Contrary to previous assumptions, statistics reveal lifelong increases in religiosity - with a potential drop among the oldest old

Secularization Trends Obscure Developmental Changes in Religiosity. Wiebke Bleidorn et al. Social Psychological and Personality Science, April 29, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1177/19485506221076684

Abstract: How do people’s religious beliefs and behaviors change over the course of adulthood? Previous research found rapid decreases in religiosity during young adulthood and rebounds in middle and late adulthood. However, secularization trends—if not accounted for—can bias or obscure age-graded changes in religiosity. Using longitudinal data from over 14,000 Dutch participants aged 16 to 101 years, we disentangled secularization trends from developmental changes in religiosity. Controlling for secularization, we found no evidence for age-graded declines in religiosity among young adults but lifelong increases in religiosity. These increases were most pronounced during middle to late adulthood, consistent with theories that emphasize the self-transcendent focus of this life stage. College-educated individuals were generally less religious and experienced less pronounced age-graded increases in their religious beliefs. These findings must be understood in the context of secularization trends as indicated by significant decreases in religiosity among people of all demographic groups.

Keywords: religiosity, lifespan, longitudinal, secularization, adult development, religious beliefs

Discussion

How do people’s religious beliefs and behaviors change over the course of adulthood? In this 11-wave longitudinal study, we separated developmental changes in three measures of religiosity—belief in God, religious service attendance, and praying—from secularization trends to draw a more precise picture of the lifespan trajectory of religiosity in a large, nationally representative sample from the Netherlands.

Results indicated that the average trajectory of all three religiosity measures was best captured by a quadratic curve, with increases over the course of adulthood and peak levels at about age 80 years. Consistent with national and international polling data (https://news.gallup.com/poll/1690/religion.aspx), we also found evidence for a significant secularization trend. That is, the average Dutch person in our sample experienced significant decreases in religiosity between 2008 and 2019.

As expected, not all individuals followed these average trends. Consistent with previous research (Arnett & Jensen, 2002; McCullough et al., 2005), men and college-educated individuals were generally less religious. Moreover, age-graded increases in belief in God were less pronounced in college-educated individuals compared to individuals without college education. In contrast to our predictions, religious background and health were unrelated to overall levels or changes in religiosity.

Implications of Findings

The present findings provide important insights into the effects of age and time on religious beliefs and behaviors in a secular culture like the Netherlands. By taking into account secularization trends, we identified a different trajectory of lifespan changes in religiosity than previous studies have. Four findings stand out.

First, in contrast to studies that emphasized the loss of religion among adolescents and young adults (e.g., Desmond et al., 2010; Hayward & Krause, 2013), we found no evidence for age-graded decreases in religiosity during emerging adulthood. When taking secularization effects into account, emerging adults were relatively stable or even increased in their religious beliefs and behaviors over the course of young adulthood (Twenge et al., 2015). In other words, observed decreases in religiosity were completely explained by secularization trends in the present sample.

Second, the quadratic trajectories indicate that most of the age-graded changes in religiosity occur during middle and late adulthood. The enhanced focus on religious beliefs and behavior in middle adulthood is consistent with lifespan developmental theories that emphasize the self-transcending and reflective focus of this life stage (Freund & Baltes, 2002; McAdams, 2001). These findings also correspond with findings on personality development in middle adulthood. Changes that typically occur during this life stage tend to reflect growth toward social maturity and adjustment (Schwaba et al., 2022), as indicated by increases in conscientiousness and agreeableness—traits that have been found to be consistently related to religiosity (Entringer et al., 2021; Gebauer et al., 2014; Saroglou, 2010).

Third, the present results shed more light on religiosity development in late adulthood. Consistent with Pascal’s wager and psychological theories that consider religious beliefs and behaviors as important strategies to cope with late-life challenges (Idler, 2006), we found significant increases in religiosity up until old age. A closer inspection of change among the oldest old suggests potential declines as people approach the end of their life. However, the relatively small sample of adults older than 85 and limited information about sample mortality precluded a more precise estimation of end-of-life changes in religiosity.

Fourth, with one exception, there was little evidence for moderators of lifespan changes in religiosity. Supporting previous research that found negative links between higher education and religiosity (Desmond et al., 2010), we found college-educated individuals to be less religious and experience less pronounced age-graded increases in their religious beliefs.

Limitations

We note some important limitations to this study. We focused on three core aspects of the religious experience; however, there may be other components of religiosity that were not covered in the present study. The generalizability of the present findings is further constrained by the moderate time period of the study (2008–2019) and the culture in which it was conducted. The Netherlands is among the most secularized Western countries and has seen accelerated secularization trends over the past decades. More longitudinal research on religiosity on samples from diverse countries and cultures is needed to gauge the generalizability of the present findings. More research is also needed to address these fundamental questions about the causes of the age-graded changes in religiosity.

Disaggregated Keynesian Economies with an Application to the COVID-19 Crisis: Reduced effectiveness of aggregate demand stimulus

Supply and Demand in Disaggregated Keynesian Economies with an Application to the COVID-19 Crisis. David Baqaee and Emmanuel Farhi. American Economic Review, 2022, vol. 112, issue 5, 1397-1436. https://doi.org/10.3886/E152801V1

Abstract: We study supply and demand shocks in a disaggregated model with multiple sectors, multiple factors, input-output linkages, downward nominal wage rigidities, credit-constraints, and a zero lower bound. We use the model to understand how the COVID-19 crisis, an omnibus supply and demand shock, affects output, unemployment, and inflation, and leads to the coexistence of tight and slack labor markets. We show that negative sectoral supply shocks are stagflationary, whereas negative demand shocks are deflationary, even though both can cause Keynesian unemployment. Furthermore, complementarities in production amplify Keynesian spillovers from supply shocks but mitigate them for demand shocks. This means that complementarities reduce the effectiveness of aggregate demand stimulus. In a stylized quantitative model of the United States, we find supply and demand shocks each explain about one-half of the reduction in real GDP from February to May 2020. Although there was as much as 6 percent Keynesian unemployment, this was concentrated in certain markets. Hence, aggregate demand stimulus is one quarter as effective as in a typical recession where all labor markets are slack.

