College and the “Culture War”: Assessing Higher Education’s Influence on Moral Attitudes. Miloš Broćić, Andrew Miles. American Sociological Review, September 18, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/00031224211041094
Abstract: Moral differences contribute to social and political conflicts. Against this backdrop, colleges and universities have been criticized for promoting liberal moral attitudes. However, direct evidence for these claims is sparse, and suggestive evidence from studies of political attitudes is inconclusive. Using four waves of data from the National Study of Youth and Religion, we examine the effects of higher education on attitudes related to three dimensions of morality that have been identified as central to conflict: moral relativism, concern for others, and concern for social order. Our results indicate that higher education liberalizes moral concerns for most students, but it also departs from the standard liberal profile by promoting moral absolutism rather than relativism. These effects are strongest for individuals majoring in the humanities, arts, or social sciences, and for students pursuing graduate studies. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our results for work on political conflict and moral socialization.
Keywords: moral attitudes, higher education, culture war, socialization, political sociology
According to Bloom (1987:26), behind the curriculum of every educational system lies a latent moral purpose to “produce a certain kind of human being.” Yet recent scholarship has questioned whether the collegiate experience is indeed a deeply formative period. Researchers have demonstrated that differences prior to enrollment explain much of the variation in outcomes across educational levels (Campbell and Horowitz 2016; Elchardus and Spruyt 2009; Gross 2013), a finding that resonates with work emphasizing the importance of early-life social experiences in forming moral dispositions (Killen and Smetana 2015; Vaisey and Lizardo 2016). We test whether higher education shapes morality using four waves of data that follow respondents from high school into young adulthood and models that test or control for selection processes. We find that moral attitudes remain malleable into young adulthood and that higher education is an important institution that facilitates change.
The most consistent predictors of moral change were pursuing graduate education and majoring in the humanities, arts, or social sciences. These educational experiences increased belief that moral principles should adapt to changes in society (moral progressivism), but—in contrast to the typical liberal moral profile—they also decreased moral relativism, suggesting some students are emerging from higher education with a greater conviction in absolute rights and wrongs. However, our data indicate this moral absolutism looks different than the moral absolutism of religious and political conservatives. Rather than supporting traditional norms, these students emerge from university with a moral profile characterized by high concern for others and weak commitment to traditional social order. One interpretation of these results is that some university students—particularly those majoring in HASS or who continue on to graduate education—come to believe that the morals of society must change to remedy historical (and current) injustices (i.e., moral progressivism), but that the moral principles they have learned through their studies represent the real moral truth (moral absolutism).
Evidence of decreased relativism is noteworthy in that it contrasts with prior critiques of higher education by religious and conservative commentators, as well as earlier scholarly accounts that described relativistic tendencies among academics (Hunter 1991; Wuthnow 1988). Lazarsfeld and Thielens’s (1958) pioneering study of the U.S. professoriate, for instance, described social scientists as relativists whose keen awareness of historical variation in morality led to contingency in their own beliefs. Consistent with this, we find HASS majors believe morals should be adjusted to social changes, suggesting a more contextual and relativistic moral understanding. However, these students differ from earlier relativists in their willingness to claim there are definite moral truths. This lends prima facie support to recent claims that the moral relativism of years past is transforming into a form of liberal moral puritanism (Campbell and Manning 2018; Lukianoff and Haidt 2018).
