Analyses revealed direct and indirect associations between frequent pornography consumption and greater sexual functioning through greater sexual flexibility in women, but not in men

Associations Between Pornography Consumption, Sexual Flexibility, and Sexual Functioning Among Austrian Adults. Nikola Komlenac & Margarethe Hochleitner. Archives of Sexual Behavior, Jan 4 2022. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-021-02201-7

Abstract: To date, only a few studies have examined the associations between pornography consumption and sexual functioning. The Acquisition, Activation, Application Model (3AM) indicates that the frequency of pornography consumption and the perceived realism of pornography may influence whether sexual scripts are acquired from viewed pornography. Having sexual scripts that are alternative to their preferred sexual behaviors may help people switch to alternative sexual behavior when sexual problems arise. The current study analyzed whether frequent pornography consumption was associated with greater sexual flexibility and greater sexual functioning. Additionally, the perceived realism of pornography consumption was tested as a moderator of those associations. At an Austrian medical university, an online cross-sectional questionnaire study was conducted among 644 medical students (54% women and 46% men; Mage = 24.1 years, SD = 3.8). The participants were asked about their pornography consumption, partnered sexual activity, sexual flexibility, perceived realism of pornography, and sexual functioning. Manifest path analyses revealed direct and indirect associations between frequent pornography consumption and greater sexual functioning through greater sexual flexibility in women but not in men. Perceived realism did not moderate those associations. In conclusion, our study was in line with previous studies that found no significant associations between men’s pornography consumption and sexual functioning in men. However, some women may expand their sexual scripts and learn new sexual behaviors from pornography consumption, which may help with their sexual functioning.

Discussion

The current study found a direct association between frequent pornography consumption and greater sexual functioning in women but not in men (H1). Additionally, an indirect link between frequent pornography consumption and greater sexual functioning through the mediator of sexual flexibility was found in women (H2). The perceived realism of pornographic material did not moderate the found associations (H3).

Frequent Pornography Consumption and Greater Sexual Functioning in Women

Our study supports previous findings that revealed no associations between men’s pornography consumption and sexual functioning (Landripet & Štulhofer, 2015; Prause & Pfaus, 2015). Moreover, our study adds to the literature by providing findings on such associations for women. In contrast to other studies that have analyzed this link (Berger et al., 2019; Wright et al., 2021), we found an association between women’s frequent pornography consumption and greater sexual functioning (Bőthe et al., 2021).

The majority of pornographic content depicts two actors who engage in genital stimulation, oral stimulation, or vaginal intercourse (Gorman et al., 2010; Vannier et al., 2014). Such pornographic material may help women expand their sexual scripts, learn new rewarding sexual behaviors, and thereby increase their sexual flexibility. For example, learning about oral-genital activity has been most frequently cited in this regard (Weinberg et al., 2010). This finding is supported by additional findings showing that women who consume pornography more frequently have oral sexual activity than do women who do not consume pornography (Brown & L'Engle, 2009).

The current finding of associations between frequent pornography consumption and greater sexual functioning is further supported by studies that report consumers’ self-perceived effects of their pornography consumption. Such studies report that people self-perceive positive effects of pornography consumption on their sexuality rather than negative consequences (Daneback et al., 2009; Hald & Malamuth, 2008; Weinberg et al., 2010).

The current study’s findings, as well as the findings of past studies, may encourage some clinical practitioners to use pornography in psychosexual therapy to instruct or show clients new or alternative sexual behaviors (Brewster & Wylie, 2008). Such material may, for example, include portrayals of adult solo and mutual masturbation and oral, vaginal, and anal sexual activity. Such material may encourage clients to explore alternative sexual activities when problems occur during preferred sexual behaviors. Furthermore, such material may help with the understanding and acceptance of certain sexual behaviors (Watson & Smith, 2012). However, one must also bear ethical implications in mind when using pornography in psychosexual therapy. Some clients might find the use of pornographic material challenging and distressing because of their attitudes or past experiences (Rhoades, 2007). Therefore, clinicians must evaluate a client’s readiness to view pornographic material. Additionally, some other sexual health concerns, such as relationship problems, may contraindicate the use of pornographic material (Miller et al., 2019; Wright et al., 2017).

