Love is not blind: What romantic partners know about our abilities compared to ourselves, our close friends, and our acquaintances

Love is not blind: What romantic partners know about our abilities compared to ourselves, our close friends, and our acquaintances. Gabriela Hofer, Silvia Macher, Aljoscha Neubauer. Journal of Research in Personality, March 4 2022, 104211. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2022.104211

Abstract: How much do our partners, close friends, and acquaintances know about our abilities, as compared to ourselves? This registered report aimed to investigate asymmetries in these perspectives’ knowledge of a person’s verbal, numerical, and spatial intelligence, creativity, and intra- and interpersonal emotional abilities. We collected self-estimates and performance measures of these abilities from 238 targets. Each target’s abilities were also rated by their romantic partner, a close friend, and an acquaintance. Results showed knowledge-asymmetries but also similarities between perspectives. People themselves were at least moderately accurate across all six domains. However, partners achieved similar accuracy and both partners and friends could provide unique insights into some abilities. We discuss these results with regard to Vazire’s self-other knowledge asymmetry model.

Introduction

“How am I doing?” This question is one that many of us likely ask themselves on a regular basis. Whether it concerns academic performance or everyday skills like driving ability, knowing how well we are doing is essential and sometimes our impression of our abilities shapes important life decisions (e.g., Ackerman & Wolman, 2007). It is, therefore, of little surprise that a lot of research has investigated the accuracy of self-estimates of abilities, reaching the conclusion that they are less accurate than one would imagine (Freund and Kasten, 2012, Zell and Krizan, 2014). Indeed, our self-estimates seem to be distorted by overestimation (e.g., Visser et al., 2008). Moreover, other people can also provide valuable information about our abilities and skills and their estimates might be similarly accurate or sometimes even slightly more accurate than our own (Denissen et al., 2011, Steinmayr and Spinath, 2009). To this date, however, hardly any research has directly compared the accuracy of self- and other-estimates of abilities (for an exception see Neubauer et al., 2018, who investigated accuracies of self- and peer-estimates in adolescents). The first main goal of this article was to provide such a comparison and to do so for an adult population and a wide range of abilities. When people make important decisions like vocational choices, they may ask several others for feedback. Close friends and romantic partners are probably common sources people turn to. Our second main goal was, therefore, to investigate, whether romantic partners and close friends have special insights or biases when it comes to assessing our abilities by comparing the accuracy of their judgments with those of acquaintances.

A considerable amount of research has focused on the accuracy of self- and other-perceptions of personality traits. Both types of perceptions can predict important outcomes like academic success or job performance and other-perceptions can provide incremental validity over self-perceptions (Connelly & Ones, 2010). However, neither perspective is without its biases. As an example, Anusic, Schimmack, Pinkus, and Lockwood (2009) found evidence for an evaluative bias factor in self- and other-ratings of the Big Five personality traits. In their truth and bias model of person perception, West and Kenny (2011) proposed that a perceiver’s rating of a target on a given trait does not only reflect the target’s true score (and measurement error) but is also affected by certain bias variables. John and Robins (1993) showed that self-other and other-other agreement for the Big Five are determined by a trait’s observability (i.e., its visibility to observers) and evaluativeness (i.e., its social desirability or undesirability). Both self-other and other-other agreement were highest for highly observable traits of low evaluativeness. High evaluativeness seemed particularly detrimental for self-other agreement. Earlier work by Paunonen (1989) had shown that not observability per se but the interaction between observability and acquaintance is related to self-other agreement: Low observability is only related to lower self-other agreement when the level of acquaintance between target and rater is low. More recently, Connelly and Ones (2010) confirmed this meta-analytically and showed that the interpersonal intimacy between perceiver and target might be even more important than acquaintance per se. They found that the most accurate ratings in terms of self-other correlations come from spouses and dating partners. A recent extension of the truth and bias model (Leising et al., 2015) found that ratings of a target were influenced by perceiver’s attitudes (liking) but only when items were high in evaluativeness. Finally, current work found that how much the perceiver likes the target and how well he/she knows the target have opposing effects on accuracy: Whereas higher knowing was associated with higher accuracy and lower positivity bias, higher liking was related to lower accuracy and higher positivity bias (Wessels et al., 2018). Overall, past research seems to agree that both characteristics of the trait to be judged and of the relationship between target and perceiver affect the accuracy of ratings. However, hardly any of these models have focused on mechanisms behind potential differences in accuracy between self- and other-estimates.

Simine Vazire’s (2010) self-other knowledge asymmetry (SOKA) model offers a framework for systematic comparisons of the accuracy of self- and other-estimates. The model builds on the Johari window (Luft & Ingham, 1955) and assumes that a person’s traits fall into one of four different quadrants, depending on how much the person themselves and others know about the respective characteristic: Traits in the ‘open area’ are judged accurately by both the self and others. If only others are accurate about a trait, it is in the ‘blind spot’, whereas traits only validly judged by oneself are in the ‘hidden area’. Lastly, traits that neither perspective can judge accurately are in the ‘unknown area’. Drawing on the research summarized in the past section, the model proposes that the position of a trait in the Johari window should be determined by two factors: observability and evaluativeness. Vazire argued that self-estimates of highly evaluative traits are often distorted, since these traits are relevant to the person’s self-esteem (see also John & Robins, 1993). At the same time, others can only make accurate estimates about observable traits. Taken together, others might have more accurate views of our observable and evaluative traits than we ourselves do. Vazire (2010) allocated traits to the positions within the SOKA model/Johari window based on differences in correlation coefficients between self- and peer-estimates and relevant behavior (for extraversion and neuroticism) or objective performance (for intellect). In this initial study, she found extraversion (high observability, low evaluativeness) to be in the open area, intellect (low observability, high evaluativeness) mostly in the blind spot, and neuroticism (low observability, low evaluativeness) in the hidden area.

Similar to some of the models discussed in section 1.1, Vazire (2010) also considered a third aspect that might influence a trait’s position within the SOKA model: the level of acquaintance. She discussed that, while well-acquainted others might have advantages compared to less acquainted others when it comes to judging low observability traits (see also Connelly and Ones, 2010, Paunonen, 1989), they might also share some of the self’s self-protective biases, leading to less accurate judgments. Unexpectedly, she found friends to be more accurate than strangers when judging the highly evaluative trait intellect. Thus, she proposed that distortions of other-estimates due to high evaluativeness might only occur in particularly emotionally invested known others like romantic partners. The emotional investment in friendships might have been too low for the negative effects of evaluativeness on accuracy to emerge. This would be in line with the negative association between liking and accuracy found by Wessels and colleagues (2018). John and Robins (1993) proposed that judgments by emotionally invested others might involve similar psychological processes as self-perception. On a similar note, it has been suggested that “in a close relationship, the person acts as if some or all aspects of the partner are partially the person's own” (Aron et al., 1991, p. 242). This is also in line with the self-evaluation maintenance model (Tesser, 1988), according to which the performance of a close other might affect one’s own self-esteem and do so negatively, if the domain in question is relevant for one’s self-definition. Vazire (2010) proposed that a direct comparison between ratings by romantic partners and similarly well-acquainted friends could provide valuable insight into this question. Surprisingly, such a study does not seem to exist until today. In general, only little research on the SOKA model has been conducted. At the time of writing, it has mainly been investigated for personality traits (e.g., Beer & Vazire, 2017) but pertinent research also exists for personality disorders (Carlson et al., 2013), and moral behaviors (Thielmann et al., 2017).

