In a large Dutch twin sample, we found that genetic variance accounted for 74% and 77% of whether people were pescatarian or vegetarian, respectively; the remaining variance was accounted for by non-shared environmental influences

The heritability of pescetarianism and vegetarianism. Laura W. Wesseldijk et al. Food Quality and Preference, August 23 2022, 104705. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodqual.2022.104705

Highlights

• Pescetarianism is 74% heritable and vegetarianism 77%.

• Genetic influences account for 70-80% of individual differences in abstinence from eating beef, pork, poultry, fish and shellfish.

• Individuals did not eat pork mostly because of health reasons, poultry, fish and shellfish because of dislike, and beef because of beliefs.

• Regardless of the different reasons for abstinence, heritability estimates were of a similar large magnitude.

Abstract: Genetic factors have a substantial influence on individuals' food preferences, but less is known about their influence on abstinence from eating meat and fish. Here we looked at the influence genetics may have on pescetarianism (not eating meat but eating fish) and vegetarianism (not eating meat and fish) in a Dutch twin sample (N = 8,196). We also examined genetic and environmental influences on abstinence from eating beef, pork, poultry, fish or shellfish separately and explored the reasons individuals gave for not eating these types of meat and fish (e.g., disliking, health concerns or beliefs). Abstinence from eating various meats or (shell)fish varied from 5.3% for beef to 46% for shellfish, and 3.7% did not eat meat (1.9% was pescatarian and 1.8% vegetarian). The prevalence of all abstinences was higher in women than men. Genetic factors accounted for 74% and 77% of variation in pescetarianism and vegetarianism, respectively, with the remaining variance accounted for by non-shared environmental influences. Heritability for abstinence from eating beef, pork, poultry, fish or shellfish ranged from 70 to 80%. Abstention from pork was mostly due to health concerns, abstention from poultry, fish and shellfish because of dislike, and abstention from beef because of beliefs (i.e., religion or convictions). Most pescatarians and vegetarians reported beliefs as one of their reason for abstinence (∼75%). Overall, regardless of the fact that different reasons seem to play a role in pescetarianism, vegetarianism and abstinence from eating different meats and fish, genetic factors undergirded all with a similar large magnitude.

 

See also Where the Rubber Meats the Road: Relationships between Vegetarianism and Socio-political Attitudes and Voting Behavior. John B. Nezlek & Catherine A. Forestell. Jul 15 2019. Ecology of Food and Nutrition, Volume 58, 2019 - Issue 6, pp 548.559. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2020/01/possible-genetic-predisposition-to.html

4. Discussion

In a large Dutch twin sample, we found that genetic variance accounted for 74% and 77% of whether people were pescatarian or vegetarian, respectively. The remaining variance was accounted for by non-shared environmental influences. Hence, we detected no effect of the common environment, which should include social transmission from parents and other forms of environmental exposures shared by twins. These results are in line with findings from the recent Finnish study that found vegetarianism/veganism to be 76% heritable (Çınar et al., 2021). We replicated the heritability estimate in a sample of a similar age (Finnish sample M = 29.51 years, SD = 7.84, Dutch sample M = 35.25 years, SD = 15.26), though with a much lower prevalence of vegetarianism. This is, however, roughly in line with country-specific prevalence for vegetarianism (approximately 4-5% in the Netherlands and 11% in Finland) (Motrøen, 2020, van Rossum et al., 2020). Furthermore, we found the degree of genetic influences on abstaining from beef, pork, poultry, fish and shellfish to all be roughly around 70 to 80%. Notably, common environment factors were strongest for abstention from pork (28%), though the influence was non-significant with an alpha of .01 (corrected for multiple testing). In a previous study, the heritability of food preference was explored in the same sample (Vink et al., 2020). The broad sense heritability for liking of meat and fish, measured on a continuous scale, varied between 41% and 60%. This suggests that genetic factors play a larger role in abstinence from eating meat and fish than in the liking of these foods.

