Some individuals have a strong desire to incite chaos when they perceive themselves to be marginalized by society; tend to see chaos as a way to invert the power structure and gain social status in the process

Some people just want to watch the world burn: The prevalence, psychology and politics of the “Need for Chaos.” Kevin Arceneaux, Timothy B. Gravelle, Matthias Osmundsen, Michael Bang Petersen, Jason Reifler and Thomas J. Scotto. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, Feb 21 2021. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2020.0147

Abstract: People form political attitudes to serve psychological needs. Recent research shows that some individuals have a strong desire to incite chaos when they perceive themselves to be marginalized by society. These individuals tend to see chaos as a way to invert the power structure and gain social status in the process. Analyzing data drawn from large-scale representative surveys conducted in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, we identify the prevalence of Need for Chaos across Anglo-Saxon societies. Using Latent Profile Analysis, we explore whether different subtypes underlie the uni-dimensional construct and find evidence that some people may be motivated to seek out chaos because they want to rebuild society, while others enjoy destruction for its own sake. We demonstrate that chaos-seekers are not a unified political group but a divergent set of malcontents. Multiple pathways can lead individuals to “want to watch the world burn.”

4. What do people high in Need for Chaos want?

The previous analysis suggests that education explains some of the variation between LC individuals and the rest and that Right-wing ideology explains some of the variance in HC categorization. Nonetheless, we do not find a clear pattern that distinguishes HC and RB with respect to demographics, which raises this question about whether these categories map onto differences in political preferences and behaviour. We now turn to this question.

These analyses focus on the USA and UK in this section, because the Australian and Canadian surveys contained a more limited (and non-comparable) set of variables. Beginning with political preferences, table 5 shows regression coefficients for each of the latent profile categories (with LC being the excluded category). The items in the rows are the dependent variables that measure policy preferences for each of the regression models. The dependent variables were measured using five-point Likert agree/disagree scales. The regression models include controls for demographic characteristics (age, gender, race, education and interaction between education and age), personality traits and political ideology.

[Table 5. The association between Need for Chaos latent profile categories and policy preferences. Each row represents a separate regression model. The models include a full slate of appropriate control variables, with full results available in the electronic supplementary material. In these two panels, we report the un-standardized coefficients for the ‘Rebuilders’, ‘Medium Chaos’, and ‘High chaos’ groups versus the excluded category of those in the ‘Low Chaos’ profile. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.005.]

We do not observe a consistent pattern in political preferences across the latent profile categories in the USA and UK. In both countries, individuals in the LC category are less likely to agree that immigration should be halted relative to the other categories. There are also no major differences between RB and HC categories with respect to immigration—individuals in both of these categories would prefer that immigration be stopped. In both countries, it also appears that those who fall in the RB category are more bothered by ‘new lifestyles’ than are individuals in the HC category. In the USA, individuals in the RB category are also more likely to question capitalism, while those in the UK are more supportive of the death penalty. Our interpretation of these findings is that those who fall in the RB category exhibit enough idealism or principles that are distinct from the full embrace of nihilism apparent in the ‘High Chaos’ profile.

Next, we consider the relationship between NFCChaos latent profile categories and political participation. Table 6 shows regression coefficients for each of the latent profile categories (with LC being the excluded category). The items in the rows are the dependent variables that measure political participation for each of the regression models. The dependent variables reflect survey items that asked respondents on a 0–10 scale how likely they are to take part in a variety of political activities in the ‘next few years’. The regression models include controls for demographic characteristics (age, gender, race, education and interaction between education and age), personality traits and political ideology. Consistent with Petersen et al. [8], we find that individuals who fall in the HC category are much more likely to say that they would take part in an ‘illegal protest,’ even relative to those in the RB category.

[Table 6 The association between Need for Chaos latent profile categories and political participation. Each row represents a separate regression model. The models include a full slate of appropriate control variables, with full results available in the electronic supplementary material. In these two panels, we report the un-standardized coefficients for the ‘Rebuilders’, ‘Medium Chaos’, and ‘High chaos’ groups versus the excluded category of those in the ‘Low Chaos’ profile. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.005.]

5. Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to explore whether different motivations underlie the characteristic adaptation Need for Chaos [8]. We replicated previous research in four Anglo-Saxon countries. The NFCChaos scale forms a uni-dimensional scale that captures a continuous characteristic adaptation in the Australia, Canada, the UK and the USA. We then turned to Latent Profile Analysis to investigate whether different subtypes of individuals explained variance in the NFCChaos scale. We found evidence that this may indeed be the case, with individuals falling into four different latent categories: Low Chaos, Medium Chaos, Rebuild and High Chaos. The key difference between those in the Rebuild and High Chaos categories is that Rebuilders were less likely to agree with statements supporting destruction for the sake of destruction relative to those who were in the High Chaos category (e.g. ‘I get a kick when natural disasters strike in foreign countries’).

Across all four countries, most people fell in the Low Chaos category and few people fell in the High Chaos category, but combining the Rebuild and High Chaos categories showed that there is support for some degree of chaos-seeking at around 20% in the four Anglo-Saxon countries. Is this something that should be worrying from a normative standpoint? We believe that the Latent Profile Analysis helps answer this question. If 20% of a country yearned for a violent overthrow of the current system, it would be worrying, but it seems that a considerable fraction of this 20% does not want destruction for the sake of destruction, but rather they imagine rebuilding society’s institutions in a way that does not involve violence. We leave aside whether their particular vision is a ‘good’ one, and simply note that most Utopian visions begin with the notion that society must be remade in some fundamental way.

We then turned our attention to exploring whether demographic and political characteristics help differentiate who falls in the different latent profile categories. Echoing previous research, we found evidence that chaos-seeking tends to be higher among the young, men and those with less than a college degree. Interestingly, we did not find consistent differences in terms of demographics between the Rebuilder and High Chaos subtypes. This would suggest that chaos-seekers, whether they like destruction for the sake of destruction or not, may be motivated by a sense of marginalization and grievance that exists at high levels in Western society today [7].

We also found that individuals who identify as Right wing were also more likely to fall in the High Chaos category, yet when we turned our attention to the political preferences of these individuals, the only consistent pattern that emerged was a dislike of immigration. Consistent with [8], we do not find much evidence that individuals in the High Chaos category are idealistic visionaries who want to dismantle social and political institutions to build a better world. Our evidence was much more consistent with the results of previous research that paint individuals high on the NFCChaos scale as nihilists who are only looking out for themselves. In contrast, individuals who fell in the Rebuild category did seem to have something approaching a social outlook. They do not like new lifestyles and, in the USA, they are not fans of capitalism. Perhaps these individuals want to replace established political institutions to make the world a better place (at least their view of what constitutes ‘better’.).

