Abstract: The current study had two aims. First, we tested three norm-based interventions to increase social distancing practices. Second, we examined five potential concerns related to COVID-19 infection as prospective predictors of social distancing practices over the next two weeks.
Thursday, May 14, 2020
We examined five potential concerns related to COVID-19 infection as prospective predictors of social distacing practices over the next two weeks.
Leary, Angelina, Robert Dvorak, Ardhys De Leon, Roselyn Peterson, and Wendy Troop-Gordon. 2020. “COVID-19 Social Distancing.” PsyArXiv. May 13. osf.io/mszw2
Abstract: The current study had two aims. First, we tested three norm-based interventions to increase social distancing practices. Second, we examined five potential concerns related to COVID-19 infection as prospective predictors of social distancing practices over the next two weeks.
Abstract: The current study had two aims. First, we tested three norm-based interventions to increase social distancing practices. Second, we examined five potential concerns related to COVID-19 infection as prospective predictors of social distancing practices over the next two weeks.
Wednesday, May 13, 2020
Does a split-brain harbor a split consciousness or is consciousness unified? The current consensus is that the body of evidence is insufficient to answer this question, maybe the answer is not a simple yes or no
Split-Brain: What We Know Now and Why This is Important for Understanding Consciousness. Edward H. F. de Haan, Paul M. Corballis, Steven A. Hillyard, Carlo A. Marzi, Anil Seth, Victor A. F. Lamme, Lukas Volz, Mara Fabri, Elizabeth Schechter, Tim Bayne, Michael Corballis & Yair Pinto. Neuropsychology Review, May 12 2020. https://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11065-020-09439-3
Abstract: Recently, the discussion regarding the consequences of cutting the corpus callosum (“split-brain”) has regained momentum (Corballis, Corballis, Berlucchi, & Marzi, Brain, 141(6), e46, 2018; Pinto et al., Brain, 140(5), 1231–1237, 2017a; Pinto, Lamme, & de Haan, Brain, 140(11), e68, 2017; Volz & Gazzaniga, Brain, 140(7), 2051–2060, 2017; Volz, Hillyard, Miller, & Gazzaniga, Brain, 141(3), e15, 2018). This collective review paper aims to summarize the empirical common ground, to delineate the different interpretations, and to identify the remaining questions. In short, callosotomy leads to a broad breakdown of functional integration ranging from perception to attention. However, the breakdown is not absolute as several processes, such as action control, seem to remain unified. Disagreement exists about the responsible mechanisms for this remaining unity. The main issue concerns the first-person perspective of a split-brain patient. Does a split-brain harbor a split consciousness or is consciousness unified? The current consensus is that the body of evidence is insufficient to answer this question, and different suggestions are made with respect to how future studies might address this paucity. In addition, it is suggested that the answers might not be a simple yes or no but that intermediate conceptualizations need to be considered.
[...]
Thus, it seems that in split-brain patients perceptual processing is largely split, yet response selection and action control appear to be unified under certain conditions. This, by itself, does not prove whether a split-brain houses one or two conscious agents. One explanation could be that the split-brain houses two agents, each having their own experiences, who synchronize their behavioral output through various means. Another possible explanation is that a split-brain houses one agent who experiences an unintegrated stream of information who controls the entire body, comparable to watching a movie where sight and sound are out-of-sync. At any rate, these findings challenge the previously mentioned classic split-brain description, which is still found in reviews and text books (Gray, 2002; Wolman, 2012). In this classic characterization the patient indicates that they saw nothing when a stimulus appeared in the left visual field. Yet, to their own verbal surprise, the left hand correctly draws the stimulus. The aforementioned examples of unity in action control suggests that these effects may depend on the type and complexity of the response that is required.
Abstract: Recently, the discussion regarding the consequences of cutting the corpus callosum (“split-brain”) has regained momentum (Corballis, Corballis, Berlucchi, & Marzi, Brain, 141(6), e46, 2018; Pinto et al., Brain, 140(5), 1231–1237, 2017a; Pinto, Lamme, & de Haan, Brain, 140(11), e68, 2017; Volz & Gazzaniga, Brain, 140(7), 2051–2060, 2017; Volz, Hillyard, Miller, & Gazzaniga, Brain, 141(3), e15, 2018). This collective review paper aims to summarize the empirical common ground, to delineate the different interpretations, and to identify the remaining questions. In short, callosotomy leads to a broad breakdown of functional integration ranging from perception to attention. However, the breakdown is not absolute as several processes, such as action control, seem to remain unified. Disagreement exists about the responsible mechanisms for this remaining unity. The main issue concerns the first-person perspective of a split-brain patient. Does a split-brain harbor a split consciousness or is consciousness unified? The current consensus is that the body of evidence is insufficient to answer this question, and different suggestions are made with respect to how future studies might address this paucity. In addition, it is suggested that the answers might not be a simple yes or no but that intermediate conceptualizations need to be considered.
[...]
Thus, it seems that in split-brain patients perceptual processing is largely split, yet response selection and action control appear to be unified under certain conditions. This, by itself, does not prove whether a split-brain houses one or two conscious agents. One explanation could be that the split-brain houses two agents, each having their own experiences, who synchronize their behavioral output through various means. Another possible explanation is that a split-brain houses one agent who experiences an unintegrated stream of information who controls the entire body, comparable to watching a movie where sight and sound are out-of-sync. At any rate, these findings challenge the previously mentioned classic split-brain description, which is still found in reviews and text books (Gray, 2002; Wolman, 2012). In this classic characterization the patient indicates that they saw nothing when a stimulus appeared in the left visual field. Yet, to their own verbal surprise, the left hand correctly draws the stimulus. The aforementioned examples of unity in action control suggests that these effects may depend on the type and complexity of the response that is required.
Interpretations
There are three, not-mutually exclusive, hypotheses concerning the mechanisms involved in, seemingly, preserved unity in the split-brain. The first notion is that information is transferred subcortically. The second idea is that ipsilateral motor control underlies unity in action control. The third idea claims that information transfer is based on varies forms of inter-hemispheric collaboration, including subtle behavioral cues. The first proposal (Corballis Corballis, Berlucchi, & Marzi, 2018; de Haan et al., 2019; Pinto, Lamme, & de Haan, 2017b; Pinto et al., 2017a; Savazzi et al., 2007; Mancuso, Uddin, Nani, Costa, & Cauda, 2019) suggests that the multitude of subcortical connections that are spared during surgery are responsible for the transfer of information. As was initially pointed out by Trevarthen (1968) and Trevarthen and Sperry (1973) and recently stressed by Pinto, de Haan, and Lamme (2017a) and Corballis et al. (2018), there are many commissures (white matter tracts that connect homologous structures on both sides of the central nervous system) and decussations (bundles that connect different structures on both sides) that link nuclei that are known to be involved in perceptual processing. The importance of these commisural connections for transferring visual information in split-brain patients has been highlighted by Trevarthen and Sperry (1973). Moreover, the role of these connections in a split-brain has recently been demonstrated by bilateral fMRI activations in the first somatosensory cortex, after unilateral stimulation of trunk midline touch receptors (Fabri et al., 2006) and in the second somatic sensory area after unilateral stimulation of hand pain receptors (Fabri, Polonara, Quattrini, & Salvolini, 2002). Uddin and colleagues used low-frequency BOLD fMRI resting state imaging to investigate functional connectivity between the two hemispheres in a patient in whom all major cerebral commissures had been cut (Uddin et al., 2008). Compared to control subjects, the patient’s interhemispheric correlation scores fell within the normal range for at least two symmetrical regions. In addition, Nomi and colleagues suggested that split-brain patients might rely particularly on dorsal and ventral pontine decussations of the cortico-cerebellar interhemispheric pathways as evidenced by increased fractional anisotropy (FA) on diffusion weighted imaging (Nomi, Marshall, Zaidel, Biswal, Castellanos, Dick, Uddin & Mooshagian, 2019). Interhemispheric exchange of information also seems to occur in the domain of taste sensitivity, activation of primary gustatory cortex in the fronto-parietal operculum was reported in both hemispheres after unilateral gustatory stimulation of the tongue receptors (Mascioli, Berlucchi, Pierpaoli, Salvolini, Barbaresi, Fabri, & Polonara, 2015). Note that patients may differ with respect to how many of these connections have been cut, and this might also explain some of the individual variance among patients. Moreover, in all patients subcortical structures remain intact. For instance, the superior colliculus is known to integrate visual information from both hemispheres and project information to both hemispheres (Meredith & Stein, 1986; Comoli et al., 2003). Such structures may support attentional networks, and may enable the right hemisphere to attend to the entire visual field. In turn, attentional unity could help in unifying cognitive and motor control, which may subserve ipsilateral motor control.
