Those who self-report a strong moral character have a tendency to hypocrisy

Being good to look good: Self-reported moral character predicts moral double standards among reputation-seeking individuals. Mengchen Dong,Tom R. Kupfer,Shuai Yuan,Jan-Willem van Prooijen. British Journal of Psychology, November 4 2022. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjop.12608

Abstract: Moral character is widely expected to lead to moral judgements and practices. However, such expectations are often breached, especially when moral character is measured by self-report. We propose that because self-reported moral character partly reflects a desire to appear good, people who self-report a strong moral character will show moral harshness towards others and downplay their own transgressions—that is, they will show greater moral hypocrisy. This self-other discrepancy in moral judgements should be pronounced among individuals who are particularly motivated by reputation. Employing diverse methods including large-scale multination panel data (N = 34,323), and vignette and behavioural experiments (N = 700), four studies supported our proposition, showing that various indicators of moral character (Benevolence and Universalism values, justice sensitivity, and moral identity) predicted harsher judgements of others' more than own transgressions. Moreover, these double standards emerged particularly among individuals possessing strong reputation management motives. The findings highlight how reputational concerns moderate the link between moral character and moral judgement.

Practitioner points

- Self-reported moral character does not predict actual moral performance well.

- Good moral character based on self-report can sometimes predict strong moral hypocrisy.

- Good moral character based on self-report indicates high moral standards, while only for others but not necessarily for the self.

- Hypocrites can be good at detecting reputational cues and presenting themselves as morally decent persons.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

A well-known Golden Rule of morality is to treat others as you wish to be treated yourself (Singer, 1963). People with a strong moral character might be expected to follow this Golden Rule, and judge others no more harshly than they judge themselves. However, when moral character is measured by self-reports, it is often intertwined with socially desirable responding and reputation management motives (Anglim et al., 2017; Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016; Reed & Aquino, 2003). The current research examines the potential downstream effects of moral character and reputation management motives on moral decisions. By attempting to differentiate the ‘genuine’ and ‘reputation managing’ components of self-reported moral character, we posited an association between moral character and moral double standards on the self and others. Imposing harsh moral standards on oneself often comes with a cost to self-interest; to signal one's moral character, criticizing others' transgressions can be a relatively cost-effective approach (Jordan et al., 2017; Kupfer & Giner-Sorolla, 2017; Simpson et al., 2013). To the extent that the demonstration of a strong moral character is driven by reputation management motives, we, therefore, predicted that it would be related to increased hypocrisy, that is, harsher judgements of others' transgressions but not stricter standards for own misdeeds.

Across four studies varying from civic transgressions (Study 1), organizational misconducts (Study 2), to selfish decisions in economic games (Study 3 and the Pilot Study in the SM), we found consistent evidence that people reporting a strong (vs. weak) moral character were more likely to judge others' misdeeds harshly, especially for those highly motivated by reputation. This amplified moral harshness towards others was sometimes also accompanied with increased moral leniency towards the self (Study 3 and the Pilot Study in the SM). Taken together, self-reported moral character relates to differential moral standards on the self versus others, which was especially true for reputation-motivated individuals.

Although Study 1 only provided circumstantial evidence by interpreting moral judgements without specific targets and self-reported transgressive frequencies as a proxy of the ‘reputation managing’ component of self-reported moral character, we have good reasons to believe that these interpretations are legitimate. First, people often apply general moral rules to judgements of others instead of themselves (Dong et al., 2021). Second, self-reported moral performance is often influenced by strategic self-presentation (Dong et al., 2019; Shaw et al., 2014). As shown in our studies, people high (vs. low) on moral character reported fewer own transgressions (Study 1) when highly (vs. weakly) motivated by reputation management. However, they did not act more or less selfishly (Study 3).

Furthermore, Studies 2 and 3 consolidated our proposition by showing a significant interaction between moral character and target of moral judgements (i.e. self vs. other), only for people with high but not low reputation management motives. These findings were replicated across a variety of individual difference measures of moral character (including Benevolence and Universalism values, justice sensitivity, and moral identity) and reputation management motives (including Power and Achievement values, self-monitoring of socially desirable behaviours, and concern about social esteem and status), and emerged only when moral judgements had a salient influence on people's reputation (e.g. when the appraised behaviour was unfavourable rather than favourable in Study 3).

Theoretical contributions

The current findings contribute to the literature on both moral character and reputation management. Previous theorizing generally implies that moral character is genuinely and unconditionally good (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Kamtekar, 2004; Walker et al., 1987; Walker & Frimer, 2007). Consistent with this ‘genuine’ perspective on moral character, we found positive correlations of moral character with stringent moral judgements (Studies 1 and 3) and a high likelihood to behave morally (Study 3), although the relation between inherent moral character and actual moral deeds may be obscured by the presence of external sanctions (e.g. third-party punishment in the Pilot Study in the SM). More importantly, we complement previous studies on moral character by making two novel contributions.

First, the present studies suggest that there are both ‘genuine’ and ‘reputation managing’ components of self-reported moral character. Although this idea was implied in many previous studies (e.g. Anglim et al., 2017; Brick et al., 2017; Dong et al., 2019; Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016; Shaw et al., 2014), our work empirically demonstrates that people who report a strong moral character can be sensitive to moral contexts, and strategically tailor their moral performances accordingly. In particular, people may apply flexible moral standards consistent with reputation management goals, and display more moral harshness towards others than towards themselves. The findings accord with perspectives that emphasize the prominent role of reputation management in moral psychology (e.g. Jordan et al., 2016; Vonasch et al., 2018), including phenomena such as moral licencing (Blanken et al., 2015) and moral contagion (Kupfer & Giner-Sorolla, 2021).