JEL Classification:

E12 General Aggregative Models: Keynes; Keynesian; Post-Keynesian

E23 Macroeconomics: Production

E24 Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity

E31 Price Level; Inflation; Deflation

E32 Business Fluctuations; Cycles

E62 Fiscal Policy

I12 Health Behavior

Abusers' emotional disconnection and predatory nature facilitate their ability to maintain an intimate relationship while engaging in a wide range of abuse resulting in widespread harm to others' mental health

Psychopathic traits predict the severity of post-traumatic stress in survivors of intimate partner abuse. Courtney Humeny, Adelle Forth, John Logan. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 193, July 2022, 111611. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2022.111611

Abstract: Limited research exists exploring survivors' experiences in a relationship with a psychopathic abuser and their mental health following relationship dissolution. The present study examines the specific traits and patterns of abuse that have the most profound impact on survivors' mental health. Self-identified survivors of an intimate relationship with a psychopathic abuser (N = 454; Mage = 45.5) were recruited from intimate partner abuse support websites. They were assessed for abuse experiences, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptomology, and the extent to which their abuser exhibited psychopathic traits via self-report questionnaires. Multiple regression analysis revealed that abusers' psychopathic traits were predictive of survivors' PTSD symptomology. Specifically, when controlling for the duration since last contact with the abuser and relationship length, interpersonal and affective traits, and experiences of versatile forms of abuse contributed to more severe PTSD symptoms. The present findings are consistent with an emerging body of research showing that abusers' emotional disconnection and predatory nature facilitate their ability to maintain an intimate relationship while engaging in a wide range of abuse resulting in widespread harm to survivors' mental health.

Keywords: PsychopathyPsychopath survivorIntimate partner abusePost-traumatic stress disorder

"Overall, we found no evidence that people can accurately identify who is authentic"

Are You for Real? Perceptions of Authenticity Are Systematically Biased and Not Accurate. Erica R. Bailey, Aharon Levy. Psychological Science, April 28, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1177/09567976211056623

Abstract: Can people accurately perceive who is authentic? Laypeople believe they can tell who is authentic, and they report that authenticity is an important attribute in others (Studies 1a and 1b; N = 369). However, when we directly tested the accuracy of perceived authenticity, we found no significant correlation between self- and other-rated authenticity in two cohorts of adult students in randomly assigned teams (Studies 2 and 3; 4,040 self-other observations). In addition, we found that perceived authenticity was biased in two ways: (a) Other-rated authenticity showed a positivity bias compared with self-ratings, and (b) other-rated authenticity was biased by the rater’s own authenticity. In Study 3, we also investigated authenticity meta-perceptions; although people expect their authenticity to be accurately perceived by others, their meta-perceptions did not correlate with other-rated authenticity. That is, beliefs about the visibility of one’s authenticity are similarly not accurate. Overall, we found no evidence that people can accurately identify who is authentic.

Keywords: perception, individual differences, social cognition, authenticity, open data, open materials

Why hunt? Why gather? Why share? Hadza women were more likely than men to rank family-provisioning highly whereas men were more likely than women to rank skill-signaling highly

Why hunt? Why gather? Why share? Hadza assessments of foraging and food-sharing motive. Duncan N.E. Stibbard-Hawkes, Kristopher Smith, Coren L. Apicella. Evolution and Human Behavior, Volume 43, Issue 3, May 2022, Pages 257-272. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2022.03.001

Abstract: Over the last half century, anthropologists have vigorously debated the adaptive motivations underlying food acquisition choices and food-sharing among hunter-gatherer groups. Numerous explanations have been proposed to account for high-levels of generosity in food-sharing, including self- and family-provisioning, reciprocity, tolerated theft and pro-social- or skill-signaling. However, few studies have asked foragers directly and systematically about the motivations underlying their foraging and sharing decisions. We recruited 110 Hadza participants and employed a combination of free-response, yes/no, ranking and forced-choice questions to do just this. In free-response answers, respondents typically gave outcome-oriented accounts of foraging motive (e.g., to get food) and moralistic accounts of sharing motive (e.g., I have a good heart). In ranking tasks, participants gave precedence to reciprocity as a motive for sharing food beyond the household. We found small but clear gender differences in foraging motive, in line with previous predictions: women were more likely than men to rank family-provisioning highly whereas men were more likely than women to rank skill-signaling highly. However, despite these gender differences, the relative importance of different motivations was similar across genders and skill-signaling, sharing and family-provisioning were the most important motivators of foraging activity for both men and women. Contrary to the expectations of tolerated theft, peer complaints and requests for food ranked very low. There are several compelling reasons that evolutionary thinkers, typically interested in ultimate-level adaptive processes, have traditionally eschewed direct and explicit investigations of motive. However, these data may yet provide important insights.

Keywords: Hunter-gatherersFood-sharingCostly signalingReciprocityCooperationHadza

Tweets from American politicians have become more incivil over the last decade; uncivil tweets tended to receive more approval and attention, publicly indexed by large quantities of “likes” and “retweets”

Incivility Is Rising Among American Politicians on Twitter. Jeremy A. Frimer et al. Social Psychological and Personality Science, April 28, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1177/19485506221083811

Abstract: We provide the first systematic investigation of trends in the incivility of American politicians on Twitter, a dominant platform for political communication in the United States. Applying a validated artificial intelligence classifier to all 1.3 million tweets made by members of Congress since 2009, we observe a 23% increase in incivility over a decade on Twitter. Further analyses suggest that the rise was partly driven by reinforcement learning in which politicians engaged in greater incivility following positive feedback. Uncivil tweets tended to receive more approval and attention, publicly indexed by large quantities of “likes” and “retweets” on the platform. Mediational and longitudinal analyses show that the greater this feedback for uncivil tweets, the more uncivil tweets were thereafter. We conclude by discussing how the structure of social media platforms might facilitate this incivility-reinforcing dynamic between politicians and their followers.

Keywords: incivility, political polarization, Twitter, social media, affective polarization

Some said that "conservatives think liberals are stupid, and liberals think conservatives are evil," but not so: Both sides see opponents as more stupid than evil

People See Political Opponents as More Stupid Than Evil. Rachel Hartman, Neil Hester, Kurt Gray. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, April 28, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672221089451

Abstract: Affective polarization is a rising threat to political discourse and democracy. Public figures have expressed that “conservatives think liberals are stupid, and liberals think conservatives are evil.” However, four studies (N = 1,660)—including a representative sample—reveal evidence that both sides view political opponents as more unintelligent than immoral. Perceiving the other side as “more stupid than evil” occurs both in general judgments (Studies 1, 3, and 4) and regarding specific issues (Study 2). Study 4 also examines “meta-perceptions” of how Democrats and Republicans disparage one another, revealing that people correctly perceive that both Democrats and Republicans see each other as more unintelligent than immoral, although they exaggerate the extent of this negativity. These studies clarify the way everyday partisans view each other, an important step in designing effective interventions to reduce political animosity.

