Saturday, September 12, 2020

From 2016... Establishing a link between sex-related differences in the structural connectome and behaviour

From 2016... Tunç B et al. 2016. Establishing a link between sex-related differences in the structural connectome and behaviour. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 371:20150111. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2015.0111

Recent years have witnessed an increased attention to studies of sex differences, partly because such differences offer important considerations for personalized medicine. While the presence of sex differences in human behaviour is well documented, our knowledge of their anatomical foundations in the brain is still relatively limited. As a natural gateway to fathom the human mind and behaviour, studies concentrating on the human brain network constitute an important segment of the research effort to investigate sex differences. Using a large sample of healthy young individuals, each assessed with diffusion MRI and a computerized neurocognitive battery, we conducted a comprehensive set of experiments examining sex-related differences in the meso-scale structures of the human connectome and elucidated how these differences may relate to sex differences at the level of behaviour. Our results suggest that behavioural sex differences, which indicate complementarity of males and females, are accompanied by related differences in brain structure across development. When using subnetworks that are defined over functional and behavioural domains, we observed increased structural connectivity related to the motor, sensory and executive function subnetworks in males. In females, subnetworks associated with social motivation, attention and memory tasks had higher connectivity. Males showed higher modularity compared to females, with females having higher inter-modular connectivity. Applying multivariate analysis, we showed an increasing separation between males and females in the course of development, not only in behavioural patterns but also in brain structure. We also showed that these behavioural and structural patterns correlate with each other, establishing a reliable link between brain and behaviour.



Check also Multifaceted origins of sex differences in the brain. Margaret M. McCarthy. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B Vol. 371, Issue 1688, February 19 2016. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2015.0106

Abstract: Studies of sex differences in the brain range from reductionistic cell and molecular analyses in animal models to functional imaging in awake human subjects, with many other levels in between. Interpretations and conclusions about the importance of particular differences often vary with differing levels of analyses and can lead to discord and dissent. In the past two decades, the range of neurobiological, psychological and psychiatric endpoints found to differ between males and females has expanded beyond reproduction into every aspect of the healthy and diseased brain, and thereby demands our attention. A greater understanding of all aspects of neural functioning will only be achieved by incorporating sex as a biological variable. The goal of this review is to highlight the current state of the art of the discipline of sex differences research with an emphasis on the brain and to contextualize the articles appearing in the accompanying special issue.
But there is another window into the human brain and that is through the minds of boys and girls. Hines has discovered a robust sex difference in toy preference between boys and girls and has convincingly demonstrated over many studies that girls prenatally exposed to androgen owing to a genetic anomaly (congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH) girls) have a boy-like toy preference [30,31]. In this issue, Hines [32] makes another major leap forward in illuminating how androgens impact the developing human brain with evidence that CAH girls are less sensitive than unaffected girls to extraneous socialization cues about gender-appropriate toy-choices. Thus, rather than concluding that there is some undiscovered ‘prefers-dolls-nucleus' in the brain, her recent work demonstrates how children are differentially sensitive to socializing cues, so that girls become even more girl-like by modelling the behaviour of other females. In this way, the nature versus nurture conundrum is broken down with the realization that nature determines the response to nurture. Whether the converse is true for boys is not yet known.

Jinping Xi : Swift shift from collective leadership to strongman rule was the result of a widely shared consensus among China’s ruling elite that the regime was facing a severe crisis that necessitated a return to such rule

A Strong Leader for A Time of Crisis: Xi Jinping’s Strongman Politics as A Collective Response to Regime Weakness. Nimrod Baranovitch. Journal of Contemporary China, Jul 13 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2020.1790901

ABSTRACT: Seeking to explain the reasons for the swift shift from collective leadership to strongman rule during Xi Jinping’s early years in office, this article argues that it was the result of a widely shared consensus among China’s ruling elite that the regime was facing a severe crisis that necessitated a return to such rule. This argument challenges the widely held view that the dramatic centralization of power in Xi’s hands was the result mainly of his individual personality, motives, and actions. While many of the factual details that this article presents are not new, it is the first to systematically integrate many of these facts to create a coherent explanation of China’s surprising abandonment of the collective leadership model that goes beyond Xi’s individual role.