Second, our work illuminates how exactly reputation management motives moderate the link between self-reported moral character and moral decisions. Beyond previous research suggesting to control for, or eliminate, reputation concerns in moral character measurements (Lee et al., 2008; Paulhus, 1984), these studies demonstrated when, and for whom, moral character precisely predicts moral decisions. When individuals had low reputation management motives, their moral character predicted moral judgements of their own more than others' misdeeds; in contrast, when people were highly motivated to gain a good reputation, moral character only predicted their moral harshness towards others but failed to predict moral decisions for themselves (Study 3 and the Pilot Study in the SM). With the increase of reputation management motives, people who reported a strong (vs. weak) moral character either showed increased hypocrisy by judging others more harshly than themselves (Studies 2 and 3), or showed reduced ‘hypercrisy’ (Lammers, 2012) by judging themselves less harshly than others (the Pilot Study in the SM). Although the specific manifestations of moral double standards varied from moral harshness towards others to moral leniency towards oneself, or both, our findings add more insight to discussions about the effectiveness of moral character measures, by suggesting the importance of taking into account reputation management motives and moral target (e.g. self or others).

Limitations and future directions

We employed diverse samples and methods to test the reputation management account of moral character; however, at least two important limitations should be noted, respectively, related to the self-reported nature of our moral character and reputation management motives measures.

First, although our findings showed a positive relationship between moral character and moral double standards, we may not fully differentiate the ‘genuine’ and ‘reputation managing’ parts of self-reported moral character. People may also internalize reputation management as an integral part of ‘genuine’ moral character. 1 In this case, moral character can facilitate socially desirable reactions in a prompt and heuristic way, and better serve the goal to appear moral to others (Everett et al., 2016; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Jordan et al., 2016; Jordan & Rand, 2020). This theorizing implies that self-reported moral character can be strongly and positively correlated with reputation management motives. However, the hypothesized interaction effect between moral character and reputation management motives on moral double standards replicated, regardless of their different correlations across studies (positive and significant in Studies 1 and 3, non-significant in Study 2, and negative and significant in the Pilot Study in the SM; see Table S6 for specifics). To more formally differentiate the roles of actual and postured moral character in behavioural hypocrisy, future research may integrate self- with other-reports of moral character.

Second, we examined reputation management motives as an individual difference variable, and did not manipulate reputation incentives to show its causal effects. As such, self-reported reputation management motives could be influenced by concerns about social approval. For example, some research suggests that people may under-report their actual reputation management motives because pursuing good reputation and high status can be stigmatized (Kim & Pettit, 2015). People may either over- or under-report their reputation management motives, depending on their perception of the motives as socially approved or disapproved.

Relatedly, our findings do not directly elucidate whether people who display moral double standards (1) genuinely believe such behaviours as morally acceptable, or (2) consciously use them as a reputation management strategy. For example, although high moral character and reputation management motives were associated with stringent moral standards on others across our studies, their relation with lenient moral standards on the self seemed to only apply to moral judgements but not to actual behaviours (Study 3 and its Pilot Study in the SM). The extent to which self-reported moral behaviours reflected actual behaviours or its strategic self-presentation was also unverifiable (Study 1). However, comparisons between different studies may provide tentative evidence on people's conscious and strategic display of moral double standards as a reputation management strategy. People who self-reported high (vs. low) moral character and reputation management motives judged themselves more leniently only in relatively anonymous settings (Study 2) but no more leniently with the presence of a third-party interviewer (Study 1) or observer (Study 3 and its Pilot Study in the SM). Future research may explore the mechanisms of moral double standards in different reputation contexts, and examine moral character and reputation management motives as antecedents to behavioural forms of moral hypocrisy (e.g. saying one thing and doing another; Dong et al., 2019; Effron et al., 2018).

Thus, overall, our results suggest that intelligence is relatively unrelated to whether someone is a kind and moral person

Anglim, Jeromy, Patrick D. Dunlop, Serena Wee, Sharon Horwood, Joshua K. Wood, and Andrew Marty. 2022. “Personality and Intelligence: A Meta-analysis.” PsyArXiv. November 4. doi:10.1037/bul0000373

Abstract: This study provides a comprehensive assessment of the associations of personality and intelligence. It presents a meta-analysis (N = 162,636, k = 272) of domain, facet, and item-level correlations between personality and intelligence (general, fluid, and crystallized) for the major Big Five and HEXACO hierarchical frameworks of personality: NEO PI-R, Big Five Aspect Scales (BFAS), BFI-2, and HEXACO PI R. It provides the first meta-analysis of personality and intelligence to comprehensively examine (a) facet-level correlations for these hierarchical frameworks of personality, (b) item-level correlations, (c) domain- and facet-level predictive models. Age and sex differences in personality and intelligence, and study-level moderators, are also examined. The study was complemented by four of our own unpublished datasets (N = 26,813) which were used to assess the ability of item-level models to provide generalizable prediction. Results showed that openness (ρ = .20) and neuroticism (ρ = -.09) were the strongest Big Five correlates of intelligence and that openness correlated more with crystallized than fluid intelligence. At the facet-level, traits related to intellectual engagement and unconventionality were more strongly related to intelligence than other openness facets, and sociability and orderliness were negatively correlated with intelligence. Facets of gregariousness and excitement seeking had stronger negative correlations, and openness to aesthetics, feelings, and values had stronger positive correlations with crystallized than fluid intelligence. Facets explained more than twice the variance of domains. Overall, the results provide the most nuanced and robust evidence to date of the relationship between personality and intelligence.

