They estimate the prevalence rate of psychopathy in the general adult population at 4.5pct

Prevalence of Psychopathy in the General Adult Population: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis. Ana Sanz-García, Clara Gesteira, Jesús Sanz and María Paz García-Vera. Front. Psychol., August 5 2021. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.661044

Abstract: The main objective of this study was to systematically and meta-analytically review the scientific literature on the prevalence of psychopathy in the general adult population. A search in PsycInfo, MEDLINE, and PSICODOC identified 15 studies published as of June 2021. Altogether, 16 samples of adults totaling 11,497 people were evaluated. Joint prevalence rates were calculated using reverse variance heterogeneity models. Meta-regression analyses were conducted to examine whether the type of instrument, sex, type of sample, and country influenced prevalence. The meta-analytical results obtained allow us to estimate the prevalence rate of psychopathy in the general adult population at 4.5%. That being said, this rate varies depending on the participants' sex (higher in males), the type of sample from the general population (higher in samples from organizations than in community samples or university students), and the type of instrument used to define psychopathy. In fact, using the PCL-R, which is currently considered the “gold standard” for the assessment and definition of psychopathy, the prevalence is only 1.2%. These results are discussed in the context of the different theoretical perspectives and the existing problems when it comes to defining the construct of psychopathy.

Discussion

The main objective of this study was to obtain an estimate of the prevalence of psychopathy in the general adult population and, in this sense, to our knowledge, it is the first systematic or meta-analytic review carried out on this topic. Following a thorough search in the scientific literature, 15 empirical studies were found that had calculated the frequency of psychopathy in samples from the general adult population, including community, organization, and university student samples. These studies used properly described tools and procedures to assess and define psychopathy. After calculating the conjoint mean of their results with meta-analytic procedures, based on a total sample of 11,497 people, it can be estimated that the prevalence of psychopathy in the general adult population is 4.5%.

As could be expected, this prevalence is much lower than that found in samples obtained in forensic or prison contexts. For example, in the meta-analysis of Fox and DeLisi (2019), it was found that the average prevalence of psychopathy among homicide offenders could be estimated at 27.8 or 34.4%, depending on the criterion used to define psychopathy with the PCL-R (cut-off score of 30 vs. 25, respectively). In the second edition of the PCL-R manual (Hare, 2003a), the prevalence of psychopathy, based on a cut-off score of 30, was 15.7% for males (Nicholls et al., 2005) and 10.3% for females (Guay et al., 2018) in the North American normative samples of prisoners.

However, although the average prevalence of psychopathy in the general population is clearly lower than that found in the offender or prison population, the prevalence rates of psychopathy in the general population obtained in the studies reviewed in this work show considerable variation, ranging from a minimum of 0% to a maximum of 21%. In fact, the results obtained in terms of the I2 and Q statistics confirmed that the heterogeneity of the studies was statistically significant.

These variations depend on many factors, such as the role of the type of instrument used to define psychopathy, the participants' sex, the type of sample of the general population, and the participants' country of origin. These factors have been analyzed in this work. In this sense, the results of the present work indicate that the first three factors, but not the country of origin, seem to have a significant impact on the prevalence of psychopathy. Depending on the chosen instrument, the participants' sex or the type of sample selected, prevalence figures can double, triple, or quadruple the figures found with a different instrument or with participants of another sex or from a different subpopulation of the general population. Moreover, the results obtained in terms of the Doi chart and the LFK index indicate that this heterogeneity does not appear to reflect a significant publication bias, but could largely be attributed to these three moderator variables.

In particular, the results of this work indicate that, when using the PCL-R (or any of its versions), an instrument that is currently considered as the gold standard for the evaluation and definition of psychopathy, it can be estimated that the prevalence of psychopathy in the general adult population is only 1.2%. However, if other instruments are used, such as self-reports of psychopathic personality traits like the LSRP (Levenson et al., 1995) or the SRP in their different versions (SRP-II, SRP-III, and SRP-SF; Hare, 1990; Paulhus et al., 2016), the estimate of the prevalence of psychopathy in the general adult population quadruples, reaching 5.4%.

In fact, as virtually all the studies with offenders use the PCL-R or one of its versions, the comparison between the prevalence rates of psychopathy obtained in the general population and in the offender or prison population should primarily focus on studies conducted with the PCL-R. In this sense, the difference in the prevalence rate of psychopathy between the two types of population, general and criminal, is much greater: 1.2%, obtained in the present work for general population, compared to 15.7 and 10.3%, obtained in the normative samples of the PCL-R for male and female prisoners, respectively (Nicholls et al., 2005; Guay et al., 2018), or vs. 27.8%, obtained in Fox and DeLisi (2019) meta-analysis for homicide offenders.

Differences in the prevalence rates as a function of the type of instrument and cut-off point established to identify psychopathy go back to the problems in defining the construct of psychopathy. Those differences also point out a limitation of the present study. We will elaborate on these ideas later in the context of the limitations of this review.

The results of this study also indicate that the prevalence of psychopathy in the general adult population is significantly higher among males than among females. In particular, psychopathy in the general population doubles its prevalence in males compared to females (7.9 vs. 2.9%). This difference is consistent with the results obtained in samples of offenders or incarcerated people, among whom the prevalence of psychopathy is also higher in males than in females (Beryl et al., 2014).

In particular, Beryl et al. (2014) conducted a systematic review of the scientific literature on the prevalence of psychopathy in adult women from within secure settings, which included criminal justice settings, or secure inpatient healthcare settings. They found prevalence rates ranging from 0 to 31% using the PCL-R or one of its versions, although they did not report the average of these rates or the conjoint prevalence. However, from the data they submitted for females in criminal justice settings, it is possible to calculate, for the 13 unique studies that defined psychopathy based on a cut-off score of 30 in the PCL-R or of 18 in the PCL:SV, a weighted average prevalence of 11.9% (Table 3 of Beryl et al., 2014, p. 191). This figure dropped slightly to 11% when also taking into account the data from the 10 unique studies that had evaluated samples of females in secure/inpatient psychiatric settings or mixed samples—secure/inpatient psychiatric and criminal justice settings—(Tables 2, 4, respectively, of Beryl et al., 2014, p. 190, 192). Moreover, these figures hardly varied when only studies using the same instrument, the PCL-R, and the same cut-off score, 30 (12.3 and 11.4%, respectively) were taken into account. Interestingly, these prevalence figures are very similar to those presented by the scales of female prisoners collected in the second edition of the PCL-R manual, which, as noted above, show a prevalence of psychopathy in female prisoners of 10.3% (Guay et al., 2018). In summary, the average prevalence of psychopathy in female offenders or prisoners can be estimated at 10–12%.

In contrast, in male offenders or prisoners, using the PCL or its versions, rates of average prevalence of psychopathy of 15–35% are usually obtained, although the average rates of 15–25% are probably the most adequate (Hare, 1991, 2003a; Guay et al., 2007; Fox and DeLisi, 2019, cited by Nicholls et al., 2005). In the 1991 PCL-R manual, Hare reported that, in a global sample of 1,200 males incarcerated in Canadian prisons, 25% scored 30 or higher on the PCL-R. However, in the second edition of the PCL-R manual, published in 2003 and based on a much larger sample with a total of 5,408 males incarcerated in American prisons, Hare reported that 15.7% of the inmates scored 30 or higher on the PCL-R (Hare, 1991, 2003a; cited by Nicholls et al., 2005). Subsequently, with that same large sample, but eliminating the participants with missing information on some items of the PCL-R (n = 543), Guay et al. (2007) reported that 19% of the remaining 4,865 male inmates scored 30 or higher on the PCL-R. Finally, in the meta-analysis of Fox and DeLisi (2019), it was found that 27.8% of the homicide offenders scored 30 or higher on the PCL-R.