The second point concerns the ipsilateral innervation of the arms. Manual action is not strictly lateralized, and the proximal (but not the distal) parts of the arm are controlled bilaterally, although the ipsilateral contribution remains undetermined. This could explain why split-brain patients may respond equally well with both hands in certain experimental conditions (Corballis, 1995; Gazzaniga, Bogen, & Sperry, 1967; Pinto, de Haan, & Lamme, 2017a). First, there is substantial evidence that bilateral cortical activations can be observed during unilateral limb movements in healthy subjects. In addition, ipsilesional motor problems in arm control have been observed in patients with unilateral cortical injuries, and finally there is evidence from electrocorticography with implanted electrodes for localization of epileptic foci showing similar spatial and spectral encoding of contralateral and ipsilateral limb kinematics (Bundy, Szrama, Pahwa, & Leuthardt, 2018). While these observations argue convincingly for a role in action control by the ipsilateral hemisphere, they do not prove that a hemisphere on it’s own can purposefully control the movements of the ipsilateral hand. Thus, the role of ipsilateral arm-hand control in explaining split-brain findings is currently not settled.
The third hypothesis argues that in addition to whatever direct neural communication may exist between the hemispheres, they may inform one another via strategic cross-cueing processes (Volz & Gazzaniga, 2017; Volz et al., 2018). The split-brain patients underwent surgery many years prior to testing, and the separated perceptual systems have had ample time to learn how to compensate for the lack of commissural connections. For example, subtle cues may be given by minimal movements of the eyes or facial muscles, which might not even be visible to an external observer but are capable of encoding, for example, the location of a stimulus for the hemisphere that did not “see” it. A cross-cueing mechanism might also allow one hemisphere to convey to the other which one of a limited set of known items had been shown (Gazzaniga & Hillyard, 1971; Gazzaniga, 2013).
Finally, it is possible to entertain combinations of the different explanations. For instance, it is conceivable that in the subacute phase following split-brain surgery the hemispheres are ineffective in communicating with each other. During this initial phase, phenomena such as an “alien hand” - that is a hand moving outside conscious control of the (verbal) person - may be present. In the ensuing period, the patients may have learned to utilize the information that is exchanged via subcortical connections, ipsilateral motor control or cross-cueing to coordinate the processing of the two hemispheres. In such a way, the patient may counteract some of the effects of losing the corpus callosum.
What do We Need to Know?
This paper aims to contribute to the agenda for the next decade of split-brain research. Full split-brain surgery is rare these days, and it is important that we try to answer the central questions while these patients are still available for study. In order to examine the variations between patients it would be useful to test as many of the available patients as possible with the same tests.
One important goal is to map out precisely how much functionality and information is still integrated across hemispheres in the split-brain, and what the underlying principles are. For instance, in some cases the two hemispheres seem to carry out sensory-motor tasks, such as visual search, independently from one another (Arguin et al., 2000; Franz, Eliassen, Ivry, & Gazzaniga, 1996; Hazeltine, Weinstein, & Ivry, 2008; Luck, Hillyard, Mangun, & Gazzaniga, 1994; Luck et al., 1989), while in other cases functions such as attentional blink, or attentional cueing, seem to be integrated across hemispheres (Giesbrecht & Kingstone, 2004; Holtzman, Volpe, & Gazzaniga, 1984; Holtzman, Sidtis, Volpe, Wilson, & Gazzaniga, 1981; Pashler et al., 1994; Ptito, Brisson, Dell’Acqua, Lassonde, & Jolicœur, 2009). An important challenge is to unveil why some cognitive functions can be carried out independently in the separated hemispheres while other functions engage both hemispheres. Furthermore, it is now clear that accurate detection and localization is possible across the whole visual field, and there is some evidence that even more information concerning visual images can be transferred between hemispheres. Although we have some understanding of what types of information can be transferred in the visual domain, our knowledge base in the somatosensory domain is much more limited. This is probably due to a bias throughout cognitive neuroscience and psychology, leading to a strong focus on vision in split-brain research. It is important to collect converging evidence by investigating the somatosensory system which is also strongly lateralized. Note that in somatosensory processing transfer between hemispheres (about 80% correct for the bimanual conditions) has been observed for basic same-different matching of real objects (Fabri, Del Pesce et al., 2005).
Another important goal is to obtain a more detailed description of the perceptual, cognitive and linguistic capabilities of the disconnected right hemisphere. For understanding unity of mind, two capabilities specifically are crucial. First, experiments investigating aspects of the conscious mind often go beyond simple visual processing, and future studies will thus critically depend on testing high-level cognitive abilities of both hemispheres. Specifically, language abilities, crucial for understanding questions and instructions, will likely play a pivotal role. Thus, the first question is to what extent the right hemisphere is capable of language processing. Note that complicated instructions (Gazzaniga, Smylie, Baynes, Hirst, & McCleary, 1984; Pinto et al., 2017a; Zaidel, 1983), for instance relating to mental imagery (Johnson, Corballis, & Gazzaniga, 2001; Kosslyn, Holtzman, Farah, & Gazzaniga, 1985; Sergent & Corballis, 1990), seem to be well within the reach of the right hemisphere. Moreover, right hemisphere language capabilities seem to improve over time (Gazzaniga, Volpe, Smylie, Wilson, & LeDoux, 1979; Gazzaniga et al., 1996). Longitudinal language tests (for instance with a Token test: De Renzi & Vignolo, 1962) would further illuminate the extent of right hemisphere language processing.
