Self-reports on the motives of selfishness, duty, altruism, belonging, and social approval: Selfish motives account for only about 15%

What Motivates People to Vote? The Role of Selfishness, Duty, and Social Motives When Voting. Valentina A. Bali, Lindon J. Robison, Richard Winder. SAGE Open, October 10, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244020950376

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1315164934637060096

Abstract: This study assesses the relative importance and explanatory power of five fundamental psychological motives for voting. Using United States survey data, we analyze self-reports on the motives of selfishness, duty, altruism, belonging, and social approval in relation to turnout. These motives have precedents in the literature, but they have not yet been evaluated simultaneously. We find that altruism and duty are the most important reported motives for turnout accounting for more than 60% of the allocations; selfish motives account for only about 15%. Turnout behavior responds positively to the motives of duty, altruism, and belonging, but it is dampened by the motive of selfishness. Turning out to vote emerges as an activity largely shaped by an individual’s social concerns and values.

Keywords: individual-level turnout, motives, participation, selfishness, duty, altruism, belonging, social approval, social capital

Robustness and Limitations

In what follows, we further probe our study’s findings as well as highlight its limitations. Specifically, we examine issues related to background correlates and spuriousness, nonvoters, further motivations, omitted variables, motives in contexts beyond the United States, and satisficing and social desirability biases from self-reports.

Background Correlates and Spuriousness

We view our hypothesized motives as psychological drivers that can influence behavior, but other personal characteristics could be influencing both reported motivations and behavior. The results presented in Table 2 provide preliminary evidence that this is not the case: the estimated coefficients for the motives remain substantively the same when we compare the motives-only models (2A and 2C) to the models with both motives and personal socioeconomic characteristics (2B and 2D). Furthermore, we estimated models predicting separately each of the motive’s scores as a function of personal socioeconomic characteristics, both for the MT and GFK samples (Supplement B). Out of the 40 coefficients for each sample, 3 were statistically significant in the MT sample and 7 in the GFK sample, suggesting again that spurious linkages are not a significant concern. Variations in motives reflect psychological traits that are not immediately determined by one’s socioeconomic context.

Nonvoters and Voters

All respondents were asked to allocate points across motives—even if they did not vote. This was done explicitly to link motives to turnout and to have the same samples when making comparisons across different activities. Nevertheless, two items remain pending: how do voters and nonvoters differ in terms of motive importance and how do motives impact the propensity to vote when nonvoters are excluded? To address the first question, we re-examined the motive allocation separately for each group (Supplement C). For example, in the MT sample (first column of Supplement C) if we exclude the 150 nonvoting respondents (~15%), we obtain for voters the following mean scores: 12% (selfishness), 25% (duty), 44% (altruism), 18% (belonging), and 2% (social approval). The MT and GFK motive allocations for voters are substantively the same as those obtained with the full sample (Table 1). A key distinction between voters and nonvoters’ allocations is that selfishness trumps personal duty among the latter. With regards to the second query, we re-estimated the models predicting turnout behavior but now excluding nonvoters and adjusting the dependent variable to flag among voters those who vote in every election (1), versus those who vote in very few, some, or most elections (0) (Supplement D). This new specification is getting at the propensity to vote frequently, among those who vote on a somewhat regular basis. For both samples, as in our main analyses (Table 2), we find that duty, altruism, and belonging are positively related to turnout though only belonging (in the MT sample) and personal duty (in the GFK sample) achieve statistical significance. In general, as might be expected by excluding nonvoters the motive effects are reduced.

Further Motivations

To address the possibility that other key drivers are at work, the MT survey allowed for other reasons to be reported, in an open-ended format, after having allocated the 100 points among the five motives. From the MT sample of 990 respondents, 150 (or ~15%) wrote in other reasons; 129 of these 150 add-ins can be recategorized into one of our five existing motives, whereas only 21 of the answers (~2%) seem to be addressing a motive or reason we had not put forth. Of the 129 responses that we can categorize, they include reasons as follows: “to get my voice heard,” which can be assigned to “belonging”; “there is an important issue I would like to see set in place” and “to try and make a difference,” which can be mapped with “altruism”; and “if you don’t vote you have no right to complain” and “I feel bad if I don’t,” which can be assigned to “duty.” Of the 21 responses that do not quite match our motives, a few address reasons related to accountability (three responses) and expressive voting (two responses), but most are related to preemption reasons (16 responses), such as “to keep someone out of office,” “to prevent people I disagree with from being elected,” “I wanted to vote Obama out,” and “I vote to keep Republicans out of office.” Preemption reasons could be linked to motives of “belonging” but through opposition by expressly denying a social bond with an individual, group, or cause. Overall, we did not uncover major unaccounted motives at work.

Omitted Variables

When examining the impact of motives on turnout behavior, we omitted certain variables that have been found in the literature to be consistent factors of influence: residential mobility, voted in previous election, party identification, political interest and knowledge, and media exposure (Smets & van Ham, 2013). Our surveys included three of these factors: residential mobility and voted in the previous election were in the MT survey and partisanship was in the GFK survey. We re-estimated the full models in Table 2 after including these additional variables (Supplement E). In the MT sample, “years in the community” is not statistically significant, whereas “voted in the last election” is statistically significant and, as expected, a very strong predictor, by 0.78 points. The motives variables are dampened and lose their statistical significance except for social approval. However, we view this specification merely as confirmatory rather than as the final model for estimation because motives and past behavior are themselves intertwined and in precisely the ways we are trying to tease out (e.g., habitual behavior can be the result of motives for duty and belonging). Indeed, if we estimate instead a logit model predicting “voted in the last election,” we obtain essentially the same results in terms of significance and size of the motive effects as in Table 2 for the MT sample (Supplement F). In the GFK sample, adding the measure of “strong partisan,” which captures whether a respondent identifies as a strong Republican or a strong Democrat, barely changes the estimated coefficients, statistical significance, and associated probabilities of each motive (Supplement E).

Other Contexts

The two commissioned surveys for this study were based in the United States and only U.S.-based respondents were considered for the analyses. Examining reported motives in a comparative setting, across a full array of countries, would be the basis of an entirely new study. Nevertheless, we sought to obtain preliminary insights by commissioning two small (N ≈ 200) online surveys in Australia and Argentina in early and mid-2014. The surveys were carried by Cint, a global survey enterprise that includes internet crowd-sourcing, like Amazon’s MT services. We chose Australia and Argentina as preliminary cases because both countries have compulsory national voting and apply sanctions if no legitimate reason for abstention has been put forth, including minor financial penalties (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance [IDEA], 2018). Therefore, we expect both personal duty and selfishness (through concerns for sanctions) to become more relevant for voting in these new samples compared with the U.S. context. We confirm these expectations, in most of the instances as shown in Table 3 (Panels B and C). Personal duty averages 23% in the U.S. sample but increases to 28% in the Australian sample and notably to 42% in the Argentine sample. Selfishness averages 13% in the U.S. sample and increases to 18% in the Australian sample but decreases to 10% in the Argentine sample, which might be the result of less-stringent enforcement in the Argentine context. In general, the increased prominence of duty under compulsory voting conforms with our expectations; however, this does not ensure more engaged political participation. As recent research has shown, compulsory voting can be linked to increases in invalid voting (Kouba & Lysek, 2016, 2019) and invalid voting can at times stem from, among other considerations, lack of interest, and disengagement (Moral, 2016; Singh, 2019). It remains to be seen whether and how more duty-driven citizens contribute to invalid voting in different contexts.⁸ Finally, as in the U.S. case, in the Australian and Argentine samples, we see as expected a decrease in the selfishness motive and increases in the social motives as we move from arm’s length exchanges (purchasing gasoline) to more social activities (recycling and voting).

