Conservatives were less influenced by overall consequences for the greater good in comparison with liberals: On average, conservatives are less inclined to accept harmful actions for the greater good than liberals

Political Ideology and Moral Dilemma Judgments: An Analysis Using the CNI Model. Dillon M. Luke, Bertram Gawronski. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, February 22, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167220987990

Abstract: Many real-world dilemmas involve disagreement about whether decisions should follow moral norms in an unconditional manner (deontology) or be based on the consequences for the greater good (utilitarianism). To examine how political ideology may account for some of these disagreements, the current research used a formal modeling approach to investigate the associations between political ideology and (a) sensitivity to consequences, (b) sensitivity to moral norms, and (c) general preference for inaction versus action in responses to moral dilemmas. Across three studies (N = 996) with samples from the United States (Studies 1 and 3) and the United Kingdom (Study 2), conservatives were less influenced by overall consequences for the greater good in comparison with liberals. Political ideology was not significantly associated with sensitivity to moral norms and general action tendencies. The findings provide more nuanced insights into how political ideology may contribute to disagreements on real-world moral dilemmas.

Keywords: CNI model, deontology, moral judgment, utilitarianism, political ideology

Discussion

The main goal of the current research was to provide deeper insights into the role of political ideology in disagreements about the right course of action in moral dilemmas. Using a battery of moral dilemmas inspired by real-world cases (Körner et al., 2020) and the CNI model to quantify sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to moral norms (N), and general preference for inaction versus action (I) in responses to moral dilemmas (Gawronski et al., 2017), we found that sensitivity to consequences decreased as a function of conservative (vs. liberal) political ideology. Political ideology was not significantly associated with sensitivity to moral norms and general action tendencies. These findings replicated in two exploratory studies (Studies 1 and 2) and one preregistered study (Study 3) with participants from the United States (Studies 1 and 3) and the United Kingdom (Study 2) and remained robust after controlling for basic demographic variables (Study 3). The results also replicated in an integrative data analysis (Curran & Hussong, 2009) combining the data from all three studies (see Table S9 in the Supplemental Online Materials). Scatterplots of the associations between political ideology and the three CNI parameters in the integrative data analysis can be seen in Figure 2.

The current findings offer more nuanced insights into why conservatives and liberals may disagree about the most appropriate course of action in real-world dilemmas. Past research suggests that conservatives are less likely than liberals to endorse actions that violate moral norms for the sake of the greater good (e.g., Hannikainen et al., 2017; Piazza & Sousa, 2014). One potential interpretation of this difference is that conservatives are more concerned about violations of moral norms than liberals (see Young et al., 2013), suggesting a significant positive correlation between conservative (vs. liberal) political ideology and sensitivity to moral norms. Another interpretation is that conservatives are more concerned about actions that interfere with current states of affairs (i.e., status quo bias; see Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988), suggesting a significant positive correlation between conservative (vs. liberal) political ideology and general preference for inaction over action. Neither of these predictions received empirical support in the current studies. Instead, we found a significant negative correlation between conservative (vs. liberal) political ideology and sensitivity to consequences, suggesting that conservatives are less willing to accept consequentialist arguments about the greater good than liberals (see Piazza & Sousa, 2014). In other words, liberals and conservatives seem to agree that certain actions would be morally wrong because they violate consensually accepted moral norms. Yet, they seem to differ in the extent to which they are willing accept trade-offs when a norm violation would be beneficial for the greater good.

An interesting question regarding this finding is whether political differences in sensitivity to consequences are driven by political conservatism, political liberalism, or both. Because participants were recruited in groups based of their political ideology (i.e., conservative, moderate, liberal), follow-up analyses using a categorical classification can provide valuable insights for this question (see Table S5 in the Supplemental Online Materials). While we did not find consistent differences between groups in the three individual studies, an integrative data analysis (Curran & Hussong, 2009) combining the data from all three studies revealed that sensitivity to consequences was significantly weaker in the conservative group than in the liberal group.5 Yet, neither the conservative nor the liberal group differed from the moderate group. Together, these results suggest that sensitivity to consequences varies continuously across the political spectrum and is not driven exclusively by either conservatism or liberalism.

Another interesting question is whether sensitivity to consequences is more strongly associated with social or economic political ideology. Follow-up analyses with the data from the three individual studies did not find consistent evidence for different associations between sensitivity to consequences and social versus economic political ideology. However, when the data from all three studies were combined, an integrative data analysis revealed that sensitivity to consequences showed a significantly stronger association with social compared to economic political ideology (see Tables S6-S9 in the Supplemental Online Materials). This difference is consistent with earlier findings by Chan (2019), who found that preference for utilitarian over deontological judgments is more strongly associated with social compared to economic political ideology. The current results expand on these findings, suggesting that associations between moral dilemma judgments and social political ideology are rooted in differences in sensitivity to consequences.

Why the Difference?

While the current findings suggest that disagreement about the correct course of action in moral dilemmas is rooted in political differences in sensitivity to consequences, it is still unclear why liberals and conservatives differ in the observed manner. One potential explanation could be derived from Greene et al.’s (2001) dual-process theory of moral dilemma judgment, which suggests that deontological judgments are rooted in automatic emotional reactions to the idea of causing harm, whereas utilitarian judgments result from deliberate cognitive analyses of costs and benefits. Thus, to the extent that conservatives are less inclined to engage in deliberate thinking compared to liberals (see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), conservatives may show a weaker sensitivity to consequences, as observed in the current studies.

5 The integrative data analysis also revealed a significant difference between groups in general preference for inaction versus action (see Table S5 in the Supplemental Online Materials). However, given that no such difference was not found in the continuous analyses examining associations between political ideology and general preference for inaction versus action, we refrain from drawing conclusions from this finding.

However, counter to this interpretation, research using the CNI model suggests that deliberate thinking influences moral dilemma judgments via general action tendencies rather than sensitivity to consequences. Specifically, Gawronski et al. (2017, Experiments 2a and 2b) found that, although cognitive load led to a weaker preference for utilitarian over deontological judgments, this effect was driven by greater general preference for inaction versus action under cognitive load, not by weaker sensitivity to consequences. These results question not only a core assumption of Greene et al.’s (2001) dual-process theory; they also pose a challenge to the idea that the obtained association between political ideology and sensitivity to consequences is driven by differences in deliberate thinking.

An alternative possibility is that political differences in sensitivity to consequences are rooted in proto-utilitarian inclinations. Kahane and colleagues (2018) have proposed a two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology, consisting of acceptance of instrumental harm for the sake of the greater good (instrumental harm) and impartial concern for the welfare of others (impartial beneficence). To the extent that instrumental harm is positively associated with political conservatism and impartial beneficence is negatively associated with political conservatism—as proposed by Everett and Kahane (2020)—the current findings may be driven by weaker impartial concern for the welfare of others among conservatives.6 However, previous findings with the CNI model render this possibility unlikely. Körner et al. (2020) examined associations between the three CNI model parameters and the two dimensions of utilitarianism as captured by the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS; Kahane et al., 2018). Across four studies, neither instrumental harm nor impartial beneficence showed reliable associations with sensitivity to consequences. Instead, both dimensions showed significant negative associations with sensitivity to moral norms, suggesting that self-reported endorsement of utilitarian ideas (as captured by the two dimensions of the OUS) merely serves to justify a rejection of moral norms without increasing people’s actual sensitivity to consequences. Thus, given that political ideology was significantly associated with sensitivity to consequences and unrelated to sensitivity to moral norms, political differences in proto-utilitarian

6 Note that the proposed positive association between political conservatism and instrumental harm should lead to a positive association between conservative (vs. liberal) political ideology and sensitivity to consequences, counter to the negative association obtained in the current studies. inclinations seem rather unlikely to account for the current findings.

A potential answer to the question of why liberals and conservatives differ in their sensitivity to consequences is suggested by the finding that sensitivity to consequences was more strongly associated with social than economic political ideology (see Table S9 in the Supplemental Online Materials). Whereas social political ideology has been found to be more strongly linked to resistance to social change, economic political ideology has been found to be more strongly linked to acceptance of inequality (Duckitt, 2010; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). Together with the current findings, these results suggest that political differences in sensitivity to consequences may be rooted in differences in resistance to social change. Consistent with this conclusion, Hannikainen, Machery, and Cushman (2018) found evidence for a societal shift towards utilitarian judgments in the resolution of moral dilemmas. To the degree that conservatives (relative to liberals) are more resistant to such societal shifts, the negative association between political conservativism and sensitivity to consequences may reflect resistance to an increased sensitivity to consequences at the societal level. Future research might evaluate this hypothesis more directly by examining whether the three parameters of the CNI model are less affected by societal changes among conservatives compared to liberals.

Some Caveats

Although we obtained consistent evidence for an association between political ideology and sensitivity to consequences, it is worth noting that there was only partial support for an association between political ideology and traditional dilemma scores. Consistent with past research (e.g., Hannikainen et al., 2017; Piazza & Sousa, 2014), conservatives showed a weaker preference for utilitarian over deontological judgment than liberals in Studies 1 and 3. However, there were no political differences in preference for utilitarian over deontological judgment in Study 2. A potential reason for these mixed findings is that traditional dilemma scores confound the influence of multiple distinct determinants of moral dilemma judgments (Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Crone & Laham, 2017), which creates noise in the measurement of each confounded factor. Disentangling the confounded factors provides cleaner measures of each factor, which can increase the statistical power to detect associations between a given factor and other variables. Consistent with this interpretation, our findings were consistent with past research when analyses were conducted using the combined data from all three studies (see Table S9 in the Supplemental Online Materials), suggesting that conservatives show a weaker preference for utilitarian over deontological judgment than liberals.

