Found occupational stereotypes to differ substantially on both warmth & competence dimensions, with Firefighters presenting the most favorable and Politicians and Unemployed people showing the least favorable evaluations

Stereotype content of occupational groups in Germany. Maria-Therese Friehs, Felicia Aparicio Lukassowitz, Ulrich Wagner. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, March 31 2022. https://doi.org/10.1111/jasp.12872

Abstract: The stereotype content model (SCM) is a prominent model of social perception proposing two dimensions of evaluation: Warmth and competence. Occupational stereotypes have rarely been assessed in this model, especially in the German context, albeit their important impact on how individuals experience gainful occupation and navigate everyday social interactions. Responding to recent methodological critiques regarding the SCM's scale performance, we developed a context-adapted, well-performing German-language SCM scale and assessed warmth and competence ratings of 13 occupational groups in a heterogeneous sample (N = 425). Using the alignment optimization procedure to allow for more reliable latent mean value comparisons, we found occupational stereotypes to differ substantially on both dimensions, with Firefighters presenting the most favorable and Politicians and Unemployed people showing the least favorable evaluations. We discuss our findings in terms of their content-wise and methodological meaning as well as their implications for research and in occupational contexts.

5 DISCUSSION

In this study, we pursued the double goals of developing a scale to measure perceived warmth and competence, the two fundamental dimensions of social perception as defined by the SCM (Fiske et al., 2002), and employing it to describe current occupational stereotypes in Germany. Using an online survey in a heterogeneous adult sample and applying the state-of-the-art alignment optimization procedure to compare latent warmth and competence means, we found substantial differences between the perception of the 13 occupational groups included in the survey. The results as well as their implications will be discussed in the following.

5.1 Development of a stereotype content scale to assess occupational stereotypes

One goal of this article was to develop and apply a stereotype content scale that assesses the social perception of occupational groups with adequate reliability, dimensionality, and comparability. This was necessary as the functionality of established German and English scales has been challenged due to its unclear dimensionality and because preconditions for (latent) mean value comparison were often not given (Friehs et al., 2022; Kotzur et al., 2019, 2020). Though initial and exemplary steps have been taken to remedy this issue (Halkias & Diamantopoulos, 2020), existing well-performing SCM scales have not proven their applicability for assessing human targets and social groups, but rather focused on products or countries. Thus, we carefully selected indicators suitable for the context of assessing occupational stereotypes and applied a comprehensive factor-analytical scale development procedure. As a result, we can present a scale with a well-defined dimensionality, good model fit for all occupational groups we assessed, and acceptable internal consistency. We hope that this scale will assist in producing more structurally valid SCM findings and will provide options for cumulative research on stereotype content by using identical scales in future research.

Naturally, this is only the first application of the newly developed scale, and as scale construction and validation are ongoing processes (Flake et al., 2017), future applications and continuous careful examinations of the SCM scale are needed. In a minor internal replication study again assessing occupational stereotypes, we found independent support for our proposed SCM scale (see Supporting Information Material L). Nonetheless, future research should apply the scale to occupation-unrelated groups (e.g., social groups defined by gender, origin, or other features, or experimental conditions) to critically evaluate its applicability. For all further applications, we call for a careful examination of the measurement models using confirmatory factor analysis. Moreover, the used alignment optimization procedure might have led to differing results compared to other more traditional or conservative procedures of comparing latent mean values, like MGCFA (Friehs et al., 2022; Kotzur et al., 2020). Indeed, the data of Kotzur et al. (2019) showed somewhat diverging results depending on the method of analysis (alignment optimization in Kotzur et al., 2019; MGCFA in Friehs et al., 2022), and this finding has also been reported elsewhere (Magraw-Mickelson et al., 2020; Seddig et al., 2020).

Allowing for a residual covariation between the two competence indicators, as we did in this study, is new to (factor-analysis-based) SCM research. Although the procedure is in line with theoretical considerations about subdimensions of warmth and competence (Abele et al., 2021; Stanciu, 2015), it somewhat hinders applications of the scale to analyze observed means, because only advanced modeling approaches can account for this residual covariation. The residual covariation could also have contributed to the relatively low internal consistencies of the scale. Additional contributing factors could be the relatively low number of indicators per scale and the fact that we reported McDonald's ω values, which—unlike Cronbach's α—do not assume τ-equivalence of indicators (Hayes & Coutts, 2020). ω values have very rarely been reported in SCM research (but see Friehs et al., 2022; Kotzur et al., 2020), and indeed, if we had computed αs, the average internal consistencies would have been substantially higher. We do not believe that the internal consistency disqualifies the further usage of our scales, as we have presented plentiful additional evidence of the scales’ dimensionality and structural validity (Flake et al., 2017). Interestingly, we found that the internal consistency of the warmth scale was lower than that of the competence scale, which is in line with recent findings that warmth is assessed more idiosyncratic and less consistent across raters (Koch et al., 2020).

5.2 Occupational stereotypes in Germany

Another goal was to describe occupational stereotypes in Germany. Previous research applying the SCM or related constructs provided ample empirical evidence to predict occupational stereotypes for some groups. As such, we were able to confirm our assumptions concerning both the warmth and competence assessments of Firefighters and Police officers, the warmth prediction of Bankers, Child care workers, and Politicians, as well as the competence expectations concerning Unemployed people, Physicians, and Teachers. Nonetheless, some of our hypotheses were contradicted outright, such as the high warmth rating of Teachers or the high competence perceptions of Politicians, or deviated slightly from our expectations, for instance for Judges, Farmers, and Craftspeople. We will not offer a detailed discussion of all findings, but in the following, we will outline some select and unexpected findings.

Based on the results reported in the literature, we expected both Physicians (Asbrock, 2010; Gesellschaft für Konsum-, Markt-, und Absatzforschung e.V., 2018; He et al., 2019; Imhoff et al., 2013) and Teachers (Eckes, 2002; Gesellschaft für Konsum-, Markt-, und Absatzforschung e.V., 2018; He et al., 2019; Imhoff et al., 2013) to be perceived as highly warm. What is more, we would have assumed contextual circumstances (i.e., the global COVID-19 pandemic during the time of data collection; see below) to reinforce this positive warmth assessment due to increased public salience and appreciation of the contributions these occupational groups make to societal functioning. However, we found both occupational groups to score medium on warmth, with at least two occupational groups showing significantly higher warmth ratings. Similar findings were recently reported in the Swedish context (Strinić et al., 2021). Our data cannot provide explanatory information for this deviation from theory, so these issues might be worth investigating in future research.

