Participants for whom religion was “not at all important” in their lives had a tenfold risk of developing Parkinson's disease (vs. very important); plus there was a dose–response relationship between decreasing religiosity & more PD risk

Religiosity and Risk of Parkinson’s Disease in England and the USA. Abidemi I. Otaiku. Journal of Religion and Health, Jun 28 2022. https://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10943-022-01603-8

Abstract: Parkinson’s disease (PD) is associated with low religiosity cross-sectionally. Whether low religiosity might be associated with an increased risk for developing PD is unknown. This study investigated whether low religiosity in adulthood is associated with increased risk for developing PD. A population-based prospective cohort study was conducted. Participants from the English Longitudinal Study of Aging and the Midlife in the United States study who were free from PD at baseline (2004–2011) and completed questionnaires on self-reported religiosity, were included in a pooled analysis. Incident PD was based on self-report. Multivariable logistic regression was used to estimate odds ratios (OR) for developing PD according to baseline religiosity, with adjustment for sociodemographic characteristics, health and lifestyle factors and engagement in religious practices. Among 9,796 participants in the pooled dataset, 74 (0.8%) cases of incident PD were identified during a median follow-up of 8.1 years. In the fully adjusted model, compared with participants who considered religion very important in their lives at baseline, it was found that participants who considered religion “not at all important” in their lives had a tenfold risk of developing PD during follow-up (OR, 9.99; 95% CI 3.28–30.36). Moreover, there was a dose–response relationship between decreasing religiosity and increasing PD risk (P < 0.001 for trend). These associations were similar when adjusting for religious upbringing and when cases occurring within the first two years of follow-up were excluded from the analysis. The association was somewhat attenuated when religious practices were removed from the model as covariates, though it remained statistically significant (OR for “not at all important” vs. “very important”, 2.26; 95% CI 1.03–4.95) (P < 0.029 for trend). This longitudinal study provides evidence for the first time that low religiosity in adulthood may be a strong risk factor for developing PD.

Discussion

Using prospective data from two population-based cohort studies in England and the USA, the current study shows for the first time that low religiosity in adulthood may be associated with an increased risk for developing PD, accounting for a wide range of potential confounders.

The findings of this longitudinal study are consistent with previous cross-sectional studies, which showed a robust association between PD and low religiosity (Boussac et al., 2021; Butler et al., 2010; Butler et al., 2011; Giaquinto et al., 2011; Kéri & Kelemen, 2016; McNamara et al., 2006; Pham et al., 2021), case-reports showing improvement of parkinsonism after intense religious experiences (Moreno & de Yebenes, 2009) and theoretical work, that has offered biologically plausible mechanisms by which religiosity could confer neuroprotection in PD (Yulug et al., 2015). The results are also in keeping with a recent neuroimaging study (Ferguson et al., 2022), which showed that brain lesions causing parkinsonism, intersect brain regions associated with religiosity.

It is noteworthy that participants who considered spirituality very important in their lives but not religion, had a higher risk for developing PD than participants who considered religion very important, and also participants who considered neither spirituality nor religion very important. This finding is consistent with an earlier study, which showed that individuals with PD, though less likely to have religious beliefs than matched controls, are on the other hand more likely than controls to have spiritual beliefs (Giaquinto et al., 2011). As such, this study corroborates previous research which suggests that individuals who have a spiritual understanding of life in the absence of a religious framework, may be more vulnerable to developing neuropsychiatric disorders (King et al., 2013; Vitorino et al., 2018).

