Independently of age, gender, education & income, people know very little about the money system or money institutions and mostly believe in money myths, such as the notion that money is still backed by gold

Money Knowledge or Money Myths? Results of a population survey on money and the monetary order. Klaus Kraemer, Luka Jakelja, Florian Brugger and Sebastian Nessel. European Journal of Sociology, Volume 61 Issue 2, Aug 28 2020. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-sociology-archives-europeennes-de-sociologie/article/money-knowledge-or-money-myths-results-of-a-population-survey-on-money-and-the-monetary-order/A7CE8F42F7F9C81B2F7BDCC3237A6A14

Abstract: People use money in everyday life in ubiquitous ways. In addition, they know that money has quite different and multiple meanings in different social contexts, depending on the situation in which it is used. That said, what do people actually know about money, money creation, money backing and the institutional foundations of the monetary order? While contributions in the rapidly extending field of financial literacy have empirically studied people’s knowledge about mathematical and financial issues, people’s knowledge about the functioning of the money system and monetary institutions remained mostly unexplored. To improve our understanding of people’s knowledge of the money system and the most important money institutions, we questioned 2,000 individuals in Austria using a standardized population survey. In this paper, after a short critical review of the sociology of money and the literature on financial literacy, we present and critically discuss the results of the survey. We found that, independently of age, gender, education and income, people know very little about the money system or money institutions and mostly believe in money myths, such as the notion that money is still backed by gold. Finally, we discuss our empirical findings against the backdrop of the state of research on the sociology of money 1.

Discussion: Knowledge, myths and misconceptions

People use money in everyday life in ubiquitous and multiple ways. They use it in markets and beyond, in both organizations and communities. They use it in very different social relationships (buyer-seller, creditor-borrower, employer-employee, state-citizen, parent-child, member-association, donor-public charity, etc.) and for a variety of economic and non-economic purposes, without being able to name them abstractly or to be reflexively aware of their effects. As Zelizer [2011] noted, people also know that money has quite different meanings in different social contexts depending on the situation in which it is used.

In sociological research on money, however, it has remained unclear what ordinary people know and what they do not know about money and the institutional foundations of the monetary system. Against the background of such a serious research desideratum, we examined empirically what people actually know about the monetary order. In this study, we found that people know hardly anything about money and the institutional foundations of the monetary order. Although people use money ubiquitously in everyday life, they mostly know little to nothing about how money is created, whether it is backed by tangible assets, or whether it represents nothing but a dematerialized “pure token” [Simmel (1900) 2004: 176]. Additionally, people have very vague notions about institutional responsibility for the value stability of the euro. People’s knowledge about money, money creation, money backing and the underlying institutions of the monetary order is at best rudimentary. This significant, blatant ignorance is remarkable, especially given that people in everyday life are naturally willing to barter goods in demand for a pure token, donate money for charitable or non-profit purposes, share and give away money within families, or do anything else to avoid monetary penalties.

Ever since Simmel, the sociology of money has assumed that people believe in money myths. Like people’s money knowledge, money myths have not been empirically investigated. At best, the sociology of money has speculated which myths are involved. With our empirical study, we show that people know little to nothing about the institutional foundations of the monetary order while claiming to know something about money. The interviewees indeed believe in money myths. That is, money myths are widely used by the population in a variety of forms; for example, the assumptions that money is backed by physical assets such as gold or other precious metals, that customers’ savings deposits are passed on by the banks as loans to borrowers, or that only central banks create money by printing and issuing banknotes, not private banks by lending, which the central banks authorize them to do. The vast majority of people do not know that deposits are created by a “keystroke” [Wray 2015: 66] when a bank customer demands a loan or overdraws the account. Obviously, most respondents believe that deposits or debit cards are the same as cash. However, respondents have illusory notions about the fact that money is backed by rare materials or value stocks. Thus, we state a double empirical finding, i.e., people know little or nothing about an institution as central as money, but at the same time they indicate that they do know something. In other words: People believe in money myths.

Another finding of the survey is sociologically significant. Similar to the belief in money myths, the lack of knowledge about money and the institutional foundations of the monetary order are more or less socially indifferently distributed throughout the population—regardless of age, gender, education, profession and income. As we have shown, all socio-demographic and socio-economic variables play a negligible role in the social distribution of monetary knowledge and myths. This finding is remarkable, since patterns of perception and interpretation are usually influenced by these sociological variables. Within the very small “zone of knowing” there are at most a few socio-structural abnormalities. For example, respondents who are self-employed or have a higher education know that money is created by private banks more often than all the others. Both of these groups are more likely to know that the ECB––and not the national central bank––is responsible for the monetary stability of the euro. However, it should be noted here that the vast majority of the self-employed with an above-average education who were surveyed believe in money myths.

So far, we have classified all “incorrect” response categories on the dimensions of money creation, money backing and monetary institutions as “money myths”, which we have located in the “zone of ignorance”. However, such a classification is not unproblematic in a sociological sense. Therefore, we differentiate in the following between money-related myths and misconceptions or fallacies. We call only such “incorrect“ response categories money myths, insofar as their claim of validity is collectively shared by a majority of the interviewees. In order to be able to speak of money myths, a second characteristic must be added. Money myths are different from other misconceptions or fallacies in that they are efficacious in the social world. Myths can facilitate or stimulate collective actions. Contrary to misconceptions or fallacies, money myths can unfold—in the sense of the classical Thomas theorem—collective effects on the structural level of a monetary order. They justify specific practices in the everyday use of money. For example, money is used in the expectation that the myth will not be disappointed. In other words, money myths influence and perpetuate specific social usages of money. The believers in money myths use money in accordance with their beliefs and not otherwise because they believe in the accuracy of the money myths. On the other hand, we define “incorrect” response categories as misconceptions or fallacies if they are only shared by a small minority of respondents and do not have a broad impact in the social world. Against the background of our empirical findings, we classify the “incorrect” response categories “all money is printed” and “money is backed by gold” as money myths. On the other hand, we interpret all those “incorrect” response categories (1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 3.1.) as misconceptions, which are only considered correct by a minority of the sample.

In the results chapter of this article, we first focused on question 1 (money creation), in respect of which response categories are “right” or “wrong”, based on recent official statements by the ECB and the Bank of England. Accordingly, we have classified the answer categories “the central banks print money” and “private banks issue credit” as “correct” and all other response categories as “incorrect”. In question 2 (money backing), we have argued that “money is not backed at all” is “correct”. In question 3 (money institutions), we have assigned “correct” and “wrong” response categories in the sense of the legal mandate of the ECB. Against the background of the sociological literature (see chapter 1), however, it makes sense to interpret the assignments of the response categories (“correct”/“incorrect”) in a broader sense. From a sociological perspective, one could argue that money myths (“all money is printed” and “money is backed by gold”) are social facts in the sense of Émile Durkheim [(1895) 1982], which create an action-oriented interpretive framework (“trust”) and influence the everyday use of money. More precisely, money myths are not mere fictional imaginations, but narratives that socially embed the usages of money. Against the background of this theoretical consideration, we interpret our empirical findings as follows: Ordinary people readily accept deposit money as long as the expectation is not disappointed that these money forms can always be exchanged for cash or precious metals at any time. Following this theoretical consideration, it makes sense to interpret collectively-shared money myths, which we have previously identified in the “zone of ignorance”, as narrative frameworks that culturally embed the monetary order and thus contribute to its social stability. In this sociological sense, money myths can be classified as “correct” response categories.

