Moral contagion effects may be explained more by self-presentation (observers infer immorality by association) than by physical contamination

Reputation management as an alternative explanation for the “contagiousness” of immorality. Tom Kupfer & Roger Giner-Sorolla. Evolution and Human Behavior, Aug 20 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2020.08.005

Abstract: Previous findings showing that people are reluctant to contact morally disgusting objects such as Nazi clothing have been interpreted as showing that immorality is perceived as physically contaminating. However, self-presentation concerns could underlie the apparent contagiousness of immorality: associating visibly with immoral stimuli risks reputation damage because observers infer immorality by association. In a scenario, participants preferred to wear a Nazi armband under rather than over their clothing, despite the under choice requiring skin contact (Study 1). And participants reported being primarily motivated by reputation, not contamination. Studies 1a and 1b revealed that, when public display was kept constant to minimize reputation concerns, skin contact increased discomfort by a small amount. A lab study using a real Nazi armband showed that the preference for hiding the armband was stronger with an audience (Study 2). Changing perspective in Study 3, third parties judged targets who made direct contact with the armband as less immoral, and even less contaminated, than those who displayed the armband. Another scenario in Study 4 revealed a strong effect of public display, but no effect of skin contact, on negative feelings about wearing an immoral t-shirt. Overall, findings suggest that apparent moral contagion effects may be explained more by self-presentation than by contamination.

Having photos of close others in sight decreases the hegemony of an economic schema in people’s minds, which in turn decreases their propensity to commit unethical behavior

Show me the ... family: How photos of meaningful relationships reduce unethical behavior at work. Ashley Hardin, Christopher Bauman & David Mayer. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, November 2020, Pages 93-108. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0749597820303629

Abstract: Environmental cues in the workplace influence unethical behavior, but the effects of these cues are less well understood than the effects of individual differences and social aspects of situations on unethical behavior. In this paper, we examine a common but underappreciated aspect of workspaces: photos of close others. Drawing on the literatures on symbols at work and behavioral ethics, we theorize that having photos of close others in sight decreases the hegemony of an economic schema in people’s minds, which in turn decreases their propensity to commit unethical behavior. Supporting our theory, a field survey and three experiments find a negative relationship between displaying photos of close others at work and financial transgressions and indicate that a decrease in the salience of the economic schema is a mechanism that drives the effect. We discuss implications of the results for the literatures on behavioral ethics, symbols at work, and work-life integration.

Consumers' schadenfreude over another's unrelated bad purchase as positive information about their own choices; & through such misattribution become more satisfied with their own choices

So happy for your loss: Consumer schadenfreude increases choice satisfaction. Dmytro Moisieiev  Radu Dimitriu  Shailendra P. Jain. Psychology & Marketing, August 25 2020 https://doi.org/10.1002/mar.21399

Abstract: Consumers often feel schadenfreude, an emotion reflecting an experience of pleasure over misfortunes of another. Schadenfreude has found wide use in advertising, but its actual consequences for consumers have not been thoroughly documented. The present research investigates the effect of schadenfreude on consumers' satisfaction with choices they have made. Building on the feelings‐as‐information theory, the authors posit that consumers take their positive feelings of schadenfreude over another's unrelated bad purchase as positive information about their own choices, and through such misattribution become more satisfied with their own choices. Three experiments show that feeling schadenfreude over another consumer's bad purchase makes consumers more satisfied with their own choices (Study 1), regardless of whether the other's bad purchase is in the same or in a different product category as one's own choice (Study 2), but only so long as consumers are not aware that they are engaging in misattribution (Study 3). The present research contributes to the literature on schadenfreude and feelings‐as‐information theory. Its findings may be used by marketers aiming to exert an unconscious influence on consumer satisfaction.

6 GENERAL DISCUSSION

6.1 Theoretical contributions

Social norms often demand a sympathetic response to another's misfortune. Schadenfreude however runs counter to this expectation, being a feeling of pleasure over another's misfortune. In that sense, it is a peculiar and complex emotion and some may even view it as socially reprehensible (Kramer et al., 2011).

At an abstract level, our research contributes to the literature on the consequences of complex emotions (Kramer, Lau‐Gesk, & Chiu, 2009; Williams & Aaker, 2002). More specifically, it extends the emerging scholarship on some of the outcomes of consumer schadenfreude (Kramer et al., 2011; Loebnitz & Grunert, 2019; Yucel‐Aybat & Kramer, 2017). Informed by the feelings‐as‐information theory (Schwarz, 2012; Schwarz & Clore, 2007), the current work reveals a surprising finding across three empirical studies—that witnessing another's failed purchase can make consumers feel better about their own choice, even though another's failure should rationally not impact the evaluation of one's own choice. Although consumers should be expected to recognize the source of their positive feelings (i.e., another's failure) and separate it from unrelated judgments, they seem to not be very adept at doing so.

Kramer et al. (2011) show that schadenfreude felt before a choice makes consumers more conservative in their choice. We show that after making a choice, schadenfreude might actually make consumers less conservative in evaluating their choice. These findings in aggregate may not be as contrasting as they appear. Kramer et al. (2011) examined the effect of schadenfreude before making a choice while we investigate its effect after making a choice. The dependent variables in the studies are also different: Kramer et al. (2011) are interested in risky versus safe choices while we are interested in choice satisfaction. In aggregate, these two inquiries enrich our understanding of the consequences of schadenfreude before and after choice by looking at different outcome variables.