These results are also in agreement with previous studies, which found higher religiosity to be associated with lower risk of developing a wide range of physical (Ahrenfeldt et al., 2017, 2019; Li et al., 2016), mental (Edlund et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2012; Opsahl et al., 2019) and cognitive disorders (Lin et al., 2015). However, the magnitude of the association found in this study is considerably higher than for any physical health condition previously reported, and therefore requires explanation. A recent study identified that individuals with high self-reported intrinsic religiosity may have significantly higher levels of brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) than individuals with low self-reported intrinsic religiosity (Mosqueiro et al., 2019). Given that BDNF has been shown to enhance the survival of dopaminergic neurons in animal models of PD (Palasz et al., 2020) and BDNF levels are significantly reduced in patients diagnosed with PD (Jiang et al., 2019), it is plausible that differences in BDNF levels among healthy adults with different levels of religiosity, could partially explain the dose–response relationship with PD risk observed in this study. In addition, there is accumulating evidence that dopaminergic pathways play a central role in mediating religious experience (Previc, 2006; van Elk & Aleman., 2017). A recent SPECT study found significant changes in dopamine transporter binding in the basal ganglia after attendance at a one-week Christian retreat (Newberg et al., 2018). Earlier studies showed increased dopamine release in the ventral striatum during certain forms of meditation (Kjaer, et al., 2002) and increased blood flow to the caudate nucleus during silent religious prayer (Schjødt et al., 2008). These studies suggest that habitual engagement in religious activities could modify dopamine levels in brain regions linked to PD pathology. Therefore, given strong preclinical evidence that enhancing dopamine neurotransmission with dopamine agonists confers neuroprotection in PD (Schapira & Olanow, 2003); it is plausible that individuals with higher religiosity, also have higher midbrain dopamine levels, and consequently have more protection against developing PD.

It is important to note however, that these results do not necessarily imply that religious participation should now be promoted by public health agencies as a preventative measure for PD; given that people’s religious beliefs and commitments are highly personal, and are not usually arrived at based on health concerns. Moreover, further studies are still required to confirm the exact biological mechanisms linking lower religiosity and PD.

Also, seemingly in contrast to the present findings, previous studies have repeatedly shown that clergy and religious workers—who are presumably high in religiosity—have a higher risk for developing PD compared to adults in the general population (Park et al., 2005; Schulte et al., 1996; Tanner et al., 2009). Although, this association is attenuated when the total number of years having worked in a religious occupation is adjusted for (Tanner et al., 2009). The most parsimonious explanation for this observation, would be that the increased risk for PD is confined to individuals with a religious occupation who subsequently experience a decline in religiosity. However, this suggestion is speculative and future studies will be required to confirm this hypothesis.

In addition, future studies are warranted to determine which aspects of religiosity are most associated with the risk of PD, especially given the striking change in the estimates when religious practices (particularly religious service attendance) were included as covariates in this analysis. On the surface, this would seem to imply that religious practices were harmful, i.e., participants with higher religiosity had a lower risk of developing PD despite engaging in more frequent religious practices. However, this would contradict the previously mentioned literature which seems to suggest that religious practices might be protective. Alternatively, it is possible that participants who engaged in more frequent religious practices, but considered religion relatively unimportant in their daily lives, may have exhibited low intrinsic religiosity—but high extrinsic religiosity. If so, it may be the case that having high extrinsic religiosity in the presence of low intrinsic religiosity, is an even stronger risk factor for developing PD than having consistently low religiosity (i.e., low intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity). Accordingly, adjusting for religious practices might have made the association more apparent—by isolating the effects of intrinsic religiosity on PD. Intriguingly, this theory may be in line with a recent cross-sectional study, which showed that newly diagnosed people with PD had lower intrinsic religiosity than age-and sex- matched healthy controls, despite the two groups being similar for frequency of religious practices (Kéri & Kelemen, 2016). Thus, if this theory is confirmed to be true, this might further explain why some clergy and religious workers are at higher risk of developing PD.

Strengths and Limitations

This study has several strengths, including the prospective design, long follow-up period, use of two large and well-documented population-representative cohorts, inclusion of a wide range of potential confounders, measurement of religiosity at two different time periods in two different continents and employment of a variety of sensitivity analyses. Furthermore, the participants were not selected on the basis of religiosity or PD diagnosis. Several limitations also warrant discussion. Following previous published studies (Kamel et al., 2007; Leng et al., 2018, 2020) this study relied on self-reporting to determine incident PD and therefore may have missed or misclassified some cases. Second, the small number of cases within each level of religiosity led to wide confidence intervals. It is also difficult to fully exclude the possibility of reverse causality, as low religiosity might be an early sign of undiagnosed PD, rather than a risk factor for developing PD (given that PD often has a long latency from motor symptom onset to diagnosis) (Breen et al., 2013). However, the long follow-up period coupled with the findings from the 2-year time lag analysis, suggest that low religiosity preceded the development of clinical PD. This would also be consistent with a recent longitudinal study, which showed that PD does not cause religiosity to decline (Redfern et al., 2020). Moreover, the analysis using 10-year changes in religiosity showed that becoming more religious over time reduced the subsequent risk of developing PD, which implies that low religiosity may cause PD. Previous studies have shown that PD patients with symptoms beginning on the left-side of their body, are less religious on average than PD patients whose symptoms begin on their right-side (Butler et al., 2011; Giaquinto et al., 2011). As information on PD characteristics were not available in this study, it was not possible to confirm whether individuals with low religiosity were more likely to develop left-onset PD. Finally, the findings from this study might not be generalizable to predominantly non-Christian populations (Lin et al., 2015).