Keywords: political polarization, affective polarization, meta-perceptions, social perceptions

General Discussion

Our aim was twofold: to assess whether cross-party perceptions of unintelligence and immorality are distinct, and to compare liberals’ and conservatives’ perceptions of each other. Although some work suggests that dimensional complexity should be higher for ingroup members, who are often perceived as more heterogeneous (Mullen & Hu, 1989), we find greater dimensional complexity for outgroup members. Across four studies, we found that for outgroup ratings, unintelligence and immorality fell into two separate categories. On the contrary, for ingroup ratings, unintelligence and immorality were best conceived of as one factor. This might be explained by the fact that people’s experiences of negative attitudes and emotions are often more complex than their experiences of positive attitudes and emotions (Koenig-Lewis & Palmer, 2014).

Contrary to Krauthammer’s popular quote, we found that both liberals and conservatives view each other as more unintelligent than immoral. Furthermore, we found that participants accurately thought both Democrats and Republicans view each other as more unintelligent than immoral. However, participants exaggerated the magnitude of disparagement, thinking political groups have more negative views of their opponents than they actually do.

These findings replicated across four studies, when the questions were asked abstractly (Studies 1, 3, and 4) or regarding specific voting behaviors (Study 2). While preparing this manuscript, we took advantage of the Coronavirus pandemic to test whether political perceptions changed during a period of political tension. The pandemic, which began as an apolitical health threat (Holzwarth, 2020), transformed into a highly partisan issue in the United States (Newport, 2020). People on the right were eager to reopen the economy, whereas people on the left worried about the health risk (Roubein, 2020). Republicans were accused of being callous about human lives, whereas Democrats were accused of not understanding the gravity of the virus’s economic effects (Hulse, 2020). On May 14, 2020, we asked 329 MTurk workers via CloudResearch (Litman et al., 2017) to think of the way Democrats and Republicans have been reacting to the pandemic and indicate the extent to which the six unintelligence and six immoral items apply to each group. Replicating the previous four studies, both Democrats and Republicans viewed each other as more unintelligent than immoral. This timely replication provides further support for our main finding (full analyses are reported in the Supplemental Materials).

Implications

Political polarization is at an all-time high. To bridge political divides, researchers and organizations need a solid understanding of how partisans perceive each other. The present studies show that, although liberals and conservatives often seem to disagree about moral values, the two groups still disparage each other’s intelligence more than each other’s morality. This finding replicates the results of the Axios poll (Hart, 2018), but runs counter to the Pew Research Foundation poll (Pew Research Center, 2019a). This may be a result of the question framing (i.e., “compared to the average American”). Future research should investigate the discrepant findings.

Two (competing) theories in the social psychology literature highlight the importance of morality in politics: According to Moral Foundations Theory (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2012), liberals and conservatives disagree on many issues because they differ in their moral foundations. According to the Theory of Dyadic Morality (Schein & Gray, 2018), liberals and conservatives share the same moral mind, and therefore, if they come to understand this fact, they should find common ground. The findings from our studies suggest that morality is just part of the story, and perhaps not the most important part. If unintelligence, rather than immorality, drives perceptions of political groups, future research and interventions should aim to facilitate recognition of the other group’s knowledge and intelligence, rather than focus primarily on their morality.

Our fourth study found that political groups tend to overestimate the degree to which they view each other as unintelligent and immoral. This finding replicates similar findings in the literature: Partisans overestimate the extremity of positions held by each group (Ahler, 2014; Chambers et al., 2006; Lees & Cikara, 2020; Levendusky & Malhotra, 2016; Van Boven et al., 2018; Yudkin et al., 2019) and think each side dehumanizes the other more than they actually do (Moore-Berg et al., 2020). Ahler (2014) has demonstrated that alleviating misperceptions is often beneficial not only in correcting the meta-perceptions but also in mitigating the attitudes themselves. Future research should explore this method for reducing affective polarization.

Limitations

We acknowledge several limitations to the present research. First, we restricted our data collection to American participants; thus, our findings may not necessarily generalize to partisan groups in other cultures. Second, the data we collected, to the extent they can be generalized to the American population, only reflect the participants’ perceptions of their outgroups at the time the data were collected. Notably, we collected our data prior to the storming of the Capitol on January 6, 2021. Significant events such as this one may have a large impact on political perceptions. However, the public discourse surrounding the event appeared to reflect our finding: On social and mass media, observers framed the right-wing protesters as “misled,” “brainwashed,” and “manipulated” (Hale, 2021; Kristof, 2021; Lewis, 2021).

In addition, as we only assessed perceptions of unintelligence and immorality, we do not exhaustively describe liberals’ and conservatives’ perceptions of each other. Partisans likely use many other negative adjectives to describe their opponents. Our study has high face validity, in that the focus on “stupid” and “evil” reflects cultural discourse about political groups, but it is far from a comprehensive overview of partisan disparagement. Furthermore, we acknowledge that we did not provide partisans with the opportunity to report positive views of their opponents.

Finally, there is the possibility that the general pattern of political outgroup unintelligence ratings being greater than immorality ratings is not a finding that is specific to political outgroups, but rather is a characteristic of any intergroup perceptions. Although it is certainly possible that one could observe the same pattern in other intergroup contexts, there are reasons to believe that these same patterns do not generalize across all ingroup–outgroup perceptions. For example, both men and women who endorse benevolent sexist beliefs (Glick & Fiske, 1996) are more likely to rate the gap between unintelligence and immorality to be larger for women than for men because here women are stereotyped as being both pure and in need of protection (i.e., incapable). Even in the case of other antagonistic groups, it is not necessarily the case that these same patterns occur. For example, atheists are uniquely seen by Christians as being highly immoral (but not necessarily unintelligent; Gervais, 2013; Gervais et al., 2011), whereas Christians are seen by atheists as being less competent in science, in part because of the perceived conflict between science and religion (Rios et al., 2015; Simpson & Rios, 2019).