Alternative Explanations

Our hypothesis that the link between pornography consumption and sexual functioning is stronger for people who perceive pornography as realistic than for people who do not perceive such content to be realistic was not supported by our findings. As is the main problem with most cross-sectional studies, the current cross-sectional study does not permit any conclusions about the directionality or causality of the found associations. The associations found between pornography consumption and sexual flexibility could mean that women who are already open and flexible in their approach to sexuality are more likely to consume pornography than are women who are limited in regard to their sexual flexibility. In such a case, one’s perceived realism of pornography is unlikely to influence the association.

The Antecedents-Context-Effects Model (Campbell & Kohut, 2017) exemplifies the problem that most of the studies about pornography do not consider the factors or traits that make a person more likely to consume pornography. Thus, many studies do not consider the so-called antecedents of pornography consumption. In some cases, those antecedents and not pornography consumption may be a better explanation for the found links between pornography consumption and components of sexual health (Campbell & Kohut, 2017). This also applies to our study and the hypothesized associations between sexual flexibility, sexual functioning and pornography consumption. Future studies of the links between pornography consumption and sexual health should consider potential factors that may explain pornography consumption and assumed effects of pornography consumption. Additionally, future longitudinal studies or experimental studies are needed to shed light on the directionality of the found associations.

Even though pornography consumption was seen to be indirectly associated with sexual functioning through sexual flexibility, sexual flexibility could not fully explain the association between pornography consumption and sexual functioning. The considerable direct effect between pornography consumption and sexual functioning indicates that further studies need to include additional mediators to explain the found associations. For example, women who consume pornography may be more likely to know their own sexual interests and desires and in turn be willing and able to communicate their preferences during partnered sexual activity (Weinberg et al., 2010). The ability to communicate sexual preferences has been reported to be associated with greater sexual satisfaction in women (Blunt-Vinti et al., 2019; Herbenick et al., 2019).

Gender Differences

The current study replicated the previously known finding that men consume pornography more frequently than women (Landripet & Štulhofer, 2015; Miller et al., 2019; Sun et al., 2016). Additional gender differences became evident, as hypothesized associations between pornography consumption, sexual flexibility, and sexual functioning were supported only in women but not in men.

Notably, an association was observed between frequent pornography consumption and greater sexual flexibility in men. However, sexual flexibility, in turn, was not linked to sexual functioning. One explanation for the different findings in women and men may be explained by the methods used to assess sexual functioning in women and men. For women, we used the FSFI-6, which includes many domains of sexual functioning. The erectile functioning scale of the IIEF, in contrast, contains questions only about erectile functioning. Thus, associations between men’s frequency of pornography consumption and other components of sexual functioning may have been missed because this scale was used. There is evidence that pornography consumption may be positively associated with men’s sexual desire (Prause & Pfaus, 2015). Future studies should use more sophisticated questionnaires that assess each component of sexual functioning with multiple items. Furthermore, future studies may also include questions about the distress a sexual problem causes because sexual problems that cause considerable distress may be clinically relevant. Prevalence rates and estimates of sexual problems change significantly when distress is considered (Hendrickx et al., 2016; Komlenac et al., 2019; Mitchell et al., 2016).

The purpose of pornography consumption may also differ between women and men. Compared to women, men are more likely to use pornography to achieve sexual arousal during solitary sexual activity. Women are more likely than men to report using pornography together with a partner to enhance sexual stimulation during partnered sexual activity (Albright, 2008; Bridges & Morokoff, 2011; Solano et al., 2020). Additionally, gender differences have been reported in regard to preferences for specific pornographic content (Hald & Štulhofer, 2016), for pornographic material (e.g., pictures, films, videos or text) accessed, or for the motivation behind or the purpose of pornography consumption (Solano et al., 2020). All these factors may influence the effects of pornography consumption (Wright, 2011) and may explain the gender differences in the found associations between pornography consumption and components of sexual health, including sexual functioning. Therefore, we agree with recommendations that future studies should extend their measures of pornography consumption to include questions on frequency, content, medium, and motivation (Hald & Štulhofer, 2016; Solano et al., 2020).