If I Could Do It, So Can They: Among the Rich, Those With Humbler Origins are Less Sensitive to the Difficulties of the Poor

If I Could Do It, So Can They: Among the Rich, Those With Humbler Origins are Less Sensitive to the Difficulties of the Poor. Hyunjin J. Koo, Paul K. Piff, Azim F. Shariff. Social Psychological and Personality Science, June 27, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1177/19485506221098921

Abstract: Americans venerate rags-to-riches stories. Here we show that people view those who became rich more positively than those born rich and expect the Became Rich to be more sympathetic toward social welfare (Studies 1a and b). However, we also find that these intuitions are misguided. Surveys of wealthy individuals (Studies 2a and b) reveal that, compared with the Born Rich, the Became Rich perceive improving one’s socioeconomic conditions as less difficult, which, in turn, predicts less empathy for the poor, less perceived sacrifices by the poor, more internal attributions for poverty, and less support for redistribution. Corroborating this, imagining having experienced upward mobility (vs. beginning and staying at the top) causes people to view such mobility as less difficult, reducing empathy and support for those failing to move up (Study 3). These findings suggest that becoming rich may shift views about the poor in ways that run counter to common intuitions and cultural assumptions.

Keywords: rich, social mobility, socioeconomic status, attitudes toward the poor, redistribution

General Discussion

Across five preregistered studies, we found that people expect the Became Rich to hold more sympathetic attitudes toward the poor than the Born Rich (Studies 1a and b). However, our subsequent studies showed these intuitions to be misguided. In reality, the Became Rich thought it less difficult to improve one’s socioeconomic conditions than the Born Rich, views that were negatively linked to redistribution support and various sympathetic attitudes toward the poor (Studies 2a and b). Corroborating this, those induced to feel that they had moved up within an organization (vs. having a stationary high position) thought it less difficult to improve one’s position in the company, which in turn predicted reduced sympathetic attitudes toward others struggling to move up (Study 3). Contrary to lay expectations, people who have successfully achieved upward social mobility may, in fact, be less sensitive to the plight of the poor than those born into privilege.

The current study has several limitations that call for future investigation. First, we cannot definitively draw the conclusion that it is the experience of upward mobility itself that causes shifts in perceptions of difficulty. Although Study 3 is supportive of the possibility, experiencing upward mobility in the workplace may not be the same as experiencing upward mobility in real life—the latter may involve longer time periods and multiple pathways (e.g., own effort, personal connections, luck, and marriage). It will be important to more directly test our findings in future studies by using, for instance, longitudinal approaches to confirm the effect of experienced upward mobility on attitudes toward social welfare. Second, although we targeted rich individuals in the United States, online survey samples do not typically include multimillionaires and billionaires. Revisiting our findings among the super wealthy would be an important next step, given the sociopolitical influence they wield. Third, our methods included information-sparse descriptions of our targets, but in reality, people are identified with specific races and genders (Hester & Gray, 2020). Our results may vary as a function of whether the race or gender, alongside class, of the target is made salient as well as the demographics of the perceivers (Craig & Richeson, 2014). Finally, there could be factors—beyond perceived hard work—that may influence how people view wealthy individuals. For instance, positive perceptions of wealthy targets may be attenuated when wealth is perceived as less deserved, for example via means perceived to be due to luck or unethicality.

The current study has certain methodological limitations. For example, we used several single-item self-report measures to capture our core constructs, and it will be important to extend our findings using more multifaceted and behavioral measures (e.g., Piff, Wiwad et al., 2020). Furthermore, it is important to note that our samples were exclusively made up of Americans. Given the uniquely powerful place that mobility plays in the ethos of the American Dream (Kluegel & Smith, 2017), there is reason to believe that the effects found in our studies may be weaker in other countries. Future studies can explore how universal or culturally contingent our effects are.

