This study is the first systematic review and meta-analysis to examine changes in domestic violence incidents from pre- to post-lockdown periods; results show moderate to strong increase in domestic violence incidents

Domestic violence during the COVID-19 pandemic - Evidence from a systematic review and meta-analysis. Alex R. Piquero et al. Journal of Criminal Justice, Volume 74, May–June 2021, 101806. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2021.101806

Highlights

• Crime changed from pre- to post-COVID-19 lockdown periods.

• Limited evidence shows an increase in domestic violence.

• This study is the first systematic review and meta-analysis to examine changes in domestic violence incidents from pre- to post-lockdown periods.

• Results show moderate to strong increase in domestic violence incidents between pre- and post-lockdown periods.

Abstract

Purpose: The aim of this review was to estimate the effect of COVID-19-related restrictions (i.e., stay at home orders, lockdown orders) on reported incidents of domestic violence.

Methods: A systematic review of articles was conducted in various databases and a meta-analysis was also performed. The search was carried out based on conventional scientific standards that are outlined in the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis Protocols (PRISMA-P) and studies needed to meet certain criteria.

Results: Analyses were conducted with a random effects restricted maximum likelihood model. Eighteen empirical studies (and 37 estimates) that met the general inclusion criteria were used. Results showed that most study estimates were indicative of an increase in domestic violence post-lockdowns. The overall mean effect size was 0.66 (CI: 0.08–1.24). The effects were stronger when only US studies were considered.

Conclusion: Incidents of domestic violence increased in response to stay-at-home/lockdown orders, a finding that is based on several studies from different cities, states, and several countries around the world.

Keywords: Meta-analysisCOVID-19Domestic violenceLockdowns

4. Discussion

The purpose of this study was to examine whether policies implemented to reduce the spread of the coronavirus, namely stay-at-home or lockdown orders, were associated with any changes in domestic violence using administrative/official pre-post records. Our work was focused on systematically reviewing the literature on any potential changes in domestic violence after restrictions were put into place.

Following systematic review protocol, our initial research started with over 22,000 records identified through database searches as being potentially eligible for inclusion. After our eligibility criteria were imposed, we ended with 18 studies that were included in the systematic review, which is substantively similar to many such reviews in the criminological literature. These 18 studies yielded a total of 37 estimates, the results of which showed an overwhelming increase (pre-post) in reports of domestic violence. Specifically, 29 of the 37 study estimates showed a significant increase. Finally, our forest plot of the distribution of effect size estimates, based on the information necessary to perform such calculations (12 studies and 17 effect sizes), showed an overall medium effect size of 0.66. In short, the evidence is strong that incidents of domestic violence increased in response to stay-at-home/lockdown orders, a finding that is based on several studies from different cities, states, and several countries around the world.

To be sure, while our results rely on the available research that met our inclusion criteria that exists at this time, it remains a sampling of the work that is being done and not yet known. As well, much of the early work that has focused on crime changes in response to the pandemic-related lockdown orders relies on short windows of observations, a few weeks or months. But this is true of the publication process, whereby the time an article has gone through review and published many months have passed since the researchers finalized their data collection. Therefore, continued follow-ups are needed to add to and update our database going forward. Another limitation of our work is that the database relies mainly from U.S. studies, in large part because those are the studies that fit the criteria outlined in our search parameters. We know, for example, that domestic violence is a serious problem in the Americas, and in particular in Low and Middle Income Countries (LMIC) where there is a significant amount of violence, but little is noted in administrative data nor is there much help to aid victims. As a consequence, we anticipate that when researchers carry out sustained analyses of domestic violence in LMIC countries, they will likely uncover a devasting toll on women and children. Lastly, our work relies on official records, which suffer from a variety of problems. At the same time, other sources of domestic violence data, such as self-reports, have tended to show some short-term increases in domestic violence as well (Jetelina, Knell, & Molsberry, 2021). Additional work is needed to assess whether there are enough studies in that line of work to perform a similar analysis to the one carried out in this study. The same is true from the data reports from service providers (Pfitzner, Fitz-Gibbon, Meyer, & True, 2020). The more we can triangulate the data on domestic violence as a result of lockdown orders to gain a more complete picture of changes in victimization experiences, the better and more confident our penultimate conclusions can be.

5. Conclusion and policy implications

The results of this study underscore the importance of increasing the knowledge base about domestic violence, as there have been concerns raised by public health leaders, victim/survivor advocates, women's and children's groups, activists, and policymakers around the world about the potential significant spike in abuse related to the pandemic (see e.g., the Lancet Commission on Gender-Based Violence and Maltreatment of Young People, Knaul, Bustreo, & Horton, 2020). The global economic impact of COVID-19, record levels of unemployment, added stressors in the home—including the care and home schooling of children, financial instability, and illness or death caused or exacerbated by the virus—combined with the mental health toll of social distancing measures required by the epidemiological response, have undermined the decades of progress made in reducing the extent and incidence of domestic violence. In turn, the results of this systematic review call for significant attention to the policy responses and resources that are needed to attend to victims and survivors of domestic abuse that may not be getting the services they need. In particular, Galea, Merchant, and Lurie (2020) note the need to direct resources to historically marginalized groups and those likely to be disproportionately isolated during the pandemic, including older adults, women, and children with past experiences with violence and abuse, and those with ongoing mental illness and chronic health conditions—and it is certainly possible that these effects are magnified for women and children of color, immigrants or refugees, and/or households that speak a language other than English. In addition, the gendered impacts of the pandemic will be far-reaching and in need of sustained research and policy attention (Wenhma, Smith, & Morgan, 2020), especially those programs and policies that are the intersection between women and children such as income transfer programs.

It is also important for our response to domestic violence during the COVID-19 pandemic to learn from the lessons of responding to previous health crises, natural disasters, and major disruptions that may offer direction and guidance (Sánchez et al., 2020). There is strong evidence to suggest that women's physical and mental health, including the risk of first-time or escalating domestic violence, is connected to the consequences of natural disasters and epidemics, including social isolation, economic instability, and increasing relationship and family conflict (Campbell & Jones, 2016; Parkinson, 2019).

The governor of Puerto Rico recently declared a state of emergency related to gender-based violence, noting it to be a serious social and public health problem that has gotten worse as a function of the territory's economic turmoil, Hurricane Maria, and now the COVID-19 pandemic (Florido, 2021). Similar to Puerto Rico, there needs to be equally strong global, federal, and state level leadership to make these bold and decisive declarations, but also commitments to expand victims' access to health and support services and economic resources directed to families during and after the pandemic. We must look to collaborative and creative thinking, as well as to skilled and experienced victim advocates who have been providing and building upon increasingly evidence-based services for over four decades, on how to expand the availability and diversity of these services and resources, particularly transitional housing options for victims who may have contracted or been exposed to COVID-19. For those victims who report to law enforcement, there will be a need for more intensive police, social services, and victim advocacy follow-up both during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. Research will also need to explore whether the pandemic's impact on the incidence of domestic violence is sustained in the long-term.