Limitations

The current study is not without its limitations. First, the study is based on participants’ self-reports. This approach entails known problems. For instance, participants may not correctly remember all occasions of their sexual activity or pornography consumption. Additionally, participants may have felt that it is socially desirable to withhold or reveal certain information (Choi & Pak, 2005).

Second, the found associations are only small or moderate (Cohen, 1988). Therefore, the found associations between sexual functioning, sexual flexibility, and pornography consumption should be interpreted with caution.

Third, we modified the questions on the IIEF (Rosen et al., 1997) from asking about sexual functioning in the previous 4 weeks to asking about sexual functioning over the last 6 months to be more in accordance with classification time frames for sexual dysfunctions (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). However, a technical error caused us to not apply the same changes to the FSFI-6 (Isidori et al., 2010). Future studies should include a 6-month time frame for women and men.

Last, even though the study used a relatively large sample, this sample has limitations. The current study’s results are based on a convenience sample of university students. Many other studies of pornography consumption have used such samples (Short et al., 2012). However, such a sample may significantly differ from other populations (Henrich et al., 2010). In general, studies with university students as participants find associations with larger effect sizes than those of studies with more general samples. Additionally, it has been shown that the directionality of an association may be in the opposite direction in studies with university students and in studies with nonstudent samples. This is why conclusions based on studies with only university students as participants may differ from studies that base their findings on a less homogeneous and more general sample (Peterson, 2001). Another limitation of the sample is that sexual minority groups remained relatively underrepresented. Found associations between sexual orientation and pornography consumption indicate that acceptance and habits of pornography consumption may differ between people of different sexual orientations. These limitations indicate the need for future studies with more diverse samples to replicate and extend current findings.

Diversity in religiosity in a society poses a threat to conventional personal morality of social conservatives (religiously devout or socially traditional), due to variegated attitudes on abortion, divorce, euthanasia, suicide, prostitution

Diversity in Religiosity Undermines Conventional Personal Morality Across the Globe: Evidence From 90 Nations, 300,000+ Individuals. M.D.R. Evans, Jonathan Kelley. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, December 14 2021. https://doi.org/10.1111/jssr.12756

Abstract: In societies where the populace exhibits a wide range of religiosity, social conservatives (religiously devout or socially traditional) feel their beliefs and way of life threatened, even where others in their society (secular, or socially liberal) have no desire to threaten them, or to discriminate against them, or even to proselytize. Examples include devout English Pilgrims in liberal 16th century Holland and devout Muslims in liberal 21st century Western Europe. We suggest that this is because diversity in religiosity itself poses a threat to conventional personal morality (attitudes on abortion, divorce, euthanasia, suicide, prostitution). The consequences of societal diversity in religiosity (the centrality of religion to one's life) for individuals’ endorsement of conventional personal morality have been neglected in prior research. This paper shows that diversity in religiosity at the national level undermines individuals’ endorsement of conventional personal morality, net of an individual's own religiosity, net of the average levels of religiosity and socioeconomic development in the individual's society, and net of key individual-level controls. Data are pooled from the World Values Surveys/European Values Surveys, 1981–2008, with 90 countries, 200+ surveys, and 300,000+ individual respondents. Analysis is by multilevel methods (variance components models with fixed effects and random intercepts, estimated by generalized least squares [GLS]).

Overall, as has been the case for previous media such as video games, concerns about screen time and mental health are not based in reliable data

Ferguson, C. J., Kaye, L. K., Branley-Bell, D., Markey, P., Ivory, J. D., Klisanin, D., Elson, M., Smyth, M., Hogg, J. L., McDonnell, D., Nichols, D., Siddiqui, S., Gregerson, M., & Wilson, J. (2021). Like this meta-analysis: Screen media and mental health. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, Jan 2022. https://doi.org/10.1037/pro0000426

Abstract: The question of whether screen time, particularly time spent with social media and smartphones, influences mental health outcomes remains a topic of considerable debate among policy makers, the public, and scholars. Some scholars have argued passionately that screen media may be contributing to an increase in poor psychosocial functioning and risk of suicide, particularly among teens. Other scholars contend that the evidence is not yet sufficient to support such a dramatic conclusion. The current meta-analysis included 37 effect sizes from 33 separate studies. To consider the most recent research, all studies analyzed were published between 2015 and 2019. Across studies, evidence suggests that screen media plays little role in mental health concerns. In particular, there was no evidence that screen media contribute to suicidal ideation or other mental health outcomes. This result was also true when investigating smartphones or social media specifically. Overall, as has been the case for previous media such as video games, concerns about screen time and mental health are not based in reliable data.