To this point, hardly any studies have investigated the SOKA model for different aspects of intelligence or other abilities, even though this line of research might provide valuable insights. When making important life decisions, people may rely on feedback about their abilities from different sources (e.g., self, parents, friends, partners or teachers; Neubauer et al., 2018). Thus, it seems essential to investigate which of these sources can provide accurate estimates for a given domain.

First evidence on self-other knowledge asymmetries for abilities comes from Vazire (2010), whose findings on intellect are based on creativity (originality in a divergent thinking task) and overall intelligence. Both abilities were measured with objective ability tests. Results showed that creativity is in the blind spot, with only friends but not the self providing accurate estimates. Findings for intelligence were similar but less clear-cut, since self-estimates showed at least some accuracy in this domain. Strangers were unable to make accurate estimates for either ability.

Only recently, Neubauer and colleagues (2018) have analyzed the position of a more diverse set of abilities within the SOKA model based on self-ratings and ratings of randomly assigned classmates in 14- and 18-year-old pupils (i.e., ages when important educational decisions have to be made). The following abilities were assessed: verbal, numerical, and spatial intelligence (as measured by a standardized intelligence test), creativity (originality in a divergent thinking task), and intra- and interpersonal emotional management abilities (as measured by a situational judgment test). In both age groups, numerical intelligence and creativity were open, verbal intelligence was in the blind spot, and intra- and interpersonal emotional abilities were hidden. Spatial intelligence was unknown in the younger group and hidden in the older one. Thus, there seems to be variation in the location of abilities within the SOKA model, even though most of those examined could be considered to belong to the concept of intellect investigated by Vazire (2010) and might, therefore, be expected to be located in the blind spot. Self-reported closeness to the rated peer did not moderate any of the effects, a finding that the authors mainly attribute to the random assignment of peer-raters.

The relevance of having an accurate view of one’s own abilities and those of one’s peers (e.g., in order to give them feedback) might be particularly high during adolescence, given that important (educational/vocational) decisions have to be made around this time (Neubauer et al., 2018). Nevertheless, accurate self- and other-assessments are probably also relevant later in life and maintaining self-insight over the course of life may prove increasingly difficult, since adults usually receive less regular feedback on their abilities than pupils in school do. The accuracy of self- and other-estimates of abilities can also be important in clinical contexts: Accurate perceptions of a person’s memory decline – which might, for example, be due to a cognitive disorder – could be essential to provide them with appropriate and timely care (Buelow et al., 2014). Even though self-reported memory complaints show a small (negative) correlation with objective cognitive function in the general aging population (Burmester et al., 2016), this association seems to disappear in individuals with mild cognitive impairment (Buelow et al., 2014, Fyock and Hampstead, 2015) or Alzheimer’s disease (Buelow et al., 2014). It has also been shown that informant-reports can outperform self-reports in terms of accuracy for individuals with mild cognitive impairment (Buelow et al., 2014, Fyock and Hampstead, 2015).

Providing a systematic comparison of the accuracy of self- and other-estimates of abilities in adults was one of the main goals of the present work. In view of the lack of literature that directly compares these perspectives, we summarized available work that focused on the accuracy of either self-estimates or other-estimates in the upcoming sections. In line with recent suggestions regarding the interpretation of effect sizes in individual difference research (Gignac & Szodorai, 2016), we classified correlations starting from .1 to indicate low accuracy and correlations starting from .2 to indicate medium or moderate accuracy. However, we used the conventional—and, thus, stricter—threshold (r ≥ .5) for high accuracy (Cohen, 1992; for a display of the practical importance of such a correlation see Table 2).

A considerable amount of research has focused on the accuracy of self-estimates of abilities, resulting in several meta-analyses (e.g., Freund and Kasten, 2012, Mabe and West, 1982, Ross, 1998) and even one metasynthesis (i.e., a combination of several meta-analyses; Zell & Krizan, 2014). According to this metasynthesis, overall accuracy of self-estimates is moderate (rmean = .29) with considerable variability of effects depending on the ability domain in question (rs ranging from .09 for interpersonal sensitivity to .63 for second language competence). Freund and Kasten (2012) focused their meta-analysis on verbal, numerical, spatial, and overall intelligence and also found moderate accuracy (rmean = .33). Additionally, they found greater accuracy of self-estimates of numerical intelligence as compared to overall intelligence, with no comparable differences in accuracy between overall and verbal or spatial intelligence.

Past results on the accuracy of self- and other- estimates of the domains that we investigated in the present study, that is verbal, numerical, and spatial intelligence, creativity, and intra- and interpersonal emotional management abilities, are summarized in Table 1. As can be seen, these results again point towards an accuracy advantage for self-estimates of numerical intelligence compared to those of other intelligence facets: In the majority of cases, very low to medium accuracy was reported for self-estimates of verbal and spatial intelligence, while medium to high accuracy was found for numerical intelligence (Furnham et al., 2001, Neubauer et al., 2018, Proyer and Ruch, 2009, Rammstedt and Rammsayer, 2002, Steinmayr and Spinath, 2009, Visser et al., 2008). Correlations between self-estimates of creativity and creative performance were found to range from slightly negative to .44, depending on the way creativity was assessed (Furnham et al., 2005, Neubauer et al., 2018, Pretz and McCollum, 2014, Vazire, 2010). For both inter- and intrapersonal emotional management abilities, correlations between self-estimates and performance were moderate to high (Freudenthaler and Neubauer, 2005, Neubauer et al., 2018). In addition to the results presented in Table 1, it seems noteworthy that Elfenbein, Barsade, and Eisenkraft (2015) reported low (r = .13) to medium (r = .3) accuracy of self-reported overall emotional management abilities in two studies, even though they did not differentiate between intra- and interpersonal aspects.

The predominant focus on correlation coefficients in this line of research has repeatedly been criticized (e.g., Dunning & Helzer, 2014) and some research has instead focused on the direction of misestimation. There is a large amount of indirect evidence for humans’ tendency to overestimate themselves. As an example, people were repeatedly shown to believe that they perform better than the average person (e.g., Dunning et al., 1989, Horrey et al., 2015, Kruger and Dunning, 1999), a phenomenon known as the above-average or better-than-average effect (Alicke & Govorun, 2005). A recent study found that 65 percent of Americans believe they are more intelligent than the average person, something that is logically impossible (Heck et al., 2018). Visser and colleagues (2008) showed that students judge their intelligence on all of Gardner’s eight intelligence domains to be above that of the average student at their university. Still, hardly any research has investigated people’s apparent tendency to overestimate themselves more directly by comparing self-estimated and objectively measured intellectual abilities (Gignac & Zajenkowski, 2019). In a rare exception, Reilly and Mulhern (1995) found that men, on average, overestimate their IQ by about 8 IQ points, while women’s self-estimates did not differ significantly from their measured IQ. In a recent study, Gignac and Zajenkowski (2019) reported that both men and women overestimate their IQ by on average 30 IQ points, which represents a large effect. Clearly, more research on this topic is needed before a definite conclusion can be made. Given the differences in accuracy correlations for different ability domains, investigating over-/underestimation in several domains seems particularly interesting.