Finally, one might argue that unintelligence perceptions were higher than immorality perceptions because of the items’ wordings. Perhaps we worded the unintelligence items more negatively, causing partisans to endorse them more. However, if this were the case, we would not have expected the same pattern of results (unintelligence > immorality) for the ingroup ratings. Another objection one might raise is that people are just averse to seeing others as evil. This may be true, but first, participants did endorse the immorality items to some degree, and second, we can conclude that despite the pervasiveness of political antipathy, partisans are still somewhat reluctant to view each other as immoral.

"Rather than discriminating against women who run for office, voters on average appear to reward women," "the average effect of being a woman (relative to a man) is a gain of approximately 2 percentage points"

What Have We Learned about Gender from Candidate Choice Experiments? A Meta-Analysis of Sixty-Seven Factorial Survey Experiments. Susanne Schwarz and Alexander Coppock. The Journal of Politics Volume 84, Number 2, April 2022. https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/716290

Abstract: Candidate choice survey experiments in the form of conjoint or vignette experiments have become a standard part of the political science toolkit for understanding the effects of candidate characteristics on vote choice. We collect 67 such studies from all over the world and reanalyze them using a standardized approach. We find that the average effect of being a woman (relative to a man) is a gain of approximately 2 percentage points. We find some evidence of heterogeneity across contexts, candidates, and respondents. The difference is somewhat larger for white (vs. black) candidates and among survey respondents who are women (vs. men) or, in the US context, identify as Democrats or Independents (vs. Republicans). Our results add to the growing body of experimental and observational evidence that voter preferences are not a major factor explaining the persistently low rates of women in elected office.

Almost half of the participants failed the Turing test, being unable to convince the other side that they were human

Would You Pass the Turing Test? Influencing Factors of the Turing Decision. Adrienn Ujhelyi, Flora Almosdi, Alexandra Fodor. Psychological Topics, Vol. 31 No. 1 (2022). Apr 2022. https://pt.ffri.hr/pt/article/view/800

Abstract: We aimed to contribute to the emerging field of human-computer interaction by revealing some of the cues we use to distinguish humans from machines. Maybe the most well-known method of inquiry in artificial intelligence is the Turing test, in which participants have to judge whether their conversation partner is either a machine or human. In two studies, we used the Turing test as an opportunity to reveal the factors influencing Turing decisions. In our first study, we created a situation similar to a Turing test: a written, online conversation and we hypothesized that if the other entity expresses a view different from ours, we might think that they are a member of another group, in this case, the group of machines. We measured the attitude of the participants (N = 100) before the conversation, then we compared the attitude difference of the partners to their Turing decision. Our results showed a significant relationship between the Turing decision and the attitude difference of the conversation partners. The more difference between attitudes correlated with a more likely decision of the other being a machine. With our second study, we wanted to widen the range of variables and we also wanted to measure their effect in a more controlled, systematic way. In this case, our participants (N = 632) were exposed to an excerpt of a manipulated Turing test transcription. The dialogues were modified based on 8 variables: humour, grammar, activity, the similarity of attitude, coherence, leading the conversation, emoji use, and the appearance of the interface. Our results showed that logical answers, proper grammar, and similar attitudes predicted the Turing decisions best. We also found that more people considered mistaking a computer for a human being a bigger problem than vice versa and this choice was greatly influenced by the participants’ negative attitudes towards robots. Besides contributing to our understanding of our attitude toward machines, our study has also shed light on the consequences of dehumanization.

Keywords: Turing test, artificial intelligence, attitude, social psychology

From 2019... Even subtle perturbations in sleep quality from one night to the next negatively impact anxiety; disturbed sleep might be an underappreciated factor in the escalating rates of anxiety disorders.

Overanxious and underslept. Eti Ben Simon, Aubrey Rossi, Allison G. Harvey & Matthew P. Walker. Nature Human Behaviour volume 4, pages100–110. Nov 4 2019. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-019-0754-8

Abstract: Are you feeling anxious? Did you sleep poorly last night? Sleep disruption is a recognized feature of all anxiety disorders. Here, we investigate the basic brain mechanisms underlying the anxiogenic impact of sleep loss. Additionally, we explore whether subtle, societally common reductions in sleep trigger elevated next-day anxiety. Finally, we examine what it is about sleep, physiologically, that provides such an overnight anxiety-reduction benefit. We demonstrate that the anxiogenic impact of sleep loss is linked to impaired medial prefrontal cortex activity and associated connectivity with extended limbic regions. In contrast, non-rapid eye movement (NREM) slow-wave oscillations offer an ameliorating, anxiolytic benefit on these brain networks following sleep. Of societal relevance, we establish that even modest night-to-night reductions in sleep across the population predict consequential day-to-day increases in anxiety. These findings help contribute to an emerging framework explaining the intimate link between sleep and anxiety and further highlight the prospect of non-rapid eye movement sleep as a therapeutic target for meaningfully reducing anxiety.

Lesbian cis women feminists express greater levels of negativity toward trans women than other cis women (heterosexual, bisexual, pansexual, and asexual) do

This is my TERF! Lesbian Feminists and the Stigmatization of Trans Women. Meredith G. F. Worthen. Sexuality & Culture, Apr 26 2022. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12119-022-09970-w

Abstract: Though there is evidence of an historical exclusion of trans women from lesbian feminist separatist spaces supported by radical feminist lesbian anti-trans discourse as well as modern examples of anti-trans perspectives promoted by feminists sometimes described as Trans Exclusionary Radical Feminists, it remains unclear as to if there is a significant association between being a lesbian cis woman feminist and harboring negative attitudes toward trans women or alternatively, if the recent proliferation of exclusionary tactics directed toward trans women’s rights (especially via social media) has been the result of loud voices among a minority who have been successful anti-trans mouthpieces as of late. The current study utilizes survey data (N = 1461 cis women; n = 331 lesbian cis women) to investigate the following research questions: (1) do lesbian cis women feminists express greater levels of negativity toward trans women than other cis women (heterosexual, bisexual, pansexual, and asexual) do? and (2) is there a relationship between feminist identity among lesbian cis women and the stigmatization of trans women (as undeserving of rights, as incapable parents/mothers, as excluded from the military, and as sexually problematic)? Results provide ample evidence of anti-trans perspectives among some lesbian cis women feminists. Overall, the findings provide a starting point to begin to understand how to dismantle the complexities embedded in the relationships between feminism, lesbian identity, and trans negativity and work toward a trans-inclusive future of feminism.