This finding somewhat challenges the assumption by scholars of the recent communication efforts of national banks about the “real” functioning of the monetary order. In contrast to Braun [2016] and Holmes [2014], for example, our findings suggest the limitation of communications by central banks, e.g. in that the bulk of modern money is created by private banks issuing credit and not by central banks issuing notes and coins. Instead, the prevalence of money myths seems deeply rooted in ordinary people’s perceptions of money. It is therefore questionable whether the central banks’ speaking to the people (Braun) and an “economy of words” (Holmes) can change monetary knowledge. Note, however, that central banks only recently began to change their communication about the monetary order in order to enhance “real” knowledge about it. Future research could hence more closely evaluate whether money myths can be altered by the communication efforts of central banks and other actors (e.g. “positive money initiatives”) in the long run and to which social groups they appeal most. As our results draw on the Austrian case where the national bank has not launched communication campaigns and full money initiatives are not existent, it would be interesting to replicate the survey used in this study in other countries (see below), particularly in the UK, which provides an outstanding example of changing communication by a central bank.

Finally, we may add that money myths never seem to be stable over time. They can erode, and they have to prove themselves in recurring financial market crises [Rogoff and Reinhart 2009]. Even in normal times they can be put to the proof. This may for example be the case if the everyday usability of cash as a payment instrument is restricted (see the different upper limits for cash payments in the eurozone since 2010) or the account holders cannot “escape” from negative interest rates and thus undermine the store of value function of money. Money myths can certainly be put to the proof in extraordinary events (bankruptcy, galloping inflation, prohibition on the private purchase of gold, limitation of legal access to cash––see the Debt Crisis in Greece of 2015). At the peak of financial market crises, money myths may even turn out to be an illusion. From a sociological perspective, it would certainly be hasty to interpret money myths as simple ignorance or as “false consciousness”. As long as money myths are not disenchanted, they can be latently efficacious in everyday life. However, money myths are questioned in a fundamental way, for example, when credit money can no longer be “withdrawn” from the cash account—within the limits of the available budget or the granted credit line.

Our empirical findings also show that we cannot confirm the assumption of the sociological literature of money since Simmel (see chapter 1) that people believe or trust that money is “backed” “through the beliefs of the people” (item 4 of question 2, 11.65%) or the future purchasing power (“goods and services”, item 3 of question 2, 24.53%). It would thus seem that our empirical findings on money knowledge can by no means be interpreted so clearly in the sense of a simple dichotomy of the response categories along the distinction between “correct” and “incorrect”. An empirically unclear issue that requires further investigation is the extent to which the myth-based ignorance of the “objective” architecture of the monetary order is indeed a prerequisite for ordinary people to use money in everyday life largely without friction, as one might theoretically assume against the background of the sociological money literature.

Another issue that remains to be investigated relates to the empirical findings in Austria on money knowledge and money myths as compared to other countries of the European Union or the eurozone. First of all, it should be noted that empirical studies on knowledge or ignorance in the population regarding money and the institutional foundations of the monetary order are not available in other countries. We suspect that similarities and variations can be found in other European societies. It would not be implausible to assume that in many countries comparable results can be expected in all three dimensions (money creation, money backing, monetary institutions). At the same time, however, it can be assumed that significant deviations would be found in some countries. The diffusion of money myths among the population may depend on country-specific institutional confidence. If institutional confidence is high, it could also be assumed that money myths are widespread. Further dependent variables would be the perceived performance of the national economy or the economic dynamics of “northern” EU-countries, the internal and external “power prestige” [Weber (1921-1922) 1978: 910] of national political elites, as well as the level of state loyalty among the population. We could expect that, in national societies with precarious economies, drastic economic and financial crises in the recent past and a strong skepticism towards the state order (e.g. Greece), the belief that money is backed by gold or that national political elites have sufficient capacities to successfully ward off a supranational crisis of the European monetary order is less widespread.

The empirical findings on money knowledge and money myths have important implications for research on financial literacy. Contributions in the field of financial literacy suggest that financial knowledge is unequally socially distributed, and that age, gender, education and income play an important role in the appropriation of mathematical and financial knowledge. However, as we have shown, the findings of financial literacy research do not correspond with the money knowledge of the population. Rather, it can be concluded that even persons with above-average financial knowledge do not necessarily know how money is created. Nor do they know the difference between private credit money (deposits) and central bank money (cash), whether money is covered by assets, and which institutions are responsible for the value stability of the euro. Rather, it can be assumed that many people with solid or above-average financial knowledge also believe in money myths. Against this background, a key aspect of financial literacy research is that the knowledge dimension is limited to mathematical and financial knowledge, but the dimensions of monetary knowledge and myths are ignored.

What follows from the empirical findings on money knowledge and money myths for the recent sociology of money? Zelizer [1994, 2011] has examined the everyday usage of money. In contrast to the classical economic exchange theory of money [see Ingham 2004] and Simmel’s sociological “quantity theory” of money, Zelizer analyses the “qualitatively” multiple, social and cultural embeddedness of money usage in everyday life [see Dodd 2014: 269-311; on the distinction between a “quantitative” and “qualitative” sociology of money and a critical review, see Kraemer and Nessel 2015: 13-21]. Our findings on money knowledge and money myths refer to a research dimension that was largely ignored by Zelizer. The use of money is not only involved in social and cultural contexts and social meanings. When people use money (for example, when sharing, lending, giving, saving, and connecting money with multiple meanings), they always do so in the expectation that they know what money is. For multiple social and cultural purposes, money can also be used—in normal times—in an unproblematic and unquestioned manner, because people are guided by their as-if-money knowledge and money myths. Against this background, it would be fruitful to more precisely discuss Zelizer’s thesis of the “social meaning of money” in the context of the presented findings on widespread money ignorance and myths.

Our findings can also be valuable for a political economy of money. Undoubtedly, Ingham is a prominent author investigating the institutional foundations of the modern monetary order, the power imbalances between key groups of actors (creditors, debtors, the state), and the dominant conflicts of interest over monetary stability from a decidedly sociological perspective. Against the background of the survey, an important question emerges with respect to ignorance and money myths within the population for the power asymmetries and conflicts of interest outlined by Ingham. It will also be necessary to clarify the influence of asymmetrically distributed money knowledge—for example, between experts and non-experts—on the modern monetary system. It is always relevant to the question of how myths about money—beyond all sociodemographic and socioeconomic variables—affect power asymmetries and conflicts of interest within the monetary system. In this context, it will also be necessary to clarify the extent to which the empirical findings on money knowledge and money myths can be used in the recent sociological debate on the privilege of private banks to create bank deposits through loans [Huber 2017; Sahr 2017]. For example, it might be discussed whether the fiat money regime works (in normal times) without friction because ordinary people do not know how money is created.

