On Libet et al.: The readiness potential (RP) may only be an “artifact of averaging” and that, when intention is measured using “tone probes,” the onset of intention is found much earlier and often before the onset of the RP

Conscious intention and human action: Review of the rise and fall of the readiness potential and Libet’s clock. Edward J. Neafsey. Consciousness and Cognition, Volume 94, September 2021, 103171. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2021.103171

Abstract: Is consciousness—the subjective awareness of the sensations, perceptions, beliefs, desires, and intentions of mental life—a genuine cause of human action or a mere impotent epiphenomenon accompanying the brain’s physical activity but utterly incapable of making anything actually happen? This article will review the history and current status of experiments and commentary related to Libet’s influential paper (Brain 106:623–664, 1983) whose conclusion “that cerebral initiation even of a spontaneous voluntary act …can and usually does begin unconsciously” has had a huge effect on debate about the efficacy of conscious intentions. Early (up to 2008) and more recent (2008 on) experiments replicating and criticizing Libet’s conclusions and especially his methods will be discussed, focusing especially on recent observations that the readiness potential (RP) may only be an “artifact of averaging” and that, when intention is measured using “tone probes,” the onset of intention is found much earlier and often before the onset of the RP. Based on these findings, Libet’s methodology was flawed and his results are no longer valid reasons for rejecting Fodor’s “good old commonsense belief/desire psychology” that “my wanting is causally responsible for my reaching.”.

Keywords: Readiness potentialBereitschaftspotentialIntentionDecisionFree willHard problemConsciousnessLibetKornhuberNeuroscienceEpiphenomenon

4. Discussion

4.1. Intention Before RP: Has the Ghost Returned?

If intentions precede the RP, does that mean that the “ghost in the machine” (Ryle, 1949) has returned and intentions are present without any brain activity? No. Even if the RP is plausibly only an artifact of averaging and even if tone probes have shown the onset of intentions takes place well before the onset of any RPs, that does not mean that nothing is going on in the brain when these intentions begin. The UCLA neurosurgeon Itzhak Fried and his coworkers recorded neuronal activity from depth electrodes implanted into the medial frontal lobe (SMA, pre-SMA, and ACC (anterior cingulate cortex)) during performance of the Libet clock task in “12 subjects with pharmacologically intractable epilepsy to localize the focus of seizure onset” (Fried, Mukamel, & Kreiman, 2011). Each depth electrode included nine microwires capable of recording single and multi-unit neuronal activity, and 760 units (254 single units and 496 multiunits) were recorded in the SMA, pre-SMA, and ACC of the 12 patients. As seen in Fig. 5A, they found “progressive neuronal recruitment over $~$1500 ms before subjects report making the decision to move …[with a] progressive increase or decrease in neuronal firing rate, particularly in the supplementary motor area (SMA), as the reported time of decision was approached.” Much of this early neuronal activity took place in the 1500 ms preceding movement, but there were a number of neurons whose firing rates changed even earlier. And, as illustrated in Fig. 5B, in experiments in monkeys done in the lab of Mark Churchland by Lara, Cunningham, and Churchland (Jul. 2018) SMA neurons showed “preparatory and movement-related activity that covaried with reach direction,” in marked contrast to the human early RP’s lack of any movement specificity. So there is early, movement-specific neuronal activity during these early intentions.

Fig. 5

Fried, like Libet, found the W time was only about 0.2 s before the movement, but, as shown above in the studies from the labs of Matsuhashi and Hallett and Verbaarschot, W time utterly fails to capture when intention actually begins. Related to such early intentions, Miller and Schwarz (2014) comment that “At the start of each trial, it seems plausible that participants would already have a weak yet conscious urge to move within the next few seconds, simply because they know that their task is to make such movements. …In this scenario, the fact that brain activity appears to emerge before the conscious decision—i.e., before W—is merely an artifact of the experimenter’s requirement that the observer impose an arbitrary criterion for making a binary judgment about an inherently gradual process that underlies decision making.” In other words, the mere presence of the subjects in the experimental situation indicates that some form of intention is already and always present; the actual intention to “move now” (Searle’s (1980) “intention in action”) arises from and “is caused by this [earlier, pre-existing] prior intention” (Searle, 1980) to move sometime (but not now).8 In a sense, given the Libet-type experimental situation, it is not possible for the subject to be in an “intentionless” state from which a new, fully-formed intention arises, as when Athena was born as a fully formed adult from the head of Zeus. This makes it impossible, in principle, to even address the question of timing of mental and physical processes in a Libet-type experiment. And, as shown by tone probes, even the final intention to move now is not instantaneous or abrupt.

