Stay-at-home orders in Mexico led to a fall in abortions of around 25%; fewer unwanted pregnancies from decreased sexual activity is at most 9.8% of the total fall in abortions

The unintended effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and stay-at-home orders on abortions. Fernanda Marquez-Padilla & Biani Saavedra. Journal of Population Economics, Sep 15 2021. https://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00148-021-00874-x

Abstract: We study the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic and of government mandated mitigation policies on the number of abortions performed by Mexico City’s public abortion program. We find that the COVID-19 pandemic and stay-at-home orders (SAHO) implemented in Mexico led to unintended consequences for women’s sexual and reproductive health. Using difference-in-differences and event study analyses, we show that SAHO and the pandemic led to a fall in abortions of around 25% and find no evidence that unsafe abortions increased. We find a decrease in the share of single and teenage women getting abortions, arguably due to fewer unwanted pregnancies from decreased sexual activity, and estimate that at most 9.8% of the total fall in abortions can be attributed to this. We complement our analysis using call data from a government helpline and show that the SAHO time period led to fewer abortion- and contraception-related calls but to an increase in pregnancy-related calls.

Discussion and conclusions

We find that the COVID-19 pandemic and SAHO implemented to mitigate the spread of the virus led to a significant decline in the number of abortions performed by CDMX’s public abortion program. We show that the effects were driven by municipalities more likely to comply with SAHO and present evidence of anticipatory effects to the policy. We find that the composition of women getting abortions changed after the lockdown, where single and adolescent women were less likely to get an abortion. We interpret this compositional change as reflecting a decline in unwanted pregnancies for these groups of women (in addition to stronger mobility restrictions). Conditional on municipality of residence, SAHO and the pandemic did not affect women’s average SES as measured by their schooling, suggesting that the reduction in abortions is not explained by changes in women’s preferences over continuing with a pregnancy.

While most of our analysis focuses on the sudden start of SAHO in Mexico, it is hard to separate the total effect of the pandemic from the effects of the SAHO, which are likely to have affected abortion simultaneously and likely in correlated ways—as the fact that effects were stronger for municipalities with high COVID-19 mortality would suggest. We believe that in any case, identifying the total effect of the pandemic on abortions is both relevant and important.

We find no evidence that the reduction in ILE abortions led to an increase in unsafe abortions as hospital discharge data for ARM shows no increases following SAHO, but rather falls following the general hospital usage trends. While abortions not obtained through the public ILE program may have been obtained in the private sector, we show that at least for the case of births we do not observe a shift from public to private healthcare services, mitigating concerns that our results merely suggest a shift from public to private abortions. Our data does not rule out the possibility that self-managed abortions may have compensated for ILE’s reduction in the supply of abortions.

We present additional evidence from helpline calls consistent with SAHO affecting women’s ability to access safe and legal abortions. This is likely to be due to limited access (a fall in the supply of abortions by public health facilities and mobility restrictions), fear of visiting healthcare facilities, and to a loss of women’s autonomy and privacy.

Taken the evidence together, our results present some of the first empirical evidence anticipating the potential effects of COVID-19 and SAHO on fertility, suggesting evidence consistent with an increase in unwanted pregnancies after SAHO started. Its potential relation with increased domestic violence and sexual abuse within the home highlights the importance of focusing policy efforts on providing more and better reproductive health services to women.

Some possible policy recommendations may include a “hotline” and/or telemedicine alternatives for safe misoprostol use in order to make home abortions safe (Drovetta 2015; Donovan 2019) and moving sexual and reproductive health services and care out of hospitals or into the community, in addition to improving the distribution of contraception (Cousins 2020).

Seven individuals who developed a rare and severe type of anterograde amnesia following damage to their medial temporal lobes: Patients’ perceptions of themselves were stuck in the past, unable to see the changes others saw

Who Are You? The Study of Personality in Patients With Anterograde Amnesia. McKenna M. Garland et al. Psychological Science, September 14, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/09567976211007463

Abstract: Little is known about the role of declarative memory in the ongoing perception of one’s personality. Seven individuals who developed a rare and severe type of anterograde amnesia following damage to their medial temporal lobes were identified from our neurological patient registry. We examined the stability of their personality ratings on the Big Five Inventory over five retest periods and assessed the accuracy of their ratings via analyses of self–caregiver agreement. The patients portrayed a stable sense of self over the course of 1 year. However, their self-ratings differed from those provided by the caregivers. Intriguingly, these discrepancies diminished when caregivers retrospectively rated the patients’ personalities prior to their brain injury, suggesting that patients’ perceptions of themselves were stuck in the past. We interpret our findings to indicate that the ability to form new declarative memories is not required for maintaining a stable sense of self but may be important for updating one’s sense of self over time.

Keywords: personality, amnesia, Big Five, medial temporal lobe, hippocampus, self–other agreement, personality stability, memory, neuropsychology

Cats show up—on average—in about 5% of the remembered dreams, which are very positive, much more so than dreams in general, or dog dreams, indicating that waking-life experiences with cats are also mostly positive

Schredl, M., Bailer, C., Weigel, M. S., & Welt, M. S. (2021). Dreaming about cats: An online survey. Dreaming, Sep 2021. https://doi.org/10.1037/drm0000176

Abstract: Cats have lived with humankind for millennia, and one would expect—according to the continuity hypothesis of dreaming—that cats also show up in dreams, more often when the relationship is between the cat and a human is closer, for example, when she or he is a cat owner. Previous studies showed that the percentage of dreams that included cats ranges from 0.4% to 2%, but studies relating waking-life experiences with cats with dreams about cats have not been carried out. In total, 1,695 persons (960 women, 735 men; mean age: 53.84 ± 13.99 years) completed an online survey that included questions about dreams and waking-life experiences with cats. The findings indicate that cats show up—on average—in about 5% of the remembered dreams, but the percentage is much higher in cat owners or persons with a close contact to cats. Interestingly, the cat dream percentage was lower compared to the dog dream percentage, elicited in a previous study. Moreover, proximity during sleep and whether the cat stays in the household is also related to a higher percentage of dreams that include cats. Cat dreams are very positive, much more so than dreams in general, indicating that waking-life experiences with cats are also mostly positive. A small percentage of participants indicted that they had negative experiences with cats in the past; this is related to the frequency of dreams with threatening cats. The results support the continuity hypothesis, and it would be very interesting to conduct content analytic studies with dream samples obtained from pet owners to learn more about the variety of interactions between dreamers and their pets as they are reflected in dreams.

Asocial free-ranging squirrels: Bolder individuals maintained larger core areas than shyer individuals; more proactive and sociable personality types had greater access to a preferred resource

Bridging animal personality with space use and resource use in a free-ranging population of an asocial ground squirrel. Jaclyn R. Aliperti et al. Animal Behaviour, September 10 2021. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2021.07.019

Highlights

• Bolder individuals maintained larger core areas than shyer individuals.

• More active and bolder individuals moved faster under natural conditions.

• More proactive and sociable personality types had greater access to a preferred resource.

• Among-individual variation in activity and sociability was positively correlated.

• Our data support personality-dependent use of space and resources in nature.