Notes

1 “Womyn-born womyn” is a phrase used to describe those who were born and labeled female as their sex assigned at birth and who have lived their entire lives as females. It emphasizes the significance of sex essentialism and the uniqueness of “female experiences.” In this conceptualization, females who are “womyn-born womyn” endure the oppressions of patriarchy in distinct ways that differ from those are not “womyn-born womyn” (Browne, 2009, p. 548).

2 This is despite the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964 statute that now (as of 2019) explicitly prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender identity.

3 Reforms to the U.K. GRA Gender Recognition Act (GRA) were suggested in 2018 and were denied in 2020. If put into place, the reforms would have made it easier for trans people to self-identify their genders because the requirements to provide a Gender Recognition Certificate and gender dysphoria diagnoses from two different medical professionals would have been dropped.

4 Trans-exclusionary feminists who reinforce sex essentialism incorrectly argue that if trans women were allowed into “women’s only” spaces, they could subject cis women to “unwanted exposure of male genitalia,” “male sexual objectification,” “male sexual violence,” and “male predation” (Burt, 2020, p. 375).

5 Numerous scholars have documented that trans women are at very high risk of sexualized violence (James et al., 2016; Meyer, 2015; Schilt & Westbrook, 2009; Wodda & Panfil, 2014) and sexual objectification (Sevelius, 2013) by hetero cis men.

6 It is unknown how many of these emails were actually received and read by the potential respondents so an exact response rate is also unknown. For example, junk mail filters could have prevented potential respondents from seeing the email invitation, some may have opened the email but decided not to click the link to access the survey, and some may have been deemed ineligible due to identity quotas being met as requested by the author set by SSI (5 of the 8 identity quotas were met).

7 For gender identity, respondents were asked “What best describes your gender?” with responses that were coded as cis men (those that indicated “I identify as a man and my sex assigned at birth was male”), cis women (those that indicated: “I identify as a woman and my sex assigned at birth was female”), trans men (those that indicated “I identify as a man and my sex assigned at birth was female”), trans women (those that indicated “I identify as a woman and my sex assigned at birth was male”), and non-binary (those that indicated “I am gender-nonbinary, gender fluid, or genderqueer”).

8 The survey was held open for 19 days in efforts to meet the quotas set for the LGBT groups. Five quotas were met as follows: gay men (5 days in), bisexual women (7 days in), lesbian women (8 days in), cis men and cis women (16 days in). The quotas for the remaining three groups (bisexual men, trans men, and trans women) were not met. The survey was closed because SSI believed it was not realistic to expect these quotas to fill in a reasonable amount of time.

9 Ancillary analyses (results not shown but available upon request) were conducted using (1) a subsample of only lesbian cis women and hetero cis women (n = 1081) so that lesbian women could be compared to only hetero cis women and (2) a subsample of only lesbian cis women and BPA cis women (n = 726) so that lesbian women could be compared to only BPA cis women. Results demonstrate similar patterns to those presented in Table 3 and there were no new patterns found in any of these analyses thus confirming that the relationships in Table 3 hold true even when the reference groups differ in these ways.

Rolf Degen summarizing... The myth that some people have a real photographic memory has become indispensable in collective consciousness

Myths of Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy: Development and Testing of a Questionnaire for Standardized Assessment. Jungmann S.M. · Witthöft M. Verhaltenstherapie, Apr 2022. https://doi.org/10.1159/000507946

Abstract:

Background: Myths in the sense of scientifically untenable statements are widespread in the field of clinical psychology and psychotherapy and can have considerable consequences (e.g., stigmatization, ineffective/potentially harmful treatments). In German-speaking countries, myths have so far been little investigated, and there is no validated questionnaire specifically for the assessment of myths in clinical psychology/psychotherapy. The aim of the study was to develop a questionnaire on myths in clinical psychology/psychotherapy (FMKPP) and to conduct a first psychometric test on two samples (general population, students). In addition, correlations with personality traits, absorption, and intolerance of uncertainty were examined.

Methods: In a sample of the German general population (n= 286) as well as in college students (n= 368), the factor structure and item characteristics were examined, and correlations with dispositional characteristics were calculated. Results: The FMKPP consists of three factors: “myths about the effectiveness of psychotherapy,” “myths about mental disorders/processes in psychotherapy,” and “myths concerning the functioning of memory.” Reliabilities (McDonald’s ω) were between 0.50 and 0.75. As expected, the FMKPP showed significant positive correlations with absorption and uncertainty intolerance.

Conclusion: The reliability and validity of individual items should be investigated in future studies. The association with intolerance of uncertainty could indicate a function of myths in terms of increasing safety and predictability.

Keywords: MythsFalse assumptionsIntolerance of uncertaintyAbsorption

Discussion

The aim of the present work was to develop a questionnaire specifically for assessing myths in clinical psychology and psychotherapy and to test its factor structure, psychometric quality, as well as correlations with personality traits on two independent samples (general population, psychology students).

According to the principal component analysis, the FMKPP comprises three factors that can be described in terms of content with the subscales “myths about the effectiveness of psychotherapy,” “myths about mental disorders/processes in psychotherapy,” and “myths concerning the functioning of memory.” This structure shows a clear overlap with the differentiation of myths in the American context of psychotherapy discussed in the review article by Lilienfeld et al. [2013], with regard to “myths about effective interventions,” “myths about memory,” and “myths about the meaning of early experiences.” The two samples were mostly the same with respect to the maximum loadings on the respective factors. The subscales correlated weakly to moderately (r = 0.14–0.28, p ≤ 0.007; Table 3). As with previous studies [Swami et al., 2012; Kanning et al., 2013, 2014; Swami et al., 2016], this finding may indicate that there are differences in myth acceptance depending on the subject area. Since the development and testing of the questionnaire were performed on the same sample, it is also possible that these correlations were overestimated and are in the low range.

