bayesian statistics to estimate the success of each effect’s replication. We found strong evidence that none of the previously significant effects replicated. However, we found substantial evidence that trigger warnings’ previously nonsignificant main effect of increasing anxiety responses to distressing content was genuine, albeit small. Interpretation of the findings, implications, and future directions are discussed.
Abstract: Trigger warnings notify people that content they are about to engage with may result in adverse emotional consequences. An experiment by Bellet, Jones, and McNally (2018) indicated that trigger warnings increased the extent to which trauma-naïve crowd-sourced participants see themselves and others as emotionally vulnerable to potential future traumas but did not have a significant main effect on anxiety responses to distressing literature passages. However, they did increase anxiety responses for participants who strongly believed that words can harm. In this article, we present a preregistered replication of this study in a college student sample, using Bayesian statistics to estimate the success of each effect’s replication. We found strong evidence that none of the previously significant effects replicated. However, we found substantial evidence that trigger warnings’ previously nonsignificant main effect of increasing anxiety responses to distressing content was genuine, albeit small. Interpretation of the findings, implications, and future directions are discussed.
Two of the best known phenomena in memory research were carried out as dissertations in the same era at the same university, each supervised by an influential researcher working within the Gestalt framework...
Zeigarnik and von Restorff: The memory effects and the stories behind them. Colin M. MacLeod. Memory & Cognition, Apr 6 2020. https://rd.springer.com/article/10.3758/s13421-020-01033-5
Abstract: Two of the best known eponymous phenomena in memory research were carried out as dissertations in the same era at the same university, each supervised by an influential researcher working within the Gestalt framework. Both examined the influence of unexpected events on memory. Bluma Zeigarnik (Psychologische Forschung, 9, 1–85, 1927) first reported that memory is better for interrupted tasks than for completed tasks, a phenomenon long known as the Zeigarnik effect. Hedwig von Restorff (Psychologische Forschung, 18, 299–342, 1933) first reported that memory is better for isolated than for non-isolated pieces of information, a phenomenon long known as the von Restorff effect. In this article, I present: (1) a biographical sketch of the researcher behind each phenomenon, (2) a description of their dissertation research, and (3) an evaluation of the current status of each phenomenon.
Abstract: Two of the best known eponymous phenomena in memory research were carried out as dissertations in the same era at the same university, each supervised by an influential researcher working within the Gestalt framework. Both examined the influence of unexpected events on memory. Bluma Zeigarnik (Psychologische Forschung, 9, 1–85, 1927) first reported that memory is better for interrupted tasks than for completed tasks, a phenomenon long known as the Zeigarnik effect. Hedwig von Restorff (Psychologische Forschung, 18, 299–342, 1933) first reported that memory is better for isolated than for non-isolated pieces of information, a phenomenon long known as the von Restorff effect. In this article, I present: (1) a biographical sketch of the researcher behind each phenomenon, (2) a description of their dissertation research, and (3) an evaluation of the current status of each phenomenon.
Polish sample: Higher level of extraversion and lower level of agreeableness were the best predictors of a higher number of sexual partners
The Relationship of Number of Sexual Partners with Personality Traits, Age, Gender and Sexual Identification. Aleksandra Rogowska, Magdalena Tofel, Barbara Zmaczyńska-Witek & Zofia Kardasz. Psychology & Sexuality, Apr 14 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/19419899.2020.1752786
Abstract: Although personality has been tested as a predictor of sexual behaviours, little is known about the contribution of personality to the number of sexual partners. This study aimed to examine the models of association between the number of lifetime sexual partners and personality traits in lesbian, gay, bisexual (LGB) and heterosexual people. A web-based questionnaire was administered to the 768 Polish adults aged between 16 and 42 years old, including 61% women. Of the participants, 61% identified themselves as heterosexual, 22% as bisexual and 17% as homosexual. A series of multiple regression analyses were conducted to find the best predictors for the association between Big-Five personality traits and number of lifetime sexual partners. Age, gender, and sexual identification were also included in the analysis. Higher level of extraversion and lower level of agreeableness were the best predictors of a higher number of sexual partners. Sexual identification was a moderator of the relation between emotional stability and the number of sexual partners, whereas age and gender were separate moderators of the association between extraversion and number of sexual partners. Scientists and clinicians may use these predictors to prepare prevention and therapy for people at risk of sexual addiction or STIs.
Keywords: Big Five, personality traits, sexual identification, number of sexual partners
Abstract: Although personality has been tested as a predictor of sexual behaviours, little is known about the contribution of personality to the number of sexual partners. This study aimed to examine the models of association between the number of lifetime sexual partners and personality traits in lesbian, gay, bisexual (LGB) and heterosexual people. A web-based questionnaire was administered to the 768 Polish adults aged between 16 and 42 years old, including 61% women. Of the participants, 61% identified themselves as heterosexual, 22% as bisexual and 17% as homosexual. A series of multiple regression analyses were conducted to find the best predictors for the association between Big-Five personality traits and number of lifetime sexual partners. Age, gender, and sexual identification were also included in the analysis. Higher level of extraversion and lower level of agreeableness were the best predictors of a higher number of sexual partners. Sexual identification was a moderator of the relation between emotional stability and the number of sexual partners, whereas age and gender were separate moderators of the association between extraversion and number of sexual partners. Scientists and clinicians may use these predictors to prepare prevention and therapy for people at risk of sexual addiction or STIs.
Keywords: Big Five, personality traits, sexual identification, number of sexual partners
Contrary to 84pct of experts polled, children's delay of gratification times are increasing over the past 50 years in a fifth of a standard deviation increase in ability per decade, mirroring IQ gains seen over decades
Kids These Days! Increasing delay of gratification ability over the past 50 years in children. ohn Protzko. Intelligence, Volume 80, May–June 2020, 101451, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2020.101451
Highlights
• 50 years of administering the ‘Marshmallow Test’ shows children can delay gratification for longer, in over 30 studies
• 260 experts in cognitive development were polled before analysis to predict the result, 84% predicted incorrectly
• The magnitude of increase is 0.18 SDs per decade, nearly identical to secular gains in IQ, suggesting a possible common cause
Abstract: Have children's ability to delay gratification decreased since the past? We analyze the past 50 years of data on the Marshmallow test of delay of gratification; where children must wait to get two preferred treats of their choosing; if they cannot wait, they only get one. Here we provide comprehensive evidence on whether children's ability to delay gratification has truly been decreasing, as theories of technology or a culture of instant gratification have predicted. Before analyzing the data, we polled 260 experts in cognitive development, 84% of who believed children are getting worse or are no different than those of the past. Contrary to this prediction, we show delay of gratification times are increasing over the past 50 years, corresponding to a fifth of a standard deviation increase in ability per decade. This mirrors the magnitude of secular gains in IQ seen over decades.
Keywords: Self-regulationMetasciencePredictionFlynn effects
Highlights
• 50 years of administering the ‘Marshmallow Test’ shows children can delay gratification for longer, in over 30 studies
• 260 experts in cognitive development were polled before analysis to predict the result, 84% predicted incorrectly
• The magnitude of increase is 0.18 SDs per decade, nearly identical to secular gains in IQ, suggesting a possible common cause
Abstract: Have children's ability to delay gratification decreased since the past? We analyze the past 50 years of data on the Marshmallow test of delay of gratification; where children must wait to get two preferred treats of their choosing; if they cannot wait, they only get one. Here we provide comprehensive evidence on whether children's ability to delay gratification has truly been decreasing, as theories of technology or a culture of instant gratification have predicted. Before analyzing the data, we polled 260 experts in cognitive development, 84% of who believed children are getting worse or are no different than those of the past. Contrary to this prediction, we show delay of gratification times are increasing over the past 50 years, corresponding to a fifth of a standard deviation increase in ability per decade. This mirrors the magnitude of secular gains in IQ seen over decades.
Keywords: Self-regulationMetasciencePredictionFlynn effects
Tuesday, April 14, 2020
Understanding "Wage Theft"... Evasion and Avoidance Responses to Minimum Wage Increases: Minimum wage noncompliance is an important reality in the low-wage labor market
Understanding "Wage Theft": Evasion and Avoidance Responses to Minimum Wage Increases. Jeffrey Clemens, Michael R. Strain. NBER Working Paper No. 26969, April 2020. https://www.nber.org/papers/w26969
Abstract: A holistic assessment of the labor market effects of minimum wage regulation requires understanding employer compliance. We investigate how minimum wage increases and the strength of enforcement regimes affect the prevalence of subminimum wage payment. Using the Current Population Survey (CPS), we find strong evidence that higher minimum wages lead to a greater prevalence of subminimum wage payment. We estimate that increases in measured underpayment following minimum wage increases average between 14 and 22 percent of realized wage gains. Furthermore, we provide evidence that these estimates are unlikely to be driven by measurement error in the CPS’s wage data, which are self-reported. Taken together, we interpret these findings as evidence that minimum wage noncompliance is an important reality in the low-wage labor market. We find some evidence that enforcement regimes mediate both baseline rates of subminimum wage payment and the response of subminimum wage payment to increases in minimum wages.
Abstract: A holistic assessment of the labor market effects of minimum wage regulation requires understanding employer compliance. We investigate how minimum wage increases and the strength of enforcement regimes affect the prevalence of subminimum wage payment. Using the Current Population Survey (CPS), we find strong evidence that higher minimum wages lead to a greater prevalence of subminimum wage payment. We estimate that increases in measured underpayment following minimum wage increases average between 14 and 22 percent of realized wage gains. Furthermore, we provide evidence that these estimates are unlikely to be driven by measurement error in the CPS’s wage data, which are self-reported. Taken together, we interpret these findings as evidence that minimum wage noncompliance is an important reality in the low-wage labor market. We find some evidence that enforcement regimes mediate both baseline rates of subminimum wage payment and the response of subminimum wage payment to increases in minimum wages.
The “return trip effect” (trip back from a destination is experienced as shorter than the trip to the destination) is due not to different familiarity of places, but to greater anticipation going out
Are We There Yet? An Anticipation Account of the Return Trip Effect. Zoey Chen, Ryan Hamilton, Derek D. Rucker. Social Psychological and Personality Science, April 13, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550620916054
Abstract: Research has documented the psychological phenomenon in which the trip back from a destination is experienced as shorter than the trip to the destination. Deemed the “return trip effect” (RTE), prior work explained this phenomenon in terms of differential familiarity between home and outbound destination or an underestimation of initial travel time. The present article posits an anticipation account for the RTE: Outbound trips to a destination tend to foster higher levels of anticipation than return trips. Due to greater anticipation, people’s perception of time elongates. Importantly, the anticipation account makes novel predictions with regard to the occurrence of the RTE that cannot be accounted for by prior explanations. Multiple studies, with diverse methodologies, test and offer evidence in support of an anticipation account of the RTE.
