Age, self-rated health, sex, education, income, children in the household, agreeableness, extraversion, neuroticism, perceived exposure risk show no relation to adherence to COVID-19 rules; conscientiousness does

Bogg, T., & Milad, E. (2020). Demographic, personality, and social cognition correlates of coronavirus guideline adherence in a U.S. sample. Health Psychology, 39(12), 1026-1036. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/hea0000891

Abstract

Objective: The present study examined patterns and psychosocial correlates of coronavirus guideline adherence in a U.S. sample (N = 500) during the initial 15-day period advocated by the White House Coronavirus Task Force.

Method: Descriptive and correlational analyses were used to examine the frequency of past 7-day adherence to each of 10 guidelines, as well as overall adherence. Guided by a disposition-belief-motivation model of health behavior, path analyses tested associations of personality traits and demographic factors to overall adherence via perceived norms, perceived control, attitudes, and self-efficacy related to guideline adherence, as well as perceived exposure risk and perceived health consequence if exposed.

Results: Adherence ranged from 94.4% reporting always avoiding eating/drinking inside bars/restaurants/food courts to 13.6% reporting always avoiding touching one’s face. Modeling showed total associations with overall adherence for greater conscientiousness (β = .191, p < .001), openness (β = .098, p < .05), perceptions of social endorsement (β = .202, p < .001), positive attitudes (β = .105, p < .05), self-efficacy (β = .234, p < .001), and the presence versus absence or uncertainty of a shelter-in-place order (β = .102, p < .01). Age, self-rated health, sex, education, income, children in the household, agreeableness, extraversion, neuroticism, perceived exposure risk, and perceived health consequence showed null-to-negligible associations with overall adherence. 

Conclusions: The results clarify adherence frequency, highlight characteristics associated with greater adherence, and suggest the need to strengthen the social contract between government and citizenry by clearly communicating adherence benefits, costs, and timelines.

KEYWORDS: COVID-19, personality, conscientiousness, social cognition, guideline adherence

Discussion

The purpose of the present research was to investigate patterns and psychosocial correlates of adherence to the White House Coronavirus Task Force guidelines for slowing the spread of the novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) using a U.S. sample. As assessed during the week following the release of the guidelines, the results showed there to be generally high, but not perfect, frequency of following most of the 10 guidelines, especially for avoiding social gatherings in groups of more than 10 people, avoiding eating or drinking inside bars, restaurants, or food courts, and avoiding visiting nursing homes or retirement or long-term care facilities. It also is notable that nontrivial minorities of participants indicated less frequent adherence to all of the guidelines as well, especially avoiding touching of the face, coughing or sneezing into an elbow, disinfecting frequently used items, washing hands for 20 s or more, avoiding being closer than six feet to other people, and avoiding social visits. These patterns reveal the variations to guideline adherence that may further contribute to the unwitting spread of SARS-CoV-2, as well as morbidity and mortality due to COVID-19.

The results of the path modeling show some of these variations can be explained by individual differences in personality traits, beliefs about guideline adherence, and, to a lesser extent, perceptions of current health. Specifically, in line with trait-consistent temperamental process models of behavior, conscientiousness was directly associated with greater past seven-day frequency of overall guideline adherence by virtue of the general tendencies to be reliable (vs. careless). Consistent with an instrumental disposition-belief-motivation perspective, open individuals were more likely to follow the guidelines by virtue of more positive attitudes associated with following the guidelines. Also consistent with an instrumental disposition-belief-motivation perspective, agreeable individuals were more likely to follow the guidelines by virtue of greater endorsement of norms and attitudes associated with following the guidelines. However, the total association between agreeableness and guideline adherence was not statistically significant. Moreover, the total associations between extraversion and neuroticism and guideline adherence also were not statistically significant.

Consistent with Social Cognitive Theory, individuals who were more confident in overcoming obstacles to following the guidelines—entreaties for social company or not feeling like it—were more likely to follow the guidelines. Consistent with the Theory of Planned Behavior, individuals who perceived others as supportive or encouraging of following the guidelines were more likely to follow the guidelines, as were individuals who held more positive views of the guidelines—as being wise or useful. In contrast, as components of the Health Belief Model, individuals who perceived greater risk of exposure and/or greater perceived health consequence were not more likely to follow the guidelines. Moreover, the results did not show consistent effects or differences for age, sex, education, income, and the presence/absence of children in the household on guideline adherence.

The findings for conscientiousness are consistent with a large body of research demonstrating the health relevance of this personality trait (e.g., Bogg & Roberts, 2013). Moreover, guideline adherence is a prototypical exemplar of conscientiousness—following socially prescribed norms and delaying gratification (Roberts, Jackson, Fayard, & Edmonds, 2009). The small total effect observed for openness is more novel, but does add to a growing body of research demonstrating the health relevance of this personality trait (e.g., Bogg & Vo, 2014; Graham et al., 2017). Similarly, the findings for perceived norms, attitudes, and self-efficacy are consistent with decades of theorizing and research using Social Cognitive Theory and the Theory of Planned Behavior. Indeed, from the vantage point of the study of individual differences in health-related behaviors, guideline adherence, despite its unprecedented status, is associated with many of the same tendencies and beliefs as other behaviors. However, with the spread of morbidity and mortality throughout the population at stake, the implications for these associations are much more acute and severe.

Implications

Given that members of the White House Coronavirus Task Force have stated they expect a resurgence of SARS-CoV-2 during the fall of 2020 and that a safe and reliable vaccine is not likely to be available until the winter of 2021, the present findings have implications for the ongoing and future use of national-level guidelines and state-, county-, and city-level emergency orders to slow the spread of the virus. To be clear, these implications pertain more to the focused and consistent implementation of existing public health approaches, rather than to wholesale changes or shifts in strategy.