Finally, we want to discuss the question of how the empirical findings on money knowledge and money myths—or misconceptions and fallacies—can be interpreted in light of Simmel’s [(1908) 2009: 315] classic thesis on “trust” as a “middle position between knowledge and ignorance”. Our findings show that the vast majority of the respondents in the sample (88.2%, see chapter 5.2) are to be found in the “zone of ignorance”. These respondents believe that the total money supply is printed and covered by value assets, that the nation state guarantees bank deposits in the event of a banking or financial crisis, and that the National Central Bank is responsible for the value stability of the euro. In contrast, the “zone of knowledge” (.3%, see chapter 5.2) of those respondents who do not believe in money myths is very small in our sample. They know that money is not only printed by central banks but also created through lending by private banks. These respondents are aware that money is not backed by gold, government bonds or commodities, or loans or debts. Instead, they state that money is not backed at all. They assume that the legal guarantee of bank deposits in the event of a banking crisis is not a redeemable promise. In addition, they know that it is the ECB and not the National Central Bank that is responsible for monetary stability. They may also distrust the “economy of words” [Holmes 2014; Beckert 2016: 113-116] of central banks.

However, it would be erroneous to suggest that the respondents in the large “zone of ignorance” know nothing about money at all. At this point we cannot provide a more detailed explanation of what the respondents in the “zone of ignorance” know about money usage, even though they do not have a reflexive knowledge of the institutional foundations of the monetary system. However, we assume that they have a “weak form of inductive knowledge” [Simmel (1900) 2004: 191] in using money (see chapter 2). At the beginning of the article, we argued that people use money ubiquitously in everyday life. We can now concretize that statement: respondents in the large “zone of ignorance” indeed have a solid, practical knowledge of money. This practical knowledge has proven itself time and again in normal times. People know that they can buy commodities and pay outstanding accounts only with money. They know that they can donate money for charitable purposes and make others happy with a gift of money. In addition, of course, these respondents also know that they can influence the behaviour of others when they threaten to reduce or cancel a cash payment. People therefore know in a practical sense that money can be used in modern capitalist societies “absolutely” (Simmel) and at the same time “multiply” (Zelizer). Money can thus be used in everyday life without financial or mathematical knowledge or an understanding of the regime of money creation. We conclude with the following quote by Max Weber [2012: 300] about the social institution of money in everyday life: “No ordinary consumer will nowadays have even a rough knowledge of the production techniques of the goods that he uses daily, and he will mostly not even know what materials they are made of and what industry has produced them. All that he is interested in are those expectations concerning the performance of these artefacts that are of practical importance for him. The situation is no different with respect to social phenomena—money, for example. A person using money does not know how it actually acquires its peculiar characteristics (since, in fact, even professional specialists have heated arguments about that).”

The majority (> 80%) of adult men have accessed pornography at some point, and in the past year (40–70%); around half of younger men (25 or under) are weekly consumers; pornography use tapers-off with age

A Literature Review of Studies into the Prevalence and Frequency of Men’s Pornography Use. Dan J. Miller, Peter T. F. Raggatt & Kerry McBain. American Journal of Sexuality Education, Volume 15, 2020 - Issue 4, Pages 502-529, Oct 13 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/15546128.2020.1831676

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1333763474472710150

Abstract: This review aims to provide information on the prevalence and frequency of adult males’ pornography use. It appears, the majority (> 80%) of adult men have accessed pornography at some point, and in the past year (40–70%). Around half of younger men (25 or under) are weekly consumers. Pornography use tapers-off with age. Relatively few (<10%) younger men have accessed violent pornography in the past year. The Internet is the primary method of access. Pornography use is associated with masturbation; use during partnered sex is less common. Differences in consumption rates between heterosexual and gay and bisexual men are discussed.

Keywords: Pornography, sexually explicit material, men, prevalence

Singapore youths: Early exposure to aggressive games was not predictive of anxiety, depression, somatic symptoms, or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 2 years later; aggresive games is not a risk factor in mental health

Aggressive Video Games Are Not a Risk Factor for Mental Health Problems in Youth: A Longitudinal Study. Christopher J. Ferguson and C.K. John Wang. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, Dec 1 2020. https://doi.org/10.1089/cyber.2020.0027

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1333729157717643266

Abstract: Recent preregistered studies and analyses have suggested that links between aggressive video games (AVGs) and aggression-related outcomes may have been exaggerated in previous literature. However, concerns about AVGs remain. Although the impact of aggressive games on aggressive behaviors has been the subject of approximately a dozen preregistered studies, the potential impact of aggressive games on the player's mental health symptoms has not been the subject of similar preregistered analyses. In the current study, a sample of more than 3000 youth from Singapore were examined by using preregistered analyses to determine whether early exposure to aggressive games was predictive of anxiety, depression, somatic symptoms, or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 2 years later. Analyses suggested that exposure to AVGs is not a risk factor for later mental health symptoms.

Making a Microaggression: Using Big Data and Qualitative Analysis to Map the Reproduction and Disruption of Microaggressions through Social Media

Making a Microaggression: Using Big Data and Qualitative Analysis to Map the Reproduction and Disruption of Microaggressions through Social Media. Rob Eschmann et al. Social Media + Society. November 30, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305120975716

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1333714191857946624

Abstract: Racial microaggressions are defined as subtle racial slights that can be offensive or hurtful. One of the defining characteristics of racial microaggressions is how difficult they can be to respond to, and the literature reports that not responding may be the most common response to microaggressions. This study addresses a vital gap in the existing literature by examining the extent to which the silence that characterizes face-to-face experiences with microaggressions extends into online social media spaces. Drawing on a dataset of 254,964 tweets over an 8-year period, we present and examine trends in the usage of the term “microaggressions” over time. Furthermore, we then generate a purposive sample of 1,038 of the most influential tweets to explore discussions and content themes through an in-depth qualitative analysis of these messages. Here, we find both a drastic increase in the usage of the term microaggression on Twitter over time and an intense contestation over its meaning and repercussions for both individuals and society. Implications of these findings in understanding the role of online social media discourse in challenging or reproducing hegemonic racial structures is discussed.

Keywords: microaggressions, social media, Twitter, racial structures, race, online communication

Discussion

This study explored the usage of the term microaggression in online spaces. The dramatic increase in usage of the term between 2010 (with 877 mentions) to 2018 (with 58,787 mentions), an increase of 6,603%, is indicative of the way in which this language is increasingly being used to describe the types of subtle racialized interactions that characterize the color-blind post-Civil Rights era. There are many potential explanations for this increase in the usage of the term microaggression, including increased attention to racial justice issues on Twitter through movements such as BLM (Anderson & Hitlin, 2016), trends towards more discussion of identity politics in the Trump era (Taylor, 2018), or the usage of an academic term (microaggressions) to describe the types of subtle experiences that many marginalized groups experience, but used other language to describe (or did not discuss in public) before the proliferation of the microaggressions concept online.

Given the silences that characterize experiences with microaggressions in face-to-face interactions (Sue, 2010), just this increased usage of the term represents a dramatic shift and increased visibility of experiences with problematic racial interactions that have been hidden—or only discussed in private by the targets of microaggressions—for so long. This unmasking of racism through social media meets many of the criteria suggested by Sue and colleagues (2019) regarding the best practices for disarming microaggressions.