Lastly, as noted by Miller and Schwarz (2014), this same fact about intention being always and already present in experimental subjects also applies to the fMRI study by Soon, Brass, Heinze, and Haynes (2008) who found very early prefrontal activity as long as 10 s before the conscious decision times of their subjects. This early activity “predicted” whether the left or right index finger would be moved (57% accurate vs. 50% for chance)9 but this activity so long before movement likely had just as much to do with the intention NOT to move my left (or right) finger now that must also be present, especially in the frontal areas where brain damage leads to loss of frontal cortical inhibitory control over behavior (Malmo, 1942, Pribram et al., 1964). Or, as suggested by Koenig-Robert and Pearson (2019), the early activity could be viewed “not in terms of unconscious decision processes …but rather by a process in which a decision (which could be conscious) is informed.” Guggisberg and Guggisberg (2013) expressed a similar view that “intention consciousness does not appear instantaneously but builds up progressively …[and] early neural markers of decision outcome are not unconscious but simply reflect conscious goal evaluation stages which are not final yet and therefore not reported with the clock method.”

5. Conclusions

5.1. The RP Is Not What It Seemed To Be

The “paradigm” (Kuhn, 1970). that the early RP indicates brain activity preparing for movement was and is beset by several important “anomalies” The first and perhaps most important anomaly is the RP’s dependence on averaging EEG potentials whose noise, when averaged, can reproduce the RP’s waveform. This was the point of attack for Eccles (1985), Ringo (1985), Stamm (1985), Schurger et al. (2012), Schmidt et al. (2016), and Maoz et al. (2019). The second anomaly is that an RP is also seen before involuntary or unconscious movements (Keller & Heckhausen, 1990) and even before decisions that involve no movement at all (Alexander et al., 2016). The third anomaly is the early RP’s lack of movement specificity, since very similar RPs occur before completely different movements, such as right hand vs. left hand (Haggard and Eimer, 1999, Herrmann et al., 2008). Related to this is that the RPs do not differ before movements with completely different motives and intentions, as seen in the RPs in the Free Wally and Object Tasks (Verbaarschot et al., 2019). The fourth anomaly is the onset time of the RP, which, for the exact same movement, has an almost perfect linear relationship to the interval between movements (Verleger et al., 2016). And the last anomaly is the absence of the RP before deliberate choice movements (Maoz et al., 2019). All of these facts argue against the early RP having anything to do with preparation for a specific movement or the voluntary intention to move and make any comparison of RP onset times and W times pointless. Whether the RP starts before (Libet) or after (tone probes) intention means nothing because the RP’s relation to upcoming movement is an illusion.

5.2. Intentions Begin Much Earlier Than Libet’s W Times

The results from the labs of Matsuhashi and Hallett (2008) and Verbaarschot et al., 2016, Verbaarschot et al., 2019 using tone probes to measure intention clearly suggest that intention is not an all-or-none phenomenon but a gradual process that begins much earlier than estimated by Libet’s W time and in many cases before the onset of the RP. But is Libet’s clock time W intention the same as the intention detected by tone probes? Matsuhashi and Hallett (2008) told their subjects to make the movement “as soon as you think about the next movement,” to ignore the tone if they are “not thinking about the next movement,” and to stop the movement “if you hear the tone after you have started thinking about the next movement or making the movement.” So these instructions clearly identify intention to move with “thinking about the next movement.” In the two studies from Verbaarschot’s lab, the instructions explicitly said to “veto their act if they were intending to act at the time they heard the beep” so “intention to move” very clearly meant “intending to act at the time.” Both labs had similar results, with tone probe intentions beginning early and even sometimes before the onset of the RP, so the small differences in the language of the instructions given to the subjects (“thinking about the next movement” vs. “intending to act at the time”) do not seem significant and are both roughly equivalent to the variety of terms Libet’s study used for reporting the time of “conscious awareness of ‘wanting’ to perform a given self-initiated movement,” which was “also described as an “urge’ or ‘intention’ or ‘decision’ to move” (Libet et al., 1983). So it would seem that the subjects in the different labs had the same concept of “intention” and that tone probes were a more sensitive way to measure the presence of intention, forcing subjects to attend to even the slightest inkling or trace of intention.

They estimate the prevalence rate of psychopathy in the general adult population at 4.5pct

Prevalence of Psychopathy in the General Adult Population: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis. Ana Sanz-García, Clara Gesteira, Jesús Sanz and María Paz García-Vera. Front. Psychol., August 5 2021. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.661044

Abstract: The main objective of this study was to systematically and meta-analytically review the scientific literature on the prevalence of psychopathy in the general adult population. A search in PsycInfo, MEDLINE, and PSICODOC identified 15 studies published as of June 2021. Altogether, 16 samples of adults totaling 11,497 people were evaluated. Joint prevalence rates were calculated using reverse variance heterogeneity models. Meta-regression analyses were conducted to examine whether the type of instrument, sex, type of sample, and country influenced prevalence. The meta-analytical results obtained allow us to estimate the prevalence rate of psychopathy in the general adult population at 4.5%. That being said, this rate varies depending on the participants' sex (higher in males), the type of sample from the general population (higher in samples from organizations than in community samples or university students), and the type of instrument used to define psychopathy. In fact, using the PCL-R, which is currently considered the “gold standard” for the assessment and definition of psychopathy, the prevalence is only 1.2%. These results are discussed in the context of the different theoretical perspectives and the existing problems when it comes to defining the construct of psychopathy.