Check also A neural circuit for spirituality and religiosity derived from patients with brain lesions: There is a common brain circuit in a region previously implicated in fear conditioning, pain modulation, and altruistic behavior:

A neural circuit for spirituality and religiosity derived from patients with brain lesions. Michael A. Ferguson et al. Biological Psychiatry, June 29 2021. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2021/06/a-neural-circuit-for-spirituality-and.html

Men were far more likely to expect a negative reaction from the receiver of an unsolicited nude or sexual image, and more likely to show a flirty or positive reaction when they were the receiver

Expectations vs. reality: Expected and actual affective reactions to unsolicited sexual images. V. Karasavva, J. Swanek, A. Smodis, A. Forth. Computers in Human Behavior, January 4 2022, 107181. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2022.107181

Highlights

•Most participants reported negative or ambivalent reactions to being cyberflashed.

• The majority of cyberflashers endorsed expecting a flirty reaction.

• Women were more likely expect flirty or positive and men negative reactions.

• Women were more likely typically have ambivalent/negative reactions when cyberflashed.

• Flirty and positive expectations were predictive of cyberflashing.

Abstract: Most of the research on cyberflashing (i.e., using technology to send someone a nude or sexual image without their consent) has focused on cisgender men sharing pictures of their genitals (i.e., “dick pics”). Within this, what is known about the expectations and reactions to cyberflashing is also limited. Here, we examine the cyberflashing practices, expectations, and reactions of both men and women. Participants in our study (n = 810, 41.8% cyberflashers; 68.0% had been cyberflashed) reported how they expected those receiving their unsolicited sexual images would feel and how they feel when they receive such an image. Women cyberflashers were more likely to endorse expecting a flirty or positive reaction from the receiver and were more likely to report having an ambivalent or negative reaction when cyberflashed. Conversely, men cyberflashers were more likely to expect a negative reaction from the receiver but reported having a flirty or positive reaction when cyberflashed. Finally, we found that expecting a flirty or positive reaction and not expecting a negative reaction were predictive of cyberflashing. Findings highlight the mismatch between the expectations and actual reactions of cyberflashing and underscore the importance of consent education for online sexual interactions.

Keywords: CyberflashingSextingDick picsImage-based sexual abuseTechnology-facilitated sexual violence

Graphical abstract

1. Download : Download high-res image (292KB)
2. Download : Download full-size image

Echo chambers, filter bubbles? The degree of heterogeneity of one’s political news consumption, as well as voting intentions for a specific party are complex psychological constructs with many different variables, each single variable only having a small effect

The degree of heterogeneity of news consumption in Germany—Descriptive statistics and relations with individual differences in personality, ideological attitudes, and voting intentions. Cornelia Sindermann, Christopher Kannen, Christian Montag. New Media & Society, December 30, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/14614448211061729

Abstract: This study aimed to examine the degree of homogeneity versus heterogeneity of individuals’ political information environments across offline and online media types and relations with sociodemographic variables, personality, and political attitudes. In two online surveys, German participants (sample 1: N = 686; sample 2: N = 702) provided information on sociodemographic variables, consumption of political news, and voting intentions, and completed the Big Five Inventory and Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) scales. Results revealed that absolutely homogeneous political news consumption was evident for a small proportion of individuals (2.04% and 0.43%). Openness (positively) and Agreeableness (negatively) exhibited significant associations with the degree of heterogeneity of political information environments across samples. No consistent patterns of relations with either the ideological attitudes of RWA and SDO or voting intentions were observed. The findings shed light on the existence of absolutely homogeneous political information environments and “who” might be prone to a more homogeneous versus more heterogeneous information environment.