Our findings can contribute to the literature in several ways. Prior work finds that social mobility beliefs influence various political and economic attitudes (e.g., redistribution and economic inequality; Alesina et al., 2018; Shariff et al., 2016). However, little is known about how individuals’ own social mobility experience can impact their worldviews (Gugushvili, 2016b)—a question made all the more imperative, given the prevalence of social mobility in many modern societies (World Economic Forum, 2020). Here we show that in the United States, for those who are rich, having experienced upward mobility can lead to viewing upward mobility as less difficult, which in turn, shapes attitudes toward those struggling in society. Future studies should extend these results by exploring how other types of mobility experiences (e.g., downward, no mobility) influence people’s beliefs about the social realm.

Previous research has shown a disconnect between people’s perceptions and socioeconomic realities (e.g., the level of income inequality and chances for upward social mobility; Davidai & Gilovich, 2015; Norton & Ariely, 2011). Here we show that people may also view individuals who have become rich as more sympathetic than they actually are. It will be important to explore the social and political ramifications of these misperceptions. For example, are the Became Rich viewed as being more charitable, favored more for political office, or forgiven more for their transgressions?

Finally, there is emerging literature on how SES shapes beliefs, attitudes, and emotions (Piff et al., 2018), and how people view various SES groups in society (Fiske et al., 2002; Wu et al., 2018). However, much of this work conceptualizes SES as relatively static over the life course. Our work contributes to a growing call in the field to conceptualize SES as dynamic and changing (see Côté et al., 2021). Movements up or down the socioeconomic hierarchy shape attitudes in ways that simple assessments of current class will miss. Ultimately, people’s social views are not only shaped by their current class position but also by the confluence of life forces that led them there.

People hold the belief that the world is growing morally worse, and that this belief is consistent across generational, political, and religious lines

West, Bryan, and David Pizarro. 2022. “Belief in Persistent Moral Decline.” PsyArXiv. June 27. doi:10.31234/osf.io/9swjb

Abstract: Across four studies (3 experimental, total n = 199; 1 archival, n = 186,000) we provide evidence that people hold the belief that the world is growing morally worse, and that this belief is consistent across generational, political, and religious lines. When asked directly about which aspects of society are getting better and which are getting worse, people are more likely to list the moral (compared to non-moral) aspects as getting worse (Studies 1-2). When provided with a list of items that are either moral or non-moral, people are more likely to report that moral (compared to non-moral) items are worsening (Study 3). Finally, when asked the question “What is the most important problem facing America today?” participants in a nationally representative survey (Heffington et al., 2019), disproportionately listed problems that fall within the moral domain (Study 4).

How Autogynephilic Are Natal Females?

How Autogynephilic Are Natal Females? J. Michael Bailey & Kevin J. Hsu. Archives of Sexual Behavior, Jun 27 2022. https://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-022-02359-8

Abstract: Blanchard proposed that autogynephilia is a natal male’s paraphilic sexual arousal in response to the thought or fantasy of being a woman. Furthermore, based on evidence collected from natal males with gender dysphoria, Blanchard argued that autogynephilia is the fundamental motivation among nonhomosexual males (i.e., those not exclusively attracted to men) who pursue sex reassignment surgery or live as transgender women. These ideas have been challenged by several writers who have asserted, or offered evidence, that autogynephilia is common among women. However, their evidence was weakened by problematic measures and limited comparison groups. We compared four samples of autogynephilic natal males (N = 1549), four samples of non-autogynephilic natal males (N = 1339), and two samples of natal females (N = 500), using Blanchard’s original measure: the Core Autogynephilia Scale. The autogynephilic samples had much higher mean scores compared with non-autogynephilic natal males and natal females, who were similar. Our findings refute the contention that autogynephilia is common among natal females.