One of the lessons learned from the person–situation debate within personality psychology is that consistent relations between personality traits and behaviors should not be expected in “powerful” and “clearly normatively scripted situations” (Kenrick & Funder, 1988, p. 31). It is when traits are provided with sufficient situational affordances for variable expression that covariation with behavior should be expected. As can be inferred from the results of the present study, situational flexibility was observed to the extent conscientiousness and social cognitions were found to be directly associated with guideline adherence. While these findings are validating from a construct perspective, they also show how individual differences can affect public health measures and guidance.

In the U.S, the prevailing ethical premise of public health policy during a pandemic is the use of evidence-based measures that do not unduly restrict individual liberties or harm well-being (Gostin, Friedman, & Wetter, 2020). In instances where more extreme measures, such as stay-at-home orders, are deemed necessary based on available evidence, then the affected population must be assured that basic needs (e.g., medical care, schooling, housing, income) will be provided for by the government and that such measures and their associated penalties have clear sunset provisions. In such a way, an unambiguous social contract can be established—one with both positive and negative contingencies associated with complying with the measures. As a prerequisite consideration to a social contract, the results of the present work suggest all those affected must be fully informed and/or reminded as to whether they are subject to more onerous measures, such as shelter-in-place or stay-at-home orders.

Several approaches could be used to strengthen perceptions of the binding nature of such a social contract. Early, consistent, and visible messaging regarding the nature and scope of the threats associated with transmission and infection would be required. This would entail careful coordination between public health and political leaders at all levels of government in order to frame the guidelines as necessary and legal emergency measures, rather than advisements for consideration. Coordinated messaging regarding the measures would likely help alter any (mis)perceptions that individual rights and liberties are absolute, that there is arbitrary local/regional variation in the utility or importance of such measures, and that public officials might appear to ignore, minimize, or repudiate the measures.

Establishing and maintaining a clear social contract is consistent with the goals of emergency public health measures (i.e., introducing and sustaining new norms for behaviors while mitigating collateral harms to well-being through the use of emergency measures). Under an effective social contract for such measures, the influences of individual differences would likely remain, but could be reduced. In principle, the terms of the social contract should serve as the primary influences of guideline adherence. In such a context, a primary task of the political–public-health apparatus would be establishing and strengthening perceptions of a social contract. To the extent there is a perception of a stronger set of contingencies for guideline adherence, then there should be a reduction in the influence of the individual characteristics associated with adherence. As noted, such a perspective is consistent with principles from the fields of personality and social psychology, which hold that more powerful situations tend to attenuate the influence of individual difference factors on behavior.

Clear articulation and sustained communication of the following could serve to strengthen perceptions of a social contract for adherence behaviors:

1. The benefits of adherence—the offsetting means by which the collateral effects of emergency measures on individual and institutional well-being would be mitigated.
2. The costs of nonadherence—aside from risks of infection and illness, the precise consequences for violations of the emergency measures and assurances that individual and institutional violators should expect them to be fair and certain.
3. The limited timeframe for adherence—the necessity of emergency measures will be continually reevaluated and emergency orders for such measures will be rescinded at the earliest appropriate opportunity.

The above recommendations are not intended to be exhaustive, but illustrate example means by which the perceived influence of the situational constraints surrounding social distancing and hygienic measures can be strengthened via explicit social contract. This will remain a concern, given the subsequent implementation of additional measures (e.g., masks), as well as fluctuations in restrictions based on changes in local rates of coronavirus infections. Clarifying the existence, structure, and contingencies of such a contract could help reduce gaps in adherence associated with lower conscientiousness and weaker beliefs about adherence behaviors.

Limitations

Although the approach of the present work provides some clarity and insights into the patterns and correlates of guideline adherence in the U.S. during the initial 15-day period of guideline implementation, the results do not come without limitations. First, the representativeness of the sample by age, sex, and race was inherently limited. The sampling strategy available from Prolific did not allow for further stratification by income, education, region, and so forth, or many other characteristics and features of the population used to strengthen claims of representativeness. Second, because the approach of the study emphasized assessment during the initial 15-day period, obtaining approval from the relevant institutional review board was prioritized. This resulted in an approach that avoided survey questions that could potentially be personally identifiable (e.g., ZIP codes), violate HIPAA or other relevant privacy regulations (e.g., symptomatic/diagnosed family members), or otherwise pose a risk greater than everyday life (e.g., reporting maladaptive coping behaviors). This approach was effective in obtaining exempt status in a timely manner, but also resulted in a more limited assessment of candidate psychosocial correlates of guideline adherence. Third, the precision of the guideline items and scale was limited by its retrospective framing and self-report format. Moreover, although the scale demonstrated adequate rudimentary psychometric properties, a more sophisticated probing of its structure is warranted. Fourth, intention (planning) to follow the guidelines, while an integral component of the Theory of Planned Behavior, was excluded due to the cross-sectional design of the study, which precluded the appropriate temporal ordering of intention prior to behavior. Finally, prospective and longitudinal designs would allow for tests of temporally predictive effects to guideline adherence, as well as COVID-19 symptoms and diagnoses, rather than relying on the tests of associations reported in the present work.

Startup formation has precipitously declined for firms operated by US PhD recipients in science and engineering due to increasing burden of knowledge, greater work complexity in R&D, & more administrative work

Declining Business Dynamism among Our Best Opportunities: The Role of the Burden of Knowledge. Thomas Åstebro, Serguey Braguinsky, Yuheng Ding. The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka Univ, August 2020. https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2020/DP1099.pdf

Abstract: We document that since 1997, the rate of startup formation has precipitously declined for firms operated by U.S. PhD recipients in science and engineering. These are supposedly the source of some of our best new technological and business opportunities. We link this to an increasing burden of knowledge by documenting a long-term earnings decline by founders, especially less experienced founders, greater work complexity in R&D, and more administrative work. The results suggest that established firms are better positioned to cope with the increasing burden of knowledge, in particular through the design of knowledge hierarchies, explaining why new firm entry has declined for high-tech, high-opportunity startups.