Keywords: return trip effect, time perception, anticipation
Abstract: Research has documented the psychological phenomenon in which the trip back from a destination is experienced as shorter than the trip to the destination. Deemed the “return trip effect” (RTE), prior work explained this phenomenon in terms of differential familiarity between home and outbound destination or an underestimation of initial travel time. The present article posits an anticipation account for the RTE: Outbound trips to a destination tend to foster higher levels of anticipation than return trips. Due to greater anticipation, people’s perception of time elongates. Importantly, the anticipation account makes novel predictions with regard to the occurrence of the RTE that cannot be accounted for by prior explanations. Multiple studies, with diverse methodologies, test and offer evidence in support of an anticipation account of the RTE.
Keywords: return trip effect, time perception, anticipation
American adolescents and young adults spent less time on non‐digital social interaction in the 2010s, with a less pronounced decline among those ages 26 and over
Declines in non‐digital social interaction among Americans, 2003–2017. Jean M. Twenge Brian H. Spitzberg. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, April 10 2020 https://doi.org/10.1111/jasp.12665
Abstract: It is unclear whether Americans spent less time on non‐digital social interaction in the 2010s than in the 2000s. In the nationally representative American Time Use Survey administered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (n = 191,558), U.S. residents 15 years of age and older spent 10 to 11 fewer minutes a day in non‐digital social interaction during leisure time in 2017 compared to 2003, which translates to 67 fewer hours a year. The decline was primarily driven by adolescents and young adults ages from15 to 25, who spent between 21 and 23 fewer minutes per day on non‐digital social interaction in 2017 compared to 2003, or 140 fewer hours a year. Thus, American adolescents and young adults spent less time on non‐digital social interaction in the 2010s, with a less pronounced decline among those ages 26 and over.
Abstract: It is unclear whether Americans spent less time on non‐digital social interaction in the 2010s than in the 2000s. In the nationally representative American Time Use Survey administered by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (n = 191,558), U.S. residents 15 years of age and older spent 10 to 11 fewer minutes a day in non‐digital social interaction during leisure time in 2017 compared to 2003, which translates to 67 fewer hours a year. The decline was primarily driven by adolescents and young adults ages from15 to 25, who spent between 21 and 23 fewer minutes per day on non‐digital social interaction in 2017 compared to 2003, or 140 fewer hours a year. Thus, American adolescents and young adults spent less time on non‐digital social interaction in the 2010s, with a less pronounced decline among those ages 26 and over.
Monday, April 13, 2020
More than fantasy: Prosocial daydreams relate to prosocial dispositions and behaviour
More than fantasy: Prosocial daydreams relate to prosocial dispositions and behaviour. Peter O. Kearns James M. Tyler William G. Graziano. International Journal of Psychology, April 13 2020 https://doi.org/10.1002/ijop.12673
Abstract: The current studies examined the relationship between the penchant to daydream about helping others and prosocial traits and behaviour. We reasoned that fantasising about prosocial acts should be positively associated with a more prosocial disposition and real behaviour. Across both studies, the findings suggest that people who exhibit prosocial characteristics (e.g., empathic concern, fantasy/fictional empathy, moral reasoning) are more likely to fantasise about prosocial behaviour, and these characteristics are reliably associated with increased helping behaviours. From Study 1, the correlational results showed that people higher in agreeableness exhibited a stronger tendency to engage in prosocial fantasising, and empathy, in part, mediated the relationship. The experimental results from Study 2 conceptually support those from Study 1; when prompted to fantasise about prosocial behaviour, those higher in agreeableness and openness to experience engaged in more helping behaviour, whereas in a control condition, no helping differences emerged. Finding that empathic concern was most consistently related to daydreaming is consistent with the theory in that people are more intrinsically motivated to promote other's welfare at a personal cost when they feel empathy. Engaging in prosocial fantasising may increase empathy, which in turn, may enhance one's prosocial disposition and increase one's helping behaviour.
Abstract: The current studies examined the relationship between the penchant to daydream about helping others and prosocial traits and behaviour. We reasoned that fantasising about prosocial acts should be positively associated with a more prosocial disposition and real behaviour. Across both studies, the findings suggest that people who exhibit prosocial characteristics (e.g., empathic concern, fantasy/fictional empathy, moral reasoning) are more likely to fantasise about prosocial behaviour, and these characteristics are reliably associated with increased helping behaviours. From Study 1, the correlational results showed that people higher in agreeableness exhibited a stronger tendency to engage in prosocial fantasising, and empathy, in part, mediated the relationship. The experimental results from Study 2 conceptually support those from Study 1; when prompted to fantasise about prosocial behaviour, those higher in agreeableness and openness to experience engaged in more helping behaviour, whereas in a control condition, no helping differences emerged. Finding that empathic concern was most consistently related to daydreaming is consistent with the theory in that people are more intrinsically motivated to promote other's welfare at a personal cost when they feel empathy. Engaging in prosocial fantasising may increase empathy, which in turn, may enhance one's prosocial disposition and increase one's helping behaviour.
Sunday, April 12, 2020
Meat consumption, depressive symptomatology and cardiovascular disease incidence in apparently healthy men and women: highlights from the ATTICA cohort study (2002–2012)
Meat consumption, depressive symptomatology and cardiovascular disease incidence in apparently healthy men and women: highlights from the ATTICA cohort study (2002–2012). Matina Kouvari et al. Nutritional Neuroscience, Apr 11 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/1028415X.2020.1750169
ABSTRACT
Objectives: To evaluate the association of meat consumption with prevalent depressive symptomatology and cardiovascular disease (CVD) incidence in apparently healthy individuals.
Methods: ATTICA study was conducted during 2001–2012 including n = 1514 men and n = 1528 women (aged >18 years old) from the greater Athens area, Greece. At baseline, depressive symptomatology through Zung Self-Rating Depression Scale (range 20–80) and meat consumption (total meat, red, white and processed meat) through validated semi-quantitative food frequency questionnaire were assessed. Follow-up (2011–2012) was achieved in n = 2020 participants (n = 317 cases); n = 845 participants with complete psychological metrics were used for the primary analysis.
Results: Ranking from 1st to 3rd total meat consumption (low to high) tertiles, participants assigned in 2nd tertile had the lowest depressive-symptomatology scoring (p<0.001). This trend was retained in multiadjusted logistic regression analysis; participants reporting moderate total and red meat consumption had ∼20% lower likelihood to be depressed (i.e. Zung scale<45) compared with their 1st tertile counterparts (Odds Ratio (OR)total meat 0.82, 95% Confidence Interval (95%CI) (0.60, 0.97) and ORred meat 0.79 95%CI (0.45, 0.96)). Non-linear associations were revealed; 2–3 serving/week total meat and 1–2 servings/week red meat presented the lowest odds of depressive symptomatology (all ps<0.05). These U-shape trends seemed to attenuate the aggravating effect of depressive symptomatology on CVD hard endpoints. All aforementioned associations were more evident in women (all ps for sex-related interaction<0.05).
Discussion: The present findings generate the hypothesis that moderate total meat consumption and notably, red meat may be more beneficial to prevent depressed mood and in turn hard CVD endpoints.
KEYWORDS: Meat, red meat, psychological health, depression, heart disease, gender, women, primary prevention
ABSTRACT
Objectives: To evaluate the association of meat consumption with prevalent depressive symptomatology and cardiovascular disease (CVD) incidence in apparently healthy individuals.
Methods: ATTICA study was conducted during 2001–2012 including n = 1514 men and n = 1528 women (aged >18 years old) from the greater Athens area, Greece. At baseline, depressive symptomatology through Zung Self-Rating Depression Scale (range 20–80) and meat consumption (total meat, red, white and processed meat) through validated semi-quantitative food frequency questionnaire were assessed. Follow-up (2011–2012) was achieved in n = 2020 participants (n = 317 cases); n = 845 participants with complete psychological metrics were used for the primary analysis.
Results: Ranking from 1st to 3rd total meat consumption (low to high) tertiles, participants assigned in 2nd tertile had the lowest depressive-symptomatology scoring (p<0.001). This trend was retained in multiadjusted logistic regression analysis; participants reporting moderate total and red meat consumption had ∼20% lower likelihood to be depressed (i.e. Zung scale<45) compared with their 1st tertile counterparts (Odds Ratio (OR)total meat 0.82, 95% Confidence Interval (95%CI) (0.60, 0.97) and ORred meat 0.79 95%CI (0.45, 0.96)). Non-linear associations were revealed; 2–3 serving/week total meat and 1–2 servings/week red meat presented the lowest odds of depressive symptomatology (all ps<0.05). These U-shape trends seemed to attenuate the aggravating effect of depressive symptomatology on CVD hard endpoints. All aforementioned associations were more evident in women (all ps for sex-related interaction<0.05).
Discussion: The present findings generate the hypothesis that moderate total meat consumption and notably, red meat may be more beneficial to prevent depressed mood and in turn hard CVD endpoints.
KEYWORDS: Meat, red meat, psychological health, depression, heart disease, gender, women, primary prevention
Those who thought about donation decisions by either deliberating about the cost-effectiveness of charities we judged of less positive moral character than those deciding based on empathy
Montealegre, Andres, Lance Bush, David Moss, David Pizarro, and William Jimenez-Leal. 2020. “Does Maximizing Good Make People Look Bad?.” PsyArXiv. April 11. doi:10.31234/osf.io/2zbax
Abstract: People make inferences about others depending on the way they arrive at their moral decisions. Here, we examine evaluations of people who make moral decisions through deliberation compared to those who decide based on empathy. To do so, we turn to charitable donations. People often fail to prioritize the cost-effectiveness of charities when donating (Berman, Barasch, Levine, & Small, 2018). We argue that this pattern exists in part because donors who make charitable decisions by deliberating about the cost-effectiveness of charities are perceived as less moral and less desirable as social partners than those who decide based on empathizing with the recipients of the donation. Across six pre-registered studies using two different scenarios (N = 1,961), we presented participants with descriptions of people who thought about donation decisions by either deliberating about the cost-effectiveness of charities, or by deciding based on empathy. Reliably, participants judged “deliberators” to have less positive moral character and to be less desirable as social partners than “empathizers.” We found these results across different designs (between-subjects and within-subjects), when evaluating respondents of different genders (male and female), and for donations of different stakes (low and high). The negative reputational effects of deliberating were reduced if “deliberators” expressed empathy first. These results suggest that there may be disincentives for selecting charities based on their impact, since people are not socially rewarded for prioritizing charitable impact but are rewarded for signaling the right kinds of moral traits. We end by discussing implications and limitations of these findings.
