Authors say: Regulation must not result in censorship; however, freedom of speech does not include the right to amplification of that speech (!?)

The psychological drivers of misinformation belief and its resistance to correction. Ullrich K. H. Ecker, Stephan Lewandowsky, John Cook, Philipp Schmid, Lisa K. Fazio, Nadia Brashier, Panayiota Kendeou, Emily K. Vraga & Michelle A. Amazeen. Nature Reviews Psychology volume 1, pages 13–29, Jan 12 2022. https://www.nature.com/articles/s44159-021-00006-y

Abstract: Misinformation has been identified as a major contributor to various contentious contemporary events ranging from elections and referenda to the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Not only can belief in misinformation lead to poor judgements and decision-making, it also exerts a lingering influence on people’s reasoning after it has been corrected — an effect known as the continued influence effect. In this Review, we describe the cognitive, social and affective factors that lead people to form or endorse misinformed views, and the psychological barriers to knowledge revision after misinformation has been corrected, including theories of continued influence. We discuss the effectiveness of both pre-emptive (‘prebunking’) and reactive (‘debunking’) interventions to reduce the effects of misinformation, as well as implications for information consumers and practitioners in various areas including journalism, public health, policymaking and education.

 

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Summary and future directions

Psychological research has built solid foundational knowledge of how people decide what is true and false, form beliefs, process corrections, and might continue to be influenced by misinformation even after it has been corrected. However, much work remains to fully understand the psychology of misinformation.

First, in line with general trends in psychology and elsewhere, research methods in the field of misinformation should be improved. Researchers should rely less on small-scale studies conducted in the laboratory or a small number of online platforms, often on non-representative (and primarily US-based) participants255. Researchers should also avoid relying on one-item questions with relatively low reliability256. Given the well-known attitude–behaviour gap — that attitude change does not readily translate into behavioural effects — researchers should also attempt to use more behavioural measures, such as information-sharing measures, rather than relying exclusively on self-report questionnaires93,94,95. Although existing research has yielded valuable insights into how people generally process misinformation (many of which will translate across different contexts and cultures), an increased focus on diversification of samples and more robust methods is likely to provide a better appreciation of important contextual factors and nuanced cultural differences7,82,205,257,258,259,260,261,262,263.

Second, most existing work has focused on explicit misinformation and text-based materials. Thus, the cognitive impacts of other types of misinformation, including subtler types of misdirection such as paltering (misleading while technically saying the truth)95,264,265,266, doctored images267, deepfake videos268 and extreme patterns of misinformation bombardment223, are currently not well understood. Non-text-based corrections, such as videos or cartoons, also deserve more exploration269,270.

Third, additional translational research is needed to explore questions about causality, including the causal impacts of misinformation and corrections on beliefs and behaviours. This research should also employ non-experimental methods230,231,271, such as observational causal inference (research aiming to establish causality in observed real-world data)272, and test the impact of interventions in the real world145,174,181,207. These studies are especially needed over the long term — weeks to months, or even years — and should test a range of outcome measures, for example those that relate to health and political behaviours, in a range of contexts. Ultimately, the success of psychological research into misinformation should be linked not only to theoretical progress but also to societal impact273.

Finally, even though the field has a reasonable understanding of the cognitive mechanisms and social determinants of misinformation processing, knowledge of the complex interplay between cognitive and social dynamics is still limited, as is insight into the role of emotion. Future empirical and theoretical work would benefit from development of an overarching theoretical model that aims to integrate cognitive, social and affective factors, for example by utilizing agent-based modelling approaches. This approach might also offer opportunities for more interdisciplinary work257 at the intersection of psychology, political science274 and social network analysis275, and the development of a more sophisticated psychology of misinformation.

U.S. freshmen hold systematically incorrect beliefs about the relationship between majors and occupations; students appear to stereotype majors, greatly exaggerating the likelihood that they lead to their most distinctive jobs

What Jobs Come to Mind? Stereotypes about Fields of Study. John J. Conlon, Dev Patel. October 30, 2022. https://johnjconlon17.github.io/website/Conlon_Patel_stereotypes.pdf

Abstract: How do students form beliefs about how their future career will depend on their choice of college major? Using both nationally representative survey data and surveys that we administered among undergraduates at the Ohio State University, we document that U.S. freshmen hold systematically incorrect beliefs about the relationship between majors and occupations. Students appear to stereotype majors, greatly exaggerating the likelihood that they lead to their most distinctive jobs (e.g., counselor for psychology, journalist for journalism, teacher for education). A stylized model of major choice suggests that stereotyping boosts demand for “risky” majors: ones with rare stereotypical careers and low-paying alternative jobs. In a field experiment among the same Ohio State sample, providing statistical information on career frequencies to first-year college students has significant effects on their intended majors (and, less precisely, on their choices of which classes to enroll in), with larger effects on students considering risky majors. Finally, we present a model of belief formation in which stereotyping arises as a product of associative memory. The same model predicts—and the survey data confirm—that students also overestimate rare non-stereotypical careers and careers that are concentrated within particular majors. The model also generates predictions regarding role model effects, with students exaggerating the frequency of career-major combinations held by people they are personally close to.