Out of all 20 misconceptions, the myth “Some people have a real photographic memory” (item 25) was most consistently accepted in both samples (mean = 4.72/4.53, SD = 1.14/1.13). Like a study in the USA [Patihis et al., 2014], which found 87.7% agreement with this misconception about the functioning of memory, the present study showed agreement rates (at least “somewhat agree”) of 89.2% (S1) or 83.7% (S2). The sociodemographic data of the student sample examined here (S2) is most comparable to the sample of Patihis et al. [2014] (students, 75% female, mean = 20 years). A high level of myth acceptance, as well as varying levels depending on the myth, can be explained in different ways, e.g., by the person’s experiences and attitudes, the type of studies or professional activity, or the myth’s popularity and media coverage [Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Lilienfeld et al., 2013; Appel and Schreiner, 2014]. The fact that “myths concerning the functioning of memory” are particularly widespread could be explained by the immediate concern and everyday relevance of memory processes, but also by the constant high media presence and controversy about the connection between memory and psychopathological processes [Crews, 1995; Appel and Schreiner, 2014]. Although misconceptions were found to be persistent [Lilienfeld et al., 2013; Otgaar et al., 2019], the present study found, consistent with previous research, that the mediation of relevant expertise – e.g., for those studying psychology – is associated with significantly lower myth acceptance [Standing and Huber, 2003; Taylor and Kowalski, 2004; Furnham and Hughes, 2014].

The item analysis indicated satisfactory to good psychometric properties. Three items showed low discriminative power in one sample each (S1: item 17; S2: items 6 and 15) (rit < 0.30) [Lienert and Raatz, 1994]. Regarding item 17 (“A very high intelligence quotient raises the risk of mental disorders”), from a scientific point of view there are also isolated divergent findings. In a study with over 10,000 adolescents [Keyes et al., 2017], the presence of a mental disorder showed no correlation or a negative one with IQ (among the disorders were ADHD, substance use disorder, and various anxiety disorders; the exception was a positive correlation with depression). With regard to the psychopathological severity across all disorders, greater severity was associated with lower fluid intelligence [Keyes et al., 2017]. A recent study [Karpinski et al., 2018] found, however, that a very high IQ (above the 98th percentile) is associated with a higher rate of ADHD, autism spectrum disorders, and anxiety and depressive disorders; but interpretation of the result should take into consideration the study’s significant methodological limitations (e.g., self-reported diagnoses), and no direct (causal) connection (“intelligence increases the risk”) has been demonstrated. The fact that item 17 cannot currently be indisputably evaluated scientifically in the form of such a sweeping statement could also explain the low factor loadings and the low discriminative power of the item, which should be checked in further studies and might lead to exclusion of the item.

Item 6 (“Disclosing the diagnosis ... harms the therapeutic alliance”) showed the lowest agreement of all the statements, especially among psychology students, with comparably high variance. Furthermore, the explanation of item 6 might be more heavily corrected and internalized by those studying psychology, due to its practical relevance compared to the other statements. With regard to item 15 (“Patients with a mental disorder, e.g., schizophrenia, are often violent”), it was striking that, contrary to the other items (except item 22), the student sample on average agreed more often than did participants from the general population. In addition, there was an unexpected positive correlation between myth acceptance and the number of semesters of study (r = 0.26, p < 0.001), with a comparatively low average number of semesters overall (mean = 3.6, SD = 2.2), which could indicate that the students had acquired some knowledge of mental disorders, which, however, could also have led to assumptions that are incorrect from a scientific standpoint.

Reliabilities were within the acceptable range for the FMKPP total scale and for the “myths about the effectiveness of psychotherapy” subscale (ω = 0.70–0.75). The subscales “myths about mental disorders/processes in psychotherapy” (ω = 0.61/0.50) and “myths concerning the functioning of memory” (ω = 0.69/0.63) yielded low values and should be checked in further studies. The low reliability of the subscale “myths about mental disorders/processes in psychotherapy” in S2 can be explained, among other things, by the fact that the two ambiguous items (6 and 13) were assigned to the second factor, to the disadvantage of S2 (content fit and higher loadings in S1). This factor also appeared to be less consistent in content, since it covers myths about both characteristics of mental disorders and processes of psychotherapy (therapeutic alliance, side effects).

Regarding correlations with personality traits, our findings indicate a lack of connection with “Openness.” The association with personality traits may also be determined by the specific content of the myths. While Swami et al. [2016] identified a negative relationship between “Openness” and a scientific myth (r= –0.21, p < 0.001), Swami et al. [2012] found no relationship to everyday (psychological) myths. Moreover, the operationalization of the construct “Openness” could also explain the differences between our study’s findings and those of Swami et al. [2016]. While we used the BFI short version, which assesses the imaginative and aesthetic components of Openness, Swami et al. [2016] studied “Openness” with the BFI more comprehensively, including the intellectual curiosity component, which was also used to explain the negative relationship with acceptance of the myth. It should also be further investigated to what extent the content and/or, for example, the form of presentation is important (more detailed description of a scenario [Swami et al., 2016]).

Consistent with the findings of Patihis et al. [2014], this first psychometric test of the FMKPP presents positive correlations between absorption (the disposition to pay more attention to sensory/imaginative experiences) and the total score as well as the subscale “myths concerning the functioning of memory” of the FMKPP (r = 0.18–0.45, p < 0.003). In previous studies, absorption was related, for one thing, to suggestibility [Eisen and Carlson, 1998], which might explain an association with greater myth acceptance in general. On the other hand, people with a higher level of absorption had greater hypnotic responsivity and more frequent reports of childhood abuse [Eisen and Carlson, 1998; Roche and McConkey, 1990]. Both areas are directly related to the factor “myths concerning the functioning of memory” of the FMKPP.

Also as expected, positive correlations were found between the FMKPP and the UIS (total FMKPP: r = 0.20–0.21, p < 0.018), which could indicate that people with higher myth acceptance have a greater need for safety and control over events and the future. Comparison of the subscales showed a differentiated picture. An inability to act associated with intolerance of uncertainty (e.g., “It paralyzes me to have to act,” low self-esteem) was, for example, positively correlated with “myths about mental disorders/processes of psychotherapy,” which could be explained by the overlapping content of the two subscales (self-esteem issues, causes of mental problems). Considering the study design (construction and validation for the same sample in each case), the (already weak) correlations may have been overestimated so that the correlations must be interpreted carefully and should only be regarded as preliminary indications. To be able to derive more reliable statements, including on (different) functions of myths, it will be necessary to conduct further studies with more representative samples and investigation of additional variables (e.g., fearfulness or situational use of myths).

