Pandemics Initially Spread Among People of Higher (Not Lower) Social Status: Evidence From COVID-19 and the Spanish Flu

Pandemics Initially Spread Among People of Higher (Not Lower) Social Status: Evidence From COVID-19 and the Spanish Flu. Jana B. Berkessel et al. Social Psychological and Personality Science, September 7, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/19485506211039990

Abstract: According to a staple in the social sciences, pandemics particularly spread among people of lower social status. Challenging this staple, we hypothesize that it holds true in later phases of pandemics only. In the initial phases, by contrast, people of higher social status should be at the center of the spread. We tested our phase-sensitive hypothesis in two studies. In Study 1, we analyzed region-level COVID-19 infection data from 3,132 U.S. regions, 299 English regions, and 400 German regions. In Study 2, we analyzed historical data from 1,159,920 U.S. residents who witnessed the 1918/1919 Spanish Flu pandemic. For both pandemics, we found that the virus initially spread more rapidly among people of higher social status. In later phases, that effect reversed; people of lower social status were most exposed. Our results provide novel insights into the center of the spread during the critical initial phases of pandemics.

Keywords: social status, pandemic spread, COVID-19, Spanish flu

Discussion

According to a staple in the social sciences, people of lower social status are particularly exposed to pandemics (O’Sullivan & Bourgoin, 2010; von Braun et al., 2020). Acknowledging that pandemics evolve in phases (World Health Organization, 2017; Zhang et al., 2020), we provided a more nuanced account. Specifically, we proposed that during the critical initial phases of pandemics, people of higher (not lower) social status are at the center of the spread. Our research builds on established social status theory in social psychology: People of higher social status exhibit more independent behavior, are more mobile, and possess more diverse social networks; people of lower social status exhibit more interdependent behavior, are less mobile, and possess more homogenous social networks (Carey & Markus, 2017; Kraus et al., 2012; Thomson et al., 2018). Further, our research helps reconcile findings from the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic that appeared contradictory (Drefahl et al., 2020; Mogi et al., 2020). Finally, our research makes much-needed progress toward a distinctively psychological theory of pandemics (Betsch, 2020; Van Bavel et al., 2020).

Across three nations, two pandemics, two levels of analysis, and different data sources, we found full support for our hypothesis. Study 1 used region-level infection data and showed that in the initial phases of the COVID-19 pandemic, the virus spread primarily in higher income regions. In the later phases of the pandemic, however, the virus spread primarily in lower income regions. Study 2 showed that the 1918/1919 Spanish Flu pandemic in the United States initially spread more strongly among people of higher social status. Later on, by contrast, the pandemic spread most strongly among people of lower social status. Study 2 relied on a unique historic data set of millions of memorials, which we web-harvested using the latest social data science techniques. As such, the study highlights the potential of adding a historical perspective to derive insights into pandemic processes (Hatchett et al., 2007) and showcases the potential of social data science to scrutinize such historical data at large scale (Adjerid & Kelley, 2018; Kosinski & Behrend, 2017). By combining large-scale contemporary data and historical data, our work is one of the few psychological studies that examines historic events (Arnett, 2008; Muthukrishna et al., 2021). A limitation of our work is its focus on three Western, developed nations (Henrich et al., 2010a, 2010b). Accordingly, it will be an important task for future research to probe whether our findings extend to non-Western, less developed nations.

The COVID-19 pandemic hit the world underprepared (Remuzzi & Remuzzi, 2020; Walker et al., 2020). Hence, far-reaching societal decisions had (and still have) to be made under great uncertainty. Our study aims at reducing these uncertainties and ultimately at improving allocation of resources. We provide a more nuanced understanding of the initially most exposed societal strata during pandemics, informing both, scientific theory and real-world decision making. In fact, our findings have actable implications for containment efforts: First, people of higher social status are at the center of the initial spread. As such, higher income regions should probably be a focus of outbreak monitoring whenever a new pandemic seems to rise. Second, the longer pandemics last, the more they will spread among people of lower social status. Importantly, our results suggest that previous research might even have underestimated the risk people of lower social status face at later pandemic phases. This is so because previous estimates did not differentiate between earlier and later phases and, thus, lumped together their opposed effects.