Redheaded women are more sexually active than other women, but it is probably due to their suitors

Redheaded women are more sexually active than other women, but it is probably due to their suitors. Katerina Sykorova et al. Front. Psychol., Nov 3 2022. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.1000753

Abstract: Women with red hair colour, i.e., 1–9% of female Europeans, tend to be the subject of various stereotypes about their sexually liberated behaviour. The aim of the present case-control study was to explore whether a connection between red hair colour and sexual behaviour really exists using data from 110 women (34% redheaded) and 93 men (22% redheaded). Redheadedness in women, correlated with various traits related to sexual life, namely with higher sexual desire as measured by Revised Sociosexual Orientation Inventory, with higher sexual activity and more sexual partners of the preferred gender over the past year, earlier initiation of sexual life, and higher sexual submissiveness. Structural equation modelling, however, showed that sexual desire of redheaded women mediated neither their higher sexual activity nor their higher number of sexual partners. These results indirectly indicate that the apparently more liberated sexual behaviour in redheaded women could be the consequence of potential mates' frequent attempts to have sex with them. Our results contradicted the three other tested models, specifically the models based on the assumption of different physiology, faster life history strategy, and altered self-perception of redheaded women induced by stereotypes about them. Naturally, the present study cannot say anything about the validity of other potential models that were not subjects of testing.

Keywords: Redheadedness, sexual behaviour, sexual desire, sexual activity, sexual submissiveness, stereotypes, mate selection

Makeup increases attractiveness in male faces

Makeup increases attractiveness in male faces. Carlota Batres, Hannah Robinson. PLoS One, November 3, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0275662

Abstract: Makeup is commonly attributed with increasing attractiveness in female faces, but this effect has not been investigated in male faces. We therefore sought to examine whether the positive effect of makeup on attractiveness can be extended to male faces. Twenty men were photographed facing forward, under constant camera and lighting conditions, with neutral expressions, and closed mouths. Each man was photographed twice: once without any cosmetics applied and another time with subtle cosmetics applied by a professional makeup artist. Two hundred participants then rated those 40 images on attractiveness. The male faces were rated as higher in attractiveness when presented wearing makeup, compared to when presented not wearing makeup. This was true for both male and female raters, and whether analyzing the data using a by-participant or a by-face analysis. These results provide the first empirical evidence that makeup increases attractiveness in male faces. Following work on female faces, future research should examine the effect of makeup on several other traits in male faces. The market for male cosmetics products is growing and evolving and this study serves as an initial step in understanding the effect of makeup on the perceptions of male faces.

Discussion

Evidence from a perceptual study supported the hypothesis that subtle cosmetics would make male faces look more attractive. We found that the same faces were rated as more attractive when they were wearing makeup, compared to when they were not wearing makeup. This effect is in line with previous research done with female faces [1–3].

While the difference between men with and without makeup was statistically significant, the effect size was small. This is in contrast with the research done with female faces which has found a large effect of makeup on attractiveness (e.g., η2 = 0.33 [22]). The small effect we found in male faces is probably due to the fact that we wanted the makeup to appear natural so as to not activate any stereotypes participants may have about male makeup [23]. Regardless, given the effects of attractiveness on real-world outcomes [5, 6], even a small effect can have large consequences.

One point to note from our study is that not all of the faces were found to be more attractive with makeup. Previous research has found that identity has an effect size that is 1.36 times larger than the effect size attributed to makeup [22]. In our study, four out of the 20 faces were not rated as more attractive with makeup and it would be interesting for future research to investigate which types of faces gain the most from makeup applications. Additionally, future research is also needed to investigate what type of makeup increases male attractiveness. In this study, the professional makeup artist used a range of cosmetics on the participants (e.g., concealer, powder) and it would be interesting to limit applications in order to investigate the individual effects of these products.

It would also be interesting to further examine what aspect of the makeup application most greatly influences attractiveness perceptions. In our study, the professional makeup artist was instructed to increase skin homogeneity, decrease facial contrast, and accentuate the bone structure. While we got an overall effect of makeup, we are not able to dissociate which of these factors was the most important. For example, perhaps skin homogeneity is responsible for the entire positive effect, or maybe it is a combination of all three factors.

Lastly, this study only looked at perceptions of attractiveness in male faces. However, there is vast amount of research examining the effects of makeup on several other traits in female faces. For instance, likeability [4], leadership ability [24], trustworthiness [25], confidence [26], earning potential [26], and competence [25]. It would therefore be interesting to also examine the effect of makeup on these traits in male faces.

In contrast to dislike, hate is rooted in seeing the hated target as morally deficient or as violating moral norms

The psychology of hate: Moral concerns differentiate hate from dislike. Clara Pretus, Jennifer L. Ray, Yael Granot, William A. Cunningham, Jay J. Van Bavel. European Journal of Social Psychology, November 3 2022. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2906

Abstract: We investigated whether any differences in the psychological conceptualization of hate and dislike were simply a matter of degree of negativity (i.e., hate falls on the end of the continuum of dislike) or also morality (i.e., hate is imbued with distinct moral components that distinguish it from dislike). In three lab studies in Canada and the United States, participants reported disliked and hated attitude objects and rated each on dimensions including valence, attitude strength, morality, and emotional content. Quantitative and qualitative measures revealed that hated attitude objects were more negative than disliked attitude objects and associated  with moral beliefs and emotions, even after adjusting for differences in negativity. In Study 4, we analysed the rhetoric on real hate sites and complaint forums and found that the language used on prominent hate websites contained more words related to morality, but not negativity, relative to complaint forums.