Self-Reports

Our study is, by design, eliciting subjective reports and as such is subject to the common concerns with survey work, namely that the data are hypothetical (i.e., elicited without actual incentives being in place) and subject to potential satisficing and social desirability biases (i.e., people may take cognitive shortcuts when responding and they may report what others socially expect them to). These limitations hold for this study. Nevertheless, several clarifications can be made. First, both surveys were online and anonymous, which, are formats that can help reduce social desirability biases (Holbrook & Krosnick, 2010; Larson, 2019) and the voting questions were placed within larger instruments without a concerted focus on politics or political participation. Second, the literature on vote over-reporting, which in part addresses responses being driven by social desirability, has found that high-resource individuals (i.e., those with more education, income, engagement in public affairs, and length in the community) are the types more likely to misreport their vote (Ansolabahere & Hersh, 2012; Enamorado & Imai, 2019; Silver et al., 1986). When we consider some of these factors as predictors of socially based motives (Supplement B), we do not find consistent associations. Also, this study analyzes multiple surveys—two in the United States for replication purposes and two preliminary ones in settings with distinct incentives (i.e., penalties for failure to vote). The way in which the results are comparable across the U.S. surveys and vary when introducing the non-U.S. surveys support the notion that we are plausibly tapping into these motives. Last, the comparisons of motives across activities, including activities less likely to trigger primed answers such as purchasing gasoline, were in line with our expectations; again, this suggests we may be reasonably eliciting respondents’ motives.

Conclusions

This article examines why people vote and who votes by analyzing reports on five fundamental motives for voting: selfishness, duty, altruism, belonging, and social approval. Each of the motives has precedents in the turnout literature but up until now have not been jointly evaluated. Therefore, we provide a much-needed empirical baseline with regards to their relative standing and influence. In the United States context, if a citizen turns out to vote, we find that altruism and duty are reported as the main psychological motives behind that decision, with more than 60% of the allocation. In one of the study samples, altruism accounts for 44% of the underlying motivation and personal duty accounts for 23%. Meanwhile, selfish motives account for only 13%. Individuals explain their voting motives as centered on doing well by others and their causes and by their own ethical commitments—their selfish consumption concerns play a very minor role.

In terms of behavior, turnout is positively responsive to the duty, altruism, and belonging motives when contrasted to selfish motivations, with personal duty at the lead. That is, the types of individuals who give more importance to these drivers, at the expense of selfishness, are more likely to be frequent voters. One implication is that mobilization efforts could be focused around these socially driven considerations, as already shown in some field experiments (e.g., Gerber et al., 2003; Gerber & Rogers, 2009). Such efforts could prove substantial for turnout because the linkages are considerable: ±20% points toggle in the importance of one of these motives can translate into changes in the likelihood of frequent turnout ranging from 0.06 points to 0.21 points. Turnout behavior is negatively associated with selfish considerations. This result might be in line with previous conceptions in the literature that voting in the United States is in general a “low-stakes decision,” or a marginal decision (Aldrich, 1993; Blais, 2000). Citizens in the United States context are not heavily invested in voting for the expectation of large personal benefits, as also revealed by their limited willingness to expend resources on this activity. In our MT survey, respondents were willing to wait, on average, only 1 hour to vote and the median respondent would only travel up to 5 miles to do so.

We hope our research encourages follow-up research queries and we identify a few promising ones. First, our study as designed and implemented cannot entirely rule out the presence of social desirability effects in the respondents’ self-reports. Future work could replicate the study but with an additional battery of questions specifically designed to control for desirability biases (see, Larson, 2019) and with improved wording to better capture social approval motives. Also, a design based from more expansive open-ended questions could be the starting step toward a text-analytic study. Next, a follow-up line of inquiry could contrast motive allocations across different forms of political participation, such as for protests (very visible), campaign contributions, and social media commentary (less visible). Finally, expanding these queries in a comparative setting could be promising, by seeking variation in institutional and political context factors. There is previous turnout work that has marked on empirical regularities, such as increased turnout with close elections and stricter compulsory voting laws, increased turnout under proportional systems, and general declining trends in turnout levels (e.g., Abrams et al., 2010; Aldrich, 1993; Edlin et al., 2007). These regularities should concord with any assumed microfoundation for voting, including its psychological dimensions.

Overall, we have not reintroduced a catchall “taste for voting,” but rather carefully identified and offered evidence for key drivers for voting that stem from some of our most fundamental needs. Our study uncovers that turnout behavior responds similarly to those sentiments we might expect when an exchange involves relational goods. By fleshing out the motives for voting within a broader spectrum of activities, we have also gained a better understanding of what distinctively drives voting.

The Case Against Economic Values in the Brain

Hayden, Benjamin, and Yael Niv. 2020. “The Case Against Economic Values in the Brain.” PsyArXiv. October 5. doi:10.31234/osf.io/7hgup

Abstract: Much of traditional neuroeconomics proceeds from the hypothesis that value is reified in the brain, that is, that there are neurons or brain regions whose responses serve the discrete purpose of encoding value. This hypothesis is supported by the finding that the activity of many neurons and brain regions covaries with subjective value as estimated in specific tasks. Here we consider an alternative: that value is not represented in the brain. This idea is motivated by close consideration of the economic concept of value, which places important epistemic constraints on our ability to identify its neural basis. It is also motivated by the behavioral economics literature, especially work on heuristics. Finally, it is buoyed by recent neural and behavioral findings regarding how animals and humans learn to choose between options. In light of our hypothesis, we critically reevaluate putative neural evidence for the representation of value, and explore an alternative: that brains directly learn action policies. We delineate how this alternative can provide a robust account of behavior that concords with existing empirical data.

Malaysian Muslims dating in non-private urban spaces (which should not be described along the lines of a colonial, Western liberal, analytically useless private–public dichotomy): Space is constructed in reaction to omnipresent Allah's gaze; the importance of an intimate relationship between a believer and Allah should never be underestimated

De-colonizing public spaces in Malaysia: dating in Kuala Lumpur. Krzysztof Nawratek, Asma Mehan. cultural geographies, February 28, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/1474474020909457

Abstract: This article discusses places and practices of young heterosexual Malaysian Muslims dating in non-private urban spaces. It is based on research conducted in Kuala Lumpur in two consecutive summers 2016 and 2017. Malaysian law (Khalwat law) does not allow for two unrelated people (where at least one of them is Muslim) of opposite sexes to be within ‘suspicious proximity’ of one another in public. This law significantly influences behaviors and activities in urban spaces in KL. In addition to the legal framework, the beliefs of Malaysian Muslims significantly influence the way they perceive space and how they behave in the city. The article discusses the empirical theme, beginning with the participants’ narratives of their engagement with the dominant sexual and gender order in non-private spaces of KL. Utilizing questionnaires, interviews and observations, this article draws upon a qualitative research project and questions the analytical usefulness of the notion of public space (as a Western construct) in the context of an Islamic, post-colonial, tropical, global city.

Keywords: dating, de-colonizing, Islam, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, public space

Conclusion: decolonizing the notion of public space

The question that underpins our investigation of non-private urban space in an Islamic context is the question of how useful the western concept of public space in KL really is. Public space, understood as an empty space (void), providing free and inclusive access, where unplanned encounters can happen and where individuals can express themselves, simply do not exist in KL. This does not mean, however, that there is only a homogeneous magma of privatized, controlled space. To the contrary, what is visible is not always audible, and spaces and activities often have several meanings, as with dating itself – a ‘hidden activity’ obscured by shopping or eating.