The empirical result of two substantive ‘chaos-seeking’ profiles warrants further comment and speculation given the current political environment and the challenges that populists politicians and causes (such as Donald Trump and Brexit) pose to the established order. Populists potentially knock on an ‘open door’ because western political systems under-supply political parties with socially conservative and economically Left-leaning manifestos [21,22]. A close look at table 5 suggests a picture of the RB and the HC members having some characteristics of politically alienated social conservatives, with the larger Rebuilder profile displaying more of these characteristics—e.g. opposition to free market capitalism and immigration or ‘new lifestyles’. The ‘supply’ of candidates and opportunities matters; results from table 6 suggest that Rebuilders and (in the UK) High Chaos respondents have little interest in traditional political activity. Will Brexit as a ‘rebuilding’ opportunity change the propensity of Rebuilders to eschew the act of voting and differentiate the two profiles further? These are areas ripe for additional research given the empirical establishment and cross-national validation of the two chaos profiles presented in this paper.

Summing up, it is important to recognize that the quest for status and recognition is deeply ingrained in human nature [23]. The finding that thwarted status-desires drive a Need for Chaos, which then activates support for political protest and violence, suggests that a Need for Chaos may be a key driver of societal change, both currently and historically. In this regard, the present analyses emphasize that while some simply want to ‘watch the world burn’, others want to the see a new world rebuilt from the ashes. Thus, we observe both nihilists (captured by the High Chaos group) and those who who have a purpose (captured by the Rebuilders group). Nonetheless, owing to the destructive force of a high Need for Chaos, one of the key challenges of contemporary societies is indeed to meet, recognize and, to the extent possible, alleviate the frustrations of these individuals. The alternative is a trail of nihilistic destruction.

A Systematic Review on Sexual Boredom: Sexual boredom is a bigger problem for men and narcissists

de Oliveira L, Carvalho J, Nobre P. A Systematic Review on Sexual Boredom. J Sex Med 2020;XX:XXX–XXX. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsxm.2020.12.019

Rolf Degen's take: Sexual boredom is a bigger problem for men and narcissists

Abstract

Background: Empirical data on sexual boredom are scarce and unsystematized, contrasting with the literature on general boredom.

Aim: The aim of this review of literature is to verify how sexual boredom is defined in previous research and which relationships were found with sexual functioning, relationship dynamics, or gender.

Methods: A systematic search was conducted in EBSCO, Scopus, Web of Science, and PubMed databases for papers published until August 2020. Search terms used were “sexual boredom” or “sexual tedium” or “sexual indifference” or “sexual monotony” or a combination of “boredom” and “sexual activity” or “intercourse”. This systematic review followed PRISMA guidelines.

Outcomes: Articles were grouped in general boredom and sexuality research and in sexual boredom research.

Results: This review consists of 43 articles, of which 31 are quantitative studies, 8 are qualitative studies, and 4 are mixed-method studies. Studies concerning general boredom and sexuality include research on diverse aspects of sexual behavior, namely solitary sexual behavior, extra-dyadic sex, compulsive sexual behavior, and risky sexual behavior. Sexual boredom research included papers regarding personality, sexual response, and varied aspects of sexual behavior.

Clinical Implications: Findings suggest sexual boredom is related with sexual response, sexual satisfaction, and hypersexuality, which renders clinical relevance. Sexual boredom impacts well-being, and further research should focus on exploring potential mechanisms underpinning this sexual problem.

Strengths and limitations: To the authors' knowledge, this is the only existing systematic review of sexual boredom and allowed identifying key features of sexual boredom and related aspects. However, because most studies are correlational, and several do not use comprehensive measures of sexual boredom, no causal relationships were identified.

Conclusion: This review indicates the construct of sexual boredom includes individual, relationship, and societal aspects. However, no definition of sexual boredom includes these, and current knowledge does not allow formulating a model or a theory of sexual boredom.

Key Words: Sexual BoredomBoredomSexual DesireSexual SatisfactionRelationshipsCouples

Darwin suggested that in many cases female preferences for elaborately ornamented males derived from a female’s taste for the beautiful, the notion that females were attracted to sexual beauty for its own sake

Darwin, sexual selection, and the brain. Michael J. Ryan. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, February 23, 2021 118 (8) e2008194118; https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2008194118

Abstract: One hundred fifty years ago Darwin published The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex, in which he presented his theory of sexual selection with its emphasis on sexual beauty. However, it was not until 50 y ago that there was a renewed interest in Darwin’s theory in general, and specifically the potency of mate choice. Darwin suggested that in many cases female preferences for elaborately ornamented males derived from a female’s taste for the beautiful, the notion that females were attracted to sexual beauty for its own sake. Initially, female mate choice attracted the interest of behavioral ecologists focusing on the fitness advantages accrued through mate choice. Subsequent studies focused on sensory ecology and signal design, often showing how sensory end organs influenced the types of traits females found attractive. Eventually, investigations of neural circuits, neurogenetics, and neurochemistry uncovered a more complete scaffolding underlying sexual attraction. More recently, research inspired by human studies in psychophysics, behavioral economics, and neuroaesthetics have provided some notion of its higher-order mechanisms. In this paper, I review progress in our understanding of Darwin’s conjecture of “a taste for the beautiful” by considering research from these diverse fields that have conspired to provide unparalleled insight into the chooser’s mate choices.

Keywords: sexual selectionmate choiceneuroscience

36% of participants found some beauty in the perfume experience; 45% of participants found some beauty in candy taste

Diessner, R., Genthôs, R., Arthur, K., Adkins, B., & Pohling, R. (2021). Olfactory and gustatory beauty: Aesthetic emotions and trait appreciation of beauty. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, 15(1), 38–50; Feb 2021. https://doi.org/10.1037/aca0000262

Abstract: Philosophers of aesthetics universally agree that visual and auditory stimuli may be considered beautiful. Divergently, controversy greets the question “Can olfactory or gustatory experiences be conceptualized as beautiful?” In Study 1 participants inhaled Joy® perfume applied to a cotton pad for 30 s and immediately completed the AESTHEMOS (Schindler et al., 2017), a scale measuring aesthetic emotions. Results indicated stronger prototypical (feeling of beauty and liking, fascination, being moved, and awe), pleasing (joy, humor, vitality, energy, and relaxation), and epistemic (surprise, interest, intellectual challenge, and insight) aesthetic emotions, and fewer negative aesthetic emotions (feeling of ugliness, boredom, confusion, anger, uneasiness, and sadness), were elicited by the perfume compared with a no-scent control condition. Results showed 36% of participants found some beauty in the perfume experience. Study 2 showed significantly higher prototypical and pleasing aesthetic emotions, and less negative aesthetic emotions were stimulated by a Werther’s caramel candy compared with a control condition (an unflavored sugar cube); and 45% of participants found some beauty in the taste. In both studies the findings were unrelated to participants’ levels of trait appreciation of beauty, as measured by the Engagement with Beauty Scale—Revised (EBS-R; Diessner, Pohling, Stacy, & Güsewell, 2018). In Study 3 we found that when the EBS-R predicted the response to an artwork, it did not predict gustatory beauty; and when the EBS-R predicted olfactory beauty, it did not predict the beauty of an artwork. Thus, the general trait of appreciating beauty, as measured by the EBS-R, may not extend to olfactory or gustatory beauty. The results are discussed in the context of philosophical approaches and empirical aesthetic research. 

