Japan: Narcissism encourages guilt and therefore inhibits lying behavior

Daiku Y, Serota KB, Levine TR (2021) A few prolific liars in Japan: Replication and the effects of Dark Triad personality traits. PLoS ONE 16(4): e0249815. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0249815

Abstract: Truth-Default Theory (TDT) predicts that across countries and cultures, a few people tell most of the lies, while a majority of people lie less frequently than average. This prediction, referred to as “a few prolific liars,” is tested in Japan. The study further investigated the extent to which the Dark Triad personality traits predict the frequency of lying. University students (N = 305) reported how many times they lied in the past 24 hours and answered personality questions. Results indicate that the few prolific liars pattern is evident in Japan thereby advancing TDT. Results also show that Japanese frequent liars tend to have Dark Triad personality traits, but the nature of the findings may be unique to Japan. Results of the generalized linear model suggest that the Dark Triad components of Machiavellianism and psychopathy exacerbate lying behavior by reducing the guilt associated with lying. However, narcissism encourages guilt and therefore inhibits lying behavior with both direct and indirect effects. These narcissism findings appear to contradict prior studies but stem from use of a more appropriate statistical analysis or the Japanese context.

Discussion

The purpose of this study was to test the few prolific liars predictions in Japan and to examine these prolific liars’ personality traits. Consistent with TDT predictions, the results documented the existence of the few prolific liars pattern in the current sample of Japanese students. Moreover, the results demonstrate that people high in Machiavellianism and psychopathy reported more lying, mediated by lowering guilt, while people high in narcissism reported less lying through both direct and indirect paths. Although we cannot fully establish the causal relationships with only this study, the results suggest that people high in Machiavellianism or psychopathy may be inclined to tell more lies due to reduced feelings of guilt and that people high in narcissism may tell fewer lies due to increased guilt. The reverse causal order alternative is that the act of lying reduces guilt causing Machiavellianism scores to increase. While it is possible that people who lie frequently come to experience less guilt over time, and as a consequence, rate themselves as higher on Machiavellianism and psychopathy, this seems less plausible than personality being the antecedent.

Consistent with prior studies, the distribution of self-reported lies is extremely skewed, indicating the existence of a few prolific liars in our sample. The average lying frequency was similar to that reported by prior studies, such as DePaulo et al. [1], Murai [2], and Serota and Levine [8]. Most participants reported five or fewer lies in the past 24 hours and only a few people reported six or more lies. Importantly, prior results demonstrate that the few prolific liar phenomenon is not an artifact of the self-reporting methodology. Halevy et al. [11] showed that the self-reported number of lies correlates with behavioral indices of dishonesty in a laboratory and in our data, eliminating low-confidence participants does not change the overall finding. Therefore, the self-reported results appear to represent a reliable index and the universality of the “few prolific liars” module of TDT.

TDT seeks to provide a pan-cultural account of human deceptive communication. Because TDT predictions are not culturally bound, it is critical to test TDT in a variety of cultures. Only by testing TDT in various countries can the robust nature of TDT’s predictions be ascertained. Although TDT studies have previously been conducted in North America, South America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, this research is the first to test TDT in Japan. The current findings add to the cultural span of TDT by replicating effects documented elsewhere.

Investigating the personality traits of the prolific liars using GLM yielded a more complex outcome than prior results. These results showed that Machiavellianism and psychopathy are associated with more lying, similar to prior studies [11, 14]. This suggests the two effects are robust enough to endure more rigorous statistical analysis. In addition, this study revealed that the effects are mediated by reduced feeling of guilt. Those high on Machiavellianism and psychopathy are thought to have lower guilt than ordinal people do, and this lower inhibition contributes to telling more lies.

These results, that the few prolific liars are Machiavellian and psychopathic people, may shed light on the fundamental question, “why is the distribution so skewed?” from an evolutionary perspective. Previous research found that people who have Dark Triad personality traits take the fast life strategy characterized by short-term mating, selfishness, and other antisocial manifestations [15, 26] and that they account for only a small part of the entire population [27]. Considering these findings, one possible explanation for the skewed distribution of lying is that the few prolific liars are people who adopted the fast life strategy. In modern society, the traits are seen as undesirable because most people do not adopt this strategy [28] but prolific lying may help those who adopt the fast life strategy to survive and reproduce. This evolutionary system may be the reason why we see the few prolific liars across cultures. This hypothesis is speculative but warrants further investigation.

However, somewhat surprisingly, narcissism had a negative effect on the frequency of lying. That is, results show people high in narcissism tell fewer lies. This result is contradictory to prior studies, which may result from the choice of statistical analyses. Jonason et al. [14] calculated the correlation coefficients and partial regression coefficients, finding a slightly positive correlation between narcissism and the number of lies. Similarly, Zvi and Elaad [12] found a positive relationship between narcissism and lying behavior. However, without accounting for the extremely skewed distribution of lie frequency, calculating Pearson correlations may yield misleading results, especially Type I errors [29]. As this and prior studies [7, 8, 11] indicated, approximately 40–60% of people asked about lying frequency report no lies during any specific 24-hour period. Therefore, the distribution for lying frequency will be positively skewed and substantial (Skewness > 1.0 is considered substantial; for the Japan data Skewness = 12.67, SE of Skewness = 0.14). This inclination is not only an extreme deviation from the assumption of normality, it is wholly unsuitable for calculating Pearson’s correlations, which assume linear relationships between two variables. In addition, just a few prolific liars might exorbitantly increase the correlation, as Pearson’s correlation is very sensitive to outliers. For these reasons, Pearson’s correlations with lie frequency may be unreliable when the skewed distribution is considered. Spearman’s rank correlation suppresses the effect of outliers.