While the association between political ideology and sensitivity to consequences was consistent across studies, it is worth noting that the obtained correlations were relatively small overall. Across studies, conservative (vs. liberal) political ideology showed a correlation with sensitivity to consequences of around r = -.13, and the strength of this association was attenuated when controlling for demographic variables, falling to marginal significance in Studies 1 and 2 (see Footnote 4). The strength of this association may seem somewhat surprising given the strong associations between political ideology and other aspects of moral judgment (e.g., Graham et al., 2009). Thus, although political ideology may contribute to disagreement about the right course of action in real-world dilemmas, it is possible that other person-related variables contribute to such debates over and above political ideology (e.g., Körner et al., 2020; Kroneisen & Heck, 2020; Luke & Gawronski, in press). In support of this possibility, gender was consistently associated with sensitivity to moral norms across studies, and age showed relatively strong associations with sensitivity to consequences and sensitivity to moral norms in Study 3. Future research examining associations between moral dilemma judgments and other person-related characteristics might help to better understand the sources of conflicting views in moral debates about real-world issues.

Related to this point, another important consideration is that the size of associations between political ideology and moral dilemma judgment may be sensitive to content-related aspects of specific dilemmas. Although associations between political ideology and preference for utilitarian over deontological judgments have been replicated with various dilemmas that are different from the ones used in the current studies (e.g., Chan, 2019; Hannikainen et al., 2017; Piazza & Landy, 2013; Piazza & Sousa, 2014; Young et al., 2013), we aimed to address this concern in an integrative data analysis (Curran & Hussong, 2009) that examined the contribution of individual dilemmas to the obtained results by separately excluding each dilemma before the calculation of the three parameter scores (see Table S10 in the Supplemental Online Materials). Confirming the generality of the obtained results, the association between political ideology and sensitivity to consequences was robust across exclusions, with conservatives being significantly less sensitive to consequences than liberals in every single case (-.15 < rs < -.11).

Finally, while the CNI modeling approach taken in the current research offers nuanced insights into the association between political ideology and moral dilemma judgment, all of the analyses are correlational and therefore not indicative of causation. Based on the preceding discussion, it seems possible that political conservatism (vs. liberalism) decreases sensitivity to consequences via resistance to societal shifts toward utilitarian judgments. Future research may test this causal hypothesis by employing longitudinal designs to examine how political ideology predicts changes in sensitivity to consequences over time or experimental designs to examine how sensitivity to consequences is influenced by manipulations of perceived societal standards surrounding moral dilemma judgment.

Extraocular photoreception has been observed in many and diverse species; now they show that in response to illumination, octopuses' arm tip reacts in a reflex-like manner, folding in and moving away from light

Feel the light – sight independent negative phototactic response in octopus' arms. Itamar Katz, Tal Shomrat, Nir Nesher. Journal of Experimental Biology Feb 3, 2021: jeb.237529 doi: 10.1242/jeb.237529

Abstract: Controlling the octopus's flexible hyper-redundant body is a challenging task. It is assumed that the octopus has poor proprioception which has driven the development of unique mechanisms for efficient body control. Here we report on such a mechanism, a phototactic response of extraocular photoreception. Extraocular photoreception has been observed in many and diverse species. Previous research on cephalopods revealed that increased illumination on their skin evokes chromatophore expansion. Recently, the mechanism was investigated and has been termed 'light-activated chromatophore expansion' (LACE). In this work we show that in response to illumination, the arm tip reacts in a reflex-like manner, folding in and moving away from the light beam. We applied a set of behavioral experiments and surgical manipulations to elucidate and characterize this phototactic response. We found that in contrast to the local activation and control of LACE, the phototactic response is mediated by the brain, although it is expressed in a reflex-like pattern. Our research results and observations led us to propose that the phototaxis is a means for protecting the arms in an instinctive manner from potential daytime predators such as fish and crabs, that could identify the worm-like tips as food. Indeed, observation of behaving octopuses revealed that the arm tips are folded-in during the daytime, while at night they are extended. Thus, the phototactic response might compensate for the octopus's poor proprioception by keeping the arms folded in illuminated areas, without the need to be aware of their state.

Wind Power Economics – Rhetoric and Reality: The average load factor for onshore turbines declines at about 3% per year as turbines age; for offshore turbines declines at about 4.5% per year

Wind Power Economics – Rhetoric and Reality. Gordon Hughes. Edinburgh Univ, November 3 2020. https://www.ref.org.uk/ref-blog/365-wind-power-economics-rhetoric-and-reality

The following is the text accompanying the talk given by Professor Gordon Hughes, School of Economics, University of Edinburgh on 4 November 2020 to launch his two new reports for REF on:

Wind Power Costs in the United Kingdom  and  The Performance of Wind Power in Denmark

For a recording of the event, and charts, go the link above.

It is difficult to make predictions, especially about the future. [Attributed variously to Niels Bohr (Nobel Prize in Physics) and Sam Goldwyn (movie mogul)]

The theme of my talk is the disparity between predictions about the future costs and performance of wind power (especially offshore wind) - the Rhetoric - and the actual evidence that is available on what it costs to build and operate wind farms and the amount of power they produce over their lifetime – the Reality.

As background, I was co-author of one of the first studies of climate change produced by an international organization in 1992. I have written or co-written several studies of adaptation to climate change. My academic field is applied statistics and economics, but much of my work has been on the interface between economics and engineering. I have worked on energy and infrastructure policies for more than three decades. For example I was responsible for developing a set of international environmental standards for power plants while I was at the World Bank.

In the UK and most of Europe, both policymakers and investors have adopted the rhetoric around renewables as the basis for very costly transformations of our economy and society to meet the goal of low or zero carbon emissions. In doing so, they have accepted the claims of dramatic improvements in costs and performance made by wind operators for new projects now and in the future. Unfortunately, the propensity of both governments and companies to understate the costs and overstate the performance of new projects has a history that is long and inglorious. The ongoing record of HS2 – and, indeed, the whole history of railways in the UK – should be sufficient warning not to believe the rhetoric.

There is a core idea that is crucial for proponents of renewable technologies across a wide range. This is that costs – or specifically capex costs – will decline as installed capacity grows due to what are called economies of scale and learning. The issue then is how rapid the decline, usually measured as the % reduction for each doubling in capacity, is likely to be. There is no doubt that such a decline in unit costs has occurred in specific cases – notably the manufacture of aircraft, the production of solar PV modules and the cost of environmental controls such as FGD for power plants. However, the pattern is far from universal - the unit costs of nuclear, coal and LNG plants have tended to increase rather than decline. It is much more plausible for manufactured capital goods than for large projects involving complicated sites and civil works. In the case of offshore wind, the parallel experience of offshore oil & gas is not encouraging.

The reality of what will happen to the costs of key renewable energy and other low carbon technologies is critical. The UK Government’s strategy for meeting its Net Zero target at an affordable cost rests on the core assumption that the costs of wind power have fallen - and will continue to fall. There is, however, a major problem with all of the projections produced by official agencies, academics and other organisations. Put bluntly, they are the product of wishful thinking applied to notional projects in the future with little or no connection to commercial reality.

Hence, in my work I have adopted a completely different approach. My starting point is the actual data reported by companies in their accounts over the last two decades. This is possible because the standard commercial arrangement is that solar, wind and other projects are operated via legal entities known as Special Purpose Vehicles whose accounts are usually audited and are filed with Companies House. I have collected data for more than 350 SPVs responsible for wind projects that have filed accounts since 2005. The dataset is unique and provides the basis for a detailed analysis of the actual costs of wind power.

Figure 1 shows the evolution of capex costs for onshore wind since the early 2000s when the modern technology using turbines with a capacity of 2+ MW became standard for utility scale projects of 10+ MW. There are large variations in unit capex costs across sites but overall the dashed line shows that there has been a significant increase in the average capex cost per MW as the amount of installed capacity has increased. Onshore wind generation has been a mature technology for at least 15 years. Global installed capacity was about 58 GW in 2005 and reached 540 GW in 2018. If actual capex costs per MW in the UK have been rising for 15 years, there is no reason to believe that the trend will abruptly change.

Figure 1 : UK onshore wind : actual capex cost versus installed capacity

Figure 2 shows the equivalent data for UK offshore wind projects. In this case the average capex costs include the cost of the offshore transmission system, since this is an essential element of any project. There are two points to note. First, offshore wind is a pan-European industry with the major operators having projects spread over North-West Europe. Hence, I have used installed offshore capacity in Europe as my capacity variable. Second, the outlier with a very high capex cost per MW is the Hywind floating turbine project. Capex costs for floating turbines are typically 50% to 100% more expensive than for turbines fixed to the sea bed.

Figure 2 : UK offshore wind : actual capex cost versus installed capacity in Europe

Offshore wind is less mature with global capacity of 3 GW in 2010 reaching 24 GW in 2018. The trend line shows that, leaving out the Hywind project, actual offshore capex costs for UK projects have increased by 15% for each doubling in European capacity. Figure 3 shows the same results but over time with markers that indicate the typical water depth for each wind farm. Statistical analysis confirms that one factor contributing to the increase in costs over time has been the need to use deeper water sites as offshore capacity has grown. This is a more powerful influence than distance from the coast. Underlying costs are likely to continue to increase because the number of suitable offshore sites with shallow or medium depths is limited. As for offshore oil & gas the costs of building and operating offshore wind farms located at deep water sites in hostile marine environments will inevitably be higher than for the initial set of shallow water projects.