Furthermore, this study extends the findings of Yucel‐Aybat and Kramer (2017, 2018), namely that schadenfreude stemming from comparative advertising may increase liking for an advertised brand. Our research shows that direct comparison between brands or choice options is not necessary to trigger schadenfreude, nor does the actual performance of the chosen option need to be known to increase the evaluation of one's choice. Therefore, consumers will mistake positive feelings of schadenfreude as information about their own choice when they have no reason to believe that their chosen product is superior than someone else's failed product. This effect is also not driven by feelings of envy or jealousy toward another (Study 1). Study 2 shows that such misattribution is robust across categories, even where the unsatisfactory performance of another's purchased product cannot be compared to the performance of one's chosen item.

This study also adds to the literature on appraisal of emotions (Lazarus, 1991; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Li et al., 2019; Morales, Wu, & Fitzsimons, 2012; Roseman & Smith, 2001; van Dijk et al., 2011). Schadenfreude occurs when people are concerned with the goal of maintaining self‐ and social‐esteem (Li et al., 2019; van Dijk et al., 2011). However, as the target of schadenfreude is another person, it can be appraised in terms of a specific appraisal dimension (theme) of certainty/uncertainty (Lerner & Keltner, 2000), leading to avoidance of uncertainty in choices (Kramer et al., 2011). This study, however, shows that overall pleasantness (positivity) of schadenfreude, another appraisal dimension, is used in judgments of one's own unrelated previous choices. Thus, drawing on the effect of the valence of the emotions, the present research contributes to the feelings‐as‐information theory (Schwarz, 2012) by identifying the specific, other‐caused emotion of schadenfreude that may be misconstrued as information about one's own (not the other's) unrelated choices. Study 3 underscores the automaticity of such misattribution (the effect disappears when consumers become aware of possible misattribution) and Study 2 indicates that temporal precedence is necessary for this misattribution to occur.

6.2 Managerial implications

Marketing communications practitioners and brand managers, in particular, may find our investigation to be of interest. Schadenfreude has found extensive use in advertising (Garfield, 2009; Luckerson, 2014; Nudd, 2011), and the present research explains why schadenfreude can enhance consumers' satisfaction with their already‐made purchases. For example, a consumer watching one of “Get a Mac” ads on their newly purchased Mac may become more satisfied with their Mac purchase. In a similar vein, a social media brand marketer might make available reviews or content (such as webcomics) about competing brands and capable of eliciting schadenfreude, thus increasing consumers' satisfaction with purchases of the promoted brand. Given that decision (choice) satisfaction is a strong predictor of consumer loyalty (Heitmann et al., 2007), which in turn contributes to a firm's financial performance (Ittner & Larcker, 1998), the findings of the present research should bear significance for practitioners.

Importantly, we also find that the effect of schadenfreude on choice satisfaction is not restricted to suggested failures involving comparable brands or products. An implication is that situations that do not involve comparable options may elicit schadenfreude leading to increased consumer choice satisfaction. To cite an example, Jet Blue's “Welcome Big Wigs” campaign makes fun of senior business executives (high in social status) flying on a budget. Such messaging could trigger schadenfreude among some consumers without resorting to direct comparisons with other brands (Garfield, 2009). Further, such non‐comparative advertising may be effective in increasing consumer choice satisfaction by means of evoking schadenfreude, so long as consumers are not aware that they may misattribute their feelings of schadenfreude to their own choices. In an online environment, viral prankvertising using acceptable targets (Luckerson, 2014) or other content featuring the downfall of high‐status individuals (e.g., news about politicians' criminal convictions) may be a tool used to elicit schadenfreude and reinforce consumer choice satisfaction. For example, an online store might feature a news piece about a famous person's tribulations after shopping checkout, prompting consumers to feel schadenfreude and unconsciously become more satisfied with the online purchase they just made.

6.3 Limitations and future research

The present research is not without limitations. First, it relies on the manipulation of schadenfreude toward a specific other (another consumer). Previous studies on schadenfreude have shown that it can be felt not only toward specific others (e.g., users of a competing brand) but also toward nonindividual entities, including competing brands themselves (Phillips‐Melancon & Dalakas, 2014) or rival sports teams (Leach et al., 2003). While the authors believe that there is no reason to expect that the effects observed in Studies 1, 2, and 3 should be different, replication of these studies by using nonindividual entities will enable scholars to examine the extent to which the current findings generalize.

Second, the present research adopted a previously successful manipulation of schadenfreude toward another consumer: their status purchase signaled higher social status and subsequent product failure elicited schadenfreude (Sundie et al., 2009). The authors believe this manipulation to be theoretically sound as it requires prior upward comparison with another consumer who is higher in social status and subsequent downward comparison when that consumer's purchase fails. Future research should test other manipulations of schadenfreude, for example, asking consumers to recall the instances when they felt schadenfreude toward someone (Kramer et al., 2011). Alternatively, to mimic some real‐life instances of schadenfreude, consumers may be shown a comparative ad featuring Caroline's tribulations with a competitor brand (cf., Yucel‐Aybat & Kramer, 2017), although the manipulations in Studies 1–3 are more general as they do not involve a direct comparison of choice options.

Further research may also study for how long the observed effects will persist. Will they live on until a consumer needs to repurchase a product (and thus choose their current product or a competitor product one more time) or will they dissipate by then? The answer to this question is likely to depend on the accessibility of feelings of schadenfreude at a particular point in time (Schwarz, 2012).

There may be a number of situational variables inherent in consumer purchases that may further moderate our observed effects. For example, a high degree of choice conflict (Chernev, Böckenholt, & Goodman, 2015) or of product involvement (Korgaonkar & Moschis, 1982; Olsen, 2007) should increase the observed effects, making consumers more likely to attend to positive information in their evaluations of their choices.