Past work focusing on other-estimates of intelligence yielded moderate to high accuracy correlations but also overestimation by close others. Several correlational studies showed that others are already able to make reasonably accurate intelligence judgements after watching short standardized videos of a person (Borkenau et al., 2004; rs between .22 and .53 Borkenau and Liebler, 1993, Reynolds and Gifford, 2001). Denissen and colleagues (2011) investigated how intelligence-estimates by fellow students develop over the course of a semester and found accuracy correlations of .25 after one week, .27 after one month, and .22 after another 4 months of acquaintance. Borkenau and Liebler (1993) investigated intelligence estimates by a person’s cohabitant (in most cases their romantic partner) and reported a correlation of .29 with objectively measured intelligence. Recently, Gignac and Zajenkowski (2019) found that women’s estimates of their male romantic partner’s intelligence correlated at .30 with the partner’s actual intelligence, whereas men’s estimates only correlated at .19 with their female partner’s intelligence. Moreover, the authors found that both genders did not only overestimate their own but also their partner’s intelligence by around 30 IQ points, which again constitutes a large effect.

As shown in Table 1, only little research seems to have investigated accuracy of other-estimates for different ability domains. Steinmayr and Spinath (2009) reported that parents judged their adolescent sons’ and daughters’ verbal, numerical, and spatial intelligence with medium accuracy. Sommer, Fink, and Neubauer (2008) found that both teachers and parents estimated elementary school pupils’ intelligence with an accuracy of around .5, creativity with an accuracy of between .2 and .3, and social competence (consisting of inter- and intrapersonal parts) with an accuracy of only .1. Neubauer and colleagues (2018) found a similar pattern of results for peer-estimates in their older age group: Numerical and verbal intelligence as well as creativity were estimated with medium accuracy, whereas estimates of intra- and interpersonal emotional management abilities were of low or low to medium accuracy. Low accuracy was also reported for peer-estimates of spatial intelligence. More support for the comparatively low accuracy of other-ratings of emotional management abilities (again consisting of intra- and interpersonal aspects) comes from Elfenbein and colleagues (2015), with estimate*performance correlations between -.04 (student classmates) and .04 (work colleagues). Vazire (2010) found quite low accuracy of stranger-ratings of creativity and slightly higher accuracy for friend-ratings.

In the present study, we investigated the position of six abilities within the SOKA model in an adult sample. We aimed to:

(1)

investigate the accuracy of self- and other-estimates of abilities, with the latter stemming from the target’s romantic partner, their best or a very close friend, and an acquaintance. Thus, we collected data from two sources who knew the target considerably well but differed with regard to the expected closeness/intimacy of their relationship to the target (friends and partners; in line with the proposition by Vazire, 2010) and added a source that we expected to know the target less well and be less close to him/her (acquaintances).

(2)

determine for which domains the four perspectives (self, partner, friend, and acquaintance) differ in their accuracy.

(3)

investigate the unique insights of each perspective and the overall amount of variance all four perspectives can jointly explain.

(4)

determine the direction of misestimation by targets, friends, partners, and acquaintances.

We included verbal, numerical, and spatial intelligence, creativity, and inter- and intrapersonal emotional management abilities due to their relevance for important life outcomes. Verbal, numerical, and spatial intelligence form part of most modern models of intelligence (see Hunt, 2010) and several meta-analyses have determined that intelligence is an important predictor of professional and socioeconomic success (Hülsheger et al., 2007, Schmidt and Hunter, 2004, Schmidt and Hunter, 1998, Strenze, 2007). Creativity is seen as essential for solving key problems and has been connected with many essential aspects of life (Hennessey and Amabile, 2010, Plucker et al., 2004). A recent meta-analysis found that creativity is associated with academic achievement, although with only a small to medium effect (Gajda et al., 2017). Emotional management comprises the highest branch in one of the most influential models of emotional intelligence (Mayer & Salovey, 1997) and refers to the “ability to manage emotions and emotional relationships for personal and interpersonal growth” (Mayer et al., 2001, p. 235). Both intra- and interpersonal emotional management abilities are associated with life satisfaction and (lower) depressive tendencies (Freudenthaler, Neubauer, & Haller, 2008). Emotional intelligence as a broader ability exhibits small but meta-analytically stable associations with job performance (Joseph et al., 2015) and was found to predict academic and social success over and above personality and psychometric intelligence (van der Zee et al., 2002).

Perhaps one of the most important methodological considerations when conducting research on accuracy in person perception relates to the choice of accuracy criteria. When it comes to perceptions of a person’s abilities, the target’s performance in objective ability tests constitutes an obvious accuracy criterion. Intelligence tests, for example, have long been accepted as objective measures of cognitive abilities and their scores are widely used as accuracy criteria (Freund & Kasten, 2012). Thus, we used subscales of a well-established, standardized intelligence test battery to measure verbal, numerical, and spatial intelligence. For conceptually broader abilities like creativity and emotional competence, the choice of adequate accuracy criteria becomes less obvious. One widely accepted measure of creativity, or to be more precise creative potential, is originality in divergent thinking tasks, which shows good reliability and validities when scored adequately (Benedek et al., 2013, Diedrich et al., 2018) and has served as accuracy criterion in past research (Neubauer et al., 2018, Pretz and McCollum, 2014, Vazire, 2010). Therefore, we used originality in the widely applied alternative uses task (AUT; Guilford, 1967) as accuracy criterion for creativity. Emotional management abilities are typically measured by confronting individuals with hypothetical situations and asking them how they would change or maintain their emotions (Mayer et al., 2004). Hence, tests of emotional management abilities like the respective subscale of the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer et al., 2003), the Situational Test of Emotional Management (STEM; MacCann & Roberts, 2008) or the Typical-performance Emotional Management Test (TEMT; Freudenthaler & Neubauer, 2005) belong to the family of situational judgement tests (SJTs)1. Maximum performance tests of emotional management like the MSCEIT or STEM, which ask the individual to judge the most effective actions in each situation, have been criticized for measuring a person’s knowledge about how to behave in emotional situations instead of their actual regulative behavior (Freudenthaler & Neubauer, 2005; see also Brackett et al., 2006). Therefore, we used a typical performance situational judgment test comprised of subscales for intra- and interpersonal emotional management.

In line with past studies (Beer and Vazire, 2017, Neubauer et al., 2018, Vazire, 2010), we considered positive correlations between estimates and performance starting from .2 to indicate relevant levels of accuracy. A correlation of this size represents a typical effect in the individual differences literature (Gignac & Szodorai, 2016) and seems like a reasonable threshold, given average effects found in research looking at the accuracy of self- and other-estimates of abilities (e.g., Denissen et al., 2011, Zell and Krizan, 2014).