Abstract: People make inferences about others depending on the way they arrive at their moral decisions. Here, we examine evaluations of people who make moral decisions through deliberation compared to those who decide based on empathy. To do so, we turn to charitable donations. People often fail to prioritize the cost-effectiveness of charities when donating (Berman, Barasch, Levine, & Small, 2018). We argue that this pattern exists in part because donors who make charitable decisions by deliberating about the cost-effectiveness of charities are perceived as less moral and less desirable as social partners than those who decide based on empathizing with the recipients of the donation. Across six pre-registered studies using two different scenarios (N = 1,961), we presented participants with descriptions of people who thought about donation decisions by either deliberating about the cost-effectiveness of charities, or by deciding based on empathy. Reliably, participants judged “deliberators” to have less positive moral character and to be less desirable as social partners than “empathizers.” We found these results across different designs (between-subjects and within-subjects), when evaluating respondents of different genders (male and female), and for donations of different stakes (low and high). The negative reputational effects of deliberating were reduced if “deliberators” expressed empathy first. These results suggest that there may be disincentives for selecting charities based on their impact, since people are not socially rewarded for prioritizing charitable impact but are rewarded for signaling the right kinds of moral traits. We end by discussing implications and limitations of these findings.
Saturday, April 11, 2020
The case for releasing the young from lockdown: A briefing paper for policymakers
The case for releasing the young from lockdown: A briefing paper for policymakers. Andrew J. Oswald, Nattavudh Powdthavee. Warwick Business School and IZA, April 2020. https://www.iza.org/publications/dp/13113/the-case-for-releasing-the-young-from-lockdown-a-briefing-paper-for-policymakers
Summary: The UK is ‘locked down’ because of coronavirus (COVID-19). No clear exit strategy currently exists. This paper suggests a possible way forward that combines elements from economics and epidemiology. The paper proposes as a policy a ‘release’ from lockdown of the young cohort of UK citizens aged between age 20 and 30 who do not live with parents. The paper calculates that there are approximately 4.2 million UK individuals who fall into this 20-30 age-band and who live outside the original parental home. Of those, 2.6 million work in the private sector, so unless some corrective action is taken they are likely to be extremely harshly affected, financially, when compared to employees in the public sector. The paper argues that a young-workforce release of this kind would lead to substantial economic and societal benefits without enormous health costs to the country. In this way, the nation might begin to move forward in the footsteps of the young. The paper’s key concept could in principle be implemented in other countries.
Key words: coronavirus; labor market; recession; COVID-19.
JEL code: I18
Summary: The UK is ‘locked down’ because of coronavirus (COVID-19). No clear exit strategy currently exists. This paper suggests a possible way forward that combines elements from economics and epidemiology. The paper proposes as a policy a ‘release’ from lockdown of the young cohort of UK citizens aged between age 20 and 30 who do not live with parents. The paper calculates that there are approximately 4.2 million UK individuals who fall into this 20-30 age-band and who live outside the original parental home. Of those, 2.6 million work in the private sector, so unless some corrective action is taken they are likely to be extremely harshly affected, financially, when compared to employees in the public sector. The paper argues that a young-workforce release of this kind would lead to substantial economic and societal benefits without enormous health costs to the country. In this way, the nation might begin to move forward in the footsteps of the young. The paper’s key concept could in principle be implemented in other countries.
Key words: coronavirus; labor market; recession; COVID-19.
JEL code: I18
Changes in Sleep Pattern, Sense of Time, and Digital Media Use During COVID-19 Lockdown in Italy
Cellini, Nicola, Natale Canale, Giovanna Mioni, and Sebastiano Costa. 2020. “Changes in Sleep Pattern, Sense of Time, and Digital Media Use During COVID-19 Lockdown in Italy.” PsyArXiv. April 11. doi:10.31234/osf.io/284mr
Abstract: Italy is one of the major COVID-19 hotspots. To reduce the spread of the infections and the pressure on Italian healthcare systems, since March 10th 2020, Italy is under a total lockdown, with restrictions on the movement of individuals in the entire nation, forcing people to home confinement. Here we present data from 1310 people living in the Italian territory (Mage= 23.91±3.60 years, 880 females, 501 workers, 809 University students), who completed an online survey from March 24th to March 28th 2020. In the survey, we asked participants to think about their use of digital media before going to bed, their sleep pattern, and their subjective experience of time in the previous week (17th-23rd of March, which was the second week of the lockdown) and to the first week of February (3rd-10th, before any restriction in any Italian area). During the lockdown, people increased the usage of digital media near bedtime, but this change did not affect sleep habits. Nevertheless, during home confinement sleep timing markedly changed, with people going to bed and waking up later, spending more time in bed but, paradoxically, also reporting a lower sleep quality. The increase in sleep difficulties was stronger for people with a higher level of depression, anxiety, and stress symptomatology, and was associated with the feeling of time dilatation. Considering that the lockdown is likely to continue for weeks, research data are urgently needed to support decision-making, to build public awareness, and to provide timely and supportive psychosocial interventions.
Abstract: Italy is one of the major COVID-19 hotspots. To reduce the spread of the infections and the pressure on Italian healthcare systems, since March 10th 2020, Italy is under a total lockdown, with restrictions on the movement of individuals in the entire nation, forcing people to home confinement. Here we present data from 1310 people living in the Italian territory (Mage= 23.91±3.60 years, 880 females, 501 workers, 809 University students), who completed an online survey from March 24th to March 28th 2020. In the survey, we asked participants to think about their use of digital media before going to bed, their sleep pattern, and their subjective experience of time in the previous week (17th-23rd of March, which was the second week of the lockdown) and to the first week of February (3rd-10th, before any restriction in any Italian area). During the lockdown, people increased the usage of digital media near bedtime, but this change did not affect sleep habits. Nevertheless, during home confinement sleep timing markedly changed, with people going to bed and waking up later, spending more time in bed but, paradoxically, also reporting a lower sleep quality. The increase in sleep difficulties was stronger for people with a higher level of depression, anxiety, and stress symptomatology, and was associated with the feeling of time dilatation. Considering that the lockdown is likely to continue for weeks, research data are urgently needed to support decision-making, to build public awareness, and to provide timely and supportive psychosocial interventions.
People see victims as moral in order to motivate adaptive justice-restorative action (i.e., punishment of perpetrators and helping of victims)
Jordan, Jillian, and Maryam Kouchaki. 2020. “Virtuous Victims.” PsyArXiv. April 11. doi:10.31234/osf.io/yz8r6
Abstract: Humans ubiquitously encounter narratives about immoral acts and their victims. Here, we demonstrate that these narratives can influence perceptions of victims’ moral character. Specifically, across a wide range of contexts, victims are seen as more moral than non-victims who have behaved identically. Using 13 experiments (total n = 8,358), we explore this Virtuous Victim effect. We show that it is specific to victims of immorality (i.e., it does not extend equally to victims of accidental misfortune) and to moral virtue (i.e., it does not extend equally to positive nonmoral traits). We also show that the Virtuous Victim effect can occur online and in the lab, when subjects have other morally relevant information about the victim, when subjects have a direct opportunity to condemn the perpetrator, and in the context of both third- and first-person victim narratives. Finally, we provide support for the Justice Restoration Hypothesis, which posits that people see victims as moral in order to motivate adaptive justice-restorative action (i.e., punishment of perpetrators and helping of victims). We show that people see victims as having elevated moral character, but do not expect them to behave more morally or less immorally—a pattern that is consistent with the Justice Restoration Hypothesis, but not readily explained by alternative explanations for the Virtuous Victim effect. And we provide both correlational and causal evidence for a key prediction of the Justice Restoration Hypothesis: when people do not perceive incentives to help victims and punish perpetrators, the Virtuous Victim effect disappears.
Abstract: Humans ubiquitously encounter narratives about immoral acts and their victims. Here, we demonstrate that these narratives can influence perceptions of victims’ moral character. Specifically, across a wide range of contexts, victims are seen as more moral than non-victims who have behaved identically. Using 13 experiments (total n = 8,358), we explore this Virtuous Victim effect. We show that it is specific to victims of immorality (i.e., it does not extend equally to victims of accidental misfortune) and to moral virtue (i.e., it does not extend equally to positive nonmoral traits). We also show that the Virtuous Victim effect can occur online and in the lab, when subjects have other morally relevant information about the victim, when subjects have a direct opportunity to condemn the perpetrator, and in the context of both third- and first-person victim narratives. Finally, we provide support for the Justice Restoration Hypothesis, which posits that people see victims as moral in order to motivate adaptive justice-restorative action (i.e., punishment of perpetrators and helping of victims). We show that people see victims as having elevated moral character, but do not expect them to behave more morally or less immorally—a pattern that is consistent with the Justice Restoration Hypothesis, but not readily explained by alternative explanations for the Virtuous Victim effect. And we provide both correlational and causal evidence for a key prediction of the Justice Restoration Hypothesis: when people do not perceive incentives to help victims and punish perpetrators, the Virtuous Victim effect disappears.
Friday, April 10, 2020
How Does Household Spending Respond to an Epidemic? Consumption During the 2020 COVID-19 Pandemic
Baker, Scott R. and Farrokhnia, R.A. and Meyer, Steffen and Pagel, Michaela and Yannelis, Constantine, How Does Household Spending Respond to an Epidemic? Consumption During the 2020 COVID-19 Pandemic (March 31, 2020). SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3565521
Abstract: We explore how household consumption responds to epidemics, utilizing transaction-level household financial data to investigate the impact of the COVID-19 virus. As the number of cases grew, households began to radically alter their typical spending across a number of major categories. Initially spending increased sharply, particularly in retail, credit card spending and food items. This was followed by a sharp decrease in overall spending. Households responded most strongly in states with shelter-in-place orders in place by March 29th. We explore heterogeneity across partisan affiliation, demographics and income. Greater levels of social distancing are associated with drops in spending, particularly in restaurants and retail.
Keywords: Consumption, Coronavirus, COVID-19, Household Finance, Transaction Data
JEL Classification: D14, E21, G51
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Women and conservatives were more prone to stockpiling in the early phase of the COVID-19 outbreak in the US
Abstract: We explore how household consumption responds to epidemics, utilizing transaction-level household financial data to investigate the impact of the COVID-19 virus. As the number of cases grew, households began to radically alter their typical spending across a number of major categories. Initially spending increased sharply, particularly in retail, credit card spending and food items. This was followed by a sharp decrease in overall spending. Households responded most strongly in states with shelter-in-place orders in place by March 29th. We explore heterogeneity across partisan affiliation, demographics and income. Greater levels of social distancing are associated with drops in spending, particularly in restaurants and retail.