Advisors robustly display overconfidence as a self-promotion tactic—even when it is punished by others

Van Zant, A. B. (2021). Strategically overconfident (to a fault): How self-promotion motivates advisor confidence. Journal of Applied Psychology, Feb 2021. https://doi.org/10.1037/apl0000879

Abstract: Unlike judgments made in private, advice contexts invoke strategic social concerns that might increase overconfidence in advice. Many scholars have assumed that overconfident advice emerges as an adaptive response to advice seekers’ preference for confident advice and failure to punish overconfidence. However, another possibility is that advisors robustly display overconfidence as a self-promotion tactic—even when it is punished by others. Across four experiments and a survey of advice professionals, the current research finds support for this account. First, it shows that advisors express more overconfidence than private decision-makers. This pattern held even after advice recipients punished advisors for their overconfidence. Second, it identifies the underlying motivations of advisors’ overconfidence. Advisors’ overconfidence was not driven by self-deception or a sincere desire to be helpful. Instead, it reflected strategic self-promotion. Relative to the overconfidence revealed by their private beliefs, advisors purposely increased their overconfidence while broadcasting judgments when (a) it was salient that others would assess their competence and (b) looking competent served their self-interest.

Girls’ depressive symptoms increased, self-esteem decreased, at a significantly greater rate than boys’ symptoms; the peak point of differentiation of these variables is at around age 13

Gittins CB, Hunt C (2020) Self-criticism and self-esteem in early adolescence: Do they predict depression? PLoS ONE 15(12): e0244182; Dec 18 2020. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0244182

Abstract: Beck’s theory suggests that forming negative self-cognitions is a key early step in the development of depression. However, others have suggested the reverse, arguing that depression leads to development of negative self-beliefs. As such, there is debate about whether these cognitions are precursors to, or alternatively are caused by, depression. Although Beck’s theory is supported in older adolescents, it has not been clearly seen in younger adolescents. This study aimed to assess the relation between two major self-cognitions (self-esteem and self-criticism) and depressive symptoms in early adolescence. Two-hundred and forty-three Australian adolescents (mean age = 12.08, 52% female) completed measures of self-esteem, self-criticism and depressive symptoms at baseline, then approximately 12- and 24-months later. Growth-curve modelling was used to assess changes in the variables. Cross-lagged analysis assessed whether either of the self-cognition variables predicted depressive symptoms, or if depressive symptoms predicted self-cognitions. Results indicated that self-criticism and depressive symptoms increased over the time period, while self-esteem decreased, and these changes were all related. Self-esteem predicted depressive symptoms from Time 2 to Time 3, while depressive symptoms predicted self-esteem from Time 1 to Time 2. Self-criticism did not predict depressive symptoms, nor did depressive symptoms predict self-criticism. These links appeared largely independent of gender. Self-esteem and depressive symptoms during the early adolescent period thus appear to have a somewhat reciprocal relation, while self-criticism does not appear to predict the development of depression. As such, while low self-esteem does appear to have an important role of in the development of depression in this age group, it is not strictly predictive, nor is this effect seen across all negative self-cognitions.

Discussion

Both depressive symptoms and self-criticism significantly increased from ages 12 to 14, while self-esteem significantly decreased, as demonstrated by growth curve analysis. These changes were also significantly associated with each other. Furthermore, initially depressive symptoms predicted reduction in self-esteem, but later, lower self-esteem levels predicted increased depressive symptoms, shown through cross-lagged analysis. Self-criticism did not significantly predict either depressive symptoms or self-esteem, although self-esteem did predict reduced self-criticism from ages 13 to 14. This pattern remained unchanged when controlling for gender.

These findings ultimately support the possibility of a reciprocal-causality model in this population. Although pathways from self-esteem to depressive symptoms and the reverse for both time-lapses were not seen, there was nevertheless a sense of reciprocity seen across the two-year period. Thus, depressed mood appears to influence how adolescents evaluate their own worth, and negative beliefs about the self as a whole appears to increase the likelihood of developing depressed mood, at least for this age group.

The findings did not suggest an indirect relation in which one self-cognition predicted the other, which subsequently predicted depressive symptoms. There was evidence, in support of Katz and Nelson’s [40] assertion, that reduced self-esteem predicted subsequent self-criticism, demonstrated here from Time 2 to Time 3. However, there is no suggestion in the current data that self-criticism predicts later depressive symptoms. Further, even when self-esteem was removed from the model, self-criticism did not predict depressive symptoms. As such, based on these data, it is unlikely that there is any significant direct predictive relation between self-criticism and symptoms of depression.

The evidence for some reciprocity between self-esteem and depressive symptoms rather than vulnerability may reflect the age of the current sample. Much of the research which has supported the vulnerability model over the scar model has been on older adolescents (15 years) and adults [26, 27]. Shahar and Henrich [31] supported the scar model but only in a young adolescent sample, aged 12 to 13. Similarly, Burwell and Shirk [32], in a sample with a mean age of 13.6, demonstrated reciprocity between self-esteem and depressive symptoms. Shahar and Henrich [31] argued that, in line with developmental theory [15, 16], self-beliefs are more changeable during this period, thus they are more susceptible to influence from factors such as depressed mood.

These results suggest a refinement of Beck’s [1, 2] theory that all types of negative beliefs about the self generally create vulnerability to depression. At least for early adolescents, self-esteem appears to be more important than self-criticism in the development of depression. Although changes in self-criticism and depressive symptoms appear associated, these variables do not specifically predict each other. Our findings are in line with previous research, which has failed to demonstrate prospective links between self-criticism alone and depression [35, 37, 38, 42].

These findings may speak to the conceptual differences between the two self-cognition constructs. Self-esteem is considered a general attitude towards the self as a holistic object [8]. In contrast, self-criticism is a general approach to the self as a whole, but is contingent upon self-perceived failure [9]. While Beck [2] specified that negative life events are necessary in combination with negative self-cognitions to increase risk for depression, this may be more true for self-criticism–a thinking style that may lay dormant unless activated by a negative event–than for self-esteem–a more ongoing sense of self rather than response to events. There is some empirical evidence to suggest that high self-criticism alone is not enough to confer increased vulnerability to depression and that negative life events are also necessary. Abela and Taylor [38] found that while self-criticism alone did not predict depression scores, a significant interaction effect between self-criticism, self-esteem and negative life events was present, such that when participants with higher levels of self-criticism and lower levels of self-esteem experienced a negative life event, this combination significantly predicted depressive symptoms.