We considered estimate*performance correlation coefficients that differed in at least .15 to indicate relevant differences in accuracy between two perspectives. Vazire (2010) proposed that differences in accuracy correlations of more than .15 can be considered as substantial, given that this number is close to one standard deviation in effect size distributions in personality and social psychology (see Richard et al., 2003). It is also slightly higher than one standard deviation in the distribution of self-estimate*performance correlations for different abilities (Zell & Krizan, 2014). To illustrate the practical importance of a difference of .15, we show binomial effect size displays (BESDs) for correlations of various sizes in Table 2. BESDs are an intuitive method to evaluate the size of correlations (Rosenthal & Rubin, 1982; see Funder & Ozer, 2019 for a recent discussion) but have also sparked some controversy (see Hall et al., 2008). Nevertheless, if we think of both measured and estimated abilities as dichotomous constructs, BESDs can provide rough estimates of the proportion of individuals that are correctly characterized as high- or low-performers based on their own or someone else’s judgment (for a similar application of BESDs see Naumann et al., 2009). Table 2 shows four BESDs for estimate*performance correlations of .05, .20, .35, and .50 in a sample of 200 and, therefore, illustrates the impact of correlational differences of .15 for correlations of various strength. To provide an example, if the correlation between partner-estimated and measured verbal intelligence is .20, this indicates 60% correct predictions (e.g., both measured and estimated verbal intelligence is high). If the correlation for friend-estimates is .35, this relates to 67.5 % correct predictions. In this example, friends clearly have higher success at providing accurate feedback than romantic partners.

Reputation: A fundamental route to human cooperation

Wu, J., Balliet, D., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2021). Reputation: A fundamental route to human cooperation. In W. Wilczynski & S. F. Brosnan (Eds.), Cooperation and conflict: The interaction of opposites in shaping social behavior (pp. 45–65). Cambridge University Press, Mar 2022. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108671187.005

Abstract: Social interactions do not occur in a vacuum. They often take place in groups and social networks where people can monitor and spread each other’s reputation. Despite the temptation to act selfishly when interacting with strangers, there is a never-ending conflict between the desire to act selfishly and the need to gain a good reputation (or avoid losing the good reputation one already has). While one’s selfish behavior guarantees immediate material benefits, it may harm one’s reputation and can lead to a long-term loss. Thus, reputation is a key element of indirect reciprocity that provides a fundamental route to human cooperation. In this chapter, we have discussed how reputation is formed and assessed in social interactions, reviewed empirical research that documents the phenomena of indirect reciprocity and reputation-based cooperation as well as evidence about the greater power of reputation over monetary sanctions in solving cooperation problems. Future research would benefit by investigating the negativity bias in reputation systems, the efficiency of reputation in varied-size groups, whether reputation transcends group boundaries to promote cooperation, and potential cultural variations. Taken together, we emphasize that reputation monitoring and spreading is a strong candidate to promote trust and cooperation, thereby reducing the possibility of social conflict, in a cost-effective manner, perhaps more so among people who are inclined to act selfishly. 

Women in relationships may be disadvantaged by hookup culture norms suggesting sex is freely available, putting pressure on them to acquiesce to the withdrawal method

Norms, Trust, and Backup Plans: U.S. College Women’s Use of Withdrawal with Casual and Committed Romantic Partners. Christie Sennott & Laurie James-Hawkins. The Journal of Sex Research, Feb 24 2022. https://doi.org/10.1080/00224499.2022.2039893

Abstract: This study integrates research on contraceptive prevalence with research on contraceptive dynamics in hookup culture to examine college women’s use of withdrawal with sexual partners. Drawing on in-depth interviews with 57 women at a midwestern U.S. university, we analyzed women’s explanations for using withdrawal for pregnancy prevention and framed our study within the research on gender norms, sexual scripts, and power dynamics. Findings showed withdrawal was normalized within collegiate hookup culture, and that women frequently relied on withdrawal as a secondary or backup method or when switching between methods. Women often followed up with emergency contraceptives if using withdrawal alone. With casual partners, women advocated for their own preferences, including for partners to withdraw. In committed relationships, women prioritized their partner’s desires for condomless sex, but also linked withdrawal with trust and love. Thus, women in relationships may be disadvantaged by hookup culture norms suggesting sex is freely available, putting pressure on them to acquiesce to withdrawal. Many women used withdrawal despite acknowledging it was not the most desirable or effective method, emphasizing the need for a sexual health approach that acknowledges these tensions and strives to help women and their partners safely meet their sexual and contraceptive preferences.

Trivialization of concepts of harm: Concept creep, the contemporary down-defining of notions of harm & trauma, makes people downplay the seriousness of the phenomenon as a whole

Broadened Concepts of Harm Appear Less Serious. Brodie C. Dakin et al. Social Psychological and Personality Science, March 3, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1177/19485506221076692

Abstract: Harm-related concepts have progressively broadened their meanings to include less severe phenomena, but the implications of this expansion are unclear. Across five studies involving 1,819 American participants recruited on MTurk or Prolific, we manipulated whether participants learned about marginal, prototypical (severe), or mixed examples of workplace bullying (Studies 1 and 3a), trauma (Studies 2 and 3b), or sexual harassment (Study 4). We hypothesized that exposure to marginal examples of a concept would lead participants to view the harm associated with it as less serious than those exposed to prototypical examples (trivialization hypothesis). We also predicted that mixing marginal examples with prototypical examples would disproportionately reduce perceived seriousness (threshold shift hypothesis). All studies supported the trivialization hypothesis, but threshold shift was not consistently supported. Our findings suggest that broadened concepts of harm may dilute the perceived severity and urgency of the harms they identify.

Keywords: concept creep, concept breadth, trauma, bullying, moral psychology

Specific cognitive abilities (fluid reasoning, processing speed, quantitative knowledge, & 13 another abilities) show a similar high heritability as general intelligence, some even a higher one

The genetics of specific cognitive abilities. Francesca Procopio, Quan Zhou, Ziye Wang, Agnieska Gidziela,  View ORCID ProfileKaili Rimfeld,  View ORCID ProfileMargherita Malanchini, Robert Plomin. bioRxiv Feb 8 2022. https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.02.05.479237

Abstract: Most research on individual differences in performance on tests of cognitive ability focuses on general cognitive ability (g), the highest level in the three-level Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) hierarchical model of intelligence. About 50% of the variance of g is due to inherited DNA differences (heritability) which increases across development. Much less is known about the genetics of the middle level of the CHC model, which includes 16 broad factors such as fluid reasoning, processing speed, and quantitative knowledge. We provide a meta-analytic review of 863,041 monozygotic-dizygotic twin comparisons from 80 publications for these middle-level factors, which we refer to as specific cognitive abilities (SCA). Twin comparisons were available for 11 of the 16 CHC domains. The average heritability across all SCA is 55%, similar to the heritability of g. However, there is substantial differential heritability and the SCA do not show the dramatic developmental increase in heritability seen for g. We also investigated SCA independent of g (g-corrected SCA, which we refer to as SCA.g). A surprising finding is that SCA.g remain substantially heritable (53% on average), even though 25% of the variance of SCA that covaries with g has been removed. Our review frames expectations for genomic research that will use polygenic scores to predict SCA and SCA.g. Genome-wide association studies of SCA.g are needed to create polygenic scores that can predict SCA profiles of cognitive abilities and disabilities independent of g. These could be used to foster children’s cognitive strengths and minimise their weaknesses.