Tax the élites! The role of economic inequality and conspiracy beliefs on attitudes towards taxes and redistribution intentions

Tax the élites! The role of economic inequality and conspiracy beliefs on attitudes towards taxes and redistribution intentions. Bruno Gabriel Salvador Casara et al. British Journal of Social Psychology, June 27 2022. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12555

Abstract: Taxation is one of the most widely acknowledged strategies to reduce inequality, particularly if based on progressivity. In a high-powered sample study (N = 2119) we investigated economic inequality and conspiracy beliefs as two key predictors of tax attitude and support for progressive taxation. We found that participants in the high economic inequality condition had lower levels of tax compliance and higher levels of conspiracy beliefs and support for progressive taxation. Furthermore, the effect of the experimental condition on tax compliance was mediated by conspiracy beliefs. Finally, conspiracy belief scores were positively associated with support for progressive taxation. Our results provide evidence that attitudes towards taxation are not monolithic but change considering the aims and targets of specific taxes. Indeed, while the perception of economic inequality prompts the desire for equal redistribution, it also fosters conspiracy narratives that undermine compliance with taxes.

DISCUSSION

In a high-powered study, we investigated economic inequality and conspiracy beliefs as two key predictors of tax attitude and support for progressive taxation.

Besides confirming previous evidence according to economic inequality increases conspiracy beliefs (Salvador Casara et al., 2022), the key novelty of our research lies in studying the impact of economic inequality and socio-economic class on both the appraisal of taxes as a value and the support for redistribution, two constructs that in the current literature have been studied in independent lines of studies. While taxation, especially if based on progressivity, is a fundamental strategy to tackle inequality, we found that people in more unequal contexts are in general more tax-averse, creating a vicious inequality-fostering spiral. However, our results suggest that this aversion is related mainly to attitude towards taxation when framed in general terms, whereas participants in the high unequal scenario were more prone to specifically support progressive taxation. These results suggest that the perceived value of taxation in general, and support for progressive taxation in particular, are distinct constructs, a distinction further corroborated by their low correlation. Specifically, the value of general taxation refers to the perceived importance and significance of paying taxes. As unequal contexts trigger conspiracy beliefs, this value is undermined, plausibly because of conspiratorial assumptions that the collected money will probably be used for negative and immoral aims. Indeed, this interpretation is in line with the observed mediated pattern of the effect of economic inequality on positive attitudes towards taxes via conspiracy beliefs. This mediational pattern was not observed for support for progressive taxation, which was directly triggered by inequality and independently associated with conspiracy beliefs. In order to try to understand these results, it is important to note that while people tend to be averse to economic inequality and that perceiving economic inequality promotes collective actions aimed to reduce economic inequality (García-Castro et al., 2020; García-Sánchez et al., 2020), it also fosters conspiracy beliefs, interpersonal and political distrust (Goubin et al., 2021; Salvador Casara et al., 2022; Uslaner & Brown, 2005). Thus, highlighting the redistributive role of taxation represents the key factor in understanding how different attitudes towards taxes are related to different psychological processes rooted in the perception of economic inequality. Specifically, when taxes are not framed as progressive and then their redistributive function is not salient, participants assume that taxes are just a penalizing cost, and conspiracy beliefs may play a role in perceiving taxes as public money wasted by a corrupted and untrustworthy élite. Differently, when the redistributive function of taxes is specifically stressed, people based their attitudes towards these policies on contextual inequality, as in the condition of high inequality all respondents tended to favour this redistribution means. This result is striking as the induced perception of inequality suppressed the association between conspiratorial beliefs and aversion to progressive taxation. In other words, even people that endorse conspiracy beliefs, and who are generally averse to taxes and with a stronger vision of taxes as a penalization, are more likely to support progressive taxation when the situation is presented as highly unequal. One possible explanation is that progressive taxations are perceived as a penalization for members of the wealthiest groups, namely the elite to be conspiratorially blamed for the unequal situation.

Indeed, the independent path that links conspiracy beliefs to support a progressive tax system is coherent with the fact that higher progressivity implies targeting élites, which are pointed to as the cause of social problems by conspiracy believers (Castanho Silva et al., 2017). Coherently, conspiracy beliefs are associated with far-left and far-right political orientation, and with populist attitudes (Castanho Silva et al., 2017; Imhoff et al., 2022), which are particularly linked to political parties advocating redistribution and anti-neoliberalism sentiment (Ganev, 2017; Hogan & Haltinner, 2015). This may suggest the necessity to disentangle economic and social conservatism when studying their relationship with conspiracy beliefs.