Abstract: Consistent individual differences in behaviour, or personality, likely influence patterns of space use and resource use in wild animals. However, studies on personality-dependent space use in natural ecosystems remain rare due to the difficulty of obtaining paired data sets on spatial dynamics and repeated personality measures from marked animals. We used repeated standardized assays (open field, mirror image stimulation, flight initiation distance and behaviour in trap) to perform the first characterization of personality in a free-ranging population of golden-mantled ground squirrels, Callospermophilus lateralis. We then used multilevel modelling to determine whether personality influenced 95% home range size, 50% core area size, movement speed or use of a preferred resource (‘perches’, vision-enhancing prominences such as rocks, which enhance survival) in nature. Data collected over 3 years showed that individual squirrels consistently differed in activity, sociability, boldness and aggressiveness (adjusted repeatability 0.16–0.44) and that activity was correlated with sociability (posterior mean correlation [95% credible interval] = 0.65 [0.39, 0.87]). We did not find an effect of personality on home range size, but bolder individuals maintained larger core areas than shyer individuals. More active and bolder individuals moved faster under natural conditions compared to their less active and shyer conspecifics. Individuals that scored higher for all four personality traits had more perches in both their home ranges and core areas compared to individuals with lower personality scores. Our results are indicative of personality-dependent space use and resource use in this study system. We hope our study will inspire future research that links animal personality with spatial ecology to inform wildlife management in natural ecosystems.

Keywords: animal personalityanimal temperamentbehavioural typeCallospermophilus lateralisground squirrelmovementrepeatabilityresource usesociabilityspace use

Contrary to many scholars’ intuitions, social aggregates like ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups, as well as diverse socio-demographic categories, add negligible explained variance to that already captured by nations

On “Nationology”: The Gravitational Field of National Culture. Plamen Akaliyski et al. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, September 11, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/00220221211044780

Abstract: Nations have been questioned as meaningful units for analyzing culture due to their allegedly limited variance-capturing power and large internal heterogeneity. Against this skepticism, we argue that culture is by definition a collective phenomenon and focusing on individual differences contradicts the very concept of culture. Through the “miracle of aggregation,” we can eliminate random noise and arbitrary variation at the individual level in order to distill the central cultural tendencies of nations. Accordingly, we depict national culture as a gravitational field that socializes individuals into the orbit of a nation’s central cultural tendency. Even though individuals are also exposed to other gravitational forces, subcultures in turn gravitate within the limited orbit of their national culture. Using data from the World Values Survey, we show that individual values cluster in concentric circles around their nation’s cultural gravity center. We reveal the miracle of aggregation by demonstrating that nations capture the bulk of the variation in the individuals’ cultural values once they are aggregated into lower-level territorial units such as towns and sub-national regions. We visualize the gravitational force of national cultures by plotting various intra-national groups from five large countries that form distinct national clusters. Contrary to many scholars’ intuitions, alternative social aggregates, such as ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups, as well as diverse socio-demographic categories, add negligible explained variance to that already captured by nations.

Keywords: culture, nation, identity, units of analysis, cultural homogeneity

The Bayesian brain: Agents set the balance between prior knowledge and incoming evidence based on how reliable or ‘precise’ these different sources of information are — lending the most weight to that which is most reliable

Precision and the Bayesian brain. Daniel Yon, Chris D. Frith. Current Biology, V 31, Issue 17, PR1026-R1032, Sep 13 2021. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2021.07.044

Summary: Scientific thinking about the minds of humans and other animals has been transformed by the idea that the brain is Bayesian. A cornerstone of this idea is that agents set the balance between prior knowledge and incoming evidence based on how reliable or ‘precise’ these different sources of information are — lending the most weight to that which is most reliable. This concept of precision has crept into several branches of cognitive science and is a lynchpin of emerging ideas in computational psychiatry — where unusual beliefs or experiences are explained as abnormalities in how the brain estimates precision. But what precisely is precision? In this Primer we explain how precision has found its way into classic and contemporary models of perception, learning, self-awareness, and social interaction. We also chart how ideas around precision are beginning to change in radical ways, meaning we must get more precise about how precision works.

Precise and imprecise percepts

Imagine you are walking a particularly disobedient dog. After being let off the leash he leaps into the bushes, and you have to dive in to fetch him out. But you are not entirely sure where he is. You hear the sound of twigs cracking to the left, but you see the leaves shake to the right. Where should you jump in to catch him?

Locating your dog based on a combination of sight and sound is an example of a general class of multisensory integration problems where our perceptual systems have to triangulate different sensory signals. In our example, the visual signal (shaking leaves to the right) and the auditory signal (cracking twigs to the left) both tell us something about one feature of the environment (the dog’s location), and so it makes sense to combine them. But how? A simple approach could be for our brain to average them together — if sight says right and sound says left, we should dive in straight ahead.

But simple averaging turns out to be suboptimal when some signals are more reliable than others. For example, the spatial acuity of vision is much greater than that of hearing, meaning visual estimates of location are considerably more precise than auditory ones. This insight was formalised in Marc Ernst and Martin Banks’ Bayesian model of multisensory integration, which assumes that our perceptual systems combine different signals according to their reliability or uncertainty. Agents are thought to achieve this by keeping track of the noise or variance in different sensory modalities — with low noise taken as an index of high precision — and affording a higher weight to those channels that are more precise.

This idea of ‘precision-weighting’ provides a good account of near-optimal cue integration seen in humans and other animals. Typically, we won’t jump straight to catch the dog, but will veer off to the right as our brains give more credence to the more precise visual signal. Importantly, this idea can also explain why perception sometimes errs: such as when we are fooled by a ventriloquist’s dummy. It is common to say that the ventriloquist ‘throws their voice’ so it appears to be coming from the silent puppet. In fact, the illusion of the speaking doll emerges because our perceptual systems infer that the visual and auditory signals come from a common source, but give more weight to what we see than what we hear as we try to pinpoint where this source is located. The perceptual experience is false — the voice is not coming from the dummy — but this can still be thought of as an optimal inference from the brain’s perspective, given that coincident sensory signals often do come from a common source, and visual information about the location of these sources is typically so much more precise.

The Psychological and Socio-Political Consequences of Infectious Diseases: Authoritarianism, Governance, and Nonzoonotic (Human-to-Human) Infection Transmission

The Psychological and Socio-Political Consequences of Infectious Diseases: Authoritarianism, Governance, and Nonzoonotic (Human-to-Human) Infection Transmission. Leor Zmigrod, Tobias Ebert, Friedrich M. Götz, Peter Jason Rentfrow. Journal of Social and Political Psychology, Volume 9 (2), Sep 9 2021. https://jspp.psychopen.eu/index.php/jspp/article/view/7297

Abstract: What are the socio-political consequences of infectious diseases? Humans have evolved to avoid disease and infection, resulting in a set of psychological mechanisms that promote disease-avoidance, referred to as the behavioral immune system (BIS). One manifestation of the BIS is the cautious avoidance of unfamiliar, foreign, or potentially contaminating stimuli. Specifically, when disease infection risk is salient or prevalent, authoritarian attitudes can emerge that seek to avoid and reject foreign outgroups while favoring homogenous, familiar ingroups. In the largest study conducted on the topic to date (N > 240,000), elevated regional levels of infectious pathogens were related to more authoritarian attitudes on three geographical levels: across U.S. metropolitan regions, U.S. states, and cross-culturally across 47 countries. The link between pathogen prevalence and authoritarian psychological dispositions predicted conservative voting behavior in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election and more authoritarian governance and state laws, in which one group of people imposes asymmetrical laws on others in a hierarchical structure. Furthermore, cross-cultural analysis illustrated that the relationship between infectious diseases and authoritarianism was pronounced for infectious diseases that can be acquired from other humans (nonzoonotic), and does not generalize to other infectious diseases that can only be acquired from non-human species (zoonotic diseases). At a time of heightened awareness of infectious diseases, the current findings are important reminders that public health and ecology can have ramifications for socio-political attitudes by shaping how citizens vote and are governed.