We are also surprised by the prominently negative occupational stereotypes of Politicians, which were rated lowest on warmth and second-lowest on competence. Though previous international literature would have led us to expect higher competence ratings (Fiske & Durante, 2014; He et al., 2019), these findings are not singular in the German context (e.g., forsa Politik-und Sozialforschung GmbH, 2019; Gesellschaft für Konsum-, Markt-, und Absatzforschung e.V., 2018; Wagner et al., 2020) and consistent with results focusing on other information sources, such as the screening of occupational groups mentioned frequently and negatively on the Internet (Gesellschaft für Konsum-, Markt-, und Absatzforschung e.V., 2018). Nonetheless, they give rise to substantial societal concerns: Cuddy et al. (2007) proposed that warmth and competence stereotypes are predictive of emotional and behavioral responses. Consequently, the negative occupational stereotypes of politicians might in part be responsible for current political issues, such as the rise of right-wing populist parties, which proclaim their distinctness from established politicians and vote for fundamental changes in the political system, or the recent reports of hate mail threatening the lives of various politicians. In the long run, these negative perceptions of politicians might impair the functioning of the democratic system through a loss of interest in and disengagement from political parties and initiatives, reduced voter participations, and support for nondemocratic movements and ambitions.

Finally, the SCM usually predicts frequent observations of ambivalent stereotypes (i.e., high ratings on one dimension paired with low ratings on the other; Abele et al., 2021; Cuddy et al., 2009; Durante et al., 2013, 2017; Fiske, 2015; Fiske et al., 2002). In contrast, our findings showed overall strong and significant positive correlations between warmth and competence both within and between occupational groups. This led to a distinct absence of ambivalently rated occupational groups. Importantly, this pattern is not indicative of a unidimensional stereotype scale, as the EFA results indicated (at least) bidimensional solutions in all occupational groups except one. Naturally, from a statistical perspective, the across-group relation between the warmth and competence dimensions is highly dependent on the selection of occupational groups. Thus, our finding might just be explained by a tendency to select nonambivalently stereotyped occupational groups for assessment (Fiske et al., 2002). However, comparable findings have been reported elsewhere (Durante et al., 2013, 2017; Kervyn et al., 2015). One explanation might be the fact that for both warmth and competence, it is assumed desirable to be rated highly, and therefore these dimensions correlate positively with general evaluations (Kervyn et al., 2013; Osgood et al., 1957). In fact, Sayans-Jiménez et al. (2017) found the support of a bifactor model of stereotype content featuring both the SCM dimensions and an independent global evaluation factor. On the other hand, high correlations between warmth and competence factors within and across occupational groups could be indicative of acquiescence or halo-effects (Judd et al., 2005). The lack of ambivalently evaluated groups is also in line with the findings of Durante et al. (2013, 2017), which predict little ambivalent stereotypes in societies with relatively low inequality and low conflict, such as Germany.

5.3 Relevance of the research results

Our findings might be applied in the investigation of social interactions and processes in specific work contexts: Oftentimes, workplaces are characterized by the intimate collaboration of differently stereotyped occupational groups (e.g., nurses and physicians in hospitals, teachers and child care workers in schools). Employees holding lower-status positions may be stereotyped as less competent and, therefore, passed over, so that information exchange and collaboration are disturbed (Koch et al., 2021). Reversely, employees in high-status positions stereotyped as highly competent might not be informed about smaller issues and problems due to strong perceptions of hierarchy, which might lead to “blind spots” and impaired decision-making processes based on incomplete information (Tourish, 2005). Acknowledging the ways in which different staff members could potentially be biased by social perception processes is crucial for well-functioning teamwork, which is a necessity in most contemporary working environments.

As mentioned before, occupational stereotypes might also strengthen occupational segregation (i.e., the distribution of individuals from different demographic backgrounds across occupations; He et al., 2019). Groups such as women, physically or mentally impaired people, or those with low socioeconomic status might be underrepresented in occupations scoring high on competence (He et al., 2019), a circumstance by which occupational stereotyping is reinforced. Occupational segregation can be reduced by predicting the social groups that might be underrepresented in a particular job and specifically encouraging and promoting their access to that occupation (e.g., with nondiscriminatory job advertisements). By knowing about occupational stereotypes and intervening accordingly, future labor shortages might be prevented (He et al., 2019). Thus, our research might also be applied to define and examine strategies to change occupational stereotypes.

5.4 Future research directions

As discussed above, we acknowledge that our findings concerning the warmth and competence assessments of different occupational groups are relational and dependent on the specific other occupational groups we assessed. Future research comparing different occupational groups might thus come to somewhat different conclusions. What is more, our study contained only a small number of occupational groups (compared to other SCM research, e.g., Asbrock, 2010; Eckes, 2002; He et al., 2019), thus limiting the descriptive and comparative informational value. Most certainly, the number and choice of groups in our study does not reflect the full range of occupational groups relevant in any society. Nonetheless, we collected data from a heterogeneous sample, most of whom had no substantial prior experience with filling in online surveys. Thus, we needed to keep survey length and participant strain to a minimum (Halkias & Diamantopoulos, 2020). Further research may investigate the stereotypes associated with more or other occupational groups.

We would also like to draw attention to the potential influence of the context this study was conducted in, as this may influence the occupational stereotypes of some groups. During the data collection period, Germany just experienced a relaxation of severe restrictions of everyday life and personal freedom due to the first wave of the global COVID-19 pandemic as well as a decreasing number of severe medical treatments. This context might impact the evaluations of some occupational groups, such as Physicians and Hospital and elderly care nurses. Likewise, schools and nurseries were closed for the most part, and parents were forced to care for their children at home, which might affect the perception of Teachers and Child care workers. This period was also marked by a large number of short-term and extensive political decisions, mainly to stabilize Germany's economy and to provide more extended health care, potentially impacting the stereotype content of Politicians. Our data collection period also overlapped somewhat with the lamentable incident of George Floyd's death in the United States on May 25, 2020, which initiated a wave of protests and a fierce public debate about racism in the police force both in the United States and in Germany. Consequently, the social perception of Police officers might be influenced by these circumstances. Previous SCM research has not, to the best of our knowledge, focused on the impact of relevant external circumstances, nor on the change of occupational stereotypes over time. Thus, further research applying repeated cross-sectional or longitudinal surveys might help answer these questions.

Finally, future research could apply the assumption that warmth and competence perceptions are predictive of emotional and behavioral reactions toward the assessed occupational groups (Cuddy et al., 2007). Thus, on the base of the presented findings, future research could predict and investigate the affective and conative responses certain occupational group memberships elicit in professional interactions or societal discourses. This approach might be applied to a variety of contemporary problems, for instance the striking contrast between the highly positive social perceptions of professions in the child, hospital, or elderly care sector on the one hand, and their precarious working conditions and insufficient remuneration on the other hand (DGB Niedersachsen, 2020). Another application might lie in the investigation of reported phenomena of actively harming or hindering representatives of different occupational groups fulfilling their occupational role (e.g., attacking firefighters and paramedics in action). The SCM and related theories may be put to the test as a theoretical framework to describe and explain these phenomena.