As we write this article, we are amid a second COVID-19 wave. It, therefore, remains an important task for future research to examine whether our results generalize to later waves. Recall that our theoretical reasoning rests on the preconditions that (a) the virus is not yet widespread and that (b) social behaviors are unrestricted. These preconditions are necessarily fulfilled during the initial phases of a pandemic’s first wave. Regarding later pandemic waves, however, it is less clear whether those preconditions are fulfilled. On the one hand, in many nations, the virus was almost entirely contained, and life has largely gone back to normal in-between COVID-19 waves (e.g., reopened restaurants, hotels, and shopping centers). From this perspective, first and later waves might show similar spreading patterns (i.e., initial spread among higher social status people in both waves). On the other hand, social behaviors were never entirely reset to their prepandemic state (e.g., mask-wearing, avoidance of large gatherings, and restricted flying). Furthermore, the virus survived at low levels in-between the waves in all societal strata. If anything, it probably survived better among people of lower social status. From this perspective, first and later waves might show different spreading patterns (i.e., initial spread among higher social status people in the first wave, but initial spread among lower social status people in later waves). Considering these competing perspectives, there might be no universal answer to the question of whether first and later waves initially spread similarly across societal strata. Rather, the spreading patterns of later waves more likely depend on a nation’s specific pandemic trajectory (e.g., consider the United States that never contained the virus vs. Germany that almost entirely contained the virus in-between waves).

Taken together, our findings hint at a most relevant (and tragic) dynamic: While people of higher social status may import novel viruses and cause their initial spread, people of lower social status carry the major burden once the pandemic unfolds. Importantly, this spread among people of lower social status during later pandemic phases is particularly consequential. Specifically, people of lower social status not only suffer from reduced access to health resources (which leads to a higher death toll) but will also need longer to economically recover from a pandemic crisis (which perpetuates existing social inequalities; Walker et al., 2020). Importantly, our findings highlight that these adverse effects for people of lower social status may be preventable. Specifically, if containment measures are implemented early and rigorously, it might be possible to stop pandemics before they reach the most vulnerable societal strata.

Negative plastic surgery effect: Women seeking plastic surgery were perceived less favorably than those planning to complete control activities across all outcome variables (warmth, competence, morality, & humanness)

Bonell S, Murphy SC, Griffiths S (2021) Under the knife: Unfavorable perceptions of women who seek plastic surgery. PLoS ONE 16(9): e0257145, Sep 7 2021. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0257145

Abstract: Plastic surgery is growing in popularity. Despite this, there has been little exploration to date regarding the psychosocial consequences of seeking plastic surgery. Our study investigated how women seeking plastic surgery are perceived by others. We presented a random sample of 985 adults (men = 54%, Mage = 35.84 years, SDage = 10.59) recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk with a series of experimental stimuli consisting of a photographed woman (attractive versus unattractive) and a vignette describing an activity she plans to engage in (plastic surgery versus control activity). Participants rated stimuli on perceived warmth, competence, morality, and humanness. We ran linear mixed-effect models to assess all study hypotheses. There was a negative plastic surgery effect; that is, women seeking plastic surgery were perceived less favorably than those planning to complete control activities across all outcome variables (warmth, competence, morality, and humanness). These relationships were moderated by physical attractiveness; while attractive women planning to undergo plastic surgery were perceived less favorably than attractive women planning to engage in control activities, perceptions of unattractive individuals remained unchanged by plastic surgery status. We theorized that empathy toward unattractive women seeking plastic surgery mitigated the negative plastic surgery effect for these women. In sum, our results suggest that perceptions of attractive women are worsened when these women decide to seek cosmetic surgery. Perceptions of warmth and competence have implications for an individual’s self-esteem and interpersonal relationships, while perceptions of morality and humanness can impact an individual’s ability to fulfil their psychological needs. As such, we concluded that attractive women seeking plastic surgery are potentially subject to experience negative psychosocial outcomes. Future research ought to examine whether perceptions and outcomes differ for women seeking reconstructive plastic surgery (versus cosmetic plastic surgery) and whether they differ across different types of surgeries (i.e. face versus body).

Discussion

Hypothesis 1 (primary hypothesis): The negative plastic surgery effect

The present study built on existing literature by examining whether women seeking plastic surgery are systematically perceived differently to other women. We hypothesized that there would be a negative plastic surgery effect; that is, women planning to have plastic surgery would be considered less warm, competent, moral, and human than those planning to complete control activities. Results largely supported this hypothesis. Importantly, this study was the first of its kind in which perceptions of women planning to undergo plastic surgery were explored (where focus has previously been on perceptions of women who had already undergone plastic surgery). As such, the present study demonstrates that negative attitudes toward plastic surgery extend specifically to plastic surgery itself, and not just to its associated outcomes; that is, negative attitudes toward plastic surgery are not dependent on how women look or feel after surgery, but rather pertain simply to the decision to undergo plastic surgery in the first place. Implications for women seeking plastic surgery are discussed below.