Second, unveiling to what extent each hemisphere is capable of subserving consciousness at all seems relevant for unity of mind as well. If the disconnected right hemisphere can produce full-blown consciousness, then questions regarding unity of mind are clearly more pertinent then if the right hemisphere only produces minimal amounts of consciousness. Right hemisphere consciousness can be studied through novel neural paradigms (Bekinschtein et al., 2009; Casali et al., 2013; Pitts, Metzler, & Hillyard, 2014; Shafto & Pitts, 2015). For instance, Bekinschtein et al. employed EEG to measure if the brain detected irregularities (as indicated by an event-related potential [ERP] signal called the P3) in different states of consciousness. They found that when consciousness was reduced, local irregularities were still detected - for instance after three high auditory tones a low tone evoked a P3. However, global irregularities - several times a low tone followed three high tones, then on the critical trial three high tones were followed by another high tone - did not evoke a P3 when consciousness was reduced. Crucially, when consciousness was unimpaired both local and global irregularities evoked a P3 response. Right hemisphere consciousness may also be studied in other patient groups where interhemispheric communication is hampered. One particularly interesting group are post-hemispherotomy patients (Lew, 2014). These patients have been surgically treated to disconnect an entire hemisphere (usually for intractable epilepsy), but unlike hemispherectomy patients the disconnected hemisphere remains in place in the cranium and remains vascularized.
Clearly, the central question, whether each hemisphere supports an independent conscious agent, is not settled yet. Novel paradigms in this respect could lead to progress. For instance, a pivotal question is whether each hemisphere makes its own decisions independent of the other hemisphere. If each hemisphere produces its own autonomous conscious agent then this should be the case. That is, if two agents are asked to freely choose a random number, then the odds that they consistently pick the same number are small. And vice versa, if each hemisphere makes its own conscious decisions, independent of the other hemisphere, then this seems to rule out unity of mind. Note that each hemisphere making its own decisions is different from information processing occurring independently per hemisphere. Unconscious information processing is almost certainly split across hemispheres in a split-brain. However, this does not prove that consciousness is split or unified. Even in a healthy brain, where consciousness is unified, many unconscious processes run independently, and in parallel.
One way to tackle the central question is by having the hemispheres respond to questions in parallel. Overt behavior most likely does not allow for this, due to bilateral motor control processes sketched earlier. However, perhaps parallel responding is possible if the hemispheres produce covert responses. For instance, the patient could be asked to pick one of four options and indicate their choice by carrying out certain content-specific mental imagery tasks. This imagery can then be decoded in parallel from each hemisphere using neuroimaging techniques (see Owen et al., 2006 for a similar approach with vegetative state patients). If each hemisphere harbors an autonomous conscious agent, then it is highly unlikely that the two hemispheres will consistently make the same choices. Thus, if the choices are uncorrelated across hemispheres, then this may critically challenge the unified mind view.
Another way to tackle the question of unified consciousness in the split-brain is to employ ERPs as markers of concurrent conscious processing in the left and right hemispheres. For instance, in one study (Kutas, Hillyard, Volpe, & Gazzaniga, 1990) visual targets were presented either separately to the left or right visual field or to both visual fields simultaneously. It was found that the P300 - a signal possibly reflecting conscious processing of a visual target (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Dehaene, Charles, King, & Marti, 2014; Salti, Bar-Haim, & Lamy, 2012) - was reduced for bilateral targets. This suggests some type of integration of conscious processing. Studies employing ERPs may indicate whether conscious processing is unified, while unconscious processing is split, which would be suggestive of unified consciousness.
Ambiguous statistical language was rated as of higher quality, allowing to communicate causal interpretations to readers without being punished for violating the norm against straightforward causal language
Alvarez-Vargas, Daniela, David W. Braithwaite, Hugues Lortie-Forgues, Melody M. Moore, Mayan Castro, Sirui Wan, Elizabeth A. Martin, et al. 2020. “Hedges, Mottes, and Baileys: Causally Ambiguous Statistical Language Can Increase Perceived Study Quality and Policy Relevance.” PsyArXiv. May 12. doi:10.31234/osf.io/nkf9
Abstract: There is a norm in psychological research to use causally ambiguous statistical language, rather than straightforward causal language, when describing methods and results of nonexperimental studies. We hypothesized that this norm leads to higher ratings of study quality and greater acceptance of policy recommendations that rely on causal interpretations of the results. In a preregistered experiment, we presented psychology faculty, postdocs, and doctoral students (n=142) with abstracts from hypothetical studies. Abstracts described studies’ results using either straightforward causal or causally ambiguous statistical language, but all concluded with policy recommendations relying on causal interpretations of the results. As hypothesized, participants rated studies with causally ambiguous statistical language as of higher quality (by .48-.59 SD) and as similarly or more supportive (by .16-.26 SD) of policy recommendations. Thus, causally ambiguous statistical language may allow psychologists to communicate causal interpretations to readers without being punished for violating the norm against straightforward causal language.
Abstract: There is a norm in psychological research to use causally ambiguous statistical language, rather than straightforward causal language, when describing methods and results of nonexperimental studies. We hypothesized that this norm leads to higher ratings of study quality and greater acceptance of policy recommendations that rely on causal interpretations of the results. In a preregistered experiment, we presented psychology faculty, postdocs, and doctoral students (n=142) with abstracts from hypothetical studies. Abstracts described studies’ results using either straightforward causal or causally ambiguous statistical language, but all concluded with policy recommendations relying on causal interpretations of the results. As hypothesized, participants rated studies with causally ambiguous statistical language as of higher quality (by .48-.59 SD) and as similarly or more supportive (by .16-.26 SD) of policy recommendations. Thus, causally ambiguous statistical language may allow psychologists to communicate causal interpretations to readers without being punished for violating the norm against straightforward causal language.
Statements about white privilege decrease support for the candidate, with an effect size that is about equal to a one standard deviation shift to the right in ideology; reparations & affirmative action has a smaller effect
Hanania, Richard, George Hawley, and Eric Kaufmann. 2020. “Losing Elections, Winning the Debate: Progressive Racial Rhetoric and White Backlash.” PsyArXiv. May 12. doi:10.31234/osf.io/uzkvf
Abstract: Recent years have seen liberals moving sharply to the left on issues related to race and gender, the so-called “Great Awokening,” accompanied by commentary arguing that this has led to a popular backlash against the left. Through a preregistered survey, this study polls a representative sample of white Americans to test the effect of a Democratic candidate, Kirsten Gillibrand, arguing for programs designed to help blacks and declaring the significance of white privilege in American life. Our results show that statements about white privilege decrease support for the candidate, with an effect size that is about equal to a one standard deviation shift to the right in ideology. The effect is concentrated among moderates and conservatives. Advocating reparations and affirmative action has a similar but smaller effect. At the same time, arguing for reparations actually increases support for such policies, and discussing white privilege may decrease some aspects of white identity among conservatives. The results indicate that taking more liberal positions on race causes white voters to punish a Democratic candidate. However, there is no evidence for the hypothesis that white Americans move to the right in response to such rhetoric or develop stronger feelings of white identity.
Abstract: Recent years have seen liberals moving sharply to the left on issues related to race and gender, the so-called “Great Awokening,” accompanied by commentary arguing that this has led to a popular backlash against the left. Through a preregistered survey, this study polls a representative sample of white Americans to test the effect of a Democratic candidate, Kirsten Gillibrand, arguing for programs designed to help blacks and declaring the significance of white privilege in American life. Our results show that statements about white privilege decrease support for the candidate, with an effect size that is about equal to a one standard deviation shift to the right in ideology. The effect is concentrated among moderates and conservatives. Advocating reparations and affirmative action has a similar but smaller effect. At the same time, arguing for reparations actually increases support for such policies, and discussing white privilege may decrease some aspects of white identity among conservatives. The results indicate that taking more liberal positions on race causes white voters to punish a Democratic candidate. However, there is no evidence for the hypothesis that white Americans move to the right in response to such rhetoric or develop stronger feelings of white identity.