The lack of sexual activity made male singles more dissatisfied than female singles

Satisfaction with Singlehood and Sexual Activity. Bente Træen & Ingela Lundin Kvalem. Sexuality & Culture, Apr 3 2022. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12119-022-09961-x

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which Norwegians are satisfied with their singlehood, and to determine the association between being single and sexual activity. Data were obtained from a questionnaire survey of a representative web sample of 1076 unpartnered individuals (568 women, 508 men) aged 18–89 years. A total of 45.2% of the single respondents reported being satisfied with being single, while 33.9% reported being unsatisfied. There was no difference between the age groups in men, but more women aged 45 years or older than women under the age of 45 were satisfied with being single. A higher percentage of gay, bisexual, and transmen than heterosexual men was satisfied with being single. More women who had not been sexually active with a partner in the past year were satisfied with being single than were women who had been sexually active. The men who were most satisfied with being single were those who had masturbated and/or had sexual intercourse, and least satisfied were those with no sexual activity, or exclusively masturbation activity. The results are discussed in terms of biological, psychological, and social positions.

Discussion

We found that the majority of single respondents reported being satisfied with being single. This finding most likely reflects that in contemporary Norwegian society, there is a higher acceptance of deviation from the “Ideology of Marriage and Family” (DePaulo & Morris, 2005). In other words, there is a broad acceptance of diversity in how people live their lives. The finding that a higher percentage of respondents who had not been sexually active during the past year was completely satisfied with being single is most likely related to the composition of the sub-sample, as the majority of respondents were female. This will be further discussed below.

A higher percentage of older than younger respondents reported being satisfied with being single. Furthermore, a higher percentage of women than men, and more women aged 60 years or older than women under the age of 60, were satisfied with being single. This finding, in part, should be considered in relation to the study by Bergström and Vivier (2020), which showed that the rate of singlehood steadily increased for women aged 40 years and that more women than men stated that singlehood for them was voluntary. Contrary to men, who are able to become fathers throughout their whole life span, women’s ability to conceive is significantly reduced by the age of 45 years. It is likely that at younger ages, single women aspire for a committed partner to raise a family and children (Du Bois-Reymond, 1998), and not finding the “right” partner reduces satisfaction with this involuntary singlehood. Around the age of 30 years, as single individuals see their friends forming relationships, they become more strongly aware of their minority status, and personal and social pressure may become more intense (Bergström & Vivier, 2020). However, approaching menopause it is likely that women’s expectancies for reproduction will decrease, and this may raise other issues of greater importance for them. Men of all ages are in a different social position, tending to form their first relationship at a later age than women (Bergström & Vivier, 2020), and having children is likely to affect their career and other aspects of self-realization less than women’s.

Another interesting finding was that heterosexual women with no sexual activity in the past 12 months were more satisfied with being single than women who had been sexually active. Furthermore, the heterosexual women who were least satisfied were those who had masturbated and had sexual intercourse. This corroborates a British study, in which a minority of those who had sexual experience but were sexually inactive, 35% of men and 24% of women, reported being dissatisfied with their sex lives (Ueda & Mercer, 2019). According to Baumeister (1999), women’s sexuality is more plastic than men’s sexuality. This implies that women without access to a committed partner may “turn off” their sex drive altogether, and not longing for something they do not have and releasing energy into other things of importance in life makes them satisfied with singlehood. It can be hypothesized that women who recently had been sexually active with a partner might have been reminded of not having an available partner, which might have caused them to long for one. In that case, it can be argued that they are committed to a romantic ideal, but had either found the wrong partner to enter into a relationship with (Træen & Sørensen, 2000), or had experienced unrequited love (Baumeister, 1993). The finding that men who had less masturbation activity in the past month were more likely to be satisfied with being single indicates that some men may have lower sexual desire than others. However, based on the findings from other studies, it may also be linked to higher levels of avoidant attachment, lower sexual self-esteem and self-confidence, lower sexual satisfaction (Anticevi et al., 2017), or poor flirting skills, unattractiveness, shyness, and bad experiences in previous relationships (Apostolou, 2019).

There was no difference in satisfaction with being single between the group with no previous sexual interactions and the group with sexual experience but with no current sexual partner. Although the groups on the surface differ in terms of sexual experience, the mean scores on satisfaction probably conceal diverse reasons for singlehood. For both groups, being single may be a consequence of an active choice or an unwanted circumstance.

Park et al.’s study (2021) showed that having a satisfying sexual life was associated with how positively single individuals viewed their singlehood. Men and women are biologically different and undergo different primary sexual socialization processes. Unlike women, both LGBT + men and heterosexual men who were satisfied with their sexual life in general, satisfied with their current level of sexual activity, and who had had sexual intercourse in the past month were more likely to be satisfied with being single. In addition, the relationships were generally stronger for LGBT + men than for heterosexual men. It could be that men in general who are satisfied with their singlehood find it more convenient to have casual partners and to avoid all partners who could become committed partners. LGBT + men may be able to obtain male sexual partners more readily than heterosexual men can female sexual partners, in part because of men’s greater interest in casual sex (e.g., Schmitt, 2005). According to Eastwick et al. (2019), passion peaks in the early stages of a relationship, and feelings of intimacy and emotional bonding peak in later stages. For single individuals who are satisfied with being single and who still have sexual activity with partners, it could be that it is the drive for passion that is satisfying to them, and that they may not have a desire for emotional bonding with a partner.

LGBT + men and women are likely to undergo a new socialization process when coming out as gay (Alonzo & Buttitta, 2019). We found that LGBT + men were more satisfied with being single than heterosexual men, but there was no difference between LGBT + women and heterosexual women. LGBT + men may have a larger pool of other men to have sexual interactions with, and in the gay sub-culture there is likely to be a higher acceptance of sex for the sake of pleasure and of not having to legitimize sex with love than in the heterosexual majority culture (Abramson & Pinkerton, 2002; Matsick et al., 2021).

Limitations

Some limitations of this study must be addressed. The sample is supposedly representative of Norway’s Internet-using population but compared to the Norwegian population there is an overrepresentation of respondents with higher education. This may hinder the generalizability of the results. A more detailed description of this has been outlined elsewhere (Træen et al., 2021a, b; Træen & Thuen, 2021; Træen & Fischer, 2021). Another limitation is the single question measure of satisfaction with singlehood, as well as satisfaction with their sexual life/current level of sexual activity. However, we chose single questions rather than scales in an effort to maximize response rates and reduce participant burden. This is generally accepted and widely used in the field of sex research, as they may capture the construct to a satisfactory degree (Gardner et al., 1998). In addition, the cross-sectional nature of this study makes it impossible to draw conclusions about cause and effect. Furthermore, the low number of LGBT + persons in the study also represents a limitation, and the statistics should thus be interpreted with caution.