Increasing love feelings, marital satisfaction, and motivated attention to the spouse

Langeslag, S. J. E., & Surti, K. (2022). Increasing love feelings, marital satisfaction, and motivated attention to the spouse. Journal of Psychophysiology, Mar 2022. https://doi.org/10.1027/0269-8803/a000294

Abstract: Love typically decreases over time, sometimes leading to divorces. We tested whether positively reappraising the spouse and/or up-regulating positive emotions unrelated to the spouse increases infatuation with and attachment to the spouse, marital satisfaction, and motivated attention to the spouse as measured by the late positive potential (LPP). Married individuals completed a regulation task in which they viewed spouse, pleasant, and neutral pictures without regulation prompt as well as spouse and pleasant pictures that were preceded by regulation prompts. Event-related potentials were recorded, and self-reported infatuation, attachment, and marital satisfaction were assessed. Viewing spouse pictures increased infatuation, attachment, and marital satisfaction compared to viewing pleasant or neutral pictures in the no regulation condition. Thinking about positive aspects of the spouse and increasing positive emotions unrelated to the spouse did not increase infatuation, attachment, and marital satisfaction any further. Motivated attention, measured by the LPP amplitude, was greatest to spouse pictures, intermediate to pleasant pictures, and minimal to neutral pictures. Although the typical up-regulation effect on the LPP amplitude was observed for pleasant pictures, positively reappraising the spouse did not increase the LPP amplitude and hence motivated attention to the spouse any further. This study indicates that looking at spouse pictures increases love and marital satisfaction, which is not due to increased positive emotions unrelated to the spouse. Looking at spouse pictures is an easy strategy that could be used to stabilize marriages in which the main problem is the decline of love feelings over time.

Dutch Marine recruits: Unexpectedly, cadets with higher levels of grit were not more likely to complete training; it seems grit is not as important as we thought

Grit was not associated to dropout in Dutch Marine recruits. Iris Dijksma, Cees Lucas & Martijn Stuiver. Military Psychology, Mar 2 2022. https://doi.org/10.1080/08995605.2022.2028518

Abstract: Approximately half of all recruits drop out of Marine recruit training. Identifying associated and predisposing factors for dropout would be helpful to understand dropout patterns and induce preventive strategies. Grit has been suggested to be a predictor of who is likely to succeed and who is not. We aimed to investigate the association between baseline grit scores and dropout of Marine recruit training in the Netherlands Armed Forces. We performed an exploratory study using data of three platoons Marine recruit training of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps. Individual grit levels were measured using the NL-Grit scale, including two subscales. The primary outcome of this study was successful completion or dropout of Marine recruit training. Data were available from 270 recruits, of whom 119 (44%) dropped out of training. The odds ratio for dropout were 1.01 (95% CI 0.84–1.21, p = .917) and 1.07 (95% CI 0.89–1.29, p = .481) per standard deviation increase of consistency of interests and perseverance of effort, respectively. Our study did not confirm the proposed association between baseline grit levels and dropout of Marine recruit training in Dutch Marine recruits using the NL-Grit scale.

Keywords: Gritmilitary trainingretentiondropout

Discussion

Our study aimed to explore the association between baseline grit scores and dropout of Marine recruit training. The results of this study did not confirm the proposed association between baseline grit levels and dropout of Marine recruit training in Dutch Marine recruits using the NL-Grit scale. This finding holds both in recruits who were discharged upon individual request and those who dropout due to musculoskeletal injuries. Explained variance in dropout by baseline grit levels was somewhat higher in the former subgroup than in the latter but lower in both.

Our results do not align with the initial findings by Duckworth and colleagues, who found that grit scores were related to successful completion of military courses (Duckworth et al., 2019; Eskreis-Winkler et al., 2014). Several phenomena may explain why our findings do not suggest an association between grit levels and dropout. First, presumably due to rigorous pre-selection procedures, the data of baseline grit levels per subscale showed a limited range, and they lacked variance (i.e., information). Because of the lack of normative data, we were unable to directly compare subscale sum scores and ranges of our sample to previously study military populations; however, we do assume that cadets at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point would show similarly limited ranges (Crede et al., 2017; Duckworth et al., 2019). The lack of variance is apparent in both subscales, but even more so in the perseverance of effort subscale, which has previously been suggested to be strongly associated with (or even predictive for) performance than consistency of interests (Crede et al., 2017). As a consequence, the possibility to differentiate (i.e., discriminate) recruits based on their grit score is limited. On the other hand, it is possible that within this restricted range, there truly is no association between baseline grit levels and dropout. After all, it is easily conceivable that, as a result of pre-selection, recruits who are fit and brave enough to arrive at the pre-attendance all must possess – and must have addressed – a relatively high level of grit. Possibly, at that point, their grit level contributes less to performance than other traits such as hardiness and resilience (Maddi et al., 2017, 2012). Second, we cannot exclude the possibility of social desirability bias in answering the NL-Grit scale (Grimm, 2010) and the possibility that (young) Marine recruits entertain a less than realistic view of their own grit levels (i.e., measurement bias because of reporting inflated grit levels) (Credé, 2018; Krumpal, 2013).

Although grit as a predictor of military success holds much intuitive appeal, the relation remains uncertain. The measurement of grit levels, and thus the possibility to differentiate, may be improved by adding items to the scale in the higher end of the spectrum. Also, the survey may be taken at an earlier stage in the selection procedure. It is likely that, at that point, the range of grit levels is wider, and the influence of social desirability bias may be less strong.

Limitations and implications

Several limitations of this explorative study are worth highlighting. First, other unmeasured variables may have obscured the association between baseline grit levels and the chance of dropout. Given the explorative nature of this study and the fact that causal paths are far from certain – for example, baseline physical fitness could be considered either a confounder or mediator (Pearl, 2010) – we chose to refrain from controlling for other variables. However, we should also note that the objective of exploring the association of grit with dropout risk was to assess its possible value as a predictor. In prediction research, the causal path and hence considerations about confounding and mediation are irrelevant as long as a variable is a consistent predictor of the outcome. Second, as per common, we measured grit through a self-reported measurement scale. Although it is stated that the act of answering survey questions can increase awareness, which opens the door to development, it also has disadvantages when such self-reported measures are used to detect and quantify associations or even predictive abilities between baseline levels and success outcomes (Oh et al., 2010). Perhaps, observer ratings of personality constructs such as grit levels – or even conscientiousness as an overarching construct – next to self-report methods may yield more valid estimates than the self-report method alone (Oh et al., 2010). Third, the NL-Grit was queried as the last survey, following other surveys. We cannot exclude the possibility that recruits rushed the last survey in order to finish it off. Finally, we wish to emphasize that our study findings are not necessarily generalizable to female military service members (since all participants were male) or other recruit training programs. Future research on both self-reported methods and observer-rated methods, also in other military courses, would add to the understanding of the relation between personality traits and dropout of military training.

“Unmasking” uncertainty, embracing it, and openly communicating about it could help alleviate anxiety and feelings of emotional exhaustion, detachment, and personal inadequacy

Understanding and Communicating Uncertainty in Achieving Diagnostic Excellence. Maria R. Dahm, Carmel Crock. JAMA, March 3, 2022. doi:10.1001/jama.2022.2141

Uncertainty pervades the diagnostic process. In health care, taxonomies of uncertainty have been developed to describe aspects such as personal (eg, individual knowledge gaps), scientific (eg, limits of biomedical knowledge), and probabilistic (eg, imprecise estimates of risk or prognosis) dimensions of uncertainty.1

When clinicians encounter diagnostic uncertainty, they often find themselves in an unfamiliar situation, without a clear method to proceed confidently, comfortably, and safely. Being unable to explain to patients what causes their symptoms may be perceived as a failure for all involved. When clinicians and patients dwell in diagnostic uncertainty, it can trigger feelings of concern and anxiety, may lead patients to mistrust clinicians’ competence, and could contribute to clinician burnout (feeling exhausted, disconnected, and personally inadequate), especially for early-career clinicians.2,3

Excellent diagnosticians should understand how uncertainty manifests. They should acknowledge and embrace uncertainty, and openly discuss it with other clinicians and patients to normalize its ubiquitous and inevitable part in the diagnostic process.4 Such a reimagining, focused on the inevitable and beneficial aspects of diagnostic uncertainty, relies on identifying how uncertainty is understood, managed, and communicated.