Individual differences may regulate how likely consumers are to apply feelings of schadenfreude to their judgments. For instance, need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Haddock, Maio, Arnold, & Huskinson, 2008), need for affect (Maio & Esses, 2001), and consumer preference for intuitive–experiential or analytical–rational thinking styles (Epstein, Pacini, Denes‐Raj, & Heier, 1996) may also moderate the observed effects, as less affect‐driven consumers may scrutinize the source of their feelings and not incorporate them into their judgments. Finally, consumer high in the Dark Triad traits (narcissism, Machiavellianism, and especially psychopathy) are more inclined to feel schadenfreude (James, Kavanagh, Jonason, Chonody, & Scrutton, 2014) and thus may be more likely to feel more satisfied with their purchases when those of others fail.

Still, schadenfreude may be a complex emotion, but it need not sound grim. Schadenfreude is not always a sign of a dark personality. It is a commonly experienced emotion and it is often used in marketing. The authors thus invite further research into how consumers' satisfaction, judgment, and behavior may rest on their feeling happy for someone else's loss.

Cultural pressure and biased responding in free will attitudes

Cultural pressure and biased responding in free will attitudes. Emiel Cracco, Carlos González-García, Ian Hussey, Senne Braem and David Wisniewski. Royal Society Open Science, August 26 2020. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.191824

Abstract: Whether you believe free will exists has profound effects on your behaviour, across different levels of processing, from simple motor action to social cognition. It is therefore important to understand which specific lay theories are held in the general public and why. Past research largely focused on investigating free will beliefs (FWB, ‘Do you think free will exists?’), but largely ignored a second key aspect: free will attitudes (FWA, ‘Do you like/value will?’). Attitudes are often independently predictive of behaviour, relative to beliefs, yet we currently know very little about FWAs in the general public. One key issue is whether such attitudes are subject to biased, socially desirable responding. The vast majority of the general public strongly believes in the existence of free will, which might create cultural pressure to value free will positively as well. In this registered report, we used a very large (N = 1100), open available dataset measuring implicit and explicit attitudes towards free will and determinism to address this issue. Our results indicate that both explicit and implicit attitudes towards free will are more positive than attitudes towards determinism. We also show that people experience cultural pressure to value free will, and to devalue determinism. Yet, we found no strong evidence that this cultural pressure affected either implicit or explicit attitudes in this dataset.

4. Discussion

In this registered report, we investigated attitudes towards free will and determinism in a large lay sample for the first time. Using data from the AIID project, we analysed both explicit and implicit attitudes towards free will and determinism. Attitudes towards free will were generally positive, while attitudes towards determinism were generally negative. This finding was robust to changes in how explicit and implicit attitudes were computed from the data. We further showed that people experience cultural pressure to value free will, and to devalue determinism. Contrary to our hypotheses, this pressure did not seem to affect free will attitudes.

4.1. Mapping free will attitudes in the general public

There is much prior research demonstrating that free will beliefs are dynamic, i.e. that they can be manipulated experimentally [7,16,21,37]. Such experimental manipulations often lead only to small effects, and there is little research directly addressing why changing free will beliefs is so difficult. Furthermore, free will belief manipulations probably affect different people to a varying degree, and we currently do not know which variables make a person susceptible to such manipulations. One factor that might partly explain these open questions is people's attitudes towards free will. A person with highly positive attitudes towards free will is likely to be less affected by FWB manipulations than a person with more negative attitudes towards free will. In order to test this hypothesis, we first need to map out and understand FWAs in the general public, which has not been done to date, however.

Our results show that both implicit and explicit attitudes towards free will are strongly positive in the general public. Only 11.39% of the participants explicitly valued free will negatively, while 34% chose the most positive available attitude rating on the scale, which mirrors similar findings for FWBs [4,5]. Furthermore, a lower proportion of participants explicitly valued determinism positively (35.96%), which again mirrors weaker belief in determinism in previous studies [5]. Interestingly, the mode of the explicit attitude distribution was nevertheless 0, indicating that many participants indicated to value free will and determinism to an equal degree. The same was not true for the implicit attitude distribution, which had a clearly positive mode instead. Thus, although many people indicated that they valued free will and determinism to an equal degree, implicit measures suggested that they in fact valued free will more strongly.

Additionally, our data demonstrate that there is considerable variance in FWAs (both explicit and implicit). Taken together, these results suggest that FWAs are a potential mediator for FWB manipulations, and might help explain why such manipulations are generally weak. Of course, these conclusions are tentative at the moment and will have to be confirmed empirically. Specifically, further research will need to directly assess the relation of FWBs and FWAs, and whether FWAs act as a mediator for FWB manipulations.

4.2. Cultural pressure and free will attitudes

One untested assumption in the free will belief literature is that responses to free will questionnaires are unbiased by cultural pressure. Here, we showed that in the domain of free will attitudes, participants indeed report cultural pressure to value free will, as well as a cultural pressure to devalue determinism. We further show that cultural pressure is stronger on free will than it is on determinism. Given this fact, one might expect that this cultural pressure affects attitudes in some measurable way. To investigate this possibility, we tested if more self-reported pressure to value free will led to more positive FWAs and whether more self-reported pressure led to more diverging explicit and implicit FWAs, since we expected cultural pressure to affect explicit attitudes more strongly than implicit ones. Both of these analyses yielded no significant results, however, leading us to conclude that cultural pressure did not affect FWA measures in our sample.

Although unexpected, there are some potential explanations for this finding. One option is that the cultural pressure measure did not fully capture the desired construct (biased/pressured responding). In order to assess cultural pressure, we only used two items that were rather blunt (e.g. ‘There is cultural pressure to think positive things about free will.’). Biased responding is clearly a wider concept than just self-rated cultural pressure, and is often measured using whole scales like the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) [38], a 40-item scale that measures both ‘impression management’ and ‘self-deceptive enhancement’. Such measures are more nuanced and of higher psychometric quality than the two cultural pressure items used in our main analysis.