IQ was not strongly related to climate change attitudes; this seems surprising to the authors because in acrimonious debates both sides accuse the other of ignorance

Correlates of belief in climate change: Demographics, ideology and belief systems. Adrian Furnham, Charlotte Robinson. Acta Psychologica, Volume 230, October 2022, 103775. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2022.103775

Abstract: This paper reports on two studies that examine correlates of attitudes to climate change (ACC). In the first study, five hundred participants completed five questionnaires and an intelligence test as well as two related measures of ACC. Using correlations and regressions we examined the relationship between ACC and demography (gender, age, education), ideology (political and religious beliefs), intelligence, self-beliefs, Belief in a Just World and the endorsement of Conspiracy Theories. One climate change questionnaire factored into three factors labelled Impact, Fatalism, and Personal action. The most consistent finding was that political opinions were most strongly related to climate change beliefs: more conservative thinkers denied that individuals could do anything. In the second study, also with 500 participants, we asked one question concerning how seriously they took the issue of global warming. Again, we examined the relationship with this response and the participants' demography, ideology and self-ratings. Political beliefs primarily were related to global warming concerns, as in the first study. Results are discussed in terms of climate change as an ideology and the possible changing of these beliefs. Limitations, like the representativeness of the sample and the single-item measure in the second study are acknowledged.

Keywords: Climate changeIdeologyBeliefsConspiracy theories

[...]

Surprisingly IQ was not strongly related to ACC, except the second factor concerning fatalistic beliefs. The IQ score was significantly correlated with other scores such as education, religious beliefs and the rejection of CTs, though it was not closely related to ACC. This is surprising because in acrimonious debates both sides accuse the other of ignorance.

[...]

4. General discussion

As is apparent from public demonstrations, social media messages and the mass media, ACC is an increasing hot topic and one which attracts a great deal of attention. Whilst these studies did not use fully representative samples, they did indicate that most people tend to the activist end of the ACC spectrum: that is the accept climate change and see it as predominantly “man-made”. Nevertheless, there is still and sufficient spread of beliefs to investigate our hypotheses.

The results from both studies suggested that gender, age, education and religious beliefs were not strongly associated with ACC but clearly demonstrate the relationship between political beliefs and ACC. Despite using three different measures of ACC in the two studies, the results showed that of all the variables we considered by far the most powerful and consistent was political beliefs. Those rated themselves as more conservative were more likely to be climate sceptics. Whilst this result would not surprise many, perhaps what is most interesting is the power of this single variable over and above the many we measured. By and large these results concur with other related studies in different countries (Krange et al., 2019; McCright & Dunlap, 2011).

In both studies we used both correlational and regression analyses. Whilst the correlations indicated many variables associated ACC the regressions gave a clearer picture identifying very clearly the role of political beliefs.

Climate change is clearly more an ideological issue than anything else. Liberal as opposed to politically conservative people accept the idea that climate change is real and primarily man made whilst conservatives reject this view. As a consequence, the former advocate a range of radical changes in society while the latter strongly reject them. Perhaps it is this factor that accounts for the finding: that is, because the “solutions” to climate change are so radical, conservatives find it easiest to reject the possible cause. This hypothesis may be tested by asking people about the beliefs in the efficacy and indeed morality of climate change interventions.

Douglas and Sutton (2015) suggest that ACC deniers may be considered conspiracy theorists. They suggest that climate conspiracy theorists believe that climate scientists and politicians are distorting or hijacking the science for their own agenda. Moreover, more than the many other conspiracy theories, those concerning climate change seem more politically loaded, dividing opinion across the left-right continuum.

It is interesting in the first study that the measure of CT, used in many other studies (Furnham, 2022), did not correlate significantly with two factors and was significant in only one regression. This may be because there is a difference between climate change cynics and sceptics; the former of which are likely to embrace a wide range of theories while the latter are very specific. There are also a number of spokespeople for the sceptic position that are clearly not conspiracy thinkers or activists.

These results raise issues about the change of ACC beliefs. There are a number of individuals and organisations that hope to convert people to their cause as regards ACC. They usually do so by the presentation of data of varying quality and complexity. They face a very similar problem to those eager to reduce CTs. Cichocka (2020) argued that three broad psychological needs underlie conspiracy beliefs: the need to understand the world, to feel safe, and to belong as well as feel positive about oneself and one's social groups. She argues that we should not abandon other methods of correcting misinformation and stemming its spread. Debunking is extremely difficult, but ‘Prebunking’ is more effective and involves warning people that they might encounter misinformation before they accept it. It would appear that there are still relatively few studies on the efficacy of methods to modify ACC.

Given these findings it would be interesting to trace politicians in various countries assertions about climate change and the way these have changed over time. It is now 60 years since Carson's (1962) famous popular book Silent Spring was published and which is still quoted by both sides in the argument.

Like all others this study had limitations. Given the relevance of ideology, particularly political beliefs, it would have been desirable to have explored in much more detail a participants' political beliefs, knowledge and past political behaviour, like voting, party membership and active participation in campaigns. However, there is evidence that this one item personal rating is consistently and logically related to other belief systems (Furnham & Robinson, 2021). The mean score (and standard deviation) in both samples was very similar and indicated most of these younger and better educated people tended to be more politically liberal than conservative.