Compared with men’s tweets, a higher proportion of women’s tweets are retweets, and that the majority of women’s retweets originate from men

From 2021... Tweeting and Retweeting: Gender Discrepancies in Discursive Political Engagement and Influence on Twitter. Lingshu Hu,Michael W. Kearney &Cynthia M. Frisby. Journal of Gender Studies, Oct 24 2021. https://doi.org/10.1080/09589236.2021.1995340

Abstract: Two studies were conducted to examine gender differences in the discursive political engagement on Twitter. Study 1 analysed about 5.6 million English tweets regarding nine political issues and one non-political issue. It found that, compared with men’s tweets, a higher proportion of women’s tweets are retweets, and that the majority of women’s retweets originate from men. The results may indicate that women have a relatively lower level of political efficacy and/or sense a higher level of environmental risk than men when participating in political discussions on Twitter. They may also indicate that men have a more significant influence than women on Twitter. Study 2 collected 225 survey responses from the adults in the U.S. via Qualtrics’s online panel. The results partly support the findings of study 1, showing that on average, women have a lower level of perceived political efficacy than men, which affects the likelihood of their political expression along with a feeling of communal support.

Keywords: Political engagementTwittergenderwomensocial mediabig data

Accurate sex classification from neural responses to sexual stimuli

Accurate sex classification from neural responses to sexual stimuli. Vesa Putkinen, Sanaz Nazari-Farsani,  View ORCID ProfileTomi Karjalainen, Severi Santavirta, Matthew Hudson, Kerttu Seppälä, Lihua Sun, Henry K. Karlsson, Jussi Hirvonen, Lauri Nummenmaa. bioRxiv, Jan 11 2022. https://doi.org/10.1101/2022.01.10.473972

Abstract: Sex differences in brain activity evoked by sexual stimuli remain elusive despite robust evidence for stronger enjoyment of and interest towards sexual stimuli in men than in women. To test whether visual sexual stimuli evoke different brain activity patterns in men and women, we measured haemodynamic brain activity induced by visual sexual stimuli in two experiments in 91 subjects (46 males). In one experiment, the subjects viewed sexual and non-sexual film clips and dynamic annotations for nudity in the clips was used to predict their hemodynamic activity. In the second experiment, the subjects viewed sexual and non-sexual pictures in an event-related design. Males showed stronger activation than females in the visual and prefrontal cortices and dorsal attention network in both experiments. Furthermore, using multivariate pattern classification we could accurately predict the sex of the subject on the basis of the brain activity elicited by the sexual stimuli. The classification generalized across the experiments indicating that the sex differences were consistent. Eye tracking data obtained from an independent sample of subjects (N = 110) showed that men looked longer than women at the chest area of the nude female actors in the film clips. These results indicate that visual sexual stimuli evoke discernible brain activity patterns in men and women which may reflect stronger attentional engagement with sexual stimuli in men than women.

Male participants sacrificed more, in terms of physical pain, for their romantic partners and opposite-sex friends than female participants

Beyond reciprocity: Relational sacrifices in romantic partners. Ke Yan et al. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, April 1, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1177/02654075221080997

Abstract: Reciprocity is often considered a precondition for sacrificial behaviors, with people being willing to make sacrifices in their relationships to better their collective interests and expecting their partners to do the same. However, whether relational sacrifices exist in a zero-sum game, wherein reciprocity cannot be established, remains unclear. Therefore, this study utilized the cold pressor task (CPT) to explore communal sacrificial behavior among romantic partners and to examine any possible gender differences in these behaviors in a laboratory setting. Seventy-two college students (36 men and 36 women, all currently in romantic relationships) were instructed to place their sub-dominant hand into cold water (2°C) as long as possible (baseline), for their romantic partners (romantic partner-beneficiary condition) or for their opposite-sex friends (friend-beneficiary condition; enduring it longer so that their friend/romantic partners may endure it for a shorter duration) in a counterbalanced order. Data on pain tolerance time were collected in the CPTs, with sacrificial behaviors indexed by how much longer participants endured pain for their romantic partners or friends than the baseline. The data indicated that participants demonstrated a longer pain tolerance time in partner-beneficiary condition than the baseline (and friend-beneficiary). No significant difference was found between friend-beneficiary condition and baseline. Moreover, a gender difference was noted, with male participants having a longer pain tolerance increment rate than female participants. These results provide a foundation for experimental research of relational sacrificial behaviors and suggest that relational sacrifices exist beyond reciprocity in romantic relationships, but not within opposite-sex friendships.

Keywords: Romantic relationship, sacrifice, cold pressor task, gender difference, zero-sum game

The largest parks, greater than 100 acres, had the highest mean happiness benefit, possibly because that larger parks provide greater opportunities for mental restoration and separation from the taxing environment of the city

Schwartz AJ, Dodds PS, O’Neil-Dunne JPM, Ricketts TH, Danforth CM (2022) Gauging the happiness benefit of US urban parks through Twitter. PLoS ONE 17(3): e0261056. Mar 30, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0261056

Abstract: The relationship between nature contact and mental well-being has received increasing attention in recent years. While a body of evidence has accumulated demonstrating a positive relationship between time in nature and mental well-being, there have been few studies comparing this relationship in different locations over long periods of time. In this study, we analyze over 1.5 million tweets to estimate a happiness benefit, the difference in expressed happiness between in- and out-of-park tweets, for the 25 largest cities in the US by population. People write happier words during park visits when compared with non-park user tweets collected around the same time. While the words people write are happier in parks on average and in most cities, we find considerable variation across cities. Tweets are happier in parks at all times of the day, week, and year, not just during the weekend or summer vacation. Across all cities, we find that the happiness benefit is highest in parks larger than 100 acres. Overall, our study suggests the happiness benefit associated with park visitation is on par with US holidays such as Thanksgiving and New Year’s Day.

Tweets inside of all park size categories exhibited a positive happiness benefit. The largest parks, greater than 100 acres, had the highest mean happiness benefit. One possible explanation is that larger parks provide greater opportunities for mental restoration and separation from the taxing environment of the city. This finding is consistent with results from our earlier study in San Francisco, in which tweets in the larger and greener Regional Parks had the highest happiness benefit [18]. Parks between 0 and 10 acres are often neighborhood parks that people use in their day to day lives. Local parks provide many essential functions; however, our results suggest that the experiences people have in larger parks may be more beneficial from a mental health perspective. Another possibility is that people spend more time in larger parks; one study suggested that 120 minutes of nature contact a week resulted in improved health and well-being [35].