Low warmth and competence: A recipe for contempt.

The Stereotype Content Model proposes that we form impressions of others by assessing them across two fundamental dimensions: warmth and competence [38, 54]. In this model, individuals are perceived as belonging to one of four quadrants: High Warmth-Low Competence, High Warmth-High Competence, Low Warmth-High Competence, or Low Warmth-Low Competence. Correlational and experimental evidence has demonstrated that the way in which people relate to members of each quadrant is unique [54]. For instance, the Low Warmth-Low Competence quadrant is said to house ‘free-loaders’ who induce contempt [37, 38]. In line with our hypothesis, plastic surgery stimuli were considered both less warm and less competent than non-plastic surgery stimuli in the present study. As such, we infer that by choosing to undergo plastic surgery, women might be subject to contempt. In work contexts, receiving contemptuous feedback has been associated with decreased self-esteem and increased interpersonal aggressiveness toward colleagues [55]. Likewise, feelings of contempt are one of the primary predictors of marital breakdown [56, 57]. As such, women seeking plastic surgery (and, by extension, inducing contempt) may face implications both interpersonally and professionally.

Immorality, dehumanization, and psychological needs.

Results indicated that plastic surgery stimuli were rated lower on morality and humanness traits than non-plastic surgery stimuli, supporting our hypothesis. Literature has suggested that ‘feeling moral’ ought to be categorized as a basic psychological need. Specifically, Prentice and colleagues [58] found that having a positive perception of one’s own morality was uniquely predictive of wellbeing over and above the effect of fulfilling traditional psychological needs (i.e. autonomy, relatedness, and competence). In line with socialization theory (whereby the beliefs of those around us heavily inform our own), we induce that women considering plastic surgery may struggle to ‘feel moral’ if others perceive them to be morally questionable [59]. In turn, they may experience worsened wellbeing relative to if they were not seeking plastic surgery. Similarly, our results suggest that plastic surgery is dehumanizing. While existing literature has extensively explored the motivations preceding dehumanization, relatively less attention has been paid to the consequences of dehumanization for victims. That said, there is some evidence to suggest that being dehumanized negatively impacts one’s ability to meet four psychological needs: perceived control, meaningful existence, sense of belonging, and self-esteem [45]. Further, dehumanized people may experience less empathy from others and be targets for aggression [46]. Therefore, we conclude that dehumanized plastic surgery recipients may face negative psychosocial outcomes.

Hypothesis 2: Justice sensitivity and disgust sensitivity as moderators for the negative plastic surgery effect

Beyond simply establishing the existence of a negative plastic surgery effect, the present study also sought to explain for whom this effect was strongest. Specifically, we hypothesized that the negative plastic surgery effect would be greater for participants higher in justice sensitivity and disgust sensitivity; that is, those more sensitive to injustice and disgust would perceive women intending to have plastic surgery less favorably. This hypothesis was not supported by results. Firstly, contrary to existing literature, these findings do not support the theory that the negative plastic surgery effect is driven by concerns pertaining to recipients reaping ‘unearned’ rewards from plastic surgery (i.e. the concern that plastic surgery is ’cheating’) [11]. Further, also in contrast with existing literature, these findings do not support the theory that the negative plastic surgery effect is driven by stigmatization toward individuals with non-normative bodies [31, 33, 60, 61]. We note, however, that in the present study, stimuli described as having had plastic surgery did not necessarily look non-normative (i.e. they did not look different to control stimuli). As such, we cannot definitively conclude that perceptions of disgust do not drive the negative plastic surgery effect in cases where women have visibly undergone surgery (e.g., they look ‘artificial’); rather, only in cases where plastic surgery status becomes known via vignette.

Hypothesis 3: ‘What is beautiful is good’

Existing literature demonstrates that the social consequences of being attractive are overwhelmingly positive [22–26]. As such, we hypothesized unattractive stimuli would be perceived as less warm, competent, moral, and human than attractive stimuli. This hypothesis was supported by results. These findings contributes to an extensive and growing body of literature that demonstrates that ‘what is beautiful is good’.

Hypothesis 4: Exploratory hypotheses

Hypothesis 4a.