Yet, this work indicates that there is contention around the microaggressions concept. The single largest code we found, denying microaggressions, made up one-third of the tweets in the dataset and consisted of tweets used to minimize and ridicule microaggressions. These tweets show that as popular understanding of the term grows, detractors may use the online space to defend their actions. This is consistent with the literature, which suggests that microaggressors are defensive when confronted (Sue, 2016). The tweets in this code indicate that many are frustrated with normal behaviors being coded as problematic through the microaggressions lens, and use social media as a way to challenge this encroachment on their free speech.

It is interesting to note that even those who are vehemently opposed to the term microaggressions are aware of it. The mechanisms of racism should not need to be defended, when they remain invisible. That some users feel the need to deny the logics of microaggressions so passionately may demonstrate a discomfort with this mechanism of power reproduction being unmasked through social media discourse. This discomfort may be increased given the role social media and Twitter have played in amplifying the voices of marginalized groups and activist and antiracist efforts, from protests against police violence against Black people, to sharing videos of White people calling the police on innocent Black people without cause (Anderson & Hitlin, 2016; Ransom, 2020). For individuals who are accustomed to (and comfortable with) racial slights being ignored and overlooked in everyday interactions, the increased attention paid to these acts through social media can represent an unwelcome change in the racial power dynamics, as users challenge the previously invisible mechanisms of White supremacy.

The data also demonstrate that Twitter users are engaged in informal knowledge production, educating other users about what microaggressions are and how they are experienced by and impact marginalized communities, including people of Color, women, queer people, and those who have intersecting identities. Sometimes, these messages are directed at those who are actively denying or committing microaggressions, demonstrating that social media is a space in which users are able to engage in discussions across ideological boundaries. Future research may explore the prevalence and productivity of such discussions. In other cases, such as in the Growth code, we see evidence of the ways in which this knowledge production can impact human development as users discuss their learning about microaggressions and the ways it has shifted their thinking and real-world interactions.

Equally important is the role discussing microaggressions on social media plays for people of Color and other marginalized groups. For folks who have been silenced in other settings—unable to respond to or critique microaggressions because of power dynamics—having access to a public space in which their experiences with microaggressions are empathized with can be a powerful form of support. Sharing their stories with people who not only believe that microaggressions occurred, but also help in processing these experiences, externalizes the problem of microaggressions with the perpetrator, taking away any sense of guilt for the targets of microaggressions. In this way, discussion of microaggressions on Twitter are consistent with what the literature has called counterpublics, digital counterpublics, and counterspaces, or alternative communication spheres that engage in discussions that may be marginalized in mainstream spaces, or online communal discussions more explicitly related to the dismantling of racism (Eschmann, 2020a; Groshek & Han, 2011; Hill, 2018; Jackson et al., 2020).

This digital discourse has the potential to normalize knowledge of the subtle mechanisms of structural racism and increase awareness of how covert acts can perpetuate racial inequality. Given that many microaggressions are ignored, and not recognized as patently offensive (Gantt Shafer, 2017), increased awareness and discourse in online spaces may change how these events are experienced and responded to in face-to-face settings. This study demonstrates the potential for online spaces to be primary sites for equity-based knowledge production and the challenging of dominant and hegemonic structures.

Personality shapes information sharing about sexual preferences, the way dissonant sexual preferences of the partners are handled, and the extent to which the person is committed to promises made to the partner

Big Five Personality Traits and Sex. Uwe Jirjahn, Martha Ottenbacher. Global Labor Organization Discussion Paper, No. 720, Nov 2020. https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/226369/1/GLO-DP-0720.pdf

Abstract: Sexual well-being plays an important role in the quality of life. Against this background, we provide an economics-based approach to the relationship between the Big Five personality traits and various dimensions of sexuality. From a theoretical viewpoint, personality influences sexual well-being not only by how a person feels about sex, but also by how the person behaves in a sexual relationship. Personality shapes information sharing about sexual preferences, the way dissonant sexual preferences of the partners are handled, and the extent to which the person is committed to promises made to the partner. Using a large representative dataset from Germany, we find that personality traits play a role in a person’s own sexual satisfaction, in (the self-assessment of) fulfilling the partner’s sexual needs and desires, in sexual communication, in actual and desired frequency of sex, and in extradyadic affairs.

Keywords: Big Five Personality Traits, Sexual Satisfaction, Frequency of Intercourse, Sexual Infidelity, Sexual Communication, Family Economics.

JEL: D10, D91, J10, J12

Consumer decision making: Biases are more rule than exception; the median consumer exhibits 10 of 17 potential biases

We are all Behavioral, More or Less: A Taxonomy of Consumer Decision Making. Victor Stango & Jonathan Zinman. NBER Working Paper 28138, November 2020. DOI 10.3386/w28138

Abstract: We examine how 17 behavioral biases relate to each other, to other decision inputs, and to decision outputs. Most consumers exhibit multiple biases in our nationally representative panel data. There is substantial heterogeneity across consumers, even within similar demographic/skill groups. Biases are positively correlated within person, especially after adjusting for measurement error, and less correlated with other inputs—risk aversion, patience, cognitive skills, and personality traits—with some expected exceptions. Accounting for this correlation structure, we reduce our 29 decision inputs to eight common factors. Seven common factors load on at least two biases, six on clusters of theoretically related biases, and two or three are distinctly behavioral. All but one common factor is distinct from cognitive skills. Factor scores strongly conditionally correlate with decisions and outcomes in various domains. We discuss several potential implications of this taxonomy for various approaches to modeling influences of behavioral biases on decision making.

Haunted House Fear And Contagion Effects

Tashjian, Sarah M., Virginia Fedrigo, Tanaz Molapour, dean mobbs, and Colin Camerer. 2020. “Contextual and Endogenous Effects on Physiology During a Haunted House Fear Induction.” PsyArXiv. November 30. doi:10.31234/osf.io/5u9se

Abstract: Threat exposure elicits physiological and psychological responses, the frequency and intensity of which, and concordance between, has implications for survival. Ethical and practical limitations on human laboratory fear inductions make it essentially impossible to measure response to extreme threat. Furthermore, ecologically valid investigations of group effects on fear are lacking in humans. The current preregistered study measured tonic and phasic electrodermal activity in 156 human participants while they participated in small groups in a 30 minute sequence of threats of varying intensity (a haunted house). Results revealed that (i) friends increased overall arousal, (ii) unexpected attacks elicited greater phasic responses than expected attacks, (iii) subjective fear increased frequency of phasic spikes, and (iv) startle had dissociable effects on frequency and amplitude of phasic reactivity. Findings show that etiology of emotional contagion varies depending on relationship type (increased among friends) and subjective fear is associated with temporal aspects of physiological arousal.

I Don’t Want You to ‘Believe’ Me. I Want You to Listen. Agnes Callard

I Don’t Want You to ‘Believe’ Me. I Want You to Listen. Agnes Callard. The New York Times, Nov. 30, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/30/opinion/i-dont-want-you-to-believe-me-i-want-you-to-listen.html

I fear that the more I tell you, the less you will understand who I am.

I am not a private person — quite the opposite — but I do have two secrets. The first concerns some Bad Events that happened to me long ago (yes, it’s the sort of thing you are thinking of), and the second is an unrelated Fact about my neurological makeup.

Let me be clear: I am not ashamed of either of these things. Keeping them secret creates, in me, an uncomfortable feeling, as though I were hiding something, as though I were ashamed, and that bugs me all the time, like a scratchy tag in my clothing. But I can’t tell you what The Fact is, because you won’t believe me; and I can't tell you about The Events, because you will.