Figure 3 : UK offshore wind : actual capex cost by depth and year

But there is worse to come. Figure 4 and 5 shows the evolution of average opex costs for typical onshore and offshore projects. The graphs are based on analyses of large samples spread over 15 years which allow for turbine size, water depth, OFTO status and other factors. In each graph the blue line shows the costs for a project commissioned in 2008. Note that opex cost is reported in £000s per MW per year at 2018 prices. The reason is that the expected load factor for new projects has increased over time. The grey line shows the costs for a project commissioned in 2018. For the offshore wind farms the 2008 project is assumed to be in shallow water with no OFTO while the 2018 project is in deep water with an OFTO. The operating costs allow for OFTO charges in the latter case.

Figure 4 UK onshore wind: average opex costs vs year of service

Figure 5 UK offshore wind: average opex costs vs year of service

For both onshore and offshore wind the base level opex cost has shifted up significantly over time and costs increase with year of service. I will focus on offshore wind because this is central to the whole Net Zero strategy. Converting offshore opex costs to £ per MWh using an expected load factor of 35% for the 2008 project and 50% for the 2018 project we get initial opex costs of £17 per MWh for the 2008 project and £44 per MWh for the 2018 deep water project. By age 12 the opex cost for the 2008 shallow water project will be £30 per MWh and it will be £82 per MWh for the 2018 deep water project. The wind-weighted average market price of power in 2019-20 was £35 per MWh. This means that at market prices – i.e. without subsidies - offshore wind from deep water projects cannot even cover operating expenses at age 1, let alone earn an adequate return on capital.

In the case of offshore wind the initial average opex cost of £44 per MWh for the 2018 deep water project, which is typical of the future for the sector, exceeds the average revenue per MWh in 2019-20 at market prices weighted by wind output. The average opex cost of £82 per MWh for this project after 12 years of service either equals or exceeds the guaranteed strike for all offshore projects awarded contracts from Allocation Round 2 (2017) onwards.

These results for capex and opex costs run completely counter to the wishful thinking put out by BEIS. The opex estimates, in particular, prompt the question of why costs are so high and have been increasing over time. To investigate this issue I have examined detailed data on the performance of 6,400 turbines in Denmark. This is a substantial update of my previous work published in 2012 using satellite data that allows me to control more reliably for variations in wind conditions.

The first part of the study examines equipment failures and major breakdowns. Figure 6 shows the failure curves by turbine category focusing on the time to the first equipment failure. The results are similar if alternative failure indicators are used. The conclusions are that (i) offshore turbines are less reliable than onshore turbines, and (ii) the older small (< 1 MW) onshore turbines were much more reliable than the 2+ MW turbines that dominate wind farms constructed since 2005. Nearly 60% of offshore turbines will experience an equipment failure in their first 5 years of operation. The reliability of 2+ MW onshore turbines deteriorates over time, so that the risk of failure increases sharply once they have been operating for more than 10 years. Finally, there are strong locational differences within Denmark with the expected number of months affected by equipment failure over a 20-year operating life increasing from 8 months in the west of the country to 15 months in the east. The reason seems to be a combination of site choice and wind turbulence caused by wind flows over land for the prevailing westerly winds.

Figure 6 : Denmark turbines: failure curve for time to first equipment failure

The second part of the Danish study looks at the evolution of the average load factors for onshore and offshore turbines with age after allowing for variations in the distribution of wind speeds and other factors. One major conclusion is that the 2+ MW turbines that were introduced in the early 2000s experienced major performance problems in the period from 2002 to 2010. This is very obvious when such turbines are compared with the smaller turbines of less than 1 MW installed up to 2000. In Denmark – and probably in the UK – the new generation of 2+ MW turbines experienced major teething problems for 5 to 8 years after they were introduced on a large scale. That is an important warning about the effects of generational shifts in turbine technology.

The third major conclusion is that the average load factor for onshore turbines declines at about 3% per year as turbines age, while the average load factor for offshore turbines declines at about 4.5% per year. This means that an onshore wind turbine installed in a location where its load factor, standardised for wind conditions, at age 1 should be 35% can be expected to achieve a standardised load factor of 25% at age 12 years. For an offshore wind turbine the decline might be from a standardised load factor of 55% at age 1 to one of only 33% at age 12.

There is an important corollary when the analysis of the performance of Danish turbines is combined with the actual opex costs for UK wind farms. Once the decline in load factor with age is taken into account, the average opex per MWh for an onshore wind farm installed in 2018 rises from £24 per MWh at age 1 to £42 per MWh at age 12. The equivalent figures for an offshore wind farm are £41 per MWh at age 1 and £125 per MWh at age 12. The increases in opex costs have a drastic impact on the expected economic life of wind farms.

If wind farms do not receive offtake prices that are higher than the market price – or very much higher in the case of offshore wind – their expected revenues will not cover opex costs after 12 or 15 years. Operators will either cease production or drastically cut operating costs leading to closure within a relatively short period. There is no way out of this trap because opex costs are linked to reliability; the decline in reliability with age means that high opex costs must be incurred to maintain production. The consequence is that the assumption made by BEIS and many investors that the expected operating life of new wind farms will be 25 or 30 years is completely at odds with the underlying economic reality. Few modern wind turbines operate for more than 20 years and many offshore wind turbines are likely to be decommissioned before they reach an age of 20 years.

Pulling these threads together I have examined the overall economic prospects for some specific projects and for offshore wind in general, focusing on the separate perspectives of investors and policy makers.

In the Danish study I have carried out a detailed risk analysis of the Kriegers Flak offshore wind farm being built by Vattenfall. This has all of elements of a financial disaster. It is unclear whether Vattenfall – a state-owned Swedish company underwritten by Swedish electricity consumers – understands what it is doing. Implicitly it has placed a huge speculative bet on the market price of power in Germany in the period from 2033 onwards, after the expiry of the initial power purchase agreement (PPA).

The breakeven price for the PPA is €75-85 per MWh excluding transmission charges whereas the actual PPA price is €50 per MWh. To recover its initial losses and offset the expected decline in the average load factor the market price in Germany would have to be roughly 6 times in real terms the average price over the last 12 months – equivalent to about €130 per MWh at 2018 prices. This is far higher than current plans for increasing carbon taxes would imply.

It is standard practice for offshore wind operators to refinance completed projects, in part by bringing in passive investors such as an infrastructure funds or groups of pension funds. This allows the operator to recoup some of its investment, thus realising part of its expected profit or limiting its potential losses. However, investors might be well-advised to steer well clear of Kriegers Flak. The fundamental problem is that the gross cash flow is likely to be consumed by debt service for the initial 12 to 15 years. Any cash extracted by Vattenfall will merely increase the risk borne by the passive investors.

The story is similar for offshore wind projects in the UK supported by CfD contracts awarded in 2017 or 2019. Figure 7 shows a simplified version of the cash flows for the Triton Knoll wind farm based on its CfD contract using alternative performance scenarios. The blue solid line shows gross revenue for a constant load factor of 50% over its lifetime, while the green solid lines shows gross revenue for a load factor of 55% at age 1 with a performance decline of 2% per year thereafter. This decline is much lower than the actual experience in Denmark. The red dashed line is total opex, while the mauve dashed line is the sum of opex and a finance charge for a real WACC of 4% with an asset life of 15 years. The economic life would be 15 years with the constant load factor and only 12 years for the declining load factor. Operating profit – gross revenue minus opex – is less than the finance charge in every year under both revenue scenarios. The project is clearly a dud for both lenders and investors if we base projections for revenues and costs on actual experience. So, what we have is the usual bromide “this time things will be different” – a variant of Samuel Johnson’s triumph of hope over experience.

Figure 7 : Prospective cash flows for Triton Knoll project

Figure 8 shows average strike prices and my estimates of breakeven prices for the CfD contracts in different allocation rounds together with the assumption necessary to achieve the breakeven prices. For onshore wind the average AR1 strike price is very close to the breakeven prices in the 2018 cost and performance scenario. For offshore wind the Investment Contract strike price of £161 was slightly more generous than the 2018 breakeven price of £152 per MWh. For projects in operation the CfD prices are reasonably close to breakeven prices and no-one should lose a lot of money.

Figure 8 : Breakeven prices for CfD projects

CfD Allocation Round Average CfD Strike Price (£/MWh) Breakeven Prices

Built 2008-09 (£/MWh) Built 2018-19 (£/MWh) In Progress (£/MWh)

Onshore Wind (actual costs) Allocation Round 1 £92 £92 £91

Offshore Wind (actual costs) Investment Contract £161 £125 £152

Offshore Wind (Model A)a Allocation Round 1 £112 £114

Offshore Wind (Model B)b Allocation Round 2 £65 £68

(a) Model A: the breakeven price of £114 / MWh assumes a constant load factor of 58% with other parameters based on actual values

(b) Model B: the breakeven price of £68 / MWh assumes a constant load factor of 60% plus operating costs for shallow water projects completed in 2008-2009

However, for Allocation Rounds AR1 and AR2 it is necessary to make very ambitious assumptions about costs and performance to match the average CfD strike prices. In AR1 the average CfD strike price was £112 per MWh. For a breakeven cost at that level projects would require a constant load factor of 58% over 15 years if costs are similar to the 2018-19 actual costs. No offshore project, even with 8-10 MW turbines, has got close to achieving that performance. In AR2 the average CfD strike price was £65 per MWh. To get the breakeven price down to that level it is necessary to assume a constant load factor of 60% and operating costs equivalent to those for shallow water projects completed in 2008-09. This is pure fantasy!