Discussion

The main objective of this study was to obtain an estimate of the prevalence of psychopathy in the general adult population and, in this sense, to our knowledge, it is the first systematic or meta-analytic review carried out on this topic. Following a thorough search in the scientific literature, 15 empirical studies were found that had calculated the frequency of psychopathy in samples from the general adult population, including community, organization, and university student samples. These studies used properly described tools and procedures to assess and define psychopathy. After calculating the conjoint mean of their results with meta-analytic procedures, based on a total sample of 11,497 people, it can be estimated that the prevalence of psychopathy in the general adult population is 4.5%.

As could be expected, this prevalence is much lower than that found in samples obtained in forensic or prison contexts. For example, in the meta-analysis of Fox and DeLisi (2019), it was found that the average prevalence of psychopathy among homicide offenders could be estimated at 27.8 or 34.4%, depending on the criterion used to define psychopathy with the PCL-R (cut-off score of 30 vs. 25, respectively). In the second edition of the PCL-R manual (Hare, 2003a), the prevalence of psychopathy, based on a cut-off score of 30, was 15.7% for males (Nicholls et al., 2005) and 10.3% for females (Guay et al., 2018) in the North American normative samples of prisoners.

However, although the average prevalence of psychopathy in the general population is clearly lower than that found in the offender or prison population, the prevalence rates of psychopathy in the general population obtained in the studies reviewed in this work show considerable variation, ranging from a minimum of 0% to a maximum of 21%. In fact, the results obtained in terms of the I2 and Q statistics confirmed that the heterogeneity of the studies was statistically significant.

These variations depend on many factors, such as the role of the type of instrument used to define psychopathy, the participants' sex, the type of sample of the general population, and the participants' country of origin. These factors have been analyzed in this work. In this sense, the results of the present work indicate that the first three factors, but not the country of origin, seem to have a significant impact on the prevalence of psychopathy. Depending on the chosen instrument, the participants' sex or the type of sample selected, prevalence figures can double, triple, or quadruple the figures found with a different instrument or with participants of another sex or from a different subpopulation of the general population. Moreover, the results obtained in terms of the Doi chart and the LFK index indicate that this heterogeneity does not appear to reflect a significant publication bias, but could largely be attributed to these three moderator variables.

In particular, the results of this work indicate that, when using the PCL-R (or any of its versions), an instrument that is currently considered as the gold standard for the evaluation and definition of psychopathy, it can be estimated that the prevalence of psychopathy in the general adult population is only 1.2%. However, if other instruments are used, such as self-reports of psychopathic personality traits like the LSRP (Levenson et al., 1995) or the SRP in their different versions (SRP-II, SRP-III, and SRP-SF; Hare, 1990; Paulhus et al., 2016), the estimate of the prevalence of psychopathy in the general adult population quadruples, reaching 5.4%.

In fact, as virtually all the studies with offenders use the PCL-R or one of its versions, the comparison between the prevalence rates of psychopathy obtained in the general population and in the offender or prison population should primarily focus on studies conducted with the PCL-R. In this sense, the difference in the prevalence rate of psychopathy between the two types of population, general and criminal, is much greater: 1.2%, obtained in the present work for general population, compared to 15.7 and 10.3%, obtained in the normative samples of the PCL-R for male and female prisoners, respectively (Nicholls et al., 2005; Guay et al., 2018), or vs. 27.8%, obtained in Fox and DeLisi (2019) meta-analysis for homicide offenders.

Differences in the prevalence rates as a function of the type of instrument and cut-off point established to identify psychopathy go back to the problems in defining the construct of psychopathy. Those differences also point out a limitation of the present study. We will elaborate on these ideas later in the context of the limitations of this review.

The results of this study also indicate that the prevalence of psychopathy in the general adult population is significantly higher among males than among females. In particular, psychopathy in the general population doubles its prevalence in males compared to females (7.9 vs. 2.9%). This difference is consistent with the results obtained in samples of offenders or incarcerated people, among whom the prevalence of psychopathy is also higher in males than in females (Beryl et al., 2014).

In particular, Beryl et al. (2014) conducted a systematic review of the scientific literature on the prevalence of psychopathy in adult women from within secure settings, which included criminal justice settings, or secure inpatient healthcare settings. They found prevalence rates ranging from 0 to 31% using the PCL-R or one of its versions, although they did not report the average of these rates or the conjoint prevalence. However, from the data they submitted for females in criminal justice settings, it is possible to calculate, for the 13 unique studies that defined psychopathy based on a cut-off score of 30 in the PCL-R or of 18 in the PCL:SV, a weighted average prevalence of 11.9% (Table 3 of Beryl et al., 2014, p. 191). This figure dropped slightly to 11% when also taking into account the data from the 10 unique studies that had evaluated samples of females in secure/inpatient psychiatric settings or mixed samples—secure/inpatient psychiatric and criminal justice settings—(Tables 2, 4, respectively, of Beryl et al., 2014, p. 190, 192). Moreover, these figures hardly varied when only studies using the same instrument, the PCL-R, and the same cut-off score, 30 (12.3 and 11.4%, respectively) were taken into account. Interestingly, these prevalence figures are very similar to those presented by the scales of female prisoners collected in the second edition of the PCL-R manual, which, as noted above, show a prevalence of psychopathy in female prisoners of 10.3% (Guay et al., 2018). In summary, the average prevalence of psychopathy in female offenders or prisoners can be estimated at 10–12%.