Pork was the only type of meat that individuals in our sample abstained from mostly because of health concerns. Beliefs, which was often selected as a reason not to eat particular types of meat (especially for beef and not eating meat), could reflect religion or conviction (in the survey the example given was veganism). We recommend future studies to differentiate the reason ‘beliefs’ and ask in more depth about the specific beliefs or convictions, like type of religion, mitigation, climate change or animal welfare. No information on religion was obtained in the current study. However, information obtained for 79.2% of the sample from one or more other surveys showed that 22% of the sample reported having no religious affiliation, 77.5% reported a religious affiliation at one point in their lives and 0.5% indicated some belief but no affiliation with a specific religion. The vast majority of those ever affiliated with a religion indicated to be Christian or to be raised as Christian and only a small minority indicated affiliations with religions that forbid the consumption of pork, beef, or both. It is therefore unlikely that beliefs reflect the influence of religion. Interestingly, people mostly abstained from poultry, fish and shellfish due to dislike. Some individuals reported 'other reasons' for their abstinence from eating meat or fish. We can only speculate about what those other reasons could be. Given that concerns about animal welfare and environmental sustainability were not among the response options, these 'other reasons' could have reflected such concerns. Additionally, some people might not eat certain types of meat or fish because they are too expensive (like shellfish), although the prevalence of being pescatarian and vegetarian was higher among higher educated participants (with probably higher incomes) than moderate or lower educated participants. Overall, regardless of the fact that different reasons seem to motivate abstention from beef, poultry, pork, fish or shellfish, genetic factors undergirded abstinence from eating all types of meat and fish with a similar magnitude (around 70-80%).

This study has limitations. We made use of self-reports. Whereas participants in the earlier Finnish sample answered yes or no to being vegetarian or vegan (Çınar et al., 2021), participants in the current study were designated as pescatarian or vegetarian based on reporting abstaining from eating specific types of meat and fish. It is possible that, in the Finnish sample, being vegetarian was interpreted as abstaining from eating meat, but not fish, or as abstaining only from certain types of meat. Conversely, some participants in the current study could abstain from beef, pork or poultry, but eat a different type of meat. Further, standard assumptions of classical twin modeling apply here (Verweij, Mosing, Zietsch, & Medland, 2012). Inferences are limited to the population which was approached for the study. The factors underlying vegetarianism in other populations might be different, especially for populations from different cultures, with different religions and/or a higher prevalence of vegetarianism. Lastly, we were initially also interested in investigating environmental and genetic influences on abstaining from all types of meats, fish and dairy (i.e., being vegan). However, our sample included only 20 vegans. Similarly, the majority of pescatarians and vegetarians were female and the data therefore did not allow to investigate sex differences in the genetic architecture. Larger sample sizes are needed to examine genetic influences on veganism, differences between males and females in the heritability of food abstinence, and genetic correlations between abstinence from different types of food. Genetic correlations (with either twin studies or molecular genetic approaches) between vegetarianism and other variables (e.g., education or personality traits) could shed light on the mechanisms underlying dietary choices. We would expect that abstaining for reasons like beliefs with respect to sustainability and animal welfare are more related to genetic factors for personality, while abstaining for reasons like dislike or allergy are more related to genetic factors for more biological processes (for example, genes that code for taste receptors). For this second scenario, we expect that molecular genetic studies will identify genetic variants that shed more light on the underlying biological mechanisms (e.g., genes related to taste, as has been found for coriander abstinence (Eriksson et al., 2012), versus genes related to personality).

To conclude, we confirmed that genetic factors play a large role in individual's choice to be pescatarian, vegetarian or to not eat meat (74-80%) in a Dutch population. Genetic influences on abstaining from beef, pork, poultry, fish and shellfish ranged from 70 to 80%, regardless of the fact that different reasons seem to motivate abstinence from these different types of food. Future research should further investigate genetic correlations and genetic influences on associations between vegetarianism and other psychological traits. 

Once amongst the tallest people in the world, the generations of bison-reliant people born after the slaughter lost their entire height advantage

The Slaughter of the Bison and Reversal of Fortunes on the Great Plains. Donn. L. Feir, Rob Gillezeau & Maggie E.C. Jones. NBER Working Paper 30368, August 2022. DOI 10.3386/w30368

Abstract: In the late nineteenth century, the North American bison was brought to the brink of extinction in just over a decade. We demonstrate that the loss of the bison had immediate, negative consequences for the Native Americans who relied on them and ultimately resulted in a permanent reversal of fortunes. Once amongst the tallest people in the world, the generations of bison-reliant people born after the slaughter lost their entire height advantage. By the early twentieth century, child mortality was 16 percentage points higher and the probability of reporting an occupation 29.7 percentage points lower in bison nations compared to nations that were never reliant on the bison. Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century and into the present, income per capita has remained 28 percent lower, on average, for bison nations. This persistent gap cannot be explained by differences in agricultural productivity, self-governance, or application of the Dawes Act. We provide evidence that this historical shock altered the dynamic path of development for formerly bison-reliant nations. We demonstrate that limited access to credit constrained the ability of bison nations to adjust through respecialization and migration.