6 GENERAL DISCUSSION

In a combination of laboratory studies and a content analysis of real online hate and complaint websites, we found initial evidence that differences in people's conceptualizations of hate and dislike are not only a matter of negativity but also morality. Morality—via both the expression of moral emotions and moral conviction—differentiates hated from disliked attitude objects. Individuals rated hated attitude objects in the lab as more closely connected to morality than disliked or even extremely disliked attitude objects. This distinction still held when adjusting for the relationship between morality and negativity. Further, real websites known by the United States government to be organized hate groups used significantly more moral language in expressing their beliefs as compared with users on complaint forums venting their dislike. Of note, we found an order effect in Study 1 such that differences between hate and dislike were less evident when participants were asked to generate disliked objects first. This suggests that people spontaneously think about objects that are closer to objects they extremely dislike or hate when asked about dislike without an explicit reference to hate.

Regarding the intensity hypothesis, we found mixed evidence for the role of negativity in distinguishing hate expressions from dislike. In Studies 1 and 2, hated attitude objects were rated as more negative than disliked attitude objects, even after controlling for morality, suggesting that both morality and negativity independently contribute to hate. These results are aligned with recent work by Martínez et al. (2022), who found increased ratings in 11 self-reported negative emotions in response to hated compared to disliked targets. However, these authors do not explore differences between hated and extremely disliked objects. We find this to be a relevant comparison in the light of Study 3, where we find that negativity differences between hated and extremely disliked objects vanished after controlling for morality, suggesting that differences in morality accounted for observed differences in negativity. Further, in Study 4, online expressions of hate did not use more negative language than online expressions of dislike. Thus, whereas hate and dislike seem to differ in both intensity and morality, it is possible that hate and extreme dislike differ mainly in the morality dimension. Future studies would benefit from employing scales and statistical techniques that allow researchers to obtain uncorrelated measures of negativity, attitude strength, and morality to better assess the independent contribution of each of these constructs in distinguishing hate from dislike.

Although it seems easy to recognize expressions of hatred when we see them—at Nazi rallies or ethno-cultural genocide—hate is still poorly understood from a scientific perspective. Our studies find that morality is a key ingredient that differentiates the conceptualization of hate from dislike in the minds of many people. These studies offer a springboard for empirical research into the psychology of hate. Centuries of philosophical theory have laid the groundwork for more rigorous empirical investigation. For example, our review of the literature raised the possibility that hate is motivational. Rempel and Burris (2005) suggested that we will ignore disliked objects but will wish to harm hated ones. In line with this, people feel more inclined to engage in attack-oriented behaviours when they experience hate versus dislike (Martínez et al., 2022). Further, while the present laboratory studies manipulated the type of attitude object generated to test differences between groups, further research could reverse the relationship between our independent and dependent variables. An important test of the connection between hate and morality would be to determine if experimentally inducing moral emotions could create hate in a laboratory setting. However, the ethics of doing so must be carefully considered.

One potential alternative explanation is that our instructions to generate hated versus disliked attitude objects elicited different classes of attitude objects (e.g., people and groups vs. concepts and beliefs). However, when we explicitly instructed people to generate different classes of attitude objects, we found that the difference between hate versus dislike was robust across these classes. It is also possible that hated versus disliked attitude objects differed systematically in level of abstraction. Some work has found that people more readily apply their moral principles to the psychologically distant (Eyal et al., 2008). Perhaps hated attitude objects are more psychologically distant or higher in abstraction? Another alternative explanation for our findings is that disliked versus hated objects do not need to have an actual antecedent: whereas people may not know why they dislike something, hatred may be more readily associated with a specific experience, making it easier to link to morality. Future research should address these possibilities.

An additional reason we believe the differences between hate and dislike extend beyond these issues is our study of online hate groups. The websites we explored did not require users to list attitudes objects they hated. In fact, many online hate groups actively disavow their categorization as “hate groups” and the content of their websites often focused on their core values (e.g., “…teaches lessons of morality and nobility, to walk as a proud White individual in a world where being White is now considered wrong”). Their websites were identified as hate groups by third parties. Our analyses nevertheless found much higher expressions of morality on these hate websites as compared to complaint forums, both about objects and about corporate groups. Together with our lab experiments, this gives us confidence that the difference between hate and dislike goes beyond simple semantics.

6.1 Hate as emotion

The current research relied on self-reports and content coding, which provides a modest scope for understanding the rich affective experience of hate. At present, it is impossible to determine if hate causes a feeling state or if labelling an experience as hate is a consequence of an emotional experience (or both). Importantly, our use of the term hate does not imply that it is a basic emotion. Our belief is that the psychological state we colloquially associate with hatred is actively constructed like other complex emotional states rather than a natural kind (see Barrett, 2006). While this is beyond the scope of the present work, these are important distinctions that should be examined in future research on the psychology of hate.

On a related note, while the conceptualization of anger, contempt, and disgust as distinctively moral emotions continues to receive empirical support (see for instance Steiger & Reyna, 2017), other scholars have challenged this view, arguing that disgust may have a broader role beyond morality or that anger can be triggered by other moral transgressions beyond autonomy (see Lomas, 2019). Thus, our results on the differences in moral emotions between hated and disliked attitude objects should be treated with caution: whereas these emotions may be necessary for hatred to arise, they may not be sufficient. Whereas higher ratings in anger, contempt, and disgust were to be expected in the hatred versus dislike condition, they should not be taken by themselves as unequivocal proof of the association between hatred and morality.