In contrast, in male offenders or prisoners, using the PCL or its versions, rates of average prevalence of psychopathy of 15–35% are usually obtained, although the average rates of 15–25% are probably the most adequate (Hare, 1991, 2003a; Guay et al., 2007; Fox and DeLisi, 2019, cited by Nicholls et al., 2005). In the 1991 PCL-R manual, Hare reported that, in a global sample of 1,200 males incarcerated in Canadian prisons, 25% scored 30 or higher on the PCL-R. However, in the second edition of the PCL-R manual, published in 2003 and based on a much larger sample with a total of 5,408 males incarcerated in American prisons, Hare reported that 15.7% of the inmates scored 30 or higher on the PCL-R (Hare, 1991, 2003a; cited by Nicholls et al., 2005). Subsequently, with that same large sample, but eliminating the participants with missing information on some items of the PCL-R (n = 543), Guay et al. (2007) reported that 19% of the remaining 4,865 male inmates scored 30 or higher on the PCL-R. Finally, in the meta-analysis of Fox and DeLisi (2019), it was found that 27.8% of the homicide offenders scored 30 or higher on the PCL-R.

In any case, it seems clear that the prevalence of psychopathy is higher in male offenders or prisoners than in female offenders or prisoners (15–25% vs. 10–12%), and this difference between the sexes is maintained in the general population (7.9 vs. 2.9%), as shown in this meta-analysis.

Another interesting result of this work has to do with the finding of differences in the prevalence of psychopathy between different groups of adults in the general population. In particular, this review has found that the prevalence of psychopathy is significantly higher among workers in some organizations and companies (managers, executives, procurement and supply professionals, advertising workers) than among university students or among people from the general community (12.9 vs. 8.1% and 1.9%, respectively). In turn, the prevalence among university students is significantly higher than among people from the general community (8.1 vs. 1.9%).

The highest prevalence of psychopathy among workers in certain organizations and companies is based on data from only three studies with a total sample of 668 people and should, therefore, be taken with some caution. However, this result is consistent with the scientific literature that proposes that psychopathy is more prevalent in certain professions (e.g., entrepreneurs, managers, politicians, investors, sellers, surgeons, lawyers, telemarketing employees) in which the personality characteristics that define psychopathy could even facilitate their success in these professions (Hare, 2003b; Dutton, 2012; Babiak and Hare, 2019; Fritzon et al., 2020).

More surprising may be the result that among university students, there is a higher prevalence of psychopathy than among people in the community. Following the previous argument, it could be assumed that among university students of certain professions there could be more people with psychopathic traits (e.g., students in business administration and management, marketing), but it could also be assumed that among university students from other professions, there could be more people with less psychopathic traits and characterized, on the contrary, by high levels of empathy, altruism, candor, trust, humility, and responsibility (e.g., students from health professions, social work, and other professions closely linked to helping). In fact, in a study of Hassall et al. (2015), it was found that business university students, in comparison to university students of psychology, showed significantly higher levels in the four psychopathy factors measured by the SRP-III (Paulhus et al., 2016). Unfortunately, this work did not provide data on the prevalence of psychopathy in the two groups of university students. In addition, in the study of Dutton (2012), mentioned in the Introduction, among the 10 professions with higher levels of psychopathic traits, there were some that require a university degree (e.g., lawyer, surgeon, journalist) and, likewise, among the 10 professions with lower levels of psychopathic traits, there were also several that require a university degree (e.g., nurse, teacher, doctor).

Therefore, future research with university students should examine whether there are significant differences in psychopathy among students of different careers. This implies that, not only among university students of certain careers may there be a higher prevalence of psychopathy than in the general population, but that among university students of other careers, there may be a similar prevalence. It could even be that among university students of certain careers, there may be a lower prevalence of psychopathy than in the general population.

Research on differences in psychopathy between people of different professions or between university students of different careers departs from the traditional application of the construct of psychopathy to the forensic and prison area. That research intertwines, as discussed in the Introduction, with the most recent interest in the presence of psychopathy in everyday life (Dutton, 2012; Babiak and Hare, 2019; Fritzon et al., 2020), in the definition of psychopathy in terms of normal personality models such as the Big Five model (Lynam and Miller, 2019), and in the concept of successful or integrated psychopathy (Dutton, 2012; Lilienfeld et al., 2015). The fact that, as found in this review, most studies on the prevalence of psychopathy in the general population were published in the twenty-first century, especially in the last 10 years, is also consistent with those most recent interests far from the area of forensic and prison psychology.