Next, we assessed the exploratory hypothesis that the negative plastic surgery effect would be moderated by patient attractiveness; that is, we examined whether attractive and unattractive women planning to have plastic surgery were both subject to similar negative plastic surgery effects. Results indicated that the negative plastic surgery effect applied exclusively to attractive plastic surgery recipients. To elaborate, person perception for unattractive individuals remained unchanged by plastic surgery status (e.g., an unattractive woman planning to have a conversation and an unattractive woman planning to have plastic surgery were perceived similarly), while attractive plastic surgery stimuli were perceived as less warm, competent, moral, and human than attractive non-plastic surgery stimuli.

Because empathy plays a crucial role in reducing stigmatization, we theorize that empathy might explain the revealed interaction between plastic surgery status and stimuli attractiveness [62–67]. Intuitively, individuals may feel that it is more ‘understandable’ that unattractive women might seek plastic surgery. Given that both the present study’s results and existing literature suggest that unattractive women are perceived to be less warm, competent, moral, and human than attractive women, it may seem reasonable for these women to want to undergo plastic surgery to reduce their experiences of appearance-based stigmatization [9, 22]. Conversely, participants may have less empathy for attractive women who do not stand to face the same stigmatization with or without surgery. In line with this theory, existing literature has demonstrated that people feel more empathy toward unattractive individuals (versus attractive individuals) across a variety of situations because they are more easily able to believe that unattractive individuals are suffering or in need of help [66, 67]. As such, we propose that there unattractive stimuli in the present study were not subject to the negative plastic surgery effect because participants were more easily able to empathize with them.

Hypothesis 4b.

Given that our hypothesis 4a was supported, we subsequently examined whether participant justice sensitivity and/or disgust sensitivity would influence the interaction between plastic surgery status and attractiveness. This exploratory hypothesis, however, was not supported by results. As such, we concluded that neither justice sensitivity nor disgust sensitivity influenced the phenomenon whereby solely attractive individuals were subject to the negative plastic surgery effect.

Limitations

There were some limitations for the present study. Firstly, we note that the plastic surgery vignette used in our study (“this woman is planning to have plastic surgery”) neither specified the nature of the plastic surgery the woman was planning to have, nor the specific surgery performed. We assumed (but did not ensure) that participants would respond to our measures with regard to cosmetic plastic surgery as opposed to reconstructive plastic surgery, given that the faces presented in our stimuli did not look disfigured in any way. We also did not specify whether the plastic surgery in question was for the face (e.g., rhinoplasty) or body (e.g., abdominoplasty), nor provide any other information pertaining to the surgery (e.g., whether she was planning to have one surgery or multiple). As such, the biggest limitation for the present study is that we cannot say with certainty whether the perceptions measured are in relation to cosmetic plastic surgery or reconstructive plastic surgery (or both), and/or whether different specific surgeries would elicit different attitudes from participants (e.g., face vs body).

We also note limitations in the generalizability of our conclusions. The means on all outcome measure scales used in the present study were consistently above the mid-point, regardless of plastic surgery condition, and our effect sizes were consistently small. In other words, while there were statistically significant differences between perceptions of women who seek surgery and women who do not across all outcome measures, the absolute difference in perceptions of these women were minimal. As such, negative outcomes faced by women seeking plastic surgery may ultimately be small, though still significant and important. Speaking further to the generalizability of the study, we note that only White plastic surgery stimuli were used. These findings therefore cannot be generalized to people of color; specifically, we are unable to establish whether plastic surgery recipients who are people of color are subject to the negative plastic surgery effect. Given that plastic surgery has historically attempted to produce more stereotypically White features (e.g., surgeries for the ‘Jewish nose’ or ‘Black nose’), it is especially important that we acknowledge the limited applicability of our findings [32, 68].

Implications, conclusions, and future directions

The present study demonstrates the existence of a negative plastic surgery effect, specifically for attractive women. In planning to undergo plastic surgery, these women are perceived as less warm, moral, competent, and human. As such, we contend that attractive women seeking plastic surgery may find themselves experiencing negative psychosocial outcomes (e.g., being subject to contempt). However, we note that at present these outcomes are purely speculative, and that future research is needed to test these associations. As per our limitations section, future research also ought to examine the negative plastic surgery for cosmetic plastic surgeries and reconstructive plastic surgeries separately, and for different types of surgeries (e.g., face vs body). Future research might also explore additional consequences that women subject to the negative plastic surgery effect are likely to face. For example, might this worsened person perception result in social exclusion or prejudicial treatment? Finally, future research need address whether these results are generalizable to non-White plastic surgery recipients. Overall, our study was the first to examine the negative plastic surgery effect experimentally. We provide a fundamental starting point from which future literature can further investigate negative plastic surgery attitudes in order to inform both women seeking plastic surgery and plastic surgeons themselves.