Understanding of cultural and religious differences is essential in the analysis of city dwellers’ usage of space in a Malaysian context. In the context of our research, public space in KL should be considered as a malleable construct of ‘visibility’, awareness, and confrontation of differences. We believe that the findings of this research allow us to question the analytical and theoretical usefulness of the (western) notion of public space. There is a need to employ a different language and different set of references to analyze spaces in KL (and potentially other non-Western cities), and this article is intended to take few initial steps into that still unknown territory.

The aim of this article goes beyond just the question of public space in an Islamic city, because there are multiple factors that strongly influence the usage of spaces in the city such as the tropical climate, the colonial past, the historically predominant presence of the Chinese community in KL (and also other religious groups), and finally the forces of global capitalism eroding any idea of public ownership (or absence of the idea of public ownership whatsoever). Because of these different forces that influence the shape of space in KL, Islam is only one of many factors that need to be considered when asking the question of the appropriateness of the term ‘public space’. However, Islamic thought also gives us a chance to discuss possibilities of a different, non-Western (non-Christian, liberal, post-Enlightenment) discourse on urban spaces, especially on a dichotomy of public–private. We would argue that in the context of KL, Islamic thought may be the starting point (taken in the further research together with Hindu and Buddhist thought) in any attempt to decolonize discourse on urban theory and practice. This article focused on dating practices among young Muslims and we predominantly use Islamic thought as the tool to dismantle Western discourse of public spaces. The presence of Christians, Hindu, Buddhists, and followers of other religions influence the way in which spaces in KL are used – further research is needed to analyze these different religious influences in detail.

The purpose of this article is to open the discussion and sketch possible lines of future research, rather than to formulate definitive conclusions, however, we believe that findings of our research contribute to new, decolonized theoretical and practical approaches to urban spaces in KL. Urban space in KL should not be described along the lines of a private–public dichotomy. In this city, space is constructed in reaction to the perceived gaze of the omnipresent Allah. This gaze is mediated externally (by society) and internally (as a set of rules based on personal faith), but the importance of an intimate relationship between a believer and Allah should never be underestimated. We argue that there is no emptiness in KL. Space is constructed as an extension and/or mutation of personal, intimate space, put in the context of other personal spaces under the gaze of the all-seeing Allah.

Social and commercial spaces seem to ‘shield’ users (by changing their status from male/female into consumers) against the oppressive gaze of the judgmental society and only the home, personal and intimate space seems to protect (allow) human freedom. However, a simple reversal of the western liberal model to place the oppression (control) outside and the freedom inside the house (private space) seems wrong. Family relationships are also hierarchical and regulated by both religion and convention. It seems that space in KL is fundamentally constructed, with the dominant principle of controlling (and self-controlling) gaze penetrating this space. The ‘unnatural’ (artificial/constructed) essence of space (built environment ‘covering’ natural land) and visibility seem the most important aspects while discussing space in KL. Therefore, the conventional, Western liberal notion of public space does not seem to be analytically useful in KL, and we would suggest considering urban space as a kind of series of granular social spaces in which moments and spheres of intimacy are built as temporary situations (expanded, mutating, interacting privacy) rather than permanent installations. When we define spaces in KL as constructed and ‘artificial’, we mean they are multi-coded and they have layers of different meanings. The efficient usage of non-private spaces is based on an ability to construct and manipulate these meanings. It is constantly reconstructed as a coexistence of personal spaces. It is never empty.

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Krater district, Matera, Apulia (source is Urban Structures for the Future. Justus Dahinden. Pall Mall Press, Apr 1972):

A previous study presented preliminary evidence for suicide-related "subliminal messages" on Instagram, defined as very brief presentations of suicide-related content; this paper confirms reports

Investigating Suicide-Related Subliminal Messages on Instagram: A Frame-by-Frame Analysis of Video Posts. Florian Arendt, Antonia Markiewitz, and Sebastian Scherr. Crisis, October 9, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1027/0227-5910/a000717

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1314829512081920001

Abstract.

Background: Suicide is the second-leading cause of death among 15–29-year-olds and Instagram is one of the most popular and fastest-growing social media platforms among this age group. A previous study presented preliminary evidence for suicide-related "subliminal messages" on Instagram, defined as very brief presentations of suicide-related content in video posts that users have no conscious awareness of.

Aim: A systematic quantitative study was pending.

Method: We conducted a quantitative content analysis of 100 Instagram video posts. A frame-by-frame coding procedure allowed for an assessment of whether suicide-related content was depicted in very brief segments, even when this content could not be consciously recognized when watched at regular speed.

Results: Analysis indicates that a substantial amount of suicide-related content is presented in very brief shots. We identified 67 very brief shots that appeared in 21 video posts. Of interest, 13 of these video posts presented more than one very brief suicide-related shot.

Limitation: The subjective threshold of conscious awareness differs inter-individually. This complicates the operationalization of subliminal messages.

Conclusion: Subliminal messages are ethically highly problematic. There is a need for a greater awareness of possible suicide-related subliminal messages on Instagram.

Keywords: subliminal messages, social media, Instagram, youth, suicide

The market premium for natural scientists unattractiveness conforms not only to the common stereotype of the natural scientist but also to a belief that the more unattractive of them engage in higher quality work

“Beauty” premium for social scientists but “unattractiveness” premium for natural scientists in the public speaking market. Weilong Bi, Ho Fai Chan & Benno Torgler. Humanities and Social Sciences Communications volume 7, Article number: 118. Oct 7 2020. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-020-00608-6

Abstract: In the face of scientists’ increasing engagement in public discourse, we examine whether facial attractiveness affects their market value (i.e., audience willingness to pay). For a sample of scientists who participate in public speaking, we find that facial attractiveness is uncorrelated with internal academic achievements (as measured by publications and citations) and is only weakly but positively linked to attention outside of academia. Notably, we find that the effect of facial attractiveness on external influence is only robust to measures where speakers’ physical appearance is likely to be most apparent to the public, such as invitations to give TED talks or Google web page counts while the effect on the number of book publications or book awards is not significant. Our results also suggest that these relationships do not differ across scientists’ fields of research. However, we find that in terms of speaking fees, social scientists benefit substantially from being more attractive, whereas unattractiveness is a comparative advantage for natural scientists. A similar divergence in the direction of the relationship between speaking fee and facial attractiveness is also evident for nonacademic speakers from different fields: whereas those from a natural science (job) background gain from unattractiveness, those with a social science history benefit from a beauty premium. This market premium for unattractiveness conforms not only to the common stereotype of the natural scientist but also to a belief that the more unattractive of these researchers engage in higher quality work. Overall, the findings indicate that facial appearance is important in the public perception of academics and, to some extent, their dissemination of knowledge.

Discussion

Our results on the benefit of facial unattractiveness for natural scientists are consistent with the finding of a previous PNAS study indicating that less attractive researchers are judged to be better scientists (Gheorghiu et al., 2017). In this study, we complement previous evidence on individual judgments by focusing on speaking fees as a proxy for the willingness to pay for a scientist’s public engagement in the marketplace (Chan et al., 2014a, 2014b). Given that our sample consists of individuals who are active public speakers and thus judged by the public speaking portals as sufficiently attractive for a public speaking engagement, our identification of an unattractiveness premium for natural scientists is particularly interesting and the >20 percent effect for a one-unit increase in facial attractiveness (on a 10-point scale) is quite substantial. This result holds even for nonacademic speakers with a natural science background. Hence, although we do not explicitly explore stereotypes, our findings confirm the public and media stereotype of a “nerdy” or “geeky” natural scientist. Indeed, a Discover article referencing (Gheorghiu et al., 2017)’s research even notes an “ugly Einstein” effect that reflects a deeper phenomenon, a “cultural Cartesian dualism” implying that an individual can either be strong/have a beautiful body or have a brilliant mind, but not bothFootnote5. Our analysis, however, demonstrates that the reverse is true for social scientists: not only are they less affected by the unattractiveness stereotype, they may actually benefit from a beauty premium.