Keywords: Consumption, Coronavirus, COVID-19, Household Finance, Transaction Data
JEL Classification: D14, E21, G51
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Women and conservatives were more prone to stockpiling in the early phase of the COVID-19 outbreak in the US
Kids These Days: Overall, however, the results represent a challenge to the dominant narrative that social skills are declining due to technological change
Douglas B. Downey and Benjamin G. Gibbs, "Kids These Days: Are Face-to-Face Social Skills among American Children Declining?," American Journal of Sociology 125, no. 4 (January 2020): 1030-1083. https://doi.org/10.1086/707985
Abstract: Many social commentators posit that children’s social skills are declining as a result of exposure to technology. But this claim is difficult to assess empirically because it is challenging to measure “social skills” with confidence and because a strong test would employ nationally representative data of multiple cohorts. No scholarship currently meets these criteria. The authors fill that gap by comparing teachers’ and parents’ evaluations of children’s social skills among children in the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study 1998 and 2010 cohorts. The authors find no evidence that teachers or parents rate children’s face-to-face social skills as poorer among more recent cohorts, even when accounting for family characteristics, screen time use, and other factors. In addition, within cohorts, children with heavy exposure to screens exhibit similar social skills trajectories compared to children with little exposure to screens. There is a notable exception—social skills are lower for children who access online gaming and social networking many times a day. Overall, however, the results represent a challenge to the dominant narrative that social skills are declining due to technological change.
Abstract: Many social commentators posit that children’s social skills are declining as a result of exposure to technology. But this claim is difficult to assess empirically because it is challenging to measure “social skills” with confidence and because a strong test would employ nationally representative data of multiple cohorts. No scholarship currently meets these criteria. The authors fill that gap by comparing teachers’ and parents’ evaluations of children’s social skills among children in the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study 1998 and 2010 cohorts. The authors find no evidence that teachers or parents rate children’s face-to-face social skills as poorer among more recent cohorts, even when accounting for family characteristics, screen time use, and other factors. In addition, within cohorts, children with heavy exposure to screens exhibit similar social skills trajectories compared to children with little exposure to screens. There is a notable exception—social skills are lower for children who access online gaming and social networking many times a day. Overall, however, the results represent a challenge to the dominant narrative that social skills are declining due to technological change.
Tattoo Visibility Status, Egalitarianism, and Personality are Predictors of Sexual Openness Among Women
Showing Skin: Tattoo Visibility Status, Egalitarianism, and Personality are Predictors of Sexual Openness Among Women. Kaylee Skoda, Flora Oswald, Kailie Brown, Cassandra Hesse & Cory L. Pedersen. Sexuality & Culture, Apr 9 2020. https://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12119-020-09729-1
Abstract: Research indicates that women with tattoos are evaluated more negatively than women without tattoos on numerous qualities. Further, men perceive better chances for sexual success with tattooed women than those without visible tattoos. Despite these findings, less is known about whether women with visible tattoos are more open to casual sexual encounters than their non-tattooed counterparts, and if so, what variables may predict such openness. The purpose of the present study was to explore whether, and to what extent, stereotyped perceptions of tattooed women as sexually open are accurate, and to explore the possible role of egalitarianism in sexual openness. Measures of personality and sensation-seeking were also examined. A sample of 814 women, both tattooed and non-tattooed, were recruited through a Western Canadian university research pool and various social media outlets to complete an online questionnaire assessing these attributes. Women with tattoos reported greater willingness to engage in uncommitted sexual relations, as well as higher endorsement of egalitarianism and sensation-seeking, relative to non-tattooed women. Among tattooed women alone, several personality and tattooing variables predicted sexual openness. Findings suggesting body tattooing as an indicator of sexual openness are critically discussed in relation to contemporary stereotypes surrounding femininity and sexuality.
Abstract: Research indicates that women with tattoos are evaluated more negatively than women without tattoos on numerous qualities. Further, men perceive better chances for sexual success with tattooed women than those without visible tattoos. Despite these findings, less is known about whether women with visible tattoos are more open to casual sexual encounters than their non-tattooed counterparts, and if so, what variables may predict such openness. The purpose of the present study was to explore whether, and to what extent, stereotyped perceptions of tattooed women as sexually open are accurate, and to explore the possible role of egalitarianism in sexual openness. Measures of personality and sensation-seeking were also examined. A sample of 814 women, both tattooed and non-tattooed, were recruited through a Western Canadian university research pool and various social media outlets to complete an online questionnaire assessing these attributes. Women with tattoos reported greater willingness to engage in uncommitted sexual relations, as well as higher endorsement of egalitarianism and sensation-seeking, relative to non-tattooed women. Among tattooed women alone, several personality and tattooing variables predicted sexual openness. Findings suggesting body tattooing as an indicator of sexual openness are critically discussed in relation to contemporary stereotypes surrounding femininity and sexuality.
We show that relationship satisfaction and infidelity are associated and that the influence of infidelity on relationship satisfaction is greater for women than for men
Translated from German...
Relationship Satisfaction and Infidelity: One Connection, Two Directions. Christiane Bozoyan & Claudia Schmiedeberg. KZfSS Cologne Journal of Sociology and Social Psychology, Apr 9 2020. https://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11577-020-00660-9
Summary: How do unfaithful behavior in a relationship and satisfaction relate to the partnership? At first, the influence of relationship quality on loyalty behavior seems plausible: the more dissatisfied a partner is in a relationship, the more likely he or she is to seek external relations. However, this does not rule out the possibility that the quality of the partnership or its assessment may also change from the perspective of the perpetrator, e.g. due to conflicts and marital crises triggered by infidelity, or to reduce feelings of cognitive dissonance. Using fixed-effects models based on data from the relationship and family panel pairfam over the observation period 2008 to 2016, we examine both possible longitudinal-average modes of effect with a 1- and 2-year interval between the measurement times. It turns out that there are interactions between the two factors, with the impact of infidelity on relationship satisfaction in women being greater than in men. While the relationship between relationship satisfaction and infidelity risk is rather low, it is shown that the risk of going abroad increases significantly when the long-term orientation in the relationship decreases.
Abstract: How are unfaithful behavior and relationship satisfaction connected? It seems plausible that relationship quality has an influence on unfaithfulness: the less satisfied a partner is in a relationship, the more he or she will look for external relations. However, this does not exclude that relationship quality changes after the infidelity episode, for example, due to conflicts and marriage crises triggered by the unfaithfulness or to reduce feelings of cognitive dissonance. Using fixed-effects models based on data from the German Family Panel pairfam during an observation period from 2008 to 2016, we investigated both causal pathways with a longitudinal design and measurement points 1 or 2 years apart. We show that relationship satisfaction and infidelity are associated and that the influence of infidelity on relationship satisfaction is greater for women than for men. Although the association between relationship satisfaction and risk of infidelity is relatively low, it is shown that the risk of being unfaithful increases sharply if long-term commitment to the relationship decreases.
Relationship Satisfaction and Infidelity: One Connection, Two Directions. Christiane Bozoyan & Claudia Schmiedeberg. KZfSS Cologne Journal of Sociology and Social Psychology, Apr 9 2020. https://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11577-020-00660-9
Summary: How do unfaithful behavior in a relationship and satisfaction relate to the partnership? At first, the influence of relationship quality on loyalty behavior seems plausible: the more dissatisfied a partner is in a relationship, the more likely he or she is to seek external relations. However, this does not rule out the possibility that the quality of the partnership or its assessment may also change from the perspective of the perpetrator, e.g. due to conflicts and marital crises triggered by infidelity, or to reduce feelings of cognitive dissonance. Using fixed-effects models based on data from the relationship and family panel pairfam over the observation period 2008 to 2016, we examine both possible longitudinal-average modes of effect with a 1- and 2-year interval between the measurement times. It turns out that there are interactions between the two factors, with the impact of infidelity on relationship satisfaction in women being greater than in men. While the relationship between relationship satisfaction and infidelity risk is rather low, it is shown that the risk of going abroad increases significantly when the long-term orientation in the relationship decreases.
Abstract: How are unfaithful behavior and relationship satisfaction connected? It seems plausible that relationship quality has an influence on unfaithfulness: the less satisfied a partner is in a relationship, the more he or she will look for external relations. However, this does not exclude that relationship quality changes after the infidelity episode, for example, due to conflicts and marriage crises triggered by the unfaithfulness or to reduce feelings of cognitive dissonance. Using fixed-effects models based on data from the German Family Panel pairfam during an observation period from 2008 to 2016, we investigated both causal pathways with a longitudinal design and measurement points 1 or 2 years apart. We show that relationship satisfaction and infidelity are associated and that the influence of infidelity on relationship satisfaction is greater for women than for men. Although the association between relationship satisfaction and risk of infidelity is relatively low, it is shown that the risk of being unfaithful increases sharply if long-term commitment to the relationship decreases.
Participants perceive actors who demonstrate virtue in public to be less virtuous than actors who demonstrate virtue in private, and, critically, this effect is greater for generosity than impartiality
Kraft-Todd, Gordon, Max Kleiman-Weiner, and Liane Young. 2020. “Differential Virtue Discounting: Public Generosity Is Seen as More Selfish Than Public Impartiality.” PsyArXiv. March 25. doi:10.31234/osf.io/zqpv7
Abstract: There is a paradox in our desire to be seen as virtuous. If we do not overtly display our virtues, others will not be able to see them; yet, if we do overtly display our virtues, others may think that we do so only for social credit. Here, we investigate how virtue signaling works across two distinct virtues—generosity and impartiality—in eleven online experiments (total N=4,586). We demonstrate the novel phenomenon of differential virtue discounting, revealing that participants perceive actors who demonstrate virtue in public to be less virtuous than actors who demonstrate virtue in private, and, critically, that this effect is greater for generosity than impartiality. Further, we provide evidence for the mechanism underlying these judgments, showing that they are mediated by perceived selfish motivations. We discuss how these findings and our novel terminology can shed light on open questions in the social perception of reputation and motivation.
Abstract: There is a paradox in our desire to be seen as virtuous. If we do not overtly display our virtues, others will not be able to see them; yet, if we do overtly display our virtues, others may think that we do so only for social credit. Here, we investigate how virtue signaling works across two distinct virtues—generosity and impartiality—in eleven online experiments (total N=4,586). We demonstrate the novel phenomenon of differential virtue discounting, revealing that participants perceive actors who demonstrate virtue in public to be less virtuous than actors who demonstrate virtue in private, and, critically, that this effect is greater for generosity than impartiality. Further, we provide evidence for the mechanism underlying these judgments, showing that they are mediated by perceived selfish motivations. We discuss how these findings and our novel terminology can shed light on open questions in the social perception of reputation and motivation.