While this systematic review provides strong evidence of increased officially reported domestic violence as a consequence of the COVID-19 stay-at-home and lockdown orders, the exact nature and context of the increase remains unknown. Increased reporting to the police, emergency rooms, and other healthcare settings may be a function of an increased number of victimizations, but also an increase in the decisions by some victims to call the police and seek criminal justice interventions. That is, changes in official reporting rates reflect both a change in extent of victimization experiences, but also the help-seeking decisions of those who were victims of domestic violence prior to and during the pandemic. The increase may include reports by a new set of domestic violence victims whose violence experiences are largely a function of the current economic impact of the pandemic, as well as the temporary isolation resulting from social distancing measures and stay-at-home orders (e.g., the abuse they experienced pre-pandemic was largely emotional in nature and circumstances surrounding the pandemic escalated that emotional control to acts of physical violence). The pandemic may have also served as the catalyst for those who were victims prior to the pandemic to report their experiences due to the increased incidence and severity of violence by their previously abusive partners.

While the findings in this study note increases in officially reported domestic violence, the direction of future research needs to include careful joint analyses of estimates from police agencies, shelter-based and clinical data, and self-report victimization data before, during, and after the COVID-19 pandemic to estimate the diverse types and context of domestic violence and also examine the ways in which the pandemic have placed women at further risk for physical violence, emotional and financial abuse, and coercive control in the long-term. Chandan et al. (2020) note that the selection bias associated with police, healthcare, and other administrative datasets consistently underestimate the extent and impact of domestic violence, a well-established finding in research before the pandemic. They conclude that without ongoing data collection and surveillance, it will not be possible to estimate the total burden of domestic violence both during and after the pandemic.

The stay-at-home measures have placed those most vulnerable to violence and abuse in close proximity to their potential abuser, and this may lead to a continued increase in the risk factors associated with domestic violence. The cause of this increase is likely to be shaped by a variety of factors that are associated with domestic violence more generally, but that have and will continue to be more prevalent during the COVID-19 pandemic. This includes social isolation and increased attempts by abusers to exert power and coercive control, unemployment, economic distress, marital conflict, and substance use and abuse. The financial stress associated with the COVID-19 pandemic has been unprecedented and is likely to disproportionately impact victims and survivors of domestic violence in the long-term. Women's economic dependence on male partners will continue to place many women at risk for new and continued domestic violence. Moreover, the disproportionate impact of the pandemic on unemployment among women, which is estimated to be four times greater for women as compared to men (Sasser Modestino, 2020; Tappe, 2020), along with their increasing responsibility for childcare and home-schooling, will exacerbate the financial challenges of women trying to navigate leaving violent relationships. Patrick et al. (2020) have identified a number of other financial stressors related to the pandemic, including increased food insecurity, decreased employer-sponsored insurance coverage for their children, and the loss of regular childcare leading to women's increasing unemployment, which in turn will lead to devastating impacts for domestic violence victims. Kashen, Glynn, and Novello (2020) point to the need for immediate and long-term action in the area of work-family policies and childcare infrastructure in order to mitigate these impacts.

Increases in domestic violence during the pandemic will also take a tremendous toll on the children living in violent homes and those directly exposed to domestic violence and abuse. As Phelps and Sperry (2020) note, for many children, schools are their only option for mental health services and trauma-informed care and support—not to mention adequate nutrition. It will therefore be important to direct research to examine the impact of the increase in domestic violence during the pandemic on children, given the well-established research on the diverse impacts of family violence on children, and the literature pointing to the intergenerational transmission of violence (Spatz-Widom, 1989). Research has already demonstrated the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic among parents and children with respect to social isolation, loneliness, and depression. Research by Patrick et al. (2020) finds that in the year since the beginning of the pandemic, a quarter of parents reported worsening mental health for themselves and a 14% worsening in the behavioral health of their children. They find that the combined impact of lack of child-care due to school closures, reduced access to healthcare due to closures and delays in visits, and declines in food security led to the most substantial declines in a family's mental and behavioral health. It is clear that these negative economic circumstances and declining mental health among parents and children, combined with the trauma of violence exposure, are likely to have substantial detrimental impacts for children long-term.

Researchers and policy makers will need to identify both the short- and long-term implications of the COVID-19 pandemic on the risk for domestic violence and subsequent consequences. This includes an understanding of the nature of domestic violence and types of victimizations that come to the attention of the police, and how police agencies may better address this changing crime problem, as well as those that do not get reported to law enforcement and how to address those situations. For those victims reporting their victimization experiences to the police, but choosing—or being forced—to remain with their abuser, there will be a need for more intensive law enforcement, social services, and victim advocacy follow-up both during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. Federal governments will need to ensure that financial stimulus packages aimed at reducing the economic impact of the pandemic on families also include targeted resources for women and children leaving violent homes, and at the same time earmark resources for victim service and healthcare providers seeing an increase in their caseloads related to domestic violence during and after the pandemic. Boserup, McKenney, and Elkbuli (2020) note the importance of making screening tools and assessments for domestic violence more readily available in diverse community, clinical, and healthcare settings, particularly via telehealth. This may also include collaboration between COVID-19 testing and vaccination sites and police agencies and domestic violence response organizations to include abuse screenings and safety planning. Finally, there will need to be creative approaches to reaching out to those women and children most at risk and often least likely to come to the attention of official agencies and victim response organizations. This includes the expansion of telehealth and remote victim services, expansion of team-based behavioral response units, and the development of innovative referral systems for any and all agencies and providers responding to calls for help from victims and survivors experiencing abuse in their home.

Participants’ intention to vote for male candidates increased with age until candidates were about 45 years old and then slightly decreased. In contrast, participants’ intention to vote for female candidates consistently decreased with candidates’ age

How Candidates’ Age and Gender Predict Voter Preference in a Hypothetical Election. Yiqin Alicia Shen, Yuichi Shoda. Psychological Science, May 21, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797620977518

Abstract: Are preferences for political candidates influenced by how old they appear to be? Amazon Mechanical Turk workers and undergraduate students were shown photos of 93 state legislators as candidates in hypothetical elections. Other information about the candidates (e.g., party affiliation) was held constant, randomized, or not presented. For very young candidates (< 35 years old), participants favored women over men. However, participants’ intention to vote for male candidates increased with age until candidates were about 45 years old and then slightly decreased. In contrast, participants’ intention to vote for female candidates consistently decreased with candidates’ age. Perceived attractiveness and warmth accounted for some of the gender differences in the effect of candidates’ perceived age.