It would also be of interest to explore knowledge of, as well as attitudes to, climate change: that is what facts and data people know or choose to quote on these issues. This would no doubt be related to their media preferences and consumption. Our sample was clearly not representative of a general (European) population, being younger and better educated. They tended to be more left-wing/liberal, with scores being around 6 out of 8 on this dimension, with an SD of around 2. It would be interesting given the results to seek out larger groups from different ends of the political spectrum, though it is not clear if the results would be much different.

In conclusion this study underlined the role of political beliefs in climate change beliefs (Conversi & Hau, 2021). Despite examining a wide range of other demographic, ideological and belief factor it seems that political persuasion is by far the major correlate of ACC. This provides useful information for those trying to change the publics ACC. On the other hand, it is important to acknowledge the nature of the sample and the measures we used to conclude that political beliefs are necessarily the major determinant of all aspects of a person's ACC.

 

Findings suggest that highly altruistic individuals believe that others deserve help regardless of their potential moral shortcomings

Beliefs about Humanity, not Higher Power, Predict Extraordinary Altruism. P. Amormino et al. Journal of Research in Personality, October 31 2022, 104313. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2022.104313

Abstract: Using a rare sample of altruistic kidney donors (n = 56, each of whom had donated a kidney to a stranger) and demographically similar controls (n = 75), we investigated how beliefs about human nature correspond to extraordinary altruism. Extraordinary altruists were less likely than controls to believe that humans can be truly evil. Results persisted after controlling for trait empathy and religiosity. Belief in pure good was not associated with extraordinary altruism. We found no differences in the religiosity and spirituality of extraordinary altruists compared to controls. Findings suggest that highly altruistic individuals believe that others deserve help regardless of their potential moral shortcomings. Results provide preliminary evidence that lower levels of cynicism motivate costly, non-normative altruistic for strangers.

People's political views predict which alternatives to reality they will find most plausible, will be most likely to spontaneously imagine, and will view as sufficient evidence of a conclusion

Polarized imagination: partisanship influences the direction and consequences of counterfactual thinking. Kai Epstude, Daniel A. Effron and Neal J. Roese. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. October 31 2022. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2021.0342

Abstract: Four studies examine how political partisanship qualifies previously documented regularities in people's counterfactual thinking (n = 1186 Democrats and Republicans). First, whereas prior work finds that people generally prefer to think about how things could have been better instead of worse (i.e. entertain counterfactuals in an upward versus downward direction), studies 1a–2 find that partisans are more likely to generate and endorse counterfactuals in whichever direction best aligns with their political views. Second, previous research finds that the closer someone comes to causing a negative event, the more blame that person receives; study 3 finds that this effect is more pronounced among partisans who oppose (versus support) a leader who ‘almost' caused a negative event. Thus, partisan reasoning may influence which alternatives to reality people will find most plausible, will be most likely to imagine spontaneously, and will view as sufficient grounds for blame.

5. General discussion

Our four studies shed new light on how partisan beliefs relate to counterfactual thinking. Partisans find a given counterfactual more plausible when it aligns with their views (studies 1a and 1b), selectively generate counterfactuals that align with their views (study 2), and deploy counterfactuals that support preferred moral judgements about leaders (study 3). In summary, partisanship predicts both the content and the conclusions of counterfactual thoughts.

Our research makes several theoretical contributions. Our main contribution is to demonstrate how partisanship qualifies two empirical regularities in the counterfactual thinking literature. First, whereas previous research demonstrated an overwhelming preference for upward over downward counterfactuals (e.g. [31]), studies 1a–2 found a complete reversal of this preference when downward counterfactuals aligned with participants' views. That is, partisans in our studies flexibly generated and endorsed counterfactuals in whichever direction best aligned with their political views on a particular issue (supporting H1a over H1b). One explanation is that prior research tended to examine situations in which people were motivated by a desire to discover ‘how things could be better,' whereas partisans tend to be more motivated by a desire to justify and defend their political views.

The second empirical regularity we qualify is that the closer someone comes to causing a negative event, the more blame that person receives (e.g. [19]). Study 3 replicated this effect, but also showed that it is more pronounced among partisans who oppose (versus support) a leader who ‘almost' caused a negative event (supporting H2). One explanation is that when people dislike a leader, they lower their standards for what constitutes evidence of that leader's blameworthiness, giving more weight to imagined events—what could have happened under the leader's watch.

In short, partisan reasoning may influence which alternatives to reality people will find most plausible, will be most likely to spontaneously imagine, and will view as sufficient grounds for blame—thus creating important boundary conditions on previously documented effects.

Another theoretical contribution is that study 3 advances understanding of counterfactual thinking's role in moral judgement [32]. In some cases, downward counterfactual thinking connects to more-lenient moral judgements [33]—a contrast effect. For example, participants felt licensed to act in a less-than-virtuous manner after they reflected on the sinful actions they could have (but did not) performed [25,26]. In other cases, downward counterfactual thinking results in harsher moral judgements [34]—an assimilation effect. Study 3 suggests that the extent to which downward counterfactual thinking produces harsher moral judgements depends on partisanship. When partisans disliked a president, downward counterfactual thinking was more tightly associated with blaming that president. That is, the closer people thought a negative event came to occurring, the more likely they were to blame the president, especially if the president was opposed by the partisan. Our findings thus raise the possibility that motivation influences how much of an assimilation effect result from downward counterfactual thinking. Future research should further examine this possibility.