What Is Diagnostic Uncertainty, and for Whom?

Diagnosis is a complex and collaborative process that involves gathering, integrating, and interpreting information across the entire diagnostic team: clinicians (physicians, nurses, and allied health professionals), patients, and patients’ families and caregivers.5 All team members encounter different types of diagnostic uncertainty at different stages in the diagnostic process.3

From the clinicians’ perspective, diagnostic uncertainty has been defined as the “subjective perception of an inability to provide an accurate explanation of the patient’s health problem.”6 These subjective feelings are entangled in a multitude of factors and tensions surrounding the qualities deemed essential in clinicians, such as competence and confidence. The decisiveness with which clinicians make a diagnosis may be perceived as reflecting diagnostic expertise and clinical competence. Yet diagnostic excellence in the setting of uncertainty requires recognition and tolerance of uncertainty, cognitive flexibility, and willingness to engage with evolving information. It includes the ability to share clinical reasoning and communicate uncertainty to patients.3,4

Patients may experience uncertainty at any point along the diagnostic process and beyond. For patients, diagnostic uncertainty often begins before they present for health care, such as doubt about whether a persistent minor pain or occasional numbness warrants a clinical visit. Patients may have doubts about how long it will take to get answers, what their role is in the diagnostic process, whether a treatment is available, and whether they want a diagnosis if they already fear having a serious illness. They may have doubts about what a diagnosis means for their personal and professional life, their functional status, and quality of life.

Patients also encounter doubt when they perceive their valid symptoms are being dismissed. This is a common experience reported by patients, particularly those who experience other health disparities related to age, sex, race and ethnicity, or language background. For example, some women with myocardial ischemia may present with symptoms (such as back or abdominal pain or vomiting) that are not considered typical cardiac presentations, and may believe their symptoms are being dismissed. Some people might have doubts when a diagnosis does not match what they think is affecting them, or when family members, such as children and older adults who are unable to advocate for themselves, experience disease progression or adverse outcomes despite having been assigned a diagnostic label and associated treatments.

Managing Uncertainty Positively

“Unmasking”4 uncertainty, embracing it, and openly communicating about it could help alleviate anxiety and feelings of emotional exhaustion, detachment, and personal inadequacy associated with burnout and help clinicians “enjoy rather than dread the diagnostic process.”7 However, tolerating uncertainty rather than trying to reduce it to absolute certainty requires a major shift in the clinician’s mindset. Current medical education inadequately prepares early-career clinicians for feelings of failure associated with diagnostic uncertainty. Instead of upholding the illusion of certainty, medical education and professional development should provide a judgment-free opportunity for clinicians to openly and safely reflect, as well as be guided by and learn to live with the stress associated with diagnostic uncertainty.8

All clinicians across hierarchies and levels of experience need to openly acknowledge the realities of diagnostic uncertainty. The uncertainty surrounding diagnosis does need not be perceived as a threat to medical “authority,” expertise, or professionalism. On the contrary, clinicians who openly encourage and engage in discussions of uncertainty without blame or penalty model excellent diagnostic processes. Normalizing and promoting acceptance of uncertainty as integral to the diagnostic process thus should become routine within clinical care and medical education.8

The effects of explicitly acknowledging and managing uncertainty in the diagnostic process could be profound; doing so may help foster a safety culture in which all diagnostic team members can openly discuss, challenge, and collaborate to refine clinical reasoning. Diagnostic possibilities could be explored in self-reflection, and in interactions with colleagues and with patients.

Communicating Uncertainty

Effective communication about uncertainty across the entire diagnostic team is essential to avoid diagnostic error and patient harm.9

Diagnostic error has been defined as a failure to find an accurate and timely explanation for a health problem or failure to communicate that explanation to the patient.5 This definition should be expanded to include failure to communicate uncertainty explicitly, given its pervasiveness, as a potent contributor to diagnostic error.3 When clinicians do not disclose their doubts, patients may leave the clinical encounter feeling reassured yet remain unaware of their clinician’s uncertainty. When medical notes in electronic medical records (EMRs) present diagnoses as certainties, the diagnostic team may miss other diagnostic possibilities. Instead, EMRs should embed differential diagnosis and language expressing uncertainty (such as “possible viral conjunctivitis”) into documentation.

Probabilistic reasoning is often used to articulate uncertainty. Probabilistic (or bayesian) reasoning is a useful method to reduce cognitive biases when information is assessed during the diagnostic process,5 yet it is underused or even misunderstood in routine medical practice. Applying bayesian reasoning principles could lead clinicians to adjust their thinking and revise disease probabilities as they gather more information, thereby potentially avoiding diagnostic errors (eg, considering the frequency of disease processes in the immediate population to avoid base-rate neglect: the tendency to overemphasize information specific to an individual).5 Most clinicians apply probabilistic reasoning unconsciously, but bringing these skills and related language to interactions could be one way to explicitly communicate uncertainty.

How people understand language commonly associated with uncertainty and probability (eg, “occasionally,” “rarely”), including in radiology or pathology reports (eg, “highly suspicious for,” “suggestive of”), could differ between speaker/sender and hearer/receiver and may lead to ambiguity regarding diagnostic certainty. Clinicians also communicate uncertainty via implicit communication strategies that patients may not identify as expressions of uncertainty. For the clinician, “I’d like to follow-up with you next week” may signal they are unsure of a diagnosis and are adopting a watchful, waiting approach. For the patient, it may seem like an ordinary follow-up appointment without any indication of uncertainty.

Key Points for Diagnostic Excellence

.  Diagnostic uncertainty should be shared explicitly with patients. Failure to communicate uncertainty contributes to diagnostic error.

.  Understanding diagnostic uncertainty can be enriched by incorporating perspectives from medicine, social sciences, and humanities.

.  Diagnostic uncertainty should be reimagined as positive and routinely embraced in clinical care and education.

.  Explicitly acknowledging, managing, and communicating uncertainty promotes a robust diagnostic safety culture.

Clinical practice would benefit from evidence-based recommendations on how to best communicate uncertainty in diagnostic encounters. For example, linguistic analysis of video-recorded diagnostic interactions can help identify the language structures clinicians use when expressing diagnostic uncertainty. Diagnostic excellence should be informed by broadening the current understanding of diagnostic uncertainty beyond medical realms to include linguistic, communication, humanistic, sociological, and patient-centered perspectives to better understand and describe the nuance of the diagnostic process and uncertainty.