Leftists Possess More National Consensus in Europe in One of Two Data Sets (as it happens in the US)

Leftists Possess More National Consensus in Europe in One of Two Data Sets. Mark J. Brandt et al. Social Psychological and Personality Science, September 13, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/19485506211041825

Abstract: A regularity in the U.S. American politics is that liberals have more policy consensus than do conservatives, and both ideological groups have more consensus than moderates. One explanation for this is that conservatives’ local conformity paradoxically results in less consensus than liberals at the national level. If so, then the liberal consensus effect should also be observed in other countries. We test this using data from Europe. In the European Social Survey (country N = 38, participant N = 376,129), we find that on average leftists have more consensus than do rightists; however, we do not find this using the Eurobarometer (country N = 18, participant N = 375,830). In both data sources, we also observe variation in ideological differences between countries. These results suggest that there is a liberal/leftist consensus effect on average, that can be found in Europe and the United States, but there are also exceptions.

Keywords: ideology, consensus, belief systems, Europe, ideological differences

Older adults were significantly less likely to cheat and had higher ratings of honesty–humility compared to younger adults; greater honesty–humility predicted lower cheating behavior

Examining honesty–humility and cheating behaviors across younger and older adults. Alison M. O’Connor et al. International Journal of Behavioral Development, September 13, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/01650254211039022

Abstract: Self-report research indicates that dishonesty decreases across adulthood; however, behavioral measures of dishonesty have yet to be examined across younger and older adults. The present study examined younger and older adults’ cheating behaviors in relation to their self-reported honesty–humility. Younger (N = 112) and older adults (N = 85) completed a matrix task where they had the opportunity to falsely inflate their performance. Participants also completed the self-report measure of honesty–humility from the HEXACO-PI-R. Older adults were significantly less likely to cheat and had higher ratings of honesty–humility compared to younger adults. Greater honesty–humility predicted lower cheating behavior. These results demonstrate that older adults show greater rates of honesty and humility compared to younger adults using both behavioral and self-report methods.

Keywords: Deception, cheating, aging, honesty, HEXACO

An Industrial Organization Perspective on Productivity

An Industrial Organization Perspective on Productivity. Jan De Loecker & Chad Syverson. NBER Working Paper 29229, Sep 2021. https://www.nber.org/papers/w29229

Abstract: This chapter overviews productivity research from an industrial organization perspective. We focus on what is known and what still needs to be learned about the productivity levels and dynamics of individual producers, but also how these interact through markets and industries to influence productivity aggregates. We overview productivity concepts, facts, data, measurement, analysis, and open questions.

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This chapter focuses on the implications and applications of productivity analysis within Industrial Organization. There is a long tradition in IO of studying productivityrelated topics like allocative eciency, technological change, regulatory effects, cost effciencies in merger analysis, and returns to scale, to name a few. The term productivity is, however, more often than not used in a fairly loose sense, usually referring to a measure of performance. In this chapter we make an explicit distinction between productivity in a strict production eciency sense, on the one hand, and performance on the other. The study of production eciency, the rate at which a producer can convert a bundle of inputs into a unit of output, is in essence about the technical relationship between output and inputs. Performance captures a variety of measures, but as this chapter will highlight, it is intimately related to eciency. However, the distinction can be crucial when analyzing the very topics listed above.

1.1 Background and Focus

While having a long history in economics, the past few decades have seen the productivity analysis of individual producers and the corresponding industry- and economy-wide aggregates become a central topic in both academic and policy circles. This renewed interest has paralleled at least three main developments.

First, over the last two decades the access to micro data has exploded. At the turn of the century, only a few large-scale producer-level datasets existed, with limited access to researchers. In contrast, the current list of countries for which micro census data is available (in manufacturing, at least) contains a rather large share of the world. In addition, private data providers have emerged offering comprehensive accounting data capturing typical variables used in productivity analysis, through the reporting of balance sheets and income and loss statements.

Second, accompanying the increased access to micro data has been a renewed interest in the estimation and identification of production functions. These are of course key objects of interest for most productivity analyses, both for their own sake as well as supplyside inputs into equilibrium analysis. This research has focused on obtaining reliable productivity measures for sets of producers when, as is the case, the researcher cannot directly observe productivity but producers can. This leads to two well-known biases, the simultaneity and selection biases, that researchers must face.

Third is the prominent role of productivity analysis in forming and executing economic policy. While policymakers still mostly focus on industry- or economy-wide aggregates, there is increasing recognition that this analysis is often most informative when built from the ground up using micro data. The melding of data, methods, and economically oriented policy analysis has spurred informative interactions among microeconomists, macroeconomists, and policymakers that have created many insights into productivity.  Our intent in this chapter is to organize and review the intellectual underlayment of this burgeoning literature. There are many facets. Our coverage includes key conceptual issues, facts about micro-level productivity, models of markets with heterogeneous productivity producers, measurement and data, productivity estimation, the positive and normative implications of the static and dynamic allocation of activity across heterogeneous producers, and an overview of what we expect to be active areas of work in the near future. We do this while taking stock of several decades of empirical work on productivity using micro data. We will unavoidably miss certain dimensions, and simple space constraints mean we cannot do justice to many contributions and insights from this extensive literature. We do hope, however, to offer a structured view on the field of productivity and how Industrial Organization scholars have contributed.

1.2 Productivity Conceptualized

Productivity is conceptualized in a number of related ways. All productivity metrics in one form or another measure how much output producers obtain from a given set of inputs. As such they are measures of the ecacy of the supply side of the economy (though \ecacy" need not always be synonymous with social welfare).  An interpretation of productivity as an economic primitive is as a factor-neutral (aka Hicks-neutral) shifter of the production function.1 Consider the general production function Q = Omega * F(.), where Q is output and F() is a function of observable inputs capital such as capital, labor and intermediate inputs.  Omega is productivity, the factor-neutral shifter.  It reflects variations in output not explained by shifts in the observable inputs that act through F(). A higher value of Omega implies the producer will obtain more output from a given set of inputs. That is, it denotes a shift in the production function's isoquants down and to the left.