Discussion

We have established a couple of new facts regarding business dynamism among high-tech, high-opportunity startups run by PhDs in science and engineering. Since 1997, the share of founders in these startups has declined by around 38 percent, not limited to any particular founder demographic or ethnic group or occupation, and this decline is widespread across regions of the United States. The share of workers at startups has followed the same path of decline.

There is a significant trend toward an increasing amount of work experience among founders (although not their age), pointing to the burden of knowledge as an explanation for the decline in startup rates. Probing this idea in the data, we show evidence that founders are rewarded for building experience, as they have had to perform an increasing number of R&D tasks over time while also increasing the number of other tasks that they have to perform. Nevertheless, founders’ earnings generally do not reflect that added workload, as average earnings have been declining, especially for less experienced founders.

The data further suggest that established firms have an advantage over startups in creating a division of labor in R&D, in particular by introducing more hierarchical layers, reducing knowledge workers’ span of control, and allocating more experienced workers to positions with greater managerial responsibility. Further, established firms compensate workers for performing more R&D tasks and supervising more individuals. These developments are not seen among founders. The differences follow from the natural limits imposed by running a small firm with less division of labor and a high amount of multitasking by the founder. The largest firms are even more active in reorganizing job tasks, increasing the depth of hierarchy at twice the rate of all established firms.

Why don’t founders hire more specialized workers and start with bigger teams and build a richer hierarchy, as established firms do? Although we do not address this follow-on question, we can at least speculate. Some of the answers might be that startups face high uncertainty about the viability of their businesses and thus start small, and either grow or exit as uncertainty diminishes; and/or most startups are financially constrained and cannot afford to hire larger teams. We leave it to future research to explore these ideas.

As noted in the introduction, a steady flow of great new high-tech firms is generally agreed to be necessary for an economy to remain vibrant in the long run. In this sense, our findings present cause for concern. It is not immediately clear what the remedy is. Typical regulatory actions, such as changing taxation rates or restricting or enlarging businesses’ operating conditions would likely have no effect. And restricting established firms’ ability to make organizational design changes seems highly unlikely to pass any legislature. Our findings suggest that if the goal is to restore business dynamism in the high-tech sector, alleviating the burden of knowledge should be front and center in the strategy to attain it.

Rolf Degen summarizing... If couple therapy has some initial positive impacts on sexual functioning, they wither away over time

Trajectories of Sexual Satisfaction and Frequency During and After Couple Therapy for Relationship Distress. Karen Rothman et al. Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy, Nov 30 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/0092623X.2020.1850575

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1334004207305830400

Abstract: Using a sample of 134 distressed, different-sex couples, this study investigated the effects of Integrative Behavioral Couple Therapy and Traditional Behavioral Couple Therapy on sexual dissatisfaction and sexual frequency both during treatment and in the five years following treatment. Therapy effects depended on treatment type, gender, and whether sexual distress was identified as a presenting problem; while couple therapy may initially improve some aspects of the sexual relationship, impacts tend to fade over follow-up. Couple therapy may benefit from incorporating a greater emphasis on sex and inclusion of techniques from sex therapy.

Robust global source credibility effect for scientific authorities ("the Einstein effect"): Across 24 countries & all levels of religiosity, nonsense from a scientist was considered more credible than nonsense attributed to a spiritual guru

Hoogeveen, Suzanne, Sacha Altay, Theiss Bendixen, Renatas Berniūnas, Joseph Bulbulia, Arik Cheshin, Claudio Gentili, et al. 2020. “The Einstein Effect: Global Evidence for Scientific Source Credibility Effects and the Influence of Religiosity.” PsyArXiv. December 1. doi:10.31234/osf.io/sf8ez

Abstract: People tend to evaluate information from reliable sources more favourably, but it is unclear exactly how perceivers' worldviews interact with this source credibility effect. Here, we present data from a cross-cultural study in which individuals (N = 10,195) from a religiously and culturally diverse sample of 24 countries were presented with obscure, meaningless statements attributed to either a spiritual guru or a scientist. The data indicate a robust global source credibility effect for scientific authorities, which we dub "the Einstein effect": across all 24 countries and all levels of religiosity, nonsense from a scientist was considered more credible than nonsense attributed to a spiritual guru. Additionally, individual religiosity predicted a weaker relative preference for the statement from the scientist vs. the spiritual guru, and was more strongly associated with credibility judgments for the guru than the scientist. Independent data on explicit trust ratings across 143 countries mirrored the experimental patterns. These findings suggest that irrespective of religious worldview, science is a powerful and universal heuristic that signals the reliability of information.

Update Feb 7 2022: From the final version, The Einstein effect provides global evidence for scientific source credibility effects and the influence of religiosity. Suzanne Hoogeveen, Julia M. Haaf, Joseph A. Bulbulia, Robert M. Ross, Ryan McKay, Sacha Altay, Theiss Bendixen, Renatas Berniūnas, Arik Cheshin, Claudio Gentili, Raluca Georgescu, Will M. Gervais, Kristin Hagel, Christopher Kavanagh, Neil Levy, Alejandra Neely, Lin Qiu, André Rabelo, Jonathan E. Ramsay, Bastiaan T. Rutjens, Hugh Turpin, Filip Uzarevic, Robin Wuyts, Dimitris Xygalatas & Michiel van Elk. Nature Human Behaviour, Feb 7 2022. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-021-01273-8

