Robust global source credibility effect for scientific authorities ("the Einstein effect"): Across 24 countries & all levels of religiosity, nonsense from a scientist was considered more credible than nonsense attributed to a spiritual guru

Hoogeveen, Suzanne, Sacha Altay, Theiss Bendixen, Renatas Berniūnas, Joseph Bulbulia, Arik Cheshin, Claudio Gentili, et al. 2020. “The Einstein Effect: Global Evidence for Scientific Source Credibility Effects and the Influence of Religiosity.” PsyArXiv. December 1. doi:10.31234/osf.io/sf8ez

Abstract: People tend to evaluate information from reliable sources more favourably, but it is unclear exactly how perceivers' worldviews interact with this source credibility effect. Here, we present data from a cross-cultural study in which individuals (N = 10,195) from a religiously and culturally diverse sample of 24 countries were presented with obscure, meaningless statements attributed to either a spiritual guru or a scientist. The data indicate a robust global source credibility effect for scientific authorities, which we dub "the Einstein effect": across all 24 countries and all levels of religiosity, nonsense from a scientist was considered more credible than nonsense attributed to a spiritual guru. Additionally, individual religiosity predicted a weaker relative preference for the statement from the scientist vs. the spiritual guru, and was more strongly associated with credibility judgments for the guru than the scientist. Independent data on explicit trust ratings across 143 countries mirrored the experimental patterns. These findings suggest that irrespective of religious worldview, science is a powerful and universal heuristic that signals the reliability of information.

Update Feb 7 2022: From the final version, The Einstein effect provides global evidence for scientific source credibility effects and the influence of religiosity. Suzanne Hoogeveen, Julia M. Haaf, Joseph A. Bulbulia, Robert M. Ross, Ryan McKay, Sacha Altay, Theiss Bendixen, Renatas Berniūnas, Arik Cheshin, Claudio Gentili, Raluca Georgescu, Will M. Gervais, Kristin Hagel, Christopher Kavanagh, Neil Levy, Alejandra Neely, Lin Qiu, André Rabelo, Jonathan E. Ramsay, Bastiaan T. Rutjens, Hugh Turpin, Filip Uzarevic, Robin Wuyts, Dimitris Xygalatas & Michiel van Elk. Nature Human Behaviour, Feb 7 2022. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-021-01273-8

Discussion

In the current cross-cultural study, we used a straightforward manipulation and measurement of source credibility effects at the individual level. We found a robust source effect on credibility judgements of meaningless statements ascribed to different authority figures; across all 24 countries and all levels of religiosity, gobbledegook from a scientist was considered more credible than the same gobbledegook from a spiritual guru. In addition to this robust overall Einstein effect, participants’ background beliefs predicted the credibility evaluations; individuals scoring low on religiosity considered the statement from the guru less credible than that from the scientist, whereas this difference was less pronounced for highly religious individuals. These patterns were consistent with explicit trust data collected for over 100,000 individuals from 143 countries: across 140 of 143 of these countries, people indicated greater trust in scientists than in traditional healers, with a larger difference for non-religious compared with religious individuals. Robustness analyses for the experimental study indicated that the effects were robust against different data inclusion criteria (for example, attention checks) and analytic choices (for example, selection of covariates, dependent variable, prior settings). Moreover, the effects also emerged compellingly when analysed as a between-subjects design (Table 2), suggesting that they are not simply explained by social desirability or participants responding in line with their guess of the research hypothesis (also note that recent empirical work indicates that online survey experiments are generally robust to experimenter demand effects77). Results of exploratory response time analyses suggest that in addition to giving more positive evaluations, people may actually put more effort into processing information from credible sources (although they did not recall it better). In particular, participants spent more time and may have tried relatively harder to decipher the gobbledegook from the scientist, whereas previous scepticism may have steered some to immediately dismiss the information from the guru as nonsense.

The pattern of results suggests that variability in the source effect between individuals and countries is more strongly driven by differences in the credibility of the spiritual authority than the scientific authority. Based on the literature one could consider various plausible hypotheses explaining cross-cultural variation in the source effects, for instance in terms of cultural religiosity, vertically versus horizontally structured societies, general trust in authorities and specific trust patterns toward religious and secular authorities78,79,80,81,82,83. However, although our analysis indicated quantitative differences in the size of the source effect between countries (that is, varying positive effects), we did not find qualitative differences (that is, changes in the direction or presence of the effect). Descriptively, the weakest source effects (that is, smallest difference between the scientific and the spiritual source) are observed in Asian countries (Japan, China, India), possibly because the spiritual guru as presented in the survey more closely fits Eastern belief systems than Abrahamic faith traditions. However, this explanation remains speculative and we are hesitant to overinterpret the cross-national variability both in the overall credibility judgements and the effect of source. Although we included main effects of age, gender, level of education and socio-economic status in the analyses, the different sampling strategies that were applied between countries also calls for caution in making inferences based on direct comparisons.

Our findings could reflect a universal gullibility with regard to gobbledegook statements: only a small minority of participants, regardless of their national or religious background, displayed candid scepticism towards the nonsense statements, and 76% of participants rated the scientist’s gobbledegook at or above the midpoint of the credibility scale (compared with 55% for the guru). However, the notion of a general gullibility underlying the observed effects is not entirely supported by the data. The median response was the midpoint of the credibility scale. Participants may have primarily used the midpoint of the scale to indicate that they were uncertain about whether or not the claim was credible, that is, to refrain from passing judgement at all84,85,86. This response might appear as a lack in motivation to critically reflect on the information that was presented; at the same time, saving one’s cognitive resources can also be considered ‘strategic’. First, as with most psychology experiments, our study was a zero-stakes task with no incentive for accuracy, which may have lowered effort and biased responses toward the midpoint. Second, when analytical reasoning about the plausibility of a presented claim does not yield any conclusion, the most rational thing to do may be either suspending judgement (selecting the neutral midpoint of the rating scale) or calibrating judgement to previous beliefs about the source of the claim. If one considers the group to which the source belongs generally competent and benevolent, it makes sense to give a positive judgement of their difficult-to-evaluate claim. After all, credible experts often acquired credentials based on their reputation of discovering phenomena that seem implausible at first glance55. For instance, the premises of using vaccines (‘inserting a virus prevents disease’) or facts about climate change (‘humans are changing the weather’) are intuitively dubious, yet reputable scientists have convinced many laypeople of their truth.