I have barely told you anything about The Events, but I suspect that you have already started believing. You want to be someone who believes women; you see this as the belief-challenge you have been waiting for; you want to rise to it. When I first told a therapist about The Events, she said: “Of course. In retrospect it makes perfect sense of so many things …”

Later she apologized for this as therapeutic overreach. Even therapists can’t help themselves — they are off to the races, believing and believing. On this topic, so much gets packaged into “being believed” that I fear the more I tell you, the less you will understand me.

I don't want you to think you know the meaning of The Events; I don’t want to be classified as damaged; I don’t want you to feel good about yourself for believing me; I don’t want you to feel sorry for me; and most of all, I don’t want you to praise my courage for “coming forward” or for “surviving.” The prospect of receiving praise or honor for this revelation fills with me with rage — when I imagine your admiration, I immediately imagine throwing it back in your face.

The Fact I’d like to tell you has to do with a difference between how we — you and I — think. But to get specific about this difference, I have to use a word you associate with people who don’t talk, who can’t take care of themselves, whose inner lives seem utterly obscure to you, people who harm themselves, people you struggle to see as human, people whose existence you see as a tragedy.

And you will find this comparison preposterous. You will tell me I shouldn’t use “that word,” you will helpfully offer me milder alternatives. You might acknowledge that I’m “quirky” or “idiosyncratic” — in a good way! — and that a few of those quirks may superficially resemble those people. But I have a professional career, a family. I can’t be like them. (Ask yourself: how much knowledge would you need, really, to be certain of this?)

You might be willing to budge a little if you could hear it from some medical professionals — though one might not be enough. You’d need a second and third opinion. Notice that if I told you I had cancer or diabetes or depression, or for that matter that I was left-handed, you would not insist on seeing my papers. You would not be inclined to think I was faking my left-handedness by having trained myself to use my left hand; or that I resembled depressed people only “in some respects.”

In the case of The Events, you are eager to assign victim status to me; in the case of The Fact, you are wary of assigning it to me. For you, there is only one question: how much suffering can she legitimately lay claim to?

You are so busy trying to answer this question — trying to serve as judge in the pain/suffering/disadvantage Olympics — that you cannot hear anything I am trying to tell you. And that means I can’t talk to you. No one can sincerely assert words whose meaning she knows will be garbled by the lexicon of her interlocutor. I don’t want privacy, but you’ve forced it onto me.

You might wonder why I have to tell you these things. Couldn’t I find a supportive community of people who endured similar Events, and wouldn’t I be believed by other Fact-Bearers? Yes, and individual connections of this kind are very valuable, but at the group level this kind of support has never worked for me.

Being surrounded by people who are supposedly like me inevitably leads me to feel maximally “different.” Probably my failure to benefit from such communities is a sign that I have not suffered so much, and deserve very little victim credit. So be it!

Solidarity is not my thing, openness is. It is a consequence of The Fact, for me, that I lean toward transparency in all contexts: I have to consciously prevent myself from oversharing (even more than I do), and I am honest from necessity rather than virtue.

There is a reason for all of this, which is that I am bad — really bad, you cannot imagine how bad — at figuring things out on my own. If I take too many steps in reasoning without the intervention of another person, I go very far wrong. So I have accustomed myself to reasoning in public as much as I can, to making sure to expose my mistakes to correction.

I know that I don’t know what corner assistance might come from. I don’t want to confide in a select group of people who grumble among themselves about how you misunderstand “us.” I want to talk to you, any and all of you, freely, so you can help me stop misunderstanding myself.

The truth is that I don’t know the meaning of The Events, for my life. Isn’t it at least possible that they simply don’t have any meaning? Or maybe the meaning will change once I am allowed to speak them out loud? Perhaps I really am scarred for life, but do we have to assume that from the outset?

If I could talk it through, I might have a hope of figuring this out. Because that is mostly how I figure out all the difficult problems of my life: I talk about them to whoever is available, whenever the problems seem relevant to something else I am thinking about; I listen; I rethink; I write; I circle back and write something else; over and over again; and over time I develop a stable picture.

With The Events, I am at sea. For so long I did not even allow myself to speak them to myself. Now that I can, it chafes at me that you have decided that if I want to talk about them with you, I have to follow your rules, and let you trample all over me. Perhaps more people who have experienced Events would talk about them with you if they thought you would do less “believing” and more listening.

Factwise, this is what I want to know: what, if anything, ties together the “superficial” differences in how I dress, how I talk, how my mind jumps around, my repetitive movements, my sensitivities, the kinds of patterns I see and the kinds I miss, my obsessions, my literal-mindedness, my odd oscillations between needing to be alone and needing to be with others, between striking you as charming and coming off as unbearable. Why do I struggle so much to understand which emotion I am feeling? Why am I so bad at predicting what you will find offensive?

The Fact makes me part of a group of people whose boundaries are amorphous; we do not all recognize one another, and even when we do, we are not sure what we have in common. You would like to manage this situation in a very specific way: First, carve off what you take to be the “most severe cases,” and find a cure that prevents any more of them from arising.

Second, assimilate the rest — people like me — as “normal,” or as normal enough, so long as you are sufficiently tolerant and accommodating. But I suspect all the tolerance and accommodation in the world won’t make me normal. Do we have to pretend that I am? Is that the condition on which you are willing to engage with me? And couldn’t a group of people have something in common even if “degree of suffering” isn’t that thing?

I could use your help — not your support, not your approval, not your reassurance but your help as an open and thoughtful audience for these difficult questions. But you won’t help me, because you won’t listen to what I’m trying to say, because all you care about is how much victim status I deserve. You are really letting me down.

Agnes Callard (@AgnesCallard), an associate professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago and the author of “Aspiration: The Agency of Becoming,” writes about public philosophy at The Point magazine.

The topological changes in rich-club organization provide novel insight into sex-specific effects on white matter connections that underlie a potential network mechanism of sex-based differences in cognitive function

Sex Differences in Anatomical Rich-Club and Structural–Functional Coupling in the Human Brain Network. Shuo Zhao, Gongshu Wang, Ting Yan, Jie Xiang, Xuexue Yu, Hong Li, Bin Wang. Cerebral Cortex, bhaa335, Nov 24 2020. https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhaa335

Abstract: Structural and functional differences between the brains of female and male adults have been well documented. However, potential sex differences in the patterns of rich-club organization and the coupling between their structural connectivity (SC) and functional connectivity (FC) remain to be determined. In this study, functional magnetic resonance imaging and diffusion tensor imaging techniques were combined to examine sex differences in rich-club organization. Females had a stronger SC-FC coupling than males. Moreover, stronger SC-FC coupling in the females was primarily located in feeder connections and non–rich-club nodes of the left inferior frontal gyrus and inferior parietal lobe and the right superior frontal gyrus and superior parietal gyrus, whereas higher coupling strength in males was primarily located in rich-club connections and rich-club node of the right insula, and non-rich-club nodes of the left hippocampus and the right parahippocampal gyrus. Sex-specific patterns in correlations were also shown between SC-FC coupling and cognitive function, including working memory and reasoning ability. The topological changes in rich-club organization provide novel insight into sex-specific effects on white matter connections that underlie a potential network mechanism of sex-based differences in cognitive function.