Moreover, we found the negative effect for narcissism (i.e., narcissists tell fewer lies) when controlling Machiavellianism and psychopathy. While the zero-order correlations of narcissism include the effects of Machiavellianism and psychopathy, the result of the negative binomial regression partials out the effects of them when assessing the effect of narcissism. Thus, it may be safe to say that the negative coefficient of narcissism is the pure effect of narcissism on lying frequency. This may be the reason why we had the negative coefficient while we had a positive correlation between lying frequency and narcissism in Spearman’s rank correlation.

This negative effect of narcissism on lying is interpretable from three perspectives. The first is narcissism’s relative brightness. Narcissism is considered the least dark trait among the three [30]. Narcissism has weaker relationships with anti-social behavior [15, 31, 32] and the ability to lie [33] than do either Machiavellianism or psychopathy. Considering these findings, perhaps it is not so surprising that narcissism had a different effect from Machiavellianism and psychopathy in our study. Narcissism is characterized by entitlement, superiority, and dominance [14]. The narcissist’s priority is keeping self-image positive, and frequent lying may hurt self-image. If so, it may be a reason why those higher on narcissism tell fewer lies.

The second consideration is lying types. Our study did not classify lying types, so all kinds of lies are included in the analysis. Narcissists are thought to tell lies mostly about themselves to make a good impression on others. In fact, Jonason et al. [14] revealed that narcissism had its strongest relationship with the number of self-gain lies. Future research might benefit by classifying lie types as well as motives to lie.

The third possibility is cultural differences. Narcissism scores may differ across countries. Foster et al. [34] found that narcissism was higher in an individualistic culture than in a collectivistic culture; the United States, especially, produced the highest levels of reported narcissism. According to their study, Japan’s narcissism is predicted to be lower than that of the United States. Moreover, Japan is thought to have a shame culture rather than a guilt culture [35], suggesting that in Japan, social behavior might be determined by feelings of shame rather than guilt. Replicating the current study in a western country could facilitate a comparative cultural analysis.

Further research on the subtypes of narcissism also might be useful for interpreting this result. Narcissism can be divided into vulnerable narcissism—associated with introversion, defensiveness, anxiety and vulnerability to life’s traumas—and grandiose narcissism—associated with extraversion, self-assurance, exhibitionism, and aggression [36]. Previous research has revealed that grandiose narcissism is more strongly related to unethical behaviors than vulnerable narcissism [16]. The Dark Triad Dirty Dozen, which we used in the current study, does not measure the two types separately. Consequently, there is a possibility that the DTDD is primarily measuring vulnerable narcissism and that this form of narcissism, which is associated with a positive self-image, is more likely to inhibit lying.

The current study has three limitations to consider. First, our analysis did not control for the frequency of social interaction. The Dark Triad personality traits are positively correlated with extraversion among the Big Five personality traits [13]. Thus, an alternative explanation for high lie frequency could be that prolific liars have more social interactions in a day rather than having an anti-social personality. However, studies that have controlled for frequency of interaction [1, 37] found prolific liars even with a known rate of interaction. Future research may resolve this point by controlling for interaction rate.

Second, the results of this study are based solely on lies reported by college students. To improve the generalizability of the results, a study obtaining lie reports from a broader sample could be conducted. Fortunately, research in other countries is informative about how student samples are similar and different from more broadly representative samples. Research has documented the few prolific liars pattern (i.e., positive skew) in studies of both students and adult samples [7, 8, 10]. The primary difference is that students tend to tell more lies on average. It is reasonable to expect that we would find a similarly skewed distribution among Japanese adults even though they may tell fewer lies, overall.

Third, the measurement of the Dark Triad used in this study may be insufficient. The Japanese version of the DTDD has differences from the original English version (e.g., lower reliability of psychopathy). The differences are most evident in Machiavellianism and psychopathy, but due to the strict translation procedures they are not substantial. It appears unlikely that the divergence for narcissism may have resulted from a translation problem.

Future research might examine other TDT propositions in Japan and other countries in Asia. Truth-bias has been documented in Korea [6] and Murai [2] found that Japanese participants reported (knowingly) receiving far few lies each day than they told. Both prior findings are consistent with TDT’s applicability in Asian countries. Future research might provide a more direct test of the truth-default using the method developed by Clare and Levine [5] thus investigating if thoughts of deception come to mind unprompted. Given known cultural differences (e.g., collectivism versus individualism; power distance), TDT’s predications regarding pan-cultural deception motives and the projected motive model also need to be tested across Asia.

Overall, this research clearly indicates the existence of a few prolific liars in a student sample in Japan. As observed in other parts of the world, most Japanese people tell few or no lies on a given day and a small number of people, prolific liars, tell the majority of lies. Additionally, the study found that lying frequency increased with higher Machiavellianism and psychopathy scores, and that these factors are mediated by feelings of guilt. Documenting the mediating effects of guilt expands our knowledge about lying and its prediction. This mediating effect suggests that people with certain personality traits such as Machiavellianism may feel less guilty about lying and consequently have fewer inhibitions about lying. Practically, it may be effective to activate people’s feelings of guilt to suppress lying in real world. We further observed an unexpected effect of narcissism, which inhibited lying frequency. How narcissism affects lying should be investigated further.