A second conceptualization is empirical: productivity as a ratio of output to inputs.  This is tightly related to the production-function-shifter interpretation above. This can be seen by isolating productivity from the production function: Omega = Q / F(.) . A is clearly an output-to-input ratio. Here, where output is divided by a combination of observable inputs, the productivity concept is named total factor productivity (TFP) (it is also sometimes called multifactor productivity, MFP). There are also single-factor productivity measures, where output is divided by the amount of a single input, most commonly labor; i.e., labor productivity. Because single-factor productivity measures can be affected not just by shifts in TFP but factor intensity decisions as well, TFP measures are often conceptually preferable. On the other hand, labor productivity is often easier to measure than TFP.

A third conceptualization is of productivity as a shifter of the producer's cost curve.  Higher productivity shifts down the cost curve; that is, at the producer's cost-minimizing combination of inputs, its total cost of producing a given quantity is lower, the higher is its TFP level. This productivity conceptualization is related to the other two because the cost function is the value function of the producer's cost minimization problem, which takes the production function as its constraint. This cost function shifts down when productivity rises.

Because it plays such an important role in the producer's production technology, measuring productivity and its influence on outcomes is the subject of an enormous literature.

This work has found in many disparate settings that, as an empirical matter, productivity is hugely important in explaining the fortunes of producers, their workers, their suppliers, and their customers. We survey work on both the measurement and effects of productivity below.

Survey data show that up to 44% of the public support politically motivated violence; but estimates of support for partisan violence are too large; large majority support charging suspects who commit acts of political violence

Westwood, Sean, Justin Grimmer, Matthew Tyler, and Clayton M. Nall. 2021. “Political Violence.” OSF Preprints. September 14. doi:10.31219/osf.io/a8m3n

Abstract: Political scientists, pundits, and citizens worry that America is entering a new period of violent partisan conflict. Provocative survey data show that up to 44% of the public support politically motivated violence in hypothetical scenarios. Yet, despite media attention, political violence is rare, amounting to a little more than 1% of violent hate crimes in the United States. We reconcile these seemingly conflicting facts with three large survey experiments (N=3,041), demonstrating that self-reported attitudes on political violence are biased upwards because of disengaged respondents, differing interpretations about questions relating to political violence, and personal dispositions towards violence that are unrelated to politics. Our estimates show that, depending on how the question is asked, existing estimates of support for partisan violence are 30-900% too large, and nearly all respondents support charging suspects who commit acts of political violence with a criminal offenses. These findings suggest that although recent acts of political violence dominate the news, they do not portend a new era of violent conflict.

Widespread Reach, not much Influence of Online News: In the absence of rigorous research on causal effects on mass political attitudes and behaviour, we do not know whether the impact of the new media is strong or weak

Widespread Reach, not much Influence: Online News and Mass Political Attitudes and Behaviour in the UK. Kenneth Newton. The Political Quarterly, Sep 2021. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-923X.13052

Abstract: In spite of the concern about the political influence of the new digital media, especially social media, a large amount of circumstantial evidence suggests that their impact on mass politicala ttitudes and behaviour, which is the focus of this article, may be small. Online news is less widely trusted than the news consumed via the legacy media (TV, radio, newspapers and magazines) and social media are least trusted of all. Most people rely heavily on the mainstream legacy media for their news, which are also the most popular online news sources—especially the BBC and much the same news is accessed on the new and old media. The majority of people have a fairly mixed diet of politically neutral and partisan news and there is little evidence of political ‘echo chambers’—even among the small minority that rely heavily on a single, partisan source. All age groups gather their news in similar ways, including the youngest, who make heavy use of the social media. Nevertheless, in the absence of rigorous research on causal effects on mass political attitudes and behaviour, we do not know whether the impact of the new media is strong or weak. The circumstantial evidence suggests they are likely to be weak.

Keywords: online news, heritage media, social media, news diets

Chemosensory anxiety signals seem to act contagiously; reduce trust as well as risk behavior; predominantly affect women; & act independent of odor concentration

It’s trust or risk? Chemosensory anxiety signals affect bargaining in women. Lukas Meister, Bettina M. Pause. Biological Psychology, Volume 162, May 2021, 108114. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2021.108114

Highlights

• Chemosensory anxiety signals seem to act contagiously.

• Chemosensory anxiety signals reduce trust as well as risk behavior.

• Chemosensory anxiety signals predominantly affect women.

• Chemosensory anxiety signals act independent of odor concentration.

Abstract

It is well documented how chemosensory anxiety signals affect the perceiver’s physiology, however, much less is known about effects on overt social behavior. The aim of the present study was to investigate the effects of chemosensory anxiety signals on trust and risk behavior in men and women. Axillary sweat samples were collected from 22 men during the experience of social anxiety, and during a sport control condition. In a series of five studies, the chemosensory stimuli were presented via an olfactometer to 214 participants acting as investors in a bargaining task either in interaction with a fictitious human co-player (trust condition) or with a computer program (risk condition). It could be shown that chemosensory anxiety signals reduce trust and risk behavior in women. In men, no effects were observed. Chemosensory anxiety is discussed to be transmitted contagiously, preferentially in women.

Keywords: Chemosensory communicationTrustRiskBargainingTSST-GAnxiety

Immigration to the USA adds 1.4 and 1.5 years to male & female life expectancy; immigration contributed roughly half of life expectancy gains 2007-2017; the post-2010 mortality stagnation is due to adverse trends among the US-born

Immigration and improvements in American life expectancy. Arun S. Hendi, Jessica Y. Ho. SSM - Population Health, Volume 15, September 2021, 100914. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmph.2021.100914

Highlights

• Immigration adds 1.4 and 1.5 years to male and female life expectancy, respectively.

• Immigration contributed roughly half of life expectancy gains between 2007 and 2017.

• The post-2010 US mortality stagnation is due to adverse trends among the US-born.

• Foreign-born life expectancies rival those of the world leaders in longevity.

Abstract: Despite the immigrant mortality advantage and the increasing share of the population born abroad, relatively little is known about how immigration has impacted trends in US life expectancy. How immigrants contribute to national life expectancy trends is of increasing interest, particularly in the context of an unprecedented stagnation in American mortality. We find that immigration increases US life expectancy by 1.5 years for men and 1.4 years for women. Over half of these contributions occur at the prime working ages of 25–64. The difference between foreign-born and US-born mortality has grown substantially since 1990, with the ratio of US-born to foreign-born mortality rates nearly doubling by 2017. In that year, foreign-born life expectancy reached 81.4 and 85.7 years for men and women, respectively—7.0 and 6.2 years higher than their US-origin counterparts. These life expectancy levels are remarkable by most standards. Foreign-born male life expectancy exceeds that of Swiss men, the world leaders in male life expectancy. Life expectancy for foreign-born women is close to that of Japanese women, the world leaders in female life expectancy. The widening mortality difference between the US-born and foreign-born populations, coupled with an increase in the share of the population born abroad, has been responsible for much of the increase in national life expectancy in recent years. Between 2007 and 2017, foreign-born men and women were responsible for 44% and 60% of national life expectancy improvements. Between 2010 and 2017, immigrants experienced gains while the US-born experienced declines in life expectancy. Thus, nearly all of the post-2010 mortality stagnation is due to adverse trends among the US-born. Without immigrants and their children, national life expectancy in 2017 would be reduced to its 2003 levels. These findings demonstrate that immigration acts to bolster American life expectancy, with particularly valuable contributions at the prime working ages.