Temporal analysis

Across all cities, we grouped park tweets and their control tweets according to the in-park tweet’s timestamp to test H4. First, we compared the happiness benefit by season. The mean happiness benefit was highest in the summer (0.12), followed by fall (0.10), spring (0.08), and winter (0.06) as shown in Fig 4B. Then we grouped park tweets and their respective control tweets according to the day of the week in which it was posted. Saturday exhibited the highest mean happiness benefit (.15) followed by Sunday (0.13). Monday through Friday were all between 0.06 and 0.09 (Fig 4). We also estimated the happiness benefit by hour of the day. The tweets posted during the 8:00 and 9:00 AM hours had a mean happiness benefit around 0.07 while the rest of the day did not show a clear pattern, ranging from 0.08 to 0.14 (S4 Fig).

We observe that the mean happiness benefit was higher in summer than other seasons; however, the happiness benefit was positive in all four seasons. Possible interpretations of seasonal differences may include that warmer or sunnier weather in the summer leads to an increased benefit from park visitation. People may engage in longer visits to parks during summer months, engage in physical activity, or connect with friends during the summer, all of which may increase the benefits of spending time in a park [36]. Alternatively, more non-residents may be tweeting from parks during the summer, leading to greater within-park sentiment scores. Similar dynamics may be driving the higher happiness benefits on the weekend compared to weekdays, though all days of the week exhibited positive values (See Fig 4). Prior work has shown that people on Twitter are happiest on the weekends and during times of year with more daylight [37]. Nevertheless, our comparisons indicate that a sentiment benefit occurs throughout the day, week, and year, indicating that the effect is not purely driven by temporal patterns. Our hourly comparison indicates that a sentiment benefit occurs during all hours of the day, indicating that the effect is not purely driven by leaving the office. This result is encouraging because some prior studies on nature contact using Twitter analyzed shorter time periods. Future studies should seek methods that can investigate the other temporal aspects of nature contact including the frequency and duration of visits [38].

We acknowledge that studying human behavior using Twitter data involves several potential sources of bias. Active users on Twitter tend to be younger and more affluent than the population at large [39]. Instead of investigating how individual users and demographic sub-groups respond to nature contact, we attempt to estimate the aggregate effect of park visitation on happiness across a city. While our happiness benefit calculation uses same-city tweets as a control, the results may not generalize beyond Twitter users. We only use English language tweets which may limit our ability to generalize to other languages and cultures. We do not control for nearby demographics when assessing the happiness benefit of specific parks. For example, larger parks may be promixal to more affluent neighborhoods or associated with adjacent neighborhood age structure. While this may introduce bias across parks within cities, it should not impact our results comparing the total happiness benefit across cities.

Future directions

Our results, along with those from previous studies, point to several important areas of future research. Future research should continue to explore the relationship between tweet happiness and other factors beyond park investment. While ParkScore® captures a variety of park-quality related metrics, vegetation and biodiversity are salient features of greenspace that significantly impact how people experience their time in nature [40–42].

More localized studies could look at the mental health impact of park-level vegetative cover and biodiversity metrics. Alternatively, similar methods could be applied to compare the mental benefits of nature contact with other experiences such as museum visits or sports games. This could provide insight into the benefit of investing in public goods such as parks for health outcomes relative to alternatives. Similarly, these analyses could isolate the importance of experiencing nature compared to the social and cultural factors that influence sentiment on Twitter.

While we investigated the seasonal variation of in-park happiness, climate and weather have been shown to influence happiness on Twitter as well [43, 44]. Tweets could be binned by some composite of temperature, humidity, and precipitation in order to investigate how weather moderates the association between nature contact and mental well-being [21].

Demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural factors also play a role in how people engage with parks [45]. While identifying such factors on Twitter is challenging and requires ethical consideration, other methodologies can continue to explore how different groups use and benefit from time in parks, to help ensure that the benefits of parks are available to everyone. As the evidence continues to mount on the many different benefits of nature contact, we must ensure park access to quality parks for all urban residents.

Those in the prosocial condition rated the role of genetics in causing the behavior as significantly greater than did those in the antisocial condition, due to the tendency to view prosocial behavior as more natural and more aligned with one’s true self

Asymmetric genetic attributions for one’s own prosocial versus antisocial behavior. Matthew S. Lebowitz, Kathryn Tabb & Paul S. Appelbaum. The Journal of Social Psychology, Mar 31 2022. https://doi.org/10.1080/00224545.2022.2058906

Abstrct: People tend to rate prosocial or positive behavior as more strongly influenced by the actor’s genes than antisocial or negative behavior. The current study tested whether people would show a similar asymmetry when rating the role of genes in their own behavior, and if so, what variables might mediate this difference. Participants were prompted to think about an example of their own behavior from the past year that was either prosocial or antisocial. Those in the prosocial condition rated the role of genetics in causing the behavior as significantly greater than did those in the antisocial condition. A mediation analysis suggested that this asymmetry could be accounted for by a tendency to view prosocial behavior as more natural and more aligned with one’s true self than antisocial behavior. These findings add to a growing body of evidence suggesting that people’s reasoning about genetics may be influenced by evaluative judgments.

Keywords: Geneticssocial cognitioncausal attributionmotivated reasoning

Their studies revealed a robust belief that “life gets better” over time (i.e., recollected past < current < anticipated future life satisfaction) in nations around the world, in relation to both objective & subjective indicators of societal-level functioning

Busseri, M. A. (2022). The global belief that “life gets better and better”: National differences in recollected past, present, and anticipated future life satisfaction around the world, across time, and in relation to societal functioning. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Apr 2022. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000415

Abstract: National-level differences in individuals’ ratings of their recollected past, current, and anticipated future life satisfaction (LS) were examined using results from two pioneering projects comprising national-level results for 14 countries (Cantril, 1965) and 15 regions of the world (Gallup International Research Institutes & Charles F. Kettering Foundation, 1976; Study 1), as well as sequential results from the Gallup World Poll based on 137 countries representing a broad range of nations from around the world surveyed from 2005 to 2018 (Study 2). Results from both studies revealed a robust belief that “life gets better” over time (i.e., recollected past < current < anticipated future LS) in nations around the world. Such beliefs were examined in relation to objective and subjective indicators of societal-level functioning. Results replicated across studies in showing that nations with less positive societal functioning and prosperity were characterized by less recollected past improvements in LS, and yet greater anticipated future improvements in LS. Results from Study 2 also revealed that such expectations were positively biased compared to changes over time in national levels of LS; further, greater bias was related to less positive societal-level functioning. In conclusion, examining national-level differences in LS from a subjective temporal perspective provides valuable new insights concerning human development and prosperity across countries, over time, and around the world.