The results of the present research might, eventually, be fruitfully applied to psychological or behaviour interventions against hate. For instance, work on relations between Israelis and Palestinians suggests that hatred toward the out-group differs from anger in terms of profiling the out-group as evil and intentionally causing harm (Halperin, 2008; see also Parker & Janoff-Bulman, 2013). Yet such conflict may be ameliorated and peace proposals more likely to be adopted when the out-group is willing to compromise sacred values—rather than economic concessions (Ginges et al., 2007). Thus, acknowledging and leveraging the moral concerns associated with hatred may provide an important avenue for addressing intergroup (as well as interpersonal) conflict. We urge research in these areas to continue this line of inquiry in the hopes of designing and testing interventions to alleviate social conflict.

Finally, we note that the samples of our first three studies were undergraduate students from Canada and the US. This poses a limitation in terms of the generalizability of the findings of these studies, which have been drawn from western educated individuals from industrialized, rich, democratic societies (WEIRD, see Henrich et al., 2010). We attempted to overcome this limitation in Study 4, where we obtained samples from a more ecological environment (websites with English-speaking audiences). Because different cultures could have different conceptualizations of hate and dislike, future research should further address this constraint by including cross-national representative samples.

Looking cross a large dataset of extinct and extant mammalian skulls, the rate of evolutionary change peaked around the time of the Cretaceous-Paleogene boundary and has general tapered off since then

Attenuated evolution of mammals through the Cenozoic. Anjali Goswami et al. Science, Oct 27 2022, Vol 378, Issue 6618, pp. 377-383. DOI: 10.1126/science.abm7525

Becoming diverse: Mammals have the greatest degree of morphological variation among vertebrate classes, ranging from giant whales to the tiny bumblebee bat. How they evolved this level of variation has been a persistent question, with much debate being centered around the timing and tempo of evolutionary change. Goswami et al. looked across a large dataset of extinct and extant mammalian skulls and found that the rate of evolutionary change peaked around the time of the Cretaceous-Paleogene boundary and has general tapered off since then (see the Perspective by Santana and Grossnickle). Certain lifestyles, such as aquatic habitats or herbivory, led to faster change, whereas in some species such as rodents, morphological change appeared to be decoupled from taxonomic diversification. —SNV

Abstract: The Cenozoic diversification of placental mammals is the archetypal adaptive radiation. Yet, discrepancies between molecular divergence estimates and the fossil record fuel ongoing debate around the timing, tempo, and drivers of this radiation. Analysis of a three-dimensional skull dataset for living and extinct placental mammals demonstrates that evolutionary rates peak early and attenuate quickly. This long-term decline in tempo is punctuated by bursts of innovation that decreased in amplitude over the past 66 million years. Social, precocial, aquatic, and herbivorous species evolve fastest, especially whales, elephants, sirenians, and extinct ungulates. Slow rates in rodents and bats indicate dissociation of taxonomic and morphological diversification. Frustratingly, highly similar ancestral shape estimates for placental mammal superorders suggest that their earliest representatives may continue to elude unequivocal identification.

 

Empirical Macroeconomics and DSGE Modeling in Statistical Perspective: Dismal forecasting errors + swapping data slightly impairs the model (and in 37% of cases the permutation of data make the model better)

Empirical Macroeconomics and DSGE Modeling in Statistical Perspective. Daniel J. McDonald, Cosma Rohilla Shalizi. Oct 31 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.16224

Abstract: Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models have been an ubiquitous, and controversial, part of macroeconomics for decades. In this paper, we approach DSGEs purely as statistical models. We do this by applying two common model validation checks to the canonical Smets and Wouters 2007 DSGE: (1) we simulate the model and see how well it can be estimated from its own simulation output, and (2) we see how well it can seem to fit nonsense data. We find that (1) even with centuries' worth of data, the model remains poorly estimated, and (2) when we swap series at random, so that (e.g.) what the model gets as the inflation rate is really hours worked, what it gets as hours worked is really investment, etc., the fit is often only slightly impaired, and in a large percentage of cases actually improves (even out of sample). Taken together, these findings cast serious doubt on the meaningfulness of parameter estimates for this DSGE, and on whether this specification represents anything structural about the economy. Constructively, our approaches can be used for model validation by anyone working with macroeconomic time series.

h/t Alex Tabarrok A Big and Embarrassing Challenge to DSGE Models Nov 3 2022 https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2022/11/a-big-and-embarrassing-challenge-to-dsge-models.html:

[...]

"If we take our estimated model and simulate several centuries of data from it, all in the stationary regime, and then re-estimate the model from the simulation, the results are disturbing. Forecasting error remains dismal and shrinks very slowly with the size of the data. Much the same is true of parameter estimates, with the important exception that many of the parameter estimates seem to be stuck around values which differ from the ones used to generate the data. These ill-behaved parameters include not just shock variances and autocorrelations, but also the “deep” ones whose presence is supposed to distinguish a micro-founded DSGE from mere time-series analysis or reduced-form regressions. All this happens in simulations where the model specification is correct, where the parameters are constant, and where the estimation can make use of centuries of stationary data, far more than will ever be available for the actual macroeconomy."

Now that is bad enough but I suppose one might argue that this is telling us something important about the world. Maybe the model is fine, it's just a sad fact that we can't uncover the true parameters even when we know the true model. Maybe but it gets worse. Much worse.

McDonald and Shalizi then swap variables and feed the model wages as if it were output and consumption as if it were wages and so forth. Now this should surely distort the model completely and produce nonsense. Right?

"If we randomly re-label the macroeconomic time series and feed them into the DSGE, the results are no more comforting. Much of the time we get a model which predicts the (permuted) data better than the model predicts the unpermuted data. Even if one disdains forecasting as end in itself, it is hard to see how this is at all compatible with a model capturing something — anything — essential about the structure of the economy. Perhaps even more disturbing, many of the parameters of the model are essentially unchanged under permutation, including “deep” parameters supposedly representing tastes, technologies and institutions."