In this study, we intentionally selected authorities that are generally considered benevolent30,31 and we generated statements that are nearly impossible to (in)validate and that bear no relation to controversial or politicized scientific topics about which people may have strong previous attitudes (efficacy of vaccinations, climate change, etc.). By using ambiguous claims without any specific ideological content, we tried to isolate the worldview effect regarding the source from any worldview effect related to the content of the claims. At the same time, we aimed to maximize the efficacy of our manipulation, by varying the names, photographs and visual contexts (chalkboard versus stars) in addition to the authority’s profession. This approach makes it more difficult to single out which specific factor contributes to the source effect (for example, the observed effects might be partly driven by the authority’s appearance rather than their domain of expertise). Relatedly, some participants might have recognized the depicted men (Enrico Fermi and José Argüelles), although we consider it unlikely that many did. Because we did not ask whether participants recognized any of the depicted sources, we tried to indirectly and retrospectively assess recognition by scanning the open text items at the end of the survey (comments and awareness item) for any mentioning of either ‘Enrico’, ‘Fermi’, ‘José’ or ‘Argüelles’ (ignoring capitalization or diacritical marks). Only one (Spanish) participant mentioned recognizing both of the sources. Although this obviously does not prove that no other participants might have known the depicted sources, it seems unlikely that this was the case for a large proportion of participants. On the other hand, the multifaceted nature of the manipulation also increases its ecological validity; our stimuli resemble popular internet memes and real-life instances of source credibility also involve a combination of different features (for example, authorities typically look the part in public and appear in congruous contexts). Furthermore, a recent study showed that the mere mentioning of a famous source such as Aristotle or the Dalai Lama enhanced profundity ratings for pseudo-profound nonsense relative to unauthored versions, suggesting that even the mere name of an authority may suffice to induce source effects87.

The effects observed in our experimental data and the associations identified in the existing trust data were highly comparable, suggesting that by using our source credibility manipulation we tapped into participants’ attitudes about scientific and religious authorities. A noteworthy divergence, however, is that whereas our data showed a small positive relation between religiosity and credibility ratings for gobbledegook from the scientist, the trust data demonstrated a small but negative association between religiosity and trust in scientists. The finding that religious people are generally less trusting towards science has often been reported in the literature53,88,89,90. However, recent studies suggest that the negative relation between religiosity and trust in science might be US-specific and be weak or absent in other countries91,92,93,94. In addition, although trust is probably closely linked to credibility, explicit trust assessments and credibility ratings of specific statements may diverge, perhaps particularly for the kind of obscure statements used in the current study. That is, the gobbledegook statements may still have resonated better with religious individuals than non-religious individuals, resulting in the main effect of religiosity on credibility ratings. This main effect may be driven by a tendency for intuitive reasoning, which has been related to religiosity78,95,96 and receptivity of pseudo-profound and pseudo-scientific nonsense36,67. It could thus be that mistrust in science only partially dampens the allure of well-sounding science-related gobbledegook for intuitive reasoners36.

Notably, our study showed that across 24 countries even those who are highly religious are prone to a scientific source credibility bias, what we have deemed the Einstein effect. Looking ahead, there are at least six compelling horizons for future research to address the generalizability and underlying causes of the Einstein effect. First, whether scientific education diminishes the appeal of scientific authority outside its immediate domain remains unclear. Although those who place faith in science are prone to Einstein effects38,40,97,98, strong scepticism is normative within the practice of science—as anyone who has experienced peer review will attest. Although it is 150 years since Charles Peirce famously argued for fixing beliefs from the ‘method of science’ in favour the ‘method of authority’, the role of appeals to scientific authority among scientists remains unclear99. Second, future researchers might investigate whether political partisanship predicts differences in scientific source credibility. Although political commitments may share common psychological features with religious commitments100,101,102,103, the rise of anti-science populist ideologies might diminish or reverse Einstein effects among political partisans. By contrast, individual differences in deference to science104 may predict enhanced Einstein effects, although a recent study failed to find this pattern for faith in science (van der Miesen et al., in preparation). Third, the historical origins of scientific source credibility across different cultures remain unclear. If we were to wind back the clock a century to Einstein’s era, would we also observe preferential source credibility for scientific authority over spiritual authority? Fourth, the proximate and sustaining social and technological causes of scientific source credibility are not addressed in our study, and remain ripe for investigations. Is scientific source credibility an artefact of global information networks, country-wide science education or the sequestering of religious authority to the private domain? Fifth, although our study covers 24 countries worldwide, we cannot claim universality for our findings. Indeed, investigating source credibility in cultures where spiritual authority dominates may help to clarify the mechanistic questions that our study raises but does not address. Sixth, future work may extend the current work and investigate how the Einstein effect is affected by content cues (for example, the use of jargon, argument coherence, disclosure of uncertainty105) and personal attitudes towards the topic106,107,108.

In conclusion, our results strongly suggest that scientific authority is generally considered a reliable source for truth, more so than spiritual authority. Indeed, there are ample examples demonstrating that science serves as an important cue for credibility; the cover of Donald Trump’s niece’s family history book is adorned by ‘Mary L. Trump, PhD’; advertisements for cosmetic products often claim to be ‘clinically proven’ and ‘recommended by dermatologists’, and even the tobacco industry used to appeal to science (for example, ‘more doctors smoke Camels than any other cigarette’). By systematically quantifying the difference between acceptance of statements by a scientific and spiritual authority in a global sample, this work addresses the fundamental question of how people trust what others say about the world.