VII. Conclusion

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the North American bison roamed the Great Plains in the tens of millions, but by 1880, the bison were nearly extinct, the result of a mass slaughter that occurred within as little as 10 years. This is the first paper to empirically quantify the persistent effects of the slaughter on the Native American nations who relied on the bison for over 10,000 years prior to its extinction. We compile historical, anthropological, geographic, and modern economic data to show that the elimination of the bison affected the well-being of the Indigenous peoples who relied on them, both immediately after the bison’s decline, and up to 150 years later. We argue that the loss of the bison resulted in a reversal of fortunes: historically, bison-reliant societies were among the most well-off people on the continent, but today, they are among the poorest.

We study the dynamic path of development through which this shock has persisted into the present day and demonstrate that early access to credit could have mitigated the persistent effects of the loss of the bison. While the loss of the bison was a unique historical event, large regional economic shocks are not. Similarly, Native Americans occupy a unique institutional space in the United States but barriers to adjustment, like costly migration, low levels of development, and credit constraints are common. The experiences of the formerly bison-reliant peoples, important in their own right, also shed light on how economic shocks can persist for decades in the absence of access to other financial resources.

Women were seven times more likely to lose work during the nationwide lockdown, and conditional on losing work, eleven times more likely to not return to work subsequently, compared to men; and on and on

Down and out? The gendered impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on India’s labour market. Rosa Abraham, Amit Basole & Surbhi Kesar. Economia Politica volume 39, pages 101–128. Jul 14 2022. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40888-021-00234-8

Abstract: The Covid-19 pandemic has created unprecedented disruptions in labour markets across the world including loss of employment and decline in incomes. Using panel data from India, we investigate the differential impact of the shock on labour market outcomes for male and female workers. We find that, conditional on being in the workforce prior to the pandemic, women were seven times more likely to lose work during the nationwide lockdown, and conditional on losing work, eleven times more likely to not return to work subsequently, compared to men. Using logit regressions on a sample stratified by gender, we find that daily wage and young workers, whether men or women, were more likely to face job loss. Education shielded male workers from job loss, whereas highly educated female workers were more vulnerable to job loss. Marriage had contrasting effects for men and women, with married women less likely to return to work and married men more likely to return to work. Religion and gender intersect to exacerbate the disproportionate impact, with Muslim women more likely to not return to work, unlike Muslim men for whom we find religion having no significant impact. Finally, for those workers who did return to work, we find that a large share of men in the workforce moved to self-employment or daily wage work, in agriculture, trade or construction. For women, on the other hand, there is limited movement into alternate employment arrangements or industries. This suggests that typical ‘fallback’ options for employment do not exist for women. During such a shock, women are forced to exit the workforce whereas men negotiate across industries and employment arrangements.

Discussion and conclusion

The stringent economic lockdown in India affected workers across regions, industries, and employment arrangements. However, the impact has been quite gendered in its nature. Women, in particular, have been more adversely affected relative to men in terms of their labour market participation. Our findings suggest that during the lockdown, women were far more likely to lose work compared to men. Moreover, even after the lifting of the lockdown and with easing of mobility and other restrictions, women’s recovery into employment has been substantially lower compared to men. While men experienced an almost-complete recovery into employment, a significant proportion of women experienced job loss of a more permanent nature. In an economy where women’s work participation rates have been historically low and declining (Mehrotra & Parida, 2017), this adverse impact and muted recovery of women’s workforce participation is particularly worrying.

Possible reasons for this gender disparity can be attributed both to the supply side as well as the demand-side factors. On the supply side, increased burden of household work, lack of socially or market-provided childcare options and shutdown of schools could force women to stay at home, as well as spend more time in care and other unpaid activities, as compared to men. Consistent with this, Deshpande (2020) confirms muted employment recovery for women with young children. While our regression estimates do not find a significant impact on the presence of children, we find that that women from larger households (and hence having more domestic work) were less likely to return to work.