Opening up relationships: Those with perceptions of higher‐quality alternatives had clearly more interest in consensual non‐monogamy

Quality of alternatives positively associated with interest in opening up a relationship. Geoff MacDonald  Yoobin Park  Alathea Hayes  Isabelle Vanasse Grosdidier  Sun W. Park. Personal Relationships, April 14 2021. https://doi.org/10.1111/pere.12377

Abstract: We use the Investment Model framework to examine what relationship features are associated with interest in and positive evaluations of consensual non‐monogamy (CNM) among individuals in monogamous relationships. In data sets from the United States (Study 1), Europe (Study 2), and Korea (Study 3; total N = 886), perceptions of higher‐quality alternatives were consistently associated with more interest in CNM. Further, consistent with previous work on commitment‐motivated relationship maintenance processes, we found support for an indirect effect whereby lower commitment was associated with higher perceived attractiveness of alternatives, which in turn was associated with more interest in CNM. The data suggest that the idea of CNM is likely to be most attractive to those who see themselves as having higher‐quality relationship options.

How Narcissism Shapes Responses to Antisocial and Prosocial Behavior: Hypo-Responsiveness

How Narcissism Shapes Responses to Antisocial and Prosocial Behavior: Hypo-Responsiveness or Hyper-Responsiveness? Jiafang Chen et al. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, April 15, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672211007293

Abstract: Narcissists have a relatively higher proclivity for displaying antisocial rather than prosocial behaviors, suggesting a comparatively higher tendency for unfavorably impacting societies. However, maintenance of social order also depends on appropriate responses to others’ social behavior. Once we focus on narcissists as observers rather than actors, their impact on social functioning becomes less clear-cut. Theoretical arguments suggest that narcissists could be either hypo-responsive or hyper-responsive to others’ social behavior. Across four studies, we examined narcissists’ responsiveness to variations in others’ antisocial and prosocial behaviors. Results showed that narcissists differentiated less between others’ antisociality/prosociality, as reflected in their subsequent moral character evaluations (Studies 1–4) and reward and punishment (Studies 3 and 4). These results suggest that narcissists are hypo-responsive to others’ social behaviors. Implications and directions for future research are discussed.

Keywords: narcissism, social perception, responsiveness, moral character evaluation, reward/punishment

General Discussion

We examined how observers’ narcissism shapes their responsiveness to others’ social behavior. Across four studies, narcissists were consistently less responsive to variations in actors’ antisocial or prosocial behavior, providing evidence for a hypo-responsiveness rather than a hyper-responsiveness hypothesis. Specifically, narcissists differentiated less between others’ antisocial versus control behavior (Study 1), others’ prosocial versus control behavior (Study 2), and others’ antisocial versus prosocial tendencies (Studies 3 and 4), which was reflected in their subsequent moral character evaluations (Studies 1–4), and reward and punishment behavior (Studies 3 and 4).

Theoretical and Practical Implications

The present research has several theoretical implications. First, it extends prior research on narcissists’ responses to others’ behavior by switching from the perspective of a direct target or victim of (close) others’ behavior (Back et al., 2013; Bushman & Baumeister, 1998) to an indirect target or third-party observer perspective, examining responses to both antisocial and prosocial behaviors, and identifying downstream consequences of narcissists’ hyposensitivity mainly for moral character evaluations and also indirectly for reward and punishment. Therefore, our findings improve our understanding of narcissists’ dynamic self-regulatory processing in interpersonal situations (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001) from more inclusive perspective.

Previous work has shown that, to maintain a positive self-concept in the agentic (vs. communal) domain (e.g., power, status; Grijalva & Zhang, 2016), narcissists are hyper-sensitive and vigilant to external cues related to status or power (Grapsas et al., 2020). Our findings on the mediation effects of recognized antisociality/prosociality complement this work by illuminating narcissists’ lower sensitivity to or recognition of communal information. Moreover, our exploratory results showing narcissists’ differentiation in perceived similarity to a successful/unsuccessful target (agentic information) provided further evidence for narcissists’ higher sensitivity to agentic than communal information (see detailed results in Supplemental Materials). Thus, it does not appear that narcissists are indiscriminately less sensitive to all contexts.

Alternatively, narcissists’ hypo-responsiveness could stem from their awareness of others’ underlying motivations for antisocial and prosocial behaviors. Both antisocial and prosocial behaviors can constitute a route to positive self-presentation (Flynn et al., 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2011), with antisocial behaviors being more commonly adopted by narcissists to gain status or attention (Adams et al., 2014). Although narcissism is unrelated to self-enhancement through prosocial behaviors (Nehrlich et al., 2019), narcissists sometimes present prosocial behaviors for selfish reasons, like gaining career experience (Brunell et al., 2014), or for praise and attention (Konrath et al., 2016). Thus, it is possible that narcissists are less responsive to others’ prosocial behaviors because they are aware of others’ potentially selfish motivations, and show greater tolerance for others’ antisocial behaviors which they themselves use to gain attention or status. Our exploratory results (see Supplemental Materials) showed that narcissists’ hypo-responsiveness on moral character evaluation was related to their lower self-reported antisociality/prosociality. One might posit that narcissists’ hypo-responsiveness resulted from them perceiving relatively lower (higher) similarity with the prosocial (antisocial) target. However, we found that narcissists showed no difference in perceived similarity with the two targets, which could be another manifestation of their insensitivity. Nonetheless, further examining the role of similarity in the scope of narcissists’ responses to others is a fruitful avenue for future research.