Gender effects

These analyses also demonstrated some support for our expectation of higher levels of negative self-cognitions and depressive symptoms for girls compared to boys, with some significant gender differences seen. Notably, girls’ depressive symptoms increased, and self-esteem decreased, at a significantly greater rate than boys’ symptoms. At the start of the test period (age 12), boys and girls demonstrated similar levels of self-esteem and of depressive symptoms. However, at 13 years, controlling for initial levels of the variables, girls’ self-esteem was significantly lower, and depressive symptoms significantly higher, than boys’ symptoms. At 14 years, controlling for autoregressive effects, there was no significant difference in depressive symptoms or self-esteem levels for girls and boys, suggesting the possibility that the peak point of differentiation of these variables is at around age 13. As such, these findings provide some support for the prediction that negative symptoms and cognitions would be higher in girls than boys

However, some other aspects of the findings provide minimal support for gender differences. When overall models were examined, the major relations demonstrated between the three variables remained unchanged when gender was added. In the growth curve model, the changes in the variables remained significantly related. Similarly, in the cross-lagged model, Time 1 depressive symptoms continued to predict Time 2 self-esteem and Time 2 self-esteem continued to predict Time 3 depression scores, while self-criticism continued not to predict depressive symptoms or self-esteem. Taken together, our findings suggest some evidence for higher levels of depressive symptoms, and higher rate of increase of these symptoms, in girls. However, no evidence of difference in the overall pattern of relations between self-esteem, self-criticism and depression for girls compared to boys was demonstrated.

Clinical implications

The current study examined relations between self-cognitions and depressive symptoms in a sample of healthy adolescents. Nevertheless, the finding that low self-esteem, but not high self-criticism, conveys direct risk for depressive symptoms may have important implications for the treatment of adolescents with, or at risk of, depression. It supports targeting self-esteem in interventions that aim to prevent depression, but also suggests that self-criticism should not necessarily be a specific focus. Further, the evidence of a reciprocal relation between self-esteem and depressive symptoms may have ramifications for depression treatment. Clinicians such as Greenberger and Padesky [63] have recommended focusing on ‘hot’ cognitions–those that are the most emotionally salient to the client–when conducting cognitive therapy. These findings suggest that, in addition to this approach, it may also be particularly important to ensure cognitions relating to negative self-esteem are also addressed, regardless of whether they are especially emotive to the client, as part of relapse prevention.

Strengths and limitations

These results should be interpreted in light of the following limitations. The observational nature of these data limits the causal assumptions that can be drawn from this research. Although cross-lagged models are designed to address this issue by controlling for autoregressive effects, nevertheless causal relations cannot be definitively determined. Furthermore, although depressive symptoms were measured, it is unclear whether these results would generalise to clinically diagnosed depression. Other factors that have been found to influence relations between self-cognitions and depression, such as negative events [38], were not included in the current research. While this enabled focus on the primary variables of interest, this is an area of research which would further elaborate on these relations.

All participants were the same grade, and most were the same age at each time point. However, age was not measured in months which would have provided more variation, and therefore the analysis may have been improved by controlling age in months. Nevertheless, given that the age range would have remained limited, this is unlikely to have had a major effect. Cross-lagged modelling is an analytical approach that is widely used and well accepted in the field (e.g. [64, 65]). In recent years, some researchers have argued that it does not take into account the possibility of stable between-person differences in the variables, and therefore runs the risk of amalgamating between-person effects with within-person effects [66, 67]. As such, this is a potential limitation of the study, which may lead to an over-estimate of the effects, and should be considered when interpreting these findings. Nevertheless, the general pattern of findings is likely to be unchanged with an alternative cross-lagged analytical approach.

This research also has a number of strengths. It is one of few studies to examine self-criticism and self-esteem together in relation to depressive symptoms and, as such, is one of the first studies to uncover the links between these three constructs. Furthermore, by using both growth curve and cross-lagged approaches, we were able to address two related but separate issues: whether the change in these variables is related and whether they predict each other. By using three data-points rather than two, we were able to examine the repeated relations and thus develop a more comprehensive understanding of these connections.

Emotions on which females scored universally higher were care & sadness; emotions that showed variability based on geography were fear & play; gender differences increased when moving from 'East' to 'West'

Gender effects in personality: a cross-cultural affective neuroscience perspective. F. G. Özkarar-Gradwohl & O. H. Turnbull. Culture and Brain, Feb 19 2021. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40167-021-00099-5

Abstract: Despite enormous progress in understanding the neuroscientific elements that underpin the basic emotions, far less attention has been paid to individual differences. The Affective Neuroscience Personality Scales (ANPS) aim to measure these universally-shared subcortical affective systems on which personality is built: CARE, PLAY, SEEK, SADNESS, FEAR and ANGER. Gender differences have been reported in several previous ANPS studies, but no systematic review of these findings has yet been conducted. The present study reviewed ANPS gender effects in 15 countries: (from West to East) Canada, U.S.A., Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Germany, Norway, Poland, Serbia, Turkey, Russia, China, Hong Kong, and Japan. The total sample size was N = 6500, composed of 38% males and 62% females. The mean age for the total sample was 26 years. The results showed that gender differences on the ANPS were variable, for different classes of basic emotions. These categories included emotions on which females scored universally higher (CARE and SADNESS); emotions that showed variability based on geography (FEAR and PLAY); and emotions that showed virtually no gender effect (SEEKING and ANGER). These findings can be interpreted in the light of biological universals, geographical variation caused by genetics, and cultural variation in emotion expression and regulation. The results were broadly consistent with gender effects reported in the Big Five personality literature, including a trend of gender differences increasing when moving from 'East' to 'West'. The paper reviews a range of suggestions for future research, including cultural data, genomic data and/or culture-gene interactions.

Facial attractiveness and face recognition are positively and linearly related; contrary to prediction, females don't outperform males in face recognition

Facial attractiveness, social status, and face recognition. Thomas E. Malloy, Carissa DiPietro, Brandon DeSimone, Christine Curley, Sathiarith Chau & Casey Silva. Visual Cognition, Feb 17 2021. https://doi.org/10.1080/13506285.2021.1884630

Abstract: Research on facial attractiveness and face recognition has produced contradictory results that we believe are rooted in methodological limitations. Three experiments evaluated the hypothesis that facial attractiveness and face recognition are positively and linearly related. We also expected that social status would moderate the attractiveness effect. Attractive faces were recognized with very high accuracy compared to less attractive faces. We specified two estimates of facial distinctiveness (generalized and idiosyncratic) and demonstrated that the attractiveness effect on face recognition was not due to distinctiveness. This solves the long-standing problem that because facial attractiveness and distinctiveness are naturally confounded, construct validity is compromised. There was no support for the prediction, based on meta-analysis, that females would outperform males in face recognition. The attractiveness effect was so strong that gender effects were precluded. Methodological prescriptions to enhance internal, construct, and statistical conclusion validity in face recognition paradigms are presented.