Third, our results contribute to a debate about whether conservatives are more prone to cognitive biases than are liberals (cf. [1,35,36]). Our results suggest that partisanship connects to counterfactual thinking among people at both ends of the political spectrum (i.e. Democrats and Republicans). That said, our results contain nuance. In studies 1a–2, Democrats and Republicans alike were more inclined to endorse and generate counterfactuals that were aligned (versus misaligned) with their views—but this effect was larger among Democrats. In study 3, people's tendency to blame a president they opposed for negative events that nearly happened was larger among Trump supporters than Biden supporters—but participants' tendency to praise a president they supported for having averted negative events was larger among Biden than Trump supporters. Future research should assess the generality of these patterns and pinpoint why they emerge. However, our results do not support the possibility that, when it comes to counterfactual thinking, conservatives show more partisan bias than do liberals.

As noted, our results are consistent with the idea that partisans engage in motivated counterfactual thinking. That is, the content and conclusions of their counterfactual thinking may reflect their desire to justify their political beliefs and to blame leaders they oppose. However, like most partisan effects in political psychology [16], ours could also be explained by non-motivated processes. For example, Republicans could be more likely than Democrats to think that ‘things would have been better’ without a particular Democratic policy because Republicans have been exposed to more information about that policy's shortcomings. Meanwhile, Democrats could be more likely than Republicans to blame Trump for ‘almost' causing war with North Korea because only Democrats are more likely to have the prior that Trump makes bad decisions. Of course, the priors and indeed the information to which partisans have been exposed may themselves have motivated origins, which illustrates the challenge of distinguishing motivated from purely cognitive processes [17]. In practice, both types of processes may work together [37].

Representing alternatives (self-generated possibilities, hypotheticals, simulations and non-actualities) to actual present experience is itself essential to the hippocampus

Imagination as a fundamental function of the hippocampus. Alison E. Comrie, Loren M. Frank and Kenneth Kay. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. October 31 2022. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2021.0336

Abstract: Imagination is a biological function that is vital to human experience and advanced cognition. Despite this importance, it remains unknown how imagination is realized in the brain. Substantial research focusing on the hippocampus, a brain structure traditionally linked to memory, indicates that firing patterns in spatially tuned neurons can represent previous and upcoming paths in space. This work has generally been interpreted under standard views that the hippocampus implements cognitive abilities primarily related to actual experience, whether in the past (e.g. recollection, consolidation), present (e.g. spatial mapping) or future (e.g. planning). However, relatively recent findings in rodents identify robust patterns of hippocampal firing corresponding to a variety of alternatives to actual experience, in many cases without overt reference to the past, present or future. Given these findings, and others on hippocampal contributions to human imagination, we suggest that a fundamental function of the hippocampus is to generate a wealth of hypothetical experiences and thoughts. Under this view, traditional accounts of hippocampal function in episodic memory and spatial navigation can be understood as particular applications of a more general system for imagination. This view also suggests that the hippocampus contributes to a wider range of cognitive abilities than previously thought.

5. Organization and origin of generative activity in the brain

Having reviewed multiple types of generative neural activity in the hippocampus, we turn to our next question of how generative representations may be organized and ‘parsed’ from representations of actual, ongoing experience. One would expect that neural processes are in place to separate actual and generative activity to avoid their confusion, reminiscent of the subject-level ability to internally distinguish actual from imagined experience [4]. Multiple organizational schemes are possible; different sets of neurons could participate in actual versus generative representations, these representations could occur at different relative times, or some combination of these schemes could take place.

Findings in the rodent hippocampus indicate that neural firing corresponding to actual and generative representations occur at different relative times that are internally determined [105]. Generative representations tend to occur not only with temporal separation from representations of actuality, but also in alignment with underlying network-level activity patterns in the hippocampus that are internally generated: SWRs and the theta rhythm (figure 3a) [68,106]. This results in a serial alternation of neural firing corresponding to actuality and generativity, or a temporal ‘multiplexing’ of actual and generative representations in the brain.

This serial alternation is present across behavioural states. During immobility, neural firing corresponding to the animal's actual present location is maintained for prolonged periods, transiently suppressed during SWR events that typically contain generative replays (tens to hundreds of milliseconds), and then subsequently restored (figure 3) [106,107].