Thursday, April 9, 2020
Women have higher magical beliefs than men, & have stronger reliance on intuition than men; reliance on intuition helps to explain why women report higher magical beliefs than men do
Examining the roles of Intuition and Gender in Magical Beliefs. Sarah J.Ward, Laura A.King. Journal of Research in Personality, April 9 2020, 103956. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.103956
Highlights
• Women have higher magical beliefs than men.
• Women have stronger reliance on intuition than men.
• Reliance on intuition helps to explain why women report higher magical beliefs than men do.
Abstract: Four studies explored gender differences in magical beliefs, specifically examining whether reliance on intuition accounts for women’s higher magical beliefs (vs. men’s). In Studies 1a and 1b (N’s= 489, 1119), women’s higher magical beliefs were accounted for by measures of reliance on intuition. Study 2 (N=533) demonstrated that an intuition induction heightened men’s magical beliefs (vs. control group), but not women’s. In Study 3 (N=404), women—but not men—exhibited more suboptimal choices in a lottery task after imagining that a dream told them to do so. These studies suggest that reliance on intuition helps account for women’s higher magical beliefs.
Keywords: magical beliefsintuitiongender
Highlights
• Women have higher magical beliefs than men.
• Women have stronger reliance on intuition than men.
• Reliance on intuition helps to explain why women report higher magical beliefs than men do.
Abstract: Four studies explored gender differences in magical beliefs, specifically examining whether reliance on intuition accounts for women’s higher magical beliefs (vs. men’s). In Studies 1a and 1b (N’s= 489, 1119), women’s higher magical beliefs were accounted for by measures of reliance on intuition. Study 2 (N=533) demonstrated that an intuition induction heightened men’s magical beliefs (vs. control group), but not women’s. In Study 3 (N=404), women—but not men—exhibited more suboptimal choices in a lottery task after imagining that a dream told them to do so. These studies suggest that reliance on intuition helps account for women’s higher magical beliefs.
Keywords: magical beliefsintuitiongender
Women Do Not Need to Have Children in Order to Be Fulfilled
Do Women Need to Have Children in Order to Be Fulfilled? A System Justification Account of the Motherhood Norm. Alexandra Suppes. Social Psychological and Personality Science, April 9, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550620909728
Abstract: There is a widely held folk belief that a woman needs to have children in order to live a fulfilled life. This article tests whether or not endorsing this folk belief—or the motherhood norm—has an impact on subjective well-being. With data from 49 countries, Study 1 shows that those who endorsed the motherhood norm experienced greater subjective well-being than those who did not, an effect that was especially true in countries with high gender inequality. Study 2 establishes that this norm exaggerates the impact of motherhood on subjective well-being. After accounting for the situation of women’s lives, motherhood status did not explain differences in self-reported life satisfaction, and mothers reported only slightly greater happiness than women who were not mothers. These findings support a series of preregistered hypotheses designed to test the palliative function of endorsing system-justifying norms, though these data may be consistent with other theories.
Keywords: system justification, subjective well-being, gender, motherhood
Abstract: There is a widely held folk belief that a woman needs to have children in order to live a fulfilled life. This article tests whether or not endorsing this folk belief—or the motherhood norm—has an impact on subjective well-being. With data from 49 countries, Study 1 shows that those who endorsed the motherhood norm experienced greater subjective well-being than those who did not, an effect that was especially true in countries with high gender inequality. Study 2 establishes that this norm exaggerates the impact of motherhood on subjective well-being. After accounting for the situation of women’s lives, motherhood status did not explain differences in self-reported life satisfaction, and mothers reported only slightly greater happiness than women who were not mothers. These findings support a series of preregistered hypotheses designed to test the palliative function of endorsing system-justifying norms, though these data may be consistent with other theories.
Keywords: system justification, subjective well-being, gender, motherhood
The conversations we seek to avoid: Commonly avoided topics include politics, money, sex, religion, work, relationships; motivations are privacy and conflict concerns
The conversations we seek to avoid. Katherine Qianwen Sun, Michael L.Slepian. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Volume 160, September 2020, Pages 87-105. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2020.03.002
Highlights
• People frequently seek to avoid certain conversation topics in daily life.
• Commonly avoided topics include politics, money, sex, religion, work, relationships.
• Two broad motivations underlie this avoidance: (1) privacy and (2) conflict concerns.
• Privacy motivations predicts inhibiting responses; conflict, activating responses.
• These pathways had implications for feelings of authenticity in the workplace.
Abstract: The current work presents the first inquiry into the conversations people seek to avoid. We introduce the Topic Avoidance Process Model, proposing two distinct processes when an interaction partner brings up a topic one wishes to avoid. When topic avoidance is motivated by concern for creating a conflict, one is more likely to leave the conversation, through increased activating emotions (e.g., annoyance). When motivated by concern for privacy, one is more likely to remain quiet, through increased inhibiting emotions (e.g., anxiety). In addition, these pathways predicted whom individuals focused on during the conversation (others vs. the self) as well as authenticity felt during conversations in the workplace. Three data-driven studies identified people’s experiences with unwanted conversation topics, yielding the present model, then supported by five studies (Ntotal = 3200) using multiple methods, including retrospective recall, live conversations, and studies online and in the field as well as text analysis and machine learning.
Check also: Shame, Guilt, and Secrets on the Mind. Michael L. Slepian, James N. Kirby, Elise K. Kalokerinos. Emotion, 20(2), 323–328. https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000542
abortion
ambition
belief/ideology
counternormative
emotional infidelity
extra-relational thoughts
habit/addiction
illegal
lie
marriage proposal
no sex
other woman/man
other-harm
poor work performance
pregnant
self-harm
sexual behavior
sexual infidelity
social discontent
surprise
drug use
employment
family detail
finances
hidden relationship
hobby
mental health
personal story
physical discontent
preference
romantic desire
romantic discontent
sexual orientation
theft
trauma
violate trust
work cheating
work discontent
Highlights
• People frequently seek to avoid certain conversation topics in daily life.
• Commonly avoided topics include politics, money, sex, religion, work, relationships.
• Two broad motivations underlie this avoidance: (1) privacy and (2) conflict concerns.
• Privacy motivations predicts inhibiting responses; conflict, activating responses.
• These pathways had implications for feelings of authenticity in the workplace.
Abstract: The current work presents the first inquiry into the conversations people seek to avoid. We introduce the Topic Avoidance Process Model, proposing two distinct processes when an interaction partner brings up a topic one wishes to avoid. When topic avoidance is motivated by concern for creating a conflict, one is more likely to leave the conversation, through increased activating emotions (e.g., annoyance). When motivated by concern for privacy, one is more likely to remain quiet, through increased inhibiting emotions (e.g., anxiety). In addition, these pathways predicted whom individuals focused on during the conversation (others vs. the self) as well as authenticity felt during conversations in the workplace. Three data-driven studies identified people’s experiences with unwanted conversation topics, yielding the present model, then supported by five studies (Ntotal = 3200) using multiple methods, including retrospective recall, live conversations, and studies online and in the field as well as text analysis and machine learning.
Check also: Shame, Guilt, and Secrets on the Mind. Michael L. Slepian, James N. Kirby, Elise K. Kalokerinos. Emotion, 20(2), 323–328. https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000542
Abstract: Recent work suggests that what is harmful about secrecy is not active concealment within social interactions but rather mind wandering to a secret outside of concealment contexts. However, it is not yet clear what predicts mind wandering to and concealing secrets. We proposed that emotional appraisals of shame and guilt for secrecy would predict how secrecy is experienced. Four studies with 1,000 participants keeping more than 6,000 secrets demonstrated that shame was linked with increased mind wandering to the secret. Guilt, in contrast, was linked with reduced mind wandering to the secret. The current work represents the first test of how emotions from secrecy determine how that secrecy is experienced.
Keywords: secrecy, mind wandering, concealment, shame and guilt, well-beingSome of the things we hide:
Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/emo0000542.supp
abortion
ambition
belief/ideology
counternormative
emotional infidelity
extra-relational thoughts
habit/addiction
illegal
lie
marriage proposal
no sex
other woman/man
other-harm
poor work performance
pregnant
self-harm
sexual behavior
sexual infidelity
social discontent
surprise
drug use
employment
family detail
finances
hidden relationship
hobby
mental health
personal story
physical discontent
preference
romantic desire
romantic discontent
sexual orientation
theft
trauma
violate trust
work cheating
work discontent
Do False Memories Look Real? Evidence That People Struggle to Identify Rich False Memories of Committing Crime and Other Emotional Events
Do False Memories Look Real? Evidence That People Struggle to Identify Rich False Memories of Committing Crime and Other Emotional Events. Julia Shaw. Front. Psychol., April 8 2020. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00650
Abstract: Two studies examined whether people could identify rich false memories. Each participant in both studies was presented with two videos, one of a person recalling a true emotional memory, and one of the same person recalling a false memory. These videos were filmed during a study which involved implanting rich false memories (Shaw and Porter, 2015). The false memories in the videos either involved committing a crime (assault, or assault with a weapon) or other highly emotional events (animal attack, or losing a large sum of money) during adolescence. In study 1, participants (n = 124) were no better than chance at accurately classifying false memories (61.29% accurate), or false memories of committing crime (53.33% accurate). In study 2, participants (n = 82) were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, where they only had access to the (i) audio account of the memory with no video, (ii) video account with no audio, or (iii) the full audio-visual accounts. False memories were classified correctly by 32.14% of the audio-only group, 45.45% of the video-only group, and 53.13% of the audio-visual group. This research provides evidence that naïve judges are not able to reliably identify false memories of emotional or criminal events, or differentiate true from false memories. These findings are likely to be of particular interest to those working in legal and criminal justice settings.
Can people tell whether a particular memory is true or false? In a review of the literature, researchers have pointed out that there are two ways of looking at this question – “focusing on the memories reported or the person reporting the memories” (Bernstein and Loftus, 2009, p. 370). Within this review, it was argued that there were no reliable neurophysiological, technological, or psychological ways to discern between true and false memories – and that telling the difference between true and false memories is one of the biggest challenges in memory research. However, this hasn’t stopped researchers from continuing to look for differences, with limited success.
Some researchers have argued that the phenomenology of false memories is different from true memories, advocating that participants are able to identify their own false memories if they focus on source monitoring decisions (where people think they know things from), confidence ratings, and explicit warnings about memory fallibility (Anastasi et al., 2000). Others have argued that providing questionnaires that help people systematically examine the characteristics of their memories can slightly improve false memory detection (Ost et al., 2002). Proponents of this phenomenological line of work broadly argue that true memories feel “richer” than false ones (Marche et al., 2010), and that false memories are “weaker” forms of true memories (Jou and Flores, 2013).