Keywords: Echo chamber, filter bubble, homogeneous information environment, ideological attitudes, news consumption, personality, political news, voting

Check also other literature with references: Politically partisan left-right online news echo chambers are real, but only a minority of approximately 5% of internet news users inhabit them; the continued popularity of mainstream outlets often preclude the formation of large partisan echo chambers

Discussion

The current study sought to contribute empirical data to the ongoing discussions around homogeneous political information environments. Three specific aims were addressed in this study: (1) An examination of the degree of heterogeneity of information environments of individuals in relation to political news, (2) analyses of the extent to which the degree of heterogeneity of an individual’s political information environment is associated with individual differences in sociodemographics and personality, and (3) an exploration of the associations of the degree of heterogeneity of individuals’ political information environments with ideological attitudes and political voting intentions. Analyses focused on political news consumption across various offline and online media types and were implemented in two independent population-based samples to derive robust, replicable, and reliable findings.

Across the two independent samples, the media type where individuals received on average the most homogeneous and attitude-consistent political news was podcasts; see Figure 2. It should be highlighted, however, that relatively few individuals in sample 1 (8.02%; but sample 2: 37.61%) actually used podcasts to consume political news. The generally low scores for consuming counter-attitudinal news via podcasts in both samples might be due to the time which needs to be invested into listening to a podcast. Given this, individuals might need to be more selective with regard to which podcast they listen to. It is also possible that individuals tend to choose to listen to podcasts delivered by specific individuals who then advertise podcasts by other individuals with similar attitudes, further reducing the heterogeneity of news consumption of listeners. The media types where individuals on average received the most heterogeneous political news were social media (sample 1) and online news websites (sample 2); see Figure 2. Thus, these results do not support the notion that social media platforms pose the greatest risk for homogeneous information environments (see arguments highlighted in the Introduction of the present study). In addition, the results do not show that political news consumed via online media types, where algorithmic filtering is possible, are generally more homogeneous than those consumed via offline media types. Unfortunately, we cannot draw any conclusion as to why heterogeneity scores differ between media types. Heterogeneity could be due to incidental, algorithmically based, or self-initiated confrontation with counter-attitudinal news. Investigating the reasons for differences in heterogeneity scores across media types will be an important research approach for forthcoming studies. Relatedly, mechanisms to increase the heterogeneity of news consumed within and across media types will need to be investigated. Based upon these investigations, citizens should be informed about the degree of heterogeneity of news presented via different media types and ways to increase heterogeneity. Further development of add-ons (e.g. for internet browsers) informing users about their personal heterogeneity of news consumption could be the first step in this direction—an add-on is, however, always limited to the online context (see examples mentioned in Bozdag and van den Hoven (2015)).

Across all media types used, only a few individuals responded “never” to seeing news contradicting their existing opinions when consuming political news (n = 14, 2.04% in sample 1; n = 3, 0.43% in sample 2). These results indicate that few individuals are exposed to absolutely homogeneous information environments across media types. This is in line with previous research on incidental and counter-attitudinal news exposure on different media types (Newman et al., 2017; Vaccari et al., 2016).

Older age and being male (versus female) were associated with greater heterogeneity of one’s political information environment across samples. These results fit with findings from previous studies (Benesch, 2012; Sindermann et al., 2020) although, in one of the cited studies significant associations with education were also found, which was only observed in one of our samples (sample 1).

With respect to individual differences in personality the following results were obtained: Significant positive associations of Openness (in correlational and regression analyses) and negative associations of Agreeableness (in regression analyses) with the degree of heterogeneity of political information environments were found across samples.

We want to specifically highlight the positive associations between Openness and the degree of heterogeneity of political information environments. These positive associations are in line with our initial hypothesis and the findings of previous studies (Matz, 2021; Sindermann et al., 2020). Moreover, it supports the intellectual stimulation hypothesis proposed by Kim and Kim (2018). Individuals scoring high in Openness seem to enjoy engagement in news reports dealing with a range of different political opinions. This is also in line with one study where a positive association between Openness and engagement in political discussions was reported (Mondak and Halperin, 2008); but we should also acknowledge the results of other studies that do not support this link (Gerber et al., 2012; Hibbing et al., 2011). As can be seen in Supplementary Table 5, Openness might be more strongly related to the degree of heterogeneity of one’s online versus offline political information environment (see results from sample 1 reported in the Supplementary Material). A greater potential for the individual to create his or her online news environment versus the offline news environment might contribute to these differential associations (see Supplementary Material).