Discussion

In the current cross-cultural study, we used a straightforward manipulation and measurement of source credibility effects at the individual level. We found a robust source effect on credibility judgements of meaningless statements ascribed to different authority figures; across all 24 countries and all levels of religiosity, gobbledegook from a scientist was considered more credible than the same gobbledegook from a spiritual guru. In addition to this robust overall Einstein effect, participants’ background beliefs predicted the credibility evaluations; individuals scoring low on religiosity considered the statement from the guru less credible than that from the scientist, whereas this difference was less pronounced for highly religious individuals. These patterns were consistent with explicit trust data collected for over 100,000 individuals from 143 countries: across 140 of 143 of these countries, people indicated greater trust in scientists than in traditional healers, with a larger difference for non-religious compared with religious individuals. Robustness analyses for the experimental study indicated that the effects were robust against different data inclusion criteria (for example, attention checks) and analytic choices (for example, selection of covariates, dependent variable, prior settings). Moreover, the effects also emerged compellingly when analysed as a between-subjects design (Table 2), suggesting that they are not simply explained by social desirability or participants responding in line with their guess of the research hypothesis (also note that recent empirical work indicates that online survey experiments are generally robust to experimenter demand effects77). Results of exploratory response time analyses suggest that in addition to giving more positive evaluations, people may actually put more effort into processing information from credible sources (although they did not recall it better). In particular, participants spent more time and may have tried relatively harder to decipher the gobbledegook from the scientist, whereas previous scepticism may have steered some to immediately dismiss the information from the guru as nonsense.

The pattern of results suggests that variability in the source effect between individuals and countries is more strongly driven by differences in the credibility of the spiritual authority than the scientific authority. Based on the literature one could consider various plausible hypotheses explaining cross-cultural variation in the source effects, for instance in terms of cultural religiosity, vertically versus horizontally structured societies, general trust in authorities and specific trust patterns toward religious and secular authorities78,79,80,81,82,83. However, although our analysis indicated quantitative differences in the size of the source effect between countries (that is, varying positive effects), we did not find qualitative differences (that is, changes in the direction or presence of the effect). Descriptively, the weakest source effects (that is, smallest difference between the scientific and the spiritual source) are observed in Asian countries (Japan, China, India), possibly because the spiritual guru as presented in the survey more closely fits Eastern belief systems than Abrahamic faith traditions. However, this explanation remains speculative and we are hesitant to overinterpret the cross-national variability both in the overall credibility judgements and the effect of source. Although we included main effects of age, gender, level of education and socio-economic status in the analyses, the different sampling strategies that were applied between countries also calls for caution in making inferences based on direct comparisons.

Our findings could reflect a universal gullibility with regard to gobbledegook statements: only a small minority of participants, regardless of their national or religious background, displayed candid scepticism towards the nonsense statements, and 76% of participants rated the scientist’s gobbledegook at or above the midpoint of the credibility scale (compared with 55% for the guru). However, the notion of a general gullibility underlying the observed effects is not entirely supported by the data. The median response was the midpoint of the credibility scale. Participants may have primarily used the midpoint of the scale to indicate that they were uncertain about whether or not the claim was credible, that is, to refrain from passing judgement at all84,85,86. This response might appear as a lack in motivation to critically reflect on the information that was presented; at the same time, saving one’s cognitive resources can also be considered ‘strategic’. First, as with most psychology experiments, our study was a zero-stakes task with no incentive for accuracy, which may have lowered effort and biased responses toward the midpoint. Second, when analytical reasoning about the plausibility of a presented claim does not yield any conclusion, the most rational thing to do may be either suspending judgement (selecting the neutral midpoint of the rating scale) or calibrating judgement to previous beliefs about the source of the claim. If one considers the group to which the source belongs generally competent and benevolent, it makes sense to give a positive judgement of their difficult-to-evaluate claim. After all, credible experts often acquired credentials based on their reputation of discovering phenomena that seem implausible at first glance55. For instance, the premises of using vaccines (‘inserting a virus prevents disease’) or facts about climate change (‘humans are changing the weather’) are intuitively dubious, yet reputable scientists have convinced many laypeople of their truth.

In this study, we intentionally selected authorities that are generally considered benevolent30,31 and we generated statements that are nearly impossible to (in)validate and that bear no relation to controversial or politicized scientific topics about which people may have strong previous attitudes (efficacy of vaccinations, climate change, etc.). By using ambiguous claims without any specific ideological content, we tried to isolate the worldview effect regarding the source from any worldview effect related to the content of the claims. At the same time, we aimed to maximize the efficacy of our manipulation, by varying the names, photographs and visual contexts (chalkboard versus stars) in addition to the authority’s profession. This approach makes it more difficult to single out which specific factor contributes to the source effect (for example, the observed effects might be partly driven by the authority’s appearance rather than their domain of expertise). Relatedly, some participants might have recognized the depicted men (Enrico Fermi and José Argüelles), although we consider it unlikely that many did. Because we did not ask whether participants recognized any of the depicted sources, we tried to indirectly and retrospectively assess recognition by scanning the open text items at the end of the survey (comments and awareness item) for any mentioning of either ‘Enrico’, ‘Fermi’, ‘José’ or ‘Argüelles’ (ignoring capitalization or diacritical marks). Only one (Spanish) participant mentioned recognizing both of the sources. Although this obviously does not prove that no other participants might have known the depicted sources, it seems unlikely that this was the case for a large proportion of participants. On the other hand, the multifaceted nature of the manipulation also increases its ecological validity; our stimuli resemble popular internet memes and real-life instances of source credibility also involve a combination of different features (for example, authorities typically look the part in public and appear in congruous contexts). Furthermore, a recent study showed that the mere mentioning of a famous source such as Aristotle or the Dalai Lama enhanced profundity ratings for pseudo-profound nonsense relative to unauthored versions, suggesting that even the mere name of an authority may suffice to induce source effects87.