Keywords: Life expectancyImmigrationForeign-bornMortalityDemographyTrends

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Foreign-born male life expectancy exceeds that of Swiss men, the world leaders in male life expectancy. Life expectancy for foreign-born women is close to that of Japanese women, the world leaders in female life expectancy.

We observed an association between frequent pornography use and not having had sex in the last year among men (which was in contrast with previous studies), but not women

Malki K, Rahm C, Öberg KG, et al. Frequency of Pornography Use and Sexual Health Outcomes in Sweden: Analysis of a National Probability Survey. J Sex Med 2021;XX:XXX–XXX. Sep 12 2021. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsxm.2021.08.003

Abstract

Background: Little is known about pornography use and its relationship with sexual health outcomes in the general population.

Aim: To assess frequency of pornography use and the association of sexual health outcomes with frequent pornography use in Sweden.

Methods: Cross-sectional analysis of 14,135 participants (6,169 men and 7,966 women) aged 16–84 years in a Swedish nationally representative survey from 2017. We used logistic regression to assess the association of sexual health outcomes with use of pornography ≥3 times/wk.

Outcomes: Frequency of pornography use (never; less than once/mo to 3 times/mo; 1–2 times/wk; 3–5 times/wk; and daily or almost daily) and sexual health outcomes (eg, sexual satisfaction and sexual health problems).

Results: In total, 68.7% of men and 27.0% of women used pornography. Among men aged 16–24 years, 17.2% used pornography daily or almost daily, 24.7% used pornography 3–5 d/wk and 23.7% used pornography 1–2 d/wk. Among women aged 16–24 years, the proportions were 1.2% for daily or almost daily, 3.1% for 3–5 times/wk, and 8.6% for 1–2 times/wk. Frequency of pornography use decreased with age among both men and women. While 22.6% of all men and 15.4% of all women reported that their or a sex partner's pornography use predominantly had positive effects on their sex life, 4.7% of men and 4.0% of women reported that the effects were predominantly negative. Variables indicating sexual dissatisfaction and sexual health problems were associated with use of pornography ≥3 times/wk: for example, dissatisfaction with sex life (age-adjusted odds ratio [aOR]: men 2.90 [95% CI 2.40–3.51]; women 1.85 [95% CI 1.09–3.16]), not having sex in the preferred way (aOR: men 2.48 [95% CI 1.92–3.20]; women 3.59 [95% CI 2.00–6.42]) and erection problems (aOR: men 2.18 [95% CI 1.73–2.76]).

Clinical Implications: While frequent pornography use is common, potential effects on sexual health outcomes are likely to differ between individuals.

Strength & Limitations: We used a large and recent nationally representative survey with detailed information regarding frequency of pornography use. The temporality of associations of sexual health variables with frequency of pornography use could not be assessed.

Conclusion: In this analysis of a nationally representative survey in Sweden, we found that frequent pornography use was common among young men; that reporting predominantly positive effects of pornography use on the sex life was more common than reporting predominantly negative effects; and that sexual dissatisfaction and sexual health problems were associated with using pornography ≥3 times/wk.

Key Words: PornographyNational Probability SurveySexual Health OutcomesSexual SatisfactionSexual Dysfunction

We assessed the frequency of pornography use and its association with sexual health outcomes using a large and nationally representative survey from 2017 in Sweden. In line with data presented in the survey report,33 around 70% of men and 30% of women aged 16–84 years used pornography; the frequency was higher in younger age groups and decreased with age. Among men aged 16–24 years, approximately 40% used pornography at least 3 times per week (of which around half used pornography daily or almost daily), and over 20% used pornography 1–2 times/wk. Among women in the same age group approximately 4% used pornography at least 3 times per week and 9% used pornography 1-2 times/wk. While less than 5% of men and women reported that their or a sex partner's pornography use had predominantly negative effects on the sex life, over 20% of men and 15% of women reported predominantly positive effects. Dissatisfaction with the quality and quantity of sexual activity and (especially among men) sexual health problems were associated with using pornography 3 times per week or more.

Data on frequent pornography use have been scarce as most studies have used small online surveys or self-selected samples and published data from population-based surveys have not included fine grained information about the frequency of pornography use.26,28,31,32 Data on weekly or monthly pornography use have been presented for 2 US nationally representative surveys from the past decade, although these surveys have not focused on sexual health outcomes. In the Relationship in America survey from 2014, 40% of men and 19% of women aged 18-23 years had used pornography in the past week.30 In the New Family Structures Study from 2011 to 2012, 47% of men and 21% of women aged 18–23 years reported using pornography once a month or more.30 While more detailed data were not presented for these US surveys, weekly pornography use in our Swedish study vs the Relationship in America survey was more common among young men and less common among young women. While it is possible that pornography use differs between the populations, there may be differences between the surveys in the type of individuals who participated and in how they reported their pornography use. Moreover, our study used more recent data (from 2017) and use of smartphone devices and the availability of online entertainment have increased rapidly in the past years.

In accordance with previous research,10,26,38 we found that a minority of individuals reported that their or a sex partner's pornography use had predominantly negative effects on their sex life and reporting of predominantly positive effects was substantially more common. Importantly, frequent pornography use has been subject to much societal concern due to suggested effects on sexual wellbeing and sexual health problems although the evidence regarding such claims is conflicting.2,10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15,27 We found associations of frequent pornography use with dissatisfaction with the quantity and quality of sexual activity and among men, with lack of arousal when having sex and erection problems. Moreover, we observed an association between frequent pornography use and not having had sex in the last year among men (which was in contrast with previous studies26,39), but not women. Further, while frequent pornography use was associated with reporting predominantly positive effects on the sex life among both men and women, an association with reporting predominantly negative effects was only observed for men; this is in line with previous observations indicating that self-reported problematic use of pornography is more common among men.

Use of pornography has been associated with changes in behaviors during sexual activity29,40 and it has been hypothesized that frequent pornography use introduces dissatisfaction by affecting expectations on sexual activity.41,42 Moreover, pornography use has been suggested to decrease partnered sexual activity and long-term sexual relationships by providing a more easily available substitute.43 However, it is reasonable to hypothesize that sexual dissatisfaction or not being able to find sex partners might increase pornography use.44 Similarly, while frequent pornography use could be hypothesized to increase the risk of sexual health problems, individuals who experience such problems may also use more pornography. The associations could also be explained by other factors (such as stress and boredom45) associated with frequent pornography use and with sexual dissatisfaction, not having partnered sex (among men) and sexual health problems. In fact, erection problems and some variables indicating sexual dissatisfaction were associated with both reporting of predominantly positive and predominantly negative effects of pornography on the sex life, indicating no consistent directionality in the associations of pornography use, as experienced by the respondents, with such outcomes. While the experience of pornography use, its potential effects on sexual health outcomes and the underlying mechanisms for such possible links are likely to differ greatly between individuals, specific sexual interests and type of pornography consumed,21,27 causal effects of pornography use on the group level can only be established in interventional studies. The findings from this study should be considered as hypothesis generating.