Contrary to our hypotheses, we did not find any significant association of ideological attitudes with the degree of heterogeneity of one’s political information environment across samples. Despite RWA and SDO having been found to positively relate to closed-mindedness (Berggren et al., 2019), they do not seem to be related to the degree of heterogeneity of one’s political information environment. Interestingly, however, additional analyses (Supplementary Material) revealed that RWA was negatively related to the heterogeneity of one’s online, but not offline, political information environment across both samples. On the one hand, it is possible that high-choice online environments in particular offer the possibility for homogeneous political news consumption for individuals high in RWA. On the other hand, more information filtering online (e.g. via algorithms) compared to offline sources might influence RWA. These results and the causal direction of associations will need to be (re-)investigated in future studies.

It is difficult to draw any firm conclusions regarding potential associations between the degree of heterogeneity of one’s political information environment and voting intentions. Lower heterogeneity was not associated with intentions of not voting, or to vote for a more extreme right-wing party, across samples. Models derived from linear discriminant analysis on associations of sociodemographic variables and the degree of heterogeneity of one’s political information environment with voting intentions revealed quite low classification accuracies. Therefore, we should not overinterpret these particular findings. Future studies might want to examine the associations between the degree of heterogeneity of political information environments and political attitudes in German samples in a slightly different way. For example, one could investigate the strength of party support, topic polarization, affective/partisan polarization via the “feeling thermometer,” or overall left–right ideological self-placement (e.g. Heatherly et al., 2017; Lee et al., 2014). Based on this idea, on an exploratory basis, we calculated the correlation between a 10-point left–right ideological self-placement item and the HoHe score in sample 2 (the left–right self-placement was only assessed in sample 2). The association was nonsignificant (ρ = –.02, p = .660). However, the association between an extremity score (absolute difference between self-placement on the left-right dimension and the mean scores 5 and 6) and the HoHe score was small but significant (ρ = .08, p = .037; these analyses were not preregistered). This indicates that these associations should be investigated in more depth in further studies to understand these complex relations.

Some limitations of the present study must be acknowledged. First of all, neither of the two samples is completely representative of the general German population. Moreover, it is important that the generalizability of the findings will be tested in future studies in other countries. Nevertheless, we are confident that the results that were replicated across the two samples of the present study will also be found in other samples. Next, it should be emphasized that data collection for both surveys was conducted in times of an exceptional crisis, namely, during the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, many news stories across different platforms are likely to have included information about the virus and legal/policy regulations to combat it (e.g. lockdowns, stay-at-home orders, etc.; GöfaK Medienforschung, 2020, as cited in Statista, 2021; tagesschau.de, 2020). The focus on these topics across news platforms might adversely affect the generalizability of findings and might explain findings that were inconsistent with our hypotheses. For instance, according to a recent survey, voters of the AfD were mostly against the measures to fight the COVID-19 pandemic (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 2020), which might (in part) explain high HoHe scores in this group. The present study should therefore be replicated when topics related to the pandemic are not dominating the news. Another limitation is that the present surveys were cross-sectional. Any conclusions about causality are limited, accordingly. One might, however, cautiously infer causal influences on the degree of heterogeneity of one’s political information environment specifically for associations with sociodemographic variables and personality traits, which are generally seen as relatively stable (Costa and McCrae, 1992a; Edmonds et al., 2008; Roberts and Mroczek, 2008). Another limitation is the application of self-report measures. Assessment of personality, ideological attitudes, and voting intentions via self-reports might be influenced by response biases or lack of ability for introspection (McDonald, 2008). Also, the statements on how many news sources one consumed within the past six months prior to participation, and on how often one was confronted with counter-attitudinal news, might be (un-)consciously biased. Nevertheless, the application of self-report measures allowed us to assess the degree of heterogeneity across various offline and online media types, which is very difficult to assess via objective methods. The HoHe score and its constituent items might be improved in future work, for example, by adding variables on the frequency of use, or the time spent on each media type. Another potential limitation is that across all results effect sizes were mostly small to medium, according to Cohen’s (1992) rules of thumb. This indicates that the degree of heterogeneity of one’s political news consumption, as well as voting intentions for a specific party, are complex psychological constructs and many different variables and their interactions contribute to explaining variance in them, with each single variable only having a small effect (Götz et al., 2021).