Tuesday, May 12, 2020
The affluent were more likely than others to tie economic outcomes to intelligence and hard work, and the top 1% were unique in emphasizing both choices and genes as causes of those traits
Ideology of Affluence: Rich Americans' Explanations for Inequality and Attitudes toward Redistribution. Elizabeth Suhay, Marko Klasnja, Gonzalo Rivero. The Journal of Politics, April 13, 2020. https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/709672
Abstract: As economic inequality increases, so does the importance of understanding affluent perspectives on the problem. We examine whether affluent Americans are more likely than others to hold individuals responsible for economic outcomes, and if such beliefs are associated with their attitudes toward redistribution. We conducted a novel survey that oversampled the top 5% of the U.S. income and wealth distributions. We elicited views about why some people achieve more success than others (intelligence, hard work, family wealth, luck) as well as why people vary in success-linked traits (their choices, environments, genes). Affluent Americans were more likely than others to tie economic outcomes to intelligence and hard work, and the top 1% were unique in emphasizing both choices and genes as causes of those traits. This individualization of economic outcomes was more strongly associated with economic conservatism among the affluent than others, suggesting it may justify their greater opposition to redistribution.
Keywords: economic inequality; wealthy people; causal attributions; genetic essentialism;
redistribution attitudes
Abstract: As economic inequality increases, so does the importance of understanding affluent perspectives on the problem. We examine whether affluent Americans are more likely than others to hold individuals responsible for economic outcomes, and if such beliefs are associated with their attitudes toward redistribution. We conducted a novel survey that oversampled the top 5% of the U.S. income and wealth distributions. We elicited views about why some people achieve more success than others (intelligence, hard work, family wealth, luck) as well as why people vary in success-linked traits (their choices, environments, genes). Affluent Americans were more likely than others to tie economic outcomes to intelligence and hard work, and the top 1% were unique in emphasizing both choices and genes as causes of those traits. This individualization of economic outcomes was more strongly associated with economic conservatism among the affluent than others, suggesting it may justify their greater opposition to redistribution.
Keywords: economic inequality; wealthy people; causal attributions; genetic essentialism;
redistribution attitudes
Effects of COVID-19 home confinement on physical activity and eating behaviour Preliminary results of the ECLB-COVID19 international online-survey
Effects of COVID-19 home confinement on physical activity and eating behaviour Preliminary results of the ECLB-COVID19 international online-survey. Michael Brach et al. medRxiv, May 08 2020. https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.05.04.20072447
Abstract
Background: Public health recommendations and governmental measures during the COVID-19 pandemic have enforced numerous restrictions on daily living including social distancing, isolation and home confinement. While these measures are imperative to abate the spreading of COVID-19, the impact of these restrictions on health behaviours and lifestyle at home is undefined. Therefore, an international online survey was launched in April 2020 in seven languages to elucidate the behavioral and lifestyle consequences of COVID-19 restrictions. This report presents the preliminary results from the first thousand responders on physical activity (PA) and nutrition behaviours.
Methods: Thirty-five research organisations from Europe, North-Africa, Western Asia and the Americas promoted the survey through their networks to the general society, in English, German, French, Arabic, Spanish, Portugese, and Slovenian languages. Questions were presented in a differential format with questions related to responses before and during confinement conditions.
Results: 1047 replies (54% women) from Asia (36%), Africa (40%), Europe (21%) and other (3%) were included into a general analysis. The COVID-19 home confinement had a negative effect on all intensities of PA (vigorous, moderate, walking and overall). Conversely, daily sitting time increased from 5 to 8 hours per day. Additionally, food consumption and meal patterns (the type of food, eating out of control, snacks between meals, number of meals) were more unhealthy during confinement with only alcohol binge drink decreasing significantly.
Conclusion: While isolation is a necessary measure to protect public health, our results indicate that it alters physical activity and eating behaviours in a direction that would compromise health. A more detailed analysis of survey data will allow for a segregation of these responses in different age groups, countries and other subgroups which will help develop bespoke interventions to mitigate the negative lifestyle behaviors manifest during the COVID-19 confinement.
Abstract
Background: Public health recommendations and governmental measures during the COVID-19 pandemic have enforced numerous restrictions on daily living including social distancing, isolation and home confinement. While these measures are imperative to abate the spreading of COVID-19, the impact of these restrictions on health behaviours and lifestyle at home is undefined. Therefore, an international online survey was launched in April 2020 in seven languages to elucidate the behavioral and lifestyle consequences of COVID-19 restrictions. This report presents the preliminary results from the first thousand responders on physical activity (PA) and nutrition behaviours.
Methods: Thirty-five research organisations from Europe, North-Africa, Western Asia and the Americas promoted the survey through their networks to the general society, in English, German, French, Arabic, Spanish, Portugese, and Slovenian languages. Questions were presented in a differential format with questions related to responses before and during confinement conditions.
Results: 1047 replies (54% women) from Asia (36%), Africa (40%), Europe (21%) and other (3%) were included into a general analysis. The COVID-19 home confinement had a negative effect on all intensities of PA (vigorous, moderate, walking and overall). Conversely, daily sitting time increased from 5 to 8 hours per day. Additionally, food consumption and meal patterns (the type of food, eating out of control, snacks between meals, number of meals) were more unhealthy during confinement with only alcohol binge drink decreasing significantly.
Conclusion: While isolation is a necessary measure to protect public health, our results indicate that it alters physical activity and eating behaviours in a direction that would compromise health. A more detailed analysis of survey data will allow for a segregation of these responses in different age groups, countries and other subgroups which will help develop bespoke interventions to mitigate the negative lifestyle behaviors manifest during the COVID-19 confinement.
Men less than women believe that they will be seriously affected by the coronavirus; men more than women agree that wearing a face covering is shameful, not cool, a sign of weakness, and a stigma
Capraro, Valerio, and Hélène Barcelo. 2020. “The Effect of Messaging and Gender on Intentions to Wear a Face Covering to Slow down COVID-19 Transmission.” PsyArXiv. May 11. doi:10.31234/osf.io/tg7vz
Abstract: Now that various countries are or will soon be moving towards relaxing shelter-in-place rules, it is important that people use a face covering, to avoid an exponential resurgence of the spreading of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19). Adherence to this measure will be made explicitly compulsory in many places. However, since it is impossible to control each and every person in a country, it is important to complement governmental laws with behavioral interventions devised to impact people’s behavior beyond the force of law. Here we report a pre-registered online experiment (N=2,459) using a heterogenous, although not representative, sample of people living in the USA, where we test the relative effect of messages highlighting that the coronavirus is a threat to “you” vs “your family” vs “your community” vs “your country” on self-reported intentions to wear a face covering. Results show that focusing on “your community” promotes intentions to wear a face covering relative to the baseline; the trend is the same when comparing “your community” to the other conditions, but not significant. We also conducted pre-registered analyses of gender differences on intentions to wear a face covering. We find that men less than women intend to wear a face covering, but this difference almost disappears in counties where wearing a face covering is mandatory. We also find that men less than women believe that they will be seriously affected by the coronavirus, and this partly mediates gender differences in intentions to wear a face covering (this is particularly ironic because official statistics actually show that men are affected by the COVID-19 more seriously than women). Finally, we also find gender differences in self-reported negative emotions felt when wearing a face covering. Men more than women agree that wearing a face covering is shameful, not cool, a sign of weakness, and a stigma; and these gender differences also mediate gender differences in intentions to wear a face covering.