The apparent discrepancies between our findings and earlier work invite the question of whether key socializing processes in higher education have changed. Our study’s focus on individual-level change limits our ability to assess this directly, but suggestive research allows us to speculate. Growing social closure along the lines of political ideology among university faculty and administrators may partly explain the rise in moral absolutism among students (Gross 2013). In 1969, 28 percent of professors described themselves as conservative, but by 2013 this decreased to 12 percent (Eagan et al. 2014; Ladd and Lipset 1975). Data on college administrators are harder to come by, but a recent survey found that among “student-facing” college administrators—those who are most responsible for shaping student experiences on campus—liberals outnumber conservatives by as much as 12 to 1 (Abrams 2018a, 2018b). Increasing political homogeneity among faculty and/or administrators could create a sense of moral consensus that leaves shared liberal beliefs unchallenged or might even make them seem naturally true. Lack of interpersonal engagement with members of an outgroup can in turn make individuals less politically tolerant, less likely to regard opposing views as legitimate, and more likely to hold extreme attitudes (Huckfeldt, Mendez, and Osborn 2004; Mutz 2002)—all traits that coincide with stronger moral conviction (Skitka et al. 2021). These processes could contribute to a sense of liberal moral certitude among students to the extent that university messaging, course content, the types of faculty mentors available, or even informal interactions with faculty and staff communicate moral consensus.
This narrative may be incomplete, however, given that moral certainty also increases for students enrolled in majors that are not heavily associated with liberal moral concerns.11 Another possibility is that growth in moral certainty might also be explained by socialization into the official culture of dominant institutions. According to scholarship in this area, universities are the primary institution for mobility into the professional classes. Consequently, their latent function is to socialize students into dominant status culture by teaching proper etiquette, aesthetic tastes, and moral evaluations that serve to legitimize their advantaged class position (Bourdieu 1984; Collins 1971; Jackman and Muha 1984). Moral justifications may differ across fields, with educated elites variously casting themselves as “enlightened cosmopolitans” (see Johnston and Baumann 2007; Lizardo and Skiles 2015; Ollivier 2008) or winners of “meritocratic struggle” (Bourdieu and Passeron 1979; Mijs 2016; Piketty 2020), but strong moral self-assurance appears to form a common sentiment. Importantly, as cultivation combines with a growing sense of expertise from formal training, educational attainment may impart moral beliefs with a stamp of objectivity (cf. Bottum 2014). Seen this way, moral righteousness might be a consequence of rising social class rather than liberal socialization alone. Of course, the two need not be mutually exclusive—professionalization and liberal attitudes could reinforce one another to the extent that dominant institutions adopt liberal values, policies, or agendas. Some evidence suggests this process might be well under way.12
Recent events suggest higher education’s role in liberalizing moral concerns could have important consequences for social conflict. Scholars have noted the growing salience of the “diploma divide” in politics, with educational attainment being among the strongest predictors of voting against Donald Trump, Brexit, and other events (Gidron and Hall 2017; Lind 2020; Piketty 2020). Our study speaks to the moral dimension of this divide. When conflict pits nativism against cosmopolitanism and “vulgar” populism against “technocratic” expertise, an educational system that promotes commitment to liberal sensibilities will likely stratify voters according to educational attainment.13 Moral stratification of this sort could pose several risks to civil society. If individuals on the political right come to regard the primary credentialing institution as hostile to their interests, partisan segregation could further escalate by deterring conservative enrollment (Gross 2013). This, in turn, could deepen the distrust toward government, media, and other institutions that employ the credentialled classes that is already evident among the less-educated (Rainie and Perrin 2019). Finally, deliberative democracy could suffer if educational attainment is accompanied by a rising moral conviction that views opposition as too dangerous to engage with or even tolerate (Skitka 2010; Skitka, Bauman, and Sargis 2005).14
However, we must be careful not to overstate the political consequences of moral change. Partisans often differ in their moral attitudes (Miles and Vaisey 2015), but it is unclear whether higher education’s effects on moral attitudes will necessarily lead to demonstrable shifts in political behavior. A student leaving the university might well emerge with less regard for traditional conservative morality, yet still vote Republican for economic, foreign policy, or other reasons. Some research even finds that partisan identification precedes moral change, suggesting moral differences may express rather than constitute partisan allegiances (Hatemi, Crabtree, and Smith 2019; Smith et al. 2017). The fact that higher education also shapes eventual class position complicates matters further by leaving open the possibility that material interests underlie conflict that on the surface appears morally motivated (Lasch 1994; Lind 2020; Piketty 2020). Given these considerations, it would be premature to conclude that morality is the only or even necessarily the primary predictor of political behavior. Future research should continue to explore how moral, economic, and political interests intersect among the highly educated, and the effects these have on political behavior. Such research could build on older sociological analyses of the “New Class” emerging from the knowledge economy (Bazelon 1967; Bell 1979; Gouldner 1978), variously treated as the “Creative Class” (Florida 2002), the “Elect” (Bottum 2014), or the “Brahmin Left” (Piketty 2020) in contemporary discussions.