Finally, no significant differences in the prevalence of psychopathy in the general population were found in this work as a function of the country of origin of the evaluated people. This absence of differences is not consistent with the results of the scientific literature on criminal and prison populations, which show the existence of differences between countries, especially between North American and European countries, in terms of the prevalence and levels of psychopathy in this type of population. For example, in the review of Beryl et al. (2014), a trend was found of lower rates of prevalence of psychopathy in European samples of women in prison or in prison hospitals than in American samples. Consistently, in the meta-analysis of Fox and DeLisi (2019), and after discarding the extreme values from samples composed exclusively of homicides with psychosis or psychopathy, significantly higher levels of PCL-measured psychopathy were found in homicide offenders from the USA and Canada than in homicide offenders from Finland, Sweden, and Germany.

Although these two reviews have reported that psychopathy prevalence is higher in North American male and female offenders and prisoners than in European male and female offenders and prisoners, the reasons for these differences are unclear. Beryl et al. (2014) suggest that the reason is “that the PCL instruments are designed to test the construct of ‘psychopathy’ as manifested in North American (male) offenders, and are less well-suited to identifying ‘psychopathy’ as manifested in European offenders” (p. 190). However, following the cultural facilitation model and Cooke et al.'s (2005) suggestions, an alternative reason is that complex social processes, such as socialization and enculturation, can suppress the development of certain aspects of psychopathy and facilitate the development of others. Therefore, it may be that socialization and enculturation in European countries suppress the development of certain psychopathic personality traits, or that those social processes in North American countries facilitate the development of certain psychopathic personality traits. There is also the possibility that both explanations are valid.

In any case, the results of the present review suggest that those differences between countries in the prevalence of psychopathy are unique to the prison or criminal population, but do not extend to the general population.

However, studies using samples from the general population of many different countries around the world have found cultural differences in the levels of different psychopathic traits. For example, in the study of Neumann et al. (2012) with 33,016 people (19,183 women) from 58 countries belonging to 11 world regions, significant differences were found between these regions in terms of the levels of different psychopathic traits (interpersonal, affective, antisocial, and lifestyle), as measured by one of the brief versions of the Hare SRP (SRP-E).

To further complicate the scenario of empirical results on the relationships between psychopathy and culture, the differences found in some studies with samples from the general population sometimes go in the opposite direction to those found in offender or prisoner populations. Thus, in the study of Lilienfeld et al. (2014), mentioned in the Introduction, in which they analyzed the responses of 3,338 people to the PPI-R-SF applied online, the Europeans showed higher levels of psychopathic traits than the Americans.

As a result, future research should address whether differences between countries in psychopathy only appear in terms of levels of certain psychopathic traits, but not in terms of the prevalence of psychopathy. When speaking about prevalence of psychopathy, we refer to it as defined by the presence of a clear set of psychopathic traits and with a certain level of intensity of such traits and/or a certain degree of impairment caused by such traits. It should also be examined whether such differences translate into a pattern of consistent differences between North American and European countries.

The results obtained in this work and the conclusions that have been reached should be assessed taking into account some of the limitations of the review itself. The most important limitations concern the high variability of the characteristics of the reviewed studies and the prevalence rates found, the small number of studies conducted to date that can help control such variability, and the methods assessing psychopathy in the reviewed studies. As already mentioned, prevalence rates vary greatly depending on factors such as the type of instrument used to define psychopathy, the participants' sex, and the type of sample from the general population. Given the small number of studies that currently constitute the scientific literature on the prevalence of psychopathy in the general population and the great heterogeneity of these studies in terms of their characteristics, it is very difficult to examine the effects of one of its factors while controlling the effect of the remaining factors. In fact, in this work, the number of subsamples/samples to examine gender prevalence was smaller than for calculating the overall prevalence. Therefore, in that smaller set, factors such as the type of instrument or sample did not reach statistical significance, thus preventing a more statistically potent analysis of the effect of gender after controlling the effects of these two factors and vice versa.

Among the factors that affected the variability of the prevalence of psychopathy, it is worth highlighting the type of instrument used to define psychopathy, since this factor points out important issue underlying this review. There is a high heterogeneity in the methods used to assess psychopathy in the reviewed studies. In addition, some of these method are more susceptible to criticisms related to their reliability and validity than others (e.g., the methods used in Hagnell et al., 1994; Gustafson and Ritzer, 1995; Pethman and Erlandsson, 2002). That heterogeneity and these criticisms go back to the problems in defining the construct of psychopathy. The different theoretical perspectives for this purpose which characterize the research of this construct are also an issue, and have already been discussed in the Introduction. In this sense, for example, an interesting exchange of views has recently been published on the debate over what components are essential to, or constitute part of psychopathy. It has also been discussed whether those components are necessary and/or sufficient (Brislin and Patrick, 2020a,b; Lynam, 2020; Marcus and Nagel, 2020). Consequently, one of the most important challenges that research in the area of psychopathy has to face is to achieve a valid and consensual definition of the construct of psychopathy and, related to this, to decide which instrument or instruments are the most valid and reliable to measure this construct. These needs are most evident when studying psychopathy in the general population because, as mentioned above, virtually all studies on psychopathy in the population of offenders or prisoners use the PCL-R or one of its versions (see the reviews of Beryl et al., 2014, and of Fox and DeLisi, 2019).