There is a larger issue behind the story of individual project risks. This concerns the stability of the financial sector. In the UK and several other European countries governments, central banks and financial regulators have actively promoted green finance. They argue that banks, money managers and pension funds should increase their lending to and investment in wind farms and similar projects as part of their wider social responsibility. However, if many such projects are very risky – as is clearly the case – this pressure is a betrayal of their fundamental duty to protect the stability of the financial system. It is no different from urging financial institutions to finance speculative property developments at the beginning of a property crash.

The likely response is that general advice does not override the obligation of lenders and investors to identify good and bad projects. That position highlights the central problem. There are no good offshore wind projects without either huge subsidies or much higher market prices. Government policy is based on assumptions that can be shown to be wrong with any reasonable amount of due diligence. Financial institutions that do their job properly are likely to be condemned for failing to support the shift to green energy. Most of them will prefer not to look too hard and to go along with the short term pressure.

This is an old and disreputable story with only one outcome, so everyone should face up to what will happen. Financial institutions will do as they are told and join the party. In roughly a decade the likelihood of large future losses will become all too obvious and asset write-downs will jeopardise both loan security and investment returns. Governments will blame financial institutions for irresponsible behaviour. They will bail out all parties via a large increase in market prices. Apart from a few people who get fired – no doubt with ample compensation - the ultimate patsy in all of this will be electricity customers.

So far I have focused on the costs and performance of wind power. There is an equally important issue concerning the economic value of the output produced from wind farms. It is well known that both wind and solar power give rise to significant system costs that are paid by customers in general. To economists these are known as negative externalities and, just as for CO2 and other pollution, their cost should be covered by the producer. That is the standard case for a carbon tax. If we follow that logic, wind and solar generators should be required to pay a charge equal to the marginal system costs of additional wind or solar output.

In a forthcoming study I have estimated the marginal cost of balancing supply and demand in the UK which covers some but not all of these system costs. The marginal balancing cost is closely related to the level of wind output, varying from £11 per MWh at the 5th percentile to £31 per MWh at the 95th percentile. Figure 9 shows the effect of allowing for this element of system costs on the cumulative distribution of the net values of wind and solar output in 2019-20. Net value in this context means the market value of the power minus the extra system costs incurred in handling wind or solar output. The solid black line is the cumulative distribution of market prices, while the dashed blue line shows the cumulative distribution of the net values of wind output. There is a large difference between the two: 50% of all wind output in the year had a net value of less than £13 per MWh and 20% of all output had a negative net value, i.e. it made everyone worse off. To be clear, Figure 9 shows that the breakeven cost of producing wind output with a net value of less than £13 per MWh is between £91 and £152 per MWh.

Figure 9 : Effect of system costs on the net value of wind and solar generation

In stark terms a significant portion of wind output is expensive to produce and of no value in terms of its contribution to national wellbeing. Other than sheer ignorance there is no excuse for policymakers tolerating, let along promoting, this outcome.

I will conclude with some general lessons from the study:

1. Stop pretending! The projections of the costs of achieving Net Zero put out by government bodies and many others rely on cost estimates that are just wishful thinking. They have no basis in actual experience and a realistic appraisal of trends in costs. As a very broad brush calculation the cost of meeting the Net Zero target by 2050 is much more likely to be 10+% of annual GDP than the claimed 1-2% of GDP.

2. Accelerating arbitrary targets is very expensive. If the Government persists with the goal of building 30 GW of extra offshore wind capacity by 2030 the costs discussed here are likely to be significant under-estimates. This will be reinforced by the adoption of similar targets elsewhere in NW Europe. The offshore wind sector does not have the capacity to build new projects at a rate of 3 to 4 times the last decade. Any familiarity with the history of offshore oil & gas and other energy projects tells us that the consequence will be a gold rush. It is plausible to assume that capex and opex costs will rise by a minimum of 20% and probably closer to 50% above the already high costs that we observe in the audited accounts.

3. Bailouts of wind farms and financial institutions are inevitable. The Government is creating a situation in which it will have no option other than to bail out failed and failing projects simply to ensure continuity of electricity supply. There will be a game of pass the parcel over how the losses will be distributed but ultimately they will fall largely on taxpayers and energy customers. Any business investor outside the renewable energy sector should plan on the basis that electricity prices in 2030 will be 3-4 times in real terms what they are today.

4. Remember that not everyone has the same priorities. The UK and the EU are very minor bit players in what happens about climate change. The outcome will depend on choices made in China, the US and India. Focusing on China and India, they are only interested in options that are consistent with both economic growth and other environmental goals. Offshore wind is expensive and of limited interest in most of Asia.

5. As a rich country, the UK can afford Net Zero by 2050 at the aggregate level. However, it will mean allocating the proceeds of 10 or 15 years of economic growth to that single goal. Past experience shows that the UK’s political system cannot handle the structural and redistributive consequences of following that path. A strategy that acknowledges the real economic costs and difficulties of trying to make the transition too quickly is much more likely to be accepted and implemented.

Meta-analysis on Belief in Free Will Manipulations: We find little evidence for the idea that manipulating belief in free will has downstream consequences on cognition, attitudes or behavior

Genschow, Oliver, Emiel Cracco, Jana Schneider, John Protzko, David Wisniewski, Marcel Brass, and Jonathan Schooler. 2021. “Meta-analysis on Belief in Free Will Manipulations.” PsyArXiv. February 21. doi:10.31234/osf.io/quwgr

Abstract: Whether free will exists is a longstanding philosophical debate. Cognitive neuroscience and popular media have been putting forward the idea that free will is an illusion, raising the question of what would happen if people stopped believing in free will altogether. Psychological research has investigated this question by testing the consequences of experimentally weakening people’s belief in free will. The results of these investigations have been mixed, with successful experiments and unsuccessful replications. This raises two fundamental questions that can best be investigated with a meta-analysis: First, can free will beliefs be manipulated and, second, do such manipulations have downstream consequences? In a meta-analysis across 146 experiments (95 unpublished) with a total of 26,305 participants, we show that exposing individuals to anti-free will manipulations decreases belief in free will, g = -0.29, 95% CI = [-0.35, -0.22], and increases belief in determinism, g = 0.17, 95% CI = [0.09, 0.24]. In contrast, we find little evidence for the idea that manipulating belief in free will has downstream consequences after accounting for small sample and publication bias. Together, our findings have important theoretical implications for research on free will beliefs and contribute to the discussion of whether reducing people’s belief in free will has societal consequences.

Making choices boosts memory, even more so for the unchosen options

Making memorable choices: Cognitive control and the self-choice effect in memory. Cassandra Baldwin, Katie E. Garrison, Roy F. Baumeister & Brandon J. Schmeichel. Self and Identity , Feb 20 2021. https://doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2021.1888787

Abstract: The current research tested the effects of active choice on memory (i.e., the self-choice effect). Across 14 experiments (N = 1100) we found that memory for choice alternatives was improved by choosing versus being assigned information to remember. A subset of 3 experiments found a bigger self-choice effect for more difficult choices. And a subset of 6 experiments found that prior acts of self-control reduce the self-choice effect. These findings represent unbiased estimates of the self-choice effect (d = 0. 62), the magnitude of the self-choice effect for easy (d = 0.35) versus more difficult (d = 0.87) choices, and the effect of ego depletion on choice memory (d = 0.39). Discussion centers on the role of cognitive control.

KEYWORDS: Choiceego depletioncognitive controlmemoryself-choice effect

COVID-19 mortality as a fingerprint of biological age (not chronological age)

COVID-19 mortality as a fingerprint of biological age. M. Cristina Polidori et al. Ageing Research Reviews, February 20 2021, 101308. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.arr.2021.101308

Highlights

• Advanced age and comorbidity do not appear to justify alone COVID-19-related mortality and being 80 years old or older cannot be the basis for resource allocation.

• COVID-19 targets pathways and domains affected by the main aging- and frailty-related pathophysiological changes.

• A closer analysis of the existing data supports a possible role of biological age, rather than chronological age, in the prognosis of COVID-19.

• While further research on measuring biological age is performed, valid assessments of multidimensional frailty should be systematically implemented in routine diagnostic algorithms to quantify risk of COVID-19-related poor outcomes.

Abstract: Corona virus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is a global emergency able to overwhelm the healthcare capacities worldwide and to affect the older generation especially. When addressing the pathophysiological mechanisms and clinical manifestations of COVID-19, it becomes evident that the disease targets pathways and domains affected by the main aging- and frailty-related pathophysiological changes. A closer analysis of the existing data supports a possible role of biological age rather than chronological age in the prognosis of COVID-19. There is a need for systematic, consequent action of identifying frail (not only older, not only multimorbid, not only symptomatic) persons at risk of poor outcomes in order to protect our oldest generation from COVID-19.