People considered hypocrites (as opposed to non-hypocrites) as less moral persons, & appraised their identical transgressive behavior more negatively, when they were high rather than low on competence

Calculating Hypocrites Effect: Moral judgments of word-deed contradictory transgressions depend on targets' competence. Mengchen Dong, Jan-Willem van Prooijen, Paul A. M. van Lange. Journal of Theoretical Social Psychology, September 6 2021. https://doi.org/10.1002/jts5.113

Abstract: People often say one thing while doing another, and are therefore criticized as hypocrites. Despite the widespread criticism of hypocrites, relatively less is known about factors that influence moral judgment of hypocrisy. In particular, why are some word-deed inconsistencies condemned more harshly than others? The current research focuses on word-deed inconsistency as a common manifestation of hypocrisy, and examines targets' competence as one important factor that influences moral judgment of hypocrisy. We propose and test a Calculating Hypocrites Effect that people perceive hypocrites as less moral than non-hypocrites (i.e., who transgress with vs. without inconsistent claims), particularly when the targets are high rather than low on competence. Across four studies where competence was either measured (Study 1) or manipulated as expertise (Study 2), occupational status (Study 3) and skills (Study 4), we found support for the presumed Calculating Hypocrites Effect. When the targets were high (vs. low) on competence, people interpreted their misaligned words with deeds as more intentional (Study 2) and self-interested (Study 4), which in turn accounted for their severity of moral judgment. Moreover, the Calculating Hypocrites Effect applied even when the targets were competent in domains unrelated to their hypocritical deeds (Study 3). We conclude that perception of competence is an important factor that determines when, and for whom, hypocrisy incurs moral outrage.

7 GENERAL DISCUSSION

Accusations of hypocrisy abound in daily gossip, social platforms, and news coverage; however, scientific evidence on how people understand hypocrisy is still limited. A basic consensus of previous studies is that word-deed inconsistency can be a strong signal that induces the perception of hypocrisy (Barden et al., 2005; Dong et al., 2021; Effron et al., 2018; Jordan et al., 2017; Laurent et al., 2014). Based on this conceptualization, the current research aims to add more insights into the question why people condemn manifestations of hypocrisy for some but not others. Four studies supported a Calculating Hypocrites Effect that higher competence intensified people's negative moral evaluations of hypocrites. With both perceptions (Study 1) and various manipulations (expertise in Study 2, occupational status in Study 3, and skills in Study 4) of competence, people considered hypocrites (as opposed to non-hypocrites) as less moral persons (Studies 1, 3, and 4), appraised their identical transgressive behavior more negatively (Study 2), and recommended harsher punishment for them (Study 4) when they were high rather than low on competence. People's negative moral judgments of hypocrites applied even when the targets were competent in domains irrelevant to their hypocritical deeds (Study 3), and were especially true when they were competent and intended to promote own rather than others' interest (Study 4).

7.1 Theoretical and practical implications

By examining the Calculating Hypocrites Effect, the present contribution shows (1) how judgments of misdeeds are contingent on previous moral claims and (2) how competence information serves as a cue to infer intentionality and ulterior motives of word-deed inconsistency. Below we elaborate on these two main theoretical contributions, in relation to previous theorizing.

First, the Calculating Hypocrites Effect expands the observer licensing theory (Effron & Monin, 2010; Kakkar et al., 2020; Polman et al., 2013), by illuminating when and why pre-existing good deeds do not excuse subsequent misdeeds, and instead induce more severe moral judgments. People do not judge moral transgressions in a vacuum; an important contextual factor is the transgressors' previous deeds. Observer licensing theory suggests that a preceding good deed can license a following transgression as if there is a “moral credit account” (Effron & Monin, 2010). This theory, however, does not elucidate judgment mechanisms where previous good and subsequent bad deeds take place in an identical behavioral domain. More specifically, people may evaluate good and bad deeds in an identical domain as a whole (e.g., hypocrisy), instead of respectively as addition or deduction to a “moral credit account”. And people may not evaluate combinations of good and bad deeds only by their face value, but also by inferred ulterior motives. Put differently, moral judgments are determined by how people interpret the relation between good and bad deeds (e.g., as happening in independent or related domains), and how people construe the intentions and motives of such combined behaviors (e.g., to conceal own bad deed and gain undeserved credit, or to prevent others from committing the same transgressions; Dong et al., 2021; Effron & Miller, 2015; Effron et al., 2018).