Why then, do we observe such “beauty” and “ugly” premiums regarding speaking fees across fields? One plausible explanation could be that facial beauty is correlated with citation-based productivity. That is, although job performance in the academic environment (e.g., research output) is clearly identifiable and thus less subject to beauty-based discrimination, facial appearance may affect publication performance if reviewers or editors know the scholar or are able to match name and image online (Dilger et al., 2015). On the other hand, the very probability of publishing—and thus of being cited—may increase due to the tendency for attractive researchers to be accepted into better graduate schools, to have access to better PhD supervisors, to be hired into higher ranked and more prestigious universities, and to have a wider social and professional network (Fidrmuc and Paphawasit, 2018). Despite the correlational nature of our findings, such difference is less likely to be explained by speakers’ (perceived) quality as an academic, as demonstrated by the null relationship between facial attractiveness and scholarly productivity or achievements in terms of publication and citation metrics among academic speakers. In other words, it is unlikely that less (more) attractive natural (social) scientists could capitalize on external prominence due to their academic success, while also controlling for scientist’s societal reputation. Interestingly, we did not find that such stereotypical bias affects scientists’ ability to generate social interest. Instead, our results indicate that facial attractiveness, regardless of their field of study, is positively correlated with measures of external influence where speakers’ physical appearance is likely to be most apparent, for example, TED talk invitations or mentions on Google web page counts. In contrast, we did not find any significant effect of facial attractiveness on external engagement, such as publishing books or its recognition in terms of nonfiction book awards. This finding corresponds, to some extent, with previous literature in which the positive effect of physical attractiveness on the perception of teaching quality or effectiveness is found to be more salient in an environment with higher physical exposure or interaction (e.g., Hamermesh and Parker, 2005; Babin et al., 2019).

There are several limitations to this study. First, while prior research has found a weak, positive, but statistically significant relationship between the Anaface attractiveness scores and human attractiveness ratings (Babin et al., 2019), we were unable to provide our own validation due to research budget constraints. Follow-up studies should consider using an independent sample to examine the robustness of the statistical relationship between human ratings and algorithm-based measures of facial attractiveness. In addition, the perception of facial attractiveness is likely to vary depending on the sample of evaluators employed. As such, one should carefully choose a sample of evaluators that represent the population of the target audience depending on the purpose of the study (e.g., high-school students, average citizens, or corporate audience). Despite the established correlations (see Supplementary Information) between the Anaface proxy and geometry-based attractiveness measures such as facial symmetry, neoclassical canons, and golden ratio, the cross-cultural validity of the latter two are problematic (Chen and Zhang, 2014; Heidekrueger et al., 2017) as they are Eurocentric constructions based on Greco-Roman and Western ideals (Bashour, 2006; Thomas and Dixon, 2016). Therefore, these measures are potentially less relevant for studies examining perceived facial attractiveness of non-Western cultures compared to facial averageness or symmetry that are biologically relevant measures of attractiveness. Such problematic proxies might be justifiable for the current context (which relied heavily on data from Western scholars), but future studies could explore the differences between those proxies by exploring a speaker pool from a non-Western culture. Lastly, there is a debate in the literature regarding the usefulness of simple citation-based metrics (such as total citation counts and h-index) as indicators of academic performance or research quality. Due to the increasing pressure to perform, such measures are potentially subject to manipulations (e.g., see the excellent discussion in Fire and Guestrin, 2019). However, these measures may also capture public perception of academic quality or achievement. We have therefore demonstrated robustness of the null relationship between facial attractiveness and scholarly achievements by using metrics that are less prone to manipulation such as variants of the h-index, which accounts for the effect of co-authors, age of the publication, and citation patterns.

It would therefore be interesting to explore other possible channels through which facial attractiveness affects the ability to thrive in the speaking market, apart from a taste-based discrimination (stereotypes) explanation. For example, whether social and natural scientists also differ in characteristics such as sociability or social intelligence and how these traits are linked to attractiveness. It may also be worth investigating whether perceived dialectic differences in natural and social sciences (Lewontin and Levins, 1998) contribute to our understanding of beauty premium differences, particularly when oral communication skills and confidence were shown as a contributor towards beauty premium in experimental labor market setting (Mobius and Rosenblat, 2006). Such insight is important given the often tenuous status of social sciences, and their perception as less solidly scientific than the natural sciences (Ecklund et al., 2018), which often forces social scientists to struggle for respect. This is despite the fact that social scientists are more actively engaged with the media, reflecting journalists’ and audiences’ selective interest in their type of research (Peters, 2013). Aspects such as perceived organizational, professional, or cultural conditions, and disciplinary socialization may also matter (Becher and Trowler, 2001), so investigating these could offer valuable insights into how appearances affect scientists’ perceived scientific communication skills, their public images, and/or the popularization of science in general.

In general, our results also add to the literature on the role played by facial attractiveness in scientific achievements by investigating the relationship using a sample of academics from different fields. Particularly, by examining a wide range of scientific productivity metrics, we find no significant effect, which is consistent across academic fields. This null relationship between facial attractiveness and citation-based performance supports the findings of Dilger et al. (2015) using Business Research scientists but differs from Fidrmuc and Paphawasit (2018), where the authors found a substantial and significant positive effect among economic scholars. Nevertheless, this difference could stem from our sample selection of academics, who may have been more established at the time they chose to engage in public speaking actively. Therefore, further research using a representative sample of scientists across fields is required in order to reach a more conclusive relationship between physical attractiveness and scientific achievements between academic disciplines.

Use caution when applying behavioural science to policy

Use caution when applying behavioural science to policy. Hans IJzerman, Neil A. Lewis Jr., Andrew K. Przybylski, Netta Weinstein, Lisa DeBruine, Stuart J. Ritchie, Simine Vazire, Patrick S. Forscher, Richard D. Morey, James D. Ivory & Farid Anvari. Nature Human Behaviour, Oct 9 2020. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-020-00990-w

Abstract: Social and behavioural scientists have attempted to speak to the COVID-19 crisis. But is behavioural research on COVID-19 suitable for making policy decisions? We offer a taxonomy that lets our science advance in ‘evidence readiness levels’ to be suitable for policy. We caution practitioners to take extreme care translating our findings to applications.

Researchers in the social and behavioural sciences periodically debate whether their research should be used to address pressing issues in society. To provide a few examples, in the 1940s psychologists discussed using research to address problems related to intergroup relations, problems brought to the fore by the Holocaust and other acts of rampant prejudice. In the 1990s, psychologists debated whether their research should inform legal decision-making. In the 2010s, psychologists argued for advising branches of government as economists often do. And now, in 2020, psychologists and other social and behavioural scientists are arguing that our research should inform the response to the new coronavirus disease (henceforth COVID-19)1,2.

We are a team mostly consisting of empirical psychologists who conduct research on basic, applied and meta-scientific processes. We believe that scientists should apply their creativity, efforts and talents to serve our society, especially during crises. However, the way that social and behavioural science research is often conducted makes it difficult to know whether our efforts will do more good than harm. We will provide some examples from the field of social-personality psychology, where most of us were trained, to illustrate our concerns. This focus is not meant to imply that our field alone suffers from the issues we will discuss. Instead, a growing meta-science literature suggests that many other social and behavioural disciplines have encountered dynamics similar to those faced by our field.