However, this seems an incomplete answer to the differences between true and false memories, as research also shows that the realism of false memories depends on the method through which they were generated (Jou and Flores, 2013). Most studies on false memories involve short timeframes, and false memories that are neither very complex, nor particularly emotional. Research has also focused almost entirely on assessments of one’s own false memory account, rather than assessments of someone else’s account. Research shows that the methodologies that use longer encoding periods, repetition, emotion, and a lot of detail and complexity create false memories that feel and look more real (Jou and Flores, 2013). Such methodology is typical of studies that try to implant rich false memories of autobiographical events, through a method called the familial informant false narrative paradigm (Loftus and Pickrell, 1995). This technique involves using a combination of trust, misinformation, imagination exercises, and repetition to convince participants that they experienced events that never happened. By using this technique, individuals have been shown to generate complex false memories of autobiographical events (Scoboria et al., 2017).
An autobiographical false memory is an incorrect recollection of part of an event, or an incorrect recollection of an entire event. The person recalling a false memory believes that they are accessing a real memory – it is not an attempt to lie (e.g., Loftus, 2005). Memories that have been implanted using the familial informant false narrative technique – and related techniques – include getting lost in a shopping mall (Loftus and Pickrell, 1995), spilling a punch bowl at a family wedding or being left in the car as a child and releasing the parking break so it rolled into something (Hyman et al., 1995). More serious false memories that have been implanted include being punched or punching someone else (Laney and Takarangi, 2013), or being the victim of an animal attack (Porter et al., 1999). Additionally, researchers have implanted a number of false memories of committing crime, including of assault, assault with a weapon, and theft (Shaw and Porter, 2015). Rich false memories of highly emotional or criminal events are of particular interest to applied psychologists, legal professionals, and law enforcement, as they can have catastrophic consequences. Because they can become distorted or fabricated evidence, such false memories can seriously threaten the integrity of a criminal investigation or legal case (e.g., Loftus, 2003).
Research on autobiographical false memories typically involves asking the participants themselves to rate the realism of their own (false) memories, and participants consistently report that such false memories feel incredibly real (e.g., Shaw and Porter, 2015; Scoboria et al., 2017). If autobiographical false memories feel largely the same as real memories, then they may also look like real memories to others. In perhaps the only study to directly examine this, participants were asked to watch videos of complex emotional true and false memories being recalled, to see if they could tell the difference (Campbell and Porter, 2002). Observers correctly identified 60% of false memories, and 53% of true memories – with 50% representing chance. This study was the inspiration for the present research. While there has been evidence to show that false memories of important emotional and criminal events can be created (e.g., Shaw and Porter, 2015; Scoboria et al., 2017), there has been little research investigating the ability of observers to distinguish between true and false memories, and no evidence on false memories of crime.
Two studies examined whether participants could correctly identify false memories. The three main hypotheses were (H1) people are no better than chance at identifying false memories, (H2) people are no better than chance at identifying false memories of criminal events, (H3) people are better at comparative judgments than absolute ones (once they know one of two memories is false, they can identify the “richer” memory). Study 2 adds an exploratory component to this, to examine whether it would make a difference if people could only see (video with no audio), hear (audio with no video), or see and hear (video with audio) the false memory accounts. This was examined for two reasons. First, it is possible that visual cues are distracting, so participants might be better able to identify false memories when they only have audio and can focus on content. Conversely, in Campbell and Porter (2002) memory classification accuracy was better for those who relied on non-verbal cues, so perhaps verbal or content cues are distracting, which could make it easier to identify false memories without sound. Additionally, evidence in legal cases is sometimes only available as audio recordings or as video footage with no sound, so examining this issue likely has practical applications. The present studies further our understanding of the realism of false memories, and whether false memories can be identified by observers.
Abstract: Two studies examined whether people could identify rich false memories. Each participant in both studies was presented with two videos, one of a person recalling a true emotional memory, and one of the same person recalling a false memory. These videos were filmed during a study which involved implanting rich false memories (Shaw and Porter, 2015). The false memories in the videos either involved committing a crime (assault, or assault with a weapon) or other highly emotional events (animal attack, or losing a large sum of money) during adolescence. In study 1, participants (n = 124) were no better than chance at accurately classifying false memories (61.29% accurate), or false memories of committing crime (53.33% accurate). In study 2, participants (n = 82) were randomly assigned to one of three conditions, where they only had access to the (i) audio account of the memory with no video, (ii) video account with no audio, or (iii) the full audio-visual accounts. False memories were classified correctly by 32.14% of the audio-only group, 45.45% of the video-only group, and 53.13% of the audio-visual group. This research provides evidence that naïve judges are not able to reliably identify false memories of emotional or criminal events, or differentiate true from false memories. These findings are likely to be of particular interest to those working in legal and criminal justice settings.
Can people tell whether a particular memory is true or false? In a review of the literature, researchers have pointed out that there are two ways of looking at this question – “focusing on the memories reported or the person reporting the memories” (Bernstein and Loftus, 2009, p. 370). Within this review, it was argued that there were no reliable neurophysiological, technological, or psychological ways to discern between true and false memories – and that telling the difference between true and false memories is one of the biggest challenges in memory research. However, this hasn’t stopped researchers from continuing to look for differences, with limited success.
Some researchers have argued that the phenomenology of false memories is different from true memories, advocating that participants are able to identify their own false memories if they focus on source monitoring decisions (where people think they know things from), confidence ratings, and explicit warnings about memory fallibility (Anastasi et al., 2000). Others have argued that providing questionnaires that help people systematically examine the characteristics of their memories can slightly improve false memory detection (Ost et al., 2002). Proponents of this phenomenological line of work broadly argue that true memories feel “richer” than false ones (Marche et al., 2010), and that false memories are “weaker” forms of true memories (Jou and Flores, 2013).
However, this seems an incomplete answer to the differences between true and false memories, as research also shows that the realism of false memories depends on the method through which they were generated (Jou and Flores, 2013). Most studies on false memories involve short timeframes, and false memories that are neither very complex, nor particularly emotional. Research has also focused almost entirely on assessments of one’s own false memory account, rather than assessments of someone else’s account. Research shows that the methodologies that use longer encoding periods, repetition, emotion, and a lot of detail and complexity create false memories that feel and look more real (Jou and Flores, 2013). Such methodology is typical of studies that try to implant rich false memories of autobiographical events, through a method called the familial informant false narrative paradigm (Loftus and Pickrell, 1995). This technique involves using a combination of trust, misinformation, imagination exercises, and repetition to convince participants that they experienced events that never happened. By using this technique, individuals have been shown to generate complex false memories of autobiographical events (Scoboria et al., 2017).
An autobiographical false memory is an incorrect recollection of part of an event, or an incorrect recollection of an entire event. The person recalling a false memory believes that they are accessing a real memory – it is not an attempt to lie (e.g., Loftus, 2005). Memories that have been implanted using the familial informant false narrative technique – and related techniques – include getting lost in a shopping mall (Loftus and Pickrell, 1995), spilling a punch bowl at a family wedding or being left in the car as a child and releasing the parking break so it rolled into something (Hyman et al., 1995). More serious false memories that have been implanted include being punched or punching someone else (Laney and Takarangi, 2013), or being the victim of an animal attack (Porter et al., 1999). Additionally, researchers have implanted a number of false memories of committing crime, including of assault, assault with a weapon, and theft (Shaw and Porter, 2015). Rich false memories of highly emotional or criminal events are of particular interest to applied psychologists, legal professionals, and law enforcement, as they can have catastrophic consequences. Because they can become distorted or fabricated evidence, such false memories can seriously threaten the integrity of a criminal investigation or legal case (e.g., Loftus, 2003).
Research on autobiographical false memories typically involves asking the participants themselves to rate the realism of their own (false) memories, and participants consistently report that such false memories feel incredibly real (e.g., Shaw and Porter, 2015; Scoboria et al., 2017). If autobiographical false memories feel largely the same as real memories, then they may also look like real memories to others. In perhaps the only study to directly examine this, participants were asked to watch videos of complex emotional true and false memories being recalled, to see if they could tell the difference (Campbell and Porter, 2002). Observers correctly identified 60% of false memories, and 53% of true memories – with 50% representing chance. This study was the inspiration for the present research. While there has been evidence to show that false memories of important emotional and criminal events can be created (e.g., Shaw and Porter, 2015; Scoboria et al., 2017), there has been little research investigating the ability of observers to distinguish between true and false memories, and no evidence on false memories of crime.
Two studies examined whether participants could correctly identify false memories. The three main hypotheses were (H1) people are no better than chance at identifying false memories, (H2) people are no better than chance at identifying false memories of criminal events, (H3) people are better at comparative judgments than absolute ones (once they know one of two memories is false, they can identify the “richer” memory). Study 2 adds an exploratory component to this, to examine whether it would make a difference if people could only see (video with no audio), hear (audio with no video), or see and hear (video with audio) the false memory accounts. This was examined for two reasons. First, it is possible that visual cues are distracting, so participants might be better able to identify false memories when they only have audio and can focus on content. Conversely, in Campbell and Porter (2002) memory classification accuracy was better for those who relied on non-verbal cues, so perhaps verbal or content cues are distracting, which could make it easier to identify false memories without sound. Additionally, evidence in legal cases is sometimes only available as audio recordings or as video footage with no sound, so examining this issue likely has practical applications. The present studies further our understanding of the realism of false memories, and whether false memories can be identified by observers.
Wednesday, April 8, 2020
Quality of service provision (effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, and absence of corruption) is correlated with happiness whereas kind of democracy and government spending is not
Happiness and the Quality of Government John F. Helliwell, Haifang Huang, Shun Wang. NBER Working Paper No. 26840, March 2020. https://www.nber.org/papers/w26840
Abstract: This chapter uses happiness data to assess the quality of government. Our happiness data are drawn from the Gallup World Poll, starting in 2005 and extending to 2017 or 2018. In our analysis of the panel of more than 150 countries and generally over 1,500 national-level observations, we show that government delivery quality is significantly correlated with national happiness, but democratic quality is not. We also analyze other quality of government indicators. Confidence in government is correlated with happiness, however forms of democracy and government spending seem not. We further discuss three channels (including peace and conflict, trust, and inequality) whereby quality of government and happiness are linked. We finally summarize what has been learned about how government policies could be formed to improve citizens’ happiness.
Abstract: This chapter uses happiness data to assess the quality of government. Our happiness data are drawn from the Gallup World Poll, starting in 2005 and extending to 2017 or 2018. In our analysis of the panel of more than 150 countries and generally over 1,500 national-level observations, we show that government delivery quality is significantly correlated with national happiness, but democratic quality is not. We also analyze other quality of government indicators. Confidence in government is correlated with happiness, however forms of democracy and government spending seem not. We further discuss three channels (including peace and conflict, trust, and inequality) whereby quality of government and happiness are linked. We finally summarize what has been learned about how government policies could be formed to improve citizens’ happiness.