Independently of age, gender, education & income, people know very little about the money system or money institutions and mostly believe in money myths, such as the notion that money is still backed by gold

Money Knowledge or Money Myths? Results of a population survey on money and the monetary order. Klaus Kraemer, Luka Jakelja, Florian Brugger and Sebastian Nessel. European Journal of Sociology, Volume 61 Issue 2, Aug 28 2020. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-sociology-archives-europeennes-de-sociologie/article/money-knowledge-or-money-myths-results-of-a-population-survey-on-money-and-the-monetary-order/A7CE8F42F7F9C81B2F7BDCC3237A6A14

Abstract: People use money in everyday life in ubiquitous ways. In addition, they know that money has quite different and multiple meanings in different social contexts, depending on the situation in which it is used. That said, what do people actually know about money, money creation, money backing and the institutional foundations of the monetary order? While contributions in the rapidly extending field of financial literacy have empirically studied people’s knowledge about mathematical and financial issues, people’s knowledge about the functioning of the money system and monetary institutions remained mostly unexplored. To improve our understanding of people’s knowledge of the money system and the most important money institutions, we questioned 2,000 individuals in Austria using a standardized population survey. In this paper, after a short critical review of the sociology of money and the literature on financial literacy, we present and critically discuss the results of the survey. We found that, independently of age, gender, education and income, people know very little about the money system or money institutions and mostly believe in money myths, such as the notion that money is still backed by gold. Finally, we discuss our empirical findings against the backdrop of the state of research on the sociology of money 1.

Discussion: Knowledge, myths and misconceptions

People use money in everyday life in ubiquitous and multiple ways. They use it in markets and beyond, in both organizations and communities. They use it in very different social relationships (buyer-seller, creditor-borrower, employer-employee, state-citizen, parent-child, member-association, donor-public charity, etc.) and for a variety of economic and non-economic purposes, without being able to name them abstractly or to be reflexively aware of their effects. As Zelizer [2011] noted, people also know that money has quite different meanings in different social contexts depending on the situation in which it is used.

In sociological research on money, however, it has remained unclear what ordinary people know and what they do not know about money and the institutional foundations of the monetary system. Against the background of such a serious research desideratum, we examined empirically what people actually know about the monetary order. In this study, we found that people know hardly anything about money and the institutional foundations of the monetary order. Although people use money ubiquitously in everyday life, they mostly know little to nothing about how money is created, whether it is backed by tangible assets, or whether it represents nothing but a dematerialized “pure token” [Simmel (1900) 2004: 176]. Additionally, people have very vague notions about institutional responsibility for the value stability of the euro. People’s knowledge about money, money creation, money backing and the underlying institutions of the monetary order is at best rudimentary. This significant, blatant ignorance is remarkable, especially given that people in everyday life are naturally willing to barter goods in demand for a pure token, donate money for charitable or non-profit purposes, share and give away money within families, or do anything else to avoid monetary penalties.

Ever since Simmel, the sociology of money has assumed that people believe in money myths. Like people’s money knowledge, money myths have not been empirically investigated. At best, the sociology of money has speculated which myths are involved. With our empirical study, we show that people know little to nothing about the institutional foundations of the monetary order while claiming to know something about money. The interviewees indeed believe in money myths. That is, money myths are widely used by the population in a variety of forms; for example, the assumptions that money is backed by physical assets such as gold or other precious metals, that customers’ savings deposits are passed on by the banks as loans to borrowers, or that only central banks create money by printing and issuing banknotes, not private banks by lending, which the central banks authorize them to do. The vast majority of people do not know that deposits are created by a “keystroke” [Wray 2015: 66] when a bank customer demands a loan or overdraws the account. Obviously, most respondents believe that deposits or debit cards are the same as cash. However, respondents have illusory notions about the fact that money is backed by rare materials or value stocks. Thus, we state a double empirical finding, i.e., people know little or nothing about an institution as central as money, but at the same time they indicate that they do know something. In other words: People believe in money myths.

Another finding of the survey is sociologically significant. Similar to the belief in money myths, the lack of knowledge about money and the institutional foundations of the monetary order are more or less socially indifferently distributed throughout the population—regardless of age, gender, education, profession and income. As we have shown, all socio-demographic and socio-economic variables play a negligible role in the social distribution of monetary knowledge and myths. This finding is remarkable, since patterns of perception and interpretation are usually influenced by these sociological variables. Within the very small “zone of knowing” there are at most a few socio-structural abnormalities. For example, respondents who are self-employed or have a higher education know that money is created by private banks more often than all the others. Both of these groups are more likely to know that the ECB––and not the national central bank––is responsible for the monetary stability of the euro. However, it should be noted here that the vast majority of the self-employed with an above-average education who were surveyed believe in money myths.

So far, we have classified all “incorrect” response categories on the dimensions of money creation, money backing and monetary institutions as “money myths”, which we have located in the “zone of ignorance”. However, such a classification is not unproblematic in a sociological sense. Therefore, we differentiate in the following between money-related myths and misconceptions or fallacies. We call only such “incorrect“ response categories money myths, insofar as their claim of validity is collectively shared by a majority of the interviewees. In order to be able to speak of money myths, a second characteristic must be added. Money myths are different from other misconceptions or fallacies in that they are efficacious in the social world. Myths can facilitate or stimulate collective actions. Contrary to misconceptions or fallacies, money myths can unfold—in the sense of the classical Thomas theorem—collective effects on the structural level of a monetary order. They justify specific practices in the everyday use of money. For example, money is used in the expectation that the myth will not be disappointed. In other words, money myths influence and perpetuate specific social usages of money. The believers in money myths use money in accordance with their beliefs and not otherwise because they believe in the accuracy of the money myths. On the other hand, we define “incorrect” response categories as misconceptions or fallacies if they are only shared by a small minority of respondents and do not have a broad impact in the social world. Against the background of our empirical findings, we classify the “incorrect” response categories “all money is printed” and “money is backed by gold” as money myths. On the other hand, we interpret all those “incorrect” response categories (1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 3.1.) as misconceptions, which are only considered correct by a minority of the sample.