Factors proposed to explain impersonal cooperation across societies (institutions (rule of law), religion (belief in God as a third-party punisher), cultural beliefs (trust) & values (collectivism), and ecology (relational mobility)) are not so important

Spadaro, G., Graf, C., Jin, S., Arai, S., Inoue, Y., Lieberman, E., Rinderu, M. I., Yuan, M., Van Lissa, C. J., & Balliet, D. (2022). Cross-cultural variation in cooperation: A meta-analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Apr 2022. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000389

Abstract: Impersonal cooperation among strangers enables societies to create valuable public goods, such as infrastructure, public services, and democracy. Several factors have been proposed to explain variation in impersonal cooperation across societies, referring to institutions (e.g., rule of law), religion (e.g., belief in God as a third-party punisher), cultural beliefs (e.g., trust) and values (e.g., collectivism), and ecology (e.g., relational mobility). We tested 17 preregistered hypotheses in a meta-analysis of 1,506 studies of impersonal cooperation in social dilemmas (e.g., the Public Goods Game) conducted across 70 societies (k = 2,271), where people make costly decisions to cooperate among strangers. After controlling for 10 study characteristics that can affect the outcome of studies, we found very little cross-societal variation in impersonal cooperation. Categorizing societies into cultural groups explained no variance in cooperation. Similarly, cultural, ancestral, and linguistic distance between societies explained little variance in cooperation. None of the cross-societal factors hypothesized to relate to impersonal cooperation explained variance in cooperation across societies. We replicated these conclusions when meta-analyzing 514 studies across 41 states and nine regions in the United States (k = 783). Thus, we observed that impersonal cooperation occurred in all societies—and to a similar degree across societies—suggesting that prior research may have overemphasized the magnitude of differences between modern societies in impersonal cooperation. We discuss the discrepancy between theory, past empirical research and the meta-analysis, address a limitation of experimental research on cooperation to study culture, and raise possible directions for future research. 

We ask: "What is cultural evolution anyway?" Our answer: a phenomenon, not a theory/ approach. Understanding this helps clarify other issues, e.g. the role of human behavioural ecology

What is cultural evolution anyway? Alberto J C Micheletti, Eva Brandl, Ruth Mace. Behavioral Ecology, arac011. Apr 1 2022.  https://doi.org/10.1093/beheco/arac011

Abstract: The term cultural evolution has become popular in the evolutionary human sciences, but it is often unclear what is meant by it. This is generating confusion and misconceptions that are hindering progress in the field. These include the claim that behavioral ecology disregards culture. We argue that these misunderstandings are caused by the unhelpful use of term cultural evolution to identify both a phenomenon—culture changing through time—and a theory to explain it—the potential role of cultural transmission biases in driving this change. We illustrate this point by considering recently published influential studies and opinion pieces. If we are to avoid confusion, the term cultural evolution is best reserved to identify the phenomenon of cultural change. This helps clarify that human behavioral ecologists do not disregard culture, but instead have studied its evolution from the very beginning. Different approaches to the study of human behavior can coexist and complement each other in the framework offered by Tinbergen’s four evolutionary questions. Clarifying key terms is crucial to achieve this synthesis.

Cultural evolution is becoming a blanket term for any kind of human behavioral evolution. However, we believe that this is leading to confusion because the term “cultural evolution” is being used to indicate both a phenomenon—culture changing through time—and an approach to study it—the focus on cultural inheritance and the potential role of transmission biases in shaping culture. This confusing use of the term is widespread in the literature and in informal discussion (we may even have been guilty of this ourselves). For example, Schulz et al. (2019: 1) state that “cultural evolution often favoured some form of cousin marriage.” Are they referring to cultural evolution as opposed to genetic evolution? Cousin marriage is surely a culturally transmitted behavior, so this comparison appears irrelevant here. Or, by cultural evolution, do they mean the action of transmission biases? Or are they referring to the whole phenomenon of cultural change? If so, how can culture changing per se “favour” a particular outcome? Innovation, migration, or cultural drift may lead to this outcome, but only some form of selection, genetic, cultural or perhaps both, may “favour” a given outcome.

A second example reveals how this ambiguity can lead to confusion that is hindering progress in the field. A study by Barsbai et al. (2021) shows that human behaviors tightly fit local environmental conditions, following very similar patterns to those shown by mammals and birds living in the same area. In a commentary to the study (Hill and Boyd 2021), the wording appears to present cultural evolution and adaptation to local ecology as alternative explanations for the diversity and distribution of these traits. They state: “Hence, the study appears to validate the basic premise of the evolutionary perspective called ‘human behavioural ecology’. However, it is a mistake to conclude from this that culture is unimportant” (Hill and Boyd 2021: 236). This seems to suggest that human behavioral ecology ignores culture. Yet, Barsbai et al. (2021) do not deny that the foraging, reproductive, and social behaviors they examine are culturally transmitted, at least in humans. Neither do they assume that cultural history plays little to no role in shaping the observed patterns, as seems to be implied by Hill and Boyd (2021: 236) when they state: “ecological factors explain much variation in human behaviour, but so too does cultural history.” Cultural phylogeny may indeed play a role and, for this reason, the authors control for it in their analyses (Barsbai et al. 2021).

Barsbai et al. (2021) simply show that a variety of human behaviors—almost certainly culturally transmitted—fit local ecology in the same way as behaviors that are probably mostly genetically controlled in birds and mammals. Therefore, their analysis suggests that these cultural traits have been shaped by inclusive fitness interests. In line with a behavioral ecological approach, they are agnostic as to the mechanism leading to this fit. It is possible that it came about through one or more specific biases in cultural transmission or, more generally, because humans are flexible learners that make conscious, strategic choices about what to adopt, sensitive to pay-offs (Burton-Chellew and West 2021). Although it is tempting to contrast adaptation to local ecology and “culture” or “cultural evolution” as two competing forces shaping the change of behavior through time, such a contrast is impossible. As Boyd has acknowledged elsewhere (Boyd 2018), adaptation to local ecology is an outcome of the process of cultural evolution, whereby cultural selection has favored a set of cultural variants because they are adaptive in a specific environment. Therefore, the tools of behavioral ecology are always going to be needed to understand cultural evolution.

Evolutionary biologists, too, have sometimes used language suggesting this unhelpful dichotomy between adaptation and culture. For example, Burton-Chellew and West (2013: 1043) ask “Will culture be more important for certain classes of traits such as those less linked to fitness?” We suspect that these authors were meaning to suggest that fitness-insensitive cultural transmission mechanisms can sometimes result in non-adaptive outcomes (especially when a trait is less fitness relevant). However, the way they presented their argument can be potentially misleading. Behaviours can be culturally transmitted, and many human behaviors are, and yet they can still be shaped, at least to some extent, by the inclusive fitness interests of their bearer.