What are those dynamics? First, study participants, mainly students, are drawn from populations that are in Western (mostly US), educated, industrialized, rich and democratic (WEIRD) societies3. Second, even with this narrow slice of population, the effects in published papers are not estimated with precision, sometimes barely ruling out trivially small effects under ostensibly controlled conditions. Third, many studies use a narrow range of stimuli and do not test for stimulus generalisability4. Fourth, many studies examine effects on measures, such as self-report scales, that are infrequently validated or linked to behaviour, much less to policy-relevant outcomes5. Fifth, independently replicated findings, even under ideal circumstances, are rare. Finally, our studies often fail to account for deeper cultural, historical, political and structural factors that play important moderating roles during the process of translation from basic findings to application. Together, these issues produce empirical insights that are more heterogeneous than might be apparent from a scan of the published literature.

Confident applications of social and behavioural science findings, then, require first and foremost an assessment of the evidence quality and weighing heterogeneity and the trade-offs and opportunity costs that follow. We must identify reliable findings that can be applied, have been investigated in the nations for which the application is intended and are derived from investigations using diverse stimuli. But the assessment of how ‘ready’ the intervention is must be included when persuading decision-makers to apply social and behavioural science evidence, particularly in crisis situations when lives are at stake and resources are limited. Not doing so can have disastrous consequences.

Here we propose one approach for assessing the quality of evidence before application and dissemination. Specifically, we draw inspiration from the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)’s ‘technology readiness levels’ (TRL6), a benchmarking system for systematically evaluating the quality of scientific evidence and which has been used by the European Commission to judge how ready scientific applications beyond space flight are for operational environments. TRLs rank a technology’s readiness for application from 1 to 9 (see Fig. 1). At TRL1, basic principles have been reliably observed, reported and translated to a formal model. In TRL2, basic principles have been developed and tested in an application area. It is not until TRL4, when a prototype is developed, that tests are run in various environments that are as representative of the eventual application area(s) as possible. Later, at TRL6, the system is tested in a ‘real’ environment (like ground-to-space). At the very highest level (TRL9), the system has been ‘flight-proven’ through successful mission operations. These TRLs provide a useful framework to jumpstart conversations about how to assess the readiness of social and behavioural science evidence for application and dissemination.

Fig 1

Introducing evidence readiness levels

The desire to “directly inform policy and individual and collective behaviour in response to the pandemic” (p. 461)1 overlooks existing evidence frameworks and the challenges we identify, illustrating that a simple taxonomy is necessary to have at hand during crises. As a very preliminary step to this end we propose a social and behavioural science variant of TRLs, evidence readiness levels (ERLs; Fig. 2).

Fig 2

There are several frameworks for assessing evidence quality across different scientific fields. The one that comes closest to what we envision is the Society for Prevention’s standards for prevention interventions7, as they incorporate standards for efficacy dissemination and feedback loops from crisis to theory. However, none of the existing frameworks capture the meta-scientific insights generated in our field in the last decade.

Our ERLs do not map perfectly onto NASA’s TRLs, and we should not expect them to; there are many differences between behavioural and rocket science. In the social and behavioural sciences we think this process should start with defining problem(s) in collaboration with the stakeholders most likely to implement the interventions (ERL1). These concepts can then be further developed in consultation with people in the target settings to gather preliminary information about how settings or context might alter processes (ERL2). From there, researchers can conduct systematic reviews and other meta-syntheses to select evidence that could potentially be applied (ERL3). These systematic reviews require a number of bias-detection techniques. It is well-known that the behavioural sciences suffer from publication bias and other practices that compromise the integrity of research evidence. Some findings may be reliable, but the onus is on us to identify which are and which are not and which generalize or don’t. Yet, these systematic reviews must still be done with an awareness that the currently available statistical techniques do not completely correct for bias and that the resultant findings are at most at ERL3.

Following this, one can gather information about stimulus and measurement validity and equivalence for application in the target setting (ERL4). Next, researchers—in consultation with local experts—should consider the potential benefits and harms associated with applying potential solutions (ERL5) and generate estimates of effects in a pilot sample (ERL6). With preliminary effects in hand, the team can then begin to test for heterogeneity in low-stakes (ERL7) and higher-stakes (ERL8) samples and settings, which would build the confidence necessary to apply the findings in the real target setting or crisis situation (ERL9).

Even at ERL9, evidence evaluation continues; applications of social and behavioural work, particularly in a crisis, should be iterative, so high-quality evidence is fed back to evaluate the effectiveness of the intervention and to develop critical and flexible improvements. Feedback should be grounded in collaboration between basic and applied researchers, as well as with stakeholders, to ensure that the resulting evidence is relevant and actionable. Failure to continually re-evaluate interventions in light of new data could lead to unnecessary harm, where even the best evidence was inadequate to predict the intervention’s real-world effects.

A benchmarking system such as the ERL requires us to think carefully about the nature of our research that can be applied credibly and guides where research investments should be made. For example, we can better recognise that our goal of gathering reliable insights (ERL3) provides a necessary foundation for further collective efforts that scaffold towards scalable and generalizable interventions (ERL7). Engaging community experts, identifying relevant theories, and collecting extensive observations are key to framing challenges and working with interdisciplinary teams to address them (ERL1). Behavioural scientists from different cultures then discuss how interventions may need to differ in nature across context and cultures. The multidisciplinary and multi-stakeholder nature of ERLs requires us to fundamentally rethink how we produce, and communicate confidence in, application-ready findings.

The current crisis provides a chance for social and behavioural scientists to question how we understand and communicate the value of our scientific models in terms of ERLs. It also requires us to communicate those ERLs to policy-makers so that they know whether we are making educated guesses (ERL3 or below) or can be confident about the application of our findings because we have tested and replicated them in representative environments (ERL7). When providing policy advice on the basis of scientific evidence, it is important to understand and be able to explain whether and how recommendations would impact affected individuals under a range of circumstances that are highly relevant to the crisis in question (ERL7).

Even if findings are at ERL3 after assessing evidence quality of primary studies, we have little way of knowing how much positive, or unintended negative, consequences an intervention might have when applied to a new situation. We are concerned to see social and behavioural scientists making confident claims about the utility of scientific findings for solving COVID-19 problems without regard for whether those findings are based on the kind of scientific methods that would move them up the ERL ladder1. The absence of recognised benchmarking systems makes this challenging. While it is tempting to instead qualify uncertainty by using non-committal language about the possible utility of existing findings (for example, ‘may’, ‘could’), this approach is fundamentally flawed because public conversations generally ignore these rhetorical caveats8. Scientists should actively communicate uncertainty, particularly when speaking to crises. Communicating that their ERL is only at 3 or 4 would empower policy-makers by providing clear understanding of how to weight our advice in terms of their options. Reaching a higher ERL is extremely complicated and will require radical changes in the way we conduct research, not only in response to crises.

How social and behavioural scientists can advance their ERLs

The field of genetics started in a position similar to the position that many behavioural sciences find themselves in now, with small, independently collected samples that produced unreliable findings. Attempts to identify candidate genes for many constructs of interest kept stalling at TRL1/ERL4. In one prominent example, 52 patients provided genetic material for an analysis of the relationship between the 5-HTT gene and major depression9, a finding that spurred enormous interest in the biological mechanisms underlying depression. Unfortunately, as with the current situation in psychology, these early results were contradicted by failed replication studies10.

Technological advances in genotyping unlocked different approaches for geneticists. Instead of working in isolated teams, geneticists pooled resources via consortium studies and thereby accelerated scientific progress and quality. Their recent studies (with samples that sometimes exceed 1,000,000) dwarf previous candidate gene studies in terms of sample size11. To accomplish this, geneticists devoted considerable time to developing research workflows, data harmonization systems and processes that increased the accuracy of their measurements. The new methodologies are not without flaws: for example, there is substantial scope for expanding the representativeness of study cohorts. But the progress that consortium research in genetics has made in a short time is impressive.