While the BIDR was also part of the AIID dataset, we chose to use the cultural pressure items because the available sample size (214 < n < 233) was much higher than for the BIDR (13 < n < 55), and because these items were directly related to free will and determinism, while the BIDR is a much more general trait measure. However, the BIDR impression management and self-deceptive enhancement scales were included in the exploratory analysis correlating FWAs with personality traits, and we assessed BIDR scores in additional non-preregistered analyses. Impression management, which is arguably closer to the cultural pressure items used in the main analysis, did not correlate with either explicit (r = 0.09, p = 0.77, n = 13) or implicit (r = 0.06, p = 0.69, n = 43) attitudes. Thus, even this alternative measure of ‘cultural pressure’ showed no significant results. In contrast, self-deceptive enhancement did correlate with explicit attitudes (r = 0.63, p = 0.02, n = 13), but not with implicit attitudes (r = −0.02, p = 0.86, n = 55). Thus, it might be that people who tend to hold exaggerated positive self-descriptions report more positive feelings towards free will, relative to determinism. This exploratory finding is based on a very small sample size though and should be interpreted with caution until is it replicated in an independent, larger sample. Clearly, more research on this is needed, but this already demonstrates that free will attitudes might still be biased, just not by self-rated cultural pressure.

4.3. Exploratory analyses

In additional registered exploratory analyses, we found that age was positively related to free will attitudes. Interestingly, this finding is not consistent with a recent report that free will beliefs do not change with age [5]. This points to an interesting dissociation between free will beliefs and free will attitudes with increasing age that should be addressed in the future.

4.4. Directions for future research

Despite the many interesting findings in the current dataset, there remain several key open questions that should be addressed. First, the methods for measuring implicit attitudes towards free will need to be further refined. While the IAT is a much used and well validated instrument, its design only allows the assessment of two concepts in direct opposition. The IAT treats free will and determinism as two endpoints on a single attitude scale: the more you value free will, the less you value determinism, and vice versa. We know from free will belief research, however, that believing in free will does not automatically translate into disbelieving determinism [5], in fact one can believe in both at the same time (compatibilism, [1]). Thus, it might be that people also value both free will and determinism positively, yet the IAT is ill-suited to detect this pattern of free will related attitudes. Additionally, we found IAT scores to be more strongly related to deliberate thoughts on free will, than they are to gut feelings on free will, a pattern of results that we did not expect. Lastly, the words used to describe free will (intention, freedom, choice), and determinism (fixed, destined, arranged) have many uses that have little to do with the philosophical concepts of either free will or determinism, and might not precisely capture them. For instance, ‘arranged’ is often used to describe arranging a meeting, which has little to do with physical determinism. Taken together, this suggests that future research should invest effort into developing alternative measures of implicit attitudes towards free will.

Second, methods for measuring explicit attitudes towards free will and determinism should also be refined, and the precise wording of the attitude items might need to be revised. Additional effort should be invested into the precise wording of the attitude items. The AIID project used a wide range of different explicit attitude items, and here we focused on valence items (‘How positive or negative do you feel towards free will/determinism?’). For research specifically focusing on free will, it might be that other items (e.g. ‘Having free will is important to me’) are better suited to capture free will attitudes. Additionally, in order to make explicit and implicit attitude measures comparable here, we computed a difference score from free will and determinism valence ratings (val_diff). While this is useful from a methodological perspective, this procedure suffers from some of the same issues as the free will IAT. Just as the IAT cannot detect people who value both free will and determinism positively, as some compatibilists might do, the val_diff items cannot do so either. In the future, explicit attitude items for free will and determinism should be investigated separately, to more easily identify compatibilist participants.

Third, future work should focus on investigating free will beliefs and attitudes simultaneously, in order to describe and explain their interactions. Here, we focused on attitudes only, but in order to understand belief attitude interaction, e.g. whether free will attitudes mediate effects of free will belief manipulations on behaviour, we need to assess beliefs and attitudes within the same participants. This would also allow us to test whether free will attitudes are conditional on specific free will beliefs (e.g. ‘I can only value free will if I believe in it’), or vice versa. Relatedly, data reported here have been acquired between 2005 and 2007, while much of the work on free will beliefs has been performed about a decade later [4,5]. Attitudes can change across time, which further emphasizes the necessity to acquire beliefs and attitudes simultaneously if we are to understand how these two aspects of lay views on free will interact.

Quiet Fires Fail to Impress: Introverted Expressions of Passion Receive Less Social Worth, so those who express their passion extravertedly are more likely to reach higher organizational echelons

Cormier, Grace, and Jon Jachimowicz. 2020. “Quiet Fires Fail to Impress: Introverted Expressions of Passion Receive Less Social Worth.” PsyArXiv. August 26. doi:10.31234/osf.io/3zg4c

Abstract: Thinking of passionate people typically brings to mind their vivacious expressions. Prior research has shown that such outward manifestations of passion are often met with increased admiration and support by others. But not everyone may express their passion so animatedly. Drawing on personality research, we argue that vivacious expressions of passion capture only a narrow set of passion expressions: those characteristic of extraversion. We suggest that passion is also expressed in ways more aligned with introversion. Based on emerging sociological perspectives, we subsequently propose that introverted expressions of passion are rewarded less social worth than extraverted expressions of passion. We provide empirical support across four studies with full-time employees (N=1,060), including a study of subordinate-supervisor pairs. Our theory and results highlight that interpersonal effects of passion depend on how passion is expressed, whereby those who express their passion extravertedly—but not introvertedly—are more likely to reach higher organizational echelons.