Similarly, during movement and exploratory behaviours, neural firing corresponding to actual present and non-actual alternative experience, or actual and generative representations, occurs serially and in alignment with characteristic phases of the theta rhythm [3,68]. More specifically, early phases characteristically contain representations of the animal's actual past and present experience, while late phases may contain firing corresponding to a variety of hypothetical experiences, resulting in alternating actual and generative representations (examples in figure 2, schematic in figure 3) [68]. Furthermore, there are multiple levels of alternation between actual and generative activity during movement—representations not only alternate within approximately 125 ms theta cycles (e.g. actual and upcoming position), but also across consecutive theta cycles (e.g. alternation of two possible paths ahead; figure 2) [68]. Additional findings are also consistent with the idea that multiple representations can be accommodated in the hippocampus via serial alternation at a sub-second timescale. For instance, studies in the rat hippocampus have reported theta-modulated ‘flickering’ between representations of two environmental contexts, as well as dynamic switching between two spatial reference frames, and separate reverse and forward-ordered location sequences within theta cycles [108–110].

The organization of actual and generative neural firing in the hippocampus also extends to other brain areas, consistent with the engagement of a distributed network in these representations [20,111,112]. Network-level neural activity patterns underlying generative representations can be coherent across the hippocampus and prefrontal cortex during replays and along the theta rhythm, with some reports of concurrent expression of actual versus alternative location representations across both regions [107,113–117]. Additionally, some generative firing events in the hippocampus are not only coordinated with but also predicted by the activity of cells in the medial prefrontal cortex [70]. Numerous other cortical and subcortical areas also share coordinated firing patterns with the hippocampus, during both replay events and the theta rhythm [67,118–125]. Recruitment of a large network of brain areas during activity related to actual and generative experience appears to reflect brain-wide organization, and the question of how firing patterns in other regions across the brain specifically contribute and respond to generative representations in the hippocampus remains an active area of research [113,122].

How might organized generative neural firing patterns in the hippocampus come about through hippocampal and extrahippocampal processes? This remains largely unknown, but some initial points can be made. First, one would expect generative firing patterns, which do not correspond to immediately ongoing circumstances, to arise primarily from internally driven activity patterns, as opposed neural activity driven directly by external stimuli. Consistent with this, generative events are observed during SWRs and in association with the theta rhythm—and both of these activity patterns are generated internally in the brain (spontaneously) rather than elicited by external stimuli [76,126]. More specifically, SWRs spontaneously occur during sleep in the absence of dynamic sensory stimuli and can be intrinsically generated in isolated hippocampal slices in vitro [76]. Hippocampal theta oscillations arise in vivo in coordination with a rhythm generator region, the medial septum, and can also be generated in isolated rodent hippocampus in vitro [127,128]. Furthermore, late phases of theta, during which generative representations tend to occur, are associated with increased recurrent network activity from within the hippocampus, and relatively weaker influence from cortical areas that are thought to provide multimodal information to the hippocampus [63,67,129,130].

While SWR and theta oscillations are understood to be internally generated and are associated with the occurrence of generative neural firing patterns in the hippocampus, the question of how specific groups of neurons (such as place cells with overlapping place fields) are recruited during generative events remains open [131]. In addition to mechanisms that support SWR and theta generation, it is likely the case that input from brain regions beyond the hippocampus have a role in this process [67]. One possibility is that the activation of particular sets of spatially tuned neurons during generative events is guided by extrahippocampal areas, such as the prefrontal cortex, that are also implicated in the default mode network [20]. This possibility is consistent with evidence that cortical activity can predict generative spiking during theta oscillations several cycles in advance, as well as SWR activity during sleep, and would argue against the idea that hippocampal ensembles are activated by exclusively unstructured input [70,125]. Studies focusing on the internal correlates of generative activity within the brain, over external behavioural correlates, may be especially important to understand what determines the generative neural firing patterns observed in the hippocampus.

The segregation of generative and actual representations in the hippocampus also raises the question of whether the hippocampus further differentiates subtypes of generative representations. For example, are events that reflect veridical experience from the past somehow distinguished from those that reflect constructed alternatives, or those that are predictive of future choices? At the level of neural firing, it remains unclear whether or how the hippocampus might separate these possible representations. However, two points of reference in the human literature offer clues that the relevant neural substrates may be outside the hippocampus. First, patients with hippocampal amnesia can entertain thoughts that distinguish the past or the future, despite impairments in episodic memory [132,133]. Additionally, hippocampal activation during mental simulations without temporal placement versus those specifically set in the future result in similar activation levels in the medial temporal lobe and default mode network [132,134]. These results are consistent with the idea that temporally differentiating representations related to the past or the future may not be hippocampally dependent. Second, healthy human subjects can subjectively discriminate internally and externally derived information, an ability known as reality monitoring [135]. Based on functional imaging studies in both healthy subjects and patients with schizophrenia who experience hallucinations, reality monitoring is thought to rely primarily on prefrontal cortical networks [112]. By contrast, another study reports that hippocampal activation was similar across cases of true and false recognition memory [136], further suggesting that this ability does not strictly rely on the hippocampus. Although probing reality monitoring in rodents is not straightforward, it would be notable if, for example, frontal cortical firing patterns systematically differed based on the representation of possibilities in the hippocampus that reflected veridical experience versus constructed alternatives. Such a result would be consistent with the idea that the hippocampus alone may not distinguish subcategories of generative events, but that the brain may do so via the engagement of prefrontal circuits.