Keywords: Biological ageCorona virus disease 2019COVID-19FrailtySevere acute respiratory syndrome-corona virus 2SARS-CoV-2

Most people across the political spectrum have relatively moderate media diets, about a quarter of which consist of mainstream news websites & portals; there is above 50pct overlap of media use among Democrats & Republicans

(Almost) Everything in Moderation: New Evidence on Americans' Online Media Diets. Andrew M. Guess. American Journal of Political Science, February 19 2021. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12589

Rolf Degen's take: Large-scale study corroborates that the vast majority of Americans consume relatively moderate media diets, making a mockery of the elitist caricature of ideologues in echo chambers

Abstract: Does the internet facilitate selective exposure to politically congenial content? To answer this question, I introduce and validate large‐N behavioral data on Americans' online media consumption in both 2015 and 2016. I then construct a simple measure of media diet slant and use machine classification to identify individual articles related to news about politics. I find that most people across the political spectrum have relatively moderate media diets, about a quarter of which consist of mainstream news websites and portals. Quantifying the similarity of Democrats' and Republicans' media diets, I find nearly 65% overlap in the two groups' distributions in 2015 and roughly 50% in 2016. An exception to this picture is a small group of partisans who drive a disproportionate amount of traffic to ideologically slanted websites. If online “echo chambers” exist, they are a reality for relatively few people who may nonetheless exert disproportionate influence and visibility.

Disagree? You must be a bot! How beliefs shape Twitter profile perceptions

Wischnewski, M., Bernemann, R., Ngo, T., & Krämer, N. (forthcoming). Disagree? You must be a bot! How beliefs shape Twitter profile perceptions. In Proceedings of Yokohama’21: ACM CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (Yokohama ’21). ACM, New York. doi:10.1145/3411764.3445109

Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the human ability to distinguish political social bots from humans on Twitter. Following motivated reasoning theory from social and cognitive psychology, our central hypothesis is that especially those accounts which are opinion-incongruent are perceived as social bot accounts when the account is ambiguous about its nature. We also hypothesize that credibility ratings mediate this relationship. We asked N = 151 participants to evaluate 24 Twitter accounts and decide whether the accounts were humans or social bots. Findings support our motivated reasoning hypothesis for a sub-group of Twitter users (those who are more familiar with Twitter): Accounts that are opinion-incongruent are evaluated as relatively more bot-like than accounts that are opinion-congruent. Moreover, it does not matter whether the account is clearly social bot or human or ambiguous about its nature. This was mediated by perceived credibility in the sense that congruent profiles were evaluated to be more credible resulting in lower perceptions as bots.

Is male sexual overperception of mating interest a bias for men to perceive interest, or something else entirely?; study says probably it’s something else

On hits and being hit on: error management theory, signal detection theory, and the male sexual overperception bias. Jordann L. Brandner, Jadyn Pohlman, Gary L. Brase. Evolution and Human Behavior, February 18 2021. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2021.01.002

Abstract: Although Error Management Theory (EMT) can explain male sexual overperception, more advanced Signal Detection Theory (SDT) analyses can identify sensitivity and bias separately. An SDT analysis of perceptions of relatively clear interest/disinterest signals (Study 1) found that sensitivity to sexual interest/disinterest signals drove participants' perceptions, rather than an overall bias to perceive sexual interest. Cues of interest were generally underperceived, while sensitivity and accuracy were uniformly high. EMT analysis also found overall sexual interest underperception, but with men slightly overperceiving interest relative to women. These discrepant results were due to EMT using difference scores, which obscure baseline perceptions for men and women. Individual differences in life history strategy, mating strategy, and mate value did not affect sensitivity or bias. Study 2 largely replicated these results using more ambivalent scenarios, except EMT analyses found men's misperception to be significantly larger than women's, despite being closer to pre-rated communication levels. These results show that sexual communication may be more nuanced than previously thought, and that an SDT analysis is more appropriate for such data.

Keywords: Sexual overperception biasError management theorySignal detection theoryHuman sex differencesIndividual differences

4. General discussion

Signal Detection Theory analyses show that sensitivity to the differences between signals of sexual interest and disinterest drove participants' perceptions of sexual interest, rather than an overall bias to perceive sexual interest. Men and women did not significantly differ in sensitivity, which was high, even when including more ambivalent combinations of behaviors in Study 2. Generally, cues of sexual interest were underperceived, with sex-based effects varying. In Study 1, women had a significantly more liberal bias than men, whereas in Study 2, there was no significant effect of sex on bias. Other individual differences, such as life history strategy, mating strategy, and mate value did not generally affect sensitivity or bias. Error Management Theory analyses also found an overall underperception of sexual interest, but with men showing higher misperception scores than women. Further examination found that EMT usage of difference scores did not accurately reflect the average levels of perception between men and women due to overall underperception. This results in negative difference scores which were exacerbated in Study 1 by different baselines for men and women. Baselines were adjusted in Study 2 to be more equal, however, issues with interpretation of the results persisted again due to negative difference scores. EMT analyses lead to the conclusion that men's misperception scores were greater than women's, even as men's perceptions were closer to true levels of interest communicated.

4.1. Theoretical and practical implications

Although the “male sexual overperception effect” was not found, there are numerous implications of these results which indicate that sexual communication is actually more nuanced than previously thought. SDT analysis is a valuable methodology for better exploring the male sexual overperception effect and other biases explained through EMT. EMT analyses of the evolutionary costs and benefits of a decision outcome can be integrated with SDT to evaluate optimal decisions under uncertainty from an evolutionary standpoint. This integration is particularly important, as SDT analyses provide measures of both bias and sensitivity, which is more informative than typical EMT analyses which only provide a measure of bias. The separation of bias (tendency to respond in one particular way) from sensitivity (how distinct signals and noise are from each other) allows for a better understanding of the psychological mechanisms underlying a behavior. For instance, the present findings indicate that sexual interest perceptions were significantly driven by sensitivity, rather than bias, suggesting that evolutionary optimality in sexual communication may be attained through the ability to separate signals of sexual interest from signals of sexual disinterest. Moreover, this high level of separation more closely matched the patterns of high participant accuracy than did the EMT analyses, which found general underperception of interest, with men perceiving more interest than women. Notably, the EMT analysis has no measure of overall accuracy or cue discriminability, leading to conclusions of men perceiving more interest. This contrasts with the more accurate SDT conclusions of high discrimination of interest from disinterest, resulting in high accuracy when perceiving sexual communication.

Additionally, the standardized measures of sensitivity and bias provided by SDT are an improvement from the non-standardized measure of bias from EMT. Measures of c and d’ are comparable to other research using SDT, whereas EMT measures of bias are only comparable to other measures of bias on the same scales. Although EMT measures of bias could potentially be standardized, such as through a z-score calculation, they would still be problematic due to known issues with difference scores in terms of information lost from the original data (Cronbach & Furby, 1970), particularly in relationship research (Griffin, Murray, & Gonzalez, 1999). A single difference score can come from a variety of situations that could be driven by a main effect in one of the variables or by one of the variables having different variance than the other. For EMT in particular, the use of difference scores leads to analyses that can only assess bias and neglect sensitivity. Because bias and sensitivity interact as people strive to make optimal judgments, this can lead to incomplete understandings of behavior.

As an example of this issue in using difference scores, it turns out that the women's vignettes in Study 1 communicated more sexual interest than men's vignettes and after these baselines were subtracted from average perceptions, women showed a larger absolute difference between perception and truth despite men and women having similar average levels of perceived interest. Moreover, because this difference was negative, men's misperception scores were greater (i.e., closer to zero) resulting in misperception scores that indicated that men perceived more interest than women, despite having a lower average perception of interest than women. While this difference in baseline scores could be accounted for through SDT's use of multilevel modeling, EMT analyses can only account for this through manipulation of stimuli. Study 2 manipulated the stimuli to address this difference, but issues with interpretation due to negative misperception scores persisted. Additionally, EMT analyses typically aggregate across trials and within sex, losing valuable information and statistical power, whereas SDT analyses can use a within-subjects multilevel approach that can account for individual and stimuli variation through inclusion of individuals and stimuli in the random effects structure (Wright & London, 2009).

In the particular context of the male sexual overperception effect, the assessment as to if men are overperceiving female sexual interest will depend on how overperception is operationalized. Is overperception simply men perceiving more sexual interest than women? Or is overperception perceiving more sexual interest than is communicated? Currently in this line of research, overperception is operationalized most commonly as men perceiving more sexual interest than women perceive. Overperception is typically tested as a sex difference in average misperception scores, which are often calculated as the difference between expressed interest and perceived interest (e.g., Perilloux et al., 2012). However, this analysis does not necessarily indicate if men are overperceiving, just that they have larger misperception scores than women. The issue of this operationalization was demonstrated in these studies. EMT's use of difference scores to operationalize misperception is flawed, so having “higher” misperception when underperceiving would be a good thing, as it would mean more accuracy, however EMT does not have the ability to address this, as it assumes misperception is always overperception and thus higher misperception values indicate poorer responding.

When using SDT methods however, researchers have more control over how overperception is operationalized. Researchers can compare a participant's perceptions to numerous baselines: members of the participant's sex (e.g., does this man perceive more sexual interest than other men say is communicated?), members of the target's sex (e.g., does this man perceive more sexual interest than women say is communicated?) or members of both sexes (e.g., does this man perceive more sexual interest than both men and women together say is communicated?). These baselines can be established during stimuli development and validation, similar to how it is approached in this study (see Supplemental Materials for details), which used members of the target sex as the baseline. Since sexual communication is often cross-sex communication, sex-specific behaviors and sex-specific ratings of behaviors are necessary for proper operationalization of sexual perception. This can get complicated, short of being able to peer into participants' souls for their absolute truth. Luckily, the estimations of baseline truth described above and in the supplementary materials can suffice for research and analysis purposes.