Interestingly, self-relevance was not found to play a role in affecting narcissists’ responsiveness in Study 1, with narcissists’ hypo-responsiveness being observed across both high and low self-relevance conditions. The fact that the antisocial actor pushed in at the front of the queue rather than immediately in front of participants might have rendered this behavior less psychologically proximate and less salient despite being relatively self-relevant, removing it from narcissists’ radar and reducing the need to allocate cognitive resources to encode this behavior (Wise et al., 2009). Consequently, such behavior may not have been perceived as a personal affront by narcissists (Lustman et al., 2010), reducing its perceived threat to their self-concept. Thus, this finding suggests that narcissists ignore threatening information that is not explicitly directed at them. Given that Back et al. (2013) did report that narcissists show revenge-related reactions when directly harmed by close others (i.e., friends), future research could examine the degree to which the anti- or prosocial behavior is directly aimed toward the narcissist while also considering the specific relationship between the narcissist and the protagonist.

Our findings that narcissists punished more overall regardless of their co-participant’s behavioral tendencies also contribute to research on narcissists’ unprovoked aggression (Park & Colvin, 2015; Reidy et al., 2010). Narcissists’ greater punishment of others might reflect their desire to assert their dominance vis-à-vis the other participant.

In terms of practical implications, our findings indicate that narcissists respond less discriminately on rewarding and punishing antisocial versus prosocial behaviors, which may over time lead to an increase in antisocial behaviors and a decrease in prosocial behaviors (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich et al., 2005). Such potential adverse influences may be particularly disconcerting when narcissists occupy influential positions. Recent research showed that narcissistic leaders sanctioned integrity-norm violators less and were associated with organizational cultures that devalued integrity (O’Reilly et al., 2018). Considering that narcissists have a higher chance of rising to powerful positions (Nevicka et al., 2011), organizations should introduce clear principles of conduct combined with incentives and penalties that are independent of leaders’ decisions to reduce the potentially detrimental impact of such leaders on organizations’ moral climate.

Strengths, Limitations, and Suggestions for Future Research

Our research has several strengths. We used different antisocial and prosocial behaviors and tendencies to demonstrate the generalizability of narcissists’ hypo-responsiveness to others’ social behavior and consistently found narcissists’ hypo-responsiveness in moral character evaluation. Furthermore, our findings show a similar effect for reward and punishment in Study 3, further lending some support for narcissists’ hypo-responsiveness. Finally, we illuminated underlying mechanisms by establishing recognition of others’ antisociality/prosociality as a mediator of narcissists’ moral character evaluations, reward, and punishment.

This research also has some limitations. Despite the validity and wide usage of the VDT (DeWall et al., 2013; Øverup et al., 2017), participants’ engagement in punishing may be affected by not seeing the consequences of their punishment behavior. Therefore, it would be helpful to enhance participants’ engagement in behavioral responses by adopting more direct punishment measures, such as noise blasts (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998). Moreover, because this was a one-shot study and there was little reason for participants to believe that the responses would affect their co-participant’s future behaviors, participants’ behavior toward their co-participant was unlikely to involve their conscious desire to regulate the co-participant’s future behavior. Future research could examine situations where punishment and reward behavior can be seen to have more observable impact on others over time.

While our research focused on im(morality) in the communal domain, future research could examine how narcissists, as third-party observers, respond to others’ (in)justices in the agentic domain that could harm or benefit someone else’s striving for status or power. For example, how would narcissists respond to seeing someone cheating in an examination, or seeing someone giving a classmate a leg up? Because narcissists’ higher feelings of power may allow them to better distinguish goal-relevant versus goal-irrelevant information (Guinote, 2007), they may categorize status- or power-related information as irrelevant if such information does not affect their own status or power. Therefore, they may be less responsive to such irrelevant information in spite of its status or power component. Thus, narcissists as a third party may likewise demonstrate hypo-responsiveness to others’ (in)justices in the agentic domain. 

The tendency toward last-minute cancellations (“social zapping”) is mainly predicted by Machiavellianism & narcissism; attentional impulsivity & timeliness procrastination are additional predictors

Predictors of social-zapping behavior: Dark Triad, impulsivity, and procrastination facets contribute to the tendency toward last-minute cancellations. Silke M. Müller, Dario Stolze, Matthias Brand. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 168, 1 January 2021, 110334. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.110334

Highlights

• Investigation of the tendency toward last-minute cancellations (“social zapping”).

• Dark Triad, maximizing, procrastination, and social zapping correlate positively.

• Social zapping is mainly predicted by Machiavellianism and narcissism.

• Attentional impulsivity and timeliness procrastination are additional predictors.

• Social zappers tend to self-serving, short-sighted decisions at the expense of others.

Abstract: The tendency to cancel appointments at short notice in favor of supposedly better alternatives is referred to as “social zapping”. Social zapping is positively associated with maximizing tendencies and problematic social networks use. However, empirical investigations on which additional personality characteristics predict social-zapping behavior are yet missing. In this study, a sample of N = 190 adults performed a questionnaire-based survey assessing different personality facets and social zapping tendency. Measures included the Dark Triad - Dirty Dozen scale, Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, Maximization scale, Pure Procrastination Scale, Fear of Missing Out (FoMO) scale, and the Social Zapping Scale. On a bivariate level, social zapping correlated positively with all other measures except for trait FoMO. The results of the multiple regression analysis showed that social zapping was mainly predicted by two dimensions of the Dark Triad, i.e. Machiavellianism and narcissism, as well as attentional impulsivity and the timeliness dimension of procrastination. Based on the results, social zappers can be characterized as individuals who tend to make self-serving and/or impulsive short-sighted decisions at the expense of others. Social zapping is a phenomenon of inherent self-interest, where individuals cancel appointments spontaneously (at the last minute) with others to pursue options they deem best for themselves.