In the results chapter of this article, we first focused on question 1 (money creation), in respect of which response categories are “right” or “wrong”, based on recent official statements by the ECB and the Bank of England. Accordingly, we have classified the answer categories “the central banks print money” and “private banks issue credit” as “correct” and all other response categories as “incorrect”. In question 2 (money backing), we have argued that “money is not backed at all” is “correct”. In question 3 (money institutions), we have assigned “correct” and “wrong” response categories in the sense of the legal mandate of the ECB. Against the background of the sociological literature (see chapter 1), however, it makes sense to interpret the assignments of the response categories (“correct”/“incorrect”) in a broader sense. From a sociological perspective, one could argue that money myths (“all money is printed” and “money is backed by gold”) are social facts in the sense of Émile Durkheim [(1895) 1982], which create an action-oriented interpretive framework (“trust”) and influence the everyday use of money. More precisely, money myths are not mere fictional imaginations, but narratives that socially embed the usages of money. Against the background of this theoretical consideration, we interpret our empirical findings as follows: Ordinary people readily accept deposit money as long as the expectation is not disappointed that these money forms can always be exchanged for cash or precious metals at any time. Following this theoretical consideration, it makes sense to interpret collectively-shared money myths, which we have previously identified in the “zone of ignorance”, as narrative frameworks that culturally embed the monetary order and thus contribute to its social stability. In this sociological sense, money myths can be classified as “correct” response categories.

This finding somewhat challenges the assumption by scholars of the recent communication efforts of national banks about the “real” functioning of the monetary order. In contrast to Braun [2016] and Holmes [2014], for example, our findings suggest the limitation of communications by central banks, e.g. in that the bulk of modern money is created by private banks issuing credit and not by central banks issuing notes and coins. Instead, the prevalence of money myths seems deeply rooted in ordinary people’s perceptions of money. It is therefore questionable whether the central banks’ speaking to the people (Braun) and an “economy of words” (Holmes) can change monetary knowledge. Note, however, that central banks only recently began to change their communication about the monetary order in order to enhance “real” knowledge about it. Future research could hence more closely evaluate whether money myths can be altered by the communication efforts of central banks and other actors (e.g. “positive money initiatives”) in the long run and to which social groups they appeal most. As our results draw on the Austrian case where the national bank has not launched communication campaigns and full money initiatives are not existent, it would be interesting to replicate the survey used in this study in other countries (see below), particularly in the UK, which provides an outstanding example of changing communication by a central bank.

Finally, we may add that money myths never seem to be stable over time. They can erode, and they have to prove themselves in recurring financial market crises [Rogoff and Reinhart 2009]. Even in normal times they can be put to the proof. This may for example be the case if the everyday usability of cash as a payment instrument is restricted (see the different upper limits for cash payments in the eurozone since 2010) or the account holders cannot “escape” from negative interest rates and thus undermine the store of value function of money. Money myths can certainly be put to the proof in extraordinary events (bankruptcy, galloping inflation, prohibition on the private purchase of gold, limitation of legal access to cash––see the Debt Crisis in Greece of 2015). At the peak of financial market crises, money myths may even turn out to be an illusion. From a sociological perspective, it would certainly be hasty to interpret money myths as simple ignorance or as “false consciousness”. As long as money myths are not disenchanted, they can be latently efficacious in everyday life. However, money myths are questioned in a fundamental way, for example, when credit money can no longer be “withdrawn” from the cash account—within the limits of the available budget or the granted credit line.

Our empirical findings also show that we cannot confirm the assumption of the sociological literature of money since Simmel (see chapter 1) that people believe or trust that money is “backed” “through the beliefs of the people” (item 4 of question 2, 11.65%) or the future purchasing power (“goods and services”, item 3 of question 2, 24.53%). It would thus seem that our empirical findings on money knowledge can by no means be interpreted so clearly in the sense of a simple dichotomy of the response categories along the distinction between “correct” and “incorrect”. An empirically unclear issue that requires further investigation is the extent to which the myth-based ignorance of the “objective” architecture of the monetary order is indeed a prerequisite for ordinary people to use money in everyday life largely without friction, as one might theoretically assume against the background of the sociological money literature.

Another issue that remains to be investigated relates to the empirical findings in Austria on money knowledge and money myths as compared to other countries of the European Union or the eurozone. First of all, it should be noted that empirical studies on knowledge or ignorance in the population regarding money and the institutional foundations of the monetary order are not available in other countries. We suspect that similarities and variations can be found in other European societies. It would not be implausible to assume that in many countries comparable results can be expected in all three dimensions (money creation, money backing, monetary institutions). At the same time, however, it can be assumed that significant deviations would be found in some countries. The diffusion of money myths among the population may depend on country-specific institutional confidence. If institutional confidence is high, it could also be assumed that money myths are widespread. Further dependent variables would be the perceived performance of the national economy or the economic dynamics of “northern” EU-countries, the internal and external “power prestige” [Weber (1921-1922) 1978: 910] of national political elites, as well as the level of state loyalty among the population. We could expect that, in national societies with precarious economies, drastic economic and financial crises in the recent past and a strong skepticism towards the state order (e.g. Greece), the belief that money is backed by gold or that national political elites have sufficient capacities to successfully ward off a supranational crisis of the European monetary order is less widespread.