KEYWORDS: Facial attractivenessface recognitionsocial statusfacial distinctiveness

The perception of one’s partner’s higher agreeableness/commitment predicted one’s higher perceived relationship power; effect is stronger in women

Lindová, Jitka; Habešová, Tereza; Klapilová, Kateřina; Havlíček, Jan. 2021. "Commitment, Dominance, and Mate Value: Power Bases in Long-Term Heterosexual Couples" Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 18, no. 4: 1914; Feb 16 2021. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18041914

h/t David Schmitt on Twitter: ""the perception of one’s partner’s higher agreeableness/commitment predicted one’s higher perceived relationship power

Abstract: We assessed the relative contribution of economic, personal, and affective power bases to perceived relationship power. Based on evolutionary studies, we predicted that personality dominance and mate value should represent alternative personal power bases. Our sample was comprised of 84 Czech heterosexual couples. We measured the economic power base using self-report scales assessing education, income and work status. Personal power bases were assessed using self-report measures of personality dominance (International Personality Item Pool Dominance and Assertiveness subscale from NEO Personality Inventory-Revised Extraversion scale), and partner-report measures of mate value (Trait-Specific Dependence Inventory, factors 2–6). The first factor of Trait-Specific Dependence Inventory, which measures agreeableness/commitment was used to assess the affective power base. Our results show that perceived relationship power is associated with a perception of partner’s high agreeableness/commitment. Moreover, women’s personality dominance and mate value are also linked with perceived relationship power, which supports our evolutionary prediction of dominance and mate value working as power bases for women. The stronger effect of women’s than men’s power bases may be due to gender differences in investment into relationships and/or due to transition to more equal relationships currently sought by women in the Czech Republic.

Keywords: power bases; dominance; mate value; commitment; relationship power

Fast life history strategy males express highest levels of rule breaking & slow LHS males lowest; no differences in rule breaking between slow & fast LHS females; differences could be explained by role of males in rearing

Life History Theory: Evolutionary mechanisms and gender role on risk-taking behaviors in young adults. Javier Salas-Rodríguez, Luis Gómez-Jacinto, María Isabel Hombrados-Mendieta. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 175, June 2021, 110752. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2021.110752

Abstract: Evolutionary psychology considers the human mind to be composed of multiple specific mechanisms with specific adaptive purposes. This evolutionary approach is in line with the domain-specific view of risk-taking behaviors. Based on the theoretical framework of Life History Theory, the present study analyzes the moderating effect of gender and the mediating effect of evolutionary domain-specific risks in young adult Spaniards (432 participants). K-factor, measured through the Mini-K, was used as an indicator of life history strategy (LHS). Evolutionary domain-specific risks were measured through the Evolutionary Domain-Specific Risk Scale and risk-taking behaviors through the Risky Behavior Questionnaire. Results showed an interaction effect between gender and LHS for rule breaking. Evolutionary domain-specific risks had a mediation effect between LHS and risk-taking behaviors, mainly through mate attraction. These results highlight the different effects of LHS on risk-taking behaviors based on gender and the impact of evolutionary mechanisms. It is, therefore, necessary to consider an evolutionary approach on intervention programs aimed at reducing risk-taking behaviors in young adults.

Keywords: Life History TheoryRisk-taking behaviorEvolutionary domain-specific riskGender differencesYoung adults

Computational and neurocognitive approaches to the political brain: key insights and future avenues for political neuroscience

Computational and neurocognitive approaches to the political brain: key insights and future avenues for political neuroscience. Leor Zmigrod and Manos Tsakiris. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, February 22 2021. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2020.0130

Abstract: Although the study of political behaviour has been traditionally restricted to the social sciences, new advances in political neuroscience and computational cognitive science highlight that the biological sciences can offer crucial insights into the roots of ideological thought and action. Echoing the dazzling diversity of human ideologies, this theme issue seeks to reflect the multiplicity of theoretical and methodological approaches to understanding the nature of the political brain. Cutting-edge research along three thematic strands is presented, including (i) computational approaches that zoom in on fine-grained mechanisms underlying political behaviour, (ii) neurocognitive perspectives that harness neuroimaging and psychophysiological techniques to study ideological processes, and (iii) behavioural studies and policy-minded analyses of such understandings across cultures and across ideological domains. Synthesizing these findings together, the issue elucidates core questions regarding the nature of uncertainty in political cognition, the mechanisms of social influence and the cognitive structure of ideological beliefs. This offers key directions for future biologically grounded research as well as a guiding map for citizens, psychologists and policymakers traversing the uneven landscape of modern polarization, misinformation, intolerance and dogmatism.

1. Unravelling the roots of ideological behaviour

The inherent challenge—and exciting promise—of political psychology and neuroscience is the task of investigating an endlessly intricate organ (the brain) in wildly diverse social contexts (the arena of ideologies). These complexities naturally compound each other, rendering a robust psychological science of ideologies and political behaviour both challenging and crucial. The rapid spread of misinformation propagated by digital media as well as pronounced tribalistic polarization within and between national entities has provoked a global sense that our understanding of the origins of voting behaviour and ideological worldviews is dangerously insufficient. While the study of political attitudes and behaviour has been traditionally confined to the social sciences, new advances in political neuroscience and computational cognitive science highlight that the biological sciences may offer crucial insights about political and ideological behaviour. Ideological behaviour can be defined as behaviour that is epistemically dogmatic and interpersonally intolerant towards non-adherents or non-members [1]. In other words, a person thinking or behaving ‘ideologically' is rigidly adhering to a doctrine, resisting credible evidence when forming opinions, and selectively antagonistic to individuals who do not follow their ideological group or cause. Ideological behaviour can therefore occur in the realm of politics, religion, gender, race, class, social media or any other area of life where social conditions are described and accordingly actions are narrowly prescribed, resulting in ingroups and outgroups.

Yet what prompts an individual to behave ideologically? What neurocognitive processes are underway when a person evaluates socio-political information and comes to dogmatic conclusions? Why do some people fall into the traps of polarization more easily than others? These are some of the pertinent questions that a science of the political brain aims to elucidate and critically evaluate.