Keywords: age, gender, voting, preregistered

The alcohol harm paradox: The hoi polloi suffer from higher rates of alcohol-related harm compared with advantaged groups, despite reporting similar or lower levels of consumption on average

Causal mechanisms proposed for the alcohol harm paradox—a systematic review. Jennifer Boyd, Olivia Sexton, Colin Angus, Petra Meier, Robin C. Purshouse, John Holmes. Addiction, May 17 2021. https://doi.org/10.1111/add.15567

Abstract

Background and Aims: The alcohol harm paradox (AHP) posits that disadvantaged groups suffer from higher rates of alcohol-related harm compared with advantaged groups, despite reporting similar or lower levels of consumption on average. The causes of this relationship remain unclear. This study aimed to identify explanations proposed for the AHP. Secondary aims were to review the existing evidence for those explanations and investigate whether authors linked explanations to one another.

Methods: This was a systematic review. We searched MEDLINE (1946–January 2021), EMBASE (1974–January 2021) and PsycINFO (1967–January 2021), supplemented with manual searching of grey literature. Included papers either explored the causes of the AHP or investigated the relationship between alcohol consumption, alcohol-related harm and socio-economic position. Papers were set in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development high-income countries. Explanations extracted for analysis could be evidenced in the empirical results or suggested by researchers in their narrative. Inductive thematic analysis was applied to group explanations.

Results: Seventy-nine papers met the inclusion criteria and initial coding revealed that these papers contained 41 distinct explanations for the AHP. Following inductive thematic analysis, these explanations were grouped into 16 themes within six broad domains: individual, life-style, contextual, disadvantage, upstream and artefactual. Explanations related to risk behaviours, which fitted within the life-style domain, were the most frequently proposed (n = 51) and analysed (n = 21).

Conclusions: While there are many potential explanations for the alcohol harm paradox, most research focuses on risk behaviours while other explanations lack empirical testing.

Discussion

This review examined explanations for the AHP to identify potential pathways and mechanisms which result in differential risk of harm between SEP groups. This is a new approach, and goes beyond previous systematic reviews and meta-analyses which have so far established the existence of the AHP and the contribution of alcohol to this relationship [3, 18]. We identified 16 themes within six domains used to explain the AHP. Risk behaviours were the most prevalent explanations. This finding, paired with the dominance of the behavioural paradigm in empirical work, suggests that there has been a reliance upon using risk behaviour to understand the AHP. Evidence found in this review opposed the idea that the AHP was an artefact. There were many other, mainly hypothetical, explanations for the AHP proposed in the literature. This included individual-level mechanisms (e.g. biological or psychological), contextual factors (e.g. place-based factors), the lived experience of disadvantage and upstream structural factors (e.g. the economy and politics). In part, this reflects an awareness that the AHP is complex; there is no simple explanation, and researchers do not view causes in isolation. However, it remains unclear why other re-occurring explanations (e.g. social support or access to health care) have been neglected, while researchers frequently return to risk behaviours. This is particularly puzzling, given that quantitative evidence suggests that risk behaviours only play a partial role [4, 47].

There are two potential reasons for this: theoretical and methodological. Study of the AHP is rooted in alcohol epidemiology, which singularly focuses upon the causes and effects of alcohol consumption [65]. More broadly, the field of epidemiology has faced criticism regarding its approach to understand population health. One of the earliest critiques by Krieger points to fundamental errors in developing epidemiological methods rather than theory, with greater weight given to proximal risk factors and a focus upon causes without context [66]. These limitations have led to an emphasis upon individual disease susceptibility and individual-level interventions. Instead, Krieger argues that the eco-social perspective (the idea that biology and biological changes are shaped by the social environment) should be used to understand health [66]. Concerns regarding how causation is viewed in epidemiology have persisted in contemporary public health, with similar criticisms raised more recently [67]. These concerns continue, despite efforts to raise the profile of theories such as the eco-social perspective and calls to adopt pluralist approaches to causality in epidemiology, which stipulate that causation is not a single connection between two things, but the context in which a causal relationship is observed plays a role [67]. Adopting such an approach would change the way alcohol researchers conceptualize and investigate the AHP.

The lack of clear theoretical structuring in epidemiology, which is argued to have led to a focus upon proximal risk factors (e.g. risk behaviours), could also be a symptom of a lack of methods to carry out more complex analyses of distal factors. Possible solutions to this include the use of complex system modelling methods, which have gained traction within public health and are now being implemented in a UK-based project to gain insight into the causal relationships between policy and health-related outcomes [68]. Software architecture has also recently been devised to address how theory can be systematically incorporated into individual-level and agent-based computer simulations to understand health and health behaviours [69]. Applying these computer simulation methods to the AHP could provide the opportunity to shift the empirical focus from risk behaviours to wider determinants, as they can capture complexity and are mechanism-based rather than focused upon testing relationships between variables.

Strengths and limitations

This is the first review, to our knowledge, to catalogue explanations provided for the AHP across a breadth of literature. In taking a broad approach to literature searching and inclusion criteria it was possible to review work from multiple disciplines employing varied methodologies. This led to the identification of a varied set of explanations. However, it is possible that some explanations are more appropriate, depending upon the study design, population and measure of harm. As the primary aim of this review was to collate and review explanations more generally, we did not conduct an in-depth exploration of this issue. However, upon examination there was no evidence that study design or population influenced which explanations were presented. In terms of measures, we found one clear example of an explanation only applicable when using a subjective measure of alcohol harm—those in low SEP groups who drink may feel their outcomes are worse because their peers are more likely to be abstainers [8]. This issue awaits further examination.

This review was restricted to high-income countries. The results and conclusions are therefore only applicable to this context. Furthermore, most papers focused upon the United Kingdom, which may limit generalizability. This was justified, given substantial differences in alcohol environments. However, given that alcohol is a global issue [1], future research should gain insight into how alcohol affects the disadvantaged in low–middle-income countries to help address the deepening of local and global health inequalities.

Another limitation is that only one reviewer screened and extracted data from the papers. We recruited an independent researcher to re-assess a sample of papers for inclusion and extraction. Cross-checking between the two reviewers demonstrated good reliability.

Research and policy implications

The lack of explicit theory used to present explanations is a barrier to understanding the causes of the AHP. The development or application of theory may be fundamental to identify the true causal mechanisms which create and sustain the AHP. Several explanations have been proposed which align with the vast literature detailing theories of health inequality more generally. The eco-social perspective, among those more commonly discussed [e.g. the materialist (the link between wealth and resources and health) or political economy perspective (the idea that risk factors for health inequalities are rooted in structures)] [70], are just some examples of health inequality theory which could be applied to understand the AHP.