In recent years we have observed similar progress in the psychological sciences going from single, small-sample studies to large-scale replications12,13 and novel studies14 to the building of the prerequisite infrastructure to facilitate team science. One example is the Psychological Science Accelerator (PSA), a large standing network with experts facilitating study selection, data management, ethics and translation15. While the PSA is making important progress, problems surrounding measurement validity, sample generalizability and organizational diversity (40% of its leadership is from North America), which affect the network’s ability to accurately interpret findings, still present material challenges to the applicability of their projects. Therefore, the PSA will require substantial improvement and investment before it can generate practical ERL7-level evidence and further develop our proposed framework.

The COVID-19 crisis underscores the critical need to bring the social and behavioural sciences in line with other mature sciences. Diverse consortia of researchers with expertise in philosophy, ethics, statistics and data and code management are needed to produce the kind of research required to better understand people the world over. Realising this mature, inclusive and efficient model necessitates a shift in the knowledge production and evaluation models that guide the social and behavioural sciences.

Be cautious when applying social and behavioural science to policy

On balance, we hold the view that the social and behavioural sciences have the potential to help us better understand our world. However, we are less sanguine about whether many areas of social and behavioural sciences are mature enough to provide such understanding, particularly when considering life-and-death issues like a pandemic. We believe that, rather than appealing to policy-makers to recognise our value, we should focus on earning the credibility that legitimates a seat at the policy table. The ERL taxonomy is a sample roadmap for achieving this level of maturity as a science and for accurately and honestly communicating our current state of evidence. Collaborations among large and diverse teams with local knowledge and multidisciplinary expertise can help us move up the evidence ladder. Equally important, studies in the behavioural sciences must be designed to move up this ladder incrementally. Designing an ERL6 study that is built on a shaky ERL1 foundation will be of little use. Moving up requires investment, thought and, most important of all, epistemic humility. Without a systematic and iterative research framework, we believe that behavioural scientists should carefully consider whether well-intentioned advice may do more harm than good.

Do People Agree on How Positive Emotions Are Expressed? A Survey of Four Emotions and Five Modalities Across 11 Cultures

Manokara, Kunalan, Mirna Đurić, Agneta Fischer, and Disa Sauter. 2020. “Do People Agree on How Positive Emotions Are Expressed? A Survey of Four Emotions and Five Modalities Across 11 Cultures.” OSF Preprints. October 5. doi:10.31219/osf.io/ep9d5

Abstract: While much is known about how negative emotions are expressed in different modalities, our understanding of the nonverbal expressions of positive emotions remains limited. In the present research, we draw upon disparate lines of theoretical and empirical work on positive emotions, and systematically examine which channels are thought to be used for expressing four positive emotions: feeling moved, gratitude, interest, and triumph. Employing the intersubjective approach, an established tool in cross-cultural psychology, we first examined how the four positive emotions were reported to be expressed in a U.S.A. community sample (Study 1: n = 1015). We next confirmed the cross-cultural generalizability of our findings by surveying respondents from ten countries that diverged on cultural values (Study 2: n = 1834). Feeling moved was thought to be signaled with facial expressions, gratitude with the use of words, interest with words, face and voice, and triumph with body posture, vocal cues, facial expressions, and words. These findings provide cross-culturally consistent findings of differential expressions across positive emotions. Notably, positive emotions were mostly thought to be expressed via modalities that go beyond the face. In addition, we hope that the intersubjective approach will constitute a useful tool for researchers studying nonverbal expressions.

An evolutionary lens can help to make sense of reliable sex & individual differences that impact appearance enhancement, as well as the context-dependent nature of putative adaptations that function to increase physical attractiveness

An Evolutionary Perspective on Appearance Enhancement Behavior. Adam C. Davis & Steven Arnocky. Archives of Sexual Behavior, Oct 6 2020. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-020-01745-4

Abstract: Researchers have highlighted numerous sociocultural factors that have been shown to underpin human appearance enhancement practices, including the influence of peers, family, the media, and sexual objectification. Fewer scholars have approached appearance enhancement from an evolutionary perspective or considered how sociocultural factors interact with evolved psychology to produce appearance enhancement behavior. Following others, we argue that evidence from the field of evolutionary psychology can complement existing sociocultural models by yielding unique insight into the historical and cross-cultural ubiquity of competition over aspects of physical appearance to embody what is desired by potential mates. An evolutionary lens can help to make sense of reliable sex and individual differences that impact appearance enhancement, as well as the context-dependent nature of putative adaptations that function to increase physical attractiveness. In the current review, appearance enhancement is described as a self-promotion strategy used to enhance reproductive success by rendering oneself more attractive than rivals to mates, thereby increasing one’s mate value. The varied ways in which humans enhance their appearance are described, as well as the divergent tactics used by women and men to augment their appearance, which correspond to the preferences of opposite-sex mates in a heterosexual context. Evolutionarily relevant individual differences and contextual factors that vary predictably with appearance enhancement behavior are also discussed. The complementarity of sociocultural and evolutionary perspectives is emphasized and recommended avenues for future interdisciplinary research are provided for scholars interested in studying appearance enhancement behavior.

Ecological harshness only influenced men’s perceptions of women’s breasts for reproductive success, rating women with larger breasts as more attractive, fertile, healthier, reproductively successful, and likely to befriend

Does Ecological Harshness Influence Men’s Perceptions of Women’s Breast Size, Ptosis, and Intermammary Distance? Ray Garza, Farid Pazhoohi & Jennifer Byrd-Craven. Evolutionary Psychological Science, Oct 2 2020. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40806-020-00262-w

Abstract: Breasts are sexually dimorphic physical characteristics, and they are enlarged post-puberty suggesting that they have been driven by sexual selection to signal fertility and residual reproductive value. Although different hypotheses have attempted to explain why men are attracted to women’s breasts, the role that ecology plays in men’s perceptions of women’s breasts has been limited. The current study used an ecologically harsh prime to investigate if ecological harshness influenced men’s perceptions of women’s breast size, ptosis (i.e., sagginess), and intermammary distance. Men were primed with an ecological harsh prime (i.e., economy uncertainty) and asked to rate women whose breast size, ptosis, and intermammary distance (i.e., cleavage) had been manipulated. Ecological harshness only influenced men’s perceptions of women’s breasts for reproductive success. Overall, men rated women with larger breasts as more attractive, fertile, healthier, reproductively successful, and likely to befriend. The study contributes to the overall literature on men’s perceptions of women’s breasts and suggests that ecological harshness may influence men's perceptions of women's reproductive success.

Check also Effects of Breast Size, Intermammary Cleft Distance (Cleavage) and Ptosis on Perceived Attractiveness, Health, Fertility and Age: Do Life History, Self-Perceived Mate Value and Sexism Attitude Play a Role? Farid Pazhoohi, Ray Garza & Alan Kingstone. Adaptive Human Behavior and Physiology, February 28 2020. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2020/02/the-perception-of-attractiveness.html

Does social psychology persist over half a century? A direct replication of Cialdini et al.’s (1975) classic door-in-the-face technique

Genschow, O., Westfal, M., Crusius, J., Bartosch, L., Feikes, K. I., Pallasch, N., & Wozniak, M. (2020). Does social psychology persist over half a century? A direct replication of Cialdini et al.’s (1975) classic door-in-the-face technique. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Oct 2020. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000261

Abstract: Many failed replications in social psychology have cast doubt on the validity of the field. Most of these replication attempts have focused on findings published from the 1990s on, ignoring a large body of older literature. As some scholars suggest that social psychological findings and theories are limited to a particular time, place, and population, we sought to test whether a classical social psychological finding that was published nearly half a century ago can be successfully replicated in another country on another continent. To this end, we directly replicated Cialdini et al.’s (1975) door-in-the-face (DITF) technique according to which people’s likelihood to comply with a target request increases after having turned down a larger request. Thereby, we put the reciprocal concessions theory—the original process explanation of the DITF technique—to a critical test. Overall, compliance rates in our replication were similarly high as those Cialdini et al. (1975) found 45 years ago. That is, participants were more likely to comply with a target request after turning down an extreme request than participants who were exposed to the target request only or to a similarly small request before being exposed to the target request. These findings support the idea that reciprocity norms play a crucial role in DITF strategies. Moreover, the results suggest that at least some social psychological findings can transcend a particular time, place, and population. Further theoretical implications are discussed. 