The empirical findings on money knowledge and money myths have important implications for research on financial literacy. Contributions in the field of financial literacy suggest that financial knowledge is unequally socially distributed, and that age, gender, education and income play an important role in the appropriation of mathematical and financial knowledge. However, as we have shown, the findings of financial literacy research do not correspond with the money knowledge of the population. Rather, it can be concluded that even persons with above-average financial knowledge do not necessarily know how money is created. Nor do they know the difference between private credit money (deposits) and central bank money (cash), whether money is covered by assets, and which institutions are responsible for the value stability of the euro. Rather, it can be assumed that many people with solid or above-average financial knowledge also believe in money myths. Against this background, a key aspect of financial literacy research is that the knowledge dimension is limited to mathematical and financial knowledge, but the dimensions of monetary knowledge and myths are ignored.

What follows from the empirical findings on money knowledge and money myths for the recent sociology of money? Zelizer [1994, 2011] has examined the everyday usage of money. In contrast to the classical economic exchange theory of money [see Ingham 2004] and Simmel’s sociological “quantity theory” of money, Zelizer analyses the “qualitatively” multiple, social and cultural embeddedness of money usage in everyday life [see Dodd 2014: 269-311; on the distinction between a “quantitative” and “qualitative” sociology of money and a critical review, see Kraemer and Nessel 2015: 13-21]. Our findings on money knowledge and money myths refer to a research dimension that was largely ignored by Zelizer. The use of money is not only involved in social and cultural contexts and social meanings. When people use money (for example, when sharing, lending, giving, saving, and connecting money with multiple meanings), they always do so in the expectation that they know what money is. For multiple social and cultural purposes, money can also be used—in normal times—in an unproblematic and unquestioned manner, because people are guided by their as-if-money knowledge and money myths. Against this background, it would be fruitful to more precisely discuss Zelizer’s thesis of the “social meaning of money” in the context of the presented findings on widespread money ignorance and myths.

Our findings can also be valuable for a political economy of money. Undoubtedly, Ingham is a prominent author investigating the institutional foundations of the modern monetary order, the power imbalances between key groups of actors (creditors, debtors, the state), and the dominant conflicts of interest over monetary stability from a decidedly sociological perspective. Against the background of the survey, an important question emerges with respect to ignorance and money myths within the population for the power asymmetries and conflicts of interest outlined by Ingham. It will also be necessary to clarify the influence of asymmetrically distributed money knowledge—for example, between experts and non-experts—on the modern monetary system. It is always relevant to the question of how myths about money—beyond all sociodemographic and socioeconomic variables—affect power asymmetries and conflicts of interest within the monetary system. In this context, it will also be necessary to clarify the extent to which the empirical findings on money knowledge and money myths can be used in the recent sociological debate on the privilege of private banks to create bank deposits through loans [Huber 2017; Sahr 2017]. For example, it might be discussed whether the fiat money regime works (in normal times) without friction because ordinary people do not know how money is created.

Finally, we want to discuss the question of how the empirical findings on money knowledge and money myths—or misconceptions and fallacies—can be interpreted in light of Simmel’s [(1908) 2009: 315] classic thesis on “trust” as a “middle position between knowledge and ignorance”. Our findings show that the vast majority of the respondents in the sample (88.2%, see chapter 5.2) are to be found in the “zone of ignorance”. These respondents believe that the total money supply is printed and covered by value assets, that the nation state guarantees bank deposits in the event of a banking or financial crisis, and that the National Central Bank is responsible for the value stability of the euro. In contrast, the “zone of knowledge” (.3%, see chapter 5.2) of those respondents who do not believe in money myths is very small in our sample. They know that money is not only printed by central banks but also created through lending by private banks. These respondents are aware that money is not backed by gold, government bonds or commodities, or loans or debts. Instead, they state that money is not backed at all. They assume that the legal guarantee of bank deposits in the event of a banking crisis is not a redeemable promise. In addition, they know that it is the ECB and not the National Central Bank that is responsible for monetary stability. They may also distrust the “economy of words” [Holmes 2014; Beckert 2016: 113-116] of central banks.

However, it would be erroneous to suggest that the respondents in the large “zone of ignorance” know nothing about money at all. At this point we cannot provide a more detailed explanation of what the respondents in the “zone of ignorance” know about money usage, even though they do not have a reflexive knowledge of the institutional foundations of the monetary system. However, we assume that they have a “weak form of inductive knowledge” [Simmel (1900) 2004: 191] in using money (see chapter 2). At the beginning of the article, we argued that people use money ubiquitously in everyday life. We can now concretize that statement: respondents in the large “zone of ignorance” indeed have a solid, practical knowledge of money. This practical knowledge has proven itself time and again in normal times. People know that they can buy commodities and pay outstanding accounts only with money. They know that they can donate money for charitable purposes and make others happy with a gift of money. In addition, of course, these respondents also know that they can influence the behaviour of others when they threaten to reduce or cancel a cash payment. People therefore know in a practical sense that money can be used in modern capitalist societies “absolutely” (Simmel) and at the same time “multiply” (Zelizer). Money can thus be used in everyday life without financial or mathematical knowledge or an understanding of the regime of money creation. We conclude with the following quote by Max Weber [2012: 300] about the social institution of money in everyday life: “No ordinary consumer will nowadays have even a rough knowledge of the production techniques of the goods that he uses daily, and he will mostly not even know what materials they are made of and what industry has produced them. All that he is interested in are those expectations concerning the performance of these artefacts that are of practical importance for him. The situation is no different with respect to social phenomena—money, for example. A person using money does not know how it actually acquires its peculiar characteristics (since, in fact, even professional specialists have heated arguments about that).”