Keywords: cognitive function, rich-club organization, SC-FC coupling, sex differences, topological properties

Discussion

We examined changes in the patterns of rich-club organization in structural networks and functional brain dynamics between females and males. The main findings were as follows: 1) We found increased values of the topological properties cost, Eg, Eloc, and strength in male versus female adults. 2) Compared with the male adults, the female adults had a greater strength in the SC-FC coupling. Moreover, the females had a negative correlation between the SC-FC coupling and the cost of the topological properties, whereas the males had a positive correlation between the SC-FC coupling and the cost of the topological properties. 3) Different regions of SC-FC coupling were observed between females and males. A higher SC-FC coupling in the females than males was primarily located in the non-rich-club nodes, including regions of the left IFG and IPL and the right SFG and SPG. A higher SC-FC coupling in the males than females was located not only in the rich-club nodes, including the right INS, but also in non–rich-club nodes, including the left hippocampus and the right PHG. 4) A sex-specific correlation was found between SC-FC coupling in the brain network and cognitive performance. The females had a negative correlation between local SC-FC coupling and working memory, whereas the males had a positive correlation between rich-club SC-FC coupling and reasoning ability. We thus conclude that the pattern differences in the correlations between SC-FC coupling and cognitive function were affected by sex differences, which may help to reveal a potential network mechanism of sex differences in cognitive function.

In this study, when a range of degrees k from 5 to 10 was used, the males had higher rich-club coefficients than the females, which reflected the existence of different rich-club organization in the brain topological properties between females and males. That is, increased effects were found with the topological properties of cost, Eg, Eloc, and strength in the males versus the females. In particular, the strength and cost of feeder and local but not rich-club connections was increased. These findings were consistent with previous studies (e.g., Wang et al. 2019a) that found higher levels of cost, density, and strength among topological properties in males than in females. These differences between males and females exhibited typical rich-club properties, revealing greater global efficiency, local efficiency, and strength in males but a more economical rich-club architecture in females.

Importantly, the present study combined DTI techniques and functional resting-state techniques and found a greater coupling strength in the SC-FC in the females than males. Although previous studies (e.g., Zell et al. 2015; Gur and Gur 2017; Ritchie et al. 2018) have reported differences between males and females in the topological properties of structural connections or functional connections, the present study provides further evidence for sex differences in the relationship between SC and FC coupling, revealing greater SC-FC coupling strength in females than in males. Compared with males, females had greater coupling strength in the rich-club and local but not feeder SC-FC coupling. Moreover, this strength was associated with the cost of topological properties in the rich-club and local coupling. Specifically, the correlation between SC-FC coupling strength and the cost of local connections was negative with females, whereas the correlation between SC-FC coupling strength and the cost of rich-club connections was positive with males. Therefore, the increase in SC-FC coupling in females was mainly concentrated in rich-club and local connections that correspond to more stringent and less dynamic brain function (Honey et al. 2009; van den Heuvel et al. 2009) and influence the cost of rich-club architecture compared to that of males. Previous studies (Collin et al. 2014) have proposed that information integration is influenced by the architecture of neural systems, which may be driven by a potential “trade-off” between cost and communication efficiency, known as the cost-efficiency trade-off of neural circuitry formation. Based on this proposition, the present finding of difference between males and females in SC-FC coupling may contribute to a more accurate understanding of sex differences in the dynamic changes and information integration in brain network structures. Additionally, as previous studies have reported that SC-FC coupling increased with age (Supekar et al. 2010; Grayson et al. 2014) and was disrupted in the context of clinical disease (van den Heuvel et al. 2013; Collin et al. 2017; Wang et al. 2019b; Cao et al. 2020), the present findings might also provide a future direction to examine the age-related changes and disease-related disruptions in SC-FC coupling in different sexes.

Moreover, a difference in SC-FC coupling was found between females and males in the nodes of the rich-club organization. Specifically, greater SC-FC coupling in the females was primarily located in the non-rich-club nodes, including the left IFG and right SFG in the frontal lobe and the left IPL and right SPG in the parietal lobe, whereas greater SC-FC coupling in the males was located not only in the rich-club nodes, including the right INS, but also in non-rich-club nodes, including the left hippocampus and right PHG. All of these regions are the limbic system. The findings were largely consistent with a previous report that the structural properties of these regions were different between females and males. Gong et al. (2009), using diffusion MRI tractography data, revealed a lower efficiency in the IFG in females than males. However, a higher regional efficiency was shown in females than males in the SPG (Gur et al. 1999). Ritchie et al. (2018) also found a larger brain volume in the right superior parietal region in females than males but no difference in the left inferior parietal region, although a greater connectivity in the IPL was reported by Gong et al. (2011). All of these regions are located in the dorsal frontoparietal network and participate in various functions, including spatial attention (Corbetta and Shulman 2002; Fellrath et al. 2016). Additionally, the INS is an important hub region associated with spatial cognition, which exhibited greater connectivity (Gong et al. 2011) but lower FA values (Chou et al. 2011) in males than females. The PHG and hippocampus are located in the limbic system and play an important role in memory. Using the tract-based spatial statistic (TBSS) method, Chou et al. (2010) showed that females had higher FA values in the PHG but lower FA values in the hippocampus. Ritchie et al. (2018) found a higher thickness in the PHG in females, but a higher volume and surface area in males. Based on these findings, our results extend the identification of sex differences to SC-FC coupling. We suggest that the advantage of this approach is the differences in SC-FC coupling in rich-club and non-rich-club nodes between females and males. As previous studies have reported sex differences in cognitive performance, including memory (Harness et al. 2008; Levine et al. 2016), spatial attention and spatial cognition (Vaquero et al. 2004; Levine et al. 2016), we therefore proposed that SC-FC coupling in females and males in the different nodal regions between rich-club and non-rich-club nodes represents submodular organization for specific functional domains that may exhibit optimized patterns, leading to improved performance in corresponding cognitive functions. However, other characteristics, such as brain volume differences, are also likely to account for sex differences in specific cognitive functions.

In this study, we also examined the relationship between SC-FC coupling and cognitive performance in females and males. Specifically, we found a negative correlation between local SC-FC coupling and working memory in the females, whereas a positive correlation was shown between rich-club SC-FC coupling and reasoning ability in the males. Previous studies have reported that males scored significantly higher on reasoning ability (Quereshi and Seitz 1993; Lakin 2013) and that females scored significantly higher on working memory (Harness et al. 2008) in cognitive performance. For example, van der Sluis et al. (2006) reported that males scored higher on reasoning ability, while females scored higher on working memory, on the Dutch WAIS-III. Neuroimaging research has also reported sex differences in cognitive performance, including working memory and reasoning ability. Specifically, a meta-analysis study (Hill et al. 2014) found that males had more activity in a distributed network including parietal regions, while females had activity in more limbic regions including the amygdala and hippocampus, as well as prefrontal regions including the right inferior frontal gyrus. Moreover, one team (Ritchie et al. 2018) showed, using a large sample (2750 females and 2466 males), that sex differences in reasoning ability were associated with brain volume and surface area. The present results extended these findings in the SC-FC coupling in the rich-club organization that showed sex differences, suggesting reduced working memory in females and increased reasoning ability in males was associated with the females having less stringent and more dynamic brain function in the local connections, and the males having more stringent and less dynamic brain function in the rich-club connections. Given the importance of working memory and reasoning ability as pivotal cognitive functions in the intellectual domain, these observations suggest that sex differences in SC-FC coupling linked to reduced working memory and increased reasoning ability are closely related to the intellectual domain, potentially helping to explain how and why males and females differ in intelligence and academic achievement. 