On the demand side, it has been argued that the disproportionately higher impact on women can be explained on the basis of women having a higher employment in those sectors most affected by the pandemic, such as health and education, and being employed in more tenuous employment contracts (World Bank, 2020a). This occupational and industrial segregation exposes women far more than men to the economic impacts of the pandemic (Oxfam, 2021). However, the results from our regression estimates show that the disproportionate impact on women remains even after controlling for industry and employment arrangements. Women, irrespective of the nature or industry of work, are more vulnerable to lose work and not return to work.

It is likely that other supply side factors that are not captured in our estimates explain the higher impact on and muted recovery of women in the workforce. In the face of an overall decline in labour demand, gender norms that ensure that scarce economic opportunities flow to men in preference to women, could constrain women’s (re-)entry into the labour market. Such gender norms may also explain the relative lack of fallback options for women within the workforce, forcing them to move out entirely. In the face of such a shock, while men negotiate labour market spaces by moving across sectors and industries, women are often left with little or no choice and are forced to exit.

Further, continued restrictions on mobility and limited functioning of public transport facilities also differentially impact women more since they are relatively more dependent on public transport (Shah et al., 2017). For many women workers, increased police patrolling for enforcing social isolation rules have also exposed them to more instances of harassment and aggression, further affecting their return to work (ISST, 2020).

Taken together, our results point to large movements downwards and outwards, particularly for women workers. We believe that this study as well as other similar emerging analyses from India and elsewhere contribute to our rapidly evolving understanding of the differential impacts of the pandemic. These insights should prove useful in designing more effective policy support measures to counteract these effects and chart a path to a robust and inclusive recovery.

Men's almost universally greater tendency to overestimate their abilities is likely the heritage of a long evolutionary urge to achieve the upper hand in the mating game

The Cocksure Conundrum: How Evolution Created a Gendered Currency of Corporate Overconfidence. Richard Ronay, William W. Maddux & William von Hippel. Adaptive Human Behavior and Physiology, Aug 19 2022. https://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40750-022-00197-5

Abstract: Biological differences between men and women mandate that women’s obligatory investment in reproduction is significantly greater than that of men. As a result, women have evolved to be the “choosier” of the two sexes and men have evolved to compete for female choice. To the degree that overconfidence is an effective tool for attracting mates and driving away competitors, greater competition among men suggests that they should express more overconfidence than women. Thus, sexual selection may be the primary reason why overconfidence is typically more pronounced in men than it is in women. Sexual selection may also be a distal, causal factor in what we describe as a cult of overconfidence pervading modern organizations and institutions. Whereas overconfidence was once regulated and constrained by features of ancestral life, levels of social mobility and accountability in contemporary society and modern organizations make it increasingly difficult to keep this gendered bias in check.

Why are People Overconfident?

Psychological explanations for the widespread tendency towards self-aggrandizement have focused primarily on intrapersonal hedonic benefits, such as higher self-esteem for those who believe they are better than others, and reduced reactivity to stressful events (e.g., Dunning et al., 1995; Taylor & Brown, 1988). An alternative possibility, however, is that overconfidence may be an evolved strategy of considerable utility for achieving status and other types of social currency, such as alliance formation, persuasion and influence, romantic attraction, and ultimately reproduction (von Hippel & Trivers, 2011a).

Individual differences in traits that lead to differential “fitness” within a given ecology result in reproductive variance (i.e., natural selection; Darwin, 1859; Andersson & Iwassa, 1996)). As a result, certain individuals’ expressed traits enable them to leave a greater genetic footprint than that of others. Across generations, this process leads to a proliferation of whatever genes assist in survival and reproduction. And so the footprint grows. The pan-cultural nature of the overconfidence bias (Sedikides et al., 2003) suggests that it may well be one such adaptive trait, selected for over many thousands of generations (Johnson & Fowler, 2011), likely predating the separation of our hominin ancestors from the ancestors of modern chimpanzees (e.g., Moore et al., 2009; Noë et al., 1980). Indeed, Daniel Kahneman speaks of overconfidence as being fundamentally built into the structures of human reasoning (Shariatmadari, 2015).