The majority (> 80%) of adult men have accessed pornography at some point, and in the past year (40–70%); around half of younger men (25 or under) are weekly consumers; pornography use tapers-off with age

A Literature Review of Studies into the Prevalence and Frequency of Men’s Pornography Use. Dan J. Miller, Peter T. F. Raggatt & Kerry McBain. American Journal of Sexuality Education, Volume 15, 2020 - Issue 4, Pages 502-529, Oct 13 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/15546128.2020.1831676

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1333763474472710150

Abstract: This review aims to provide information on the prevalence and frequency of adult males’ pornography use. It appears, the majority (> 80%) of adult men have accessed pornography at some point, and in the past year (40–70%). Around half of younger men (25 or under) are weekly consumers. Pornography use tapers-off with age. Relatively few (<10%) younger men have accessed violent pornography in the past year. The Internet is the primary method of access. Pornography use is associated with masturbation; use during partnered sex is less common. Differences in consumption rates between heterosexual and gay and bisexual men are discussed.

Keywords: Pornography, sexually explicit material, men, prevalence

Singapore youths: Early exposure to aggressive games was not predictive of anxiety, depression, somatic symptoms, or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 2 years later; aggresive games is not a risk factor in mental health

Aggressive Video Games Are Not a Risk Factor for Mental Health Problems in Youth: A Longitudinal Study. Christopher J. Ferguson and C.K. John Wang. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, Dec 1 2020. https://doi.org/10.1089/cyber.2020.0027

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1333729157717643266

Abstract: Recent preregistered studies and analyses have suggested that links between aggressive video games (AVGs) and aggression-related outcomes may have been exaggerated in previous literature. However, concerns about AVGs remain. Although the impact of aggressive games on aggressive behaviors has been the subject of approximately a dozen preregistered studies, the potential impact of aggressive games on the player's mental health symptoms has not been the subject of similar preregistered analyses. In the current study, a sample of more than 3000 youth from Singapore were examined by using preregistered analyses to determine whether early exposure to aggressive games was predictive of anxiety, depression, somatic symptoms, or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 2 years later. Analyses suggested that exposure to AVGs is not a risk factor for later mental health symptoms.

Making a Microaggression: Using Big Data and Qualitative Analysis to Map the Reproduction and Disruption of Microaggressions through Social Media

Making a Microaggression: Using Big Data and Qualitative Analysis to Map the Reproduction and Disruption of Microaggressions through Social Media. Rob Eschmann et al. Social Media + Society. November 30, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305120975716

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1333714191857946624

Abstract: Racial microaggressions are defined as subtle racial slights that can be offensive or hurtful. One of the defining characteristics of racial microaggressions is how difficult they can be to respond to, and the literature reports that not responding may be the most common response to microaggressions. This study addresses a vital gap in the existing literature by examining the extent to which the silence that characterizes face-to-face experiences with microaggressions extends into online social media spaces. Drawing on a dataset of 254,964 tweets over an 8-year period, we present and examine trends in the usage of the term “microaggressions” over time. Furthermore, we then generate a purposive sample of 1,038 of the most influential tweets to explore discussions and content themes through an in-depth qualitative analysis of these messages. Here, we find both a drastic increase in the usage of the term microaggression on Twitter over time and an intense contestation over its meaning and repercussions for both individuals and society. Implications of these findings in understanding the role of online social media discourse in challenging or reproducing hegemonic racial structures is discussed.

Keywords: microaggressions, social media, Twitter, racial structures, race, online communication

Discussion

This study explored the usage of the term microaggression in online spaces. The dramatic increase in usage of the term between 2010 (with 877 mentions) to 2018 (with 58,787 mentions), an increase of 6,603%, is indicative of the way in which this language is increasingly being used to describe the types of subtle racialized interactions that characterize the color-blind post-Civil Rights era. There are many potential explanations for this increase in the usage of the term microaggression, including increased attention to racial justice issues on Twitter through movements such as BLM (Anderson & Hitlin, 2016), trends towards more discussion of identity politics in the Trump era (Taylor, 2018), or the usage of an academic term (microaggressions) to describe the types of subtle experiences that many marginalized groups experience, but used other language to describe (or did not discuss in public) before the proliferation of the microaggressions concept online.

Given the silences that characterize experiences with microaggressions in face-to-face interactions (Sue, 2010), just this increased usage of the term represents a dramatic shift and increased visibility of experiences with problematic racial interactions that have been hidden—or only discussed in private by the targets of microaggressions—for so long. This unmasking of racism through social media meets many of the criteria suggested by Sue and colleagues (2019) regarding the best practices for disarming microaggressions.

Yet, this work indicates that there is contention around the microaggressions concept. The single largest code we found, denying microaggressions, made up one-third of the tweets in the dataset and consisted of tweets used to minimize and ridicule microaggressions. These tweets show that as popular understanding of the term grows, detractors may use the online space to defend their actions. This is consistent with the literature, which suggests that microaggressors are defensive when confronted (Sue, 2016). The tweets in this code indicate that many are frustrated with normal behaviors being coded as problematic through the microaggressions lens, and use social media as a way to challenge this encroachment on their free speech.

It is interesting to note that even those who are vehemently opposed to the term microaggressions are aware of it. The mechanisms of racism should not need to be defended, when they remain invisible. That some users feel the need to deny the logics of microaggressions so passionately may demonstrate a discomfort with this mechanism of power reproduction being unmasked through social media discourse. This discomfort may be increased given the role social media and Twitter have played in amplifying the voices of marginalized groups and activist and antiracist efforts, from protests against police violence against Black people, to sharing videos of White people calling the police on innocent Black people without cause (Anderson & Hitlin, 2016; Ransom, 2020). For individuals who are accustomed to (and comfortable with) racial slights being ignored and overlooked in everyday interactions, the increased attention paid to these acts through social media can represent an unwelcome change in the racial power dynamics, as users challenge the previously invisible mechanisms of White supremacy.

The data also demonstrate that Twitter users are engaged in informal knowledge production, educating other users about what microaggressions are and how they are experienced by and impact marginalized communities, including people of Color, women, queer people, and those who have intersecting identities. Sometimes, these messages are directed at those who are actively denying or committing microaggressions, demonstrating that social media is a space in which users are able to engage in discussions across ideological boundaries. Future research may explore the prevalence and productivity of such discussions. In other cases, such as in the Growth code, we see evidence of the ways in which this knowledge production can impact human development as users discuss their learning about microaggressions and the ways it has shifted their thinking and real-world interactions.