Looking beyond rodents, it remains an open question as to which patterns of generative activity in the hippocampus are shared across species [137]. On the one hand, SWRs have been observed in a range of vertebrates, as have neural reactivation patterns suggestive of replay [138–144]. In humans, replay and replay-like patterns have also been reported, including activity patterns consistent with reactivating prior experience, as well as inferred sequential activity that is not simply recapitulative [145–149]. By contrast to the ubiquity of SWRs across vertebrates, the theta rhythm appears to be more prominent and continuous in the rodent hippocampus than in various other species [137]. A notable example is the bat hippocampus, which shows network-level activity fluctuations that are not generally rhythmic yet still organize place cell firing according to phase [140,150–153]. This may suggest that actual and generative representations can be organized via temporal multiplexing even in the absence of strong rhythmicity. In nonhuman primates and humans, the hippocampal theta rhythm appears to occur in intermittent bouts and at a lower frequency [140,150–153]. Recently, theta phase coding has also been shown in single cells in human subjects [154,155]. In all, these results indicate some conservation across species of the organization of neural firing with respect to network-level hippocampal activity. More generally, they leave open the possibility that the brains of many species temporally multiplex actual versus generative internal representations.

Conspiracy theories explain distressing events as malevolent actions by powerful groups. Why do people believe in secret plots when other explanations are more probable?

Do Conspiracy Theorists Think Too Much or Too Little? Nadia M. Brashier. Current Opinion in Psychology, October 31 2022, 101504. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2022.101504

Abstract: Conspiracy theories explain distressing events as malevolent actions by powerful groups. Why do people believe in secret plots when other explanations are more probable? On the one hand, conspiracy theorists seem to disregard accuracy; they tend to endorse mutually incompatible conspiracies, think intuitively, use heuristics, and hold other irrational beliefs. But by definition, conspiracy theorists reject the mainstream explanation for an event, often in favor of a more complex account. They exhibit a general distrust of others and expend considerable effort to find ‘evidence’ supporting their beliefs. In searching for answers, conspiracy theorists likely expose themselves to misleading information online and overestimate their own knowledge. Understanding when elaboration and cognitive effort might backfire is crucial, as conspiracy beliefs lead to political disengagement, environmental inaction, prejudice, and support for violence.

Keywords: conspiracy beliefscognitive effortheuristicsdeliberationinformation seeking

Modeling Female Sexual Desire

Modeling Female Sexual Desire: An Overview and Commentary. Abigail L. Kohut-Jackson, Johnathan M. Borland and Robert L. Meisel. In Sexual Disorders and Dysfunctions, Ed. Dhastagir Sultan Sheriff, October 25th, 2022. https://www.intechopen.com/online-first/84390

Abstract: Hypoactive sexual desire disorder (HSDD) in women is a condition of low sexual desire that develops over time. Sexual desire normally diminishes over long-term relationships, but is also negatively affected by a demanding lifestyle, poor self-esteem and body image, and loss of intimacy in a relationship. HSDD elevates to a disorder when it is a concern for the woman, arising from conflict with a partner who is interested in a greater frequency of sexual interaction. Two drugs have been marketed (Addyi and Vyleesi) to treat HSDD. Neither drug was originally developed for this purpose, nor is either drug particularly effective. The lack of rational development of drugs to treat sexual disorders in women is due to the mistaken belief that components of female sexuality, such as sexual desire, cannot be effectively modeled in animals. To the contrary, sexual interest, desire, arousal, and reward are measurable aspects of sexual behavior in female rodents. Going forward, basic research using these pre-clinical models should be the starting point for drug development. At the same time, it is not clear that drug development represents the primary therapeutic approach to the problem, with behavioral therapies providing good options for first line of treatments for HSDD.

Keywords: sexual arousalsexual interestsexual rewardhypoactive sexual desire disorderAddyiVyleesianimal modelsmesolimbic systemnucleus accumbensdopamineglutamatemelanocortin receptors

6. Commentary

Nappi [7] presented an expert opinion on the relative lack of drugs to treat female sexual dysfunction. She highlighted the wide range of causes for sexual dysfunction in women, as opposed to simply erectile dysfunction in men. She noted that we still have an incomplete understanding of a woman’s sexuality, which is a prerequisite to developing treatments. She also pointed out that female sexual dysfunction is not a life-threatening clinical problem, so that it is important to balance the clinical effectiveness of drugs with the drug’s safety for the women taking them. Finally, Nappi [7] was concerned with drugs that needed to be taken chronically (e.g., Addyi), and hoped that on-demand medications (e.g., Vyleesi) could be developed. Nappi’s commentary is still very current and meaningful, and rational drug development (in her view) will only be achieved through the cooperative partnership of sexual experts, pharmaceutical companies and medical agencies [7].

6.1 A rational approach to drug development

In Section 4 we described how Addyi and Vyleesi went to clinical trials with remarkably little preclinical data supporting their effects on sexual behavior in animal models. If developing drugs to treat sexual dysfunction in women is an important endeavor, the starting point has to be investment in basic research in both the public and pharmaceutical sectors. This research should be designed to take advantage of current animal models (and develop new animal models [81]) to identify potential molecular targets for therapeutics. This is how drug development begins for essentially all diseases and is only emphasized here because this message clearly was lost in the development and marketing of drugs for HSDD in women.