In any case, it seems clear that the prevalence of psychopathy is higher in male offenders or prisoners than in female offenders or prisoners (15–25% vs. 10–12%), and this difference between the sexes is maintained in the general population (7.9 vs. 2.9%), as shown in this meta-analysis.

Another interesting result of this work has to do with the finding of differences in the prevalence of psychopathy between different groups of adults in the general population. In particular, this review has found that the prevalence of psychopathy is significantly higher among workers in some organizations and companies (managers, executives, procurement and supply professionals, advertising workers) than among university students or among people from the general community (12.9 vs. 8.1% and 1.9%, respectively). In turn, the prevalence among university students is significantly higher than among people from the general community (8.1 vs. 1.9%).

The highest prevalence of psychopathy among workers in certain organizations and companies is based on data from only three studies with a total sample of 668 people and should, therefore, be taken with some caution. However, this result is consistent with the scientific literature that proposes that psychopathy is more prevalent in certain professions (e.g., entrepreneurs, managers, politicians, investors, sellers, surgeons, lawyers, telemarketing employees) in which the personality characteristics that define psychopathy could even facilitate their success in these professions (Hare, 2003b; Dutton, 2012; Babiak and Hare, 2019; Fritzon et al., 2020).

More surprising may be the result that among university students, there is a higher prevalence of psychopathy than among people in the community. Following the previous argument, it could be assumed that among university students of certain professions there could be more people with psychopathic traits (e.g., students in business administration and management, marketing), but it could also be assumed that among university students from other professions, there could be more people with less psychopathic traits and characterized, on the contrary, by high levels of empathy, altruism, candor, trust, humility, and responsibility (e.g., students from health professions, social work, and other professions closely linked to helping). In fact, in a study of Hassall et al. (2015), it was found that business university students, in comparison to university students of psychology, showed significantly higher levels in the four psychopathy factors measured by the SRP-III (Paulhus et al., 2016). Unfortunately, this work did not provide data on the prevalence of psychopathy in the two groups of university students. In addition, in the study of Dutton (2012), mentioned in the Introduction, among the 10 professions with higher levels of psychopathic traits, there were some that require a university degree (e.g., lawyer, surgeon, journalist) and, likewise, among the 10 professions with lower levels of psychopathic traits, there were also several that require a university degree (e.g., nurse, teacher, doctor).

Therefore, future research with university students should examine whether there are significant differences in psychopathy among students of different careers. This implies that, not only among university students of certain careers may there be a higher prevalence of psychopathy than in the general population, but that among university students of other careers, there may be a similar prevalence. It could even be that among university students of certain careers, there may be a lower prevalence of psychopathy than in the general population.

Research on differences in psychopathy between people of different professions or between university students of different careers departs from the traditional application of the construct of psychopathy to the forensic and prison area. That research intertwines, as discussed in the Introduction, with the most recent interest in the presence of psychopathy in everyday life (Dutton, 2012; Babiak and Hare, 2019; Fritzon et al., 2020), in the definition of psychopathy in terms of normal personality models such as the Big Five model (Lynam and Miller, 2019), and in the concept of successful or integrated psychopathy (Dutton, 2012; Lilienfeld et al., 2015). The fact that, as found in this review, most studies on the prevalence of psychopathy in the general population were published in the twenty-first century, especially in the last 10 years, is also consistent with those most recent interests far from the area of forensic and prison psychology.

Finally, no significant differences in the prevalence of psychopathy in the general population were found in this work as a function of the country of origin of the evaluated people. This absence of differences is not consistent with the results of the scientific literature on criminal and prison populations, which show the existence of differences between countries, especially between North American and European countries, in terms of the prevalence and levels of psychopathy in this type of population. For example, in the review of Beryl et al. (2014), a trend was found of lower rates of prevalence of psychopathy in European samples of women in prison or in prison hospitals than in American samples. Consistently, in the meta-analysis of Fox and DeLisi (2019), and after discarding the extreme values from samples composed exclusively of homicides with psychosis or psychopathy, significantly higher levels of PCL-measured psychopathy were found in homicide offenders from the USA and Canada than in homicide offenders from Finland, Sweden, and Germany.

Although these two reviews have reported that psychopathy prevalence is higher in North American male and female offenders and prisoners than in European male and female offenders and prisoners, the reasons for these differences are unclear. Beryl et al. (2014) suggest that the reason is “that the PCL instruments are designed to test the construct of ‘psychopathy’ as manifested in North American (male) offenders, and are less well-suited to identifying ‘psychopathy’ as manifested in European offenders” (p. 190). However, following the cultural facilitation model and Cooke et al.'s (2005) suggestions, an alternative reason is that complex social processes, such as socialization and enculturation, can suppress the development of certain aspects of psychopathy and facilitate the development of others. Therefore, it may be that socialization and enculturation in European countries suppress the development of certain psychopathic personality traits, or that those social processes in North American countries facilitate the development of certain psychopathic personality traits. There is also the possibility that both explanations are valid.

In any case, the results of the present review suggest that those differences between countries in the prevalence of psychopathy are unique to the prison or criminal population, but do not extend to the general population.

However, studies using samples from the general population of many different countries around the world have found cultural differences in the levels of different psychopathic traits. For example, in the study of Neumann et al. (2012) with 33,016 people (19,183 women) from 58 countries belonging to 11 world regions, significant differences were found between these regions in terms of the levels of different psychopathic traits (interpersonal, affective, antisocial, and lifestyle), as measured by one of the brief versions of the Hare SRP (SRP-E).

To further complicate the scenario of empirical results on the relationships between psychopathy and culture, the differences found in some studies with samples from the general population sometimes go in the opposite direction to those found in offender or prisoner populations. Thus, in the study of Lilienfeld et al. (2014), mentioned in the Introduction, in which they analyzed the responses of 3,338 people to the PPI-R-SF applied online, the Europeans showed higher levels of psychopathic traits than the Americans.

As a result, future research should address whether differences between countries in psychopathy only appear in terms of levels of certain psychopathic traits, but not in terms of the prevalence of psychopathy. When speaking about prevalence of psychopathy, we refer to it as defined by the presence of a clear set of psychopathic traits and with a certain level of intensity of such traits and/or a certain degree of impairment caused by such traits. It should also be examined whether such differences translate into a pattern of consistent differences between North American and European countries.

The results obtained in this work and the conclusions that have been reached should be assessed taking into account some of the limitations of the review itself. The most important limitations concern the high variability of the characteristics of the reviewed studies and the prevalence rates found, the small number of studies conducted to date that can help control such variability, and the methods assessing psychopathy in the reviewed studies. As already mentioned, prevalence rates vary greatly depending on factors such as the type of instrument used to define psychopathy, the participants' sex, and the type of sample from the general population. Given the small number of studies that currently constitute the scientific literature on the prevalence of psychopathy in the general population and the great heterogeneity of these studies in terms of their characteristics, it is very difficult to examine the effects of one of its factors while controlling the effect of the remaining factors. In fact, in this work, the number of subsamples/samples to examine gender prevalence was smaller than for calculating the overall prevalence. Therefore, in that smaller set, factors such as the type of instrument or sample did not reach statistical significance, thus preventing a more statistically potent analysis of the effect of gender after controlling the effects of these two factors and vice versa.