Lastly, SDT analyses also allow for more precise exploration of the effects of individual differences. Whereas previous EMT research has correlated individuals' personality measures with their average difference scores (e.g., Perilloux et al., 2012) or used regression to predict average difference scores using personality measures (e.g., Howell et al., 2012; Kohl & Robertson, 2014), SDT analysis can examine the effect of individual differences on sensitivity and/or bias, depending on the hypothesis. Although correlation and regression are valid tools, applying them on the average difference scores used by EMT can be problematic due to the issues noted above.

4.2. Limitations

It is important to note that the present research used vignettes as a proxy for communication. While the use of descriptions of actions rather than real actions is common for research in male sexual overperception (e.g., Abbey & Harnish, 1995; DeSouza et al., 1992; Edmondson & Conger, 1995; Fisher & Walters, 2003; Haselton & Buss, 2000; Kowalski, 1993), it nevertheless could have affected the results and conclusions of this study. Prior research has indicated that different formats of presentation can affect perceptions of sexual interest, with formats including less information showing more overperception (Edmondson & Conger, 1995). This could indicate that more realistic stimuli could result in even more underperception of sexual interest, as the vignettes used here simplify an interaction to three behaviors. Another possible issue with these vignettes is that they were created using an act-nomination frequency approach (Buss & Craik, 1983). This resulted in some behaviors which included a certain degree of interpretation implicitly included in the descriptions (e.g., giving a “nasty look”). These potential issues with vignettes could be addressed in future studies by creation of video stimuli which include information about whether or not participants were truly attracted to each other, and thus covertly signaling sexual interest.

Like all studies on male sexual overperception, these studies rely on indirect measures of sexual interest. No truly objective measures of sexual intent exist, resulting in methods that rely on self-report and 3rd-party observers. Self-ratings may understate true intent, especially for women, as concealment of sexual interest and disinterest can be advantageous for gathering additional information about potential mates (Trivers, 1972). Conversely, same sex 3rd-party observers might overstate a woman's sexual interest, either as a misperception or as a tactic of intrasexual competition. These present studies used an iterated act-frequency nomination and evaluation approach for developing stimuli that describe typical sexual interest and disinterest behaviors, and hopefully this reduced any influences of self-concealment and 3rd-party competition. Future research in this area, though, should examine the differences between self and 3rd-party evaluations of interest, as well as include evaluations of interest from others who are close to the individual and may know them better, such as close family or friends.

This research does not directly address other theories regarding male sexual overperception, such as the general oversexualization hypothesis (Abbey, 1982, Abbey, 1991), the media hypothesis (Abbey, 1991), or the default-model hypothesis (Shotland & Craig, 1988). The revealed structure and outcomes from the SDT analysis, however, are more consistent with EMT than with any of those alternative theories. Further study designs could employ SDT analyses of variables that would contrast at least some of these competing hypotheses. The current research does provide evidence against the general insensitivity hypothesis (Farris, Viken, & Treat, 2010; Farris et al., 2008a, Farris et al., 2008b) as sensitivity to cues of sexual interest was very high and drove responses, contrary to this hypothesis which proposes sensitivity to these cues is low.

These studies also do not address is if male sexual overperception is a biased cognitive mechanism or a biased behavioral outcome. Much discussion of the male sexual overperception effect in recent years has been about whether men truly believe women are more sexually interested in them, or if they just behave as if women are sexually interested in them (e.g., McKay & Efferson, 2010; Murray, Murphy, von Hippel, Trivers, & Haselton, 2017; Perilloux & Kurzban, 2015; Perilloux & Kurzban, 2017). These studies found no effect of bias on responses and instead found that sensitivity was driving responses, and thus it may be a case of neither biased cognitions nor biased actions, but instead sensitivity to cues. Moreover, if an effect of bias had been found, these studies would not be able to examine if the bias was caused by a belief pattern or a behavioral pattern. Future studies should consider including measures of confidence in the belief that a woman is communicating sexual interest to help clarify this issue.

These studies demonstrate that the use of difference scores in prior research may have overestimated the actual prevalence of the male sexual overperception effect. This opens up an interesting topic of when and under what situations male sexual overperception may (or may not) appear. For instance, a version of this argument could note that data collection for Study 1 occurred during the fall/winter of 2018, closely following the confirmation hearings of Brett Kavanaugh and Dr. Christine Blasey-Ford's testimony as well as the #MeToo movement. These events may have influenced participants to underestimate sexual interest in a precautionary manner. However, Study 2 occurred during the summer and fall of 2020, well past the immediate effects of these contexts and yet the same results were found. Is it possible that the societal effects of these events are both persistent and outweigh more ultimate evolutionary bias adjustments? Reanalyzing previous research (which have datasets that include repeated measures and thus are amenable to SDT analysis methods) or other research across time and varying cultures may help to partially address this question.

Treating the weekend like a vacation can increase happiness, and exploratory analyses show support for the underlying role of increased attention to the present moment

Happiness From Treating the Weekend Like a Vacation. Colin West, Cassie Mogilner, Sanford E. DeVoe.  Social Psychological and Personality Science, June 15, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550620916080

Abstract: Americans are time-poor. They work long hours and leave paid vacation days unused. An analysis of over 200,000 U.S. workers reveals that not prioritizing vacation is linked to lower happiness. Many people, however, do not feel they can take vacation due to financial and temporal constraints. How might people enjoy the emotional benefits of vacation without taking additional time off or spending additional money? Three preregistered experiments tested the effect of simply treating the weekend “like a vacation” (vs. “like a regular weekend”) on subsequent happiness—measured as more positive affect, less negative affect, and greater satisfaction when back at work on Monday. Although unable to definitively rule out the role of demand characteristics, the study results suggest that treating the weekend like a vacation can increase happiness, and exploratory analyses show support for the underlying role of increased attention to the present moment.

Keywords: happiness, subjective well-being, vacation, time, attention to the present, mindfulness

Intelligence contributes 48–90 times more than grit to educational success and 13 times more to job-market success

In a Representative Sample Grit Has a Negligible Effect on Educational and Economic Success Compared to Intelligence. Chen Zisman, Yoav Ganzach. Social Psychological and Personality Science, July 14, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550620920531

Abstract: We compare the relative contribution of grit and intelligence to educational and job-market success in a representative sample of the American population. We find that, in terms of ΔR 2, intelligence contributes 48–90 times more than grit to educational success and 13 times more to job-market success. Conscientiousness also contributes to success more than grit but only twice as much. We show that the reason our results differ from those of previous studies which showed that grit has a stronger effect on success is that these previous studies used nonrepresentative samples that were range restricted on intelligence. Our findings suggest that although grit has some effect on success, it is negligible compared to intelligence and perhaps also to other traditional predictors of success.

Keywords: intelligence, achievement, grit, educational success

Although people can selectively endorse moral principles about freedom of speech depending on their political agenda, many seek to conceal this bias from others, and perhaps also themselves

Motivated moral judgments about freedom of speech are constrained by a need to maintain consistency. Nikolai Haahjem Eftedal, Lotte Thomsen. Cognition, Volume 211, June 2021, 104623. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104623

Abstract: Speech is a critical means of negotiating political, adaptive interests in human society. Prior research on motivated political cognition has found that support for freedom of speech depends on whether one agrees with its ideological content. However, it remains unclear if people (A) openly hold that some speech should be more free than other speech; or (B) want to feel as if speech content does not affect their judgments. Here, we find support for (B) over (A), using social dominance orientation and political alignment to predict support for speech. Study 1 demonstrates that if people have previously judged restrictions of speech which they oppose, they are less harsh in condemning restrictions of speech which they support, and vice versa. Studies 2 and 3 find that when participants judge two versions of the same scenario, with only the ideological direction of speech being reversed, their answers are strongly affected by the ordering of conditions: While the first judgment is made in accordance with one's political attitudes, the second opposing judgment is made so as to remain consistent with the first. Studies 4 and 5 find that people broadly support the principle of giving both sides of contested issues equal speech rights, also when this is stated abstractly, detached from any specific scenario. In Study 6 we explore the boundaries of our findings, and find that the need to be consistent weakens substantially for speech that is widely seen as too extreme. Together, these results suggest that although people can selectively endorse moral principles depending on their political agenda, many seek to conceal this bias from others, and perhaps also themselves.