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How Strong Leaders are Made: A Combination of Structure and Agency

For many years, some Western experts and liberal Chinese intellectuals and reformist leaders have
urged China to adopt significant political reforms and promote democratization, arguing that this
was the only way that the country would be able to continue to develop and flourish and overcome
the many structural problems that it faced.70 However, as China’s politics under Xi Jinping demonstrates, for many Chinese and particularly among the majority of China’s top-level leaders, this option has obviously not been a desirable one. In fact, as one China observer has put it, the return to
strongman politics under Xi Jinping was actually a ‘return to a more normal political reality in
China’.71 Indeed, ironically, even many of the more liberal and reformist leaders in China of recent
decades have supported the notion of strong, authoritarian leadership, arguing that such leadership
is necessary to advance reform.72 Thus, the choice of the Chinese ruling elite to return to strongman
politics in a time of crisis should come as no surprise. After all, the tendency to centralize political
power in times of crisis is a well-known phenomenon and is certainly not unique to China. Many
dictators and less totalitarian strong leaders in world history have emerged and continue to emerge
in situations of national crisis. Moreover, as history has shown multiple times, in states of emergency,
even in democracies it is a norm, often anchored in the law, to concentrate more power in the hands
of the regime at the expense of citizens’ individual rights and liberties. In light of these general
tendencies, it should come as no surprise that the centralization of political power in a time of crisis
manifests itself in a more radical form in a non-democratic country like China that has always
preferred authoritative forms of government.
As the shift to personalistic rule under Xi Jinping seems to demonstrate, China’s ruling elite still
considered a strongman leader as the best mechanism to overcome the many challenges that their
country currently confronts. From the perspective of China’s political culture, a strong leader can
unite quarreling factions within the political elite by imposing his unchallenged authority. Very much
aware of this role, since he came to power, Xi has repeatedly criticized the cliques and factions within
the Party, and the continuing campaign against corruption that has been implemented under his
command has dealt powerful blows to both factions, signaling that he is above factional politics.73 As an all-powerful leader, Xi can also take decisive and drastic actions to radically transform
a problematic reality without the need to compromise or appease competing sources of power
and interest groups. Furthermore, a strong leader can also create a sense of security among an
anxious society and restore the legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of the public when this
legitimacy is challenged or eroded. Indeed, in authoritarian regimes, the charisma and popularity
of the top leader often serve as one of the regime’s main sources of legitimacy,74 especially in times
when other resources of legitimation are exhausted. In addition to all of these advantages, strong leaders can also project their personal power outward to deter external powers that already pose or
are about to pose a serious threat to their country.
The tendency in China to centralize political power seems to have been strengthened in recent
decades and even more so in recent years as a result of global events. As many of the sources cited in
this article illustrate, China’s leaders consider the collapse of the Soviet Union a disaster that took
place not only because the regime lost its legitimacy, but also because of political reforms and
because the leadership lost its faith in the dominant ideology and the political system. In a similar
vein, many Chinese look at the gloomy outcome of the Arab Spring in Syria, Libya, Egypt, and other
countries and see political chaos, civil war, mass death, and rising poverty, and they find nothing
attractive in this path of failed democratization.
It is quite possible that the return of strongman leadership to China would have taken place long
before Xi Jinping came to power. Favorable conditions for such a return were already in existence
during the years that followed the Tian’anmen crisis of 1989, when the Party’s legitimacy was at its
lowest point since the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, the ‘Mao Craze’ (毛热) that swept China in the
wake of the violent crackdown, during which the country saw a surge of popular nostalgia for the
deceased leader, reflected the yearning of the public and many conservative members of the ruling
elite for an all-powerful leader who would restore a sense of stability, order, and security.75 The
yearning for strong leadership was not confined to popular fads but was also manifested in several
policy changes. Indeed, in the early 1990s the Party retreated from all of former general secretary
Zhao Ziyang’s political reforms, and contrary to the practice that Deng Xiaoping promoted of
decentralizing power in the higher ranks of the Party, all of the three highest political positions
(Party general secretary, chairman of the CMC, and president) were given to Jiang Zemin. Moreover,
after promoting collective leadership for almost a decade, as an immediate reaction to the
Tian’anmen crisis, Deng himself seems to have realized that this model of leadership had its
limitations. Thus, although he did not eliminate collective leadership, already in June 1989 he
came up with the new concept of the ‘core leader’ in a clear attempt to consolidate the authority
of Jiang Zemin and thereby ensure elite cohesion.76
These changes notwithstanding, several conditions prevented the return of strongman leadership
at that time. These factors included the memory of the disastrous Cultural Revolution, which was
still too fresh, Deng’s resistance to such a renaissance and his insistence on proceeding with reforms,
and no less importantly, the fact that the new Party general secretary, Jiang Zemin, did not possess
the personal qualities that are needed to make a strongman leader. However, contrary to the
situation in the post-Tian’anmen years, in 2012/2013 all of the factors that prevented the return of
a strong leader two decades earlier had disappeared. The Cultural Revolution had practically been
forgotten, Deng Xiaoping was not around anymore, China was richer and more confident that
material prosperity could be achieved without political reform, and Xi Jinping had more charisma
than Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, as well as the other necessary personal qualities that are needed to
make a strong leader and which were mentioned in the beginning of this article. Xi was the right man
at the right time, and once he had the support of enough members of China’s ruling elite due to the
severe crisis that the regime was facing, the way was paved for China’s return to one-man rule.
However, while provisional elite support certainly helped empower Xi Jinping in his early years in
office, his moves and actions in recent years suggest that he has taken this opportunity and
consolidated and developed his strongman leadership to a degree that is perhaps beyond the
intentions even of those who supported him. It remains to be seen for how much longer Xi will be
able to hold so much power and still maintain his legitimacy and the broad elite support that he has
enjoyed until recently.