Until recently, social psychology was fairly limited in the methods available to study such processes rigorously. Measurement approaches were overwhelmingly based on self-report questionnaires, which are susceptible to self-knowledge and social desirability biases and which struggle to tap into unconscious processes and dispositions. Methods were restricted to laboratory-based studies, encompassing participants from limited university student populations that were frequently neither representative nor diverse. Nonetheless, over the last decade, and the past 5 years in particular, the methodology has advanced beyond recognition. Behavioural and cognitive measures can now be administered online, allowing for genuine interdisciplinarity between political research questions and cognitive methods that quantify implicit psychological processes and traits. These effective online paradigms possess the added value of increasing the accessibility and diversity of participant populations and enabling more reliable cross-cultural comparisons. Moreover, the advent of neuroscience has opened up the field towards studying the neural systems that underpin political cognition, resulting in both new insights and dangerous pitfalls [2,3]. Computational modelling approaches are also now sliding into political psychology [4], facilitating more precise calculation of cognitive parameters as well as more imaginative and complex simulations of how mental processes interact with social dynamics. Political psychology and neuroscience have therefore never been better placed to address the nuances of the political brain. At a time of substantial ideological turmoil and division, the field has also perhaps never been more pertinent.

Yet—as any good philosopher of science will observe—improved methodologies have a limited impact without inventive and thoughtful theoretical approaches that can take the field forward and build knowledge across disciplines. It is this marriage between cutting-edge methods and original, well-reasoned hypotheses that this special issue wishes to highlight. This collection of state-of-the-art research in political neuroscience, psychology and political science seeks to illustrate that a robust science of political behaviour is possible and productive, illuminating critical insights about the nature of ideology, the human brain and the societies we live in.

We have chosen to highlight three strands of research: (i) computational approaches that zoom in on fine-grained mechanisms underlying political behaviour, (ii) neurocognitive perspectives that harness neuroimaging and psychophysiological techniques to study ideological processes, and (iii) behavioural studies and policy repercussions of such understandings across cultures and across ideological domains. Evaluating these interdisciplinary approaches together unearths common themes that can inform present theory as well as guide future research efforts. These will be synthesized and summarized below. Above all, we hope that the empirical findings and theoretical implications presented in this theme issue will inspire researchers, policy makers and scholars from a range of disciplines to tackle the intricacies of studying brains in their political environments with rigour, innovation and hope.

2. Computational approaches

Computational perspectives on the nature of ideological behaviour typically take two primary forms: computational simulations of hypothetical behavioural dynamics or computational modelling of human behaviour on cognitive tasks. The papers in this collection reflect both types of computational approaches and result in striking overlaps and complementary findings.

Kashima et al. [5] explore how computational models of social influence in networks relate to ideological discourse. Using a computational model of communication, the authors identify four subtypes of potential ideological agents according to their level of cognitive bias and motivational ego-involvement when interpreting and storing information in memory. This maps on to the doctrinal and relational components of ideological thinking posited by Zmigrod [1]. The results demonstrate that certain kinds of ideological minds are more likely to polarize in particular ways and that even non-ideological agents can polarize if they communicate exclusively with polarized agents. Hence, the computational modelling employed by Kashima et al. [5] illustrates the subtle ways in which cognitive dispositions can interact with political contexts to shape the course of polarization. As they conclude, micro-psychological and macro-historical processes modulate each other in profound ways.

In another demonstration of the interaction between psychological mechanisms and interpersonal dynamics, De Dreu et al. [6] review the literature on how agents in political conflict can be modelled through a game theory framework informed by neurobiological insights. Synthesizing formal models with the literature on the neurocognitive roots of attack and defence strategies, the authors argue that the likelihood of status quo revision can be predicted by understanding a host of psychological processes, including the nature of selfish and non-selfish motivations, information-processing capacity to compute cost-benefit trade-offs and metacognitive beliefs.

Metacognition is dissected further by Rollwage & Fleming [7], who use simulation-based modelling to demonstrate that metacognitive insight modulates the adaptiveness of confirmation bias. Agents with accurate metacognitive skills can in fact benefit from biased information processing, suggesting that confirmation bias itself may only be deleterious for individuals who also have a metacognitive impairment. Metacognitive ability may thus be a useful locus for interventions aiming to reduce dogmatism and belief polarization.

To elucidate the cognitive basis of dogmatic and ideological thinking, Zmigrod et al. [8] conducted a large-scale data-driven investigation. By administering 37 cognitive tasks and 22 personality surveys, and studying the links to 16 ideological attitudes, Zmigrod and colleagues [8] examined how psychological dispositions sculpt individuals' ideological worldviews. Through computational drift-diffusion and Bayesian modelling, the researchers found that individuals' ideologies mirrored their cognitive decision-making strategies. Dogmatism was characterized by impaired evidence accumulation in perceptual decision-making tasks as well as impulsive personality, revealing that dogmatism may emerge owing to general tendencies to make impulsive decisions based on imperfectly processed evidence. Furthermore, the findings illuminate the cognitive and personality roots of political conservatism, nationalism, authoritarianism, system justification, social dominance orientation and extremist attitudes. It is therefore a key resource for scientists of ideology interested in the psychological individual differences that give rise to ideological thought and action.

The underpinnings of political behaviour are further explicated by Lau's [9] review of the literature on social categorization as latent structure learning. The paper argues that in order to understand political phenomena, scientists must adopt high-level conceptualizations of social categorization. Lau's research on how the brain probabilistically infers and tracks latent groups demonstrates that individuals' assessments of the contours of their group identities rely not only on how similar they are to the targets, but on a whole host of contextual factors. The manner in which individuals understand their ingroups and outgroups is thus more complex than previously imagined and can shed light on political polarization in various parliamentary structures—as well as its antidotes.

We examined participant & target predictors of dating behavior in a swiping task; target attractiveness & race were the largest predictors of decisions; individual personality traits were not important to make decisions

Modeling dating decisions in a mock swiping paradigm: An examination of participant and target characteristics. William J. Chopik, David J. Johnson. Journal of Research in Personality, Available online 20 February 2021, 104076. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2021.104076

Highlights

• We examined participant and target predictors of dating behavior in a swiping task.

• Target attractiveness and target race were the largest predictors of decisions.

• Individual difference characteristics were poor predictors.

• The relative influence of predictors in mobile-based dating apps are discussed.

Abstract: New online dating platforms, such as Tinder, are dramatically changing the context in which people seek romantic relationships. In these platforms, users select partners they are willing to start a conversation with by “swiping” on them. These platforms provide exciting possibilities for applying new methods to test how user (e.g., demographic, personality) and target/partner (e.g., attractiveness, race) factors predict attraction. Across four laboratory studies (total N = 2,679), target physical attractiveness and target race were the largest predictors of decisions in this hypothetical dating context, whereas user individual difference traits were poor predictors. The current studies provide substantive information about the factors that predict romantic attraction in the context of mobile-based dating applications.