Neither age nor intelligence is systematically related to wisdom; wisdom is correlated with openness, hedonic well-being, and eudaimonic well-being

Thirty Years of Psychological Wisdom Research: What We Know About the Correlates of an Ancient Concept. Mengxi Dong, Nic M. Weststrate, and Marc A. Fournier. Perspectives on Psychological Science, November 2, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1177/17456916221114096

Abstract: Psychologists have studied the ancient concept of wisdom for 3 decades. Nevertheless, apparent discrepancies in theories and empirical findings have left the nomological network of the construct unclear. Using multilevel meta-analyses, we summarized wisdom’s correlations with age, intelligence, the Big Five personality traits, narcissism, self-esteem, social desirability, and well-being. We furthermore examined whether these correlations were moderated by the general approach to conceptualizing and measuring wisdom (i.e., phenomenological wisdom as indexed by self-report vs. performative wisdom as indexed by performance ratings), by specific wisdom measures, and by variable-specific factors (e.g., age range, type of intelligence measures, and well-being type). Although phenomenological and performative approaches to conceptualizing and measuring wisdom had some unique correlates, both were correlated with openness, hedonic well-being, and eudaimonic well-being, especially the growth aspect of eudaimonic well-being. Differences between phenomenological and performative wisdom are discussed in terms of the differences between typical and maximal performance, self-ratings and observer ratings, and global and state wisdom. This article will help move the scientific study of wisdom forward by elucidating reliable wisdom correlates and by offering concrete suggestions for future empirical research based on the meta-analytic findings.

Discussion

By meta-analyzing the extant literature, we summarized wisdom’s correlations with age, intelligence, the Big Five traits, narcissism, self-esteem, social desirability, and well-being. Although phenomenological and performative approaches to conceptualizing wisdom have their distinct correlates, both are correlated with openness, hedonic well-being, and eudaimonic well-being, especially the growth aspect of eudaimonic well-being. Transcending differences in conceptualizations and operationalizations of wisdom, these commonalities may reflect the fundamental characteristics of wisdom that are shared across theoretical perspectives. Specifically, wisdom entails being flexible in one’s thinking, the tendency and willingness to take on different ideas and perspectives, and an orientation toward exploration, psychological growth, and personal fulfillment. Furthermore, the results suggest that wisdom may indeed predict a good life, both in the hedonic and eudaimonic sense. Although not all forms of wisdom predict lives that are affectively positive, wiser individuals are ultimately happy, perhaps suggesting that wisdom may enable one to find contentment in life regardless of objective circumstances and one’s affective reactions to them. Importantly, the commonalities that we have identified through meta-analyses empirically corroborate earlier work (Glück, 2018; Grossmann et al., 2020) in showing that the diverse theoretical traditions and measurement approaches are not to be taken as an indication that the construct of wisdom lacks validity; instead, they should be seen as attempts that, although each incomplete and imperfect on their own, capture different aspects of the same phenomenon. We believe that these findings will in turn help future efforts at designing wisdom measures by providing more reliable estimates of wisdom correlates that will help with the evaluation of convergent and discriminant validity.

Beyond the common correlates, however, the meta-analytic results paint two distinct portraits for phenomenological and performative wisdom. The portrait for phenomenological wisdom is one of adaptation and adjustment. Individuals who experience wise cognition, motivation, emotion, and behavior are uniquely more likely to report higher self-esteem, more positive affect, less negative affect, and greater life satisfaction and have an adaptive profile of personality traits, in which agreeableness, extraversion, and conscientiousness are high and neuroticism is low. As suggested by results of the supplementary analyses, this positive association between phenomenological wisdom and adjustment cannot be fully explained by methodological artifacts such as socially desirable responding. Instead, echoing previous theorizing (e.g., Ardelt, 2019), we argue that these correlations are at least in part substantive and reflect the nature of wisdom as subjectively experienced by individuals.

However, when wisdom is judged by other people through wisdom-relevant products, as is the case with performative wisdom, it is not associated with most of the indicators of adaptation. Intelligence, a cognitive ability, is relevant to at least some (i.e., the Berlin wisdom paradigm), although not all, indicators of performative wisdom. Notably, the association between intelligence and wisdom is the strongest for crystallized intelligence. Taken together with the findings that performative wisdom correlated with openness and the growth aspect of eudaimonic well-being, it appears that in the eyes of the beholder, wisdom entails not only one’s orientation toward thinking wisely but also one’s competence at doing so. We argue that, rather than being contradictory, the findings for phenomenological and performative wisdom are complementary to one another. Perhaps analogous to the distinction in creativity research between “little-c” creativity, or the everyday, subjectively defined form of creativity, and “big-C” creativity, or the consensually recognized form of creativity (e.g., Simonton, 2017), phenomenological wisdom may capture the everyday experiences of wisdom, but whether these subjective experiences are recognized as wise by other people is a different question, which is in turn captured by performative wisdom.

Surprisingly, neither phenomenological nor performative wisdom correlated negatively with narcissism, which should be theoretically antithetical to wisdom. For phenomenological wisdom, one possible explanation of the nonsignificant correlation may be that although narcissism may decrease the endorsement of communal items in self-report wisdom measures, it may enhance the endorsement of agentic items. This is because narcissists have been shown to have overly positive perceptions of their agentic traits (e.g., intelligence, creativity, adjustment) but have accurate perceptions of their low levels of communal traits (e.g., care, compassion, and morality; Carlson & Khafagy, 2018). The lack of significant correlation with performative wisdom is hard to explain because performative wisdom measures are unlikely to have been strongly affected by self-enhancement. Because very few studies have measured wisdom alongside with narcissism, the estimates of the current meta-analysis may not be reliable, and it is possible that a clearer pattern of the relationship between the two constructs will emerge after more empirical research. We suggest that, given its theoretical relevance, future research should look more into the relationship between wisdom and narcissism, and associations with narcissism may offer an opportunity to evaluate the validity and comprehensiveness of wisdom measures.