Among the factors that affected the variability of the prevalence of psychopathy, it is worth highlighting the type of instrument used to define psychopathy, since this factor points out important issue underlying this review. There is a high heterogeneity in the methods used to assess psychopathy in the reviewed studies. In addition, some of these method are more susceptible to criticisms related to their reliability and validity than others (e.g., the methods used in Hagnell et al., 1994; Gustafson and Ritzer, 1995; Pethman and Erlandsson, 2002). That heterogeneity and these criticisms go back to the problems in defining the construct of psychopathy. The different theoretical perspectives for this purpose which characterize the research of this construct are also an issue, and have already been discussed in the Introduction. In this sense, for example, an interesting exchange of views has recently been published on the debate over what components are essential to, or constitute part of psychopathy. It has also been discussed whether those components are necessary and/or sufficient (Brislin and Patrick, 2020a,b; Lynam, 2020; Marcus and Nagel, 2020). Consequently, one of the most important challenges that research in the area of psychopathy has to face is to achieve a valid and consensual definition of the construct of psychopathy and, related to this, to decide which instrument or instruments are the most valid and reliable to measure this construct. These needs are most evident when studying psychopathy in the general population because, as mentioned above, virtually all studies on psychopathy in the population of offenders or prisoners use the PCL-R or one of its versions (see the reviews of Beryl et al., 2014, and of Fox and DeLisi, 2019).

On the other hand, future research should also focus on the prevalence of the components of psychopathy, especially on the prevalence of psychopathic traits. Moreover, future research should also be conducted on the prevalence of the other personality constructs that are included under the Dark Triad label: Machiavellianism and narcissism.

Despite the above-mentioned limitations, the obtained results reflect relatively strong trends in the data that at least deserve to be the subject of future research and the formation of hypotheses to be taken into account in such research. In short, these trends allow the following conclusions to be drawn:

1) The prevalence of psychopathy in the general adult population can be estimated at 4.5%.

2) This prevalence is much lower than that found in the offender or prison population, which usually ranges between 10 and 35% (Nicholls et al., 2005; Guay et al., 2018; Fox and DeLisi, 2019).

3) The prevalence rates of psychopathy in the general population show considerable variation as a function of the type of instrument used to define psychopathy, the participants' sex, and the type of sample from the general population.

4) Using the PCL-R (or any of its versions), lower psychopathy prevalence rates are obtained than if self-reports of psychopathic personality traits are used.

5) As the PCL-R is currently considered the “gold standard” for the assessment and definition of psychopathy, the prevalence of psychopathy in the general population may be only 1.2% and, therefore, the difference with the prevalence of the offender or prison population may be even greater.

6) As is often the case in the offender and prison population, the prevalence of psychopathy in the general adult population is significantly higher among males than among females.

7) The prevalence of psychopathy is significantly higher among workers in some organizations and companies (e.g., managers, executives, procurement and supply professionals, advertising workers) than among university students or people from the general community. In turn, the prevalence of psychopathy among university students is significantly higher than among people from the general community, although the latter result could be due to the type of career that university students are pursuing (e.g., company careers vs. helping careers).

Observer-rated physical attractiveness generally predicted individuals’ support of the theoretical evolutionary psychology principles better than did gender, political orientation, or self-esteem

Ward A, English T, Chin M (2021) Physical attractiveness predicts endorsement of specific evolutionary psychology principles. PLoS ONE 16(8): e0254725. August 4, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0254725

Abstract: Evolutionary psychology has emerged as a controversial discipline, particularly with regard to its claims concerning the biological basis of sex differences in human mate preferences. Drawing on theories of motivated inference, we hypothesized that those who are most likely to be privileged by specific aspects of the theory would be most likely to support the theory. In particular, we predicted that physical attractiveness would be positively associated with endorsement of predictions of evolutionary psychology concerning mating strategies. Two studies confirmed this hypothesis. In Study 1, participants rated as higher in physical attractiveness were more likely to support specific principles of evolutionary psychology. In Study 2, a manipulation designed to boost self-perceived physical attractiveness increased endorsement of those same principles. Observer-rated physical attractiveness generally predicted individuals’ support of the theoretical principles better than did gender, political orientation, or self-esteem. Results suggest that those most likely to benefit according to certain predictions of evolutionary psychology are also those most likely to be sympathetic toward its relevant principles.

General discussion

Across two studies, attractiveness—either judged by raters or self-reported—was associated with a greater likelihood of endorsing evolutionary psychology. In a separate study, we ruled out the possibility that attractiveness renders individuals significantly more likely to endorse any controversial theory, finding that the Study 2 manipulation did not lead participants to preferentially endorse the precepts of psychoanalysis or support critiques of biological approaches in psychology.

Comparing the results of Study 1 and Study 2

It is important to reiterate a key difference between the methods of Study 1 and Study 2. In Study 1, outside raters actually evaluated the physical attractiveness of each participant. In Study 2, by contrast, participants themselves were asked to indicate how a typical observer would rate their attractiveness. Nevertheless, the results of Study 1 and Study 2a both showed that higher ratings of attractiveness were associated with greater endorsement of particular aspects of evolutionary psychology (though, interestingly, the effect was stronger in Study 1 than in Study 2a).

To assess the overall effect across the two studies, we conducted a mini meta-analysis [23]. This analysis yielded a combined r of.19, a small-to-medium effect size that, using the Stouffer formula [24], was highly statistically significant, p < .001. In addition, it is perhaps worth noting that the findings across both studies, though differing in effect size, would seem to be highly consistent with one another, unless one were to argue that those who are rated as more physically attractive (Study 1) also somehow possess no awareness that they are seen as more attractive by others (Study 2a) or even worse, somehow think they are seen as less attractive by others than do those who are rated as less physically attractive. We consider such possibilities extremely remote, and we find ourselves in general agreement with Marcus and Miller [14]: “Overall, we know who is pretty or handsome, and those who are attractive know it as well” [p. 334].

Limitations

Evolutionary psychology has been described by one critic as a field that “requires reducing people to our base instincts” [25]. Independent of the validity of such a critique, the present studies suggest that those who benefit from enhanced physical attractiveness, either as judged by others (Study 1) or themselves (Study 2), are more likely to favor aspects of evolutionary psychology that pertain to human mating.

Of course, based on reported demographic data, participants in our studies were not representative of the U.S. population as a whole, being younger, more liberal, and from a higher family income bracket than the typical U.S. citizen. They were, as well, only asked to respond to the account of evolutionary psychology that we provided to them. In order to ensure a concise stimulus paragraph, such an account was somewhat simplified, describing differences between female and male mating preferences that, while continuing to be supported by current research [26], could more properly be characterized in relative rather than absolute terms, with significant overlap between the sexes in terms of mating strategies [27].

Moreover, although our hypotheses were derived from theories of motivated inference, it is important to note that the present studies were concerned solely with documenting the existence of the relevant bias. Additional research could help explicate the underlying reasons for the favoring by physically attractive individuals of the specific predictions of evolutionary psychology that were explored in these studies. Indeed, although a motivated inference account would suggest that physically attractive individuals would favor a theory that privileges their ingroup [28], and thus they would be particularly attracted to aspects of the provided evolutionary account that highlighted the benefits of physical beauty for themselves and/or their anticipated mate, it is at least possible that such individuals were particularly drawn to other aspects of the theory, such as those privileging resource accumulation. Again, further research could help untangle these possibilities.