I find support for pure altruism because individuals who received additional Social Security benefits passed on 15.4 percent to children via inter vivos transfers without receiving any additional care in return

Intergenerational Altruism and Retirement Transfers: Evidence from the Social Security Notch. Anita Mukherjee. J. Human Resources August 6, 2020 0419-10140R3. http://jhr.uwpress.org/content/early/2020/08/11/jhr.58.1.0419-10140R3.abstract

Abstract: I contribute new evidence on altruistic preferences in intergenerational transfers using variation in Social Security benefits induced by an inflation-indexing mistake. The instrument is most relevant for those with low education, so I focus on this group. I find support for pure altruism because individuals who received additional Social Security benefits passed on 15.4 percent to children via inter vivos transfers without receiving any additional care in return. On the contrary, children reduce caregiving monotonically with increases in parental Social Security benefits. Adult female children appear to be the most affected as they both receive monetary transfers and reduce caregiving.

Adoptees: Parents’ over‐reactive and hostile parenting at 27 months were partially due to heritable (bio-mother internalizing problems and substance use) & prenatal factors (bio-mother illicit drug use during pregnancy)

Child Effects on Parental Negativity: The Role of Heritable and Prenatal Factors. Chang Liu et al. Child Development, Aug 1 2020. https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.13404

Abstract: This study examined two possible mechanisms, evocative gene-environment correlation and prenatal factors, in accounting for child effects on parental negativity. Participants included 561 children adopted at birth, and their adoptive parents and birth parents within a prospective longitudinal adoption study. Findings indicated child effects on parental negativity, such that toddlers’ negative reactivity at 18 months was positively associated with adoptive parents’ over‐reactive and hostile parenting at 27 months. Furthermore, we found that child effects on parental negativity were partially due to heritable (e.g., birth mother [BM] internalizing problems and substance use) and prenatal factors (e.g., BM illicit drug use during pregnancy) that influence children’s negative reactivity at 18 months. This study provides critical evidence for “child on parent” effects.

From 2019... They used the spin precession of the Rb atoms as a clock to measure the time it takes them to cross the classically forbidden region; traversal time was 0.61(7) ms

Measurement of the time spent by a tunnelling atom within the barrier region. Ramón Ramos, David Spierings, Isabelle Racicot & Aephraim M. Steinberg. Nature volume 583, pages529–532(2020). Jul 22, 2020. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-020-2490-7

Abstract: Tunnelling is one of the most characteristic phenomena of quantum physics, underlying processes such as photosynthesis and nuclear fusion, as well as devices ranging from superconducting quantum interference device (SQUID) magnetometers to superconducting qubits for quantum computers. The question of how long a particle takes to tunnel through a barrier, however, has remained contentious since the first attempts to calculate it1. It is now well understood that the group delay2—the arrival time of the peak of the transmitted wavepacket at the far side of the barrier—can be smaller than the barrier thickness divided by the speed of light, without violating causality. This has been confirmed by many experiments3,4,5,6, and a recent work even claims that tunnelling may take no time at all7. There have also been efforts to identify a different timescale that would better describe how long a given particle spends in the barrier region8,9,10. Here we directly measure such a time by studying Bose-condensed 87Rb atoms tunnelling through a 1.3-micrometre-thick optical barrier. By localizing a pseudo-magnetic field inside the barrier, we use the spin precession of the atoms as a clock to measure the time that they require to cross the classically forbidden region. We study the dependence of the traversal time on the incident energy, finding a value of 0.61(7) milliseconds at the lowest energy for which tunnelling is observable. This experiment lays the groundwork for addressing fundamental questions about history in quantum mechanics: for instance, what we can learn about where a particle was at earlier times by observing where it is now11,12,13.

Free version from 2019... Measuring the time a tunnelling atom spends in the barrier. Ramón Ramos, David Spierings, Isabelle Racicot, Aephraim M. Steinberg. arXiv:1907.13523. Jul 31 2019. https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.13523

Abstract: Tunnelling is one of the most paradigmatic and evocative phenomena of quantum physics, underlying processes such as photosynthesis and nuclear fusion, as well as devices ranging from SQUID magnetometers to superconducting qubits for quantum computers. The question of how long a particle takes to tunnel, however, has remained controversial since the first attempts to calculate it, which relied on the group delay. It is now well understood that this delay (the arrival time of the transmitted wave packet peak at the far side of the barrier) can be smaller than the barrier thickness divided by the speed of light, without violating causality. There have been a number of experiments confirming this, and even a recent one claiming that tunnelling may take no time at all. There have also been efforts to identify another timescale, which would better describe how long a given particle spends in the barrier region. Here we present a direct measurement of such a time, studying Bose-condensed 87Rb atoms tunnelling through a 1.3-μm thick optical barrier. By localizing a pseudo-magnetic field inside the barrier, we use the spin precession of the atoms as a clock to measure the time it takes them to cross the classically forbidden region. We find a traversal time of 0.62(7) ms and study its dependence on incident energy. In addition to finally shedding light on the fundamental question of the tunnelling time, this experiment lays the groundwork for addressing deep foundational questions about history in quantum mechanics: for instance, what can we learn about where a particle was at earlier times by observing where it is now?

In the American and Dutch samples, we found that optimism increased across younger adulthood, plateaued in midlife, and then decreased in older adulthood

Changes in optimism and pessimism in response to life events: Evidence from three large panel studies. William J. Chopik et al. Journal of Research in Personality, Volume 88, October 2020, 103985. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.103985

Abstract: Although individuals vary in how optimistic they are about the future, one assumption that researchers make is that optimism is sensitive to changes in life events and circumstances. We examined how optimism and pessimism changed across the lifespan and in response to life events in three large panel studies (combined N = 74,886). In the American and Dutch samples, we found that optimism increased across younger adulthood, plateaued in midlife, and then decreased in older adulthood. In the German sample, there were inconsistent results with respect to age differences and mean level changes in optimism. Associations between life events and changes in optimism/pessimism were inconsistent across samples. We discuss our results in the context of life events and lifespan development.