Social network size is a negative predictor of incivility; Twitter users who have built larger networks and gained positive responses from others are less likely to use uncivil language
Effects of Social Grooming on Incivility in COVID-19. Bumsoo Kim. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, Apr 8 2020. https://doi.org/10.1089/cyber.2020.0201
Abstract: This study implements a computer-assisted content analysis to identify which social grooming factors reduce social media users' incivility when commenting or posting about the COVID-19 situation in South Korea. In addition, this study conducts semantic network analysis to interpret qualitatively how people express their thoughts. The findings suggest that social network size is a negative predictor of incivility. Moreover, Twitter users who have built larger networks and gained positive responses from others are less likely to use uncivil language. Lastly, linguistic choice among users is different depending on the size of their social network.
Abstract: This study implements a computer-assisted content analysis to identify which social grooming factors reduce social media users' incivility when commenting or posting about the COVID-19 situation in South Korea. In addition, this study conducts semantic network analysis to interpret qualitatively how people express their thoughts. The findings suggest that social network size is a negative predictor of incivility. Moreover, Twitter users who have built larger networks and gained positive responses from others are less likely to use uncivil language. Lastly, linguistic choice among users is different depending on the size of their social network.
Discussion
The findings of this study imply that social network size is a negative predictor of incivility. Twitter users with a larger network size tend to use fewer uncivil remarks when they have more positive responses from others. Distinctive linguistic differences were identified in the two network maps conditional upon network size: users with a smaller network size (below the mean score) tend to use uncivil words. These findings point out one specific conclusion: incivility is still observed on social media, but social grooming might be a good solution to reduce it. Given that prior studies reveal internal and contextual factors that generate incivility,5,11 the findings of this study are unique by highlighting that social network size can be an important predictor of social media users' language selection.
With respect to the role of social grooming, we need to ponder deeply the implicit meanings behind increased social network size, specifically the number of friends and number of followers. Compared to users who have larger networks, those with smaller social media networks have fewer opportunities to understand diverse viewpoints.11 Given that larger networks are positively related to rationality, tolerance, and knowledge,30 users with a smaller network size could react aggressively in response to contextual news topics and divergent opinions.6 In this sense, emotional, emphatic, and uncivil remarks were identified in the smaller network size map.
Another important point in the findings is that contextual factors such as authors, news topics, and news sources can be implicit indicators of using uncivil remarks among users.5 When Twitter users talk about COVID-19 issues, they use “Wuhan pneumonia,” despite the fact that the Korean government discouraged the use of this term due to discrimination issues. With respect to users' language choice, the contextual factors cannot be overridden. According to the literature on incivility, partisan media also use uncivil remarks about political issues/characters, especially in the context of political elections, which strongly encourages audiences to use uncivil language.11 Like contentious political contexts, COVID-19 is not just a health-related issue, it also generates numerous political conflicts. In particular, many non-legacy media outlets use the COVID-19 issue politically to emphasize a linguistic combination by using the specific location name with the disease together, which could generate individuals' antipathy toward the location.
In spite of the noteworthy findings, this study's focus on Twitter limits the generalizability of the findings to other social media platforms. In addition, even though valid bags of words were used in this study, nuanced uncivil sentences and connotative/metaphorical remarks are hard to capture. Lastly, given that many Tweets also contain visual images, it would also be worthwhile for future researchers to investigate visual sentiment analysis that often combines textual and visual information to predict what content most affects people's opinions through social media.
Based on the findings of this study, it is suggested that social grooming with wider and more diverse social networks is an important predictor of incivility reduction. Methodologically, a combination analysis of textual and visual information or other advanced analytics (e.g., visual sentiment analysis, popularity prediction, virality prediction) might be possible options for future studies. As communication spheres become complex, we must continue to keep tracking linguistic patterns and influential factors in terms of morality and civility.
We find that cognitive effort as measured by response times increases by 40% when payments are very high; performance, on the other hand, improves very mildly or not at all as incentives increase
Cognitive Biases: Mistakes or Missing Stakes? Benjamin Enke, Uri Gneezy, Brian Hall, David Martin, Vadim Nelidov, Theo Offerman, Jeroen van de Ven. CESifo working paper 8168/2020. March 2020. https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp8168.pdf
Abstract: Despite decades of research on heuristics and biases, empirical evidence on the effect of large incentives – as present in relevant economic decisions – on cognitive biases is scant. This paper tests the effect of incentives on four widely documented biases: base rate neglect, anchoring, failure of contingent thinking, and intuitive reasoning in the Cognitive Reflection Test. In preregistered laboratory experiments with 1,236 college students in Nairobi, we implement three incentive levels: no incentives, standard lab payments, and very high incentives that increase the stakes by a factor of 100 to more than a monthly income. We find that cognitive effort as measured by response times increases by 40% with very high stakes. Performance, on the other hand, improves very mildly or not at all as incentives increase, with the largest improvements due to a reduced reliance on intuitions. In none of the tasks are very high stakes sufficient to debias participants, or come even close to doing so. These results contrast with expert predictions that forecast larger performance improvements.
Keywords: cognitive biases, incentives
JEL-Codes: D010
Abstract: Despite decades of research on heuristics and biases, empirical evidence on the effect of large incentives – as present in relevant economic decisions – on cognitive biases is scant. This paper tests the effect of incentives on four widely documented biases: base rate neglect, anchoring, failure of contingent thinking, and intuitive reasoning in the Cognitive Reflection Test. In preregistered laboratory experiments with 1,236 college students in Nairobi, we implement three incentive levels: no incentives, standard lab payments, and very high incentives that increase the stakes by a factor of 100 to more than a monthly income. We find that cognitive effort as measured by response times increases by 40% with very high stakes. Performance, on the other hand, improves very mildly or not at all as incentives increase, with the largest improvements due to a reduced reliance on intuitions. In none of the tasks are very high stakes sufficient to debias participants, or come even close to doing so. These results contrast with expert predictions that forecast larger performance improvements.
Keywords: cognitive biases, incentives
JEL-Codes: D010
Tuesday, April 7, 2020
The increased facial attractiveness of women in the most fertile phase of the menstrual cycle is not driven by changes in facial shape; might instead stem from other changes like more attractive skin tone
Stability of women's facial shape throughout the menstrual cycle. U. M. Marcinkowska and I. J. Holzleitner. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, April 8 2020. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2019.2910
Abstract: Facial characteristics can serve as a cue for judgements of multiple human traits, from maternal tendencies, overall fertility to sexual openness. In this study, we tested previously found fluctuations in facial shape throughout the menstrual cycle. With methods more robust than those formerly used (larger sample size and detailed hormonal assessments determining the timing of the ovulation), we did not find significant changes in either of the three facial measurements conducted: symmetry, averageness and sexual dimorphism (all F ≤ 0.78, all partial η2 ≤ 0.01, all p ≥ 0.542). After narrowing the sample to cycles that had a higher probability of being ovulatory (based on daily measurements of luteinizing hormone and oestradiol), the results remained non-significant (all F ≤ 1.20, all partial η2 ≤ 0.03, all p ≥ 0.315). Our results (i) suggest that the previously found increased facial attractiveness of women in the most fertile phase of the menstrual cycle is not driven by changes in facial shape, but might instead stem from other changes in facial appearance, such as a more attractive skin tone; and (ii) underline the importance of replication of studies with new methods.
Abstract: Facial characteristics can serve as a cue for judgements of multiple human traits, from maternal tendencies, overall fertility to sexual openness. In this study, we tested previously found fluctuations in facial shape throughout the menstrual cycle. With methods more robust than those formerly used (larger sample size and detailed hormonal assessments determining the timing of the ovulation), we did not find significant changes in either of the three facial measurements conducted: symmetry, averageness and sexual dimorphism (all F ≤ 0.78, all partial η2 ≤ 0.01, all p ≥ 0.542). After narrowing the sample to cycles that had a higher probability of being ovulatory (based on daily measurements of luteinizing hormone and oestradiol), the results remained non-significant (all F ≤ 1.20, all partial η2 ≤ 0.03, all p ≥ 0.315). Our results (i) suggest that the previously found increased facial attractiveness of women in the most fertile phase of the menstrual cycle is not driven by changes in facial shape, but might instead stem from other changes in facial appearance, such as a more attractive skin tone; and (ii) underline the importance of replication of studies with new methods.
Women with smaller waists & lower waist-to-hip ratios were found most attractive; men with broader shoulders and higher shoulder-to-waist (or hips) ratios were more attractive; taller individuals were preferred by both
Preferences for Sexually Dimorphic Body Characteristics Revealed in a Large Sample of Speed Daters. Morgan J. Sidari et al. Social Psychological and Personality Science, April 7, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550619882925
Abstract: While hundreds of studies have investigated the indices that make up attractive body shapes, these studies were based on preferences measured in the laboratory using pictorial stimuli. Whether these preferences translate into real-time, face-to-face evaluations of potential partners is unclear. Here, 539 (275 female) participants in 75 laboratory-based sessions had their body dimensions measured before engaging in round-robin speed dates. After each date, they rated each other’s body, face, personality, and overall attractiveness and noted whether they would go on a date with the partner. Women with smaller waists and lower waist-to-hip ratios were found most attractive, and men with broader shoulders and higher shoulder-to-waist (or hips) ratios were found most attractive. Taller individuals were preferred by both sexes. Our results show that body dimensions associated with greater health, reproductive value (in women), and formidability (in men) influence face-to-face evaluations of attractiveness, consistent with a role of intersexual selection in shaping human bodies.
Keywords: body shape, intersexual selection, mate preferences, speed-dating, physical attractiveness
Abstract: While hundreds of studies have investigated the indices that make up attractive body shapes, these studies were based on preferences measured in the laboratory using pictorial stimuli. Whether these preferences translate into real-time, face-to-face evaluations of potential partners is unclear. Here, 539 (275 female) participants in 75 laboratory-based sessions had their body dimensions measured before engaging in round-robin speed dates. After each date, they rated each other’s body, face, personality, and overall attractiveness and noted whether they would go on a date with the partner. Women with smaller waists and lower waist-to-hip ratios were found most attractive, and men with broader shoulders and higher shoulder-to-waist (or hips) ratios were found most attractive. Taller individuals were preferred by both sexes. Our results show that body dimensions associated with greater health, reproductive value (in women), and formidability (in men) influence face-to-face evaluations of attractiveness, consistent with a role of intersexual selection in shaping human bodies.