Abstract: Now that various countries are or will soon be moving towards relaxing shelter-in-place rules, it is important that people use a face covering, to avoid an exponential resurgence of the spreading of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19). Adherence to this measure will be made explicitly compulsory in many places. However, since it is impossible to control each and every person in a country, it is important to complement governmental laws with behavioral interventions devised to impact people’s behavior beyond the force of law. Here we report a pre-registered online experiment (N=2,459) using a heterogenous, although not representative, sample of people living in the USA, where we test the relative effect of messages highlighting that the coronavirus is a threat to “you” vs “your family” vs “your community” vs “your country” on self-reported intentions to wear a face covering. Results show that focusing on “your community” promotes intentions to wear a face covering relative to the baseline; the trend is the same when comparing “your community” to the other conditions, but not significant. We also conducted pre-registered analyses of gender differences on intentions to wear a face covering. We find that men less than women intend to wear a face covering, but this difference almost disappears in counties where wearing a face covering is mandatory. We also find that men less than women believe that they will be seriously affected by the coronavirus, and this partly mediates gender differences in intentions to wear a face covering (this is particularly ironic because official statistics actually show that men are affected by the COVID-19 more seriously than women). Finally, we also find gender differences in self-reported negative emotions felt when wearing a face covering. Men more than women agree that wearing a face covering is shameful, not cool, a sign of weakness, and a stigma; and these gender differences also mediate gender differences in intentions to wear a face covering.
Individuals with broader beliefs about trauma experienced more intense negative emotions; reported more event-related distress (e.g., intrusions, nightmares) several days following
Jones, Payton J., and Richard J. McNally. 2020. “Does Broadening One's Concept of Trauma Undermine Resilience?.” PsyArXiv. May 11. doi:10.31234/osf.io/5ureb
Abstract: The term 'trauma' seems to have expanded from a narrow usage (referring exclusively to extreme events such as rape and warfare) to a broad usage (encompassing almost any event that results in emotional distress). Today, individuals vary widely in the extent to which their personal 'trauma concept' is relatively narrow or broad. In this study, we explore whether this variation is important to individuals' actual experience when facing a stressful event (in this case, watching a disturbing film clip). Individuals with broader beliefs about trauma experienced more intense negative emotions and were more likely to report viewing the film clip as a personal trauma. Moreover, those who saw the film clip as a personal trauma reported more event-related distress (e.g., intrusions, nightmares) several days following. However, we find limited support for causality, with an experimental manipulation showing a significant effect on personal trauma concepts but mixed effects on other outcomes.
Abstract: The term 'trauma' seems to have expanded from a narrow usage (referring exclusively to extreme events such as rape and warfare) to a broad usage (encompassing almost any event that results in emotional distress). Today, individuals vary widely in the extent to which their personal 'trauma concept' is relatively narrow or broad. In this study, we explore whether this variation is important to individuals' actual experience when facing a stressful event (in this case, watching a disturbing film clip). Individuals with broader beliefs about trauma experienced more intense negative emotions and were more likely to report viewing the film clip as a personal trauma. Moreover, those who saw the film clip as a personal trauma reported more event-related distress (e.g., intrusions, nightmares) several days following. However, we find limited support for causality, with an experimental manipulation showing a significant effect on personal trauma concepts but mixed effects on other outcomes.
Clarifying the Structure and Nature of Left-wing Authoritarianism
Costello, Thomas H., Shauna Bowes, Sean T. Stevens, Irwin Waldman, and Scott O. Lilienfeld. 2020. “Clarifying the Structure and Nature of Left-wing Authoritarianism.” PsyArXiv. May 11. doi:10.31234/osf.io/3nprq
Abstract: Left-wing authoritarianism (LWA) is one of the more controversial and poorly understood major constructs in political psychology. In this series of studies, we investigate LWA’s nature, structure, correlates, and psychological implications. Beginning with a broad preliminary conceptualization of LWA, we use exploratory and empirical strategies of test construction across five community samples (N = 6,292) to iteratively construct a measure of LWA with promising content validity; refine our conceptualization based on the measure’s structural and nomological validity; and update the measure to reflect these changes. We conduct quantitative tests of LWA’s relations with a host of authoritarianism-related variables, based on a priori hypotheses derived in part from right-wing authoritarianism’s well-established nomological network, and use a behavioral paradigm to show that LWA and social dominance orientation (but not right-wing authoritarianism) predict aggression towards threatening ideological opponents over and above political ideology. We conclude that a shared psychological “core” underlies authoritarianism across the political left and right.
Abstract: Left-wing authoritarianism (LWA) is one of the more controversial and poorly understood major constructs in political psychology. In this series of studies, we investigate LWA’s nature, structure, correlates, and psychological implications. Beginning with a broad preliminary conceptualization of LWA, we use exploratory and empirical strategies of test construction across five community samples (N = 6,292) to iteratively construct a measure of LWA with promising content validity; refine our conceptualization based on the measure’s structural and nomological validity; and update the measure to reflect these changes. We conduct quantitative tests of LWA’s relations with a host of authoritarianism-related variables, based on a priori hypotheses derived in part from right-wing authoritarianism’s well-established nomological network, and use a behavioral paradigm to show that LWA and social dominance orientation (but not right-wing authoritarianism) predict aggression towards threatening ideological opponents over and above political ideology. We conclude that a shared psychological “core” underlies authoritarianism across the political left and right.
Reactions and gender differences to online pictures of covered sexual organs among heterosexual young adults—Studies based on behavior, eye movement and ERP
Reactions and gender differences to online pictures of covered sexual organs among heterosexual young adults—Studies based on behavior, eye movement and ERP. Lei Han et al. Computers in Human Behavior, May 11 2020, 106425, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2020.106425
Highlights
• Sexual cognition of online sexual pictures.
• Employ eye-movement technology and ERPs to explore sexual cognition differences.
• Covered pictures can cause significant sexual arousal.
• Both naked and covered pictures can induce gender category-specific effect.
Abstract: To increase internet traffic, some online media try to attract attention by presenting pictures that cover the sexual organs of the body. However, compared with naked pictures, it remains unclear whether these covered pictures can evoke similar levels of sexual arousal in heterosexual young adults and category-specific patterns in men. To examine the above problems, this research divided female and male pictures into 4 types (fully dressed pictures, naked pictures, covered pictures and underwear-wearing pictures). Behavioral experiments, eye-movement technology and ERP measurements were employed to explore the different levels of sexual arousal between men and women in response to pictures of different sexes and types. The results revealed that the level of sexual arousal induced by covered pictures was significantly higher than that induced by naked pictures. There was no significant difference in the P300 amplitude of the parietal lobe between covered pictures and naked pictures, but in the frontal lobe, the P300 amplitude induced by covered pictures was significantly higher than that induced by naked pictures. The results indicated that unlike the process of sexual arousal induced by naked pictures, the process of sexual arousal induced by covered pictures not only included the processing of visual stimuli but also required the frontal lobe to actively construct to perceive pictures of covered sexual organs as naked pictures and thus induce sexual arousal. In addition, we also found that both covered pictures (as reflected in the levels of sexual arousal and the average amplitude of P300) and naked pictures (as reflected in the levels of sexual arousal, the number of fixations and the average amplitude of P300) can induce category specificity in heterosexual men. On the one hand, this research extends knowledge regarding sexual cognition and finds that covered pictures can also evoke category specificity in men; on the other hand, from the perspective of brain cognition, the difference in sexual cognitive processing between covered pictures and naked pictures is recognized.