Moreover, the Calculating Hypocrites Effect illuminates the role of competence and its implications on intentionality and motive inferences in moral judgments. While previous studies on competence and morality suggest that people form more negative impressions of immoral (vs. moral) others and resent them more strongly in social interactions when they are competent rather than incompetent (Goodwin et al., 2014; Landy et al., 2016), the underlying mechanisms are still not clear. Our work suggests that when the targets are high (vs. low) on competence, self-claimed morals or ethics prompt a stronger perception of intentionality and self-interest in followed transgressions, and induce harsher moral judgments than open transgressions without conflicting claims. Considering word-deed inconsistency as a unique but prevalent moral phenomenon, competence can be one important criterion for its normative judgments. More broadly, perceived competence may explain why people judge identical (im)moral deeds differently, depending on, for example, the targets' skill level (Guglielmo & Malle, 2010), leadership position (Karelaia & Keck, 2013;), social prestige (Dong et al., 2021; Polman et al., 2013), and socioeconomic status (Yuan et al., 2018).

The Calculating Hypocrites Effect has practical implications on various social contexts where moral judgments play a central role. For example, in first social encounters, competence impression may influence moral impressions of inconsistent actors (Studies 1, 3, and 4), and further affect interaction dynamics like decisions of recruitment or cooperation (Goodwin et al., 2014; Landy et al., 2016). In legal contexts, identical transgressions can induce different juror judgments depending on the availability of evidence suggesting expertise and previous commitment in the behavioral domain (Study 2). The “right” legal decisions may be better made by fully communicating these influential factors in juror deliberations. Also, in organizational settings, it may not be enough to establish punitive mechanisms based on the severity of unethical behavior. To maintain a just system, employees may deem that higher-status transgressors of organizational values deserve more penalties, especially when they transgress the very norms that they are trying to enforce on others (Study 4).

7.2 Limitations and future directions

The current research examined and replicated the Calculating Hypocrites Effect with various manipulations of competence and diverse manifestations of moral hypocrisy. However, some limitations should be noted, which merit future research.

First, although the current research examined moral hypocrisy in various behavioral domains, it did not cover the whole spectrum of morally relevant behaviors, especially the extremely severe or criminal ones (e.g., crimes against a person). Preaching against crimes (e.g., “we should not harm others physically”) is usually widely acknowledged and may not help actors gain much approval. People's harsher moral judgments of hypocrites and especially competent hypocrites may be more salient for proscriptive (characterizing what is good to do) than prescriptive (characterizing what should not be done) moral violations (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009). These ideas are speculative, however, and deserve future empirical tests.

Second, despite a consistent pattern across some key societal domains, the evidence in support of the Calculating Hypocrites Effect was small in magnitude (see the internal meta-analysis). Though the present research conceptualized hypocrisy as objective word-deed inconsistency and examined hypocrisy as a discrete variable (i.e., hypocritical as compared to open transgressions), people's subjective understanding can vary on a spectrum depending on, for example, what kind of inconsistency (e.g., between saying and doing; between organizational value and individual behavior) in what domains (e.g., environmentalism, organizational values) they deem as hypocritical. For instance, liberals rather than conservatives may condemn environmental word-deed inconsistency of competent targets more harshly, given that liberals are more likely to moralize environmental topics (Feinberg & Willer, 2013) and deem environmental inconsistency as hypocritical (Kreps et al., 2017). This subjective perspective on hypocrisy can also help synthesize discrepant findings in our studies. The presumed Calculating Hypocrites Effect did not emerge when high- (vs. low-) status targets transgressed their affiliated organization's ethical values (Study 3). In this case, people may have attributed strong hypocrisy regardless of the transgressors' status or personal claims (Effron et al., 2015). Likewise, people condemned identical word-deed inconsistency more harshly when such inconsistency was introduced as self-oriented rather than other-oriented (Study 4). This finding may also relate to the fact that people perceived self- (vs. other-) oriented word-deed inconsistency as more hypocritical. Future research may integrate this subjective perspective on hypocrisy and investigate the influence of competence attributes on moral judgments through perceived hypocrisy.