The Washington Consensus, 1970-2015: Despite the unpopularity of the Washington Consensus, its policies reliably raise average incomes; countries that had sustained reform were 16% richer 10 years later

The Washington Consensus Works: Causal Effects of Reform, 1970-2015. Kevin B. Grier, Robin M. Grier. Journal of Comparative Economics, September 8 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2020.09.001

Highlights
• Sustained economic reform significantly raises real GDP per capita over a 5- to 10-year horizon.
• Despite the unpopularity of the Washington Consensus, its policies reliably raise average incomes.
• Countries that had sustained reform were 16% richer 10 years later.

Abstract: Traditional policy reforms of the type embodied in the Washington Consensus have been out of academic fashion for decades. However, we are not aware of a paper that convincingly rejects the efficacy of these reforms. In this paper, we define generalized reform as a discrete, sustained jump in an index of economic freedom, whose components map well onto the points of the old consensus. We identify 49 cases of generalized reform in our dataset that spans 141 countries from 1970 to 2015. The average treatment effect associated with these reforms is positive, sizeable, and significant over 5- and 10- year windows. The result is robust to different thresholds for defining reform and different estimation methods. We argue that the policy reform baby was prematurely thrown out with the neoliberal bathwater.

Keywords: ReformWashington ConsensusRule of lawProperty rightsEconomic development


Effects of the Black Death: Growth of Europe relative to the rest of the world, demise of serfdom in Western Europe, decline in the authority of religious institutions, and emergence of stronger states

Jedwab, Remi and Johnson, Noel D. and Koyama, Mark, The Economic Impact of the Black Death (August 18, 2020). SSRN, Aug 18 2020. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3689980

Abstract: The Black Death was the largest demographic shock in European history. We review the evidence for the origins, spread, and mortality of the disease. We document that it was a plausibly exogenous shock to the European economy and trace out its aggregate and local impacts in both the short-run and the long-run. The initial effect of the plague was highly disruptive. Wages and per capita income rose. But, in the long-run, this rise was only sustained in some parts of Europe. The other indirect long-run effects of the Black Death are associated with the growth of Europe relative to the rest of the world, especially Asia and the Middle East (the Great Divergence), a shift in the economic geography of Europe towards the Northwest (the Little Divergence), the demise of serfdom in Western Europe, a decline in the authority of religious institutions, and the emergence of stronger states. Finally, avenues for future research are laid out.

Keywords: Pandemics; Black Death; Institutions; Cities; Urbanization; Malthusian Theory; Demography; Long-Run Growth; Middle Ages; Europe; Asia
JEL Classification: N00; N13; I15; I14; J11; O10; O43

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Numerous scholars are interested in the emergence of the rule of law and “inclusive institutions” (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, 2019). One aspect of this is the protection of minorities. Finley and Koyama (2018) study the Black Death pogroms in the Holy Roman Empire and show that political decentralization and fragmentation was dangerous for minority groups: the fact that no one ruler had an encompassing interest in protecting Jews made violence more likely. Specifically, using data from Germania Judaica for the entirety of the Holy Roman Empire and covering 340 Jewish communities, Finley and Koyama (2018) construct an ordinal measure of pogrom intensity. They find that the persecution of Jews was more violent in communities governed by bishoprics, archbishoprics, and imperial free cities. Specifically, they had a 20-25% higher “intensity score” meaning that Jews in those cities were more likely to be “wiped out” or “killed in large numbers”. In contrast, Jews were less vulnerable in territories ruled either by the emperor or by one of the major secular electors. These findings suggest that in the absence of the rule of law, minority groups are better protected under an autocrat and that they are especially vulnerable when power is contested.