Keywords: Sexual cognitionCategory specificityGender differenceEye movementERP
Highlights
• Sexual cognition of online sexual pictures.
• Employ eye-movement technology and ERPs to explore sexual cognition differences.
• Covered pictures can cause significant sexual arousal.
• Both naked and covered pictures can induce gender category-specific effect.
Abstract: To increase internet traffic, some online media try to attract attention by presenting pictures that cover the sexual organs of the body. However, compared with naked pictures, it remains unclear whether these covered pictures can evoke similar levels of sexual arousal in heterosexual young adults and category-specific patterns in men. To examine the above problems, this research divided female and male pictures into 4 types (fully dressed pictures, naked pictures, covered pictures and underwear-wearing pictures). Behavioral experiments, eye-movement technology and ERP measurements were employed to explore the different levels of sexual arousal between men and women in response to pictures of different sexes and types. The results revealed that the level of sexual arousal induced by covered pictures was significantly higher than that induced by naked pictures. There was no significant difference in the P300 amplitude of the parietal lobe between covered pictures and naked pictures, but in the frontal lobe, the P300 amplitude induced by covered pictures was significantly higher than that induced by naked pictures. The results indicated that unlike the process of sexual arousal induced by naked pictures, the process of sexual arousal induced by covered pictures not only included the processing of visual stimuli but also required the frontal lobe to actively construct to perceive pictures of covered sexual organs as naked pictures and thus induce sexual arousal. In addition, we also found that both covered pictures (as reflected in the levels of sexual arousal and the average amplitude of P300) and naked pictures (as reflected in the levels of sexual arousal, the number of fixations and the average amplitude of P300) can induce category specificity in heterosexual men. On the one hand, this research extends knowledge regarding sexual cognition and finds that covered pictures can also evoke category specificity in men; on the other hand, from the perspective of brain cognition, the difference in sexual cognitive processing between covered pictures and naked pictures is recognized.
Keywords: Sexual cognitionCategory specificityGender differenceEye movementERP
Monday, May 11, 2020
How people perceive the minds of the dead: The importance of consciousness at the moment of death
How people perceive the minds of the dead: The importance of consciousness at the moment of death. Cameron M.Doyle, Kurt Gray. Cognition, Volume 202, September 2020, 104308. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104308
Abstract: Immortality is thought to be achieved through heroic deeds, reincarnation, and the afterlife. The present studies reveal an alternative path to transcending death: dying while conscious. Seven studies demonstrate that dying while more awake, aware and/or lucid leads people to see a richer postmortem mind—an effect we call conservation of consciousness. People see more mind in the deceased when they die with their eyes open (Study 1), and while awake (vs. in a coma), while suffering from ALS (vs. from Alzheimer's), while on hallucinogens (vs. sedatives), and while dreaming (vs. in a deep sleep; Study 2). This effect is robust, holding even in a between-subjects design, and even when participants are explicitly encouraged to interpret the mind perception items literally (Study 3). Perceived conservation of consciousness after death is driven more by general perceived awareness than by fear of death (Study 4) and predicts perceptions of mind beyond having a vivid (vs. dull) life (Study 5). The last wishes of the dying are also given more moral weight if made by those who ultimately die while conscious (Study 6). Perceived conservation of consciousness also occurs in the real-world context of a historic cemetery (Study 7). These results reveal a simple way to increase your influence after death and highlight both the power of endings and the subjective nature of mind.
Abstract: Immortality is thought to be achieved through heroic deeds, reincarnation, and the afterlife. The present studies reveal an alternative path to transcending death: dying while conscious. Seven studies demonstrate that dying while more awake, aware and/or lucid leads people to see a richer postmortem mind—an effect we call conservation of consciousness. People see more mind in the deceased when they die with their eyes open (Study 1), and while awake (vs. in a coma), while suffering from ALS (vs. from Alzheimer's), while on hallucinogens (vs. sedatives), and while dreaming (vs. in a deep sleep; Study 2). This effect is robust, holding even in a between-subjects design, and even when participants are explicitly encouraged to interpret the mind perception items literally (Study 3). Perceived conservation of consciousness after death is driven more by general perceived awareness than by fear of death (Study 4) and predicts perceptions of mind beyond having a vivid (vs. dull) life (Study 5). The last wishes of the dying are also given more moral weight if made by those who ultimately die while conscious (Study 6). Perceived conservation of consciousness also occurs in the real-world context of a historic cemetery (Study 7). These results reveal a simple way to increase your influence after death and highlight both the power of endings and the subjective nature of mind.
Bullshit ability is predictive of participants’ intelligence and individuals capable of producing more satisfying bullshit are judged by second-hand observers to be higher in intelligence
Turpin, Martin H., Mane Kara-Yakoubian, Alexander C. Walker, and Jonathan A. Fugelsang. 2020. “Bullshit Ability as an Honest Signal of Intelligence.” PsyArXiv. May 11. doi:10.31234/osf.io/aru3f > final version Evolutionary Psychology, May 17, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/14747049211000317
Abstract: The ability to navigate social systems efficiently is critical to our species. Humans appear endowed with a cognitive system that has at least partially formed to best meet the unique cognitive challenges that emerge in a highly social species. Bullshitting, a style of communication characterised by an intent to be convincing or impressive without concern for the truth, is ubiquitous within human societies. Across two studies (N = 1,017), we assess whether participants’ ability to produce satisfying and seemingly accurate bullshit (i.e., explanations of fake concepts) acts as an honest signal of their intelligence. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that bullshit ability is predictive of participants’ intelligence and individuals capable of producing more satisfying bullshit are judged by second-hand observers to be higher in intelligence. We interpret these results as adding further evidence for human intelligence being naturally geared towards the efficient navigation of social systems. The ability to produce satisfying bullshit may serve to assist individuals in negotiating their social world, both as an energetically efficient strategy for impressing others and as an honest signal of one’s intelligence.
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Abstract: The ability to navigate social systems efficiently is critical to our species. Humans appear endowed with a cognitive system that has at least partially formed to best meet the unique cognitive challenges that emerge in a highly social species. Bullshitting, a style of communication characterised by an intent to be convincing or impressive without concern for the truth, is ubiquitous within human societies. Across two studies (N = 1,017), we assess whether participants’ ability to produce satisfying and seemingly accurate bullshit (i.e., explanations of fake concepts) acts as an honest signal of their intelligence. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that bullshit ability is predictive of participants’ intelligence and individuals capable of producing more satisfying bullshit are judged by second-hand observers to be higher in intelligence. We interpret these results as adding further evidence for human intelligence being naturally geared towards the efficient navigation of social systems. The ability to produce satisfying bullshit may serve to assist individuals in negotiating their social world, both as an energetically efficient strategy for impressing others and as an honest signal of one’s intelligence.