Although these studies included limitations and revealed modest effect sizes, the complementary approach of correlational and experimental designs bolsters the validity of the findings, which arguably can be considered substantial in the context of other plausible predictor variables [29]. Indeed, when individuals were presented with a definition of evolutionary psychology, including its application to mate preferences, observer-rated physical attractiveness best predicted support of the theory, in terms of the absolute value of the relevant correlation coefficient, r(84) = .31, 95% CI = [.11,.50], as compared to the next three highest contenders. These included self-esteem, r(125) = .22, 95% CI = [.04,.38] and political orientation (with, again, higher numbers = more conservative), r(125) = .21, 95% CI = [.04,.38], both assessed in the Study 2a control condition; and gender (coded as 1 = female, 2 = male), r(84) = .19 [-.03,.39], as assessed in Study 1, all of three which, interestingly, appeared to be much more aligned in terms of their absolute effect sizes.

From 1996... Managing Dysfunctional Emotions In Organizations

From 1996... Managing Dysfunctional Emotions In Organizations. Alistair Ostell. Journal of Management Studies, Volume33, Issue 4, July 1996, Pages 525-557. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.1996.tb00167.x

Abstract: Although much has been written about the different skills of managing people in work organizations there is a paucity of research and theorizing regarding a particular activity managers are often required to perform: that of dealing with the emotional behaviour of others. This paper aims to integrate research from clinical, social and occupational psychology with personal experience as a psychotherapist and management consultant to develop a framework of principles, strategies and tactics concerning how dysfunctional emotional behaviour of others can be managed effectively at work. the meaning of the term emotional behaviour is discussed and the issue of how emotional behaviour can be recognized is addressed. Five principles for managing dysfunctional emotional behaviour are outlined and strategies for the management of three common emotions (anger, anxiety, depression) are proposed, as well as consideration given to some specific tactics which illustrate how these principles and strategies can be implemented. Finally, guidelines concerning the management of different kinds of emotional reactions and the impact of organizational culture and emotional climate upon emotional behaviour are discussed along with the training implications of this framework.

Supportive, nonparental adults play a critical role in the lives of adolescents, helping them navigate their identities, & providing support that can offset considerable individual & contextual risks, promoting resilience

Youth-Initiated Mentoring as a Scalable Approach to Addressing Mental Health Problems During the COVID-19 Crisis. Levi van Dam, Jean Rhodes, Renée Spencer. JAMA Psychiatry, April 28, 2021;78(8):817-818. doi:10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2021.0490

Although adolescents have lower COVID-19 infection rates compared with adults, the pandemic is taking a toll on young people’s mental health. There have been multiple reports of increases in mental health challenges for adolescents during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, including a rapid systematic review indicating that adolescents are now more likely to experience high rates of depression and anxiety.1 This calls for a response from clinical services to offer support and early intervention where possible and be prepared for an increase in mental health problems. It also calls for the mobilization of social networks, which are beneficial for health and can function as a buffer against various individual and contextual risks. Especially for adolescents, supportive relationships with caring adults have been found to be a protective factor of the development for mental health problems.2 Therefore, besides societal awareness of the potential effect of these supportive relationships, clinicians, social workers, and teachers should facilitate youths’ connections with natural mentors.

Supportive, nonparental adults play a critical role in the lives of adolescents, helping them navigate their identities, and providing support that can offset considerable individual and contextual risks, while promoting resilience across a range of important academic, behavioral, and health domains (eg, van Dam et al3). Research indicates that the benefits of such relationships for mental and relational health can last into adulthood, even for those who experienced significant childhood adversities.4 Yet adolescents from ethnic minority groups as well as socioeconomically disadvantaged families are less likely to have such supportive and caring relationships with nonparental adults relative to their more privileged peers (eg, Raposa et al5). Despite considerable efforts to foster such connections through formal youth mentoring programs that match youths with adult volunteers, recruiting enough adults to meet the demands of vulnerable youths and their families has been a persistent problem, as has retaining these mentors once matched with mentees.6 Youth-initiated mentoring (YIM), a hybrid approach in which youths and their families are helped to identify and recruit caring adult mentors from within their existing social networks and to maintain such relationships, is a promising strategy for addressing these problems and expanding the reach of youth mentoring.

Although most YIM programs are in the early stages of development, a 2021 meta-analysis7 describes its application in different domains: to prevent school dropout as a systemic approach to prevent out-of-home placement among vulnerable youths, with youths in foster care, with delinquent youths, as a preventive approach for youths who are at risk or being hospitalized for attempting suicide, and as a universal prevention strategy in educational settings to support first-generation college students.7 The meta-analysis provides encouraging empirical evidence that this approach protects against risks, fosters positive outcomes, and might improve the outcomes of youth psychological therapy and the delivery of treatment. The study revealed that, across a range of outcomes, overall effects were significantly greater (g = 0.30) than achieved by either formal mentoring (volunteer-based mentoring, g = 0.21)8 or purely natural mentoring (youths experiencing a supportive adult within their community but not embedded within a formal mentoring program, g = 0.22).3

The reported effects of YIM programs may in part result from the familiarity and comfort with the recruited mentors as well as the tendency to focus on specific problems (eg, violence prevention in a high-violence area, prevention of suicide, and out-of-home placement). Such targeted approaches differ from most formal mentoring programs, which use a general nonspecific, friendship approach for youths with various needs. A 2020 meta-analysis9 indicated that targeted mentor programs, matched to the specific needs of their mentees, had larger effect sizes than nonspecific programs (g = 0.25 vs g = 0.11).9 Moreover, several of the interventions included in the YIM meta-analysis incorporated professional mental health treatment with the YIM approach, a focus that may have resulted in stronger treatment motivation, more positive adult-youth alliances, and improved goal orientation.

Additionally, YIM relationships tend to be remarkably long-lasting, even in traditionally high-risk samples. In 1 study, 74% of participants reported having contact with their recruited mentors almost 2 years after the official program commitment. Likewise, when a YIM program was used to prevent out-of-home placement of youths with complex needs, 75% of the adult mentors kept in touch with the adolescents after 2 years, and 80% of the youths still lived at home or within their community. Additionally, qualitative studies have underscored how meaningful it was for adults recruited as mentors in YIM programs to have been selected and invited to serve in this capacity.10 Because they already knew the adolescent, they had more realistic expectations and were able to build on an established tie. Unlike mentors recruited and selected by formal mentoring programs, who tend to volunteer in hope of making a positive difference in an adolescent’s life, YIM mentors have reported beginning the relationship feeling they have already made such a difference by virtue of being chosen by the youth to serve as his or her mentor.10

Youths in the top socioeconomic status quartile have somewhat greater access to natural mentors than do lower-income and at-risk youth,6 but YIM offers a promising strategy for increasing the latter groups’ access by intentionally connecting them with adults they trust from within their communities. This innovative preventive, scalable approach shifts current systems of care and social service from client-focused to network-focused, which raises new questions. For example: how do professionals and natural mentors collaborate successfully? What new skills does this require from clinicians and social workers? What type of support do recruited mentors need? Given the health-promoting and protective nature of mentoring relationships, it is imperative that we increase access to them for all youths. Especially in these challenging times, with increased isolation and loneliness owing to COVID-19 restrictions, supportive relationships can offer an important antidote.

References and full text at the link above.

Simply wait for deniers & contrarians to “age out;” said Nye: “There’s an old saying — ‘science proceeds one funeral at a time,’” Nye said, “but it’s not happening fast enough.”