The AHP is well-evidenced, and behavioural-related explanations play a partial role. However, these explanations fall short in understanding the complex causes of inequalities in alcohol-related harm. There is a current lack of evidence investigating other explanations found in this review, which makes it difficult to suggest potential interventions to mitigate the AHP. Future research should empirically investigate these alternative explanations for the AHP. Computer simulations models offer one potential way of achieving this aim in the short term and for relatively low cost.

Based on the evidence from this review, the key policy implication is that tackling drinking alone will not reduce inequalities in alcohol-related harm. While there is some evidence that improving multiple health behaviours may attenuate the risk of alcohol-related harm, it is critical that policymakers look to policies outside the scope of public health to mitigate the inequality produced by the paradox.

San Francisco’s flavor ban was associated with more than doubled odds of recent smoking among underage high school students relative to concurrent changes in other districts

A Difference-in-Differences Analysis of Youth Smoking and a Ban on Sales of Flavored Tobacco Products in San Francisco, California Abigail S. Friedman. JAMA Pediatr., May 24, 2021. https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapediatrics/fullarticle/2780248

Restrictions on flavored tobacco product sales are increasingly popular; 5 US states and hundreds of localities have implemented them in the past few years alone. Yet only 1 study,1 to my knowledge, has considered how complete flavor bans applying to electronic nicotine delivery systems and combustible tobacco products, without retailer exemptions, are associated with tobacco use. A convenience sample of residents of San Francisco, California, aged 18 to 34 years who had ever used a tobacco product showed significant reductions in any tobacco use following the city’s flavor ban, with a marginally significant increase in combustible cigarette use (smoking) among those aged 18 to 24 years.1 Absent a comparison group, however, it is impossible to ascertain if preexisting trends could have driven these findings.

Given the relative health costs of smoking vs vaping nicotine,2,3 flavor bans that increase smoking may prove harmful. Thus, this study’s objective was to estimate the association between San Francisco’s ban on flavored tobacco product sales and smoking among high school students younger than 18 years.

Methods

Data came from the 2011-2019 Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (YRBSS) biennial school district surveys, with consideration restricted to districts with representative smoking data (with response rates ≥60%) available through the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for each wave: New York City, New York; Broward County, Florida; Los Angeles, California; Orange County, Florida; Palm Beach County, Florida; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and San Diego, California, as well as San Francisco, California. This analysis focused on high school students younger than 18 years who had nonmissing data for the outcome of interest: a binary indicator for recent (ie, past 30-day) smoking. This study was deemed exempt from institutional review board review under US federal regulation 45 CFR 46.101(b)(4). The analysis used publicly available YBRSS data, a survey with collection procedures designed to maintain student anonymity; therefore, informed consent was not required.

[...]

Recent vaping was not considered because of likely confounding. California legalized recreational marijuana use the same year San Francisco’s flavor ban went into effect; in addition, the YRBSS’s vaping questions did not distinguish vaping nicotine vs marijuana.

Covariates captured age, sex, and race/ethnicity fixed effects and tobacco policies on January 1 of the survey year (specifically, state-plus-district conventional cigarette taxes and indicators for smoke-free restaurant laws). San Francisco did not implement other new tobacco control policies between the 2017 and 2019 surveys.4

[...]

Results

[...] Difference-in-differences analyses found that San Francisco’s flavor ban was associated with more than doubled odds of recent smoking among underage high school students relative to concurrent changes in other districts (adjusted odds ratio, 2.24 [95% CI, 1.42-3.53]; P = .001; Figure 2). This result was robust to adjustment for district-specific time trends (adjusted odds ratio, 2.32 [95% CI, 1.45-3.70]; P < .001) and limiting consideration to California (adjusted odds ratio, 2.01 [95% CI, 1.15-3.51]; P = .01).

Discussion

San Francisco’s ban on flavored tobacco product sales was associated with increased smoking among minor high school students relative to other school districts. While the policy applied to all tobacco products, its outcome was likely greater for youths who vaped than those who smoked due to higher rates of flavored tobacco use among those who vaped.5 This raises concerns that reducing access to flavored electronic nicotine delivery systems may motivate youths who would otherwise vape to substitute smoking. Indeed, analyses of how minimum legal sales ages for electronic nicotine delivery systems are associated with youth smoking also suggest such substitution.6

This study’s primary limitation is generalizability. Future research should assess whether estimates hold over time and in other localities and consider how policy heterogeneity (eg, retailer exemptions) modifies such bans’ outcomes.

Despite substantial changes in group composition, chimpanzees adhered for 12 years to arbitrary group-specific greetings not explained by genetics or the environment; seems that our conventions are rooted in our evolutionary history

Temporal stability of chimpanzee social culture. Edwin J. C. van Leeuwen. Royal Society Biology Letters, May 26 2021. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2021.0031

Abstract: Culture is a hallmark of the human species, both in terms of the transmission of material inventions (e.g. tool manufacturing) and the adherence to social conventions (e.g. greeting mannerisms). While material culture has been reported across the animal kingdom, indications of social culture in animals are limited. Moreover, there is a paucity of evidencing cultural stability in animals. Here, based on a large dataset spanning 12 years, I show that chimpanzees adhere to arbitrary group-specific handclasp preferences that cannot be explained by genetics or the ecological environment. Despite substantial changes in group compositions across the study period, and all chimpanzees having several behavioural variants in their repertoires, chimpanzees showed and maintained the within-group homogeneity and between-group heterogeneity that are so characteristic of the cultural phenomenon in the human species. These findings indicate that human culture, including its arbitrary social conventions and long-term stability, is rooted in our evolutionary history.

4. Discussion

For a behaviour to be labelled ‘cultural’, scholars typically evaluate the behaviour for its (i) emergence through social learning, (ii) sharedness among group members (and absence or difference for members of other groups) and (iii) longevity [14,39,40]. While a plethora of studies have documented socially learned behavioural traditions in animals [41,42], to my knowledge, there is a paucity with respect to evidencing the stability of traditions.

One established example of cultural persistence in animals concerns tool use in wild chimpanzees: over a period of 25 years, group differences with respect to tool-material selection for nut cracking remained highly similar, despite a large number of (female) migrations [43,44]. Material culture has plausibly been part of chimpanzees' repertoire for thousands of years [45], yet social culture remains to be systematically documented in animals. Recently, cultural transmission of social customs has been suggested for traditions in great apes ([9,10,46]; also see [14,47]). Moreover, social culture in terms of socially learned patterns of association and interaction that result in group-specific sociality has been implied as an explanatory mechanism for non-random social dynamics in animals (e.g. [48–54]). In these studies, some forms of stability were documented—for instance, neighbouring groups of meerkats (Suricata suricatta) differed consistently in the time of day on which they emerged from their burrows across a decade [54], and reef sharks (Carcharhinus amblyrhynchos) were found to gather in the same close association cliques annually across four consecutive years, presumably to benefit from public information regarding food patches [52]. Arguably the best-documented case of social culture in animals comes from observations on troops of wild olive baboons (Papio anubis) living in the Masai Mara Reserve of Kenya. Owing to the simultaneous deaths of a substantial number of aggressive adult males (caused by a selective outbreak of tuberculosis), the respective ‘Forest Troop’ became a group of relatively socially tolerant and non-aggressive members in comparison to another group living in the same reserve (Talek troop) and the Forest Troop pre-dating the deaths [48,53]. Despite a substantial influx of new group members, across a period of at least 10 years, the Forest Troop remained markedly characterized by what the authors called a culture of ‘pacifism’—relatively high rates of grooming and affiliation, relaxed dominance hierarchies and an overall tendency of non-aggressive interactions, even between resident females and newly immigrated males [48].