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From the final version:
The current work provides initial evidence for bullshit ability as an honest signal of intelligence. We find that the ability to create satisfying and seemingly accurate bullshit (e.g., explanations of fake concepts) was associated with obtaining higher scores on two measures of cognitive ability (i.e., the Wordsum and RPM). Interestingly, we find that one’s ability to produce satisfying bullshit is independent of one’s willingness to produce bullshit. Indeed, the two were uncorrelated in our studies, and had opposite associations with measures of intelligence. Others have found similar negative associations with measures of intelligence. For example, Pennycook and Rand (2019) found that overclaiming (arguably a form of bullshitting very similar to our bullshit willingness measure) was negatively correlated with performance on the Cognitive Reflection Task. Additionally, in a study by Littrell and colleagues (2021), intelligence (as indexed by Numeracy and Wordsum) was found to be negatively associated with persuasive bullshitting frequency.
It would seem logical that those who are better at bullshitting would opt to use it more frequently, however, we do not find this here. A possible explanation may be one which appeals to Theory of Mind models of intelligence. Of the three evolutionary pressures discussed in the introduction, the current set of studies has largely focused on a Machiavellian view, that intelligence affords us opportunities to deceive others to our advantage, as well as an IQ-signaling perspective, whereby bullshitting may be useful as an honest signal of a person’s quality or fitness through signaling their intelligence. We may lean on the third pressure to explain why it is that despite their superior ability to create bullshit, intelligent people seem to display less willingness to spontaneously engage in bullshitting. Part of this explanation may be that increased intelligence also results in a more sophisticated ability to simulate the mental states of others. In casual language, this may be described as “knowing your audience” and as such, they may possess a more sophisticated understanding of when and where bullshitting will work if attempted. Further, if highly intelligent people tend to associate with similarly intelligent people due to factors related to assortative mating, for example, intelligent people preferring intelligent mates or, “like pairs with like” (Thiessen & Gregg, 1980) or general homophily (McPherson et al., 2001) they may often find themselves around people who are likely to detect attempts at bullshitting, lowering its appeal as a first-order social strategy. As previous research has argued, a determiner of whether people will make an attempt to bullshit someone is whether they believe it will go undetected (Petrocelli, 2018). If smarter people are better able to know the contents of other people’s thoughts, they may be more carefully calibrated to the conditions under which an attempt at bullshitting will be unsuccessful. Of note, “bullshit ability,” as measured in our studies, involved the production of explanations for fake concepts, while “bullshit willingness” only required that the participant be willing to rate their knowledge of such fake concepts higher than “none.” Therefore, the lack of association we observed could be due to the specific methods selected to measure these two constructs. Future work should further dissociate the processes underlying one’s ability and willingness to produce bullshit.
While work has begun examining the degree to which personality may predict receptivity to bullshit (Bainbridge et al., 2019; Čavojová et al., 2020), it has yet to be explored how personality influences the tendency or ability to bullshit. It could be the case that different personality traits (e.g., openness, honesty-humility, agreeableness; Lee & Ashton, 2004), moderate one’s willingness to engage in bullshitting. For example, a person who scores high in honesty-humility, a personality dimension which captures traits like sincerity, fairness, or modesty, may be less willing to bullshit, given that bullshitting is characterized by the desire to impress others without regard for the truth. The reverse may be true for those who are low in agreeableness, they may, especially when confronted with a disagreement, be more likely to deemphasize the importance of truth in favor of self-advancement through the use of bullshit. The numerous ways that common personality factors may interact in predicting the tendency and ability to bullshit makes for a promising topic of future exploration.
Regardless of whether bullshit ability honestly signals one’s intelligence, of potentially greater importance is that skilled bullshit producers are perceived by others as highly intelligent. From the perspective of navigating social systems, being perceived as intelligent may be just as valuable to an agent as actually being intelligent, as this perception may afford one opportunities to obtain status and form relationships as well as have greater trust placed in their competence. To this point, we observed a strong positive association between bullshit ability and perceived intelligence. However, this association was found in a situation in which those judging the intelligence of bullshit producers knew nothing of these individuals except their ability to produce satisfying explanations of real and fake concepts. Thus, it is likely that the strength of this association was overestimated in the present work as–with limited information–any signal of quality may have been exaggerated. In addition, as Bullshit Raters rated bullshit ability and perceived intelligence using similar 5-point scales, the strength of this association may be inflated due to unthoughtful responding by some participants (i.e., some participants may be inclined to simply select the same values on the scales).
Overall, we interpret these results as initial evidence that the ability to bullshit well provides an honest signal of a person’s ability to successfully navigate social systems, fitting the current work into existing frameworks whereby human intelligence is geared towards efficiently navigating such systems (Dunbar, 1998; Crow, 1993). More specifically, we propose that the ability to produce satisfying bullshit may have emerged as an energetically efficient strategy for achieving an individual’s goals (such as acquiring status or impressing mates). That is, a person can engage in the arduous process of acquiring expert skills in domains that they could then leverage to accomplish certain goals, or can use bullshit as a strategy that potentially produces the same benefits at a much smaller cost (Turpin et al., 2019). Of course, these strategies need not be mutually exclusive, as the ability to produce satisfying bullshit may help even highly skilled individuals achieve their goals over equally skilled peers. This may be especially true in domains in which success depends largely on the subjective evaluations of others (e.g., art, advertising, politics, life coaching, journalism, humanities).
Limitations
An obvious limitation of the current work is its correlational nature, meaning that we cannot conclude that being more intelligent causes a person to be a better bullshitter. The current study merely provides preliminary evidence consistent with one plausible causal model. Future work should seek to explicitly probe the causal relation between intelligence and bullshit ability if any such relation exists. In addition, as noted above, the association between perceived intelligence and bullshit ability is likely overestimated in our sample due to the limited information available to the raters and the means of assessment. With respect to the latter, future research should include alternative metrics to assess perceived intelligence (e.g., estimating the actual IQ of bullshit producers using a number rather than a rating scale) to limit the possibility of unthoughtful responding contributing to the association.
The use of the WordSum and Raven’s Progressive Matrices made the conduct of the study possible given constraints on time. Independently, they predict IQ fairly well with correlations ranging between r = .55 and r = .66 between scores on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale and Raven’s Matrices, and a correlation between Wordsum performance and IQ of r = .88 (Burke, 1985; Malhotra et al., 2007; McLaurin et al., 1973). However, more sophisticated measures for IQ would improve the accuracy of any cognitive ability measurement and therefore provide a more exact picture of the true relation between bullshit ability and cognitive ability. Relatedly, more opportunities to assess bullshit ability through either increasing the number of fake concepts participants were to bullshit about, or even better, using multiple different tasks which meet the criteria for “bullshitting” would improve our ability to draw conclusions about “bullshitting” behavior generally.
The bullshit generation task required participants to produce bullshit by explicitly directing them to ignore the truth. This is, under a Frankfurtian definition, “bullshit,” but this task is merely a substitute for the truly interesting question of how bullshit ability and cognitive ability relate in naturalistic settings, where bullshitting happens spontaneously. This artificial task is sufficient for establishing some initial evidence of the link between bullshit ability and cognitive ability, but more work is required to identify the nature of this relation.