Given that overconfidence can lead to faulty assessments of one’s circumstances, and hence potentially perilous decisions, it seems odd that overconfidence might have provided an advantage in the context of natural selection. Believing oneself single-handedly capable of bringing down a woolly mammoth was unlikely to have been a winning attitude for our ancestors. Nonetheless, in competitive settings marked by uncertainty, overconfidence has the potential to maximize individual outcomes, so long as the associated costs of failure are outweighed by the benefits of possible success (Johnson & Fowler, 2011; Számadó, 2000). In other words, when the potential gains of achieving a particular goal outweigh the potential costs of failing, risky strategies such as overconfidence have adaptive utility (Adams & Mesterton-Gibbons, 1995; Számadó, 2003).

This perspective is consistent with Error Management Theory (Haselton & Buss, 2000), which predicts the emergence of psychological biases when; (1) the decision had recurrent impacts on fitness (reproductive success), (2) the decision is based on uncertain information, (3) the costs of false positives and false negatives were recurrently asymmetrical over evolutionary time. Overconfidence in one’s abilities meet these criteria quite well under many circumstances.

First, overconfidence potentially impacts fitness by helping individuals compete for sexual opportunity (Murphy et al., 2015) as well as other material and social resources that contribute to reproduction, such as status, prestige, and material rewards (e.g., Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Second, uncertainty would have been a necessary condition for overconfidence to evolve, as certainty does away with the need for competition and signaling. In such cases, the strongest or most obviously qualified rival simply takes the desired resource. Indeed, as the uncertainty of contested outcomes increases, so too does the utility of overconfidence (Johnson & Fowler, 2011). Third, the costs in lost opportunities associated with being underconfident, or even accurate, are often greater than the costs associated with being overconfident, particularly when people compete with each other over limited resources (Soldà et al., 2021).

As a result of these processes, in situations where the potential gains of overconfidence outweigh the potential risks of overclaiming, overconfident individuals may have an advantage. If so, then overconfident displays may be a functional adaptation that help individuals acquire material and social benefits, depending on the relative magnitude of the risks and rewards that a given situation affords (Adams & Mesterton-Gibbons, 1995; Számadó, 2000, 2003). Consistent with the above reasoning, overconfident people gain a host of social and material benefits, such as increased perceptions of competence and a rise in social status and perceived leadership potential (Anderson et al., 2012; Ronay et al., 2019). As status increases, physiological markers of stress such as cortisol decrease (Sherman & Mehta, 2020) and dopamine sensitivity increases (Morgan et al., 2002), providing proximate, secondary mechanisms for the relationship between overconfidence and the maintenance of positive affect in response to social stressors (Ronay et al., 2019). Thus, it comes as no surprise that overconfidence is selected for in CEO appointments, despite the higher probability of overconfident leaders initiating value-destroying investments (Goel & Thakor, 2008) and financial reporting fraud (Schrand & Zechman, 2012). And perhaps, as we outline below, no surprise that fewer than 5% of CEO positions in the US and Europe are held by women (Edgecliffe-Johnson, 2018).

Why are Overconfident People So Often Men?

This distally focused, status-enhancing account of overconfidence has at least one important moderating factor: The available evidence strongly suggests that men tend to be more overconfident than women. For example, men exhibit more overconfidence than women in academic achievement (Bengtsson et al., 2005), finance and trading (Cueva et al., 2019; Prince, 1993), conflict and competitions (Johnson et al., 2006; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007), science and mathematics (Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003; Hyde et al., 1990), past performance (Reuben et al., 2012), intelligence (Steinmayr & Spinath, 2009), and on general knowledge and cognitive tasks (O'Laughlin & Brubaker, 1998; Pallier, 2003). By way of example, in one study, 70% of men and 30% of women, overestimated their work performance and professional skills (Lindeman et al., 1995). While under-confidence is generally the exception, it is more often women than men who err on the side of excessive humility (Lenney, 1977; Small et al., 2007), underestimating their chances of success across various outcomes (Erkut, 1983; Mura, 1987). Even successful women are more likely to attribute their triumphs to external causes, such as others in their team, or luck, rather than to personal aptitude (Campbell & Hackett, 1986; Haynes & Heilman, 2013; LaNoue & Curtis, 1985).