Will Aguirre | The Daily Collegian. Apr 22, 2021. https://www.collegian.psu.edu/news/campus/penn-state-professor-climate-scientist-michael-mann-fights-against-climate-denialism/article_a7a6c7c6-a2f7-11eb-ab1c-5bca01044a1a.html

[Copy to preserve the record, since the original link no longer seems to work]

As the world changes and climate changes with it, one thing has stayed the same for decades — Michael Mann’s commitment to fighting the climate war.

[…]

Mann began studying quantum mechanics as an undergraduate at the University of California, Berkeley, with majors in physics and applied math. When he began work as a graduate student at Yale University, Mann said he was “lured away” from the physics department because there were still opportunities for young scientists to make “substantial contributions” at the forefront of climate studies.

[…]

Mann said he doesn’t want to blame fossil fuel workers for engaging in the “climate war.” Instead, he said he believes there are just a few corporate CEOs who serve as “bad actors” and make “cynical decisions knowing the devastating impact” they would have on the climate.

[…]

According to Nye, both him and Mann are frequently asked two common questions: “What can I do about climate change,” and “What can be done to convince someone who’s a climate denier?”

Nye calls these the $10 trillion questions, because climate deniers are so “dug in” to their beliefs, which only makes it harder to convince them of what the science suggests.

The only definitive way to see significant action to prevent climate change is to simply wait for deniers and contrarians to “age out,” according to Nye.

“There’s an old saying — ‘science proceeds one funeral at a time,’” Nye said, “but it’s not happening fast enough.”

[…]

Porn use is only linked to relationship dissatisfaction when one partner uses it alone and the other doesn't; but porn itself doesn't seem to be the problem in these cases—porn appears to be a symptom of dissimilarity in sex drive

But What’s Your Partner Up to? Associations Between Relationship Quality and Pornography Use Depend on Contextual Patterns of Use Within the Couple. Taylor Kohut et al. Front. Psychol., July 30 2021. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.661347

Abstract: It is commonly assumed that exposure to pornography harms relationships because pornography changes the way that individuals think, feel, and behave in problematic ways. In the current research, we contribute to a small but growing body of work that challenges this assumption by carefully scrutinizing the relational context of pornography use. In contrast to dominant theoretical explanations in this field, we argue that at least some of the apparent negative “impacts” of pornography use on relationship quality may reflect partner dissimilarity in pornography use behavior rather than the consequences of exposure to such materials. Moreover, we further examine a particular type of pornography use – shared use with a partner – which previous evidence suggests may be positively associated with relationship quality. To this end, we sought to test whether dyadic patterns of pornography use, and related attributes, were associated with sexual and relationship satisfaction in two cross-sectional (N1 = 200; N3 = 207) and two longitudinal (N2 = 77; N4 = 277) samples of heterosexual couples. Across these samples, we found consistent evidence that partners who watch pornography together report higher relationship and sexual satisfaction than partners who do not, and notably, this association was not moderated by gender. Independent of this association, we also found evidence of a similarity-dissimilarity effect, such that the solitary pornography use of one partner was negatively associated with their own relationship and sexual satisfaction, but only in cases where their romantic partners used little or no pornography alone. Further consideration of several correlates of pornography use established comparable patterns of results for dissimilarity in attitudes toward pornography, erotophobia-erotophilia, sexual preferences, and sex drive. Importantly, only dissimilarity in sex drive statistically accounted for dissimilarity in solitary pornography use, suggesting that differences in sex drive may be implicated in the associations between pornography use and relationship quality. These findings demonstrate that links between pornography use and relationship health are partially a function of different dyadic patterns of pornography use within couples and do not always suggest relational harm.

General Discussion

Building on previous research indicating positive correlations between pornography use and relationship functioning (Kohut et al., 2017b, 2018), the current work sought to determine if associations between pornography use and relationship and sexual satisfaction may vary as a function of different dyadic patterns of pornography use within adult relationships. Across three studies, we found consistent evidence that partners who watch pornography together report higher relationship and sexual satisfaction than partners who do not, and notably, this association was not moderated by gender. Independent of this association, we also found evidence of a similarity-dissimilarity effect, such that the solitary pornography use of one partner was negatively associated with their own relationship and sexual satisfaction, but only in cases where their romantic partners used little or no pornography alone8. Further, satisfaction measures tended to be highest among couples in which both partners either used pornography at a high frequency or did not use pornography at all. In probing potential mechanisms for the similarity-dissimilarity effect, we found that similarity-dissimilarity in sex drive, but not attitudes toward pornography, erotophobia-erotophilia, or sexual preferences may be implicated.

The most robust finding in the current analysis was that the frequency of shared pornography use was positively associated with both relationship and sexual satisfaction. These findings corroborate previous reports of similar associations in research that failed to control for similarity-dissimilarity in partners’ solitary pornography use (Bridges and Morokoff, 2011; Maddox et al., 2011; Willoughby and Leonhardt, 2020), and extend Kohut et al.’s (2018) findings that shared pornography use is associated with more open sexual communication and higher interpersonal closeness. Positive associations between shared pornography use and relationship functioning are difficult to explain with harm-focused exposure-based paradigms that draw heavily from objectification, social comparison, and script theories. Such findings, however, are quite consistent with descriptions of shared pornography use as a novel and exciting couples’ activity (Kohut et al., 2017b), as well as more general theories and evidence that link the experience of shared novel and exciting activities with relationship functioning (Aron et al., 1992, 2000; Reissman et al., 1993). Further experimental research in this vein should consider whether the introduction of (or increase in) shared pornography use can improve relationship and sexual satisfaction within couples to determine if causal claims are warranted.

While the results were less robust, it is more intriguing that similarity-dissimilarity in solitary pornography use was associated with sexual satisfaction and, to a lesser extent, relationship satisfaction. Across Studies 1, 3, and 4, we found consistent evidence indicating that the well-established negative association between pornography and sexual satisfaction was limited to cases where partners were very dissimilar in their solitary pornography use. We also found evidence that solitary pornography use was positively related to sexual and relationship satisfaction among couples in which both members frequently used pornography alone, but such effects were limited to Study 3. When considering these findings in conjunction with past research (Kohut et al., 2018), we are inclined to believe that the positive associations between solitary pornography use and relationship quality reported in Study 3 were a result of chance variation and will be unlikely to replicate in future research. Moreover, it is evident to us that dissimilarity in solitary pornography use is much more common than similarity in moderate to frequent solitary pornography use (Kohut et al., 2017a), at least with respect to the heterosexual couples that have been studied. Consequently, we are left to conclude that while solitary pornography use may typically be associated with poor relationship functioning within most heterosexual romantic couples (Wright et al., 2017), there exist at least some cases where it is not. With respect to Holbert and Park’s (2020) classification of interaction types, the interaction between heterosexual couple members’ solitary pornography use would best be described as a form of contingent moderation with a divergent negative pattern.

Such findings are nevertheless important for a number of reasons. First, if one takes the position that pornography causes relationships to deteriorate then these findings indicate important boundary conditions that limit pornography’s harmful effects to relationships with particular patterns of dissimilar pornography use. Second, these results accord nicely with well-established findings that similarity-dissimilarity in attitudes, personality, and sexual preferences are related to enhanced attraction and relationship functioning (Smith et al., 1993; Purnine and Carey, 1999; Montoya and Horton, 2013), which implies that mechanisms that are not premised on the impact of exposure to sexual content may be responsible for at least some of the purported “harms” of pornography. Finally, the lack of evidence indicating that the similarity-dissimilarity effects were further moderated by gender reinforces the possibility that previously reported gender differences in the associations between pornography use and relationship functioning (Wright et al., 2017) actually represent similarity-dissimilarity effects, rather than gender-specific responses to sexual media. While intriguing, this last speculation can only be tested conclusively with large dyadic samples of male and female same-sex relationships. Nevertheless, the current results call into question the utility of further theorizing about male- and female-specific relationship “consequences” of exposure to sexual media until such research can be conducted.