On the other hand, future research should also focus on the prevalence of the components of psychopathy, especially on the prevalence of psychopathic traits. Moreover, future research should also be conducted on the prevalence of the other personality constructs that are included under the Dark Triad label: Machiavellianism and narcissism.

Despite the above-mentioned limitations, the obtained results reflect relatively strong trends in the data that at least deserve to be the subject of future research and the formation of hypotheses to be taken into account in such research. In short, these trends allow the following conclusions to be drawn:

1) The prevalence of psychopathy in the general adult population can be estimated at 4.5%.

2) This prevalence is much lower than that found in the offender or prison population, which usually ranges between 10 and 35% (Nicholls et al., 2005; Guay et al., 2018; Fox and DeLisi, 2019).

3) The prevalence rates of psychopathy in the general population show considerable variation as a function of the type of instrument used to define psychopathy, the participants' sex, and the type of sample from the general population.

4) Using the PCL-R (or any of its versions), lower psychopathy prevalence rates are obtained than if self-reports of psychopathic personality traits are used.

5) As the PCL-R is currently considered the “gold standard” for the assessment and definition of psychopathy, the prevalence of psychopathy in the general population may be only 1.2% and, therefore, the difference with the prevalence of the offender or prison population may be even greater.

6) As is often the case in the offender and prison population, the prevalence of psychopathy in the general adult population is significantly higher among males than among females.

7) The prevalence of psychopathy is significantly higher among workers in some organizations and companies (e.g., managers, executives, procurement and supply professionals, advertising workers) than among university students or people from the general community. In turn, the prevalence of psychopathy among university students is significantly higher than among people from the general community, although the latter result could be due to the type of career that university students are pursuing (e.g., company careers vs. helping careers).

Observer-rated physical attractiveness generally predicted individuals’ support of the theoretical evolutionary psychology principles better than did gender, political orientation, or self-esteem

Ward A, English T, Chin M (2021) Physical attractiveness predicts endorsement of specific evolutionary psychology principles. PLoS ONE 16(8): e0254725. August 4, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0254725

Abstract: Evolutionary psychology has emerged as a controversial discipline, particularly with regard to its claims concerning the biological basis of sex differences in human mate preferences. Drawing on theories of motivated inference, we hypothesized that those who are most likely to be privileged by specific aspects of the theory would be most likely to support the theory. In particular, we predicted that physical attractiveness would be positively associated with endorsement of predictions of evolutionary psychology concerning mating strategies. Two studies confirmed this hypothesis. In Study 1, participants rated as higher in physical attractiveness were more likely to support specific principles of evolutionary psychology. In Study 2, a manipulation designed to boost self-perceived physical attractiveness increased endorsement of those same principles. Observer-rated physical attractiveness generally predicted individuals’ support of the theoretical principles better than did gender, political orientation, or self-esteem. Results suggest that those most likely to benefit according to certain predictions of evolutionary psychology are also those most likely to be sympathetic toward its relevant principles.

General discussion

Across two studies, attractiveness—either judged by raters or self-reported—was associated with a greater likelihood of endorsing evolutionary psychology. In a separate study, we ruled out the possibility that attractiveness renders individuals significantly more likely to endorse any controversial theory, finding that the Study 2 manipulation did not lead participants to preferentially endorse the precepts of psychoanalysis or support critiques of biological approaches in psychology.

Comparing the results of Study 1 and Study 2

It is important to reiterate a key difference between the methods of Study 1 and Study 2. In Study 1, outside raters actually evaluated the physical attractiveness of each participant. In Study 2, by contrast, participants themselves were asked to indicate how a typical observer would rate their attractiveness. Nevertheless, the results of Study 1 and Study 2a both showed that higher ratings of attractiveness were associated with greater endorsement of particular aspects of evolutionary psychology (though, interestingly, the effect was stronger in Study 1 than in Study 2a).

To assess the overall effect across the two studies, we conducted a mini meta-analysis [23]. This analysis yielded a combined r of.19, a small-to-medium effect size that, using the Stouffer formula [24], was highly statistically significant, p < .001. In addition, it is perhaps worth noting that the findings across both studies, though differing in effect size, would seem to be highly consistent with one another, unless one were to argue that those who are rated as more physically attractive (Study 1) also somehow possess no awareness that they are seen as more attractive by others (Study 2a) or even worse, somehow think they are seen as less attractive by others than do those who are rated as less physically attractive. We consider such possibilities extremely remote, and we find ourselves in general agreement with Marcus and Miller [14]: “Overall, we know who is pretty or handsome, and those who are attractive know it as well” [p. 334].

Limitations

Evolutionary psychology has been described by one critic as a field that “requires reducing people to our base instincts” [25]. Independent of the validity of such a critique, the present studies suggest that those who benefit from enhanced physical attractiveness, either as judged by others (Study 1) or themselves (Study 2), are more likely to favor aspects of evolutionary psychology that pertain to human mating.