Limitations

This study should be interpreted as a presentation of the development and the first test of the FMKPP. An examination of the factor values and item analysis revealed some, although comparatively few, inconsistent findings between the two samples (maximum loadings, items 6 and 13), low discriminative power of items 6, 15, and 17 (<0.30) [Lienert and Raatz, 1994 ], and ambiguities of content (item 11, item 17 see discussion above). Item 11 (“… important… to vent one’s anger”) showed unambiguous factor values and was therefore assigned to the corresponding factor (“myths concerning the functioning of memory”), but its content is rather removed from the other myths about memory. One association with this factor could be that item 11 also addresses an underlying cause (comparable to traumatic experiences) and how it is dealt with (repression as inadequate) so that the classification was left in this form during the first trial. These limitations in factor structure and item analysis can probably also explain the low reliabilities of the two subscales “myths about mental disorders” and “myths about the functioning of memory” and should be studied in a more representative general population.

The construction and validation of the FMKPP used the same sample (although in parallel on two independent samples). In the development process, for example, there was no step-by-step selection of items, which, among other things, might explain the sometimes low item-scale correlations. This method might also lead to a tendency to overestimate the correlations found (Table 3). In light of the weak correlations with absorption and intolerance of uncertainty, as well as the possibility of alpha error inflation, the results should be interpreted very carefully and as preliminary indications.

The choice of the associated constructs was primarily based on prior English-language work. For future research, it would make sense to conduct a stringent convergent and discriminant validation of the FMKPP (e.g., the subject’s agreement with misconceptions from the field of psychology and other sciences, belief/orientation based on empirical findings).

Regarding the sample, it should also be mentioned that the general population studied here comprised a disproportionately high proportion of participants with an academic degree (46%), as well as participants who had studied psychology in the past or were studying it currently (9%). This can be explained by the method of recruitment (“convenience sample”), which occurred via social media among the friends, acquaintances, and family of psychology students, people who presumably have a comparably high school/academic education.

Research to date suggests that schooling in general [Kanning et al., 2013] and psychological training in particular [Gardner and Dalsing, 1986; Standing and Huber, 2003; Kanning et al., 2013] are associated with lower agreement with misconceptions. Since the sample of the general population studied here showed low variance with regard to education, no reliable statement can be made about the relationship between education and myth acceptance. The FMKPP should therefore be examined in future studies with more representative samples (especially with regard to education). Other studies have also shown that higher IQ scores and a critically reflective mindset are associated with lower myth acceptance [McCutcheon et al., 1992; Bensley et al., 2014; Patihis et al., 2014]. Since IQ scores and education are significantly correlated, the question posed for future research is to what extent both factors contribute to the acceptance or rejection of misconceptions.

The statements used in the FMKPP are excerpted from myths that are often studied in the English-speaking world, as well as the authors’ experiences, which can currently be divided into three areas. Additional misconceptions may be interesting to investigate, which could also result in alternative or additional factors. The FMKPP makes no claim as to the completeness of its list of misconceptions in the field of clinical psychology and psychotherapy; its goal is to comparatively efficiently assess misconceptions in the German-speaking countries that also frequently occur internationally and thus to make possible international comparisons.

For single men, testosterone increased ratings of attractiveness for low attractive female faces; for paired men, it increased ratings of attractiveness for the high attractive

Relatively rapid effects of testosterone on men's ratings of female attractiveness depend on relationship status and the attractiveness of stimulus faces. Shawn N. Geniole et al. Hormones and Behavior, Volume 142, June 2022, 105174, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.yhbeh.2022.105174

Highlights

• Effects of testosterone on men’s ratings of female attractiveness

• Testosterone's effects depended on relationship status and attractiveness of the stimulus face.

• For single men, testosterone increased ratings of attractiveness for low attractive female faces.

• For paired men, testosterone increased ratings of attractiveness for high attractive female faces.

Abstract: Attractiveness judgements influence desires to initiate and maintain romantic relationships. Testosterone also predicts relationship initiation and maintenance; such effects may be driven by the hormone's modulation of attractiveness judgements, but no studies have investigated causal (and situation-dependent) effects of the hormone on these judgements. Using a placebo-controlled cross-over design, our preregistered analyses revealed order- and relationship- dependent effects: single heterosexual men judged the women as more appealing when testosterone was administered first (and placebo second), but marginally less appealing when placebo was administered first (and testosterone second). In a more complex model incorporating the women's attractiveness (as rated by an independent set of observers), however, we show that testosterone increases the appeal of women —but this effect depends upon the men's relationship status and the women's attractiveness. In partnered men (n = 53) who tend to derogate attractive alternatives (by rating them as less appealing), testosterone countered this effect, boosting the appeal of these attractive alternatives. In single men (n = 53), conversely, testosterone increased the appeal of low-attractive women. These differential effects highlight the possibility of a newly discovered mechanism whereby testosterone promotes male sexual reproduction through different routes depending on relationship status, promoting partner up- rather than down-grading when partnered and reducing choosiness when single. Further, such effects were relatively rapid [within 85 (±5) minutes], suggesting a potential non-genomic mechanism of action.

Keywords: Facial attractivenessTestosteroneRelationship statusDerogation effect

The female partners tended to underreport the levels of psychopathic traits in their male partner

When the Partner’s Reality Bites: Associations Between Self- and Partner Ratings of Psychopathic Traits, Relationship Quality and Conflict Tactics. Kasia Uzieblo et al. International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, April 21, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1177/0306624X221086560

Abstract: The present study examined associations of self- and partner-reported psychopathic traits, as well as the level of agreement between these reports (perceptual accuracy), with relationship quality, and the moderating role of violent and non-violent conflict tactics. Participants were 259 heterosexual couples from the community. Results indicated that, despite moderate convergence between self- and partner-reports, the female partners tended to underreport the levels of psychopathic traits in their male partner. Relationship quality was negatively associated with partner-reported and, albeit to a lesser extent, self-reported psychopathic traits. Contrary to expectations, perceptual accuracy was barely associated with relationship quality. Whereas no evidence was found for the moderating role of aggressive conflict tactics, non-violent negotiation seemed to buffer the effect of psychopathic traits on relationship quality. The study highlights the importance of considering the partner’s perceptions as well as constructive conflict tactics when examining psychopathic traits in intimate relationships.