Keywords: body shape, intersexual selection, mate preferences, speed-dating, physical attractiveness
People systematically judged slower responses as less sincere for a range of scenarios; response delays are perceived to be the result of the responder suppressing automatic, truthful thoughts
Ziano, Ignazio, and Deming Wang. 2019. “Slow Lies: Response Delays Promote Perceptions of Insincerity.” PsyArXiv. May 22. doi:10.31234/osf.io/t56av
Abstract: Evaluating other people’s sincerity is a ubiquitous and important part of social interactions. Ten experiments (total N = 6381) show that response speed is an important cue on which people base their sincerity inferences. Specifically, people systematically judged slower (vs. faster) responses as less sincere for a range of scenarios from trivial daily conversations to high stakes situations such as police interrogation. Our findings suggest that this is because response delays are perceived to be the result of the responder suppressing automatic, truthful thoughts. People seem to have a rich lay theory of response speed, which takes into account a variety of situational factors. For instance, the effect of response speed on perceived sincerity is smaller if the response is socially undesirable, or if it can be attributed to memory effort. Finally, we showed that people are only partially able to disregard response speed in making sincerity inferences.
Abstract: Evaluating other people’s sincerity is a ubiquitous and important part of social interactions. Ten experiments (total N = 6381) show that response speed is an important cue on which people base their sincerity inferences. Specifically, people systematically judged slower (vs. faster) responses as less sincere for a range of scenarios from trivial daily conversations to high stakes situations such as police interrogation. Our findings suggest that this is because response delays are perceived to be the result of the responder suppressing automatic, truthful thoughts. People seem to have a rich lay theory of response speed, which takes into account a variety of situational factors. For instance, the effect of response speed on perceived sincerity is smaller if the response is socially undesirable, or if it can be attributed to memory effort. Finally, we showed that people are only partially able to disregard response speed in making sincerity inferences.
The morbidly curious reported increased interest in pandemic/virus/horror/thriller genres; it may reflect an adaptive predisposition toward learning about the dangerous & disgusting aspects of a threat
Scrivner, Coltan. 2020. “An Infectious Curiosity.” PsyArXiv. April 8. doi:10.31234/osf.io/7sfty
Abstract: In this study conducted during the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic, I explored how trait morbid curiosity was related to interest in 1) factual information about Coronavirus that was specifically morbid, 2) general factual information about Coronavirus, 3) pandemic and virus genres of films and TV shows, and 4) genres of film and TV shows that center around threat more broadly. Participants (n = 125) who scored high in morbid curiosity reported increased interest, compared to usual, in pandemic/virus genres as well as horror and thriller genres. Morbidly curious participants were also more interested specifically in morbid information about Coronavirus. Furthermore, disgust sensitivity was unrelated to these preferences. These results provide initial evidence that trait morbid curiosity can predict particular media preferences in the face of a real threat, and that morbid curiosity may reflect an adaptive predisposition in some individuals toward learning about the dangerous and disgusting aspects of a threat.
Abstract: In this study conducted during the 2020 Coronavirus pandemic, I explored how trait morbid curiosity was related to interest in 1) factual information about Coronavirus that was specifically morbid, 2) general factual information about Coronavirus, 3) pandemic and virus genres of films and TV shows, and 4) genres of film and TV shows that center around threat more broadly. Participants (n = 125) who scored high in morbid curiosity reported increased interest, compared to usual, in pandemic/virus genres as well as horror and thriller genres. Morbidly curious participants were also more interested specifically in morbid information about Coronavirus. Furthermore, disgust sensitivity was unrelated to these preferences. These results provide initial evidence that trait morbid curiosity can predict particular media preferences in the face of a real threat, and that morbid curiosity may reflect an adaptive predisposition in some individuals toward learning about the dangerous and disgusting aspects of a threat.
Consumers: Being observed prior to reaching the decision threatens consumers’ sense of autonomy in making the decision, resulting in an aversion to being observed
On My Own: The Aversion to Being Observed During the Preference-Construction Stage. Yonat Zwebner, Rom Y Schrift. Journal of Consumer Research, ucaa016, Apr 3 2020, https://doi.org/10.1093/jcr/ucaa016
Abstract: Previous research in consumer behavior and decision making has explored many important aspects of social observation. However, the effect of social observation during the specific time wherein consumers construct their preferences remains relatively understudied. The present work seeks to fill this knowledge gap and add to this literature by studying how consumers react to being observed during the preference-construction stage (i.e., prior to reaching their decision). While existing research on social observation focuses on accountability and self-presentation concerns, the current paper uncovers an additional unique concern. Specifically, eight studies (three additional studies reported in the Web Appendix) find that being observed prior to reaching the decision threatens consumers’ sense of autonomy in making the decision, resulting in an aversion to being observed. Further, we find that such threats lead consumers to terminate their decision by avoiding purchase or by choosing default options. Given the extent to which consumers are observed in the marketplace by other individuals and by online platforms, and given the rise in consumers’ privacy concerns associated with such practices, understanding consumer reactions to being observed in the pre-decisional stage is an important topic with practical implications.
Keywords: constructed preferences, privacy concerns, sense of autonomy, social influence, online tracking
Abstract: Previous research in consumer behavior and decision making has explored many important aspects of social observation. However, the effect of social observation during the specific time wherein consumers construct their preferences remains relatively understudied. The present work seeks to fill this knowledge gap and add to this literature by studying how consumers react to being observed during the preference-construction stage (i.e., prior to reaching their decision). While existing research on social observation focuses on accountability and self-presentation concerns, the current paper uncovers an additional unique concern. Specifically, eight studies (three additional studies reported in the Web Appendix) find that being observed prior to reaching the decision threatens consumers’ sense of autonomy in making the decision, resulting in an aversion to being observed. Further, we find that such threats lead consumers to terminate their decision by avoiding purchase or by choosing default options. Given the extent to which consumers are observed in the marketplace by other individuals and by online platforms, and given the rise in consumers’ privacy concerns associated with such practices, understanding consumer reactions to being observed in the pre-decisional stage is an important topic with practical implications.
Keywords: constructed preferences, privacy concerns, sense of autonomy, social influence, online tracking
Cross-national data: Consistent, substantial, and replicable connection between deep-seated pathogen avoidance motivations and socially conservative party preferences
The behavioral immune system shapes partisan preferences in modern democracies: Disgust sensitivity predicts voting for socially conservative parties. Lene Aarøe, Michael Bang Petersen, Kevin Arceneaux. Accepted for publication in Political Psychology, Mar 2020. https://pure.au.dk/portal/files/183368519/Aar_e_Petersen_Arceneaux_accepted_manuscript_merged.pdf
Abstract: While there is growing interest in the relationship between pathogen avoidance motivations and partisanship, the extant findings remain contradictory and suffer from a number of methodological limitations related to measurement and internal and external validity. We address these limitations and marshal the most complete test to date of the relationship between the behavioral immune system and partisanship, as indexed by which party people identify with and vote for. Using a unique research design, including multiple well-powered, nationally representative samples from the United States and Denmark collected in election and nonelection contexts, our study is the first to establish in cross-national data a consistent, substantial, and replicable connection between deep-seated pathogen avoidance motivations and socially conservative party preferences across multiple validated measures of individual differences in disgust sensitivity, and using large representative samples. We explore the relative contribution of the pathogen avoidance model and sexual strategies for accounting for this relationship.
Abstract: While there is growing interest in the relationship between pathogen avoidance motivations and partisanship, the extant findings remain contradictory and suffer from a number of methodological limitations related to measurement and internal and external validity. We address these limitations and marshal the most complete test to date of the relationship between the behavioral immune system and partisanship, as indexed by which party people identify with and vote for. Using a unique research design, including multiple well-powered, nationally representative samples from the United States and Denmark collected in election and nonelection contexts, our study is the first to establish in cross-national data a consistent, substantial, and replicable connection between deep-seated pathogen avoidance motivations and socially conservative party preferences across multiple validated measures of individual differences in disgust sensitivity, and using large representative samples. We explore the relative contribution of the pathogen avoidance model and sexual strategies for accounting for this relationship.
The Great Depression: Over the long run, firms in more affected areas compensate for the decline in entrepreneurial innovation and produce patents with greater impact
Babina, Tania and Bernstein, Asaf and Mezzanotti, Filippo, Crisis Innovation (April 2, 2020). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3567425
Abstract: The effect of financial crises on innovative activity is an unsettled and important question for economic growth, but one difficult to answer with modern data. Using a differences-in-differences design surrounding the Great Depression, we are able to obtain plausible variation in local shocks to innovative ecosystems and examine the long-run impact of their inventions. We document a sudden and persistent decline in patenting by the largest organizational form of innovation at this time—independent inventors. Parallel trends prior to the shock, evidence of a drop within every major technology class, and consistent results using distress driven by commodity shocks all suggest a causal effect of local distress. Despite this negative effect, our evidence shows that innovation during crises can be more resilient than it may appear at a first glance. First, the average quality of surviving patents rises so much that there is no observable change in the aggregate future citations of these patents, in spite of the decline in the quantity of patents. Second, the shock is in part absorbed through a reallocation of inventors into established firms, which overall were less affected by the shock. Over the long run, firms in more affected areas compensate for the decline in entrepreneurial innovation and produce patents with greater impact. Third, the results reveal no significant brain drain of inventors from the affected areas. Overall, our findings suggest that financial crises are both destructive and creative forces for innovation, and we provide the first systematic evidence of the role that distress from the Great Depression played in the long-run innovative activity and the organization of innovation in the U.S. economy.
Abstract: The effect of financial crises on innovative activity is an unsettled and important question for economic growth, but one difficult to answer with modern data. Using a differences-in-differences design surrounding the Great Depression, we are able to obtain plausible variation in local shocks to innovative ecosystems and examine the long-run impact of their inventions. We document a sudden and persistent decline in patenting by the largest organizational form of innovation at this time—independent inventors. Parallel trends prior to the shock, evidence of a drop within every major technology class, and consistent results using distress driven by commodity shocks all suggest a causal effect of local distress. Despite this negative effect, our evidence shows that innovation during crises can be more resilient than it may appear at a first glance. First, the average quality of surviving patents rises so much that there is no observable change in the aggregate future citations of these patents, in spite of the decline in the quantity of patents. Second, the shock is in part absorbed through a reallocation of inventors into established firms, which overall were less affected by the shock. Over the long run, firms in more affected areas compensate for the decline in entrepreneurial innovation and produce patents with greater impact. Third, the results reveal no significant brain drain of inventors from the affected areas. Overall, our findings suggest that financial crises are both destructive and creative forces for innovation, and we provide the first systematic evidence of the role that distress from the Great Depression played in the long-run innovative activity and the organization of innovation in the U.S. economy.
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