Limitations.

The present study has several limitations that should be acknowledged. First, the sample size of subjects was relatively small. Regarding the limitation of the dataset, it is important to validate our findings by replicating our analyses using a larger sample of subjects. Second, in this study, we analyzed the coupling between SC and FC, which was limited to the connections with nonzero SC and FC. Although a strong FC also exists between regions with indirect SC (Honey et al. 2009), there is currently no way to analyze the associations between FC and indirect SC because of the limitations of the method. The aim of this study was simply to investigate differences in SC-FC coupling between females and males. Future research should examine the indirect connections to analyze the SC-FC coupling between females and males. Furthermore, this study did not sufficiently examine the correlations between the strength of the SC-FC coupling and working memory and reasoning ability in females and males. We used LNS and MR scores to examine the correlations between the strength of the SC-FC coupling and working memory and reasoning ability in females and males. Given that LNS and MR measures only the working memory ability to retrieve auditory information and nonverbal spatial reasoning ability, future studies should also evaluate the relationships between visual working memory and verbal reasoning ability.

In summary, this study found that sex significantly affected the rich-club organization of structural networks in individuals with typical development. Differences in the male versus female adults were shown with the topological properties of cost, Eg, Eloc, and strength. Importantly, a greater coupling strength of the SC-FC in females versus males was observed. Moreover, higher SC-FC coupling in the females was primarily located in the non-rich-club nodes, whereas higher SC-FC coupling in the males was located not only in the rich-club but also in non–rich-club nodes. Our results also found different patterns across sexes in the correlations between SC-FC coupling and cognitive function, including working memory and reasoning ability. Our findings of the topological changes in rich-club organization provide novel insight into sex differences on white matter connections that may underlie a potential network mechanism of sex-based differences in cognitive function.

The strong underrepresentation of women in math-related fields is more pronounced in more egalitarian & more developed countries; could be due to stronger stereotypes relating math primarily to men in those societies

Gender stereotypes can explain the gender-equality paradox. Thomas Breda et al. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, November 23, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2008704117

Significance: Recent research has found that the strong underrepresentation of women in math-related fields is more pronounced in more egalitarian and more developed countries. This pattern has been called the “gender-equality paradox.” We show that stereotypes relating math primarily to men are actually stronger in more egalitarian and more developed countries and that they mediate the link between development and segregation across fields of study. The mechanisms connecting socioeconomic development to the strengthening of these stereotypes and the gendering of math-related fields are discussed. Results suggest that gender occupational segregation can be reduced but will not decrease by itself as societies become more developed. Appropriate policies are therefore needed to limit this segregation or its impact on gender inequality.

Abstract: The so-called “gender-equality paradox” is the fact that gender segregation across occupations is more pronounced in more egalitarian and more developed countries. Some scholars have explained this paradox by the existence of deeply rooted or intrinsic gender differences in preferences that materialize more easily in countries where economic constraints are more limited. In line with a strand of research in sociology, we show instead that it can be explained by cross-country differences in essentialist gender norms regarding math aptitudes and appropriate occupational choices. To this aim, we propose a measure of the prevalence and extent of internalization of the stereotype that “math is not for girls” at the country level. This is done using individual-level data on the math attitudes of 300,000 15-y-old female and male students in 64 countries. The stereotype associating math to men is stronger in more egalitarian and developed countries. It is also strongly associated with various measures of female underrepresentation in math-intensive fields and can therefore entirely explain the gender-equality paradox. We suggest that economic development and gender equality in rights go hand-in-hand with a reshaping rather than a suppression of gender norms, with the emergence of new and more horizontal forms of social differentiation across genders.

Keywords: gender gap in STEMgender stereotypessocioeconomic development

Check also Sex Differences in Anatomical Rich-Club and Structural–Functional Coupling in the Human Brain Network. Shuo Zhao, Gongshu Wang, Ting Yan, Jie Xiang, Xuexue Yu, Hong Li, Bin Wang. Cerebral Cortex, bhaa335, Nov 24 2020.  https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2020/11/the-topological-changes-in-rich-club.html

Psychiatric disorders: While many factors contribute to risk, epidemiological evidence suggests that the genetic contribution carries the highest risk burden; the increased rates are nonspecific

Risk in Relatives, Heritability, SNP-Based Heritability, and Genetic Correlations in Psychiatric Disorders: A Review. Bart M.L. Baselmans et al. Biological Psychiatry, Volume 89, Issue 1, January 1 2021, Pages 11-19. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2020.05.034

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1333344147185541120

Abstract: The genetic contribution to psychiatric disorders is observed through the increased rates of disorders in the relatives of those diagnosed with disorders. These increased rates are observed to be nonspecific; for example, children of those with schizophrenia have increased rates of schizophrenia but also a broad range of other psychiatric diagnoses. While many factors contribute to risk, epidemiological evidence suggests that the genetic contribution carries the highest risk burden. The patterns of inheritance are consistent with a polygenic architecture of many contributing risk loci. The genetic studies of the past decade have provided empirical evidence identifying thousands of DNA variants associated with psychiatric disorders. Here, we describe how these latest results are consistent with observations from epidemiology. We provide an R tool (CHARRGe) to calculate genetic parameters from epidemiological parameters and vice versa. We discuss how the single nucleotide polymorphism–based estimates of heritability and genetic correlation relate to those estimated from family records.

Keywords: Family register dataGenetic correlationGWASHeritabilityPsychiatric geneticsRisk in relatives

Conclusions

In this capstone narrative, we bring together the methods and results that summarize the genetic contribution to psychiatric disorders and the genetic relationship between them. We note that we use the common assumption that psychiatric disorder diagnosis definitions are underpinned by a consistent polygenic biology. If this is not true—for example, if a single clinical diagnosis is allocated to one or more independent or correlated biological diseases—then further thought is needed to interpret the estimates of heritability and genetic correlation. Such a scenario could explain (41), in part, the large difference between heritability and SNP-based heritability (Figure 1) in addition to contributions from rare variants and low LD between genotyped and causal variants. Previously, we concluded that only with large GWAS sample sizes and extensive clinical data (40,41) would we have the information needed to examine this interesting question. Despite this caveat, multiple results from GWAS data confirm that individuals allocated a specific diagnosis are genetically more similar, on average, than those allocated other diagnoses (i.e., heritabilities of individual disorders are greater than co-heritabilities between disorders) (Figure S2 in Supplement 2).