Reconciling the two forms of wisdom

Results of the current study necessitate a better understanding of the differences between phenomenological and performative wisdom. We speculate that three potential sources of these differences may be (a) the distinction between typical and maximal performance, (b) the distinction between self-ratings and other-ratings, and (c) the distinction between global and state wisdom.

Typical versus maximal performance

In the context of wisdom, maximal performance refers to how wise one can be, whereas typical performance refers to how wise one is in daily life. Maximal performance is episodic and is typically elicited when individuals know that their performance will be evaluated and so exert their full effort (Sackett et al., 1988). Although these conditions for maximal performance are not explicitly expressed in the instructions of performative wisdom measures, performative wisdom measures can reasonably be seen as measures of maximal, rather than typical, performance. This is because most extant measures of performative wisdom, especially those involving interviews with experimenters, press participants to think more thoroughly about the dilemmas through a series of standard questions. In addition, the task of working through challenging dilemmas in a lab setting may itself be enough to suggest evaluation to participants. Responding to phenomenological wisdom measures, on the other hand, typically entails recalling how one typically behaves in the past, across many situations. Even when phenomenological wisdom measures assess state-level wisdom, as is the case with the SWIS, it is likely that they capture typical, rather than maximal, performance, because there is no reason to believe that the situational contexts elicit full effort in these cases. The discrepancies between performative and phenomenological wisdom may therefore be exaggerated by the fact that one assesses maximal performance whereas the other assesses typical performance. This implies that the discrepancies may be reduced if performative wisdom can be compared to maximal levels of phenomenological wisdom and vice versa. Because no extant phenomenological wisdom measures assess maximal performance and no performative wisdom measures assess typical performance, the development of these scales may constitute promising areas of future research.

Self-ratings vs. other-ratings

Another source of difference between phenomenological and performative wisdom may be the fact that phenomenological wisdom is experienced, whereas performative wisdom is evaluated. All extant performative wisdom measures entail the evaluation of products of wisdom (i.e., participants’ attempts at thinking through a challenging dilemma), whereas phenomenological wisdom measures entail reporting one’s subjective experience of wisdom-related cognitions, motivations, emotions, and behaviors. A high correspondence between the two forms of wisdom therefore entails the successful translation of one’s subjective experience of wisdom into products of wisdom, which are then recognized by other people. It is conceivable that several factors may affect the success of this process, such as ability and knowledge. A high correspondence between subjective (phenomenological) measures and objective (performative) measures also implies a high level of self-knowledge accuracy. Because accurate self-knowledge is regarded as an essential aspect of wisdom (Mickler & Staudinger, 2008), it is possible that the discrepancy between phenomenological and performative wisdom is reduced for wise individuals, a possibility to be examined by future research.

Global versus state wisdom

In this meta-analytic study, we categorized measures of wisdom as capturing either phenomenological or performative wisdom. Phenomenological and performative wisdom are not only theoretically distinct but are also consistent with how wisdom measures cluster together in principal component analysis (e.g., Dong & Fournier, 2022). However, there are other distinctions among the wisdom measures. For instance, wisdom measures also differ in whether they assess state or global wisdom. Specifically, all performative wisdom measures included in this meta-analysis are measures of state wisdom because they assess wisdom performance in one or a few instances. Of the phenomenological wisdom measures, only the SWIS assesses state wisdom, whereas all other phenomenological wisdom measures included in this study assess global wisdom. It is conceivable that some of the differences between phenomenological and performative wisdom are attributable to the state versus global wisdom distinction. The moderate correlations among state wisdom in different situations (Brienza et al., 2018) may explain why performative wisdom measures showed more divergent patterns of correlations than phenomenological wisdom measures. State wisdom also only moderately correlates with global wisdom (Brienza et al., 2018), which may partly explain the finding that the SWIS was unlike the rest of the phenomenological wisdom measures in its correlations with many of the variables examined (i.e., conscientiousness, neuroticism, self-esteem, and negative affect).

The distinctions that we have observed between phenomenological and performative wisdom in the current study may therefore be due to a variety of reasons beyond disagreements among conceptualizations of wisdom. The assessment of typical versus maximal performance, the source of judgment (self vs. others), and the assessment of state versus global wisdom likely all contributed to the divergence between phenomenological and performative wisdom in their relationships with other variables. These factors should be taken into consideration when designing future empirical studies of wisdom.

Implications

The findings of the current study allow us to make a few suggestions for future research. The first of these suggestions concerns the selection of the proper wisdom measure(s) to administer in empirical studies. Although some studies have employed a battery of wisdom measures, encompassing measures of both phenomenological and performative wisdom to comprehensively assess the construct (e.g., Dong & Fournier, 2022; Weststrate et al., 2018; Weststrate & Glück, 2017b), such an approach is time-consuming, resource-intensive, and infeasible in many circumstances. Researchers are therefore faced with the decision of choosing one or a few wisdom measures to administer. In many cases, this decision seems to have been made based on the researchers’ knowledge of and familiarity with specific measures, rather than on a systematic evaluation of all available measures given one’s research goals, which can obfuscate the relationships of interest.