Equally important is the role discussing microaggressions on social media plays for people of Color and other marginalized groups. For folks who have been silenced in other settings—unable to respond to or critique microaggressions because of power dynamics—having access to a public space in which their experiences with microaggressions are empathized with can be a powerful form of support. Sharing their stories with people who not only believe that microaggressions occurred, but also help in processing these experiences, externalizes the problem of microaggressions with the perpetrator, taking away any sense of guilt for the targets of microaggressions. In this way, discussion of microaggressions on Twitter are consistent with what the literature has called counterpublics, digital counterpublics, and counterspaces, or alternative communication spheres that engage in discussions that may be marginalized in mainstream spaces, or online communal discussions more explicitly related to the dismantling of racism (Eschmann, 2020a; Groshek & Han, 2011; Hill, 2018; Jackson et al., 2020).

This digital discourse has the potential to normalize knowledge of the subtle mechanisms of structural racism and increase awareness of how covert acts can perpetuate racial inequality. Given that many microaggressions are ignored, and not recognized as patently offensive (Gantt Shafer, 2017), increased awareness and discourse in online spaces may change how these events are experienced and responded to in face-to-face settings. This study demonstrates the potential for online spaces to be primary sites for equity-based knowledge production and the challenging of dominant and hegemonic structures.

Personality shapes information sharing about sexual preferences, the way dissonant sexual preferences of the partners are handled, and the extent to which the person is committed to promises made to the partner

Big Five Personality Traits and Sex. Uwe Jirjahn, Martha Ottenbacher. Global Labor Organization Discussion Paper, No. 720, Nov 2020. https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/226369/1/GLO-DP-0720.pdf

Abstract: Sexual well-being plays an important role in the quality of life. Against this background, we provide an economics-based approach to the relationship between the Big Five personality traits and various dimensions of sexuality. From a theoretical viewpoint, personality influences sexual well-being not only by how a person feels about sex, but also by how the person behaves in a sexual relationship. Personality shapes information sharing about sexual preferences, the way dissonant sexual preferences of the partners are handled, and the extent to which the person is committed to promises made to the partner. Using a large representative dataset from Germany, we find that personality traits play a role in a person’s own sexual satisfaction, in (the self-assessment of) fulfilling the partner’s sexual needs and desires, in sexual communication, in actual and desired frequency of sex, and in extradyadic affairs.

Keywords: Big Five Personality Traits, Sexual Satisfaction, Frequency of Intercourse, Sexual Infidelity, Sexual Communication, Family Economics.

JEL: D10, D91, J10, J12

Consumer decision making: Biases are more rule than exception; the median consumer exhibits 10 of 17 potential biases

We are all Behavioral, More or Less: A Taxonomy of Consumer Decision Making. Victor Stango & Jonathan Zinman. NBER Working Paper 28138, November 2020. DOI 10.3386/w28138

Abstract: We examine how 17 behavioral biases relate to each other, to other decision inputs, and to decision outputs. Most consumers exhibit multiple biases in our nationally representative panel data. There is substantial heterogeneity across consumers, even within similar demographic/skill groups. Biases are positively correlated within person, especially after adjusting for measurement error, and less correlated with other inputs—risk aversion, patience, cognitive skills, and personality traits—with some expected exceptions. Accounting for this correlation structure, we reduce our 29 decision inputs to eight common factors. Seven common factors load on at least two biases, six on clusters of theoretically related biases, and two or three are distinctly behavioral. All but one common factor is distinct from cognitive skills. Factor scores strongly conditionally correlate with decisions and outcomes in various domains. We discuss several potential implications of this taxonomy for various approaches to modeling influences of behavioral biases on decision making.

Haunted House Fear And Contagion Effects

Tashjian, Sarah M., Virginia Fedrigo, Tanaz Molapour, dean mobbs, and Colin Camerer. 2020. “Contextual and Endogenous Effects on Physiology During a Haunted House Fear Induction.” PsyArXiv. November 30. doi:10.31234/osf.io/5u9se

Abstract: Threat exposure elicits physiological and psychological responses, the frequency and intensity of which, and concordance between, has implications for survival. Ethical and practical limitations on human laboratory fear inductions make it essentially impossible to measure response to extreme threat. Furthermore, ecologically valid investigations of group effects on fear are lacking in humans. The current preregistered study measured tonic and phasic electrodermal activity in 156 human participants while they participated in small groups in a 30 minute sequence of threats of varying intensity (a haunted house). Results revealed that (i) friends increased overall arousal, (ii) unexpected attacks elicited greater phasic responses than expected attacks, (iii) subjective fear increased frequency of phasic spikes, and (iv) startle had dissociable effects on frequency and amplitude of phasic reactivity. Findings show that etiology of emotional contagion varies depending on relationship type (increased among friends) and subjective fear is associated with temporal aspects of physiological arousal.

I Don’t Want You to ‘Believe’ Me. I Want You to Listen. Agnes Callard

I Don’t Want You to ‘Believe’ Me. I Want You to Listen. Agnes Callard. The New York Times, Nov. 30, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/30/opinion/i-dont-want-you-to-believe-me-i-want-you-to-listen.html

I fear that the more I tell you, the less you will understand who I am.

I am not a private person — quite the opposite — but I do have two secrets. The first concerns some Bad Events that happened to me long ago (yes, it’s the sort of thing you are thinking of), and the second is an unrelated Fact about my neurological makeup.

Let me be clear: I am not ashamed of either of these things. Keeping them secret creates, in me, an uncomfortable feeling, as though I were hiding something, as though I were ashamed, and that bugs me all the time, like a scratchy tag in my clothing. But I can’t tell you what The Fact is, because you won’t believe me; and I can't tell you about The Events, because you will.