Here, I report the multiyear (12 years) stability of a variational cultural practice [24], which is plausibly devoid of any ecological relevance. Whereas material cultures [7,55], but also culturally induced social foraging [52] and dyadic interactions [48,53] are behaviours with clear adaptive value [56], the precise variant by which chimpanzees engage in the handclasp grooming does not bear any relevance to survival or fitness. As such, stability in variant preference might be even less expected given the lack of eliciting affordances in the environment (e.g. the presence of termites might (re-)trigger termite fishing). In analogy to human culture: whereas the motivation for bridging social distances gives rise to greeting behaviours universally, the exact manner in which the greeting gesture emerges (and perpetuates) is highly culture specific [57,58]. The here reported group differences are also difficult to explain based on genetics: the study groups do not systematically differ in their subspecies composition, and whereas the handclasp behaviour an sich could be hypothesized to be under positive genetic selection [59] (i.e. its function is still largely unknown), the relative style preferences by which the groups choose to handclasp seem harder to place in such a selectionist framework (also see [11,24]). The finding that female dyads engaged more in palm clasping while male dyads engaged more in wrist clasping could be due to the fact that chimpanzee males may use the handclasp as a means to confirm or assert dominance over the partner. The subject's wrist position allows the partner to support the weight of the subject's clasping arm, which can be viewed as a prosocial act by the partner [11]. Albeit plausible, more research is needed to investigate this conjecture, including how such configurations are initiated.

Between-group heterogeneity is expected to gradually transition toward homogeneity owing to factors like drift, the natural cycle of births and deaths, and migrations, unless there are mechanisms in place to prevent this, like in humans [2]. Despite such changes of group composition in the studied chimpanzees, the group-specific variant preferences remained, suggesting the workings of stability-fostering mechanisms (also see [43,60]). One potent mechanism promoting group-level cultural stability is conformity—the tendency to copy the behaviour of the majority [2,28]. Whether chimpanzees are conformists remains disputed [43,61–64]—yet, the findings of this study warrant scrutiny of any chimpanzee behaviour that could bolster within-group cultural homogeneity across extended periods of time. In any case, where the minimal genetic and environmental variation across groups allows for inferring the cultural nature of the handclasp styles by means of the method of exclusion (also see [24,25]), the observed temporal stability of group-specific style preferences despite substantial population turnover provides a positive indication of the cultural hypothesis.

Recapitulating, chimpanzees retained group-specific grooming style preferences across a 12-year study period in which a substantial number of individuals replaced original group members owing to births, deaths and translocations. This stability of cultural variants indicates that (i) preliminary findings on social culture in chimpanzees are robust, (ii) animals can develop and maintain cultural preferences in the domain of arbitrary, non-fitness-related phenomena, much like the human species and (iii) animal cultures can possess the necessary ingredients in terms of variant adherence and longevity to be a potent force in gene–culture coevolutionary dynamics, thus shaping both phenotypes and genotypes in animals [12,13].

Extraversion development & sport participation effects: Children and adolescents who dropped out of sport showed greater decreases in extraversion than those who continued participation in sport

Extraversion development in childhood, adolescence and adulthood: Testing the role of sport participation in three nationally-representative samples. Mark S. Allen et al. Journal of Sports Sciences, May 20 2021. https://doi.org/10.1080/02640414.2021.1930672

Abstract: This research sought to test whether sport participation relates to the development of trait extraversion across three life phases. Sport participation and extraversion were measured in children aged 10.5 ± 0.5 years (n = 3600), in adolescents aged 14.5 ± 0.5 years (n = 3463), and in adults with a mean age of 49.4 ± 18.0 years (n = 12,280), with corresponding data collected four years earlier. There were small mean-level decreases in extraversion during childhood and adulthood, and a large decrease in extraversion during adolescence. Four-year rank-order stability in extraversion was .58 in childhood, .61 in adolescence and .76 in adulthood. Sport participation was associated with higher extraversion in all three samples. After controlling for sociodemographic factors, children and adolescents who dropped out of sport showed greater decreases in extraversion than those who continued participation in sport. Sport participation was unrelated to mean-level change in extraversion during adulthood. Sport participation was also associated with greater intra-individual stability in extraversion for children, adolescents and adults. There were no significant sex moderation effects for mean-level change or individual-level stability. These findings provide evidence that sport participation might have an important role in trait extraversion stability and change across the lifespan.

KEYWORDS: Child developmentintroversionlongitudinalpersonalityyouth sport

Neuroanatomy of Transgender Identity: Transgender persons differed significantly from cisgender persons with respect to (sub)cortical brain volumes and surface area, but not cortical thickness

Mueller SC, Guillamon A, Zubiaurre-Elorza L, et al. The Neuroanatomy of Transgender Identity: Mega-Analytic Findings From the ENIGMA Transgender Persons Working Group. J Sex Med 2021;XXX:XXX–XXX. May 21 2021. https://www.jsm.jsexmed.org/article/S1743-6095(21)00425-2/fulltext

Abstract

Background: In contrast to cisgender persons, transgender persons identify with a different gender than the one assigned at birth. Although research on the underlying neurobiology of transgender persons has been accumulating over the years, neuroimaging studies in this relatively rare population are often based on very small samples resulting in discrepant findings.

Aim: To examine the neurobiology of transgender persons in a large sample.

Methods: Using a mega-analytic approach, structural MRI data of 803 non-hormonally treated transgender men (TM, n = 214, female assigned at birth with male gender identity), transgender women (TW, n = 172, male assigned at birth with female gender identity), cisgender men (CM, n = 221, male assigned at birth with male gender identity) and cisgender women (CW, n = 196, female assigned at birth with female gender identity) were analyzed.

Outcomes: Structural brain measures, including grey matter volume, cortical surface area, and cortical thickness.

Results: Transgender persons differed significantly from cisgender persons with respect to (sub)cortical brain volumes and surface area, but not cortical thickness. Contrasting the 4 groups (TM, TW, CM, and CW), we observed a variety of patterns that not only depended on the direction of gender identity (towards male or towards female) but also on the brain measure as well as the brain region examined.