Of course, based on reported demographic data, participants in our studies were not representative of the U.S. population as a whole, being younger, more liberal, and from a higher family income bracket than the typical U.S. citizen. They were, as well, only asked to respond to the account of evolutionary psychology that we provided to them. In order to ensure a concise stimulus paragraph, such an account was somewhat simplified, describing differences between female and male mating preferences that, while continuing to be supported by current research [26], could more properly be characterized in relative rather than absolute terms, with significant overlap between the sexes in terms of mating strategies [27].

Moreover, although our hypotheses were derived from theories of motivated inference, it is important to note that the present studies were concerned solely with documenting the existence of the relevant bias. Additional research could help explicate the underlying reasons for the favoring by physically attractive individuals of the specific predictions of evolutionary psychology that were explored in these studies. Indeed, although a motivated inference account would suggest that physically attractive individuals would favor a theory that privileges their ingroup [28], and thus they would be particularly attracted to aspects of the provided evolutionary account that highlighted the benefits of physical beauty for themselves and/or their anticipated mate, it is at least possible that such individuals were particularly drawn to other aspects of the theory, such as those privileging resource accumulation. Again, further research could help untangle these possibilities.

Although these studies included limitations and revealed modest effect sizes, the complementary approach of correlational and experimental designs bolsters the validity of the findings, which arguably can be considered substantial in the context of other plausible predictor variables [29]. Indeed, when individuals were presented with a definition of evolutionary psychology, including its application to mate preferences, observer-rated physical attractiveness best predicted support of the theory, in terms of the absolute value of the relevant correlation coefficient, r(84) = .31, 95% CI = [.11,.50], as compared to the next three highest contenders. These included self-esteem, r(125) = .22, 95% CI = [.04,.38] and political orientation (with, again, higher numbers = more conservative), r(125) = .21, 95% CI = [.04,.38], both assessed in the Study 2a control condition; and gender (coded as 1 = female, 2 = male), r(84) = .19 [-.03,.39], as assessed in Study 1, all of three which, interestingly, appeared to be much more aligned in terms of their absolute effect sizes.

From 1996... Managing Dysfunctional Emotions In Organizations

From 1996... Managing Dysfunctional Emotions In Organizations. Alistair Ostell. Journal of Management Studies, Volume33, Issue 4, July 1996, Pages 525-557. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.1996.tb00167.x

Abstract: Although much has been written about the different skills of managing people in work organizations there is a paucity of research and theorizing regarding a particular activity managers are often required to perform: that of dealing with the emotional behaviour of others. This paper aims to integrate research from clinical, social and occupational psychology with personal experience as a psychotherapist and management consultant to develop a framework of principles, strategies and tactics concerning how dysfunctional emotional behaviour of others can be managed effectively at work. the meaning of the term emotional behaviour is discussed and the issue of how emotional behaviour can be recognized is addressed. Five principles for managing dysfunctional emotional behaviour are outlined and strategies for the management of three common emotions (anger, anxiety, depression) are proposed, as well as consideration given to some specific tactics which illustrate how these principles and strategies can be implemented. Finally, guidelines concerning the management of different kinds of emotional reactions and the impact of organizational culture and emotional climate upon emotional behaviour are discussed along with the training implications of this framework.

Supportive, nonparental adults play a critical role in the lives of adolescents, helping them navigate their identities, & providing support that can offset considerable individual & contextual risks, promoting resilience

Youth-Initiated Mentoring as a Scalable Approach to Addressing Mental Health Problems During the COVID-19 Crisis. Levi van Dam, Jean Rhodes, Renée Spencer. JAMA Psychiatry, April 28, 2021;78(8):817-818. doi:10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2021.0490

Although adolescents have lower COVID-19 infection rates compared with adults, the pandemic is taking a toll on young people’s mental health. There have been multiple reports of increases in mental health challenges for adolescents during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, including a rapid systematic review indicating that adolescents are now more likely to experience high rates of depression and anxiety.1 This calls for a response from clinical services to offer support and early intervention where possible and be prepared for an increase in mental health problems. It also calls for the mobilization of social networks, which are beneficial for health and can function as a buffer against various individual and contextual risks. Especially for adolescents, supportive relationships with caring adults have been found to be a protective factor of the development for mental health problems.2 Therefore, besides societal awareness of the potential effect of these supportive relationships, clinicians, social workers, and teachers should facilitate youths’ connections with natural mentors.

Supportive, nonparental adults play a critical role in the lives of adolescents, helping them navigate their identities, and providing support that can offset considerable individual and contextual risks, while promoting resilience across a range of important academic, behavioral, and health domains (eg, van Dam et al3). Research indicates that the benefits of such relationships for mental and relational health can last into adulthood, even for those who experienced significant childhood adversities.4 Yet adolescents from ethnic minority groups as well as socioeconomically disadvantaged families are less likely to have such supportive and caring relationships with nonparental adults relative to their more privileged peers (eg, Raposa et al5). Despite considerable efforts to foster such connections through formal youth mentoring programs that match youths with adult volunteers, recruiting enough adults to meet the demands of vulnerable youths and their families has been a persistent problem, as has retaining these mentors once matched with mentees.6 Youth-initiated mentoring (YIM), a hybrid approach in which youths and their families are helped to identify and recruit caring adult mentors from within their existing social networks and to maintain such relationships, is a promising strategy for addressing these problems and expanding the reach of youth mentoring.