Our efforts to probe potential mechanisms for the associations between similarity-dissimilarity in solitary pornography use and relationship and sexual satisfaction corroborated previous reports that similarity-dissimilarity in attitudes (Montoya and Horton, 2013), erotophobia-erotophilia (Smith et al., 1993), sexual preferences (Purnine and Carey, 1999), and sex drive (Davies et al., 1999; Mark, 2015) are related to relationship functioning. Of particular relevance to the current analysis, similarity-dissimilarity in sex drive, but not attitudes toward one’s own pornography use, attitudes toward a partner’s pornography use, erotophobia-erotophilia, or sexual preferences, statistically accounted for similarity-dissimilarity effects of solitary pornography use. Specifically, in Study 4, once couple differences in similarity-dissimilarity in sex drive were controlled for, patterns of solitary pornography use within couples were unrelated to their sexual satisfaction. In this case, neither similarity-dissimilarity in pornography use nor sex-drive “dominated” the statistical model as such associations effectively canceled each other out. Independent of the issue of similarity-dissimilarity, both partners’ levels of sex drive in this model, but not their levels of solitary pornography use, were positively associated with sexual satisfaction. This suggests the presence of connections between sex-drive and sexual satisfaction, that are independent of solitary pornography use. It is also notable that controlling for similarity-dissimilarity in sex-drive did not interfere with the association between shared pornography use and sexual satisfaction. We believe that this latter finding reinforces the notion that the relationship correlates of shared pornography use and similarity-dissimilarity in solitary pornography use operate through different causal pathways.

The statistical overlap between similarity-dissimilarity in solitary pornography use and sex drive may be especially notable because similarity-dissimilarity in solitary pornography use was more reliably connected to sexual rather than relationship satisfaction, despite the high correlations between these two constructs. In this connection it is also worth noting that past research has indicated that pornography use has a modestly stronger association with sexual satisfaction than relationship satisfaction (Wright et al., 2017). While very speculative, such findings coupled with our own incline us to believe that at least some of the association between pornography use and relationship satisfaction may be a downstream consequence of a more proximal relationship between pornography use and sexual satisfaction, rather than vice versa. If that is the case then ameliorating sexual dissatisfaction among couples who are dissimilar in solitary pornography use by directly addressing their sexual concerns related to pornography or by tackling factors like dissimilarity in sex drive might have further salutary effects on other aspects of their relationship quality (e.g., relationship satisfaction, interpersonal closeness, commitment, etc.).

The exact nature of the relationship between solitary pornography use and sexual satisfaction remains an open question. The ACE perspective, with its emphasis on antecedent conditions and potentially spurious associations, would suggest that partner discrepancies in sex drive – which are common in heterosexual relationships (Ellison, 2002) – may precipitate and maintain dissimilarities in solitary pornography use, and potentially independent from that, fuel sexual dissatisfaction in relationships. In other words, the similarity-dissimilarity effects of solitary pornography use may have little or no impact on sexual satisfaction and may simply represent a “marker” of the causal relationship between dissimilarity in sex-drive and sexual satisfaction. However, other views would stress the possibility that our findings represent evidence that sex drive mediates the relationship between pornography use and sexual satisfaction (e.g., Wright, 2021b). That is, solitary pornography use may fundamentally increase users’ sex drives, creating imbalances in desire in the relationship, which ultimately lead to decreased sexual satisfaction for both partners. The results of Study 4 are equally consistent with both possibilities, though we would caution somewhat against the latter view. Pornography clearly induces sexual arousal in many people, but compelling data concerning pornography-induced long-term changes in people’s general levels of sexual desire are scarce. The only relevant data that we are aware of indicates that perceived increases in sex drive stemming from pornography use are not particularly common and are about equally balanced by reports that pornography use decreases sexual interests (Grov et al., 2011; Kohut et al., 2017b). Regardless, assuming our pattern of findings with respect to sex-drive are robust and replicate, further work seeking to understand the role of sex drive in the associations between solitary pornography use and sexual satisfaction will need to consider experimental designs that attempt to manipulate both sex drive and solitary pornography use independently and follow couples over time.

Limitations

As is typically the case, the implications of this work are constrained by several important limitations. First, while we have speculated about several potential causal paths that could explain the associations between pornography use and relationship quality, these possibilities cannot be adequately tested with the current studies. We would also like to note that while our causal speculations are premised in part on research involving the experimental manipulation of perceived similarity and the introduction of shared novel activities among couples, we are quite open to the possibility that we are wrong, and other causal arrangements of the relevant constructs provide better explanations. Second, although one of these studies employed a quota sampling approach to approximately match the distribution of age and political affiliation of married American women, the remaining studies relied on convenience samples of Americans, limiting the generalizability of the current findings. Third, none of the current studies was expressly designed to examine the hypotheses of interest. Had they been, design elements, particularly the inclusion and operationalization of specific measures, would have been more consistent across studies. Relatedly, the particular operationalizations of pornography use employed in these studies may be suspect. The measure employed in Study 4 was conceptually broader than the measures used in Study’s 1 and 3 as it included “sexually charged” situations like visiting a strip-club and sex chatting, which are explicitly excluded in the other studies. While this is a poor defense, their currently exists no thoroughly validated measure of pornography use, nor any consensus on the best conceptual and operational definitions of this construct (Short et al., 2012; Kohut, 2014; Kohut et al., 2020). Given both the single-item assessments of pornography use and their different operationalizations across studies, it is at least promising that similar patterns of results emerged across our studies. Finally, while we made efforts to register all analytic plans before conducting the analyses, only Study 3 pre-registered these analyses before the data had been examined in any respect. In all other occasions, we had indications that similarity-dissimilarity effects for solitary pornography use emerged when different, yet closely related variables or models were tested. As a consequence, we would recommend that readers interpret the results of Studies 1, 2, and 4 as corroborative exploratory evidence for a pattern of results we confirmed in Study 3.

Rolf Degen summarizing... Changes in a person's morality are perceived as a greater disruption of their self than changes in other aspects of personhood—except by psychopaths

Everett, Jim A. C., Joshua A. Skorburg, and Jordan Livingston. 2021. “Me, My (moral) Self, and I.” PsyArXiv. August 4. doi:10.31234/osf.io/af7u5

Abstract: In this chapter we critically review interdisciplinary work from philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience to shed light on perceptions of personal identity and selfhood. We review recent research that has addressed traditional philosophical questions about personal identity using empirical methods, focusing on the “moral self effect”: the finding that morality, more so than memory, is perceived to be at the core of personal identity. We raise and respond to a number of key questions and criticisms about this work. We begin by considering the operationalization of identity concepts in the empirical literature, before turning to explore the boundary conditions of “moral self effect” and how generalizable it is, and then reflecting on how this work might be connected more deeply with other neuroscience research shedding light on the self. Throughout, we highlight connections between classical themes in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience, while also suggesting new directions for interdisciplinary collaboration.