The effects observed in our experimental data and the associations identified in the existing trust data were highly comparable, suggesting that by using our source credibility manipulation we tapped into participants’ attitudes about scientific and religious authorities. A noteworthy divergence, however, is that whereas our data showed a small positive relation between religiosity and credibility ratings for gobbledegook from the scientist, the trust data demonstrated a small but negative association between religiosity and trust in scientists. The finding that religious people are generally less trusting towards science has often been reported in the literature53,88,89,90. However, recent studies suggest that the negative relation between religiosity and trust in science might be US-specific and be weak or absent in other countries91,92,93,94. In addition, although trust is probably closely linked to credibility, explicit trust assessments and credibility ratings of specific statements may diverge, perhaps particularly for the kind of obscure statements used in the current study. That is, the gobbledegook statements may still have resonated better with religious individuals than non-religious individuals, resulting in the main effect of religiosity on credibility ratings. This main effect may be driven by a tendency for intuitive reasoning, which has been related to religiosity78,95,96 and receptivity of pseudo-profound and pseudo-scientific nonsense36,67. It could thus be that mistrust in science only partially dampens the allure of well-sounding science-related gobbledegook for intuitive reasoners36.

Notably, our study showed that across 24 countries even those who are highly religious are prone to a scientific source credibility bias, what we have deemed the Einstein effect. Looking ahead, there are at least six compelling horizons for future research to address the generalizability and underlying causes of the Einstein effect. First, whether scientific education diminishes the appeal of scientific authority outside its immediate domain remains unclear. Although those who place faith in science are prone to Einstein effects38,40,97,98, strong scepticism is normative within the practice of science—as anyone who has experienced peer review will attest. Although it is 150 years since Charles Peirce famously argued for fixing beliefs from the ‘method of science’ in favour the ‘method of authority’, the role of appeals to scientific authority among scientists remains unclear99. Second, future researchers might investigate whether political partisanship predicts differences in scientific source credibility. Although political commitments may share common psychological features with religious commitments100,101,102,103, the rise of anti-science populist ideologies might diminish or reverse Einstein effects among political partisans. By contrast, individual differences in deference to science104 may predict enhanced Einstein effects, although a recent study failed to find this pattern for faith in science (van der Miesen et al., in preparation). Third, the historical origins of scientific source credibility across different cultures remain unclear. If we were to wind back the clock a century to Einstein’s era, would we also observe preferential source credibility for scientific authority over spiritual authority? Fourth, the proximate and sustaining social and technological causes of scientific source credibility are not addressed in our study, and remain ripe for investigations. Is scientific source credibility an artefact of global information networks, country-wide science education or the sequestering of religious authority to the private domain? Fifth, although our study covers 24 countries worldwide, we cannot claim universality for our findings. Indeed, investigating source credibility in cultures where spiritual authority dominates may help to clarify the mechanistic questions that our study raises but does not address. Sixth, future work may extend the current work and investigate how the Einstein effect is affected by content cues (for example, the use of jargon, argument coherence, disclosure of uncertainty105) and personal attitudes towards the topic106,107,108.

In conclusion, our results strongly suggest that scientific authority is generally considered a reliable source for truth, more so than spiritual authority. Indeed, there are ample examples demonstrating that science serves as an important cue for credibility; the cover of Donald Trump’s niece’s family history book is adorned by ‘Mary L. Trump, PhD’; advertisements for cosmetic products often claim to be ‘clinically proven’ and ‘recommended by dermatologists’, and even the tobacco industry used to appeal to science (for example, ‘more doctors smoke Camels than any other cigarette’). By systematically quantifying the difference between acceptance of statements by a scientific and spiritual authority in a global sample, this work addresses the fundamental question of how people trust what others say about the world.

Independently of age, gender, education & income, people know very little about the money system or money institutions and mostly believe in money myths, such as the notion that money is still backed by gold

Money Knowledge or Money Myths? Results of a population survey on money and the monetary order. Klaus Kraemer, Luka Jakelja, Florian Brugger and Sebastian Nessel. European Journal of Sociology, Volume 61 Issue 2, Aug 28 2020. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-of-sociology-archives-europeennes-de-sociologie/article/money-knowledge-or-money-myths-results-of-a-population-survey-on-money-and-the-monetary-order/A7CE8F42F7F9C81B2F7BDCC3237A6A14

Abstract: People use money in everyday life in ubiquitous ways. In addition, they know that money has quite different and multiple meanings in different social contexts, depending on the situation in which it is used. That said, what do people actually know about money, money creation, money backing and the institutional foundations of the monetary order? While contributions in the rapidly extending field of financial literacy have empirically studied people’s knowledge about mathematical and financial issues, people’s knowledge about the functioning of the money system and monetary institutions remained mostly unexplored. To improve our understanding of people’s knowledge of the money system and the most important money institutions, we questioned 2,000 individuals in Austria using a standardized population survey. In this paper, after a short critical review of the sociology of money and the literature on financial literacy, we present and critically discuss the results of the survey. We found that, independently of age, gender, education and income, people know very little about the money system or money institutions and mostly believe in money myths, such as the notion that money is still backed by gold. Finally, we discuss our empirical findings against the backdrop of the state of research on the sociology of money 1.

Discussion: Knowledge, myths and misconceptions

People use money in everyday life in ubiquitous and multiple ways. They use it in markets and beyond, in both organizations and communities. They use it in very different social relationships (buyer-seller, creditor-borrower, employer-employee, state-citizen, parent-child, member-association, donor-public charity, etc.) and for a variety of economic and non-economic purposes, without being able to name them abstractly or to be reflexively aware of their effects. As Zelizer [2011] noted, people also know that money has quite different meanings in different social contexts depending on the situation in which it is used.