Keywords:  Social zappingDark TriadFear of Missing OutMachiavellianismNarcissismPsychopathyMaximizationProcrastination

Professionals keep overestimating replicability of research

Gordon M, Viganola D, Dreber A, Johannesson M, Pfeiffer T (2021) Predicting replicability—Analysis of survey and prediction market data from large-scale forecasting projects. PLoS ONE 16(4): e0248780, Ap4 14 2021. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0248780

Abstract: The reproducibility of published research has become an important topic in science policy. A number of large-scale replication projects have been conducted to gauge the overall reproducibility in specific academic fields. Here, we present an analysis of data from four studies which sought to forecast the outcomes of replication projects in the social and behavioural sciences, using human experts who participated in prediction markets and answered surveys. Because the number of findings replicated and predicted in each individual study was small, pooling the data offers an opportunity to evaluate hypotheses regarding the performance of prediction markets and surveys at a higher power. In total, peer beliefs were elicited for the replication outcomes of 103 published findings. We find there is information within the scientific community about the replicability of scientific findings, and that both surveys and prediction markets can be used to elicit and aggregate this information. Our results show prediction markets can determine the outcomes of direct replications with 73% accuracy (n = 103). Both the prediction market prices, and the average survey responses are correlated with outcomes (0.581 and 0.564 respectively, both p < .001). We also found a significant relationship between p-values of the original findings and replication outcomes. The dataset is made available through the R package “pooledmaRket” and can be used to further study community beliefs towards replications outcomes as elicited in the surveys and prediction markets.

4 Discussion

In this paper, we investigate the forecasting performance of two different procedures to elicit beliefs about replication of scientific studies: prediction markets and prediction survey. We pooled the forecasting data using these two methods from four published papers in which forecasters, mainly researchers and scholars in the social sciences, estimated the probability that a tested hypothesis taken from a paper published in scientific journals would replicate. We find that the prediction markets correctly identify replication outcomes 73% of the time (75/103), while the prediction surveys are correct 66% of the time (68/103). Both the prediction market estimates, and the surveys-based estimates are highly correlated with the replication outcomes of the studies selected for replication (Pearson correlation = 0.581 and = 0.564, respectively), suggesting that studies that replicate can be distinguished from studies that do not successfully replicate. However, both the forecasts elicitation methods tend to overestimate the realized replication rates, and beliefs about replication are on average about ten percentage units larger than the observed replication rate. The results suggest that peer beliefs can be elicited to obtain important information about reproducibility, but the systematic overestimation of the replication probability also imply that there is room for calibrating the elicited beliefs to further improve predictions. In terms of comparing which elicitation method performs better in the task of aggregating beliefs and providing more accurate forecasts, our results suggest that the markets perform somewhat better than the survey especially if evaluating based on absolute prediction error.

We confirmed previous results which indicated that p-values, which can be interpreted as a measure for the strength of evidence, are informative in respect to replication success. There is, however, some debate on the appropriateness of interpreting p-values as a measure of strength of evidence [35, 36]. While Fisher viewed smaller p-values as stronger evidence against the null hypothesis [37], others methods have been proposed to be more suitable for quantifying the strength of evidence [38, 39]. Our findings thus provide some context for interpreting p-values as strength of evidence by demonstrating a relationship with replicability, but further research could extend this by analysing the relation between replication outcomes with other measures for the strength of evidence such as effect sizes. In addition, a meta-analysis provides no evidence for the relation between the p-value and replication outcomes to differ from project to project (or between academic fields). Conversely there is suggestive evidence of heterogeneity in the relationship between forecast and replication outcome, as shown by the meta-analysis of the correlations from the different projects. This heterogeneity may arise from differences in study design, the forecasters involved, or some fields may be easier to forecast than others. However, with only a small number of studies used in our meta-analyses, further data are required for more conclusive results.

The data and results presented in this paper can be used for future forecasting projects that are either planned or in progress [14], by informing experimental design and forecasting aggregation. The results can also be used to evaluate the predictive performance of prediction markets against other methods [33, 34, 40]. The pooled dataset presents opportunities for other researchers investigate replicability of scientific research, human forecasts and their intersection, as well as providing a benchmark for any further replication-based markets.

Unexpected losses of local teams lead to a small decrease in the number of births nine months thereafter due to reduced short-term sexual interest and intercourse

Soccer Scores, Short-Term Mood and Fertility. Fabrizio Bernardi & Marco Cozzani. European Journal of Population, Apr 14 2021, https://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10680-021-09576-2

Abstract: Previous research has shown that seemingly irrelevant events such as unexpected outcomes in sporting events can affect mood and have relevant consequences for episodes of crime and violence, investing behavior and political preferences. In this article, we test whether mood shocks associated with unexpected results in soccer matches in Spain affect fertility. We use data on betting odds and actual scores to define mood shocks and link them to births by month and province in Spain, between 2001 and 2015. We find that unexpected losses of local teams lead to a small decrease in the number of births nine months thereafter. The effect is larger for more unexpected losses, in those provinces with the largest amount of support for the local team and robust to a number of placebo tests. We argue that these results are consistent with the gain–loss asymmetry predicted by prospect theory.