Although most YIM programs are in the early stages of development, a 2021 meta-analysis7 describes its application in different domains: to prevent school dropout as a systemic approach to prevent out-of-home placement among vulnerable youths, with youths in foster care, with delinquent youths, as a preventive approach for youths who are at risk or being hospitalized for attempting suicide, and as a universal prevention strategy in educational settings to support first-generation college students.7 The meta-analysis provides encouraging empirical evidence that this approach protects against risks, fosters positive outcomes, and might improve the outcomes of youth psychological therapy and the delivery of treatment. The study revealed that, across a range of outcomes, overall effects were significantly greater (g = 0.30) than achieved by either formal mentoring (volunteer-based mentoring, g = 0.21)8 or purely natural mentoring (youths experiencing a supportive adult within their community but not embedded within a formal mentoring program, g = 0.22).3

The reported effects of YIM programs may in part result from the familiarity and comfort with the recruited mentors as well as the tendency to focus on specific problems (eg, violence prevention in a high-violence area, prevention of suicide, and out-of-home placement). Such targeted approaches differ from most formal mentoring programs, which use a general nonspecific, friendship approach for youths with various needs. A 2020 meta-analysis9 indicated that targeted mentor programs, matched to the specific needs of their mentees, had larger effect sizes than nonspecific programs (g = 0.25 vs g = 0.11).9 Moreover, several of the interventions included in the YIM meta-analysis incorporated professional mental health treatment with the YIM approach, a focus that may have resulted in stronger treatment motivation, more positive adult-youth alliances, and improved goal orientation.

Additionally, YIM relationships tend to be remarkably long-lasting, even in traditionally high-risk samples. In 1 study, 74% of participants reported having contact with their recruited mentors almost 2 years after the official program commitment. Likewise, when a YIM program was used to prevent out-of-home placement of youths with complex needs, 75% of the adult mentors kept in touch with the adolescents after 2 years, and 80% of the youths still lived at home or within their community. Additionally, qualitative studies have underscored how meaningful it was for adults recruited as mentors in YIM programs to have been selected and invited to serve in this capacity.10 Because they already knew the adolescent, they had more realistic expectations and were able to build on an established tie. Unlike mentors recruited and selected by formal mentoring programs, who tend to volunteer in hope of making a positive difference in an adolescent’s life, YIM mentors have reported beginning the relationship feeling they have already made such a difference by virtue of being chosen by the youth to serve as his or her mentor.10

Youths in the top socioeconomic status quartile have somewhat greater access to natural mentors than do lower-income and at-risk youth,6 but YIM offers a promising strategy for increasing the latter groups’ access by intentionally connecting them with adults they trust from within their communities. This innovative preventive, scalable approach shifts current systems of care and social service from client-focused to network-focused, which raises new questions. For example: how do professionals and natural mentors collaborate successfully? What new skills does this require from clinicians and social workers? What type of support do recruited mentors need? Given the health-promoting and protective nature of mentoring relationships, it is imperative that we increase access to them for all youths. Especially in these challenging times, with increased isolation and loneliness owing to COVID-19 restrictions, supportive relationships can offer an important antidote.

References and full text at the link above.

Simply wait for deniers & contrarians to “age out;” said Nye: “There’s an old saying — ‘science proceeds one funeral at a time,’” Nye said, “but it’s not happening fast enough.”

Will Aguirre | The Daily Collegian. Apr 22, 2021. https://www.collegian.psu.edu/news/campus/penn-state-professor-climate-scientist-michael-mann-fights-against-climate-denialism/article_a7a6c7c6-a2f7-11eb-ab1c-5bca01044a1a.html

[Copy to preserve the record, since the original link no longer seems to work]

As the world changes and climate changes with it, one thing has stayed the same for decades — Michael Mann’s commitment to fighting the climate war.

[…]

Mann began studying quantum mechanics as an undergraduate at the University of California, Berkeley, with majors in physics and applied math. When he began work as a graduate student at Yale University, Mann said he was “lured away” from the physics department because there were still opportunities for young scientists to make “substantial contributions” at the forefront of climate studies.

[…]

Mann said he doesn’t want to blame fossil fuel workers for engaging in the “climate war.” Instead, he said he believes there are just a few corporate CEOs who serve as “bad actors” and make “cynical decisions knowing the devastating impact” they would have on the climate.

[…]

According to Nye, both him and Mann are frequently asked two common questions: “What can I do about climate change,” and “What can be done to convince someone who’s a climate denier?”

Nye calls these the $10 trillion questions, because climate deniers are so “dug in” to their beliefs, which only makes it harder to convince them of what the science suggests.

The only definitive way to see significant action to prevent climate change is to simply wait for deniers and contrarians to “age out,” according to Nye.

“There’s an old saying — ‘science proceeds one funeral at a time,’” Nye said, “but it’s not happening fast enough.”

[…]