In sociological research on money, however, it has remained unclear what ordinary people know and what they do not know about money and the institutional foundations of the monetary system. Against the background of such a serious research desideratum, we examined empirically what people actually know about the monetary order. In this study, we found that people know hardly anything about money and the institutional foundations of the monetary order. Although people use money ubiquitously in everyday life, they mostly know little to nothing about how money is created, whether it is backed by tangible assets, or whether it represents nothing but a dematerialized “pure token” [Simmel (1900) 2004: 176]. Additionally, people have very vague notions about institutional responsibility for the value stability of the euro. People’s knowledge about money, money creation, money backing and the underlying institutions of the monetary order is at best rudimentary. This significant, blatant ignorance is remarkable, especially given that people in everyday life are naturally willing to barter goods in demand for a pure token, donate money for charitable or non-profit purposes, share and give away money within families, or do anything else to avoid monetary penalties.

Ever since Simmel, the sociology of money has assumed that people believe in money myths. Like people’s money knowledge, money myths have not been empirically investigated. At best, the sociology of money has speculated which myths are involved. With our empirical study, we show that people know little to nothing about the institutional foundations of the monetary order while claiming to know something about money. The interviewees indeed believe in money myths. That is, money myths are widely used by the population in a variety of forms; for example, the assumptions that money is backed by physical assets such as gold or other precious metals, that customers’ savings deposits are passed on by the banks as loans to borrowers, or that only central banks create money by printing and issuing banknotes, not private banks by lending, which the central banks authorize them to do. The vast majority of people do not know that deposits are created by a “keystroke” [Wray 2015: 66] when a bank customer demands a loan or overdraws the account. Obviously, most respondents believe that deposits or debit cards are the same as cash. However, respondents have illusory notions about the fact that money is backed by rare materials or value stocks. Thus, we state a double empirical finding, i.e., people know little or nothing about an institution as central as money, but at the same time they indicate that they do know something. In other words: People believe in money myths.

Another finding of the survey is sociologically significant. Similar to the belief in money myths, the lack of knowledge about money and the institutional foundations of the monetary order are more or less socially indifferently distributed throughout the population—regardless of age, gender, education, profession and income. As we have shown, all socio-demographic and socio-economic variables play a negligible role in the social distribution of monetary knowledge and myths. This finding is remarkable, since patterns of perception and interpretation are usually influenced by these sociological variables. Within the very small “zone of knowing” there are at most a few socio-structural abnormalities. For example, respondents who are self-employed or have a higher education know that money is created by private banks more often than all the others. Both of these groups are more likely to know that the ECB––and not the national central bank––is responsible for the monetary stability of the euro. However, it should be noted here that the vast majority of the self-employed with an above-average education who were surveyed believe in money myths.

So far, we have classified all “incorrect” response categories on the dimensions of money creation, money backing and monetary institutions as “money myths”, which we have located in the “zone of ignorance”. However, such a classification is not unproblematic in a sociological sense. Therefore, we differentiate in the following between money-related myths and misconceptions or fallacies. We call only such “incorrect“ response categories money myths, insofar as their claim of validity is collectively shared by a majority of the interviewees. In order to be able to speak of money myths, a second characteristic must be added. Money myths are different from other misconceptions or fallacies in that they are efficacious in the social world. Myths can facilitate or stimulate collective actions. Contrary to misconceptions or fallacies, money myths can unfold—in the sense of the classical Thomas theorem—collective effects on the structural level of a monetary order. They justify specific practices in the everyday use of money. For example, money is used in the expectation that the myth will not be disappointed. In other words, money myths influence and perpetuate specific social usages of money. The believers in money myths use money in accordance with their beliefs and not otherwise because they believe in the accuracy of the money myths. On the other hand, we define “incorrect” response categories as misconceptions or fallacies if they are only shared by a small minority of respondents and do not have a broad impact in the social world. Against the background of our empirical findings, we classify the “incorrect” response categories “all money is printed” and “money is backed by gold” as money myths. On the other hand, we interpret all those “incorrect” response categories (1.2, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 3.1.) as misconceptions, which are only considered correct by a minority of the sample.

In the results chapter of this article, we first focused on question 1 (money creation), in respect of which response categories are “right” or “wrong”, based on recent official statements by the ECB and the Bank of England. Accordingly, we have classified the answer categories “the central banks print money” and “private banks issue credit” as “correct” and all other response categories as “incorrect”. In question 2 (money backing), we have argued that “money is not backed at all” is “correct”. In question 3 (money institutions), we have assigned “correct” and “wrong” response categories in the sense of the legal mandate of the ECB. Against the background of the sociological literature (see chapter 1), however, it makes sense to interpret the assignments of the response categories (“correct”/“incorrect”) in a broader sense. From a sociological perspective, one could argue that money myths (“all money is printed” and “money is backed by gold”) are social facts in the sense of Émile Durkheim [(1895) 1982], which create an action-oriented interpretive framework (“trust”) and influence the everyday use of money. More precisely, money myths are not mere fictional imaginations, but narratives that socially embed the usages of money. Against the background of this theoretical consideration, we interpret our empirical findings as follows: Ordinary people readily accept deposit money as long as the expectation is not disappointed that these money forms can always be exchanged for cash or precious metals at any time. Following this theoretical consideration, it makes sense to interpret collectively-shared money myths, which we have previously identified in the “zone of ignorance”, as narrative frameworks that culturally embed the monetary order and thus contribute to its social stability. In this sociological sense, money myths can be classified as “correct” response categories.