Keywords: OptimismLifespan developmentLife eventsAgingTime perspectiveAdult personality development


Check also Optimism increased throughout early & middle adulthood before plateauing at age 55; experience of positive events was associated with optimism development across adulthood; negative life events were not associated with development:

Optimism Development Across Adulthood and Associations With Positive and Negative Life Events. Ted Schwaba et al. Social Psychological and Personality Science, March 21, 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/03/optimism-increased-throughout-early.html

Honesty-Humility (HH) is negatively linked to dishonest behavior; the HH-dishonesty link is unaffected by the utility of incentives (irrespective of incentive size or a gain-vs-loss framing)

On the robustness of the association between Honesty-Humility and dishonest behavior for varying incentives. Sina A. Klein et al. Journal of Research in Personality, Volume 88, October 2020, 104006. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104006

Highlights
• Honesty-Humility (HH) is negatively linked to dishonest behavior.
• The HH-dishonesty link is unaffected by the utility of incentives.
• This finding replicates for incentive size and different framing of incentives.

Abstract: Previous research consistently showed a negative link between Honesty-Humility (HH) and dishonest behavior. However, most prior research neglected the influence of situational factors and their potential interaction with HH. In two incentivized experiments (N = 322, N = 552), we thus tested whether the (subjective) utility of incentives moderates the HH-dishonesty link. Replicating prior evidence, HH showed a consistent negative link to dishonesty. However, the utility of incentives did not moderate this association, neither when manipulated through incentive size (BF01 = 5.7) nor when manipulated through gain versus loss framing (BF01 = 20.4). These results demonstrate the robustness of the HH-dishonesty link.

Keywords: HEXACO Honesty-HumilityCoin-toss taskCheatingIncentivesFraming

Desired personality traits in politicians: The ideal politician is more stable, extravert, conscientious, open, honest than voter

Desired personality traits in politicians: Similar to me but more of a leader. ulian Aichholzer, Johanna Willmann. Journal of Research in Personality, Volume 88, October 2020, 103990. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.103990

Highlights
• Provides insights into citizens’ personality trait preferences for politicians.
• Ideal politician is more stable, extravert, conscientious, open, honest than voter.
• Citizens seek personality similarity in basic value-related traits.
• Personality similarity is mediated by core ideological views.
• Similarity may ensure affective closeness and ideological representation.

Abstract: What makes voters prefer a certain type of politician? First, we argue that voters’ trait preferences follow a “desired leadership” principle. We show that citizens want the ideal-type politician to be more emotionally stable, extravert-assertive, more deliberate-conscientious and open, more honest, but also somewhat more disagreeable than the average citizen. Second, we argue that voters prefer a model candidate with similar basic value-related personality traits. Importantly, we show that trait congruence is partly mediated by core ideological preferences and thus ensures democratic representation. The study’s findings have implications for personalization of politics and democratic representation, because personality traits can be vital cues for voters deciding whether candidates will act in their interest and represent them well.

Keywords: Congruency modelAssumed similarityLeader personalityIdeological attitudesPolitician

6. Summary and conclusion

If candidates are taking over as figureheads in electoral campaigns, the question naturally arises, what makes voters prefer a certain type of politician? We start from the assumption that a politician’s personality is a powerful anchoring cue and heuristic in that regard. Such a heuristic might become even more decisive in a world where candidates use personalized communication and campaigning through various social media channels. In doing so, candidates themselves serve as the faces of their parties, which allows and forces candidates to constantly create images of themselves. From such images, voters can infer the personality traits of candidates that are—in analogy to parties’ ideological leanings—relatively stable individual differences in behaviors that allow voters to extrapolate the what and how of politicians’ likely future behavior.

This leads us to develop two principles that guide voters’ preferences for personality traits in politicians. First, we contend that voters expect politicians to be more capable or “better” than themselves on traits associated with leadership (the “desired leadership traits” principle). Our results show that, when compared to the general population, voters want politicians to be more emotionally stable, extravert-assertive, more deliberate-conscientious and open, more honest, but also somewhat more disagreeable—many of the traits associated with leadership, political ambition, and higher media visibility.

Second, we contend that voters seek representation by candidates who exhibit personality congruence with their own personality (the “voter-politician congruence” principle). This is partly due to the sheer emotional liking of likeness that allows for identification with the candidate. However, as we were able to show, to some degree, homophily is also due to ideological reasons and permits voters to determine what candidates would do once they are in office. We have demonstrated that greater SDO partly explains (mediates) a preference for politicians who score low on agreeableness, while greater RWA partly explains a preference for politicians low on openness and high on conscientiousness.

6.1. Implications

Our research has several important implications. First, one could be tempted to conclude that political campaign content is taking a backseat as individual personalities are increasingly superseding parties as cues and targets in political elections. We argue that, on the contrary, people’s vote choice is not necessarily becoming less political when voters shift from choosing between parties to choosing between candidates, since personality is not void of ideologically relevant content. As we have shown, ideological leanings shape preferences for politicians’ personalities.

Second, we put forward an explanation for why the general public will demand certain traits from their leaders, who are expected to accomplish certain tasks and navigate the country into a stable and prosperous future.

Third, we further develop the theory on personality trait matching and provide a bridge between the two—at times mutually exclusive—concepts, namely, desired similarity (representation) between the targets and desired exceptionality (need for a leader). In the literature on personal relationships and mating, for instance, there exist two approaches: people look for partners who are similar to themselves (assortative mating), and there are absolute preferences (aspirational assortative preference), i.e., traits that are more generally endorsed (Liu et al., 2018). We argue that even in an asymmetrical relationship like the one between voters and politicians, similarity plays an important role and limits aspirational considerations. Voters generally want to be represented by their politicians, i.e., seek similarity, but on traits that are conventionally associated with good leadership, they expect politicians to be more capable than themselves.