Limitations

We used survey data, which are subject to response and reporting bias,30,46 although such biases might have been mitigated by the use of self-administered questionnaires47, 48, 49 and the weighting of the sample to be representative of the Swedish population with respect to the distribution of gender, age, region, country of birth and educational level. The survey did not define pornography, nor was information available about the type of pornography used and the duration and context of use. The questions used in the survey had not been validated and their interpretation may have differed between participants. Because the data were cross-sectional, we could not assess temporality of the associations of sociodemographic and sexual health variables with the frequency and self-reported effects of pornography use.

Testing Women’s Trust in Other Women and Same-Sex Attracted Males in Three Cultures

Testing Women’s Trust in Other Women and Same-Sex Attracted Males in Three Cultures. Scott W. Semenyna, Francisco R. Gómez Jiménez & Paul L. Vasey. Archives of Sexual Behavior, Sep 8 2021. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10508-021-02139-w

Abstract: Heterosexual women trust mating-relevant advice received from gay men more than that received from heterosexual women. This trust is predicated on women’s perception that gay men lack ulterior sexual motives and romantically pursue other gay men. However, this trust may not hold in all cultures. For example, in both Samoa and the Istmo Zapotec of Southern Mexico, women take part in mate competition against feminine same-sex attracted males—referred to as fa’afafine and muxe, respectively—who regularly engage in sexual activity with masculine men. The present studies sought to replicate and extend research on women’s trust in males who are same-sex attracted. Experiments were conducted in Canada, Samoa, and the Istmo Zapotec, with women randomly assigned to consider the likelihood of various mate-poaching behaviors performed by either a rival woman or a same-sex attracted male. In Canada, women were more trusting of cisgender gay men than other women. Similarly, Samoan women were more trusting of fa’afafine than other women. In the Istmo Zapotec, women were equally distrustful of women and feminine muxe gunaa, whereas more masculine muxe nguiiu were rated as more trustworthy than women and muxe gunaa. These results illustrate that women’s trust in same-sex attracted males varies both between and within cultural contexts, perhaps impacted by the relative femininity of the male in question.

Helmholtz Versus Haute Couture: How Horizontal Stripes and Dark Clothes Make You Look Thinner

Helmholtz Versus Haute Couture: How Horizontal Stripes and Dark Clothes Make You Look Thinner. Antonis Koutsoumpis, Elias Economou, Erik van der Burg. Perception, August 16, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/03010066211038158

Abstract: In Helmholtz’s illusion, a square with horizontal stripes appears taller than an identical square with vertical stripes. This effect has also been observed in experiments with human stimuli, where a human figure wearing a dress with horizontal stripes appears thinner than a drawing clad in vertical stripes. These findings do not agree with the common belief that clothes with horizontal stripes make someone appear wider, neither do they disentangle whether the horizontal or vertical stripes account for the thinning effect. In the present study, we focused on the effect of horizontal stripes in clothes comparing horizontal stripes against no-stripes (not against vertical; Experiments 1 and 2), using photos of a real-life female model, and controlling for the average luminance of the stripes (Experiment 2). Results showed that horizontal stripes and lower luminance have—independently—a small-to-moderate thinning effect on the perceived size of the body, and the effect is larger when the two variables are combined. In Experiment 3, we further show that the thinning effect due to the luminance of the dress is enhanced when the general background gets darker.

Keywords: size perception, horizontal stripes, luminance, Helmholtz illusion, clothes

Discussion

In the present study, we focused on the perceptual effect of horizontal stripes in clothes. Unlike most previous studies, we compared the effect of horizontal stripes against non-striped stimuli, that is, against a neutral condition. In Experiment 1, we found that participants perceived a striped dress (with light-green and black stripes) to be significantly thinner than an identical non-striped (light-green) version of the same dress, but not when compared to a non-striped black version. Since the thinning effect was significant only when the striped dress was compared to the light-green dress, we hypothesized that luminance might moderate the thinning effect. In Experiment 2, we dissociated the stripes and luminance effects by including two extra stimuli. In this way, it was possible to measure the effect of horizontal stripes and luminance on the perceived body width independently, as well as their aggregating effect. The results showed that, first, when the effect of luminance was controlled for, horizontal stripes had a thinning effect against non-striped stimuli. Second, when the effect of horizontal stripes was controlled for, stimuli with lower luminance had a thinning effect against stimuli with higher luminance, either when both stimuli were striped or non-striped. Third, when both stripes and luminance were taken together, the effect was even larger.

Although it seems that the stripes effect holds when the luminance of the stimuli and the background are held constant, the luminance of the background—against which the stimuli were placed—might have affected the thinning effect of darker stimuli. This is because, in the luminance effect, the darker (vs. lighter) stimuli were further away from the luminance of the background and this luminance difference might have affected size perception. In Experiment 3, we manipulated the background luminance (i.e., creating light, average, and dark backgrounds) to investigate whether the luminance effect of Experiment 2 was due to the increased contrast between the dark dresses and the light-grey background. The results showed that the thinning effect of dark dresses could not be attributed to stimuli-background contrast. Instead, we discovered that when the luminance of the general background is darker, the thinning effect becomes more pronounced.

The thinning effect of low luminance is in line with the irradiation illusion (Helmholtz, 1962), according to which a bright area seems larger than a darker area of similar size (Long & Murtagh, 1984; Oyama & Nanri, 1960), an effect attributable to the non-linear visual processing of dark and light both on retinal (Valeton & van Norren, 1983; Westheimer, 2008) and cortical level (Kremkow et al., 2014). On the cortical level for instance, Kremkow et al. (2014) showed that the ON and OFF neurons operate in dissimilar ways in our visual system, with the OFF neurons responding linearly to external stimuli, and the ON neurons responding in a curvilinear way (overresponding even to limited external stimulation). The practical implication is that dark stimuli are perceived as smaller than bright, not because the size of dark stimuli is underestimated, but rather because the size of bright stimuli is overestimated. As a consequence, the darker dresses in Experiments 2 and 3 were perceived as thinner presumably because participants might have overestimated the size of the brighter dresses.

So far only one study has tested the perceptual effect of horizontal stripes against non-striped stimuli. Thompson and Mikellidou (2011; Experiment 3) found that a cylinder with horizontal stripes was perceived as similar in size (neither wider nor thinner) to an identical non-striped cylinder. This finding is at odds with the results of the present experiments. Nevertheless, the present results suggest that the thinning effect of horizontal stripes seems to be consistent and strong (in terms of effect size and observed statistical power). They also suggest that the thinning effect is further decomposed into two separate effects, that is, both the orientation and the luminance of the stripes affected the perceived size of the dress, and the thinning effect of luminance was further amplified as the luminance of the background decreased.

Our results also extend and partially explain the Helmholtz illusion. In the original paradigm, a square with horizontal stripes is compared to a similar square with vertical stripes. In that context, the thinning effect of horizontal stripes cannot be attributed to luminance, since both stimuli have the same luminance regardless of stripe orientation. It can be attributed, however, to the thinning effect of horizontal stripes, as Experiment 2 showed. Whether vertical stripes also contribute to the overall effect or not, remains an open empirical question.