This finding somewhat challenges the assumption by scholars of the recent communication efforts of national banks about the “real” functioning of the monetary order. In contrast to Braun [2016] and Holmes [2014], for example, our findings suggest the limitation of communications by central banks, e.g. in that the bulk of modern money is created by private banks issuing credit and not by central banks issuing notes and coins. Instead, the prevalence of money myths seems deeply rooted in ordinary people’s perceptions of money. It is therefore questionable whether the central banks’ speaking to the people (Braun) and an “economy of words” (Holmes) can change monetary knowledge. Note, however, that central banks only recently began to change their communication about the monetary order in order to enhance “real” knowledge about it. Future research could hence more closely evaluate whether money myths can be altered by the communication efforts of central banks and other actors (e.g. “positive money initiatives”) in the long run and to which social groups they appeal most. As our results draw on the Austrian case where the national bank has not launched communication campaigns and full money initiatives are not existent, it would be interesting to replicate the survey used in this study in other countries (see below), particularly in the UK, which provides an outstanding example of changing communication by a central bank.

Finally, we may add that money myths never seem to be stable over time. They can erode, and they have to prove themselves in recurring financial market crises [Rogoff and Reinhart 2009]. Even in normal times they can be put to the proof. This may for example be the case if the everyday usability of cash as a payment instrument is restricted (see the different upper limits for cash payments in the eurozone since 2010) or the account holders cannot “escape” from negative interest rates and thus undermine the store of value function of money. Money myths can certainly be put to the proof in extraordinary events (bankruptcy, galloping inflation, prohibition on the private purchase of gold, limitation of legal access to cash––see the Debt Crisis in Greece of 2015). At the peak of financial market crises, money myths may even turn out to be an illusion. From a sociological perspective, it would certainly be hasty to interpret money myths as simple ignorance or as “false consciousness”. As long as money myths are not disenchanted, they can be latently efficacious in everyday life. However, money myths are questioned in a fundamental way, for example, when credit money can no longer be “withdrawn” from the cash account—within the limits of the available budget or the granted credit line.

Our empirical findings also show that we cannot confirm the assumption of the sociological literature of money since Simmel (see chapter 1) that people believe or trust that money is “backed” “through the beliefs of the people” (item 4 of question 2, 11.65%) or the future purchasing power (“goods and services”, item 3 of question 2, 24.53%). It would thus seem that our empirical findings on money knowledge can by no means be interpreted so clearly in the sense of a simple dichotomy of the response categories along the distinction between “correct” and “incorrect”. An empirically unclear issue that requires further investigation is the extent to which the myth-based ignorance of the “objective” architecture of the monetary order is indeed a prerequisite for ordinary people to use money in everyday life largely without friction, as one might theoretically assume against the background of the sociological money literature.

Another issue that remains to be investigated relates to the empirical findings in Austria on money knowledge and money myths as compared to other countries of the European Union or the eurozone. First of all, it should be noted that empirical studies on knowledge or ignorance in the population regarding money and the institutional foundations of the monetary order are not available in other countries. We suspect that similarities and variations can be found in other European societies. It would not be implausible to assume that in many countries comparable results can be expected in all three dimensions (money creation, money backing, monetary institutions). At the same time, however, it can be assumed that significant deviations would be found in some countries. The diffusion of money myths among the population may depend on country-specific institutional confidence. If institutional confidence is high, it could also be assumed that money myths are widespread. Further dependent variables would be the perceived performance of the national economy or the economic dynamics of “northern” EU-countries, the internal and external “power prestige” [Weber (1921-1922) 1978: 910] of national political elites, as well as the level of state loyalty among the population. We could expect that, in national societies with precarious economies, drastic economic and financial crises in the recent past and a strong skepticism towards the state order (e.g. Greece), the belief that money is backed by gold or that national political elites have sufficient capacities to successfully ward off a supranational crisis of the European monetary order is less widespread.

The empirical findings on money knowledge and money myths have important implications for research on financial literacy. Contributions in the field of financial literacy suggest that financial knowledge is unequally socially distributed, and that age, gender, education and income play an important role in the appropriation of mathematical and financial knowledge. However, as we have shown, the findings of financial literacy research do not correspond with the money knowledge of the population. Rather, it can be concluded that even persons with above-average financial knowledge do not necessarily know how money is created. Nor do they know the difference between private credit money (deposits) and central bank money (cash), whether money is covered by assets, and which institutions are responsible for the value stability of the euro. Rather, it can be assumed that many people with solid or above-average financial knowledge also believe in money myths. Against this background, a key aspect of financial literacy research is that the knowledge dimension is limited to mathematical and financial knowledge, but the dimensions of monetary knowledge and myths are ignored.

What follows from the empirical findings on money knowledge and money myths for the recent sociology of money? Zelizer [1994, 2011] has examined the everyday usage of money. In contrast to the classical economic exchange theory of money [see Ingham 2004] and Simmel’s sociological “quantity theory” of money, Zelizer analyses the “qualitatively” multiple, social and cultural embeddedness of money usage in everyday life [see Dodd 2014: 269-311; on the distinction between a “quantitative” and “qualitative” sociology of money and a critical review, see Kraemer and Nessel 2015: 13-21]. Our findings on money knowledge and money myths refer to a research dimension that was largely ignored by Zelizer. The use of money is not only involved in social and cultural contexts and social meanings. When people use money (for example, when sharing, lending, giving, saving, and connecting money with multiple meanings), they always do so in the expectation that they know what money is. For multiple social and cultural purposes, money can also be used—in normal times—in an unproblematic and unquestioned manner, because people are guided by their as-if-money knowledge and money myths. Against this background, it would be fruitful to more precisely discuss Zelizer’s thesis of the “social meaning of money” in the context of the presented findings on widespread money ignorance and myths.