6.2 Pathologizing the normal

Basson et al. [9] developed a comprehensive model of female sexuality that emphasized the complexity of a woman’s sexual response. At the same time that this model is a valuable contribution to understanding female sexuality, it also highlights the individual variability in sexual responses among women, making it difficult to define what a normal response pattern is. If we cannot define a normal sexual response, then how do we define sexual dysfunction in women [82, 83, 84]. Basson et al. [82] disagree with DSM criteria that quantify numbers of sexual fantasies or whether a woman initiates sexual activity as determinants of sexual dysfunction. They assert that few or no sexual fantasies are not a pathology, nor is it pathological if a woman does not initiate sexual activity.

Based on earlier arguments, Meixel et al. [84] lay out a historical account of the many examples of the drug industry’s marketing strategy of “condition branding”. With condition branding, the drug company creates a medical condition to support the development of a drug. In the example of Addyi, HSDD was elevated in significance as a treatable source of distress as part of the rebranding of the drug to address the disparity in the treatment of sexual dysfunction in men and women. It is disturbing that drug-company supported continuing medical education (CME) modules were developed to “educate” clinicians about this disorder. Meixel et al. [84] note (p. 860):

“Specific marketing messages that we identified within the CME modules included the following:

Hypoactive sexual desire disorder is very common and underdiagnosed.

Hypoactive sexual desire disorder can have a profound effect on quality of life.

Women may not be aware that they are sick or distressed.

Hypoactive sexual desire disorder and distress can have other names.

Clinicians should initiate conversation with their patients about their sexual health.

Clinicians find it difficult to discuss their patients’ sexual concerns and lack training and confidence in the diagnosis of sexual problems.

Clinicians need tools and resources to help them diagnose hypoactive sexual desire disorder.

Simple tools, including the decreased sexual desire screener (DSDS) and Female Sexual Function Index (FSFI) can assist clinicians in diagnosing hypoactive sexual desire disorder.

A major barrier to clinicians talking about hypoactive sexual desire disorder/female sexual dysfunction is the lack of medications.

It is problematic that there are medicines available to treat sexual problems for men but not women.”

Key elements in the continuing education modules to be noted here are that the lack (at the time) of medications for HSDD was an impediment for physicians to have discussions about sexual desire with their patients and that women may have HSDD even if they are unaware of it.

6.3 Therapeutic approaches

A starting point for therapy may lie in reassuring women that their sexual feelings are not abnormal and are shared by many other women [82]. This does not alleviate tensions and conflict in a relationship, but can more effectively set the stage for other therapeutic approaches. For example, changing a women’s view of herself can aid in communication with her partner about her sexuality to alleviate interpersonal conflicts [82]. Knowing that her feelings are normal and shared will boost self-esteem and relieve personal insecurities, both of which are barriers to promoting relationship satisfaction and feeling sexually desirable. This is clearly a simplistic approach that in isolation will not be sufficient for most women [85]. Still, this is an important component of any therapeutic plan.

Given that fatigue is a key factor underlying low sexual desire in women, approaches to reduce lifestyle stress and fatigue may be helpful. Mindfulness strategies can be helpful in this regard [86, 87, 88, 89] and have the advantage of being easy to apply and are inexpensive. Presumably other lifestyle approaches may also be beneficial when HSDD results from these types of life events.

Cognitive processes impact HSDD when women view their own behavior, rather than relationship issues, as central to their levels of sexual desire. A rather thorough review [90] supports a role of cognitive behavioral therapies in treating women with HSDD. The goals of these approaches are straightforward, aiming to increasing the rewarding experiences for women and improve relationships through cognitive restructuring and communication. As with mindfulness strategies, cognitive behavioral therapy can be conducted through online training as well as in person.

Drugs should be a last line of treatment [2, 91], and used perhaps in conjunction with behavioral therapies. The worry with drug therapies is that they necessarily carry side effects that vary in severity. This is unavoidable with any compound that affects neurotransmission, as there will be direct and indirect effects on chemical transmission that are spread throughout the central nervous system, beyond the specific circuits targeting the behaviors in question [36].

Today’s Older Adults Are Cognitively Fitter Than Older Adults Were 20 Years Ago, but When and How They Decline Is No Different Than in the Past

Today’s Older Adults Are Cognitively Fitter Than Older Adults Were 20 Years Ago, but When and How They Decline Is No Different Than in the Past. Denis Gerstorf et al. Psychological Science, October 25, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1177/09567976221118541

Abstract: History-graded increases in older adults’ levels of cognitive performance are well documented, but little is known about historical shifts in within-person change: cognitive decline and onset of decline. We combined harmonized perceptual-motor speed data from independent samples recruited in 1990 and 2010 to obtain 2,008 age-matched longitudinal observations (M = 78 years, 50% women) from 228 participants in the Berlin Aging Study (BASE) and 583 participants in the Berlin Aging Study II (BASE-II). We used nonlinear growth models that orthogonalized within- and between-person age effects and controlled for retest effects. At age 78, the later-born BASE-II cohort substantially outperformed the earlier-born BASE cohort (d = 1.20; 25 years of age difference). Age trajectories, however, were parallel, and there was no evidence of cohort differences in the amount or rate of decline and the onset of decline. Cognitive functioning has shifted to higher levels, but cognitive decline in old age appears to proceed similarly as it did two decades ago.