Fourth, and of crucial importance, we provide for an account of why voters might seek trait similarity with politicians. The congruency model, as outlined by Caprara and Zimbardo (2004), demonstrates voter-politician similarity in traits but leaves room for speculation about the mechanism and the function of the similarity principle (see Caprara et al., 2007). We try to close this gap and suggest that similarity serves two functions. First, a preference for similarity might stem from a mere liking of likeness, which allows for affective closeness to the politician in question. Second, however, we introduce a new way of looking at personality trait similarity and argue that it also serves a political function, namely, ideological representation. We demonstrate that similarity on openness, conscientiousness, and agreeableness is partially explained—and thus partially mediated—by ideological beliefs (SDO, RWA). This lends support to several theories arguing that our personality is an organizing system that translates into motivational goals or values, including SDO and RWA, which eventually guide ideological orientations and political behavior (Caprara and Vecchione, 2017, Duckitt and Sibley, 2010, Jost et al., 2009).

6.2. Limitations and future avenues

Finally, we want to discuss some limitations of the current study and propose avenues for future research. Our studies lack a standardized personality inventory tailored to the job of politicians. This is because we used a personality inventory that would lend itself to a bipolar rating scale format without creating (huge) social desirability. A contextualized measure with item content applicable to the job of politicians is, however, missing thus far. A suitable and more extensive measurement of personality would also allow for delving deeper into personality facets or “dark” or “socially malevolent” traits, such as narcissism and machiavellianism. Hence, future studies might investigate whether and which of the more specific traits and socially malevolent traits are preferred/accepted by voters, who does so, and under what circumstances (context).

Further, we asked respondents to rate what their ideal politician would look like (see also Kinder et al., 1980, Roets and Van Hiel, 2009), although with somewhat different question framing (“lead the country and ensure that the population is doing well”/”which of the following character traits make a good politician”). However, with this format, we cannot assess whether respondents thought of one or several abstract model politicians or whether they had a concrete man or a concrete woman in mind (see Kinder et al., 1980). Nevertheless, we think that this does not interfere with our conclusions about an idealized picture of aspired traits and the congruence with them. We did not ask respondents whether they would indeed vote for particular politicians that exhibit these traits (and that carry other confounding variables such as a party). Future research might want to address this and examine more closely whether desired traits by voters are indeed decisive as vote determinants.

The two samples investigated in the present work are, of course, limited in their generalizability. While Study 1 allowed us to make inferences about expectations regarding more specific personality facets, Study 2 does only measure perceptions about broad personality domains. In addition, although the Austrian sample (Study 2) was based on a random population sample, the German sample (Study 1) was not representative of the general population. It thus remains to be determined to what extent the reported findings can be generalized to other samples, for instance, outside Europe.

Another avenue to follow up on the present research is the homophily (or similarity) principle between voters and politicians more generally and its significance for political representation. In the political science literature, the homophily principle is not at all new. For example, it is well established that voters tend to support candidates with similar sociodemographic characteristics (Campbell et al., 1960, Cutler, 2002). Additionally, similarity in physical traits, such as facial similarity between voters and candidates, seems to create liking (e.g., Bailenson, Iyengar, Yee, & Collins, 2008). More recently, Bankert (2016) found that even nonpolitical social similarity with the party prototype (e.g., hobbies, lifestyle) intensifies feelings of partisan identity. With candidates becoming more important voting cues, future research might want to further investigate voter-politician similarity as well as which specific traits make the “ideal” politician.

Feeling emotions for others that they don’t feel: Agency appraisals and vicarious anger

Feeling emotions for others that they don’t feel: Agency appraisals and vicarious anger. Joshua Daniel Wondra. PsyArXiv, Aug 24, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.31234/OSF.IO/M4BXZ

Abstract: How do people feel emotions for someone else? This has been studied as empathy—feeling the same emotion that someone else feels. But people also feel emotions for someone else that the other person doesn’t feel, such as feeling angry for someone who is sad. We use appraisal theories to predict that people feel an emotion for someone else when they appraise that person’s situation differently. According to appraisal theories, people react to misfortunes with anger if they are caused by another person, but not if the cause is impersonal, and we predicted that this would also be true in feeling emotions for another person, regardless of what the other person feels. In two studies, subjects learned about a disadvantaged high school student who applied to college and was rejected from every school. Subjects felt angrier when they learned that the student’s friend caused the bad outcome than when the student made a well-intentioned mistake, but they did not think the student felt angry. The difference in subjects’ anger was mediated by changes in appraisals of agency. The student believed the rejections were caused by bad circumstances and felt sad in both conditions. The results extend research on empathy and other vicarious emotional experiences by supporting appraisal as a process that is involved in feeling emotions for other people.

Is it obligatory to donate effectively? Judgments about the wrongness of donating ineffectively

Is it obligatory to donate effectively? Judgments about the wrongness of donating ineffectively. Lucius Caviola, Stefan Schubert. PsyArXiv, Aug 24, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/J2H4R

Abstract: Most donations end up with relatively ineffective charities. In this paper, we present five preliminary studies on the hypothesis that people don’t find it obligatory to donate effectively. We find that people typically do not find it obligatory to donate to highly effective charities. We explore the conditions under which people ​do ​consider it obligatory to help effectively. For example, we find that people consider effectiveness more important when they are the only person who can help, or when the ineffective option is Pareto dominated by a more effective option. We also find that judgments of how obligatory it is to donate effectively are correlated with judgments of how obligatory it is to donate in the first place.