Understanding the genetic contribution to common disease is a foundation for many other research directions. It is outside the scope of this review to focus on the utility of the estimates of heritability and genetic correlation in detail. Estimates of SNP-based heritability help to guide whether efforts to increase GWAS sample sizes should continue, as they provide an upper limit on the combined effects of individual associated loci. Estimates of heritability and SNP-based heritability provide guidelines of maximum future accuracy of risk prediction applied to people whose disease status is not yet known. Genetic correlations can be used to determine how much the accuracy of the risk prediction can be improved by drawing on information from correlated traits, which perhaps are available in much larger samples than for the primary disorder itself (68). Here, we have focused on genetic correlations between psychiatric disorders, an approach that is likely to reflect pleiotropy (same causal variants affecting more than one disorder). However, genetic correlations can also be estimated between psychiatric disorders and other common diseases, or between psychiatric disorders and traits measurable in the population (such as educational attainment or smoking status), and these estimates could reflect causal relationships, which have been long-discussed in the psychiatric epidemiology literature (69). In the past 5 years, results from GWASs have allowed causal relationships using putative exposure traits and psychiatric disorders to be explored, as well as those between psychiatric disorders and subsequent metabolic disease, using the Mendelian randomization approach. The application of Mendelian randomization to psychiatric disorders has been discussed elsewhere (70) and is an exciting tool in psychiatry (as long as studies are well powered) to investigate putative causal relationships that are impossible or unethical to address through clinical trials. As an example, we recently showed that although there is considerable pleiotropy between genetic variants for vitamin D and psychiatric disorders, there is no evidence of a causal relationship (71). Such analyses contribute hard data to a long discussion in psychiatric epidemiology (72,73). Finally, we hope that our Supplementary materials, including Rmarkdown script and CHARRGe Shiny application (https://shiny.cnsgenomics.com/CHARRGe/), are useful to others both in research and as teaching and learning aids.

Who Mismanages Student Loans and Why? Loan management is worse for men & minorities

Cornaggia, Kimberly Rodgers and Xia, Han, Who Mismanages Student Loans and Why? (August 21, 2020). SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3686937

Abstract: With a license to use individually identifiable information on student loan borrowers, we find that a majority of distressed student borrowers manage their debt sub-optimally and that suboptimal debt management is associated with higher loan delinquency. Cross-sectional analysis indicates that loan (mis)management varies significantly across student gender, ethnicity, and age. We test several potential selection-based explanations for such demographic variation in student loan management, including variation in students’ overconfidence, consumption preferences and discount rates, and aversion to administrative paperwork. Motivated by federal and state allegations against student loan servicers, we also test for the presence of treatment effects. Overall, the empirical evidence supports the conclusion that loan servicers’ differential treatment across borrowers play an important role in student loan outcomes.

Keywords: Student loans, Student demographics, Household finance, Loan servicers

JEL Classification: D14, H52, H81, I22, I28

An Investigation Across 105 Countries of Gender Differences in the Five Factor Model of Personality: Men score higher in Emotional Stability (the more individualist the country, the more stable) & lower in Agreeableness

International Comparison of Gender Differences in the Five Factor Model of Personality: An Investigation Across 105 Countries. Sara A. Murphy, Peter A. Fisher, Chet Robie. Journal of Research in Personality, 104047, Nov 29 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2020.104047

Abstract: Researchers have been interested in cross-cultural gender differences in personality for decades. Early research on the five factor (FFM) model of personality focused on estimating the difference between men and women on personality dimensions, however results have varied. Using a large cross-country sample of personality data and advanced analytic techniques, we uncover accurate estimates of cross-country gender differences in personality. Relatively small (δÌ¿^ < |.10|) cross-country gender differences emerged on most FFM dimensions, with the largest differences emerging for Emotional Stability (δÌ¿^ = .38) and Agreeableness (δÌ¿^ = -.17). After controlling for socioeconomic indicators, gender indicators, and Type I error, only country-level Individualism accounted for unique variance in effect size differences for Emotional Stability. Implications and future directions are discussed.

Keywords: Gender; Personality; Five-Factor Model; Cross-cultural; Cross-country

Suspecting infidelity: Greater reported suspicion-related distress, depression, physical health symptoms, & risky health behavior, particularly those with higher beliefs in the importance of fidelity, or a history of infidelity

Suspicious minds: The psychological, physical and behavioral consequences of suspecting a partner’s infidelity. Daniel J. Weigel, M. Rosie Shrout. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, November 28, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0265407520975851

Abstract: Guided by transactional stress theory, this study examined the psychological, physical, and behavioral consequences of the suspicion of a partner’s infidelity. Survey data collected from 246 individuals revealed that suspecting a partner’s infidelity was associated with greater reported suspicion-related distress, depression, physical health symptoms, and risky health behavior. Mediation and moderated mediation analyses revealed that the relationship between suspected infidelity and well-being was indirectly affected by suspicion-related distress. The effects of suspected infidelity were particularly hard on those with higher beliefs in the importance of fidelity, a history of infidelity in the relationship, and higher relationship satisfaction. The findings show that the mere suspicion of a partner’s infidelity can have powerful psychological, physical, and behavioral consequences in romantic relationships.

Keywords: Health, infidelity, stress, suspicion, well-being

More attractive individuals are more likely to be invited to join, and join, both organizations and informal gatherings, particularly early in adult life

Physical Attractiveness, Halo Effects, and Social Joining. Carl L. Palmer  Rolfe Daus Peterson. Social Science Quarterly, November 27 2020. https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12892

Abstract

Objective: Scholarship in psychology on halo effects demonstrates the powerful effects attractiveness has on social interactions. Here, we consider the influence of physical attractiveness on the development of social capital through social joining. With the unavoidable nature of attractiveness biases, we argue that more physically attractive individuals should be increasingly likely to join social organizations, which have been shown to be important parts of broader social engagement and the growth of social capital.

Methods: Utilizing the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study and an original survey experiment, we find that individuals who are rated as more attractive are consistently more likely to participate in organizations, particularly early in adult life. These effects persist when controlling for socioeconomic variables like income and education.

Results: Our experimental results bolster these findings, showing that more attractive individuals are more likely to be invited to join both organizations and informal gatherings.

Conclusions: These findings suggest a further mechanism through which the development of social capital differs between individuals in society.

Despite negative vision on atheists, there is a positive view too—preferring atheist partners as party hosts, open-minded conversation partners, and science tutor

Moon, Jordan W., Jaimie Krems, and Adam B. Cohen. 2020. “Is There Anything Good About Atheists? Exploring Positive and Negative Stereotypes of the Religious and Nonreligious.” PsyArXiv. November 29. doi:10.31234/osf.io/8ksnd. Accepted at Social Psychological and Personality Science

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1332925681114738691

Abstract: Negative stereotypes about atheists are widespread, robust, rooted in distrust, and linked to discrimination. Here, we examine whether social perceivers in the US might additionally hold any positive stereotypes about atheists (and corresponding negative stereotypes of the religious). Experiments 1 (N = 401) and 2 (N = 398, preregistered) used methods of intuitive stereotypes (the conjunction fallacy). People tended to stereotype atheists as fun, open-minded, and scientific—even as they harbor extreme intuitive anti-atheist prejudice in Experiment 2. Experiment 3 (N = 382) used a quasi-behavioral partner-choice paradigm, finding that most people choose atheist (versus religious) partners in stereotype-relevant domains. Overall, results suggest that people simultaneously possess negative and also positive stereotypes about atheists, but that corresponding negative stereotypes of the religious may be even stronger. These effects are robust among the nonreligious and somewhat religious, but evidence is mixed about whether the highly religious harbor these positive stereotypes.