??? Total deaths due to falls have increased steadily since 1990, nearly doubling by 2017; age-standardised mortality rates have slightly decreased over the same period

The global burden of falls: global, regional and national estimates of morbidity and mortality from the Global Burden of Disease Study 2017. Spencer L James et al. Injury Prevention, Volume 26, Issue Supp 1. Oct 1 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/injuryprev-2019-043286

Abstract

Background Falls can lead to severe health loss including death. Past research has shown that falls are an important cause of death and disability worldwide. The Global Burden of Disease Study 2017 (GBD 2017) provides a comprehensive assessment of morbidity and mortality from falls.

Methods Estimates for mortality, years of life lost (YLLs), incidence, prevalence, years lived with disability (YLDs) and disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) were produced for 195 countries and territories from 1990 to 2017 for all ages using the GBD 2017 framework. Distributions of the bodily injury (eg, hip fracture) were estimated using hospital records.

Results Globally, the age-standardised incidence of falls was 2238 (1990–2532) per 100 000 in 2017, representing a decline of 3.7% (7.4 to 0.3) from 1990 to 2017. Age-standardised prevalence was 5186 (4622–5849) per 100 000 in 2017, representing a decline of 6.5% (7.6 to 5.4) from 1990 to 2017. Age-standardised mortality rate was 9.2 (8.5–9.8) per 100 000 which equated to 695 771 (644 927–741 720) deaths in 2017. Globally, falls resulted in 16 688 088 (15 101 897–17 636 830) YLLs, 19 252 699 (13 725 429–26 140 433) YLDs and 35 940 787 (30 185 695–42 903 289) DALYs across all ages. The most common injury sustained by fall victims is fracture of patella, tibia or fibula, or ankle. Globally, age-specific YLD rates increased with age.

Conclusions This study shows that the burden of falls is substantial. Investing in further research, fall prevention strategies and access to care is critical.

Discussion

This study represents the first time that GBD estimates for falls have been reported in this level of detail through recent years, and illustrates the substantial amount of mortality and health loss in every country, age group and sex. Globally, total deaths and DALYs due to falls have increased steadily since 1990, with death counts nearly doubling by 2017. Conversely, age-standardised mortality rates and DALY rates have slightly decreased over the same period. At the country level, age-standardised mortality due to falls was highest in the Solomon Islands, India and Vietnam. The patterns of MIRs described in the results of our study emphasise how mortality risk per fall varies substantially by country and reveal that certain areas of the world likely have inadequate capabilities of responding to injurious falls. Since mortality from falls is associated with age and since global populations are generally ageing, it is important for all countries to ensure that their older adult populations as well as their ageing populations have adequate access to caretaking and treatment resources now and in the future.10 More focused research in the countries with the highest MIRs should investigate the specific causes of injury deaths from falls, the associated risk factors, and the circumstances and context of falls in order to target prevention efforts and appropriately allocate treatment resources. We additionally describe how falls have improved in terms of incidence and cause-specific mortality in the highest SDI countries, but that these improvements have not necessarily been experienced in lower SDI countries. This pattern emphasises how it is critical for lower SDI countries to more thoroughly investigate patterns of falls and to invest in prevention and treatment programmes.

Among clinicians, falls are known to be an important risk in certain populations, as they can be an origin of injury that leads to more complex care, such as the otherwise healthy older adult who slips, falls, sustains a femur fracture and then is admitted to the hospital for surgical repair and develops a condition like healthcare-acquired pneumonia. Such vignettes emphasise how a fall can precipitate significant health loss and potentially death. 29However, a young person who falls can also suffer disability the rest of his or her life, leading to income loss, dependence on caretakers and adequate accessibility options. Among the countries with highest incidence in 2017 were Slovenia, Czech Republic and Slovakia—countries with high percentages of rural populations.30 In Slovenia, nearly half of the population lives in a rural area, and there is evidence that falls are less fatal and more frequent in rural older people.31 32 Age-standardised DALY rates were particularly high in specific regions, including Central Europe, Eastern Europe and Australasia. Many of these regions are experiencing intensive ageing of the population.33 Poland, for example, is projected to increase the population aged 65 and over by 4.9 million in the years 2015–2050, requiring significant public healthcare expenditure on therapeutic rehabilitation.34

Research suggests that falls can cause physical harm and psychological and financial harm. A 3-year longitudinal study conducted by Tinetti and Williams explored the short and long-term effects of a fall on the well-being of those 65 and older. Among the participants, injurious falls resulted in a variety of conditions, including hip fractures, other fractures and soft tissue injuries; ultimately these injurious falls led to a decline in daily functional status.35 Other research has shown that falling often triggers a fear of falling again, likely impairing one’s sense of mobility and autonomy.9 This fear is a proven risk factor for future falls; thus, one fall can initiate a cascade of negative health outcomes.9 Ultimately, the initial morbidity of a fall can manifest into significant health loss over time, amounting to considerable treatment and care costs.36 Future GBD research may provide estimates on the probability of long-term disability for individuals who sustain injurious falls.

In general, research on the prevention of falls has shown that improving personal health as well as addressing unsafe external factors can be effective in preventing falls. For example, exercise programmes have been shown to reduce falls among community-dwelling individuals aged 65 and older.8 37 A person’s surrounding environment has also been identified as a leading cause of falls,9 10 meaning it is possible to prevent falls through the improvement of living conditions and public spaces, especially if older adults and universal design principles attending to safety are kept in mind when spaces are designed, altered and maintained.38 While some external hazards for falls are well known (eg, slippery surfaces or poor lighting), others are less visible or obvious. For example, in the inpatient setting, a study by Vassallo et al found that the hospital wards with more inpatient beds within the sightline of the nursing station had fewer falls than the ward with poor visibility between beds and the nursing station.39 Location-specific research in falls prevention has also shown that exercise, home modification, educational materials and vision correction are all important.40 41 It is also important to consider how morbidity or mortality resulting from falls might be mitigated. Clinical literature has supported frequent medication review with avoidance of polypharmacy,42 and dietary supplementation with cholecalciferol (vitamin D3) for select patients as methods to both prevent fall incidents and to help minimise fracture risk, though more recent assessments and recommendations by the US Preventive Services Task Force have revealed mixed results in terms of the benefits of vitamin D supplementation.43–46

Our study has several limitations. The first limitation is a function of our case definition in non-fatal models, where we estimate the incidence of falls that require medical care. While not every fall leads to injury, it is possible that care-seeking behavior with similar injuries could vary by location. Similarly, it is possible that in survey data or routine outpatient care visits, a patient may not report falls in the past year even if they led to minor injuries. Since our case definition includes only falls that lead to injury, our MIR estimates are likely lower than if we included all falls regardless of whether they led to injury requiring medical care. However, since the purpose of estimating those ratios is to illustrate patterns in severity and access to treatment, this limitation does not impact the key themes highlighted in our study. In addition, a general limitation in GBD analysis is that some areas of the world that may have high burden of various diseases and injuries do not have reliable incidence and cause-of-death data, and therefore our estimation process relies more heavily on covariates and regional trends in those areas. Similarly, the nature-of-injury distributions and injury duration parameters rely more heavily on data from higher income locations and Dutch injury data, and therefore may benefit in the future from adding more data sources from lower income locations so that that these parameters can be refined with greater location heterogeneity in future studies. Accordingly, an emphasis of GBD estimation going forward is to continue seeking additional data sources to be used in our modelling process.