This report introduces the Global Collectivism Index (GCI) – a measure covering 99.9% of the earth's population; collectivism is very high in Sub-Saharan Africa, very low in Western Europe, and intermediate in most other regions

A Truly Global, non-WEIRD Examination of Collectivism: The Global Collectivism Index. Brett Pelham et al. Current Research in Ecological and Social Psychology, December 29 2021, 100030. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cresp.2021.100030

Highlights of Global Collectivism Index Report

• Despite recent growth in research on collectivism, there are no truly global measures of collectivism

• Our measure (the GCI) updates past measures and covers 99.9% of earth's population

• Our measure eliminates the strong WEIRD biases of past research

• Our measure is mostly behavioral and relies on representative national sampling

• Our measure compares favorably with existing measures

• Our measure is associated with important outcomes (e.g., suicide rates, human rights)

• This association is statistically independent of both national wealth (GDP) and modernity

• Our measure uncovers two important drivers of cultural evolution: farming and pathogen load

Abstract: This report introduces the Global Collectivism Index (GCI) – a measure covering 99.9% of the earth's population. The GCI includes six sub-scores (e.g., household living arrangements, ingroup favoritism). Collectivism is very high in Sub-Saharan Africa, very low in Western Europe, and intermediate in most other regions. Even after controlling for both national wealth and technological sophistication, national collectivism scores predict variables such as suicide rates, alcohol consumption, agricultural employment, and valuing child obedience. Further, this was true after directly pitting the GCI against several competing predictors of the major cultural outcomes examined in this report – from national wealth (GDP) and modernization to a seven-factor conceptualization of interdependence. The GCI is a much-needed, well-validated, historically updated measure that eliminates previous WEIRD biases and offers greatly increased statistical power in cross-cultural research.

A Final Look at Japan's Low Collectivism Scores

Many readers have been puzzled by our finding that Japan received a very low collectivism score. In fact, Japan's collectivism score on the GCI is identical to that of the United States. We are not the first to document low levels of collectivism in Asia. Oyserman et al. (2002) found that Japanese, South Korean, and U.S. citizens had similar collectivism scores. Such findings need not invalidate the bulk of the empirical observations that have been made in past comparisons of Japan (or South Korea) and the United States. But they do suggest that collectivism is an unlikely explanation for some of the recent cross-cultural differences observed between Japan and the United States. They also suggest that some of the past cross-cultural differences observed between these two nations might no longer appear in modern samples of young adults.

The assumption that Japan is a collectivistic nation is so widely accepted that many readers may question the validity of the GCI. But readers who reject our measure because of Japan's cross-national rankings would have to reject previously developed measures of collectivism as well. On Hofstede et al.’s (2010) popular measure of individualism, 39 out of 70 nations were more collectivistic (less individualistic) than Japan in 1970. On the GLOBE measure, Japan ranks 44th out of 55 nations in collectivism. Minkov's (2017) modern update on Hofstede's individualism measure places Japan one notch higher than the United States in global individualism. The WEIRD analyses presented here virtually guarantee that if existing measures of collectivism had included many more nations, Japan would have scored very low in collectivism. This is exactly what the GCI reveals. Further, as shown in Study 4, the fact that Japan has become much more individualistic in the past few decades is theoretically predictable, from drivers of cultural change.

Some avid believers in Japan's collectivism have argued that the GCI must be missing subscales that capture crucial aspects of collectivism. Such critics have yet to name any indicators that would radically change Japan's global rankings. For example, if one were to treat attitudes about child obedience as a subscale in our collectivism Index (rather than an outcome), this would lower Japan's collectivism score. There does appear to be one very good candidate for distinguishing Japan and other east Asian nations from the United States and Western Europe – in ways that are pretty consistent with much prior research on culture. This is Minkov et al.’s (2017) concept of flexibility-monumentalism. This cultural dimension has to do – at least in part – with the degree to which people behave very differently from one situation to another. It appears to overlap greatly with what Vignoles and colleagues call self-consistency (see Vignoles et al., 2016; especially Table 8). In fact, in Minkov's (2017) study of 56 nations, Japan had the world's highest score on this monumentalism-flexibility dimension (scoring strongly in the flexible direction). Minkov and colleagues specifically argue, however, that this dimension is largely independent of the dimension of individualism versus collectivism.