Clinical Translation: The outcomes of this large-scale study may provide a normative framework that may become useful in clinical studies.

Strengths and Limitations: While this is the largest study of MRI data in transgender persons to date, the analyses conducted were governed (and restricted) by the type of data collected across all participating sites.

Conclusion: Rather than being merely shifted towards either end of the male-female spectrum, transgender persons seem to present with their own unique brain phenotype.

First impressions, lack of judgement: Betting decisions are affected by uninformative racehorse names; betting returns on fast-sounding horses are lower compared to bets on other horses

Sonic Thunder vs. Brian the Snail. Are people affected by uninformative racehorse names? Oliver Merz, Raphael Flepp, Egon Franck. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, May 25 2021, 101724. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2021.101724

Highlights

• Betting decisions are affected by uninformative racehorse names.

• Winning probabilities of horses with fast-sounding names are overstated.

• Betting returns on fast-sounding horses are lower compared to bets on other horses.

• Affective betting decisions impair the betting market efficiency.

Abstract: This paper examines whether individuals’ decision making is affected by fast-sounding horse names in a betting exchange market environment. In horse racing, the name of a horse does not depend on the horse's performance and is thus uninformative. If positive affect towards fast-sounding horse names is present, we expect less accurate prices, i.e., winning probabilities and lower returns due to the increased demand for these bets. Using over 3 million horse bets, we find evidence that the winning probabilities of bets on horses with fast-sounding names are overstated, which impairs the prediction accuracy of such bets. This finding implies that prices in betting exchange markets are distorted by incorporating affective, misleading information from a horse's fast-sounding name. Consequently, this bias translates into significantly lower betting returns for horses with names classified as fast-sounding compared to the returns for all other horses.

Keywords: Affect heuristicDecision makingMarket efficiencyBetting marketHorse racing

JEL D40G40G41L83

5. Conclusion

Our paper contributes to the understanding of the role affect plays in human decision making. We extend the previous literature by testing the external validity of the findings in laboratory experiments using the real-life setting of betting markets in which decisions have a substantial financial impact. Moreover, this setting allows a clean investigation of biases in betting prices, avoiding the well-known problem of unknown fundamental values prevalent in traditional financial markets. Overall, our findings suggest that betting prices are biased due to people's positive affective feelings towards fast-sounding horses. Consequently, betting returns on horses with fast-sounding names are systematically lower than the returns on all other horses. This result suggests that bettors should avoid jumping on the bandwagon when many other bettors are tempted to base their investment decisions on irrelevant factors and instead be aware of the potential mispricing of such bets.

While the prohibition of certain horse names might seem to be a first approach to correct the suboptimal decisions caused by affective feelings in our setting, the implementation of this kind of regulation in practice would cause both significant transaction costs and severe limitations on freedom. Even if we abstracted from the second point, the definition, validation, permanent adaptation and implementation of a “list of affect-enhancing horse names” would be a giant task. Further, even if this regulatory strategy somehow worked, it would just contribute to a solution in horse-betting, which is a relatively small field of the entire economy. Therefore, this regulatory strategy cannot serve as a remedy for the general problem that affective feelings towards objectively irrelevant attributes presumably distort decisions in other areas of the economy.

Awareness-raising strategies seem to be a more promising avenue to deal with affect in decision-making, according to psychology and neuroscience research stating that managing affect requires constant awareness of it (Peterson, 2007). Our article increases this awareness by clearly showing that affect plays a role in a real-life setting. This raises the question of whether affective feelings towards certain objectively irrelevant attributes might be even more prevalent in society than anticipated so far. Affective reactions presumably are not limited to suboptimal decisions in laboratory experiments or people's decisions in private life, such as excessive shopping or smoking, but might also impact large-scale areas starting from inefficient betting market prices to bubbles in stock markets to outcomes of political elections. The more research shows that affect leads to suboptimal decisions in a variety of areas, the greater the awareness of this phenomenon will be.

Additional field-specific regulations aiming to raise awareness among relevant decision-makers must be built on further research. So far, it remains unclear which measures – e.g., warnings that bettors would have to read or declarations that bettors would have to sign before placing their bets – could lead to increased self-monitoring and reduce the impact of affect in the horse-betting context in our paper.

Video chats undermine the collective intelligence of groups, but in a surprising way: It turns out it is the video, & not the chat, that is the problem. Teams with video on during calls end up syncing up less, & have less even turn-taking during meetings. Turn off your video?

Tomprou M, Kim YJ, Chikersal P, Woolley AW, Dabbish LA (2021) Speaking out of turn: How video conferencing reduces vocal synchrony and collective intelligence. PLoS ONE 16(3): e0247655, Mar 18 2021. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0247655

Abstract: Collective intelligence (CI) is the ability of a group to solve a wide range of problems. Synchrony in nonverbal cues is critically important to the development of CI; however, extant findings are mostly based on studies conducted face-to-face. Given how much collaboration takes place via the internet, does nonverbal synchrony still matter and can it be achieved when collaborators are physically separated? Here, we hypothesize and test the effect of nonverbal synchrony on CI that develops through visual and audio cues in physically-separated teammates. We show that, contrary to popular belief, the presence of visual cues surprisingly has no effect on CI; furthermore, teams without visual cues are more successful in synchronizing their vocal cues and speaking turns, and when they do so, they have higher CI. Our findings show that nonverbal synchrony is important in distributed collaboration and call into question the necessity of video support.

Discussion

We explored what role, if any, video access to partners plays in facilitating collaboration when partners are not collocated. Though we found no direct effects of video access on collective intelligence or facial expression synchrony, we did find that in the video condition, facial expression synchrony predicts collective intelligence. This result suggests that when visual cues are available it is important that interaction partners attend to them. Furthermore, when video was available, social perceptiveness predicted facial synchrony, reinforcing the role this individual characteristic plays in heightening attention to available cues. We also found that prosodic synchrony improves collective intelligence in physically separated collaborators whether or not they had access to video. An important precursor to prosodic synchrony is the equality in speaking turns that emerges among collaborators, which enhances prosodic synchrony and, in turn, collective intelligence. Surprisingly, our findings suggest that video access may, in fact, impede the development of prosodic synchrony by creating greater speaking turn inequality, countering some prevailing assumptions about the importance of richer media to facilitate distributed collaboration.