The Wealth Inequality of Nations: Wealth inequality varies greatly across countries, and there is no clear correlation with countries’ levels of income inequality

The Wealth Inequality of Nations. Fabian T. Pfeffer, Nora Waitkus. American Sociological Review, July 30, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/00031224211027800

Abstract: Comparative research on income inequality has produced several frameworks to study the institutional determinants of income stratification. In contrast, no such framework and much less empirical evidence exist to explain cross-national differences in wealth inequality. This situation is particularly lamentable as cross-national patterns of inequality in wealth diverge sharply from those in income. We seek to pave the way for new explanations of cross-national differences in wealth inequality by tracing them to the influence of different wealth components. Drawing on the literatures on financialization and housing, we argue that housing equity should be the central building block of the comparative analysis of wealth inequality. Using harmonized data on 15 countries included in the Luxembourg Wealth Study (LWS), we demonstrate a lack of association between national levels of income and wealth inequality and concentration. Using decomposition approaches, we then estimate the degree to which national levels of wealth inequality and concentration relate to cross-national differences in wealth portfolios and the distribution of specific asset components. Considering the role of housing equity, financial assets, non-housing real assets, and non-housing debt, we show that cross-national variation in wealth inequality and concentration is centrally determined by the distribution of housing equity.

Keywords: wealth, income, housing, inequality, comparison

Conclusion

While advanced capitalist societies are marked by high levels of inequality in household

wealth as well as concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, considerable variation

exists in the extent of national levels of wealth inequality and concentration. Yet, current

knowledge about national patterns and determinants of wealth inequality is limited and,

as we have argued here, will rely on fundamentally different explanatory approaches than

those developed over decades in a laborious field of research on international differences in

income inequality. International differences in income inequality tell us close to nothing about

international differences in wealth inequality, as we have shown here. In fact, many countries

that we customarily describe as comparatively egalitarian using income-based comparisons

– such as Scandinavian countries – can be classified as anything but in terms of their levels

of wealth inequality. Many countries that were henceforth thought of as similarly unequal –

for instance, Germany and Greece – are far apart from each other in terms of their level of

wealth inequality (with Germany displaying very high levels). As such, prior institutional

explanations of inequality hold little promise in elucidating the international ranking of

wealth inequality and the vast cross-national variation in wealth stratification remains in

urgent need of explanation.

This contribution takes but one first step in this direction by carefully investigating the

role of different asset components in accounting for the overall distribution of wealth. We

surmise that any potential institutional explanations of wealth inequality need to rest on a

careful consideration of the operative components of wealth. That is, we first need a clear

understanding of how the distribution of different types of assets relates to nations’ overall

level of wealth inequality and concentration. Is wealth inequality, for instance, largely a

reflection of the spread of debt, financial liabilities, and general exposure to financial markets,

as emerging theories of financialization may suggest? Or, do we best understand the degree

of wealth concentration in a given country as the concentration of capital held in real assets,

reflected, for instance, in the hoarding of wealth among a business elite? Our empirical

findings, instead, consistently point in a different direction: Cross-national differences in

wealth inequality and concentration chiefly reflect the level of inequality in and concentration

of housing equity. While simple indicators of home ownership rates, typically used to capture

the overall importance of housing assets in a given country, suggest that broader access to

home ownership may dampen wealth inequality and concentration, the overall distribution

of housing equity, of which the prevalence of home ownership is just one aspect, is the central

element accounting for overall wealth inequality. A country’s distribution of housing equity

explains its overall level of wealth inequality and concentration to a substantial degree,

including both the outlying position of the United States as well as the overall variation

across many different countries. This is not to say that the strong concentration of financial

assets and business equity at the top of the wealth distribution in most countries would be

unimportant. In fact, a focus on financial assets and business equity is likely central to the

understanding of elite closure and the continued and accelerating wealth accumulation of

the top one percent (Piketty 2014; Carney and Nason 2018). But, based on the evidence

presented here, our understanding of wealth inequality among the remaining 99 percent relies

on increased attention to the structure and dynamics of housing and mortgage markets.

Our two main findings – the non-correlation of income inequality and wealth inequality,

on the one side, and the centrality of housing equity, on the other side – are thus connected:

The reason why cross-national differences in income inequality do not predict cross-national

differences in wealth inequality is that the latter are most centrally driven by housing equity.

In turn, the distribution of housing equity, we argue, is crucially determined by financialization

and housing market dynamics, i.e., in institutional spheres outside of the labor market

and the classical realms of the welfare state. Work on comparative stratification and welfare

state regimes, therefore, will have to expand its view to these additional institutional factors

to make sense of a dimension of particularly profound and lasting inequality. Ideally, such

future work will draw on both qualitative and quantitative indicators of financialized housing

markets, such as housing and mortgage market regulations.

It seems unfortunate that one of the most ambitious theoretical and empirical studies on

the determinants of wealth inequality, Piketty’s Capital (2014), also mostly disregards the

role of housing as a driver of wealth inequality (see also Bonnet et al. 2014; Fuller et al. 2019;

Rognlie 2015), and the proposed “rule” of growing wealth inequality (r > g) at best discounts

the importance of a careful analysis of the institutional determinants of wealth inequality

(see also Acemoglu and Robinson 2015). An alternative, theoretically ambitious effort that

focuses on the role of housing may, instead, naturally align with the rapidly expanding

literature on financialization that has forcefully argued for the central role of mortgage

lending. At the backdrop of the findings presented here, one way to bring the literature on

financialization and the literature on wealth into closer conversation would be to establish a

clear empirical link between different lending regimes and the structure of national housing

markets. Doing so would also promise to ameliorate the surprising disconnect between the

scholarships on wealth and debt (see also Dwyer 2018). The comparative study of lending

regimes is at an early stage but has produced some interesting initial insights: For instance,

in a comparison of the mortgage debt structure in six European countries, van Gunten and

Navot (2018) show that differences in the distribution of mortgage debt is best captured by

the degree of credit intensity, i.e., the expansion of credit among those already holding it,

rather than differences in mortgage market participation (which also makes the distribution

of mortgage credit largely independent from national home ownership rates). This pattern

chimes well with our finding of the dominant role of the distribution of housing equity,

rather than home ownership rates, in explaining overall wealth inequality. However, in

the U.S., mortgage debt has also expanded into new population groups as the “predatory

inclusion” of minority households grew through new and exploitative mortgage products

(Rugh and Massey 2010; Taylor 2019). Future research should thus expand its comparative

range to understand different modes of housing market financialization (see also Blackwell

and Kohl 2018). Some of this research may also pursue a meso-level approach, popular in

some financialization studies, to compare the role of banks and asset management firms, the

real estate industry, or other intermediaries involved in expanding and intensifying mortgage

credit (Baradaran 2017; Jorda et al. 2016; Taylor 2019; Braun 2020).

To pursue an explanatory agenda, comparative wealth research will also be able to fruitfully

draw on research on recent housing markets dynamics. For instance, Adkins et al.