Our study also speaks to work on moral socialization (Guhin, Calarco, and Miller-Idriss 2021). Contrary to recent accounts emphasizing selection effects, we find that moral socialization occurs within universities in a meaningful way. Consider higher education’s effect as it compares to religious practices. Scholars often depict religion as the defining cleavage of cultural conflict (Castle 2019; Gorski 2020; Wuthnow 1989), yet our analysis finds that the effect of higher education on moral concerns is comparable to the moral influence of adolescent religion and imparts a sense of moral absolutism that rivals the effect of religiosity. Evidence of moral change invites additional research into what aspects of early morality are stable, and which are open to revision. Theories of moral socialization often acknowledge the possibility of later moral change, but in practice focus on innate moral impulses or moral learning processes that occur early in life (Graham et al. 2009; Killen and Smetana 2015). Scholars who consider attitude development during adulthood, moreover, find greater support for a “settled disposition model” emphasizing stability rather than change (Kiley and Vaisey 2020; Vaisey and Lizardo 2016). However, our results suggest adolescence and young adulthood remain important periods of moral change worthy of scholarly attention (cf. Hardy and Carlo 2011).
Further work is also needed to understand the processes whereby educational attainment influences moral attitudes. Consistent with the socialization hypothesis, moral change was strongest for HASS students, and comparatively weaker and in some cases absent for other majors. This suggests curricular content matters for moral change. The traditional socialization hypothesis holds that moral relativism is the natural by-product of exposure to cultural diversity, but this was not borne out by our analyses. Instead, we observed an increase in moral absolutism, which may suggest students are being actively taught moral ideals. This, however, remains speculative and requires systematic exploration. Furthermore, the fact that moral relativism decreases across all fields suggests socialization effects likely are not due to curricular content alone and may indicate social learning through noncurricular aspects of the university experience. As discussed earlier, we speculate that formal and informal socialization into official culture might explain this effect, with institutional validation and expertise giving students moral self-assurance, and the mostly liberal direction of this change signaling the elevation of social justice and related liberal concerns within major institutions (Campbell and Manning 2018; Lind 2020).
Ideally, future research would address the limitations of this study. For example, future work should use larger samples to increase statistical power to detect effects when cross-classifying educational categories. Furthermore, we believe our research supports a causal interpretation, but this interpretation is necessarily provisional, particularly for our results linking higher education to changing moral concerns for order, given that these were measured only at wave 4. Researchers should collect data on moral concerns at multiple waves so that correlated-random-effects models or equivalent methods can be used to test for and—if needed—correct for the influence of unobserved time-constant confounds. Future analysis could also unpack the causal mechanisms involved by incorporating direct measures of course content and noncurricular aspects of the academic environment (e.g., campus messaging, programming, friendship networks; see Rauf 2021; Strother et al. 2020). The moral consequences of cognitive sophistication could also be clarified. Indeed, absolute moral certitude appears at odds with the cognitive hypothesis, which predicts greater intellectual flexibility as a result of sophistication (cf. Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1996; Jost et al. 2003). Finally, it is important to replicate our results using recent samples of college-aged adults. Although victimhood culture (under various names) has been discussed since at least the 1980s (Bloom 1987), some scholars argue that manifestations of this moral culture increased sharply beginning in the mid-2010s (Campell and Manning 2018; Lukianoff and Haidt 2018). The final wave of data for the NSYR was collected in 2012 to 2013, which places our data relatively early in these developments. More recent data would allow our findings to be tested in a sample that more closely aligns with the theorized timeline and could provide important insights into the underlying mechanisms.