Our findings build on existing research demonstrating that synchrony improves coordination [30, 33] by showing that it also improves cognitive aspects of a group, such as joint problem-solving and collective intelligence in distributed collaboration. Much of the previous research on synchrony has been conducted in face-to-face settings. We offer evidence that nonverbal synchrony can occur and is important to the level of collective intelligence in distributed collaboration. Furthermore, we demonstrate different pathways through which different types of cues can affect nonverbal synchrony and, in turn, collective intelligence. For example, prosodic synchrony and speaking turn equality seem to be important means for regulating collaboration. Speaking turns are a key communication mechanism operating in social interaction by regulating the pace at which communication proceeds, and is governed by a set of interaction rules such as yielding, requesting, or maintaining turns [18]. These rules are often subtly communicated through nonverbal cues such as eye contact and vocal cues (e.g., back channels), altering volume and rate [18]. However, our findings suggest that visual nonverbal cues may also enable some interacting partners to dominate the conversation. By contrast, we show that when interacting partners have audio cues only, the lack of video does not hinder them from communicating these rules but instead helps them to regulate their conversation more smoothly by engaging in more equal exchange of turns and by establishing improved prosodic synchrony. Previous research has focused largely on synchrony regulated by visual cues, such as studies showing that synchrony in facial expressions improves cohesion in collocated teams [30]. Our study underscores the importance of audio cues, which appear to be compromised by video access.

Our findings offer several avenues for future research on nonverbal synchrony and human collaboration. For instance, how can we enhance prosodic synchrony? Some research has examined the role of interventions to enhance speaking turn equality for decision making effectiveness [67]. Could regulating conversational behavior increase prosodic synchrony? Furthermore, does nonverbal synchrony affect collective intelligence similarly in larger groups? For example, as group size increases, a handful of team members tend to dominate the conversation [68] with implications for spoken communication, nonverbal synchrony, and ultimately collective intelligence. Our results also underscore the importance of using behavioral measures to index the quality of collaboration to augment the dominant focus on self-report measures of attitudes and processes in the social sciences, because collaborators may not always report better collaborations despite exhibiting increased synchrony and collective intelligence [2, 10]. Our study has limitations, which offer opportunities for future research. For example, our findings were observed in newly formed and non-recurring dyads in the laboratory. It remains to be seen whether our findings will generalize to teams that are ongoing or in which there is greater familiarity among members, as in the case of distributed teams in organizations. We encourage future research to test these findings in the field within organizational teams.

Overall, our findings enhance our understanding of the nonverbal cues that people rely on when collaborating with a distant partner via different communication media. As distributed collaboration increases as a form of work (e.g., virtual teams, crowdsourcing), this study suggests that collective intelligence will be a function of subtle cues and available modalities. Extrapolating from our results, one can argue that limited access to video may promote better communication and social interaction during collaborative problem solving, as there are fewer stimuli to distract collaborators. Consequently, we may achieve greater problem solving if new technologies offer fewer distractions and less visual stimuli.

We analyzed all first marriages reported in 2010–2014 in South Korea and compared men who married Korean brides (N = 1,088,457) with those who purchased their brides (N = 45,528)

Men's revealed preference for their mates' ages. Kitae Sohn. Evolution and Human Behavior, Volume 38, Issue 1, January 2017, Pages 58-62. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2016.06.007

Abstract: Both young and old men say that they are sexually attracted to young, fertile women, but older men tend to marry older women, including those who are peri- and post-menopausal. We assessed men's freely revealed preference for their mates' age using an unusual marriage phenomenon in South Korea: the practice in which men purchase their brides from developing countries. Presumably, the men's mate choice, at least regarding the brides' age, is unrestricted by women. We analyzed all first marriages reported in 2010–2014 in South Korea and compared men who married Korean brides (N = 1,088,457) with those who purchased their brides (N = 45,528); the age range of grooms and brides was 15–59. While the former exhibited the typical pattern where older men married older women, the latter, whether young or old, always married young, fertile women. This finding is consistent with men's stated preference for young, fertile women in mating and suggests that the typical pattern is generated by women's limiting role in mating.

Keywords: SexEvolutionMarriagePurchase of brideReproductionSouth Korea

We conclude that Shank's 1980 observation, that intelligence is all about generalization and that AI is not particularly good at this, has, so far, withstood the test of time

How much intelligence is there in artificial intelligence? A 2020 update. Han L.J. van der Maas, Lukas Snoek, Claire E. Stevenson. Intelligence, Volume 87, July–August 2021, 101548. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2021.101548

Highlights

• Recent AI breakthroughs, such as deep learning and reinforcement learning, have deep roots in psychology.

• Modern AI models are much more human and brain like at the implementational level.

• There is nothing wrong with AI's crystallized intelligence, but generalization is still a weakness of AI systems.

• The psychological relevance of AI extends to areas such as the study of individual differences and cognitive development.

• We expect fruitful interactions with regard to the measurement of natural and artificial intelligence.

Abstract: Schank (1980) wrote an editorial for Intelligence on “How much intelligence is there in artificial intelligence?”. In this paper, we revisit this question. We start with a short overview of modern AI and showcase some of the AI breakthroughs in the four decades since Schank’s paper. We follow with a description of the main techniques these AI breakthroughs were based upon, such as deep learning and reinforcement learning; two techniques that have deep roots in psychology. Next, we discuss how psychologically plausible AI is and could become given the modern breakthroughs in AI’s ability to learn. We then access the main question of how intelligent AI systems actually are. For example, are there AI systems that can solve human intelligence tests? We conclude that Shank's observation, that intelligence is all about generalization and that AI is not particularly good at this, has, so far, withstood the test of time. Finally, we consider what AI insights could mean for the study of individual differences in intelligence. We close with how AI can further Intelligence research and vice versa, and look forward to fruitful interactions in the future.

Keywords: Artificial IntelligenceDeep learningIndividual differencesIntelligence testsReinforcement

5. Discussion

AI has seen multiple cycles of enthusiasm and disappointment, but the current wave seems to be of a different order. As we stated in the introduction of this paper, one of the original goals of AI was to learn more about human intelligence. This endeavor could be misguided as AI may only produce “cognitive wheels”, techniques that have no equivalent in human cognition. In this paper we argued that this might have been true for some older approaches (e.g., brute force search techniques), but is less the case for much of current AI. The progress made in recent years is certainly technologically driven, but inspired by biological and psychological knowledge about human information processing and learning.

We expect that the recent progress in AI will change the way we think about intelligence. AI forces us to rethink the definition of intelligence. Definitions that center on just information processing and problem solving are perhaps insufficient. Shank's observation that intelligence is all about generalization has, so far, withstood the test of time. Many information processing problems, from processing speech to playing chess, appear to be less difficult than perhaps expected. The really hard problem is to deal with completely novel cases. One requirement for solving this hard problem is the ability to learn invariant and thus generalizable patterns. And especially with regard to learning, the progress in AI has been spectacular. The main difference between AI systems of the past, such as expert systems, and modern AI is the fact that they learn. That deep learning and reinforcement learning, the core techniques in current AI, have deep roots in psychology is remarkable and promising for studying how artificial and human intelligence are related.