Future Research

The present results open two main venues for future research. The first is to further probe the boundary conditions that might account for the effect. In the present study we tested the effect of horizontal stripes, luminance, and contrast but the list of confounding variables may be longer. Some variables that might account for the effect include the orientation of the stripes (e.g., test the effect of vertical stripes against a neutral condition), their spatial frequency (the thickness of the stripes), or color. Moreover, previous studies reported that the body size moderates the effect, with bigger body types decreasing (Ashida et al., 2013) or even reversing the thinning effect of horizontal stripes (Imai, 1982). Future studies can test the effect in different body sizes and body shapes (e.g., hourglass, spoon, rectangle).

The second line of research calls for an interdisciplinary approach between the fields of social cognition (participants’ previous beliefs) and psychophysics (participants’ perception). It is striking that, although the results of the present experiments support the thinning effect of horizontal stripes, this finding clashes with participants’ beliefs and leads to a paradox: during the behavioral task in the lab participants perceived horizontal stripes in clothes as thinner, but in self-reports they stated the opposite.³ This inconsistency was also described by Ridgway et al. (2017) where they scanned the body of 15 women and their 3D avatars were presented on a computer. The avatars were dressed in horizontal stripes (and seven more optical illusions) and participants were asked to evaluate them. A thematic analysis (a qualitative in-depth interview method) revealed that a number of participants swayed away from their original negative attitude towards horizontal stripes once they saw themselves in the horizontally striped dress. Although the results of that study were based on qualitative analysis and did not provide any conclusive evidence, the discrepancy between previous beliefs and behavioral responses regarding the effect of horizontal stripes in clothes still remains.

Especially with the increasing devaluation of the other group, but also with the increasing conviction of their own position, the supporters of COVID restrictions accept restrictions regarding the others’ freedom of expression

Polarisation and Silencing others During the Covid-19 Pandemic in Germany: An Experimental Study Using Algorithmically Curated Online Environments. Tim Neumann, Ole Kelm, Marco Dohle. Javnost - The Public, Sep 10 2021. https://doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2021.1969621

Abstract: In 2020, societies debated the use of government restrictions on public life to stem the COVID-19 pandemic. Many of these debates took place online. The Internet enables people to come into contact with like-minded content. Algorithms based on collaborative filtering can contribute to this process and might lead to homogenous like-minded online environments that contribute to a polarisation of society. This article therefore examines the effects of (1) like-minded versus opposing online environments, which were (2) randomly versus algorithmically curated. Data from a between-subject experiment embedded in a two-wave panel survey of German citizens (n = 318) show that attitude polarisation as well as affective polarisation are largely independent of exposure to different online environments. Moreover, the results indicate that polarised attitudes of supporters and opponents of the COVID-19-related restrictions relate to varying degrees of beliefs in the importance of silencing people with opposing opinions: While supporters’ polarised attitudes are positively related to the belief in the importance of silencing others, opponents’ polarised attitudes are rather negatively related to such beliefs.

KEYWORDS: belief in the importance of silencing otherscollaborative filteringexperimentonline discussionpolarisationselective exposure

Discussion

One central aim of this article was to examine the effects of homogenous and algorithmically curated opinion environments on polarisation in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. For this purpose, data from a two-wave panel survey conducted among the German population with an embedded between-subject experiment were analysed. Participants were assigned to different online environments, in which they were exposed to either (1) like-minded or (2) opposing arguments for restrictions to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. The selection of these arguments was either (1) random or (2) based on an algorithm with collaborative filtering.

The results show that the generated online environments did not influence attitude polarisation, i.e. they did not affect how certain the respondents are in terms of their respective attitudes toward the government actions. One reason for this could be that the COVID-19 pandemic is not the ideal context to test the influence of like-minded online environments and the role of algorithms as, for example, many people are most likely confronted with information on this topic outside online environments (Viehmann, Ziegele, and Quiring 2020). This potentially limits at least the short-term effects of arguments presented in online environments. Moreover, the non-existent effects regarding the selection mode must be treated with caution, as the manipulation check regarding the selection mode failed.

Another reason could be that the respondents’ attitudes toward the government actions were so pronounced that they could not even be strongly influenced by the presentation of convincing arguments. However, other explanations for these non-existent effects are possible. For example, it might not only be the content of an argument that is crucial to its persuasiveness. Instead, also in algorithmically curated online environments, how an argument is presented and whether, for example, it is presented factually, emotionally or embedded in a narrative might be (more) relevant. Even more obvious, who has authored and spread the argument might also be important. In line with the echo chamber hypothesis, other people echo one’s own opinion. Through repeated interaction, people can build a relationship with these like-minded others, giving their arguments more weight than the arguments of other people or, which seems to be relevant in the case at hand, than the arguments that are presented via an anonymous platform. In addition, people more often use the content of sources and people they trust (e.g. Strömbäck et al. 2020). As a result, and in line with the filter bubble hypothesis, algorithms with collaborative filtering are likely to select more often information from these sources or from people with whom the people in question more often interact. Thus, the impact of the authors of the arguments, which did not play a role in the presented experimental study, may be crucial.

The experimental results also show that the different online environments created in this study did not influence affective polarisation. Again, the reason could be that the respondents’ attitudes toward the other group were so pronounced that they could not be strongly influenced by the content presented via the online discussion platform. However, it might also be the case that group identification in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic is too low. Many people in Germany had an opinion on the government actions, but they might not have seen themselves as part of a specific group—maybe also because they recognised that (almost) the entire population was and is affected by the consequences. This makes affective polarisation as a consequence of arguments that were presented only once more unlikely. More likely, affective polarisation may occur as a consequence of observing behaviour that one disapproves of (e.g. ignoring restrictions on demonstrations). Another explanation is that the presented arguments were within the democratic spectrum of opinion and did not contain, for example, incivility, exaggeration or satirical elements. These elements may trigger affective polarisation more strongly than the direction of an argument (Druckman et al. 2019).

Another central aim of the study was to examine how attitude polarisation and affective polarisation are related to the BISO. The study shows that affective polarisation among the opponents of restrictions is rather negatively related to the BISO. In view of previous research results (Tsfati 2020), this may initially be surprising. However, it is conceivable that the opponents of the restrictions consider the restrictions as an unreasonable limitation of their fundamental rights. Since they perceive their fundamental rights as already being restricted, they might fear further restrictions of such rights. If they themselves silence other groups, this will lead to cognitive dissonance, which they want to avoid. Moreover, as there are no short-term political majorities for their demands, they are, compared to the supporters of restrictions, more dependent on a public debate that is as open and broad as possible.