 

Consumers particular vulnerable to financial bullshit are more likely to be young, male, have a higher income, and be overconfident with regards to their own financial knowledge

Individual differences in susceptibility to financial bullshit. Mario Kienzler, Daniel Västfjäll, Gustav Tinghög. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, March 31 2022, 100655. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef.2022.100655

Abstract: What is the effect of seemingly impressive verbal financial assertions that are presented as true and meaningful but are actually meaningless; that is, financial pseudo-profound bullshit? We develop and validate a novel measurement scale to assess consumers’ ability to detect and distinguish financial bullshit. We show that this financial bullshit scale captures a unique construct that is only moderately correlated with related constructs such as financial knowledge and cognitive abilities. Consumers particular vulnerable to financial bullshit are more likely to be young, male, have a higher income, and be overconfident with regards to their own financial knowledge. The ability to detect and distinguish financial bullshit also predicts financial well-being while being less predictive of consumers’ self-reported financial behavior, suggesting that susceptibility to financial bullshit is linked to affective rather than behavioral reactions. Our findings have implications for the understanding of how financial communication impacts consumer decision making and financial well-being. 

JEL: G41G51G53

Keywords: BullshitFinancial bullshitFinancial behaviorFinancial well-beingScale

4. Discussion and conclusion

The ability to detect and distinguish profound statements (and information) from plain gibberish is crucial for individual’s to effectively navigate any social system and make well informed decisions. Finance is often portrayed as a complex and difficult area of decision making, where interactions commonly are characterized by jargon, acronyms, and slogans. This provides a hotbed for bullshitting to thrive and obscure the view of consumers. We developed and validated a novel measurement scale that allows us to measure individual differences in susceptibility to financial bullshit – the financial bullshit scale. We show that this scale captures a unique construct that is only moderately correlated with related constructs such as financial literacy and numeric ability. Moreover, we show that the ability to detect financial bullshit is distinctively separate from the ability to detect general bullshit and predict financial behavior beyond the original general bullshit scale.

Our results also provide insights into ‘who is more susceptible for financial bullshit?’. Consumers particular vulnerable to financial bullshit were more likely to be young, male, have a higher income, and be overconfident with regards to their own financial knowledge. This finding is in line with prior research that found age to be positively related to people’s ability to distinguish profound and pseudo-profound communication in general (Erlandsson et al., 2018). The finding that women showed a greater ability to detect and distinguish bullshit from genuine financial statements is a little surprising given that prior research has documented a persistent gender gap in financial literacy which partly can be attributed to stereotype threat, which posits that inbuilt prejudices about gender and finance undermine performance among women in tasks involving finance (Tinghög et al., 2021). The finding that higher income was positively related to being susceptible to financial bullshit might also be surprising. However, it seems reasonable to believe that as income rise consumers become less vigilant when it comes to financial matters and therefore less alert when it comes to detecting to be affected by impressive financial language. Much in the same way that scarcity requires trade-off thinking and makes people more efficient (Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013).

We also investigated the consequences susceptibility to financial bullshit has for financial wellbeing and financial behavior. Our results show that the financial bullshit scale predicted subjective financial well-being. In particular, consumers with an increasing ability to detect bullshit felt more insecure about their finances. Put differently, consumers worse at distinguishing between bullshit and genuine communication exhibited an ignorance-is-bliss effect when it came to subjective financial wellbeing. This ignorance-is-bliss effect did however not extend to self-reported financial behavior in our study. Considering these results, being able to detect and distinguish bullshit from genuine financial statements is neither unequivocally a good nor a bad thing. On the good side, people who were less susceptible to financial bullshit displayed a greater ability on a number of financially relevant competencies (e.g., greater objective financial knowledge). On the bad side, susceptible to bullshit was also related to a decrease in perceived financial security about their own future financial situation.

Even if the financial bullshit scale was related to financial well-being, we did not find a systematic relationship to self-reported financial behaviors. The financial management behavior scale taps into everyday household finance behaviors and management strategies (e.g., keep a budget, pay bills on time). Prior research demonstrated that this scale is related to both self-control and financial well-being (Strömbäck et al., 2017, Strömbäck et al., 2020). In hindsight these general behaviors are likely less strongly related to individual differences in susceptibility to financial bullshit, than behaviors containing financial bullshit (e.g., purchase of questionable financial products or evaluating misleading claims about the financial performance of products). Our results, showing that susceptibility to financial bullshit was related to financial buzzword comprehension but not general financial behavior supports this notion. We also note that, the present research relates to research on overclaiming in the financial domain. For instance, previous research on overclaiming (e.g., Atir et al. 2015) used people’s self-assessed financial knowledge and compared it to their knowledge claims of fictional finance terms. We, on the other hand, used people’s self-assessed financial knowledge and compared it with their actual knowledge. We also showed that people’s financial sophistication can be related to their financial bullshit score.

Ideally the financial bullshit scale can be used in future research to advance understanding on how to make individuals better equipped to distill financial communication and navigate the financial landscape. As done here, the scale can be used to identify customers that are vulnerable to fall prey for seemingly impressive statements that could be misleading in negotiations and other financial situations involving human interactions (for more research on financial vulnerability, see O’Connor et al., 2019). By extending research on the psychology of bullshit into the domain of financial decision making we hope to spur future research on what we think is an overlooked topic in consumer research; the impact (bad) financial communication has on consumer financial decision making.

Finally, the present study has practical implications for financial institutions and policy makers. First, our results show that consumers vary in their susceptibility to financial bullshit and certain groups of consumers are more vulnerable to it than others. This information can be an important steppingstone for designing tailored interventions. For example, interventions aimed at helping consumers to make better decisions and feeling less anxious about their personal finances. Second, financial institutions need to consider that consumers with an increasing ability to detect bullshit felt more insecure about their finances. This suggests that financial institutions need to apply nuanced strategies to serve their customer base. For instance, help customers who can distinguish genuine and bullshit financial communication to feel more secure in their money matters rather than to merely provide them with sound financial advice. This should lead to positive consequences for actual and perceived financial well-being.

People at least somewhat agree on what a gullible person looks like; & people whose facial features resemble an expression of anger are perceived as particularly low on gullibility

Who Can Be Fooled? Modeling Facial Impressions of Gullibility. Bastian Jaeger and Erdem O. Meral. Social CognitionVol. 40, No. 2, March 2022. https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2022.40.2.127

Abstract: The success of acts of deceit and exploitation depends on how trusting and naïve (i.e., gullible) targets are. In three preregistered studies, using both theory-driven and data-driven approaches, we examined how people form impressions of gullibility based on targets' facial appearance. We find significant consensus in gullibility impressions, suggesting that people have a somewhat shared representation of what a gullible person looks like (Study 1, n = 294). Gullibility impressions is based on different cues than trustworthiness or dominance impressions, suggesting that they constitute dissociable facial stereotypes (Study 2, n = 403). Examining a wide range of facial features, we find that gullibility impressions are primarily based on resemblance to an angry facial expression. We also find that young, female, and smiling individuals were seen as more gullible (Study 3, n = 209). These findings suggest that gullibility impressions are based on cues linked to low levels of perceived threat.