One potential origin of these observed gender differences is biased sampling, in that prior research has often assessed overconfidence in what are considered traditionally masculine domains. However, we argue that overconfidence is not a direct product of domain importance, expertise, or even stereotypicality; rather it is a product of the desire to persuade others of one’s competence in a given domain (Hoffman & Yoeli, 2022; von Hippel & Trivers, 2011a). As such, it is not so much the male-bias of the domains that matters, but the degree to which perceived ability in the domain can help people compete with members of the same sex or attract members of the opposite sex.

Thus, our theorizing also suggests that in contexts that stimulate competition between women, we might see stronger expressions of female overconfidence. For instance, given the importance of social support to female reproductive success (Campbell, 2004; Taylor et al., 2000), we might expect greater female overconfidence in domains related to emotional intelligence, such as empathy (Muthukrishna et al., 2018). And given that attractiveness is a primary dimension of competition for women (Blake et al., 2018; Buss, 1989), we might also see greater overconfidence in attractiveness among women than among men. A finding that is potentially consistent with this possibility is that the correlation between self- and other-ratings of physical attractiveness is substantially lower for women (r = 0.29) than it is for men (r = 0.53) (Marcus & Miller, 2003; see also Pereira et al., 2019).

Despite these possibilities, there are two important caveats that suggest male overconfidence is more important than female overconfidence in attracting a mate. First, with greater variability on a trait, competition for that trait becomes more important. In short-term mating the playing field among females is much more equal than it is among males (Brooks, 2021), suggesting that overconfidence is more likely to be wielded by males than females in short-term mating contexts. In long-term mating, competition among females is more focused on male traits that confer status, and as such, we might expect female status competition to increase with greater variability in male status and income. Support for this prediction can be seen in the finding that women’s self-sexualization occurs to a greater extent in environments that are economically unequal (Blake et al., 2018). Maximizing one’s beauty is a fruitful strategy for attracting high-status male partners (Udry & Eckland, 1984), which historically, has been an important strategy (indeed, sometimes the only strategy) for female survival and social mobility (Blake & Brooks, 2019).

But this possibility leads to our second point, which is that competition among females for long term mates is more focused on male traits that are not directly observable and hence can only be detected with greater uncertainty (e.g., the capacity to gain resources and assist in parental care giving; Taylor et al., 2000). As noted above, uncertainty magnifies the impact of overconfidence. As a consequence, overconfidence has more potential to enhance perceptions of important male traits (such as competence) than it does to enhance perceptions of important female traits (such as physical attractiveness). Perhaps for this reason, Blake (2018) finds that expenditure at beauty salons and women’s clothing stores also covaries with economic inequality, as adornments may be a more viable means of amplifying physical attractiveness than overconfidence. Women’s relative overuse of image-enhancing filters and photo editing (Dhir et al., 2016) may stem from similar motivations. The bottom line here is that males’ internal assets are more readily distorted via overconfident claims.

These differences in adaptive pressures are not unique to humans, and although cognitive tools such as language, theory of mind, and episodic foresight have dramatically enhanced the scope of human deception (Dor, 2017; Suddendorf et al., 2022), false signaling in the context of sexual competition is widespread. For instance, Noë et al. (1980) examined the role of dominance in explaining social rank within chimpanzee hierarchies, identifying three categories of dominance displays – agonistic, bluff, and competitive. They found that male chimpanzee’s social rank to be tied to displays of agonistic dominance (direct physical dominance) and bluff displays (closest to overconfidence). Females social rank was linked only with dominance in competition for space – such as giving way when another is approaching; and social competition – such as refraining from interacting with another partner because another chimp usually acts as partner to the third. Consistent with the human data, overconfidence has the greatest utility in the context of agonistic confrontations and bluff displays.

We can see similar effects further afield from our genetic roots: consider male fig wasps who signal their fighting ability during territorial competitions by displaying their impressive mandibles (Moore et al., 2009). Wasps with large mandibles are intimidating as they can inflict significant damage on opponents. Capitalizing on this advantage, there is an atypical male phenotype that develops mandibles 50% larger than expected for body size. These males are competitive signalers and engage in fewer fights than typical males but have higher mating success. Nonetheless, when compelled to combat, they fare poorly and incur more injuries than a typical male. Taken together, these examples from our near and distant cousins suggest that male sexual competition frequently takes the form of exaggerated signaling, a strategy that may be well served by self-deceptive overconfidence (see Angilletta et al., 2019).