AI is relevant to intelligence research because it enhances our understanding of the core mechanisms of human cognition. How the immense neural systems in our brain are able to process extremely complicated information such as speech and produce logical thinking is an extremely difficult question. Having an artificial system that performs such tasks using the same basic principles is extremely useful. Classic questions regarding the modularity of the mind, the origin of creativity, and the organization of long-term memory spring to mind. In addition, we argued that the psychological relevance of AI extends to unexpected areas such as the understanding of individual differences and the development of cognition. It is relatively easy to create a population of AI systems with minor differences in architecture and training regime. Modern AI provides us with a new playing field for individual differences research.

On a practical level we expect fruitful interactions regarding the measurement of natural and artificial intelligence. As modern AI systems are incredibly complex, our experience in examining such systems may be relevant for AI. Vice versa, insights from AI may lead to new developments in (adaptive) intelligence testing and educational interventions.

We attempted to shed light on the future of intelligence research from the point of view of AI. Our overview is necessarily limited and probably quickly outdated, but hopefully we have given intelligence researchers some insights in the rapid developments in AI and the possible consequences for our field.

Australia & UK: Gay & bisexual men, men who ‘prefer not to say,’ and gay women are less satisfied with their lives; in the UK is the same but for gay women, who do not have a lower level of satisfaction

Sexual orientation and life satisfaction. David Bartram. Journal of Sociology, May 19, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/14407833211017672

Abstract: Existing quantitative research on sexual orientation and life satisfaction uses models with control variables that do not have a clear rationale. With a correct understanding of what control variables do, no controls are necessary to estimate the consequences of sexual orientation on life satisfaction. An analysis constructed from this perspective reveals gay and bisexual men in the UK and Australia are less satisfied with their lives (relative to heterosexual men). Bisexual women in both countries are less satisfied as well. Lesbians in Australia are less satisfied (relative to straight women) – but lesbians in the UK do not have lower satisfaction. These conclusions hold also in an analysis that considers the possibility that some non-heterosexual people might be unwilling to disclose their sexual orientation on surveys.

Keywords: Australia, control variables, life satisfaction, sexual orientation, United Kingdom

Conclusion

Having a non-normative sexual orientation in the UK and Australia comes with consequences – including a lower level of life satisfaction. The only exception to that general pattern is lesbian women in the UK. The gap is especially large for bisexuals, of both sexes, and in both countries. There is also a striking negative coefficient for Australian men who ‘prefer not to say’. It is not hard to imagine that there must be a reason some Australian men prefer not to disclose their sexual orientation (especially if what they prefer not to disclose is: not being straight).

Researchers should be confident in perceiving that the right way to model the impact of sexual orientation on SWB is to exclude ‘other determinants’ as controls in this context – because the other determinants of SWB cannot also be determinants of sexual orientation. That assertion forms the key recommendation for future research on this topic. Building larger models with many control variables might appear desirable simply because a more parsimonious model (especially one containing no controls) might seem unpersuasive (e.g. to potential anonymous reviewers). But size on its own is hardly a coherent criterion for constructing an analytical model whose purpose is to gauge a causal impact (see e.g. Gangl, 2010).

The fact that lesbians in the UK report life satisfaction on a par with that of heterosexual women (in contrast with the life satisfaction deficit among gay men) is a striking finding, perhaps at odds with what one might expect, given the context of stigma and discrimination that commonly confronts people belonging to a sexual minority. Being gay in a heteronormative society sometimes goes with a perceived loss of masculinity and thus a reduction in status more generally (Connell, 1995); the lower life satisfaction among gay men is arguably understandable in these terms. A similar dynamic might not apply to the experience of lesbians to the same extent, perhaps in part because women in general already have lower social status in a patriarchal society such as the UK.

There is a genuine limitation of the analysis presented here: the findings describe average impacts pertaining to the categories available in the data and thus do not capture the diversity of experiences that go under the heading of being ‘gay’, ‘lesbian’, ‘bisexual’, etc. That point applies as well to the way people might choose from the available options on a survey question, at a single point in time. There are many ways to be non-heterosexual and indeed to be heterosexual, with imprecise and fluid boundaries for many (Cover, 2019). The fact that the available response categories inhibit a more fine-grained analysis does not mean this point is anything other than a limitation. The analysis in this article gives us average effects of belonging to an indicated category; for some individuals a negative impact will exceed that average, while for others the impact might be less negative or perhaps even null (cf. Feinstein et al., 2015). Even so, any attempt to gauge effects in a finer grain must ensure a correct use of control variables, along the lines developed in this article.

Although early sexual intercourse may be associated with increased depressive symptoms, first intercourse was, on average, associated with decreased psychological distress for both male & female late adolescents

Changes in psychological distress after first vaginal intercourse in late adolescence. Sara A. Vasilenko, Eva S. Lefkowitz, Jennifer L. Maggs. Journal of Adolescence, Volume 89, June 2021, Pages 213-216. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adolescence.2021.05.003

Abstract

Introduction: Although early sexual intercourse may be associated with increased depressive symptoms, little research has examined whether first intercourse in late adolescence is associated with changes in mental health.

Methods: This paper uses 3 years of longitudinal data from previously sexually abstinent late adolescent students at a large state university in the northeastern United States (N = 144, 53.5% male, M age = 18.5 years old, 47.2% White, 26.4% Asian/Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, 20.1% Hispanic/Latino, 18.1% Black/African American) to examine whether levels of psychological distress changed after first intercourse.

Results: Students’ distress decreased after first intercourse, although this effect was only significant two or more semesters after first intercourse. There were no gender differences in these associations.

Conclusions: Findings suggest first intercourse was, on average, associated with decreased psychological distress for both male and female late adolescents.

Keywords: Sexual behaviorMental healthFirst intercourse

A substantial share of Americans express readiness to sell their votes for cash: 12% of respondents would do so for just $25, as would nearly 20% for $100

Would You Sell Your Vote? Jordan Gans-Morse, Simeon Nichter. American Politics Research, May 24, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X211013565

Abstract: Prominent scholars in recent years have expressed alarm about political polarization, weakened civil liberties, and growing support for authoritarianism in the United States. But discussions of democratic backsliding pay short shrift to the value citizens place on one of the most fundamental democratic institutions: the act of voting. Drawing on nationally representative survey data, we show that despite traditional portrayals of the U.S. as the embodiment of a democratic “civic culture,” a substantial share of Americans express readiness to sell their votes for cash: 12% of respondents would do so for just $25, as would nearly 20% for $100. Citizens who place low importance on living in a democracy are significantly more willing to sell their votes. We argue that heightened attention to US voters’ attitudes toward clientelism would provide an additional barometer of democratic skepticism, help to integrate the study of American and comparative politics, and stimulate novel research agendas about the historic decline of vote buying in the United States.

Keywords: elections, democracy, vote buying, clientelism, machine politics