Finally, results did not provide evidence for an interaction between economic inequality conditions and social economic class, neither considering social class as an experimentally assigned status nor self-perceived socio-economic standing. This pattern can be interpreted in at least two possible ways. First, because conspiracy beliefs refer to theories that involve members of a small élite, it is unlikely that this élite is included in the high-class group. Thus, it is possible that even when people perceive themselves as wealthy, they still do not self-identify with the powerful and potentially conspiratorial élite. This, therefore, maintains every respondent passible of referring to the conspiratorial elite as an outgroup, leaving little space for cross-modal effects. A second process that may explain why each class is similarly affected by economic inequality regards system justifying mechanisms, which characterize both minority and majority groups (Jost et al., 2004). Previous evidence suggests that high inequality is generally associated with the tendency to justify and, therefore, maintain the status quo (Du & King, 2021; Goudarzi et al., 2020). This process may be in action across all respondents, explaining why inequality does not interact with social class.

Limitations and future directions

It is important to acknowledge that the use of the Bimboola Paradigm is not without limitations. Indeed, the fictitious society cannot accurately simulate the complexity of real-world societies. We, therefore, suggest future research to investigate this phenomenon using other research methods (e.g. big data or qualitative methods) in order to better understand these dynamics in real life. Moreover, we also recommend exploring the impact of economic inequality on conspiracy beliefs and tax preferences in countries with different levels of actual economic inequality, in order to capture the subtle nuances of this phenomenon. Another limitation related to the paradigm we implemented refers to the fact that the economic inequality condition and the assigned socio-economic class condition may not be fully orthogonal. Indeed, participants in the low- and high-class conditions had different choices among the high- and low economic inequality condition, whereas the middle class condition was the only one identical for both high- and low economic inequality conditions. However, the fact that we did not find any interaction between the assigned socio-economic class condition and the economic inequality condition suggests that the impact of the assigned socio-economic class is similar in both inequality conditions. Given the big sample we have, we were able to analyse respondents assigned to the middle class (N = 725) as an unifactorial design with two experimental conditions, inequality versus equality and inspecting the role of their perceived social standing. Results confirm that economic inequality still differently affected tax attitudes and support for progressive taxation, with social class having a main effect, and no interaction with inequality (see Supporting Information).

This paradigm also has relevant strengths. In fact, it allows us to isolate the effect of economic inequality on conspiracy beliefs and tax attitudes, and to remove potentially confounding variables that naturally covary with social status; hence this paradigm allowed us to infer a causal relationship between the investigated variables. The use of a fictional scenario also avoids ethical concerns related to giving false feedback about the level of economic inequalities. Moreover, it allows isolating effects related to potential a priori perceptions related to the actual level of inequality of a real country. Finally, the findings obtained in Bimboola are typically aligned with findings from correlational or field studies (see for example Salvador Casara et al., 2022; Sprong et al., 2019).

Given its flexibility, future studies may apply this paradigm to manipulate other societal features that have important consequences for political attitudes. For example, it would be suitable to manipulate the ethnic diversity of a fictitious society, a factor that undermines trust and support for welfare policies (Edo et al., 2019; van der Meer et al., 2020). Attitudes towards general and specific policies could, therefore, be assessed in order to extend the present findings to different domains both in terms of societal features and practical implications.

Finally, caution is necessary for the interpretation of the mediation models. Although the rationale for using them was justified in the introduction, statistical models per se cannot provide evidence for causality (see, Fiedler et al., 2018).

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION

These findings provide important information about the challenges in tackling economic inequality. In particular, our study suggests at least two ways to effectively address economic inequality. First, increasing the awareness of inequality and presenting the entity of the phenomenon (which in our societies is closer to the high inequality than to the low inequality condition) may be an educational strategy to increase support for progressive taxation, even among people who are generally highly averse, such as people that endorse conspiracy beliefs. However, this strategy is to be cautiously applied, as the perception of high inequality also triggers conspiracy views, which fire back on taxation in general. The second type of strategy could, therefore, tackle conspiracy beliefs with indirect or direct interventions. In order to improve tax compliance in societies characterized by high levels of economic inequality, governments and institutions should aim their policies and their communication at indirectly reducing conspiracy beliefs by boosting trust (van Mulukom et al., 2020). For example, improving transparency can reduce the power asymmetry between institutions and citizens, and increase the accountability of governments, and the perceived legitimacy of their power (Brusca et al., 2018). Another intervention could be to directly tackle conspiracy theories, by both inoculating scepticism against conspiratorial narratives, and debunking conspiratorial information (Brashier et al., 2021; Jolley & Douglas, 2017; Salvador Casara et al., 2019).