Early visual areas seem not to be processing visual input in a neutral or passive way; rather, their activation seems to be the result of anticipatory, task-driven processes, constituting an active engagement with the environment

The Anticipatory and Task-Driven Nature of Visual Perception. Sebo Uithol, Katherine L Bryant, Ivan Toni, Rogier B Mars. Cerebral Cortex, bhab163, September 7 2021. https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhab163

Abstract: Humans have a remarkable capacity to arrange and rearrange perceptual input according to different categorizations. This begs the question whether the categorization is exclusively a higher visual or amodal process, or whether categorization processes influence early visual areas as well. To investigate this we scanned healthy participants in a magnetic resonance imaging scanner during a conceptual decision task in which participants had to answer questions about upcoming images of animals. Early visual cortices (V1 and V2) contained information about the current visual input, about the granularity of the forthcoming categorical decision, as well as perceptual expectations about the upcoming visual stimulus. The middle temporal gyrus, the anterior temporal lobe, and the inferior frontal gyrus were also involved in the categorization process, constituting an attention and control network that modulates perceptual processing. These findings provide further evidence that early visual processes are driven by conceptual expectations and task demands.

Keywords: visual Categorization, MVPA, FMRI, conceptual knowledge

Discussion

We have shown that the nature of a stimulus (dogs or frogs) can be decoded from the fMRI data, primarily in left and right V1 and V2, and the right fusiform gyrus. Interestingly, the decoding accuracy was strongly dependent on the viewing task. Decoding image perception following superordinate-level questions was significantly less than following basic-level questions. This suggests that the activation in early visual areas is not solely driven by perceptual input, but a combination of the input and task properties, in line with “active vision” theories. This stronger decoding accuracy may be partly driven by the occurrence of more concrete predictions upon basic-level questions, but not entirely, since the cortical surface from which we can decode frogs and dogs is much larger than the cortical surface from which we can validate predictions.

Previous work shows that task properties (i.e., physical vs. semantic judgments) have an impact on the processing of object stimuli at several cortical sites, including ventral temporal and prefrontal regions (Harel et al. 2014). It has been shown that the usability of a presented object (e.g., tool vs. nontool) affects the occipitotemporal cortex differently (Bracci et al. 2017). Similarly, Nastase et al. (2017) found differences in brain response for a taxonomic versus an ethological judgment task in multiple brain regions, including occipital areas. These studies all found task-dependent processing of visual information, but only outside the primary visual areas. We, however, did find task dependence activation in primary visual areas. This may be due to the fact that our study has fewer categories (i.e., only 2 categories in 2 different tasks), compared to previous studies, which enhances statistical power drastically.

We speculated that prefrontal areas, specifically inferior frontal gyrus would be involved in modulating the activity in both temporal and visual areas. Indeed, these areas all seem to contain information about the task and stimulus identity, as reflected in above-chance decoding accuracy in Analyses 1 and 3.

The primate is an inherently visual animal, which is reflected in its elaborate visual system, including the so-called dorsal parietal and ventral temporal streams. It has been argued that the ventral, temporal stream evolved to allow an ever more abstract processing of the visual stimulus, which might provide the basis for our categorization behavior (Murray et al. 2019). In the ape and human lineages, this ability is more developed and possibly expanded to multisensory information (Bryant et al. 2019). As such, we expected that a network of prefrontal, temporal, and visual areas would underlie our capacity to use conceptual knowledge to process visual input. The anterior temporal cortex and the middle temporal gyrus, both bimodal association areas, are known to be involved in categorical decisions (Patterson et al. 2007). Indeed, it was possible to decode the level of abstraction of the required processing of the stimulus ventral anterior temporal cortex and middle temporal gyrus. The middle temporal gyrus result is particularly interesting, as it is close to the part of the temporal cortex that has most expanded and reorganized in the human, compared to the macaque, brain (Mars et al. 2018; Van Essen and Dierker 2007). The level of abstraction of the question itself could be decoded in a much larger set of cortical areas, including the inferior frontal cortex. Interestingly, these frontal and temporal areas are connected by specific sets of white matter fibers (i.e., the arcutate fasciculus and the inferior fronto-occipital fasciculus), some of which are particularly extended in the human lineage (Eichert et al. 2020). Our results suggest the involvement of these systems in tuning early visual processing for efficient task processing.

These results are in line with the framing of perception as a dynamic and task-driven process, tailored to the current needs of the cognitive system. Enactivist theories argue that cognition is not the representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind, but rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs. Within this view, perceptual capacities are embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological, and cultural context (Varela et al. 1991). This active engagement with the environment is also suggested by more recent theoretical approaches to cognition (Hutto and Myin 2013; Myin and Degenaar 2014).