For supporters of the COVID-19-related restrictions, however, the results were different: Especially with the increasing devaluation of the other group, but also with the increasing conviction of their own position, the supporters of restrictions want to prevent positions perceived as dangerous from being spread—for this reason, they also accept restrictions regarding the others’ freedom of expression. The differences between the supporters and the opponents of the restrictions can also be explained by the object of silencing: Tsfati and Dvir-Gvirsman’s (2018) understanding of the BISO focuses on interpersonal communication—whether face-to-face or in online environments. From the point of view of the opponents, there are reasons to support a broad public debate (which, of course, includes all forms of interpersonal communication), whereas from the point of view of the supporters of the restrictions, there are reasons to limit this public debate to acceptable contributions. If silencing had been applied to journalism or authorities, the results might have been different.

The study has limitations. Although government restrictions and incidence numbers in Germany changed little during the fieldwork, many people’s opinions toward the restrictions changed. The results of the control group of this study also illustrate this: In total, 21.9 per cent of the respondents assigned to the control group changed their opinion toward the restrictions from t1 to t2. Thus, the time gap between t1 and t2 may be responsible for the fact that arguments selected by the algorithm were not (more) convincing. This also became apparent in the manipulation check, which did not show a significant difference in the persuasiveness of the arguments that were randomly selected and those that were selected by the algorithm.

Second, the respondents were only briefly exposed to the stimulus. This may have reduced its effects. This might be especially true for the chosen topic, about which most people have probably received extensive information via many sources. Further studies should examine the effects of different online environments in other polarised contexts that are less in the media spotlight (e.g. genetically modified food).

Third, the respondents were not able to choose which online environment they entered (“forced exposure”), and forced and self-selective exposure might have different effects on polarisation (e.g. Arceneaux and Johnson 2013).

Fourth, as the results of the regressions are based on cross-sectional data, no causal claims can be made, which is why no mediation models were calculated (see Chan, Hu, and Mak 2020), even if the results suggest potential mediation effects. The results imply that attitude polarisation has an effect on the BISO and that this effect is mediated by affective polarisation. To test these assumptions, experimental studies should (1) manipulate attitude polarisation to analyse its potential effect on affective polarisation and the BISO and (2) manipulate affective polarisation to analyse its potential effect on the BISO.

Finally, we only focused on one country. Thus, it is unclear whether the results are generalisable to other contexts.

Despite these limitations, the present study contributes to current research on how like-minded and opposing online environments influence polarisation. Even though it cannot be ruled out that the non-existent findings are due to the experimental set-up, it is also possible that the results indicate that the process of how like-minded or opposing information influences polarisation is more complex than previously suspected. More studies are needed that focus on the potential effects of being exposed to these online environments. Experimental studies using algorithmically curated stimuli may be helpful to determine the effects. Furthermore, this study has shown that the BISO is a theoretical concept that is also relevant in more (national) contexts than those previously tested (e.g. Tsfati 2020). Silencing others and the belief in the importance of doing so may be important concepts for understanding polarised societies.

Sex differences in total brain volume are not accounted for by sex differences in height and weight, and that once global brain size is taken into account, there remain numerous regional sex differences in both directions

Sex differences in the brain are not reduced to differences in body size. Camille Michèle et al. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, September 11 2021. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2021.09.015

Abstract: In their comprehensive review of sex differences in the brain, Eliot et al. (2021) conclude that (1) men and women significantly differ in global brain size, but this “mostly parallels the divergence of male/female body size during development” and that (2) “once we account for individual differences in brain size, there is almost no difference in the volume of specific cortical or subcortical structures between men and women”. In sum, almost all brain differences would directly or indirectly follow from differences in body size. In a recent study that does not have the same limitations as most studies reviewed by Eliot et al., we find that sex differences in total brain volume are not accounted for by sex differences in height and weight, and that once global brain size is taken into account, there remain numerous regional sex differences in both directions (Williams et al., 2021).

Keywords: sex differencesBrain VolumesCortical Mean ThicknessesCortical Surface Areas

Adoptive & biological families with 30-year-old offspring: Proportion of variance in IQ attributable to environmentally mediated effects of parental IQs was estimated at .01; heritability was estimated to be 0.42

Genetic and environmental contributions to IQ in adoptive and biological families with 30-year-old offspring. Emily A. Willoughby, Matt McGue, William G. Iacono, James J. Lee. Intelligence, Volume 88, September–October 2021, 101579. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2021.101579

Highlights

• Genetic and environmental sources of variance in IQ were estimated from 486 adoptive and biological families

• Families include 419 mothers, 201 fathers, 415 adopted and 347 biological fully-adult offspring (M age = 31.8 years; SD = 2.7)

• Proportion of variance in IQ attributable to environmentally mediated effects of parental IQs was estimated at .01 [95% CI 0.00, 0.02]

• Heritability was estimated to be 0.42 [95% CI 0.21, 0.64]

• Parent-offspring correlations for educational attainment polygenic scores show no evidence of adoption placement effect

Abstract: While adoption studies have provided key insights into the influence of the familial environment on IQ scores of adolescents and children, few have followed adopted offspring long past the time spent living in the family home. To improve confidence about the extent to which shared environment exerts enduring effects on IQ, we estimated genetic and environmental effects on adulthood IQ in a unique sample of 486 biological and adoptive families. These families, tested previously on measures of IQ when offspring averaged age 15, were assessed a second time nearly two decades later (M offspring age = 32 years). We estimated the proportions of the variance in IQ attributable to environmentally mediated effects of parental IQs, sibling-specific shared environment, and gene-environment covariance to be 0.01 [95% CI 0.00, 0.02], 0.04 [95% CI 0.00, 0.15], and 0.03 [95% CI 0.00, 0.07] respectively; these components jointly accounted for 8% of the IQ variance in adulthood. The heritability was estimated to be 0.42 [95% CI 0.21, 0.64]. Together, these findings provide further evidence for the predominance of genetic influences on adult intelligence over any other systematic source of variation.

Keywords: IntelligenceAdoptionHeritabilityVocabularyPolygenic scores

Asking the mayor's office how to start a business: Chinese & German cities responded to 36-37% requests; American cities responded to 22%; Chinese cities were more responsive to requests from men

Köhler, Ekkehard A. and Matsusaka, John G. and Wu, Yanhui, Street-Level Responsiveness of City Governments in China, Germany, and the United States (August 19, 2021). SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3907862

Abstract: This paper presents evidence from parallel field experiments in China, Germany, and the United States. We contacted the mayor’s office in over 6,000 cities asking for information about procedures for starting a new business. Chinese and German cities responded to 36-37 percent requests; American cities responded to only 22 percent of requests. We randomly varied the text of the request to identify factors that affect the likelihood of receiving a response. American and German cities were more responsive to requests from citizens than foreigners; Chinese cities did not discriminate on this basis. Chinese cities were more responsive to requests from men than women; German cities did not discriminate on this basis and American cities had a slight bias in favor of women. Cities in all three countries were more responsive to requests associated with starting a construction business than a green business, but especially Chinese cities. Chinese cities were more responsive when the mayor was being considered for promotion than after a promotion decision, suggesting the importance of promotion incentives in China, but low responsiveness to green investment suggests limited incentives for environmental improvement. We argue that the response patterns are consistent with simple political economy theories of democracy and autocracy.

Keywords: Responsiveness, bureaucracy, democracy, autocracy, environment, discrimination, China, Germany

JEL Classification: H7, H83, O38, P5, R5