Finally, it is important to consider that these strategies are likely to be safely used by a wide portion of the population, as the observed pattern was not moderated by both assigned and self-attributed socio-economic class.

Our results contribute to the understanding of the social basis that hinders inequality reduction, providing evidence that attitudes towards taxation are not monolithic, but change considering the aims and targets of specific taxes. Governments and policy-makers may take advantage of this research in order to implement context-specific tax policies that help tackle tax evasion and economic inequality.

Access to fast food has often been blamed for the rise in childhood obesity; our econometric evidence suggests that fast food exposure had no effect

Childhood obesity, is fast food exposure a factor? Peter J. Dolton, WiktoriaTafesse. Economics & Human Biology, June 26 2022, 101153. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ehb.2022.101153

Highlights

• Access to fast food has often been blamed for the rise in childhood obesity.

• Possible links to obesity has motivated policies to curb the spread of fast food.

• Spatial and timing data on early fast food outlets from the UK from 1968-86 is used.

• Medically measured data on Body Mass Index for a British Cohort is exploited.

• Our econometric evidence suggests that fast food exposure had no effect.

Abstract: Access to fast food has often been blamed for the rise in obesity which in turn has motivated policies to curb the spread of fast food. However, robust evidence in this area is scarce, particularly using data outside of the US. It is difficult to estimate a causal effect of fast food given spatial sorting and ever-present exposure. We investigate whether the residential access to fast food increased BMI of adolescents at a time when fast food restaurants started to open in the UK. The time period presents the study with large spatial and temporal differences in exposure as well as plausibly exogenous variation. We merge data on the location and timing of the first openings of all fast food outlets in the UK from 1968 -1986, with data on objectively measured BMI from the 1970 British Cohort Survey. The relationship between adolescent BMI and the distance from the respondents’ homes and time since opening, is studied using OLS and Instrumental Variables regression. We find that fast food exposure had no effect on BMI. Extensive robustness checks do not change our conclusion.

JEL: I120I190

Keywords ObesityDiet

8. Conclusion

This paper studied the relationship between exposure to fast food and adolescent BMI using the BCS and historical data relating to the inception of fast food in Great Britain. The data on the timing of establishment and location of all fast food outlets prior to 1986 allowed us to investigate whether fast food proximity, duration since opening, as well as a generated intensity measure taking into account the the proximity and durations of multiple outlets, affects BMI. We do not find any evidence of a positive association between numerous measures of exposure in the home environment and adolescent BMI. This study has filled a gap in the existing literature which has mostly focused on the distance to ever-present fast food restaurants using American data.

Our results are robust to instrumenting for the distance to one’s closest fast food outlet with the distance to a fast food distribution centre. Additionally, one company, Wimpy, suddenly increased its number of fast food outlets which did not allow for a strategic timing and citing of their outlets. Restricting the analysis to Wimpy outlets confirms the zero results. The lack of a relationship is supported by previous research, see; Anderson and Matsa, 2011, Fraser et al., 2012, Lee, 2012, Dunn et al., 2012 and Asirvatham et al. (2019).

There are several potential explanations for our null findings. Firstly, the effect may be highly context specific, see Dunn, 2010, Anderson and Matsa, 2011, Dunn et al., 2012, Grier and Davis, 2013. Adolescents may have less control over food choices in their home environment compared to their school environment. Our findings might differ from studies using American data where fast food is eaten more frequently than in the UK (Fraser et al., 2012). In fact, our analysis does not find support of fast food proximity having a meaningful impact on the frequency of takeaway consumption. Alternatively, the time period of our study may not translate to large effects on obesity as only a small proportion of our sample was exposed to fast food very near their home, particularly at younger ages. Specifically, the lack of weight gain during our study period may be explained by fast food being a novelty or not being comparably cheap relative to other foods as they are today which may cause different consumption patterns (Wiggins et al., 2015). Moreover, it is uncertain how well diets and caloric expenditure during the 1980’s compare to current levels and how this may interact with access to different size and scope of fast food establishments. Additionally, the population studied might not have a large propensity to gain weight if exposed to fast food given that positive effects have been found for specific sub-groups such as ethnic minority urban youth (Currie et al., 2010, Grier and Davis, 2013 and youth living in the poorest and one of the least healthy American states (Alviola et al., 2014). Our reduced sample size does not permit us to do a heterogeneity analysis.