Keywords: Motivated reasoningMoral judgmentFreedom of speechSelf-deceptionSocial dominancePolitical ideology

Users do not universally interpret high numbers of “likes” for messages congruent to their own attitudes as valid evidence for the public agreeing with them, especially if their interest in a topic is high

Luzsa, R., & Mayr, S. (2021). False consensus in the echo chamber: Exposure to favorably biased social media news feeds leads to increased perception of public support for own opinions. Cyberpsychology: Journal of Psychosocial Research on Cyberspace, 15(1), Article 3. https://doi.org/10.5817/CP2021-1-3

Abstract: Studies suggest that users of online social networking sites can tend to preferably connect with like-minded others, leading to “Echo Chambers” in which attitudinally congruent information circulates. However, little is known about how exposure to artifacts of Echo Chambers, such as biased attitudinally congruent online news feeds, affects individuals’ perceptions and behavior. This study experimentally tested if exposure to attitudinally congruent online news feeds affects individuals' False Consensus Effect, that is, how strongly individuals perceive public opinions as favorably biased and in support of their own opinions. It was predicted that the extent of the False Consensus Effect is influenced by the level of agreement individuals encounter in online news feeds, with high agreement leading to a higher estimate of public support for their own opinions than low agreement. Two online experiments (n1 = 331 and n2 = 207) exposed participants to nine news feeds, each containing four messages. Two factors were manipulated: Agreement expressed in message texts (all but one [Exp.1] / all [Exp.2] messages were congruent or incongruent to participants' attitudes) and endorsement of congruent messages by other users (congruent messages displayed higher or lower numbers of “likes” than incongruent messages). Additionally, based on Elaboration Likelihood Theory, interest in a topic was considered as a moderating variable. Both studies confirmed that participants infer public support for their own attitudes from the degree of agreement they encounter in online messages, yet are skeptical of the validity of “likes”, especially if their interest in a topic is high.

Keywords: Echo chambers; social networking; false consensus; selective exposure

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While online users appear not to suspect biases in agreement expressed in message texts, they appear critical of endorsement indicated by the numbers of “likes”: They do not universally interpret high numbers of “likes” for messages congruent to their own attitudes as valid evidence for the public agreeing with them, especially if their interest in a topic is high. Instead, they lower their estimate of public agreement. Thus, users appear to be wary of biases in numbers of “likes” and should be somewhat resistant towards attempts to influence their perception of public opinion via manipulated number of likes.

Deception is perceived to be ethical, and individuals want to be deceived, when deception is perceived to prevent unnecessary harm

Levine, Emma. 2021. “Community Standards of Deception: Deception Is Perceived to Be Ethical When It Prevents Unnecessary Harm.” PsyArXiv. February 19. doi:10.31234/osf.io/g5trb

Abstract: We frequently claim that lying is wrong, despite modeling that it is often right. The present research sheds light on this tension by unearthing systematic cases in which people believe lying is ethical in everyday communication and by proposing and testing a theory to explain these cases. Using both inductive and experimental approaches, I find that deception is perceived to be ethical, and individuals want to be deceived, when deception is perceived to prevent unnecessary harm. I identify eight implicit rules – pertaining to the targets of deception and the topic and timing of a conversation – that clarify systematic circumstances in which deception is perceived to prevent unnecessary harm, and I document the causal effect of each implicit rule on the endorsement of deception. I also explore how perceptions of unnecessary harm influence communicators’ use of deception in everyday life, above and beyond other moral concerns. This research provides insight into when and why people value honesty and paves the way for future research on when and why people embrace deception.

Cleansing effects (one can wash one's hands to recover innocence): Its size has been inflated by dubious research practices

Ross, R., Van Aert, R., Van den Akker, O., & Van Elk, M. (2021). The role of meta-analysis and preregistration in assessing the evidence for cleansing effects. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 44, E19. doi:10.1017/S0140525X20000606

Abstract: Lee and Schwarz interpret meta-analytic research and replication studies as providing evidence for the robustness of cleansing effects. We argue that the currently available evidence is unconvincing because (a) publication bias and the opportunistic use of researcher degrees of freedom appear to have inflated meta-analytic effect size estimates, and (b) preregistered replications failed to find any evidence of cleansing effects.

Free text: PsyArXiv Preprints | The role of meta-analysis and preregistration in assessing the evidence for cleansing effects

More Questions About Multiple Passions: Who Has Them, How Many Do People Have, and the Relationship Between Polyamorous Passion and Well-being

More Questions About Multiple Passions: Who Has Them, How Many Do People Have, and the Relationship Between Polyamorous Passion and Well-being. Benjamin Schellenberg & Daniel Bailis. Journal of Happiness Studies, Feb 19 2021. https://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10902-021-00369-2

Abstract: People are often passionate toward multiple activities in their lives. However, more has been learned about passion toward any single activity than about passion toward multiple activities. Relying on the dualistic model of passion (Vallerand in The psychology of passion: a dualistic model, Oxford University Press, New York, 2015), this research addressed the antecedents and consequences of polyamorous passion. In three pre-registered studies (total N = 1322) and one mini meta-analysis, we found that (a) people tend to report being passionate for between 2 and 4 activities; (b) harmonious passion becomes a less potent predictor of well-being as it is directed toward less-favored activities; (c) harmonious passion does not contribute to the prediction of well-being beyond a second-favorite activity; and (d) openness to experience is a personality trait that is positively associated with the number of passionate activities that people have in their lives. These results contribute to our understanding of who has multiple passions, how many passionate activities people tend to have, and the relationship between polyamorous passion and well-being.

General Discussion

Research relying on the dualistic model of passion has revealed a great deal about the antecedents and consequences of feeling passion toward a single activity (Vallerand 2015). But it is common for people to feel passionate about multiple activities, and little is known about people who have multiple passions in life. The aim of this research was to contribute to this emerging area by focusing on four specific questions about polyamorous passion. In general, our findings add to our understanding of how many passionate activities people have in their lives, the effect of having multiple passions on well-being, and who becomes polyamorously passionate. How many passionate activities do people have?  We addressed this question (Question 1) in all four studies and found that people typically have between 2 and 4 passionate activities in their lives. The number of reported passions was closer to 2 when the number of passionate activities was classified based on passion criteria scores, and closer to 4 when the number of passionate activities was freely reported. These results lead to two conclusions. First, most people are polyamorously passionate; it is more common to be passionate for multiple activities than it is to be passionate about one or no activity. People therefore appear to be very capable of engaging in multiple activities that they enjoy, find valuable and meaningful, devote a great deal of time, energy, and resources, and incorporate into their identities (Vallerand 2015). Second, people typically limit the number of passionate activities they pursue to only a few. There could be many factors that restrict the number of passionate activities people pursue, including limited time and energy that people are able to devote to different activities. The overall message from these findings is that people are unquestionably passionate, and this passion is most often directed toward more than one activity. What is the effect of having multiple passions on well-being? We addressed this question in two ways. In Study 1 we tested whether the relationship between HP and well-being depended on whether HP was directed toward a favorite or fourthfavorite activity (Question 2), and in Studies 2 and 3 we tested if HP for less favored activities predicted well-being beyond what could be predicted by HP for more favored activities (Question 3). In general, the results support the dualistic model by showing that well-being is positively associated with HP, not OP (Vallerand, 2012). But the results contribute to our knowledge about passion by showing that, when directed toward a second-favorite activity, HP contributed to variance in well-being beyond HP for a favorite activity. Having high levels of HP toward two activities may allow people to have two domains in which they can have experiences that contribute to greater well-being, including greater positive affect (Rousseau and Vallerand 2008), flow (Carpentier et al. 2011), and psychological need satisfaction (Verner-Filion et al. 2017). However, the results also showed that HP becomes less predictive of well-being as it is directed toward activities that are less favored. In fact, consistent across Studies 2 and 3, levels of HP did not significantly contribute to the prediction of well-being beyond a second-favorite activity. There must certainly be a limit on the extent to which engaging in passionate activities can enhance well-being (Lyubomirsky et al. 2005), and this research suggests that this benefit is limited to two passionate activities, provided that they are pursued with high HP. Beyond two activities, the benefits of HP for well-being reaches a point of diminishing returns. Perhaps most importantly, the findings also suggest that many adults, especially those higher in openness to experience, consider a greater number of activities to be passions in their lives than they can actually derive increased well-being from, even if those activities are pursued with high HP. We recognize that people may be passionate for numerous activities for good reasons that lie beyond personal well-being, and we would not take the present findings to imply that these people should reduce the number of passions they are trying to pursue. However, we do take the findings to reflect an underlying psychological reality that even in the best-case scenario of consistently high HP, the benefits for well-being do not extend equally and indefinitely to all of the activities one might pursue as passions. Most of these benefits derive from one’s favorite and second-favorite activity. Who has multiple passions?  To address this final question (Question 4), we began by exploring if the big five personality traits were related to passion quantity. The results of all four studies and a mini meta-analysis found consistent evidence in support of a small-to-medium-sized positive association between openness to experience and number of passionate activities. There are many potential reasons why openness predicts a greater number of passionate activities. People with high levels of openness may engage in more or more varied activities (Ihle et al. 2015), thus increasing chances that multiple activities will develop into passionate activities. People with high levels of openness may also find novel activities or experiences more interesting and pleasurable (Fayn et al. 2015), which could facilitate feelings of passion toward them. Testing these and other potential reasons for why openness is linked with a greater number of passionate activities is an important area for future research. Limitations and Future Directions This research is limited by its reliance on self-report assessments and its cross-sectional design. Additional research is needed to replicate these effects using other types of assessments (e.g., interviews, other-reports) or designs (e.g., experimental, longitudinal). There is also evidence that participants recruited on crowdsourcing websites such as Prolific may differ from the general population in several characteristics (see Huff and Tingley 2015). Although a more representative sample was recruited in Study 3, research going forward should focus on other types of samples to address the questions posed in this research. We should also note that the results with HP in Studies 2 and 3 were based on a short, 3-item assessment of HP. Short scales were administered to reduce participant burden and, although others have successfully taken this approach (e.g., Trepanier et al. 2014), our findings should be replicated with the full measure of HP. 