Diagnosis as a Relational, Communicative Process

Diagnosis is “a relational process, with each party (lay and medical) confronting illness with different explanations, understandings, values, and beliefs.”10 Managing patient anxiety surrounding uncertainty in diagnosis requires open interpersonal communication to increase patients’ awareness of the nature of diagnosis as a process rather than an isolated event. Clinicians could build rapport and trust and manage expectations by listening to patients, clearly communicating steps along the diagnostic process, and sharing their own uncertainty.

Patients’ expectations change as they gain a more transparent understanding of the complex and often complicated pathway to diagnosis. Clinicians can build safety nets by alerting patients about their uncertainty, discussing red-flag symptoms, and codeveloping plans of when and where patients should seek additional or urgent help.3 Open communication between clinicians and patients could also provide avenues for feedback on diagnostic performance, essential to calibrate clinicians’ diagnostic abilities.5

To effectively manage the complexity and challenges of the diagnostic process, clinicians and patients need to find approaches to address uncertainty. Acknowledging, embracing, and communicating uncertainty opens diagnostic possibilities and a way toward achieving diagnostic excellence.

Choice Matters More with Others: Choosing to be with Other People is More Consequential to Well-Being than Choosing to be Alone

Choice Matters More with Others: Choosing to be with Other People is More Consequential to Well-Being than Choosing to be Alone. Liad Uziel & Tomer Schmidt-Barad. Journal of Happiness Studies, Mar 2 2022. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10902-022-00506-5

Abstract: Stable social relationships are conducive to well-being. However, similar effects are not reported consistently for daily social interactions in affecting episodic (experiential) subjective well-being (ESWB). The present investigation suggests that the choice of being in a social context plays an important moderating role, such that social interactions increase ESWB only if taken place by one's choice. Moreover, it is argued that choice matters more in a social context than in an alone context because experiences with others are amplified. These ideas were tested and supported in two studies: An experiment that manipulated social context and choice status, and a 10-day experience-sampling study, which explored these variables in real-life settings. Results showed that being with others by one’s choice had the strongest positive association with ESWB, sense of meaning, and control, whereas being with others not by one’s choice—the strongest negative association with ESWB. Effects of being alone on ESWB also varied by choice status, but to a lesser extent. The findings offer theoretical and practical insights into the effects of the social environment on well-being.

Discussion

By studying participants’ experiences in their natural environment, this study affirmed our previous findings that ESWB is shaped by an interaction between the social context and choice of being in this context. Across the different expressions of ESWB, choice was more consequential 'with others' than alone, corroborating approaches that suggest that social contexts act to amplify and intensify experiences (e.g., Steinmetz et al., 2016).

The findings extended beyond ESWB, addressing some of the processes that could account for the observed differences in ESWB. Being with others by choice was also associated with an increase in sense of meaning and control. Our participants evaluated their activities and their level of agency more extremely during non-solitary experiences, and the choice of being in each social context moderated whether this would be for better or worse.

General Discussion

Being alone and socializing are fundamental bricks in the human experience. The mere being in one state (vs. the other) carries important short-term (Kahneman et al., 2004; Uziel, 2007) and long-term (Bowlby, 1973; Winnicott, 1958) implications in a wide range of domains—affective, cognitive, motivational, and behavioral. Crucially, both conditions are conducive to well-being (Uziel, 2021). Seminal studies documented the immense importance of meeting social needs and establishing sound social bonds on healthy development and personal well-being (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), and emerging literature recognizes the benefits of solitary living (DePaulo & Morris, 2005).

In the present investigation, we sought to add to this literature in several respects. First, much of our knowledge on the effects of social bonds or solitary living is based on these conditions as stable ways of living (e.g., being married vs. being single). These are important aspects of our social lives, but the knowledge acquired only via a 'stable relations' lens does not capture the dynamics of our social lives as they unfold across the scenes that comprise our daily experiences (Nezlek et al., 2002). Second, research generally does not compare these social conditions (alone/'with others') but studies each condition separately. And, importantly, research has yet to fully account for the substantial variability in ESWB in these two settings. To address these issues we conducted two studies, an experiment and an experience-sampling study, which provided initial answers to these questions.

Our experience-sampling study (Study 2), which sampled more than 4200 episodes across 10 days, uncovered some of the dynamics of (young) individuals’ daily social lives. Participants reported being with others in about 63% (and alone 37%) of the sampled episodes (which were throughout the day), and regardless of the social context, they were also in a setting of their choice in most (64%) of the episodes. These frequencies are consistent with findings reported in previous studies (e.g., Hudson et al., 2020; O'Connor & Rosenblood, 1996), and they imply that individuals (specifically, students) spend non-negligible periods—about a third of their time—in externally imposed social settings.

Do social interactions increase ESWB compared with periods of aloneness? The extant literature associates stable social relations with greater subjective well-being (Diener & Seligman, 2002), but findings are less conclusive for episodic social interactions (Uziel et al., 2020). The results of the present research coincide with the intricacy of the effect and provide directions toward understanding when and how episodic interactions affect well-being. First, being with others is associated with desirable effects if it reinforces one’s sense of agency, and it is detrimental in the absence of control. Supporting this account are our findings on the sense of control, which increased under chosen social settings, along with the increase in ESWB. These findings resonate early models about the effects of social presence in the social facilitation effect, which emphasized the role of (un)certainty in shaping the reaction to others’ presence (Guerin & Innes, 1982; Zajonc, 1965).

Another path for constructive (vs. destructive) episodic social interactions that emerges from the present findings concerns the sense of meaning. Social contacts were constructive when they were experienced as meaningful. Interestingly, low meaningful contacts (which in experiential sense are less impactful) were nonetheless associated with a relative reduction in ESWB, highlighting an often-neglected aspect in our daily social life. Furthermore, our findings imply that choosing (and perhaps initiating) social interactions is central in affecting ESWB, thus accounting for both—the reason why many people do not initiate such relations (because they generally expect to experience low ESWB in non-chosen settings), and why they may gain if acted to initiate (i.e., choose to be in such) interactions (Epley & Schroeder, 2014).

In popular and academic writings, episodes of aloneness are often depicted as reflecting reduced subjective well-being compared to social engagement (Larson, 1990; Srivastava, 2008). Our data lend partial support to these findings. Study 2 (but not Study 1) found periods of aloneness to be less conducive to well-being than 'with others' contexts, averaged across the different measures. Differences between these conditions were especially notable for sense of meaning. People felt that their actions were more meaningful 'with others' than alone (with the interaction term significant, but weaker than for other measures). This, though, does not necessarily imply that the alone setting was less desirable, as it could reflect the sense that having others observe your actions makes them more consequential (Baumeister, 1982).

Aloneness (by choice and not) emerged as a setting of relative stability, with participants experiencing their different alone conditions quite similarly. Therefore, solitude might not present immediate benefits to well-being, but it does appear to offer a more predictable experience, and if utilized effectively could be a source of personal growth (Lay et al., 2018; Long & Averill, 2003; Uziel, 2021). A worthy direction for future research would be to compare the immediate and sustained implications of periods of aloneness. Moreover, these findings imply that internal (i.e., non-contextual) factors play a significant role in shaping the effects of aloneness. Indeed, the literature has begun identifying relevant factors, such as personality traits (Uziel, 2016; Uziel et al., 2020), preferences and desires (Coplan et al., 2019; Leary et al., 2003), and developmental periods (Larson et al., 1985).