Keywords: Tinderdating decisionsindividual differencesmating behaviorraceattraction

Involuntary singlehood and its causes: The effects of flirting capacity, mating effort, choosiness and capacity to perceive signals of interest

Involuntary singlehood and its causes: The effects of flirting capacity, mating effort, choosiness and capacity to perceive signals of interest. Menelaos Apostolou. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 176, July 2021, 110782. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2021.110782

Abstract: A considerable proportion of the population is involuntarily single; that is, they want to be in an intimate relationship but they face difficulties in doing so. The current paper attempted to assess some possible predictors of this phenomenon. More specifically, in a sample of 1228 Greek-speaking women and men, we found that participants who scored low in flirting capacity, capacity to perceive signals of interest and mating effort, were more likely to be involuntarily single than in an intimate relationship, and experienced longer spells of singlehood. Mating effort had also a significant effect on voluntary singlehood, with low scorers being more likely to be in this category than high scorers. Choosiness had also a significant effect, but only on voluntary singlehood, with high scorers being more likely to prefer to be single than low scorers.

Keywords: SinglehoodInvoluntary singlehoodFlirting capacityMating effortChoosinessSignals of interest

Check also The art of flirting: What are the traits that make it effective? Menelaos Apostolou, Christoforos Christoforou. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 158, 1 May 2020, 109866. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2020/01/the-art-of-flirting-what-are-traits.html

And A considerable proportion of people in postindustrial societies experience difficulties in intimate relationships and spend considerable time being single:

The Association Between Mating Performance, Marital Status, and the Length of Singlehood: Evidence From Greece and China. Menelaos Apostolou, Yan Wang. Evolutionary Psychology, November 13, 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/11/a-considerable-proportion-of-people-in.html

Conservatives were less influenced by overall consequences for the greater good in comparison with liberals: On average, conservatives are less inclined to accept harmful actions for the greater good than liberals

Political Ideology and Moral Dilemma Judgments: An Analysis Using the CNI Model. Dillon M. Luke, Bertram Gawronski. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, February 22, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167220987990

Abstract: Many real-world dilemmas involve disagreement about whether decisions should follow moral norms in an unconditional manner (deontology) or be based on the consequences for the greater good (utilitarianism). To examine how political ideology may account for some of these disagreements, the current research used a formal modeling approach to investigate the associations between political ideology and (a) sensitivity to consequences, (b) sensitivity to moral norms, and (c) general preference for inaction versus action in responses to moral dilemmas. Across three studies (N = 996) with samples from the United States (Studies 1 and 3) and the United Kingdom (Study 2), conservatives were less influenced by overall consequences for the greater good in comparison with liberals. Political ideology was not significantly associated with sensitivity to moral norms and general action tendencies. The findings provide more nuanced insights into how political ideology may contribute to disagreements on real-world moral dilemmas.

Keywords: CNI model, deontology, moral judgment, utilitarianism, political ideology

Discussion

The main goal of the current research was to provide deeper insights into the role of political ideology in disagreements about the right course of action in moral dilemmas. Using a battery of moral dilemmas inspired by real-world cases (Körner et al., 2020) and the CNI model to quantify sensitivity to consequences (C), sensitivity to moral norms (N), and general preference for inaction versus action (I) in responses to moral dilemmas (Gawronski et al., 2017), we found that sensitivity to consequences decreased as a function of conservative (vs. liberal) political ideology. Political ideology was not significantly associated with sensitivity to moral norms and general action tendencies. These findings replicated in two exploratory studies (Studies 1 and 2) and one preregistered study (Study 3) with participants from the United States (Studies 1 and 3) and the United Kingdom (Study 2) and remained robust after controlling for basic demographic variables (Study 3). The results also replicated in an integrative data analysis (Curran & Hussong, 2009) combining the data from all three studies (see Table S9 in the Supplemental Online Materials). Scatterplots of the associations between political ideology and the three CNI parameters in the integrative data analysis can be seen in Figure 2.

The current findings offer more nuanced insights into why conservatives and liberals may disagree about the most appropriate course of action in real-world dilemmas. Past research suggests that conservatives are less likely than liberals to endorse actions that violate moral norms for the sake of the greater good (e.g., Hannikainen et al., 2017; Piazza & Sousa, 2014). One potential interpretation of this difference is that conservatives are more concerned about violations of moral norms than liberals (see Young et al., 2013), suggesting a significant positive correlation between conservative (vs. liberal) political ideology and sensitivity to moral norms. Another interpretation is that conservatives are more concerned about actions that interfere with current states of affairs (i.e., status quo bias; see Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988), suggesting a significant positive correlation between conservative (vs. liberal) political ideology and general preference for inaction over action. Neither of these predictions received empirical support in the current studies. Instead, we found a significant negative correlation between conservative (vs. liberal) political ideology and sensitivity to consequences, suggesting that conservatives are less willing to accept consequentialist arguments about the greater good than liberals (see Piazza & Sousa, 2014). In other words, liberals and conservatives seem to agree that certain actions would be morally wrong because they violate consensually accepted moral norms. Yet, they seem to differ in the extent to which they are willing accept trade-offs when a norm violation would be beneficial for the greater good.

An interesting question regarding this finding is whether political differences in sensitivity to consequences are driven by political conservatism, political liberalism, or both. Because participants were recruited in groups based of their political ideology (i.e., conservative, moderate, liberal), follow-up analyses using a categorical classification can provide valuable insights for this question (see Table S5 in the Supplemental Online Materials). While we did not find consistent differences between groups in the three individual studies, an integrative data analysis (Curran & Hussong, 2009) combining the data from all three studies revealed that sensitivity to consequences was significantly weaker in the conservative group than in the liberal group.5 Yet, neither the conservative nor the liberal group differed from the moderate group. Together, these results suggest that sensitivity to consequences varies continuously across the political spectrum and is not driven exclusively by either conservatism or liberalism.

Another interesting question is whether sensitivity to consequences is more strongly associated with social or economic political ideology. Follow-up analyses with the data from the three individual studies did not find consistent evidence for different associations between sensitivity to consequences and social versus economic political ideology. However, when the data from all three studies were combined, an integrative data analysis revealed that sensitivity to consequences showed a significantly stronger association with social compared to economic political ideology (see Tables S6-S9 in the Supplemental Online Materials). This difference is consistent with earlier findings by Chan (2019), who found that preference for utilitarian over deontological judgments is more strongly associated with social compared to economic political ideology. The current results expand on these findings, suggesting that associations between moral dilemma judgments and social political ideology are rooted in differences in sensitivity to consequences.

Why the Difference?

While the current findings suggest that disagreement about the correct course of action in moral dilemmas is rooted in political differences in sensitivity to consequences, it is still unclear why liberals and conservatives differ in the observed manner. One potential explanation could be derived from Greene et al.’s (2001) dual-process theory of moral dilemma judgment, which suggests that deontological judgments are rooted in automatic emotional reactions to the idea of causing harm, whereas utilitarian judgments result from deliberate cognitive analyses of costs and benefits. Thus, to the extent that conservatives are less inclined to engage in deliberate thinking compared to liberals (see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), conservatives may show a weaker sensitivity to consequences, as observed in the current studies.