New Deal, New Patriots: How 1930s Government Spending Boosted Patriotism During WWII

New Deal, New Patriots: How 1930s Government Spending Boosted Patriotism During WWII. Bruno Caprettini, Hans-Joachim Voth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, qjac028, June 30 2022. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac028

Abstract: We demonstrate an important complementarity between patriotism and public-good provision. After 1933, the New Deal led to an unprecedented expansion of the US federal government’s role. Those who benefited from social spending were markedly more patriotic during WWII: they bought more war bonds, volunteered more, and, as soldiers, won more medals. This pattern was new—WWI volunteering did not show the same geography of patriotism. We match military service records with the 1940 census to show that this pattern holds at the individual level. Using geographical variation, we exploit two instruments to suggest that the effect is causal: droughts and congressional committee representation predict more New Deal agricultural support, as well as bond buying, volunteering, and medals.

JEL D64 - Altruism; PhilanthropyD74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; RevolutionsD91 - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision MakingH53 - Government Expenditures and Welfare ProgramsH56 - National Security and WarI38 - Government Policy; Provision and Effects of Welfare ProgramsN31 - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913N41 - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913P16 - Political Economy

5 Conclusion

Patriotism is widespread today – in 48 out of 52 countries, according to the World Value Survey, more than 80% of citizens are "quite proud" or "very proud" of their country (Beauchamp, 2014). At the same time, an important literature views nation-states and nationalist sentiment as artificial inventions that are socially constructed based on shared myths and narratives (Anderson, 2006; Colley, 1992). In the words of Yuval Harari: "We can weave common myths such as .. the nationalist myths of modern states. Such myths give Sapiens unprecedented ability to cooperate flexibly in large numbers... with countless strangers"(Harari, 2014). Instead of common narratives and myths as sources of patriotism, we focus on the contractual origins of state capacity, and in particular, intrinsic reciprocity towards the nation (Besley, 2020; Sobel, 2005). We demonstrate that where the US federal government provided help and support in times of crisis during the 1930s, patriotic deeds became much more common. Roosevelt’s New Deal ushered in an unprecedented expansion of federal spending, fundamentally changing the role of the Federal Government in American society (Schlesinger, 1957). Where the New Deal offered more support, Americans were more likely to help their country in wartime. By observing the same, costly actions – volunteering and medal awards – in both WW I and II, we can examine what factors changed attitudes. Importantly, New Deal spending was not targeted at areas that were already more patriotic during WW I; it created a new geography of patriotism. These results hold both at the county level and at the individual level, examining patterns of volunteering among the 12 million American men of military age in 1940. Our findings have implications for two literatures. First, they offer insight into the synergy between civic capital and pro-social behaviors on the one side, and state capacity on the other. An emerging literature in economics analyzes the origins of capable states and the role of armed conflict (Besley and Persson, 2009; Acemoglu, 2005; Gennaioli and Voth, 2015). It often focuses on war shocks, military spending needs, and taxes as a key dimension of state building (Levi, 1989; Scheve and Stasavage, 2010). The case of US patriotism during WW II suggests that the complementarity between government intervention and civic capital goes far beyond taxation and direct, legal obligations – with social spending and government support inducing a form of generalized, intrinsic "reciprocity" towards the country as a whole (Besley, 2020; Sobel, 2005). In this way, the New Deal helped to overcome a fundamental distrust of the federal government (Wallis, 2010). The US pattern after 1940 therefore bears out a general mechanism that led conservative politicians from Bismarck to Churchill to advocate greater social spending to enhance military prowess. Second, a large literature has demonstrated that culture — the combination of attitudes, prac23 tices, and beliefs governing everyday life — can persist over long periods (Becker et al., 2016; Guiso et al., 2016; Voigtländer and Voth, 2012; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011). Research on the determinants of changes in attitudes is in its infancy (Giuliano and Nunn, 2021). Here, we demonstrate how government spending can fundamentally transform patriotic attitudes in a relatively short space of time, creating a new geography of patriotism. 