The most robust effect that emerged from the present two studies is in the intersection of being with others, aloneness, and choice. Choice was substantially more important 'with others' (vs. alone) in determining ESWB, sense of meaning, and control. This finding showed in controlled settings (Study 1) and real-life data (Study 2). This finding is in line with approaches stemming from laboratory research, which associate social presence with polarizing effects (Blascovich et al., 1999; Uziel, 2007, 2015), greater intensity and arousal (Wilt & Revelle, 2019; Zajonc, 1965), and self-presentational concerns (Baumeister, 1982). They are further in line with cognitive approaches suggesting that experiences are amplified in social presence (Boothby et al., 2014; Steinmetz et al., 2016). Our data indicate that for better or worse, experiences are more intense 'with others', and that choice of being with others is more consequential to well-being than the choice (vs. not) to be alone.

Last, this study highlights a relatively neglected aspect of research in social psychology, which often applies an experimental approach to the study of social interactions, and consequently non-chosen social settings. The findings inform about the role that chosen social settings play in real-life dynamics, showing that individuals often manage to navigate their social lives by their choice. It is worthwhile to consider this aspect with greater attention in future research.

Limitations and Future Directions

The present research is not free from limitations. First, although sample composition varied between the two studies (e.g., by age and native language), participants were nonetheless from Western cultures (UK and Israel), and Study 2 participants were (mainly Female) college students. Perceptions and experiences of aloneness and of being with others may differ by culture and over the lifespan. Marital status, family composition, and work status could affect not only the likelihood of being with others (or alone) by choice (or not) but also one’s experience in these conditions. Future research could extend the present findings beyond the sampled populations and systematically consider the role of different life conditions.Footnote3

Second, the present studies were focused on transient situational variables, yet individual differences in personality may also affect the experiences in these settings. For example, being alone is experienced differently by individuals varying in neuroticism (Uziel et al., 2020) or in affinity for aloneness (Coplan et al., 2019). Seeking others' company is often affected by extraversion (Wilt & Revelle, 2019) and a range of additional personality traits (e.g., Uziel, 2015). Furthermore, locus of control and self-deception may moderate people's experience of situations as chosen or not.

A third issue concerns the scope of the experiences sampled. Our conclusions are bounded by sampling daily activities in the lives of normative populations. Questions of choice (or lack thereof) and solitude take different forms under extreme conditions, and this warrants separate investigations. Moreover, choice was considered in our study a (subjectively judged) dichotomy. It could be argued that situations are often a mix of choice and constraints. Future research could address this issue by considering different levels of experienced choice. In addition, although our Study 2 sampled a large number of episodes across and within days, it addressed experiences resulting from being in a given situation, but not dynamics resulting from these situations. Future research could address such dynamics by looking at situational contingencies (e.g., likelihood of being alone by choice after being with others), time spent in each situation, and variations in ESWB over extended periods. Additionally, we did not ask about the specific activities that participants were doing (nor about their level of engagement with other people in the ‘with others’ setting). Future research could extend the present findings by emphasizing the type of activities people pursue under these settings.

Relatedly, the present research was focused on self-related constructs. Future research could address implications associated with interpersonal variables (e.g., trust), and objective outcomes (e.g., physiological responses). An additional extension concerns intervention aiming to modify the perceptions of choice in (imposed) social contexts (e.g., while commuting) and their impact on ESWB.

Daughters are less likely than sons to take over their parents’ rightist positions, while parent-son transmission is equally large on the left and the right

Political socialization, political gender gaps, and the intergenerational transmission of left-right ideology. Mathilde M. van Ditmars. European Journal of Political Research, February 21 2022. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12517

Abstract: While left and right are the main terms to distinguish political views in Western Europe, the family socialization of citizens has mainly been studied in terms of partisan preferences rather than identification with these ideological blocks. Therefore, this study investigates the intergenerational transmission of left-right ideological positions in two European multiparty systems. To investigate expectations regarding gendered patterns in political socialization, ideological transmission between mothers, fathers, daughters and sons are analysed, making use of German and Swiss household data. The results underline the relevance of the family in the transmission of political ideology in multiparty systems, showing high contemporary parent-child concordance in ideological positioning in line with classic work in political socialization. Moreover, the study demonstrates how the gender-generation gap in political ideology is consequential for this process. Young women consistently place themselves on the left of men across all combinations of parental ideology, which indicates that the gender-generation gap trumps other gendered patterns in intergenerational transmission. Consequently, daughters are less likely than sons to take over their parents’ rightist positions, while parent-son transmission is equally large on the left and the right. This also means that left-leaning parents have a general advantage over right-leaning parents in having their ideological identification reproduced by their daughters. The study highlights the importance of differentiating between the transmission of left- and right-wing ideology in political socialization processes. Moreover, it demonstrates that the distinction by offspring gender is imperative when studying the intergenerational transmission of traits that display gender differences within and between parental and offspring generations. The findings point at the active role of especially female offspring in the political socialization process, as they seem to be more strongly impacted by influences outside the family that sustain generational processes of further gender realignment.

Placebo effects are ubiquitous yet highly variable between individuals; a meta-analysis of 10 different personality traits shows no evidence of associations between them and the magnitude of placebo effects

Kang, Heemin, Miriam S. Miksche, and Dan-Mikael Ellingsen. 2022. “The Association Between Personality Traits and Placebo Effects: A Preregistered Systematic Review and Meta-analysis.” PsyArXiv. March 1. doi:10.31234/osf.io/tc9e8

Abstract: Placebo effects are ubiquitous yet highly variable between individuals, and therefore strongly impact clinical trial outcomes. It is unclear whether dispositional psychological traits influence responsiveness to placebo. This preregistered meta-analysis and systematic review synthesized the literature investigating the association between personality traits and placebo effects. Based on 19 studies with 712 participants, we performed formal meta-analyses for 10 different personality traits. We did not find evidence of associations between any of these traits and magnitude of placebo effects, which was supported by equivalence tests. Furthermore, we did not find evidence for moderating factors such as placebo manipulation type (Conditioning, non-conditioning) or condition (pain, non-pain). However, the current synthesis was not statistically powered for full inquiry into potential conditional or interactive associations between personality and situational variables. These findings challenge the notion that personality influences responsiveness to placebos and contradict its utility for identifying placebo “responders” and “non-responders”.

 

Evidence of a talisman effect of insurance—consumers who have an insurance policy feel that the covered mishap is less likely to occur

Anxiety, Cognitive Availability, and the Talisman Effect of Insurance. Robert M. Schindler et al. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, March 1, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672221077791

Abstract: Across four experiments (N = 1,923), this research provides converging evidence of a talisman effect of insurance—consumers who have an insurance policy feel that the covered mishap is less likely to occur. Although such an effect has previously been proposed, empirical evidence for it is limited, in part because the talisman effect has often been conflated with a related but distinct magical-thinking phenomenon, the tempting-fate effect. By disentangling these two effects, we are better able to isolate the talisman effect and show that it is a robust phenomenon in its own right. We also provide support for a mechanism underlying the talisman effect: Insurance reduces anxiety and repetitious thoughts related to the mishap; with fewer thoughts about the mishap, its cognitive availability is lower and so it seems less likely to occur.

Keywords: insurance, magical thinking, tempting fate, availability, anxiety