Rolf Degen summarizing... Christians value receiving a prayer in a hardship from a Christian stranger at an average of $2.34, while non-believers are willing to pay $1.56 not to be prayed for

Thunström L, Noy S (2022) What we think prayers do: Americans’ expectations and valuation of intercessory prayer. PLoS ONE 17(3): e0265836. Mar 31 2022. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0265836

Abstract: Praying for others in the wake of a disasters is a common interpersonal and public response to tragedy in the United States. But these gestures are controversial. In a survey experiment, we elicit how people value receiving a prayer from a Christian stranger in support of a recent hardship and examine factors that affect the value of the prayer. We find that people who positively value receiving the prayer do so primarily because they believe it provides emotional support and will be answered by God. Many also value the prayer because they believe it will improve their health and wealth, although empirical support of such effects is lacking. People who negatively value receiving the prayer do so primarily because they believe praying is a waste of time. The negative value is particularly large if people are offended by religion. Finally, the hardship experienced by the prayer recipient matters to the intensity by which recipients like or dislike the gesture, suggesting the benefit of prayers varies not only across people, but also across contexts.

Reasons people positively value prayers from religious strangers.

Participants who stated a positive WTP for receiving a prayer from a stranger (Christian: N = 375/451; non-believers: N = 56/166), were asked about the factors that contributed to the value of the prayer.

Large majorities of both Christians and non-believers who value the prayer do so because it gives them emotional comfort to know that the stranger is thinking of them. The answers to the open ended question provide additional information on the comfort people experience from receiving the prayer–e.g., one non-believer noted that they valued prayers positively because “someone is acknowledging the hardships I am going through and wishes for me to get through them successfully” (R_161) while a Christian participant explained: as “a Christian, prayer is invaluable and a source of personal comfort through faith” (R_282).

Further, a large majority of Christians (82 percent) believe that the prayer will result in God intervening to ease their emotional pain. While shares are smaller, many Christians also value the prayer because they believe God will help materially (36 percent) or improve their health (55 percent). Such expectations appear to be misplaced, given previous research shows that prayers for others have no effect on the recipient’s health [23], and therefore might bias the value of prayers upwards. They might also explain why prayers may reduce material aid [8]–if God is expected to intervene materially in response to prayers, the perceived need for material aid may be lower.

We also asked Christians who positively value prayers (N = 375/451) about the probability that the prayer from the stranger would be answered by God. Their average response was 78 percent. Amongst these participants, those who were more religious (as measured by frequency of church attendance), Republicans and those with low income (compared to high income) stated a higher probability that God would answer the prayer. For details, see Supplemental Online Material.

The share of non-believers who value the prayer and believe the prayer will result in help from God (whether emotional, material, or health) is not statistically significantly different from zero, i.e., even though some non-believers positively value receiving a prayer, they do not expect the prayer to generate benefits due to divine intervention. Finally, a large majority of both Christians and non-believers positively value the prayer because they think sending the prayer is a meaningful activity for the stranger. Hence, altruism could be an important part of the prayer’s value, to both Christians and non-believers–the recipient believes the sender of the prayer will benefit from undertaking the prayer.

While the results shown in Fig 2 indicate why people positively value prayers, it does not show how intensely each factor affects the positive value. Next, we examined the extent to which these factors, and covariates, affect the positive WTP. To do so, we regressed WTP for the prayer from the Christian stranger on agreement with each statement in Fig 2, a set of common demographics—gender, age, conservatism, religious belonging, religiosity (measured as frequency of church attendance) income and college attendance–as well as the type of hardship (issue) described in the experimental survey.

[...]

Fig 3 shows that the highest positive value for a prayer is generated if the recipient expects emotional comfort from the prayer. Although Fig 2 shows that many participants value the prayer because it benefits the sender to pray (altruism), the benefit to the sender does not contribute to the average positive value of a prayer (if anything, it brings down the mean positive value of the prayer). Further, beliefs that the prayer generates material help or improved health do not affect the mean positive value of the prayer.

[...]

The type of hardship addressed by the prayer also matters to the intensity by which a person values receiving a prayer. Around 30 percent of participants reported a health issue (for self or a loved one) as the hardship, around 30 percent reported a financial issue, between 15 and 20 percent reported a relationship issue, and around 20 percent an issue that does not fall into any of those categories. Recipients value the prayer more if the hardship they experience consists of a health or relationship issue (for themselves or a loved one), compared to if they or a loved one experience a financial issues (the benchmark in the model underlying Fig 3). These results are robust to the inclusion of covariates. Note that while being conservative significantly affects whether a prayer is positively valued (see above), more conservative people who value prayers do not assign a particularly high positive value to the prayer. This result is stable across our measurements of conservatism—it does not matter whether we use the SEC scale (the conservatism measure in Fig 3), the liberal-conservatism scale or political party belonging as a measure of conservatism.

The stability of beliefs in conspiracy theories is comparable to or higher than some of the most stable psychological attributes

Williams, Matt N., Mathew Ling, John R. Kerr, Stephen R. Hill, Mathew Marques, Hollie Mawson, and Edward J. R. Clarke. 2022. “To What Extent Do Beliefs in Conspiracy Theories Change over Time?.” PsyArXiv. March 31. doi:10.31234/osf.io/5q2ky

Abstract: Recent years have seen an explosion in psychological research on beliefs in conspiracy theories. This research has produced a significant body of knowledge about the antecedents and consequences of inter-individual belief in conspiracy theories. What is less clear, however, is the extent to which individuals’ beliefs in conspiracy theories vary over time (i.e., intra-individual variation). In this descriptive and exploratory study we therefore aimed to describe intra-individual variability in belief in conspiracy theories. We collected data from 498 Australians and New Zealanders using an online longitudinal survey, with data collected at monthly intervals over six months (March to September 2021). Our measure of conspiracy theories included items describing ten unfounded conspiracy theories with responses on a 5-point Likert scale. While there was substantial variability in beliefs between different participants (i.e., inter-individual variability), there was much less intra-individual variability (intraclass r = 0.91). Indeed, it was common for participants to give exactly the same response to a given theory at every time point. Via power analyses, we demonstrate that the small quantity of intra-individual variation in beliefs in conspiracy theories has important consequences for sample size planning in longitudinal studies.