Discussion

Our findings indicate that later-born older Berliners tested in the 2010s outperformed their earlier-born age peers tested in the 1990s. Contrary to our hypotheses, results showed that later-born older adults did not exhibit shallower declines on perceptual-motor speed or a later onset of decline. The later born cohort’s cognitive performance was shifted upward from the earlier-born cohort’s, but trajectories of cognitive aging were parallel.

Historical change in cognitive performance

Consistent with the Flynn effect (Pietschnig & Voracek, 2015), results from our carefully matched longitudinal data obtained from same-aged older adults tested two decades apart provide more evidence of historical change in levels of performance. The effect size (d = 1.20) is striking and even larger than that obtained in our earlier time-lagged cross-sectional analysis of a subset of participants (Gerstorf et al., 2015: d = 0.85). This constitutes one more set of evidence that cultural changes over the last 30 years, including better access to individual resources (e.g., quantity and quality of education) and innovations in science and technology (e.g., advances in medicine and nutrition; Drewelies et al., 2019), have contributed to improved cognitive performance in old age. Future work should detail how the many different mechanisms that drive improvements in unique and specific resource constellations can further improve cognitive functioning (and productivity) of older adults.

Are old-age cognitive declines today shallower or postponed to later ages?

Our results parallel those of studies that did not find history-graded improvements in cognitive aging trajectories (e.g., Brailean et al., 2018) but differ from studies that had found such improvements (e.g., Dodge et al., 2014). Beyond similarities in the calendar years participants were born and tested, the discrepant findings may result from country-level differences in health care and differences in the studies’ measurement and analysis procedures.

In the 1990s, studies had documented that elevated blood pressure in midlife (rather than old age) is predictive of steeper cognitive declines in old age (Launer et al., 1995). Since then, widespread prescription and use of effective anti-hypertensive medication may have weakened those links. However, implementation in Germany occurred about a decade later than in the United States and other nations (Wolf-Maier et al., 2003). Consequently, our later-born older Berliners may have already been too old to have benefitted from widespread changes in delivery of health care. Back when this generation of older adults was in midlife, blood pressure treatment had not yet improved (Koenig et al., 2018). Going forward, cross-national studies can be used to test hypotheses about long-latency treatment effects of midlife blood pressure for cognitive decline in old age.

Interestingly, studies that reported cohort differences in rates of cognitive decline either did not include perceptual speed measures (Dodge et al., 2017 and Gerstorf et al., 2011: reasoning, verbal meaning, and memory), did not find cohort effects on perceptual speed measures (but on verbal fluency and working memory; Grasset et al., 2018), or found that cohort differences in perceptual speed measures were smaller than for other measures (executive functions; Dodge et al., 2014). Although measures of perceptual speed capture age-related declines well, they may not be very sensitive to history-graded changes in decline. More systematic charting of how cohort differences manifest across a wider set of aging-sensitive (e.g., memory) and more aging-resilient (e.g., crystallized) abilities is needed.

Our analytic approach also differed from approaches used in other studies. The nonlinear growth-modeling framework allowed us to account for a variety of potential confounds. First, the observation-level age matching between BASE and BASE-II samples drawn from the same underlying population provided a strong foundation for testing differences between same-age observations obtained from different cohorts. Second, we modeled and accounted for retest effects that often emerge with repeated test taking. Third, our model explicitly separated between-person from within-person age effects (age gradients vs. intraindividual change), allowing for more precise testing of hypotheses about history-graded shifts in cognitive aging—a distinctly intraindividual process.

To our knowledge, this is the first study to directly test cohort differences in the age of onset of cognitive decline. Contrary to the cognitive-reserve hypothesis, results showed no evidence for a shift in the onset of decline. However, this finding is consistent with both the preserved-differentiation perspective (Salthouse, 2006), by which level differences established in early life are maintained and carried forward into old age, and recent meta-analyses showing that differences in education have substantial effects on levels of cognitive functioning but null effects on rates of cognitive aging (Lövdén et al., 2020) or brain aging (Nyberg et al., 2021). It seems that history-graded improvements resulting from early-life education, cognitive stimulation, and health care persist into old age, but not because aging processes have been any kinder.

Limitations and future directions

Several limitations in our design and sample must also be noted. A time window of two decades may suffice to identify historical change in levels of perceptual-motor speed but may not be long enough to identify historical change in key features of cognitive aging trajectories. Further, because our assessments were obtained only in old age, we were unable to disentangle late-life processes from those unfolding during early life and mid-life. With the Flynn effect reversing among young men (Bratsberg & Rogeberg, 2018), future research should systematically examine how history-graded changes may proceed differentially throughout life.

Participants were drawn from one geographical region and represent a positively selected population segment. One key question is whether our findings apply to resource-poor population segments. Conceptual perspectives on manufactured survival (Olshansky & Carnes, 2019) suggest that some older adults today carry disease burdens longer than did older adults in the past. Future research should carefully examine whether cohort differences in decline emerge in more diverse samples and are moderated by access to resources.