I have barely told you anything about The Events, but I suspect that you have already started believing. You want to be someone who believes women; you see this as the belief-challenge you have been waiting for; you want to rise to it. When I first told a therapist about The Events, she said: “Of course. In retrospect it makes perfect sense of so many things …”

Later she apologized for this as therapeutic overreach. Even therapists can’t help themselves — they are off to the races, believing and believing. On this topic, so much gets packaged into “being believed” that I fear the more I tell you, the less you will understand me.

I don't want you to think you know the meaning of The Events; I don’t want to be classified as damaged; I don’t want you to feel good about yourself for believing me; I don’t want you to feel sorry for me; and most of all, I don’t want you to praise my courage for “coming forward” or for “surviving.” The prospect of receiving praise or honor for this revelation fills with me with rage — when I imagine your admiration, I immediately imagine throwing it back in your face.

The Fact I’d like to tell you has to do with a difference between how we — you and I — think. But to get specific about this difference, I have to use a word you associate with people who don’t talk, who can’t take care of themselves, whose inner lives seem utterly obscure to you, people who harm themselves, people you struggle to see as human, people whose existence you see as a tragedy.

And you will find this comparison preposterous. You will tell me I shouldn’t use “that word,” you will helpfully offer me milder alternatives. You might acknowledge that I’m “quirky” or “idiosyncratic” — in a good way! — and that a few of those quirks may superficially resemble those people. But I have a professional career, a family. I can’t be like them. (Ask yourself: how much knowledge would you need, really, to be certain of this?)

You might be willing to budge a little if you could hear it from some medical professionals — though one might not be enough. You’d need a second and third opinion. Notice that if I told you I had cancer or diabetes or depression, or for that matter that I was left-handed, you would not insist on seeing my papers. You would not be inclined to think I was faking my left-handedness by having trained myself to use my left hand; or that I resembled depressed people only “in some respects.”

In the case of The Events, you are eager to assign victim status to me; in the case of The Fact, you are wary of assigning it to me. For you, there is only one question: how much suffering can she legitimately lay claim to?

You are so busy trying to answer this question — trying to serve as judge in the pain/suffering/disadvantage Olympics — that you cannot hear anything I am trying to tell you. And that means I can’t talk to you. No one can sincerely assert words whose meaning she knows will be garbled by the lexicon of her interlocutor. I don’t want privacy, but you’ve forced it onto me.

You might wonder why I have to tell you these things. Couldn’t I find a supportive community of people who endured similar Events, and wouldn’t I be believed by other Fact-Bearers? Yes, and individual connections of this kind are very valuable, but at the group level this kind of support has never worked for me.

Being surrounded by people who are supposedly like me inevitably leads me to feel maximally “different.” Probably my failure to benefit from such communities is a sign that I have not suffered so much, and deserve very little victim credit. So be it!

Solidarity is not my thing, openness is. It is a consequence of The Fact, for me, that I lean toward transparency in all contexts: I have to consciously prevent myself from oversharing (even more than I do), and I am honest from necessity rather than virtue.

There is a reason for all of this, which is that I am bad — really bad, you cannot imagine how bad — at figuring things out on my own. If I take too many steps in reasoning without the intervention of another person, I go very far wrong. So I have accustomed myself to reasoning in public as much as I can, to making sure to expose my mistakes to correction.

I know that I don’t know what corner assistance might come from. I don’t want to confide in a select group of people who grumble among themselves about how you misunderstand “us.” I want to talk to you, any and all of you, freely, so you can help me stop misunderstanding myself.

The truth is that I don’t know the meaning of The Events, for my life. Isn’t it at least possible that they simply don’t have any meaning? Or maybe the meaning will change once I am allowed to speak them out loud? Perhaps I really am scarred for life, but do we have to assume that from the outset?

If I could talk it through, I might have a hope of figuring this out. Because that is mostly how I figure out all the difficult problems of my life: I talk about them to whoever is available, whenever the problems seem relevant to something else I am thinking about; I listen; I rethink; I write; I circle back and write something else; over and over again; and over time I develop a stable picture.

With The Events, I am at sea. For so long I did not even allow myself to speak them to myself. Now that I can, it chafes at me that you have decided that if I want to talk about them with you, I have to follow your rules, and let you trample all over me. Perhaps more people who have experienced Events would talk about them with you if they thought you would do less “believing” and more listening.

Factwise, this is what I want to know: what, if anything, ties together the “superficial” differences in how I dress, how I talk, how my mind jumps around, my repetitive movements, my sensitivities, the kinds of patterns I see and the kinds I miss, my obsessions, my literal-mindedness, my odd oscillations between needing to be alone and needing to be with others, between striking you as charming and coming off as unbearable. Why do I struggle so much to understand which emotion I am feeling? Why am I so bad at predicting what you will find offensive?

The Fact makes me part of a group of people whose boundaries are amorphous; we do not all recognize one another, and even when we do, we are not sure what we have in common. You would like to manage this situation in a very specific way: First, carve off what you take to be the “most severe cases,” and find a cure that prevents any more of them from arising.

Second, assimilate the rest — people like me — as “normal,” or as normal enough, so long as you are sufficiently tolerant and accommodating. But I suspect all the tolerance and accommodation in the world won’t make me normal. Do we have to pretend that I am? Is that the condition on which you are willing to engage with me? And couldn’t a group of people have something in common even if “degree of suffering” isn’t that thing?

I could use your help — not your support, not your approval, not your reassurance but your help as an open and thoughtful audience for these difficult questions. But you won’t help me, because you won’t listen to what I’m trying to say, because all you care about is how much victim status I deserve. You are really letting me down.

Agnes Callard (@AgnesCallard), an associate professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago and the author of “Aspiration: The Agency of Becoming,” writes about public philosophy at The Point magazine.