Conclusions

Previous studies have documented that seemingly irrelevant events may have important consequences for political preferences and opinions, for risk-taking economic decisions and for episodes of crime and violence (Card and Dahl 2011; Edmans et al. 2007; Healy et al. 2010; Munyo and Rossi 2013). These findings have been interpreted as evidence that changes in mood spread to otherwise unrelated dimensions such as evaluation of politics or of economic risk and can trigger other types of behaviors. In this article, we build on this literature and test the hypothesis that mood shocks might influence fertility behavior. To this end, we analyze the universe of births data in Spain between 2001 and 2015 and focus on mood shocks arising from soccer scores in Spain. We compare betting odds and actual outcomes of soccer games in Spain to identify exogenous mood shocks around expected outcomes.

Two previous academic articles on the effect of sport events on fertility have produced contradictory findings. The anecdotal claim of an “Iniesta generation” following the last-minute goal by the Barcelona midfielder in the UEFA Champions league semifinal against Chelsea is confirmed by Montesinos et al. (2013), while no evidence of “Super Bowl Babies” is found by Hayward and Rybińska (2017). What these two studies have in common is that they both focus on the supposed positive effect of success in a major sport event on fertility. In our study, we enlarge the explicative framework to also consider the consequence of losses. We find that an unexpected loss by the most popular soccer team in a Spanish province leads to a reduction of 0.8% in the number of births nine months later in that province. We do not find an opposite effect for unexpected wins. This finding is consistent with an asymmetric hypothesis drawn from prospect theory, stating that mood changes arise due to deviations from expected outcomes, with losses having larger effect than wins. A possible way to reconcile our findings and those by Hayward and Rybińska (2017) and Montesinos et al. (2013) is that a sport victory has to come as really unexpected with an unique collective celebration to produce an increase in the number of births, as it might have been the case for the agonic victory of FC Barcelona against Chelsea, associated with the Iniesta generation, and less so for the Super Bowl games whose outcomes tend to be more equalized a priori.

From a quantitative point of view, the point estimate of our main finding is very small. For instance, the 0.8 percent reduction in the number of births in a given province associated with one unexpected loss of the local soccer in team nine months earlier that we have documented corresponds on average to a reduction of about 49 births for each unexpected loss in a given month for the province of Madrid. The estimated effect, therefore, does not entail any consequences for the aggregate fertility rate in Spanish provinces. The decrease in the number of births nine months after an unexpected loss by the local team is likely to be compensated in the following months, by those couples who were planning to have a child. Even small-sized effect can, however, entail theoretical relevance (Elliott and Granger 2004; Bernardi et al. 2017). First, our key finding supports the idea that emotions and mood can be important determinants for fertility. Scholars should then consider how to include emotions into the increasingly popular models of planned behavior to study fertility (Ajzen and Klobas 2013; Mencarini et al. 2015). Work in close-by disciplines can provide some fruitful interdisciplinary inspiration in that direction (Elster, 1998; Massey, 2002). Second, our main finding also provides support for the prediction of prospect theory beyond its most common applications in finance, insurance and consumption-saving decisions (Barberis, 2013).

Methodologically, our study adds to a body of studies that have investigated the effect of subjective well-being on fertility. Moods and emotions are an important component of subjective well-being (Diener et al. 1999). There is now some evidence that happier people are more likely to have children and conversely that stress and poor mood might cause infertility (Aassve et al. 2012; Cetre et al. 2016; Greil 1997; Le Moglie et al. 2015; Parr 2010). Although our results refer only to short-lived mood shock, they provide critical evidence that supports a causal interpretation of the association previously found between happiness and fertility.

A major limitation of our study that makes us interpret these suggestive results with caution is that we cannot observe the intervening mechanisms between soccer scores and mood shock and between the latter and reduction in number of births. In a direct extension of this work, one could measure mood shocks with a sentiment analysis using Twitter data on province base (Mencarini et al. 2019). One could also focus on the intervening mechanism between mood shocks and fertility, i.e., reduction in sexual desire and intercourse. One could then study the effect of mood shock on some proxies for sexual arousal and intercourse, such as the internet access to porn sites (Markey and Markey 2010) or consumption of condoms and morning-after pills.

Still, these additional analyses with different indicators for mood shocks and proxies for sexual intercourse at the province level would still suffer from a major limitation that we also face in this current work, namely that we use macro-level data to test a micro-level mechanism. In this respect, future research could focus on physiological mechanisms (Bernhardt et al. 1998; van der Meij el al. 2012) and test whether testosterone change following vicarious experience of unexpected wins and losses is indeed asymmetric, so that a hormone change after unexpected losses is larger than the increase after unexpected wins. One could also look at variations in sexual interest and behaviors (Bancroft et al. 2003; Janssen et al. 2013) and analyze whether and how mood shocks related to soccer outcomes (or any other event that might affect mood) affect sexual interest and intercourse.

Humans sometimes picture themselves from an external vantage point, particularly when they consider events in a broader context or care about their reputation

Picturing yourself: a social-cognitive process model to integrate third-person imagery effects. Zachary Adolph Niese,Richard P. Eibach &Lisa K. Libby. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, Apr 13 2021. https://doi.org/10.1080/20445911.2021.1912051

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1382386165299486721

Abstract: People have a fascinating capacity to picture their actions from an external vantage point. Much of the research on this third-person imagery has focused on the specific effects it has on cognition due to the elements of episodic experience that it lacks relative to first-person imagery. Other research focuses on the information that the third-person provides that first-person imagery lacks. We propose a more systematic approach that conceptualises how third-person imagery’s various effects interrelate due to a common underlying social-cognitive function. Specifically, we outline an integrative model proposing that third-person and first-person imagery cause people to adopt qualitatively distinct processing styles. This model explains many of the diverse effects that have been documented in the literature and helps reconcile seemingly discrepant findings. We conclude with recommendations for strategies to more systematically investigate the functions of visual perspective in mental imagery to build more comprehensive understanding of this phenomenological variable.