Sunday, May 10, 2020
In simulations: Interpersonal distance is significantly reduced when the characters wear a face mask compared to other conditions
Cartaud, Alice, Quesque François, and Yann Coello. 2020. “Beware of Virus! Wearing a Face Mask Against COVID-19 Results in a Reduction of Social Distancing.” PsyArXiv. May 11. doi:10.31234/osf.io/ubzea
Abstract: In the context of Covid-19 pandemic, barrier gestures such as regular hand washing, social distancing, and wearing face mask are highly recommended. Critically, interpersonal distances depend on the physical and emotional dimensions involved in social interaction, two factors that might be affected by the current Covid-19 context. In the present internet-based experimental study, we analyzed the preferred interpersonal distance of 461 participants, when facing a virtual character either wearing a face mask or displaying a neutral, happy or angry facial expression. The results showed that interpersonal distance is significantly reduced when the characters wear a face mask compared to other conditions. Importantly, it was also reduced in participants already infected with Covid-19, or living in a low-risk area. The present findings are of dramatic importance as they indicate that the general requirement to wear a mask in social contexts can have deleterious effects, interfering with social distancing recommendations.
Abstract: In the context of Covid-19 pandemic, barrier gestures such as regular hand washing, social distancing, and wearing face mask are highly recommended. Critically, interpersonal distances depend on the physical and emotional dimensions involved in social interaction, two factors that might be affected by the current Covid-19 context. In the present internet-based experimental study, we analyzed the preferred interpersonal distance of 461 participants, when facing a virtual character either wearing a face mask or displaying a neutral, happy or angry facial expression. The results showed that interpersonal distance is significantly reduced when the characters wear a face mask compared to other conditions. Importantly, it was also reduced in participants already infected with Covid-19, or living in a low-risk area. The present findings are of dramatic importance as they indicate that the general requirement to wear a mask in social contexts can have deleterious effects, interfering with social distancing recommendations.
Individuals high in neuroticism experienced more negative affect in their daily lives during the Covid-19 pandemic
Kroencke, Lara, Katharina Geukes, Till Utesch, Niclas Kuper, and Mitja Back. 2020. “Neuroticism and Emotional Risk During the Covid-19 Pandemic.” PsyArXiv. May 10. doi:10.31234/osf.io/8c6nh
Abstract: Large-scale health crises, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, may evoke negative affective responses, which are closely linked to psychological maladjustment and psychopathology. Here, we shed light on the role of the personality trait neuroticism in predicting who is at risk and why. In a large-scale experience-sampling study based on a German convenience sample (N = 1,609; 38,120 momentary reports), individuals high in neuroticism experienced more negative affect in their daily lives during the Covid-19 pandemic. The effects of neuroticism on negative affect were substantially stronger than those of sociodemographic factors and personally experienced health threats. Underlying mechanisms included (a) higher attention to Covid-19-related information and higher engagement in Covid-19-related worries (crisis preoccupation), and (b) stronger negative affect during this preoccupation (affective reactivity). These findings highlight that global pandemics put not only people’s physical health at stake but also their psychological well-being and offer concrete starting points for large-scale prevention efforts.
Abstract: Large-scale health crises, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, may evoke negative affective responses, which are closely linked to psychological maladjustment and psychopathology. Here, we shed light on the role of the personality trait neuroticism in predicting who is at risk and why. In a large-scale experience-sampling study based on a German convenience sample (N = 1,609; 38,120 momentary reports), individuals high in neuroticism experienced more negative affect in their daily lives during the Covid-19 pandemic. The effects of neuroticism on negative affect were substantially stronger than those of sociodemographic factors and personally experienced health threats. Underlying mechanisms included (a) higher attention to Covid-19-related information and higher engagement in Covid-19-related worries (crisis preoccupation), and (b) stronger negative affect during this preoccupation (affective reactivity). These findings highlight that global pandemics put not only people’s physical health at stake but also their psychological well-being and offer concrete starting points for large-scale prevention efforts.
A concern raised by the “immunity passports” is that not-yet-infected individuals would have an incentive to expose themselves to the virus intentionally so that they can develop antibodies and get passports
Hemel, Daniel Jacob and Malani, Anup, Immunity Passports and Moral Hazard (May 8, 2020). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3596569
Abstract: The idea of using “immunity passports” to restart the economy before the arrival of a SARS-CoV-2 vaccine has attracted increasing attention as the Covid-19 crisis has escalated. Under an “immunity passport” regime, individuals who test positive for SARS-CoV-2 antibodies would receive certificates allowing them to return to work and potentially to participate in a broader range of activities without social distancing. One concern raised by the “immunity passport” proposal is that not-yet-infected individuals would have an incentive to expose themselves to the virus intentionally so that they can develop antibodies and obtain passports. This paper evaluates the moral-hazard risk that an immunity passport regime would generate. We develop a rudimentary rational-actor model of self-infection decisions under an immunity passport regime and then parameterize the model using early data on SARS-CoV-2 infection outcomes. Our topline result is that strategic self-infection would be privately rational for younger adults under a wide range of plausible parameters. This result raises two significant concerns. First, in the process of infecting themselves, younger adults may expose others—including older and/or immunocompromised individuals—to SARS-CoV-2, generating significant negative externalities. Second, even if younger adults can self-infect without exposing others to risk, large numbers of self-infections over a short timeframe after introduction of the immunity passport regime may impose significant congestion externalities on health care infrastructure. We then evaluate several interventions that could mitigate moral hazard under an immunity passport regime, including the extension of unemployment benefits, staggered implementation of passports, and controlled exposure of individuals who seek to self-infect. Our results underscore the importance of careful planning around moral hazard as part of any widescale immunity passport regime.
Keywords: immunity passports, immunity certificates, moral hazard, COVID-19, SARS-CoV-2
JEL Classification: I10, I13, I18, J0, J4, K1,
Abstract: The idea of using “immunity passports” to restart the economy before the arrival of a SARS-CoV-2 vaccine has attracted increasing attention as the Covid-19 crisis has escalated. Under an “immunity passport” regime, individuals who test positive for SARS-CoV-2 antibodies would receive certificates allowing them to return to work and potentially to participate in a broader range of activities without social distancing. One concern raised by the “immunity passport” proposal is that not-yet-infected individuals would have an incentive to expose themselves to the virus intentionally so that they can develop antibodies and obtain passports. This paper evaluates the moral-hazard risk that an immunity passport regime would generate. We develop a rudimentary rational-actor model of self-infection decisions under an immunity passport regime and then parameterize the model using early data on SARS-CoV-2 infection outcomes. Our topline result is that strategic self-infection would be privately rational for younger adults under a wide range of plausible parameters. This result raises two significant concerns. First, in the process of infecting themselves, younger adults may expose others—including older and/or immunocompromised individuals—to SARS-CoV-2, generating significant negative externalities. Second, even if younger adults can self-infect without exposing others to risk, large numbers of self-infections over a short timeframe after introduction of the immunity passport regime may impose significant congestion externalities on health care infrastructure. We then evaluate several interventions that could mitigate moral hazard under an immunity passport regime, including the extension of unemployment benefits, staggered implementation of passports, and controlled exposure of individuals who seek to self-infect. Our results underscore the importance of careful planning around moral hazard as part of any widescale immunity passport regime.
Keywords: immunity passports, immunity certificates, moral hazard, COVID-19, SARS-CoV-2
JEL Classification: I10, I13, I18, J0, J4, K1,
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