Keywords: psychopathy, relationship quality, intimate partner violence, negotiation, conflict tactics

Exposure to The Ultimate Fighter, with fighters competing on violent mixed martial arts, significantly reduced crime; these effects are particularly evident for assault, began in the month the show premiered, and persisted for many years

Effects of Violent Media Content: Evidence from the Rise of the UFC. Jason M. Lindo, Isaac D.Swensen, Glen R. Waddell. Journal of Health Economics, April 22 2022, 102623. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2022.102623

Abstract: We document the effect of violent media on crime. Specifically, we evaluate the effects of The Ultimate Fighter, a hit TV show that features fighters competing in violent mixed martial arts and which brought Ultimate Fighting Championship into the mainstream. We estimate the effect of exposure to the show’s earliest episodes using panel data from police agencies across the United States and a strategy that uses network ratings prior to the show’s premier as an instrumental variable. We show that this exposure significantly reduced crime: these effects are particularly evident for assault, began in the month the show premiered, and persisted for many years. These estimates do not reflect systematic differences across geographic areas in their trends in crime rates prior to 2005. To complement our main results, we also investigate the effects of “UFC Main Events,” which air in bars and on Pay-Per-View. This analysis additionally suggests reductions in violence caused by viewership.

JEL: K42 L82 L83

Unsociable emerging adults reported significantly greater happiness, satisfaction with their lives, social support, and self-worth than both shy and avoidant emerging adults

Is there an Upside to Social Withdrawal? Considering Well-Being among Socially Withdrawn Emerging Adults. Leanna M. Closson, Alicia M. McVarnock & Laura E. Cook. Applied Research in Quality of Life, Apr 25 2022. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11482-022-10056-w

Abstract: Removing oneself from social interactions, referred to as social withdrawal, has primarily been shown to predict maladjustment. Previous research distinguishing between social withdrawal subtypes based on individual differences in underlying social motivations, indicates that shyness and avoidance are more problematic than unsociability, particularly during the emerging adulthood years. Nevertheless, little research has examined the potential upside to social withdrawal. The aim of this study was to consider differences in well-being between sociable, shy, avoidant, and unsociable emerging adults. Participants included 813 Canadian university students between the ages of 18 to 25. Participants completed a series of self-report surveys assessing social withdrawal and indices of well-being. Results showed that unsociable emerging adults reported significantly greater happiness, satisfaction with their lives, social support, and self-worth than both shy and avoidant emerging adults. Social withdrawal is largely viewed as detrimental to psychosocial functioning; however, these findings show that unsociability might not pose the same risk to emerging adults’ well-being as shyness or avoidance. Indicators of well-being among unsociable emerging adults did not significantly differ from their more sociable counterparts, suggesting there may be an upside to social withdrawal for unsociable individuals.

Happy people tend to be more similar to each other than unhappy people

Iliev, Rumen, and Will Bennis. 2022. “The Convergence of Positivity: Are Happy People All Alike?” PsyArXiv. April 25. doi:10.31234/osf.io/5zdp2a

Abstract: More than a century ago Leo Tolstoy noted that happy families tend to be more similar to each other than unhappy families. Was this just a cognitive illusion, driven by his mind’s predisposition to see positive entities as more similar to each other, or did he make a profound observation about the world? If it is true, is the phenomenon limited to happiness, or is it a characteristic of positive traits more generally? This question has received attention in multiple fields, but not in psychology. We ran five studies, testing the more general hypothesis that people who share some positive individual-difference trait are more alike than those who do not (The Convergence of Positivity Hypothesis), and we consistently found empirical support for it. Happier, healthier and richer people were more alike in their personality, values, and in various other domains. The research approach we followed here departs from traditional behavioral science methods and proposes a different level of analysis, where valence and directionality play a central role. We speculate about why this pattern might exist and about the boundary conditions, including whether it extends beyond individual differences to a broader set of complex systems where positivity can be defined.

Brazilian jeitinho, an informal problem-solving strategy that is central to Brazilian culture: We found no practically meaningful mean differences: jeitinho was endorsed equally across all regions of the country

An Exploration of Within-Cultural Differences of a Culture-specific Syndrome: The Case of Brazilian jeitinho. Ronaldo Pilati, Ronald Fischer. Cross-Cultural Research, April 21, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1177/10693971221086818

Abstract: To what extent are cultural syndromes invariant within nations or can we identify within-cultural variability in structure and endorsement of cultural syndromes? These questions are central to a) recent discussions around the relevance of nation-states in cultural vs. geographical psychology and b) explorations of how cultural syndromes described in anthropological research are endorsed by individuals within and across regions within the country. We report data on Brazilian jeitinho, an informal problem-solving strategy that is central to Brazilian culture but may show within-cultural variability as suggested in previous anthropological and sociological research. Using a large online sample (N = 1259) we found evidence of full score equivalence for two multi-dimensional jeitinho measures across the most populous Brazilian regions, suggesting that respondents interpret the instruments similarly. Second, we found no practically meaningful mean differences: jeitinho was endorsed equally across all regions of the country. Finally, we found some small but consistent associations with demographic variables, notably gender, age, and education differences. We need to pay greater attention to behavioral functionality at individual level—the social position of individuals within the system rather than geographical boundaries.

Keywords: jeitinho, cultural syndrome, informal problem-solving strategy, simpatia, culture-specific behavior

Wealth inherited in silence, with not much agitation and propaganda

Ruchir Sharma @Financial Times:

Macron had promised to reduce state spending — then a record at more than 56 per cent of gross domestic product — by about 5 percentage points. Instead, under pressure from protests and the pandemic, state spending rose to a staggering 60 per cent of GDP. France’s government spending is 15 points above the average for developed economies.

Moreover, that gap is explained less by heavy spending on education, health or housing than on welfare programmes, which at 18 per cent of GDP is nearly double the average for developed economies. France is stuck in a welfare trap, spending generously on income transfers but pushed by voters to spend even more, given discontent with the rising cost of living and with inequality.

On inheritance outside the US, which is the Grrreat Wooorry these days:

Total billionaire wealth doubled under Macron to 17 per cent of GDP, and nearly 80 per cent of French billionaires’ wealth is inherited — among the highest in the world.

 

h/t Tyler Cowen. Link to Sharma's article in his post https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2022/04/france-analysis-of-the-day.html