Our view is that this research is another step toward gaining a better understanding of the antecedents and consequences of polyamorous passion. But research in this area is still taking its first steps. Although there is still a great deal to learn, we would like to suggest two routes that additional research can take. A first route is to focus on how passion for multiple activities develops over the life course. For instance, does the number of passionate activities people pursue remain stable, or does this number fluctuate throughout life? Do people go through some periods when they have many passionate activities, and other periods when they have none? It should also be emphasized that all participants in this research, and in the studies reported by Schellenberg and Bailis (2015), were adults, meaning that little is known about how passion for multiple activities develops and changes from childhood to adolescence to adulthood. A second route is to focus on extremes. On one extreme are those who are not passionate for any activity in their lives. Vallerand (2015) reports that between 15% and 25% of people are not passionate for any activity in their lives. The results from this research support these figures. On the other extreme are those who are passionate for many activities. Why do some have passion for many activities in their lives, and others do not have passion for any? Little is known about nonpassionate people (Vallerand 2015), and even less is known about those who are superpolyamorously passionate

Like all salamanders, newts can re-grow a lost limb or amputated tail. This regenerative ability… is a superpower we are eager to steal, a piece of real animal magic

Torching for Newts. Anita Roy. Dark Mountain Project, Feb 10 2021. https://dark-mountain.net/torching-for-newts/

A century ago there were a million ponds in Britain, home to the mighty great crested newt. Now with increasing building work and a hostile government, amphibian life is being squeezed out of its territories. But not entirely. As their first migrations from land to water begin next month, Anita Roy goes into the Somerset night to discover the tiny dragons that live in the liminal spaces of our land and imaginations.

Anita Roy is a writer and editor based in Wellington, Somerset. She is the co-editor of Gifts of Gravity and Light: A Nature Almanac for the 21st century (July 2021) and author of A Year in Kingcombe.

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Hannah handed me a torch. It was a serious piece of kit, with a battery-pack the size of a toaster slung on a broad black strap across my shoulder. I strafed the undergrowth enthusiastically until she suggested mildly that I might like to conserve the power until we actually got where we were going. I quickly switched it off, partly to hide my blushes.

I was the only rookie accompanying four ecologists to check for newts in the ponds on the edge of town. Seven years ago, a new housing estate was being built here and the developers had had to create several new ponds in order to relocate a small population of great crested newts. The ecologists I was with – Hannah, Polly, Mark and Paul – had overseen the whole operation and our mission tonight was to check how the newts were faring in their newbuilds. 

We left behind the sodium glow of streetlights, and headed down the slope into the tall grass. The last vestiges of daylight showed as a streak of rose madder beneath clouds as rich as plums. Darkness pooled in dips and ditches and our pupils dilated to drink in what little light lingered. Tattered shadows flitted overhead: bats. 

[...]

The pond was one of three that had been created to ‘mitigate’ the effects of the housing estate. Polly – who forged along ahead of me, battery-pack knocking against her hip – was one of the original team who had supervised the gathering up and resettlement of newts before the bulldozers arrived. 

Pond number two was more established and seemed richer with wildlife possibilities. The rushes were fatter and lay in dense beds around the water’s edge. A few passes of the torch through the sepia water and – bingo: newts. ‘Lots of them,’ said Polly. ‘Good.’

These were smooth and palmate newts, the commonest of the UK’s three native species. Slim little creatures, as long as your little finger, they slipped through the water in tiny Chinese brushstrokes, with an elegant economy of movement. With their vertical fish-tails and four legs, they seem not quite fully formed – like adult frogs who have been unable to shake off their tadpoley youth, or an illustration from a children’s encyclopaedia on evolution: your Middle Devonian great-great-great-great-to-the-power-x grandmother, dragging herself out of the primaeval soup and onto the newly formed land. 

[...]

Amphibians are well-named: from the Greek ‘amphi’ meaning both, and ‘bios’, life. They live a double life, moving between aquatic and terrestrial realms. Half in the water and half out, creatures of the twilight world between day and night, living on the outskirts of town and the margins of countryside, newts seem most at home in liminal spaces. 

Like all salamanders, newts can re-grow a lost limb or amputated tail. This regenerative ability has long fascinated humans. It is a superpower we are eager to steal, a piece of real animal magic. The mad scientist eager to exploit the process for their own gains is a familiar figure in popular culture. In the 2012 Amazing Spider-Man movie, Rhys Ifans plays Dr Curt Connors, a scientist obsessed with regenerating his own amputated arm using a serum extracted from lizards. Inevitably, the experiment goes horribly wrong, as the mild-mannered doctor morphs into an evil monster, Lizardman, and goes on the rampage. The eponymous hybrid man-fish of the 1954 horror film Creature from the Black Lagoon also proved hard to kill, recovering/regenerating from each bullet-riddled denouement to rise again in sequel after sequel. The creature is reincarnated in Guillermo del Toro’s Shape of Water in 2017. As in the original movie, it has been captured from deep in the Amazon where it was worshipped as a god and brought to the lab, where it is known only as ‘the Asset’: biological raw material for humans to mine and extract knowledge from, at no matter what cost to the beast.

In 1994, Dr Goro Eguchi of the Shokei Educational Institution, Japan, and Panagiotis Tsonis at the University of Dayton, Ohio, decided to investigate this apparently magical ability for real. In the lab, they cut open the  eye of a live Japanese fire-bellied newt (Cynops pyrrhogaster) and removed the lens to see if it would regenerate. It did, perfectly. And not from residual lens tissue but from epithelial cells in the iris. So they did it again. And again. Over the course of sixteen years, they cut out the newt’s eye no fewer than eighteen times. And each time, the poor newt grew it back, fresh, complete, in fully working order. The eye of a newt half its age.

Dr Tsonis is quoted in one article as pointing out the ‘good news’ from this study: once we fully understand it, he says, ‘age will not be a problem’ in terms of, for example, wound repair. After all, he says, ‘old people need regeneration, not young ones.’

Perhaps it is no wonder that ‘eye of newt’ is an essential ingredient for the most famous magic potion in history: the hell-broth Macbeth’s witches boil up in order to reveal the future. It is no surprise that the future foretold involves hubris, nemesis and murder most foul. 

[...]

Full text at the link above.

Is Conscientiousness Always Associated With Better Health? A U.S.–Japan Cross-Cultural Examination of Biological Health Risk

Is Conscientiousness Always Associated With Better Health? A U.S.–Japan Cross-Cultural Examination of Biological Health Risk. Shinobu Kitayama, Jiyoung Park. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, June 18, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167220929824

Abstract: In Western societies, conscientiousness is associated with better health. Here, we tested whether this pattern would extend to East Asian, collectivistic societies. In these societies, social obligation motivated by conscientiousness could be excessive and thus health-impairing. We tested this prediction using cross-cultural surveys of Americans (N = 1,054) and Japanese (N = 382). Biomarkers of inflammation (interleukin-6 and C-reactive protein) and cardiovascular malfunction (systolic blood pressure and total-to-HDL cholesterol ratio) were adopted to define biological health risk (BHR). Among Americans, conscientiousness was associated with lower BHR. Moreover, this relationship was mediated by healthy lifestyle. In contrast, among Japanese, the relationship between conscientiousness and BHR was not significant. Further analysis revealed, however, that conscientiousness was associated with a greater commitment to social obligation, which in turn predicted higher BHR. These findings suggest that conscientiousness may or may not be salubrious, depending on health implications of normatively sanctioned behaviors in varying cultures.

Keywords: culture, conscientiousness, biological health risk, healthy lifestyle, social obligation

Gay men were more likely to accept casual sex offers than lesbian women, but both had accepted their most recent casual sex offer more than half of the time

Gender Similarities and Differences in Casual Sex Acceptance Among Lesbian Women and Gay Men. Jes L. Matsick, Mary Kruk, Terri D. Conley, Amy C. Moors & Ali Ziegler. Archives of Sexual Behavior, Feb 18 2021. https://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-020-01864-y

Rolf Degen's take: Gay men were more likely to accept casual sex offers than lesbian women, but both had accepted their most recent casual sex offer more than half of the time

Abstract: Popular wisdom and scientific evidence suggest women desire and engage in casual sex less frequently than men; however, theories of gender differences in sexuality are often formulated in light of heterosexual relations. Less is understood about sexual behavior among lesbian and gay people, or individuals in which there is arguably less motivation to pursue sex for reproductive purposes and fewer expectations for people to behave in gender-typical ways. Drawing from scripts theory and pleasure theory, in two studies (N1 =  465; N2 =  487) we examined lesbian and gay people’s acceptance of casual sex. We asked participants who had been propositioned for casual sex whether they accepted the offer and to rate their perceptions of the proposer’s sexual capabilities and sexual orientation. They also reported on their awareness of stigma surrounding casual sex. We found a gender difference in acceptance: Gay men were more likely than lesbian women to have accepted a casual sex offer from other gay/lesbian people, and this difference was mediated by participants’ stigma awareness. We also found the proposer’s sexual orientation played a role in people’s acceptance. Lesbian women and gay men were equally likely to accept offers from bisexual proposers but expressed different acceptance rates with “straight-but-curious” proposers, which was mediated by expected pleasure. We discuss dynamics within lesbian and gay communities and implications for studying theories of sexual behavior and gender differences beyond heterosexual contexts.