(2020) proposes property price inflation as the foundation of a new logic of inequality: Having

access to home ownership in areas experiencing such inflation determines individuals’

economic well-being over and above their employment. The extent to which homes out-earn

the individuals who own them, of course, also varies vastly within countries. Geographic

polarization of home ownership and housing prices has been documented in several countries

(e.g., Levin and Pryce 2011; Baldenius et al. 2020), in some taking the shape of run-away

home values in “superstar” cities, where transnational wealth elites store and invest vast

fortunes and drive up home prices in the process (Fernandez et al. 2016). Outside of these

zones of wealth storage and accumulation, asset prices are depressed and yield lower wealth

returns, for instance, in U.S. minority neighborhoods (Killewald and Bryan 2016; LaBriola

2020). Future research may seek to relate national-level wealth inequality and concentration

to regional and other spatial inequalities within countries. Recent contributions that

have pursued similar questions in the context of the income distribution in the U.S. have

shown that national-level trends in income inequality are the main driver of regional income

inequality (Manduca 2019) and that the distribution of income across and within U.S. geographies

has large, causal effects on the economic well-being of the next generation (Chetty

and Hendren 2018). If the variation in local housing markets is at least as large as that in

local labor markets, one may hypothesize that geographic variation in wealth levels and inequality

may be even more pronounced and consequential for the distribution of opportunity

among the next generation. For most nations, this vital analysis of within-country variation

in wealth levels, inequality, and persistence, however, awaits the development of a new data

data infrastructure to assess the distribution of wealth at the sub-national level, for instance,

based on full-population tax data or other administrative records. Finally, complementary

to a focus on recent housing market dynamics, a comparative-historical approach to uncover

the institutional foundations of countries’ housing and mortgage markets can draw on recent

work that not only documents high long-term wealth returns on housing (Jorda et al. 2019;

Blackwell and Kohl 2019) but also great cross-national variation in housing price trajectories

(Knoll et al. 2017). We remind the reader that our data are chiefly drawn from the period

following the Great Recession. And although our stability analyses based on immediate

pre-recession measures for a few countries suggest that our main conclusions are stable, we

believe that the cross-national variation in the impact of the housing crisis provides new

analytic opportunities.

We believe that future wealth research stands to learn a lot from a focus on countries at

either end of the international ranking of wealth inequality. As some of the most wealthegalitarian

countries in our analysis, post-socialist nations and their radical shift in home

ownership regulations during market transition provide promising analytic opportunities

(Marcuse 1996; Zavisca 2008; Tsenkova 2017; Song and Xie 2014; Xie and Jin 2015). At the

same time, we expect our results to trigger additional interest in analyzing countries with

the highest level of wealth inequality and concentration. Likely, the unfortunate leadership

position of the U.S. in the international ranking of wealth inequality will not come as a

surprise to most comparative stratification scholars; the degree to which the U.S. outranks

its peer countries in terms of wealth concentration may. We have gone to great lengths

to rule out that the high wealth concentration estimate for the U.S. is simply a product

of (putatively) superior data quality. It is also not exclusively a reflection of deep racial

inequalities in wealth; even among white U.S. households the level of wealth concentration

is exceptional in comparative perspective. The next two most wealth-unequal countries in

our analysis, Sweden and Norway, in contrast may cause more surprise and critique – even

though we are not the first to document high wealth levels for these countries (e.g., Roine

and Waldenstroem 2009; Jaentti et al. 2013). After all, comparative stratification research

has long and rightfully held up Scandinavia as the egalitarian poster-child based on its

national income distributions. The analysis of wealth considerably complicates this image

and invites scholars to revisit the assessment of Scandinavian egalitarianism. High wealth

stratification in Scandinavian countries may well be a long-term reflection of its much less

egalitarian history (see e.g., Piketty 2020) as well as the more recent neo-liberal turn in their

politics (Fagerberg et al. 1990; Ryner 1999). Critics may still wonder whether high wealth

inequality takes on fundamentally different social significance in a context with comparatively

generous systems of public insurance that may make wealth less central to maintaining more

stable lives. In contrast, we submit that wealth inequality in such contexts is still highly

consequential for a range of outcomes, in particular, for the intergenerational reproduction

of inequality: Recent contributions have highlighted the independent role of wealth in the

distribution of educational opportunity and the intergenerational transmission of advantage

in Sweden and Norway (Haellsten and Pfeffer 2017; Adermon et al. 2018; Hansen 2014;

Galster and Wessel 2019).

At the same time, concerns about the public insurance context of different wealth inequality

regimes do point to an important area for future research: As acknowledged before,

the inclusion of (estimated present values of) public pension entitlements is certain to provide

lower estimates of inequality in Scandinavia and other contexts. We have pointed out

that our analysis, in line with most other wealth research, applies a definition of net worth

that does not include public pensions nor most other forms of employer-provided pensions.

We have focused on assets available to working-age households. Unlike the marketable assets

included in our analyses, pension wealth is inaccessible (to varying degrees depending on the

type of pension) to households until older ages. Measures of wealth that include the present

values of pensions, i.e. “augmented net worth,” thus shift the analytic question.13 Although

harmonized measures of augmented net worth will be enormously difficult to construct for

a broad range of countries given cross-national differences in pension systems, future comparative

studies of augmented net worth inequality may provide a different country ranking.

Institutional explanations of such ranking will likely also profit from direct connections to

the literatures reviewed here as the financialization of pension systems complements that of

housing markets (Dixon 2008; Schwartz 2012; van Gunten and Kohl 2020).

Finally, we are convinced that the analysis of wealth inequality stands to gain from

future expansion of its comparative scope to other national contexts (see also Davies 2008).

As typical of most “medium-N” and “large-N” cross-national comparisons, our sample of

countries is a reflection of data availability, which in turn is based on various historical and

political contingencies that prohibit inference to other countries (see Ebbinghaus 2005). In

this sense, we provide an initial descriptive approach that awaits expansion to other countries

as the availability of LWS and other wealth data continues to expand (see Killewald et al.

2017; Zucman 2019). The findings reported here may also facilitate the meaningful selection

of a smaller number of comparative cases (Ebbinghaus 2005) that, in a “small-N” comparison,

would help elucidate the institutional foundations of distinct housing markets and their

relationship to overall wealth. The inability to draw firm causal conclusions based on either

type of comparative approach should not keep us from taking the next significant step in

filling the lacuna of evidence on the potential sources of national levels of wealth inequality.

Mice carrying the humanized Foxp2 allele were using higher frequencies and more complex syllable types than mice of the corresponding wildtype inbred strain

A humanized version of Foxp2 affects ultrasonic vocalization in adult female and male mice. Sophie von Merten, Christine Pfeifle, Sven Künzel, Svenja Hoier, Diethard Tautz. Genes, Brain and Behavior, August 2 2021. https://doi.org/10.1111/gbb.12764

Abstract: The transcription factor FoxP2 is involved in setting up the neuronal circuitry for vocal learning in mammals and birds and is thought to have played a special role in the evolution of human speech and language. It has been shown that an allele with a humanized version of the murine Foxp2 gene changes the ultrasonic vocalization of mouse pups compared to pups of the wild-type inbred strain. Here we tested if this humanized allele would also affect the ultrasonic vocalization of adult female and male mice. In a previous study, in which only male vocalization was considered and the mice were recorded under a restricted spatial and temporal regime, no difference in adult vocalization between genotypes was found. Here, we use a different test paradigm in which both female and male vocalizations are recorded in extended social contact. We found differences in temporal, spectral and syntactical parameters between the genotypes in both sexes, and between sexes. Mice carrying the humanized Foxp2 allele were using higher frequencies and more complex syllable types than mice of the corresponding wildtype inbred strain. Our results support the notion that the humanized Foxp2 allele has a differential effect on mouse ultrasonic vocalization. As mice carrying the humanized version of the Foxp2 gene show effects opposite to those of mice carrying disrupted or mutated alleles of this gene, we conclude that this mouse line represents an important model for the study of human speech and language evolution.