KEYWORDS: visual imagery perspectivethird-person imageryprocessing styles

An ant can increase and decrease its brain size, according to its reproductive status

Reversible plasticity in brain size, behaviour and physiology characterizes caste transitions in a socially flexible ant (Harpegnathos saltator). Clint A. Penick, Majid Ghaninia, Kevin L. Haight, Comzit Opachaloemphan, Hua Yan, Danny Reinberg and Jürgen Liebig. Proceedings of the Royal Society B, April 14 2021. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2021.0141

Abstract: Phenotypic plasticity allows organisms to respond to changing environments throughout their lifetime, but these changes are rarely reversible. Exceptions occur in relatively long-lived vertebrate species that exhibit seasonal plasticity in brain size, although similar changes have not been identified in short-lived species, such as insects. Here, we investigate brain plasticity in reproductive workers of the ant Harpegnathos saltator. Unlike most ant species, workers of H. saltator are capable of sexual reproduction, and they compete in a dominance tournament to establish a group of reproductive workers, termed ‘gamergates'. We demonstrated that, compared to foragers, gamergates exhibited a 19% reduction in brain volume in addition to significant differences in behaviour, ovarian status, venom production, cuticular hydrocarbon profile, and expression profiles of related genes. In experimentally manipulated gamergates, 6–8 weeks after being reverted back to non-reproductive status their phenotypes shifted to the forager phenotype across all traits we measured, including brain volume, a trait in which changes were previously shown to be irreversible in honeybees and Drosophila. Brain plasticity in H. saltator is therefore more similar to that found in some long-lived vertebrates that display reversible changes in brain volume throughout their lifetimes.

4. Discussion

Workers of Harpegnathos saltator exhibited reversible changes in brain size similar to that found in relatively long-lived vertebrate species. Changes in brain volume observed in vertebrates generally track seasonal reproductive cycles and are triggered by reproductive hormone cascades [9]. Likewise, brain changes in H. saltator also track the reproductive status and are associated with changes in reproductive hormone levels [20,21] and the expression of key regulatory genes [42]. Changes in the vertebrate brain include the seasonal addition of new neurons [54], which we did not specifically measure here, but changes in total and region-specific brain volumes are comparable.

[Figure 6. Correlated plasticity in brain, behaviour, and physiology between reproductive and non-reproductive workers. (Online version in colour.)]

Task or experience-dependent plasticity of brain compartments has been demonstrated in various insects, including honeybees, ants, paper wasps, and moths (e.g. [11,34,55–57]). In H. saltator, gamergate brains were 19% smaller than the brains of foragers on average, which is in line with predictions that brain size should be reduced to divert metabolic resources to reproduction [12,13]. Even compared to comparatively younger inside workers, gamergate optic lobes were 24% smaller, suggesting they may not simply retain the brain size of young nurse workers, but most likely experience region-specific brain volume reduction. When gamergates of H. saltator were reverted back to non-reproductive status, their brains re-expanded and matched that of forager brains. Foraging requires the ability to orient towards the nest and to attack and retrieve live prey items, all of which requires higher cognitive processing. The observed reduction in central brain volume of gamergates and the subsequent expansion in reverted gamergates suggest it is used for the more demanding cognitive abilities of foraging [58]. Changes in the central brain of H. saltator, which includes the mushroom body, are consistent with results from other social insects [59]. In carpenter ants, foragers that perform cognitively demanding tasks exhibit an increase of more than 50% of mushroom body neuropile volume [11] and a similar pattern is found in the mushroom body of honeybees [60].

The pattern of size differences in the optic lobe of H. saltator suggests a programmed rather than experience-dependent change in brain volume. Gamergates displayed significantly smaller optic lobes than inside workers and foragers, both of which had equally large optic lobes. Gamergates were still exposed to light and thereby received visual stimulation from their nest-mates in our laboratory settings, so sensory deprivation is an unlikely cause for the size differences we observed. Given that gamergates do not rely on optic information under natural conditions, a reproduction-dependent size reduction seems most likely. The intermediate optic lobe size of reverted gamergates relative to gamergates and non-reproductive workers suggests a presumably slower reversion speed of the optic lobe compared to the central brain. However, the size reductions of the optic lobes and of the central brain compared to reverted gamergates both suggest this brain size reduction is an energy-saving mechanism as proposed previously [12,13].

The reversibility of changes in brain size in H. saltator contrasts with results in the honeybee and in Drosophila. Brain size in honeybees increases as nurse workers transition to foragers, but when foragers are reverted to nurse status, they do not show a decrease in brain volume [32]. Honeybee foragers in the study by Fahrbach et al. [32] were only reverted back to nurses for 5 days, while gamergates in the present study were reverted for 6–8 weeks, which may explain why brain changes were observed in our study but not in previous studies on honeybees. In addition, honeybee foragers typically only live for a matter of weeks, and there is no biological ‘reason' for why they should fully revert to nurse status—in a colony of 50 000 bees, foragers can easily be replaced by new workers. By contrast, H. saltator colonies are small (usually less than 100 individuals), and each worker represents a more valuable resource in terms of their relative contribution to colony productivity. Studies in Drosophila have looked at region-specific changes in brain size associated with adult age, and while the medulla of the optic lobe in D. melanogaster increases in size with age, sensory deprived medullae do not increase in size and this lack of growth seems to be irreversible later in life [33]. This difference in brain plasticity corroborates differences in the plasticity of the antennal lobe between ants and Drosophila. When the odorant receptor co-receptor (orco) was knocked out in ants, the antennal lobes showed a significant reduction in two ant species [61,62]. A similar morphological change was not present in Drosophila when orco was knocked out, which suggests a hardwired mode of olfactory glomeruli formation in the Drosophila antennal lobe [63] and potentially major differences in brain development between Drosophila and ants.