Check also Donors vastly underestimate differences in charities’ effectiveness. Lucius Caviola et al. Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 15, No. 4, July 2020, pp. 509–516. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2020/07/some-charities-are-much-more-cost.html

Comparing the morally relevant capacities (e.g., intelligence, emotional capacities) of an animal that is frequently eaten by Americans (pig) & one that is not (dog) shifted participants’ moral beliefs about eating meat

Horne, Zachary, Josh Rottman, and Caroline Lawrence. 2018. “Can Coherence-based Interventions Change Dogged Moral Beliefs?.” PsyArXiv. December 31. doi:10.31234/osf.io/jx6fd

Abstract: Coherence-based interventions can change people’s moral beliefs about abstract moral principles, but it is unclear whether these interventions would be similarly effective for everyday moral beliefs that can impact routine behavior. In the present research, we examined whether coherence-based “memes” highlighting the moral similarities of pigs and dogs can likewise shift moral beliefs about consuming meat. Across three experiments, we found beliefs about the permissibility of eating some animals can be subtly shifted by brief coherence-based interventions which highlight moral similarity. Comparing the morally relevant capacities (e.g., intelligence, emotional capacities) of an animal that is frequently eaten by Americans (pig) and an animal that is typically considered forbidden to eat by Americans (dog) shifted participants’ moral beliefs. We discuss the implications of these findings for psychological and ethical theory.

Charter schools increase quality of available teachers: Educators with high fixed-costs use charter schools to explore teaching careers before obtaining licenses required for higher paying public sector jobs

Regulatory Arbitrage in Teacher Hiring and Retention: Evidence from Massachusetts Charter Schools. Jesse Bruhn, Scott Imberman & Marcus Winters. NBER Working Paper 27607, July 2020. https://www.nber.org/papers/w27607

Abstract: We study personnel flexibility in charter schools by exploring how teacher retention varies with teacher and school quality in Massachusetts. Charters are more likely to lose their highest and lowest value-added teachers. Low performers tend to exit public education, while high performers tend to switch to traditional public schools. To rationalize these findings, we propose a model in which educators with high fixed-costs use charter schools to explore teaching careers before obtaining licenses required for higher paying public sector jobs. The model suggests charter schools create positive externalities for traditional public schools by increasing the average quality of available teachers.

Supporting previous evidence, it was found that individuals were more prosocial when gossip (both positive and negative) was possible, compared to when their behavior was completely anonymous

Imada, H., Hopthrow, T., & Abrams, D. (2020). The role of positive and negative gossip in promoting prosocial behavior. Evolutionary Behavioral Sciences, Aug 2020. https://doi.org/10.1037/ebs0000218

Abstract: Gossip can promote cooperation via reputational concern. However, the relative effectiveness of positive and negative gossip in fostering prosociality has not been examined. The present study explored the influence of positive and negative gossip on prosocial behavior, using an economic game. Supporting previous evidence, it was found that individuals were more prosocial when gossip of any kind was possible, compared to when their behavior was completely anonymous. However, there was no significant difference in the efficiency in promoting cooperation between positive and negative gossip, suggesting that it is reputational concern elicited by gossip per se, rather than its valence, that stimulates prosociality

While partisanship influenced the extent to which participants relied on the misinformation overall, retractions were equally effective across all conditions; no impact of political worldview on retraction effectiveness

Ecker, Ullrich K. H., Brandon Sze, and Matthew Andreotta. 2020. “No Effect of Partisan Worldview on Corrections of Political Misinformation.” PsyArXiv. August 20. doi:10.31234/osf.io/bszm4

Abstract: Misinformation often has a continuing effect on people’s reasoning despite clear correction. One factor assumed to affect post-correction reliance on misinformation is worldview-driven motivated reasoning. For example, a recent study with an Australian undergraduate sample found that when politically-situated misinformation was retracted, political partisanship influenced the effectiveness of the retraction. This worldview effect was asymmetrical, that is, particularly pronounced in politically-conservative participants. However, the evidence regarding such worldview effects (and their symmetry) has been inconsistent. Thus, the present study aimed to extend previous findings by examining a sample of 429 pre-screened U.S. participants supporting either the Democratic or Republican Party. Participants received misinformation suggesting that politicians of either party were more likely to commit embezzlement; this was or was not subsequently retracted, and participants’ inferential reasoning was measured. While political worldview (i.e., partisanship) influenced the extent to which participants relied on the misinformation overall, retractions were equally effective across all conditions. There was no impact of political worldview on retraction effectiveness, let alone evidence of a backfire effect, and thus we did not replicate the asymmetry observed in the Australian-based study. This pattern emerged despite some evidence that Republicans showed a stronger emotional response than Democrats to worldview-incongruent misinformation.

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In sum, our results are in line with the notion that potentially-irrational rejection of
evidence is equally likely on both ends of the political-worldview spectrum, and that part of
the reason that evidence rejection has been predominantly demonstrated in conservatives is
that researchers have predominantly looked at rejection of evidence that is consistent with
conservative worldviews. However, this presents future research with a conundrum, because
a number of studies have now aimed but failed to find rejection of scientific evidence on the
left (e.g., Baumgaertner, Carlisle, & Justwan, 2018; Hamilton, Hartter, & Saito, 2015;
Lewandowsky, Woike, & Oberauer, 2020). For example, Lewandowsky et al. (2020)
reported that vaccine-hesitancy and endorsement of alternative medicine—both anecdotally
associated with a liberal worldview—were in fact more prevalent in right-wing libertarians
and conservatives. Based on additional evidence from a task that required reasoning about
scientific evidence “dilemmas” that featured both worldview-consistent and inconsistent
aspects, Lewandowsky et al. concluded that partisans on both ends of the spectrum show
biased processing of evidence, but that science denial was nevertheless a mainstay of the
political right. Future research therefore needs to shed light on the catalysts that turn
omnipresent information-processing biases into actual evidence rejection and science denial.