5 The integrative data analysis also revealed a significant difference between groups in general preference for inaction versus action (see Table S5 in the Supplemental Online Materials). However, given that no such difference was not found in the continuous analyses examining associations between political ideology and general preference for inaction versus action, we refrain from drawing conclusions from this finding.

However, counter to this interpretation, research using the CNI model suggests that deliberate thinking influences moral dilemma judgments via general action tendencies rather than sensitivity to consequences. Specifically, Gawronski et al. (2017, Experiments 2a and 2b) found that, although cognitive load led to a weaker preference for utilitarian over deontological judgments, this effect was driven by greater general preference for inaction versus action under cognitive load, not by weaker sensitivity to consequences. These results question not only a core assumption of Greene et al.’s (2001) dual-process theory; they also pose a challenge to the idea that the obtained association between political ideology and sensitivity to consequences is driven by differences in deliberate thinking.

An alternative possibility is that political differences in sensitivity to consequences are rooted in proto-utilitarian inclinations. Kahane and colleagues (2018) have proposed a two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology, consisting of acceptance of instrumental harm for the sake of the greater good (instrumental harm) and impartial concern for the welfare of others (impartial beneficence). To the extent that instrumental harm is positively associated with political conservatism and impartial beneficence is negatively associated with political conservatism—as proposed by Everett and Kahane (2020)—the current findings may be driven by weaker impartial concern for the welfare of others among conservatives.6 However, previous findings with the CNI model render this possibility unlikely. Körner et al. (2020) examined associations between the three CNI model parameters and the two dimensions of utilitarianism as captured by the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale (OUS; Kahane et al., 2018). Across four studies, neither instrumental harm nor impartial beneficence showed reliable associations with sensitivity to consequences. Instead, both dimensions showed significant negative associations with sensitivity to moral norms, suggesting that self-reported endorsement of utilitarian ideas (as captured by the two dimensions of the OUS) merely serves to justify a rejection of moral norms without increasing people’s actual sensitivity to consequences. Thus, given that political ideology was significantly associated with sensitivity to consequences and unrelated to sensitivity to moral norms, political differences in proto-utilitarian

6 Note that the proposed positive association between political conservatism and instrumental harm should lead to a positive association between conservative (vs. liberal) political ideology and sensitivity to consequences, counter to the negative association obtained in the current studies. inclinations seem rather unlikely to account for the current findings.

A potential answer to the question of why liberals and conservatives differ in their sensitivity to consequences is suggested by the finding that sensitivity to consequences was more strongly associated with social than economic political ideology (see Table S9 in the Supplemental Online Materials). Whereas social political ideology has been found to be more strongly linked to resistance to social change, economic political ideology has been found to be more strongly linked to acceptance of inequality (Duckitt, 2010; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). Together with the current findings, these results suggest that political differences in sensitivity to consequences may be rooted in differences in resistance to social change. Consistent with this conclusion, Hannikainen, Machery, and Cushman (2018) found evidence for a societal shift towards utilitarian judgments in the resolution of moral dilemmas. To the degree that conservatives (relative to liberals) are more resistant to such societal shifts, the negative association between political conservativism and sensitivity to consequences may reflect resistance to an increased sensitivity to consequences at the societal level. Future research might evaluate this hypothesis more directly by examining whether the three parameters of the CNI model are less affected by societal changes among conservatives compared to liberals.

Some Caveats

Although we obtained consistent evidence for an association between political ideology and sensitivity to consequences, it is worth noting that there was only partial support for an association between political ideology and traditional dilemma scores. Consistent with past research (e.g., Hannikainen et al., 2017; Piazza & Sousa, 2014), conservatives showed a weaker preference for utilitarian over deontological judgment than liberals in Studies 1 and 3. However, there were no political differences in preference for utilitarian over deontological judgment in Study 2. A potential reason for these mixed findings is that traditional dilemma scores confound the influence of multiple distinct determinants of moral dilemma judgments (Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Crone & Laham, 2017), which creates noise in the measurement of each confounded factor. Disentangling the confounded factors provides cleaner measures of each factor, which can increase the statistical power to detect associations between a given factor and other variables. Consistent with this interpretation, our findings were consistent with past research when analyses were conducted using the combined data from all three studies (see Table S9 in the Supplemental Online Materials), suggesting that conservatives show a weaker preference for utilitarian over deontological judgment than liberals.

While the association between political ideology and sensitivity to consequences was consistent across studies, it is worth noting that the obtained correlations were relatively small overall. Across studies, conservative (vs. liberal) political ideology showed a correlation with sensitivity to consequences of around r = -.13, and the strength of this association was attenuated when controlling for demographic variables, falling to marginal significance in Studies 1 and 2 (see Footnote 4). The strength of this association may seem somewhat surprising given the strong associations between political ideology and other aspects of moral judgment (e.g., Graham et al., 2009). Thus, although political ideology may contribute to disagreement about the right course of action in real-world dilemmas, it is possible that other person-related variables contribute to such debates over and above political ideology (e.g., Körner et al., 2020; Kroneisen & Heck, 2020; Luke & Gawronski, in press). In support of this possibility, gender was consistently associated with sensitivity to moral norms across studies, and age showed relatively strong associations with sensitivity to consequences and sensitivity to moral norms in Study 3. Future research examining associations between moral dilemma judgments and other person-related characteristics might help to better understand the sources of conflicting views in moral debates about real-world issues.

Related to this point, another important consideration is that the size of associations between political ideology and moral dilemma judgment may be sensitive to content-related aspects of specific dilemmas. Although associations between political ideology and preference for utilitarian over deontological judgments have been replicated with various dilemmas that are different from the ones used in the current studies (e.g., Chan, 2019; Hannikainen et al., 2017; Piazza & Landy, 2013; Piazza & Sousa, 2014; Young et al., 2013), we aimed to address this concern in an integrative data analysis (Curran & Hussong, 2009) that examined the contribution of individual dilemmas to the obtained results by separately excluding each dilemma before the calculation of the three parameter scores (see Table S10 in the Supplemental Online Materials). Confirming the generality of the obtained results, the association between political ideology and sensitivity to consequences was robust across exclusions, with conservatives being significantly less sensitive to consequences than liberals in every single case (-.15 < rs < -.11).

Finally, while the CNI modeling approach taken in the current research offers nuanced insights into the association between political ideology and moral dilemma judgment, all of the analyses are correlational and therefore not indicative of causation. Based on the preceding discussion, it seems possible that political conservatism (vs. liberalism) decreases sensitivity to consequences via resistance to societal shifts toward utilitarian judgments. Future research may test this causal hypothesis by employing longitudinal designs to examine how political ideology predicts changes in sensitivity to consequences over time or experimental designs to examine how sensitivity to consequences is influenced by manipulations of perceived societal standards surrounding moral dilemma judgment.