Along with reversion in brain size, we found behavioural and physiological reversions that include the ovarian activity, venom production, CHC profile, and expression of associated genes (figure 6). Combined changes in physiological traits and underlying gene expression levels demonstrate that the changes we observed in reverted gamergates were not random, but instead matched a clearly defined worker phenotype. If we had observed a mix of different physiological changes that were inconsistent with the worker phenotype, then we might have expected these changes to be driven by isolation stress alone. The effects of chronic stress are generally expected to increase the allostatic load and result in decreases in body mass and brain function [64], yet contrary to this prediction, we observed increases in brain size and venom production in reverted gamergates. Likewise, changes in gene expression of ELOV, which is involved in fatty acid elongation, and Vg, the vitellogenin egg yolk precursor, were consistent with downstream physiological responses of CHC profiles and ovarian activity.

The observed reversibility in phenotypic plasticity in H. saltator gamergates that transition back to non-reproductive workers is present despite the rarity of such events. Naturally, queens and gamergates reproduce until senescence and do not substantially contribute to foraging after the loss of status. Thus, there would appear to be little selective pressure to keep reproductive specialization reversible. However, reversibility of phenotypic plasticity could be maintained to allow workers the return to forager status after they have lost a reproductive tournament. Dominance tournaments last up to 40 days in H. saltator, and initially up to half the workforce of a colony may compete [41]. Physiological changes begin shortly after tournaments are initiated [21,42], and reversibility may allow workers to return to forager status without suffering long-term effects associated with the early transition period to reproductive status. Among social insects, lower termites offer another rare example of reversible plasticity, in which individuals develop regressively from nymphal instars to ‘worker' instars that lack wing buds [65]. The precise reason why regressive moults occur in lower termites is not understood, but it does have parallels to reversible plasticity in H. saltator. In both H. saltator and lower termites, reversible plasticity allows individuals to retain flexibility in shifting between non-reproductive and reproductive pathways.

Neither Facial Aggressiveness nor Facial Width to Height Ratio Are Related to Fighting Success

Richardson, Thomas, Anam Bhutta, Elena Bantoft, and R. Tucker Gilman. 2021. “Neither Facial Aggressiveness nor Facial Width to Height Ratio Are Related to Fighting Success.” PsyArXiv. April 14. doi:10.31234/osf.io/8zu6h

Abstract: There is a growing consensus that there is information in a man’s faces about how formidable (big and strong) he is. Recent work in mixed martial artists has shown that there may be facial correlates of fighting success. Fighters with more aggressive looking faces, as well as higher facial width to height ratios (fWHR), win a greater percentage of their fights. This has been used as evidence that human males may have evolved to signal and detect formidability using facial features. However, all previous studies have used datasets that may have considerable overlap, so it is important to replicate these effects in new samples. Moreover, some studies show that facial width to height ratio is correlated with body size, which may have confounded associations between fWHR and fighting success. The present study attempted to replicate and expand previous findings in 3 samples totalling several hundred professional fighters taken from several combat sporting leagues. I also tested whether head tilt affected ratings of aggressiveness, as previous studies have found conflicting effects. Overall, I found no significant links between fighting success and fWHR or facial aggressiveness. Tilting the head up or down both made a fighter’s face look more aggressive. Interestingly, there was only low-moderate agreement between raters on the apparent aggressiveness of a given face. Further, I found that facial width to height ratio was related to body size, and that body size mediated the link between fWHR and perceived aggression. This work casts doubt on several theories that argue the human face evolved to show fighting prowess and threat.

We believe we rely more on reasoning, and less on feelings, than others, driven by the motivation to self‐enhance because we believe the use of reasoning is superior & self‐enhancing, compared to the use of feelings

More Rational or More Emotional than Others? Lay Beliefs about Decision‐Making Strategies. Noah VanBergen  Nicholas H. Lurie  Zoey Chen. Journal of Consumer Psychology, April 13 2021. https://doi.org/10.1002/jcpy.1244

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1382197818425806848

Abstract: Research demonstrates that people utilize both reasoning and feeling in decision making and that both strategies can be advantageous. However, little is known about how people perceive their decision making relative to others. Despite research findings and popular appeals supporting the use of affective decision processes, across a series of studies, we find that individuals believe they rely more on reasoning, and less on feelings, than others. These effects are driven by the motivation to self‐enhance where, in most contexts, individuals believe the use of reasoning is superior, and self‐enhancing, compared to the use of feelings. Consistent with this mechanism, beliefs that one’s decisions are more rational than others’ are: (a) stronger for those who exhibit greater beliefs in the superiority of reasoning (vs. feeling), (b) attenuated when the decision context precludes motivational thinking about the self or the self is affirmed, and (c) reversed when the use of feelings is perceived as more self‐enhancing. We demonstrate downstream consequences (e.g., decision delegation), rule out alternative explanations, and discuss practical implications of these lay beliefs.