Theolinguistic Study of Directive Speech Acts Performed by an Islamic Preacher in Friday Sermon in Bandung, Indonesia

Theolinguistic Study of Directive Speech Acts Performed by Islamic Preacher in Friday Sermon in Bandung Indonesia. Cipto Wardoyo, Lina Marlina, Wahyudi Darmalakasana, Ija Suntana, and Dadang Kahmad. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Sociology Education (ICSE 2017) - Volume 1, pages 178-183, ISBN: 978-989-758-316-2. https://www.scitepress.org/Papers/2017/70950/70950.pdf

Abstract: Theolinguistic study tries to explain the relationship between linguistics and religion. Religious rituals in Islamic teachings are closely related to verbal activities such as pray, daily prayer, sermons, and wedding ceremony. One method of delivering the teachings of Islam is through Friday sermons. The speech of preacher in Islamic Friday sermons is relevant to be approached pragmatically by using the theory of speech acts. This research tries to focus on studying directive speech acts performed by khatib (Islamic preacher) in Friday sermons. The data in this study was taken from the recording Friday sermon mosque in the Bandung, West Java, Indonesia. The result shows that the strategy of directive speech acts using suffix “lash” and “kan” also has higher number among the finding data. The directive speech acts strategy using inclusive pronoun “kita” indicates that khatib want to be more polite. The strategy of directive speech acts using prohibition words also has quite high number. Khatib asked attendees to fear God, be thankful, always remember and pray to God, khatib supported his argument with Quranic verses and prophetic tradition.

Keywords: Theolinguistics, Speech Acts, Islamic Friday Sermon.

People fail to give prosocial input (complimenting someone), because of overestimation of the costs of doing so (e.g., making recipients uncomfortable); this reluctance to give prosocial input results in a short supply of kindness

Kindness in Short Supply: Evidence for Inadequate Prosocial Input. Jennifer E. Abel et al. Current Opinion in Psychology, August 20 2022, 101458. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2022.101458

Abstract: In everyday life, people often have opportunities to improve others’ lives, whether offering well-intentioned advice or complimenting someone on a job well done. These are opportunities to provide “prosocial input” (information intended to benefit others), including feedback, advice, compliments, and expressions of gratitude. Despite widespread evidence that giving prosocial input can improve the well-being of both givers and recipients, people sometimes hesitate to offer their input. The current paper documents when and why people fail to give prosocial input, noting that potential givers overestimate the costs of doing so (e.g., making recipients uncomfortable) and underestimate the benefits (e.g., being helpful) for at least four psychological reasons. Unfortunately, the reluctance to give prosocial input results in a short supply of kindness.

Keywords: prosocial behaviorsocial cognitionfeedbackadvicecomplimentsgratitude

Due to the male backlash channel, women in employment in India face significantly higher levels of intimate partner violence compared to women involved in domestic work only

Male Backlash and Female Guilt: Women’s Employment and Intimate Partner Violence in Urban India. Sowmya Dhanaraj & Vidya Mahambare. Feminist Economics, Volume 28, 2022 - Issue 1, Pages 170-198, Nov 25 2021. https://doi.org/10.1080/13545701.2021.1986226

Abstract: This study investigates the relationship between a married woman’s paid work participation and her exposure to intimate partner violence (IPV) in urban India. Results show that due to the male backlash channel, women in employment face significantly higher levels of IPV compared to women involved in domestic work only. The study does not find evidence that any autonomy women gain by doing paid work lowers their experience of IPV. Furthermore, this paper contributes to the literature on gender-based violence by introducing and testing for a “female guilt channel” – a phenomenon in which women in paid work justify IPV against them more than those not in paid work – that, in turn, further raises their IPV exposure. The paper finds weak evidence for the guilt channel in the overall sample and stronger evidence among women with intermediate levels of education.

Highlights

. Women in paid work in urban India are more likely to accept intimate partner violence (IPV), as well as experience a higher degree of marital controlling behavior by husbands.

. Urban women and men with tertiary education are most likely to overcome gendered norms for paid work.

. IPV is higher among urban women in paid work whose husbands are not employed or earning less.

. Raising women’s economic opportunities alone may not lead to universally better outcomes for them inside households.

Keywords: Violence against womenwomen’s paid workgender relationsgender roles

JEL J12J16