We contribute to the existing literature, often based on data for smaller geographical areas, by using nationwide data. Our results are based on the sample of BCS respondents who did not relocate in the last 6 years and for whom anthropometric and postcode information is available. However, it should be noted that this population could differ from the overall nationally representative sample. Various types of food outlets have been shown to cluster together (Hobbs et al., 2019a). Therefore, a limitation is that we are unable model the direct effects of community determinants of body weight, such as the commercial food environment or access to exercise inducing spaces, due to limited area-level information in the BCS and the lack of supplementary historical data. Furthermore, our small sample size and rich set of controls does not allow us to control for local area fixed effects.

Keeping these caveats in mind, there is no evidence of that the introduction of fast food induced any behavioural change which resulted in weight gain amongst adolescents in the UK in the 1980s. Our overall findings are supported by there being a decrease in total calories purchased since the 1980’s (Griffith et al., 2016). Thus, we suggest that it is unlikely that the access to fast food caused the British obesity epidemic. Half of local government areas in England have enacted policies to curb takeaway food outlets which for example restrict new outlets from opening in designated exclusion zones around places used by children (Keeble et al., 2019). However, despite such policies being common, there is a scarcity of literature evaluating these effects besides Sturm and Hattori (2015) which showed that zoning interventions do not deliver the expected results (Keeble et al., 2019). Thus, our paper supplements the evidence base regarding the lack of a relationship between a changing access to fast food and childhood and adolescent obesity which suggests that complementary interventions need to be considered.

Compared to moderate levels of drinking, both abstinence and heavier drinking in late adolescence/early adulthood predicted greater likelihood of lifetime childlessness and fewer children

Alcohol consumption at age 18-25 and number of children at a 33-year follow-up individual and within-pair analyses of Finnish twins. Richard J. Rose et al. Alcoholism, June 19 2022. https://doi.org/10.1111/acer.14886

Abstract

Background: Do drinking patterns in late adolescence/early adulthood predict lifetime childlessness and number of children? Past research is but tangentially relevant, inconsistent in results, and compromised in design. Genetic and environmental confounds are poorly controlled; covariate effects of smoking and education often ignored; males are understudied; population-based sampling is rare, and long-term prospective studies with genetically informative designs are yet to be reported.

Method: In a 33-year follow-up, we linked drinking patterns of >3,500 Finnish twin pairs, assessed at ages 18-25, to registry data on their eventual number of children. Analyses distinguished associations of early drinking patterns with lifetime childlessness from those predictive of family size. Within-twin pair analyses used fixed-effects regression models to account for shared familial confounds and genetic liabilities. Childlessness was analyzed with Cox proportional hazards models and family size with Poisson regression. Analyses within-pairs and of twins as individuals were made before and after adjustment for smoking and education, and for oral contraceptive use in individual-level analyses of female twins.

Results: Baseline abstinence and heavier drinking significantly predicted lifetime childlessness in individual-level analyses. Few abstinent women used OCs, but they were nonetheless more often eventually childless; adjusting for smoking and education, abstinence-childless associations remained. Excluding childless twins, Poisson models of family size found heavier drinking at 18-25 predictive of fewer children in both men and women. Those associations replicated in within-pair analyses of DZ twins, each level of heavier drinking associated with smaller families. Among MZ twins, associations of drinking with completed family size yielded effects of similar magnitude, reaching significance at highest levels of consumption, ruling out familial confounds.

Conclusions: Compared to moderate levels of drinking, both abstinence and heavier drinking in late adolescence/early adulthood predicted greater likelihood of lifetime childlessness and fewer children. Familial confounds do not fully explain these associations.