Experiences of ending engagements and canceling weddings: Rituals of wedding planning (e.g., trying on a dress and selecting a venue) appear to serve as a catalyst for this process

Beyond cold feet: Experiences of ending engagements and canceling weddings. J. Kale Monk et al. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, July 30, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0265407520942590

Abstract: The engagement period is a critical window to understand stay–leave decisions because it marks a stage when individuals are moving toward lifelong commitment, but do not have the obligations of legal marriage that make dissolution more difficult. According to Inertia Theory, felt momentum can propel couples through relationship transitions without sufficient consideration of their dedication, which could constrain partners in poor quality relationships. Drawing from this perspective, we examined how individuals reduce relationship momentum and end a marital engagement. We conducted interviews with individuals who made the decision to end their engagements and cancel their weddings (N = 30). Experiences were analyzed using grounded theory techniques. The core concept we identified, visualizing, consisted of imagining a relational future (or alternative present) that became heightened during the engagement period. Rituals of wedding planning (e.g., trying on a dress and selecting a venue) appear to serve as a catalyst for this process. This cognitive shift prompted individuals to slow relational momentum (e.g., through trial separations and the returning of rings) and reconsider “red flags” and constraints to leaving the relationship. Once participants decided to leave, they described the process of breaking off the engagement and uncoupling from their partners. Family members and friends who assisted in managing the emotional fallout and logistics of ending the engagement (e.g., canceling with vendors and informing guests) were reported as particularly helpful supports. Visualizing married life beyond the wedding may be leveraged to help individuals navigate premarital doubts.

Keywords: Courtship, decision-making, dissolution, family rituals, qualitative research

Fear of missing out: Across age cohorts, low self-esteem and loneliness were each associated with high levels of FoMO, particularly for individuals who were also engaged in relatively greater social media activity

Fear of missing out (FoMO): A generational phenomenon or an individual difference. Christopher T. Barry, Megan Y. Wong. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, August 7, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0265407520945394

Abstract: Fear of missing out (FoMO) regarding activities within one’s social circle is a potential downside of the advent of social media and more rapid forms of communication. To examine potential generational or individual implications of FoMO, this study considered age cohort differences and self-perception correlates of FoMO. Participants were 419 individuals from throughout the U.S. who were members of 14- to 17-year-old, 24- to 27-year-old, 34- to 37-year-old, or 44- to 47-year-old cohorts. There were no cohort differences in overall FoMO, FoMO regarding close friends, or FoMO regarding family members. Across age cohorts, low self-esteem and loneliness were each associated with high levels of FoMO, particularly for individuals who were also engaged in relatively greater social media activity. Thus, the present findings indicate that FoMO concerning others’ activities may be particularly problematic for some individuals who are highly engaged with social media.

Keywords Fear of missing out, self-compassion, social media engagement

Check also Fear of missing out: prevalence, dynamics, and consequences of experiencing FOMO. Marina Milyavskaya et al. Motivation and Emotion, Mar 2018. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/03/fear-of-missing-out-prevalence-dynamics.html

More worried about the prospects for boys than for girls, & for their own sons more than their own daughters; conservatives & men are most concerned about boys in general, but liberals are most worried about their own sons

Americans are more worried about their sons than their daughters. Richard V. Reeves and Ember Smith. Brookings, Wednesday, October 7, 2020. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/10/07/americans-are-more-worried-about-their-sons-than-their-daughters/

Gender equality has been very much on the agenda in recent years. The challenges facing girls and women on many fronts are clear, including access to reproductive health care, protection from harassment in the workplace, labor force participation and rewards, and representation at the highest levels of politics and business.

But Americans are in general more worried about the prospects for boys than for girls, and for their own sons more than their own daughters, according to new data from the American Family Survey. Conservatives and men are most concerned about boys in general – but liberals are most worried about their own sons. These views may be influencing political trends, and in particular the growing partisanship gap between men and women.  

[...]

Americans are more worried about boys in general. Forty-one percent agree or strongly agree with the statement “I am worried about boys in the United States becoming successful adults,” compared to 33% saying the same for girls. But there is a big partisan divide here. Half (48%) of conservatives are worried about boys, and only 28% are worried about girls. Liberals, by contrast, are if anything slightly more worried about girls (44% compared to 41%). There is also a gender gap: 45% of men are worried about boys, only 31% are worried about girls. Overall, women are also more worried about boys than about girls, but by a much smaller margin (38% compared to 35%). 

14.6% of the general population reported insufficient left-right identification that 42.9% of individuals use a hand-related strategy

Distinguishing left from right: A large scale investigation of left right confusion in healthy individuals. Ineke van der Ham, H. Chris Dijkerman, Haike van Stralen. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, October 8, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/1747021820968519

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1314442081755172864

Abstract: The ability to distinguish left from right has been shown to vary substantially within healthy individuals, yet its characteristics and mechanisms are poorly understood. In three experiments, we focused on a detailed description of the ability to distinguish left from right, the role of individual differences, and further explored the potential underlying mechanisms. In Experiment 1, a questionnaire concerning self-reported Left-Right Identification (LRI) and strategy use was administered. Objective assessment was used in Experiment 2 by means of vocal responses to line drawings of a figure, with the participants’ hands in a spatially neutral position. In Experiment 3, the arm positions and visibility of the hands were manipulated to assess whether bodily posture influences left right decisions. Results indicate that 14.6% of the general population reported insufficient LRI and that 42.9% of individuals use a hand-related strategy. Furthermore, we found that spatial alignment of the participants’ arms with the stimuli increased performance, in particular with a hand-related strategy and females. Performance was affected only by the layout of the stimuli, not by the position of the participant during the experiment. Taken together, confusion about left and right occurs within healthy population to a limited extent, and a hand-related strategy affects LRI. Moreover, the process involved appears to make use of a stored body representation and not bottom-up sensory input. Therefore, we suggest a top-down body representation is the key mechanism in determining left and right, even when this is not explicitly part of the task.

Keywords: left-right identification, body representation, individual differences

People shy away from renting products that have a sentimental meaning for the owner, for fear of the increased responsibility

Why We Don't Rent What Others Love: The Role of Product Attachment in Consumer‐to‐Consumer Transactions. Antje R. H. Graul  Aaron R. Brough. Journal of Consumer Psychology, September 13 2020. https://doi.org/10.1002/jcpy.1193

Rolf Degen's take: 

Abstract: When listing a possession for rent on a consumer‐to‐consumer platform, owners typically write a brief product description. Such descriptions often include attachment cues—indications that the owner is emotionally attached to the product. How does knowing that an owner is sharing a possession that has sentimental value impact rental likelihood? Evidence from secondary data and four experiments suggests that although some owners mistakenly expect attachment cues to enhance a product's appeal, attachment cues instead tend to deter prospective renters. We attribute this effect to renters' desire to avoid the responsibility of protecting (e.g., from damage, loss, or theft) an item to which the owner is emotionally attached. Whereas prior research has examined how product attachment influences owners' decisions, we show how an owners' expression of attachment affects others involved in a transaction. By refuting the lay theories of some owners about how to attract renters, our findings provide practical implications for owners and the platforms that connect them to users in the multi‐billion‐dollar consumer‐to‐consumer rental market.