In line with this, we show that the early visual areas are tuned to those features in the environment that are relevant for the task at hand. The finding that left inferior frontal cortex shows significantly different activation patterns for basic-level and superordinate level judgment tasks suggests that the control this area exerts is not confined to behavioral control, but control over perceptual processing as well (Higo et al. 2011). This could also explain the absence of a univariate effect in our comparison of basic-level and superordinate-level trials. When perception is not a neutral process, but sense-making from the start, it would be equally task-driven in both conditions.

The finding of a behavioral difference suggests that the 2 decision processes (basic vs. superordinate) are not equally difficult. Superordinate categories are assumed to be less restricted in terms of visual input (e.g., the category “mammal” shows greater variance than the category “dog”). This increased difficulty is reflected by an increase in reaction time in the behavioral task. At the same time, the increased difficulty is reflected in a decrease of the cortical area from which the perceptual input could be decoded. Together with the fact that the increased difficulty is not reflected in gross brain activation (univariate BOLD result) during the viewing epoch of the imaging task, this suggests that the cortical areas are qually strongly but differently in nature involved in both tasks.

For efficient processing it is likely that task-dependent tuning to perceptual features primes the visual system before the actual perception. Indeed we have found evidence for expectations of upcoming stimuli in V1 and V2. A classifier trained on contrasting dog from frog questions was able to contrast dog from frog images as well. This anticipation surpasses low-level features such as lines and orientation, as different images were used per animal. This finding of modulation of V1 is in line with a recent reports showing that processes in V1 are biased by semantic categories (Ester et al. 2019) as well as action intentions (Gallivan et al. 2011). The finding of stimulus anticipation in V1 is in line with predictive coding accounts that recently have gained attention (Clark 2013; Rao and Ballard 1999). The influence of the level of the question we showed in V1 and V2 could partly be attributed to the presence of a concrete expectation of a dog or a frog in basic-level trials and the absence of such an expectation in superordinate trials, yet the cluster was far more extensive in the “levels” analysis compared with the anticipation analysis.

One could argue that the decreased decoding accuracy in superordinate trials is a consequence of differences in viewing behavior. Since participants were allowed to explore the presented image freely, it could be that viewing behavior in the superordinate condition was more variable. We did not collect eye-tracking data in order to quantify this potential difference, but the absence of a univariate results and the fact that the average difference in reaction time during the behavioral experiment between the 2 conditions was only 50 ms (note that the average saccades lasts 150–200 ms (Palmer 1999)), suggest that the contribution of differences in viewing behavior to the decoding effect is likely to be limited. Additionally, if indeed viewing behavior would play a role, one would expect this difference to be largest in the retinotopically organized occipital areas (e.g., V1). To the contrary, in our results, above-chance decoding is “preserved” in V1 and V2, and absent in more complex visual areas.

We cross-decoded questions and images, and questions and the gray screen between images and questions in order to check the nature of the anticipation present in early visual areas. The fact that we could not cross-validate questions and gray screens, but we could cross-validate questions and images suggests that the anticipation is a more complex phenomenon than mere sustained activity, and points toward more dynamical explanations (see for instance Wolff et al. 2017 for an example of such a model for working memory).

In all, these findings suggest that early visual areas are not processing visual input in a neutral or passive way. Rather their activation seems to be the result of anticipatory, task-driven processes, constituting an active engagement with the environment. These findings could have profound consequences for our understanding of how concepts are processed by the brain. Apparently, a frog-as-a-frog is processed differently than a frog-as-an-amphibian. Even the activity in the left temporal pole, which has been suggested to accommodate task-independent concept representations (Patterson et al. 2007), shows task-dependent modulation in our study. Our findings are thus more in line with classical pragmatists (Sellars 1963) and more recent enactivist (Hutto and Myin 2013) theories that suggests that the identity of a concept is (partly) grounded in the way a concept is used. This could provide a highly speculative, but interesting new explanation for the reported dependence of conceptual knowledge on perceptual systems (Barsalou et al. 2003): concepts can be seen as perceptual capacities, driven by parietal and prefrontal control processes, rather than internal representations. When concepts are much more use-based, as hypothesized, the question moves from how concepts are represented (Patterson et al. 2007), to how concepts acquire the stable character that they have in their (communicative) use. Part of the stability may be dependent on invariant structures outside of the brain, for instance in social practice or other behavioral patterns.