Brewer and Chen (2007) might argue that the present measure of collectivism – like other past measures of collectivism, allocentrism, and interdependence – conflates relational and group processes. These reflect two distinct forms of collectivism (Gabriel & Gardner, 1999). As applied to identity, relational identities refer to motives and self-evaluations that are grounded in close relationships and personal roles (e.g., aunt, grandfather). In contrast, group identities connect people to larger but less intimate social factions (e.g., one's fellow Moroccans, Cubs fan). Gabriel and Gardner (1999) found, for example, that men tend to privilege collective identities whereas women tend to privilege relational identities. From this viewpoint, the GCI seems to emphasize relational identities. This is especially true for total fertility, family living arrangements, and marriage to divorce ratios. But it is presumably much less true for religiosity – which connects people to large, extra-family groups. As operationalized in the GCI, ingroup bias is a roughly 2:1 blend of relational to collective concerns because Van de Vliert's measure includes familism and nepotism (which are heavily relational) and nationalism (which is about an extremely large group). Motor vehicle ownership rates may have more to do with truly individualistic motivations. Such motivations can be at odds with both relational and group motivations – and may differ less across modern cultures than do relational or collective motivations (Kreuzbauer, Chiu, & Lin, 2009).

General Discussion

In this report, we introduce the GCI – a theoretically-derived, empirically-validated national-level measure of collectivism. This single-factor measure has several desirable features. First, rather than relying on self-reported attitudes, the GCI consists mainly of behavioral measures, many of which can be assessed objectively. Second, unlike previous national-level measures of collectivism, the GCI covers virtually the entire planet. Moreover, most of the more than 100 nations that are covered by the GCI and not covered by existing measure are understudied, non-WEIRD cultures. The GCI also appears to be less strongly confounded with GDP and with modernity than are existing measures. Finally, taking nothing away from Minkov's (2017) update, the GCI represents a much-needed global update on levels of collectivism across the globe.

The GCI also has the advantage of being conceptually similar to Vandello and Cohen's (1999) measure of regional variation in collectivism across the 50 U.S. states. With this in mind, national scores on the GCI are reliably associated with national scores on both the likely origins and the likely consequences of collectivism. The GCI almost always predicted cross-national variation in social, political, and health outcomes even after we controlled for both GDP and “modernity” (technological and economic innovation).

Future studies should carefully address the likely origins and consequences of collectivism. The GCI will make that job much easier than it has been in the past. For example, one could use the GCI and Hofstede's original, 50-year-old, collectivism scores to model changes in collectivism over time. Doing so might help resolve the current debate about whether national wealth or pathogen loads better predict cultural evolution in the direction of individualism. Of course, this model would be limited to only about 55 nations, but we can think of no reason why such an analysis would not be at least as informative as the current studies that focus on many fewer nations (sometimes a single nation). We hope that even critics of this particular idea will agree that, at a bare minimum, the present data on the GCI show that the often-cited findings of Vandello and Cohen (1999) replicate very well at the global level.

Another way to appreciate the utility of the GCI is to see what would have happened if we had tested the hypotheses examined here using only the existing measures of collectivism. In such cases, we would have often observed incorrect or ambiguous findings. In a series of supplemental analyses, we assessed whether any of the existing measures of collectivism predicted how strongly parents valued obedience. All of these measures were correlated in the expected direction with this measure. However, only two of the four zero-order correlations were significant at p < .05 (those for the GLOBE and for Suh's measure). Further, after we statistically controlled for GDP, none of the measures was uniquely associated at p < .05 with valuing child obedience. Further, in four of the five cases, there was a significant unique effect for GDP. The main reason for this problem is clear. There was a median of 34 cases per regression analysis. This, combined with the limited statistical range for GDP and collectivism in heavily WEIRD nations, made it hard to separate collectivism and GDP. A nearly global pool of nations offers researchers much-needed statistical power when it comes to separating GDP and collectivism.