Our findings can also be valuable for a political economy of money. Undoubtedly, Ingham is a prominent author investigating the institutional foundations of the modern monetary order, the power imbalances between key groups of actors (creditors, debtors, the state), and the dominant conflicts of interest over monetary stability from a decidedly sociological perspective. Against the background of the survey, an important question emerges with respect to ignorance and money myths within the population for the power asymmetries and conflicts of interest outlined by Ingham. It will also be necessary to clarify the influence of asymmetrically distributed money knowledge—for example, between experts and non-experts—on the modern monetary system. It is always relevant to the question of how myths about money—beyond all sociodemographic and socioeconomic variables—affect power asymmetries and conflicts of interest within the monetary system. In this context, it will also be necessary to clarify the extent to which the empirical findings on money knowledge and money myths can be used in the recent sociological debate on the privilege of private banks to create bank deposits through loans [Huber 2017; Sahr 2017]. For example, it might be discussed whether the fiat money regime works (in normal times) without friction because ordinary people do not know how money is created.

Finally, we want to discuss the question of how the empirical findings on money knowledge and money myths—or misconceptions and fallacies—can be interpreted in light of Simmel’s [(1908) 2009: 315] classic thesis on “trust” as a “middle position between knowledge and ignorance”. Our findings show that the vast majority of the respondents in the sample (88.2%, see chapter 5.2) are to be found in the “zone of ignorance”. These respondents believe that the total money supply is printed and covered by value assets, that the nation state guarantees bank deposits in the event of a banking or financial crisis, and that the National Central Bank is responsible for the value stability of the euro. In contrast, the “zone of knowledge” (.3%, see chapter 5.2) of those respondents who do not believe in money myths is very small in our sample. They know that money is not only printed by central banks but also created through lending by private banks. These respondents are aware that money is not backed by gold, government bonds or commodities, or loans or debts. Instead, they state that money is not backed at all. They assume that the legal guarantee of bank deposits in the event of a banking crisis is not a redeemable promise. In addition, they know that it is the ECB and not the National Central Bank that is responsible for monetary stability. They may also distrust the “economy of words” [Holmes 2014; Beckert 2016: 113-116] of central banks.

However, it would be erroneous to suggest that the respondents in the large “zone of ignorance” know nothing about money at all. At this point we cannot provide a more detailed explanation of what the respondents in the “zone of ignorance” know about money usage, even though they do not have a reflexive knowledge of the institutional foundations of the monetary system. However, we assume that they have a “weak form of inductive knowledge” [Simmel (1900) 2004: 191] in using money (see chapter 2). At the beginning of the article, we argued that people use money ubiquitously in everyday life. We can now concretize that statement: respondents in the large “zone of ignorance” indeed have a solid, practical knowledge of money. This practical knowledge has proven itself time and again in normal times. People know that they can buy commodities and pay outstanding accounts only with money. They know that they can donate money for charitable purposes and make others happy with a gift of money. In addition, of course, these respondents also know that they can influence the behaviour of others when they threaten to reduce or cancel a cash payment. People therefore know in a practical sense that money can be used in modern capitalist societies “absolutely” (Simmel) and at the same time “multiply” (Zelizer). Money can thus be used in everyday life without financial or mathematical knowledge or an understanding of the regime of money creation. We conclude with the following quote by Max Weber [2012: 300] about the social institution of money in everyday life: “No ordinary consumer will nowadays have even a rough knowledge of the production techniques of the goods that he uses daily, and he will mostly not even know what materials they are made of and what industry has produced them. All that he is interested in are those expectations concerning the performance of these artefacts that are of practical importance for him. The situation is no different with respect to social phenomena—money, for example. A person using money does not know how it actually acquires its peculiar characteristics (since, in fact, even professional specialists have heated arguments about that).”

The majority (> 80%) of adult men have accessed pornography at some point, and in the past year (40–70%); around half of younger men (25 or under) are weekly consumers; pornography use tapers-off with age

A Literature Review of Studies into the Prevalence and Frequency of Men’s Pornography Use. Dan J. Miller, Peter T. F. Raggatt & Kerry McBain. American Journal of Sexuality Education, Volume 15, 2020 - Issue 4, Pages 502-529, Oct 13 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/15546128.2020.1831676

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1333763474472710150

Abstract: This review aims to provide information on the prevalence and frequency of adult males’ pornography use. It appears, the majority (> 80%) of adult men have accessed pornography at some point, and in the past year (40–70%). Around half of younger men (25 or under) are weekly consumers. Pornography use tapers-off with age. Relatively few (<10%) younger men have accessed violent pornography in the past year. The Internet is the primary method of access. Pornography use is associated with masturbation; use during partnered sex is less common. Differences in consumption rates between heterosexual and gay and bisexual men are discussed.

Keywords: Pornography, sexually explicit material, men, prevalence

Singapore youths: Early exposure to aggressive games was not predictive of anxiety, depression, somatic symptoms, or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 2 years later; aggresive games is not a risk factor in mental health

Aggressive Video Games Are Not a Risk Factor for Mental Health Problems in Youth: A Longitudinal Study. Christopher J. Ferguson and C.K. John Wang. Cyberpsychology, Behavior, and Social Networking, Dec 1 2020. https://doi.org/10.1089/cyber.2020.0027

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1333729157717643266

Abstract: Recent preregistered studies and analyses have suggested that links between aggressive video games (AVGs) and aggression-related outcomes may have been exaggerated in previous literature. However, concerns about AVGs remain. Although the impact of aggressive games on aggressive behaviors has been the subject of approximately a dozen preregistered studies, the potential impact of aggressive games on the player's mental health symptoms has not been the subject of similar preregistered analyses. In the current study, a sample of more than 3000 youth from Singapore were examined by using preregistered analyses to determine whether early exposure to aggressive games was predictive of anxiety, depression, somatic symptoms, or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 2 years later. Analyses suggested that exposure to AVGs is not a risk factor for later mental health symptoms.