Based on the insights gained from the current study, we propose that the following questions should be considered when selecting wisdom measures for a study. First, one should identify the form of wisdom that should be assessed given the research question. Phenomenological wisdom may be more relevant for some research questions (e.g., whether one’s self-perception of one’s wisdom agrees with the perceptions of other people), whereas performative wisdom may be more relevant for other research questions (e.g., whether wisdom predicts more negotiation successes). In addition, it is important to consider whether state wisdom or global wisdom is more relevant. If one is interested in the relationships between wisdom and other variables in specific contexts, then it is more appropriate to administer state measures of wisdom. Conversely, if one is interested in assessing wisdom as a stable characteristic, then one can either administer global measures of wisdom or administer state measures of wisdom multiple times and use the average of states to approximate global wisdom. Second, it is important to consider the content of wisdom measures and how that may affect the results of the study. Ideally, the wisdom measure(s) chosen for a study should be relevant to the research question, but not so much so as to share common dimensions with other variables in the study. For instance, the SAWS showed the highest meta-analytic correlation with trait openness; however, this is likely because openness constitutes one dimension of the SAWS. Thus, if wisdom is to be examined in relation to openness, it may be advisable to avoid using the SAWS as the measure of wisdom because it may artificially inflate the relationship between the constructs.

Limitations

The current study has several limitations. First, despite our best effort to gather relevant studies, it is unlikely that we have gathered all. Studies that were not in PsycINFO would have escaped the initial literature search. If these studies were not cited by one of the coded studies or submitted by their authors in response to our calls, then they would not have been included in the meta-analyses. Furthermore, some authors did not respond to our requests for submissions, so we were unable to obtain the relevant effect sizes that were not reported in the articles we gathered. There could also be relevant, unpublished data that were not submitted in response to our call. Given that the effect sizes meta-analyzed in the current study are only a subset of all relevant effect sizes, the results of the meta-analyses we present are only approximations of the true associations between wisdom and the criterion variables. Although we have no reason to believe that there were systematic differences between the studies included in the meta-analysis and those that were not, it is possible that the inclusion of additional studies would change the results of the meta-analyses. The results and conclusions of the current study should therefore be viewed as preliminary evidence, rather than final verdicts, on wisdom’s correlations with age, intelligence, the Big Five traits, narcissism, self-esteem, social desirability, and well-being.

Second, our meta-analyses were unable to address the more nuanced associations between wisdom and the criterion variables. For instance, previous studies have shown that the association between age and wisdom changes with age (e.g., Ardelt et al., 2019; Brienza et al., 2018; Webster, Westerhof, & Bohlmeijer, 2014). Although we have offered some preliminary evidence for this postulation by examining the moderating role of age range on the correlation between wisdom and age, the meta-analytic data and technique did not allow us to evaluate whether the association between age and wisdom followed a curvilinear relationship. Likewise, many researchers consider intelligence to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for wisdom (e.g., Glück, 2017; Grossmann et al., 2020; Staudinger & Pasupathi, 2003), which has already received some empirical support (Dong & Fournier, 2022; Glück & Scherpf, 2022); however, we were unable to examine this postulation in the current study. Therefore, although the study provides insights into the rudimentary, linear relationships between wisdom and criterion variables, it is insufficient for a full understanding of these relationships.

Third, because of the small numbers of effect sizes and samples of participants, it was impossible to examine the interactions between the moderators reliably, leading us to decide against conducting such analyses in the current study. Moderators were tested one at a time and independently from each other. This meant that we were unable to address questions such as whether age range moderates the association between age and wisdom differently for different measures of wisdom or whether phenomenological and performative wisdom were differentially associated with crystallized and fluid intelligence. These questions are important and should be addressed by future meta-analytical attempts as more primary studies accumulate.

Fourth, we could not address the moderating role of culture in wisdom’s association with the criterion variables. This was primarily because of the difficulty in appropriately coding the culture of participant samples, as most samples included a mixture of ethnicities, indicating that they may not be uniform in culture. Moreover, most of the samples were collected in Europe and North America. Because other cultures were underrepresented, estimated cultural effects were unlikely to be reliable or accurate. Although the current study could not examine culture as a moderating variable, evidence suggests that culture may indeed play a moderating role in wisdom’s correlation with other variables (e.g., Grossmann et al., 2012). To date, relatively few studies have examined whether the correlates of wisdom change across cultures, a gap that should be addressed by future studies.

For both victims and perpetrators, infidelity was preceded (but not followed) by longer periods of decline in personal and relationship well-being

Estranged and Unhappy? Examining the Dynamics of Personal and Relationship Well-Being Surrounding Infidelity. Olga Stavrova, Tila Pronk, and Jaap Denissen. Psychological Science, November 2, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1177/09567976221116892

Abstract: Although relationship theories often describe infidelity as a damaging event in a couple’s life, it remains unclear whether relationship problems actually follow infidelity, precede it, or both. The analyses of dyadic panel data of adults in Germany including about 1,000 infidelity events showed that infidelity was preceded (but not followed) by a gradual decrease in relationship functioning in perpetrators and victims. There was little evidence of rebound effects in the aftermath of infidelity, with the exception of unfaithful women and individuals with lower initial relationship commitment who returned to the pre-event level of well-being or even exceeded it, providing support to the expectancy violation theory (vs. the investment model of infidelity). By showing that well-being starts to decline before infidelity happens, this study provides a differentiated view on the temporal dynamics of infidelity and well-being and contributes to the literature on romantic relationship dynamics and major life events.

Discussion

We used prospective dyadic data to examine the temporal dynamics of personal and relationship well-being surrounding experiences of infidelity. Our analyses provided four main findings that we summarize below.

First, for the first time, we showed that infidelity events were preceded by a gradual decrease in personal and relationship well-being in victims and perpetrators, as evident in both actor and partner reports. In perpetrators, this decline might be a reason for starting an affair or even an intentional distress management strategy (see Scott et al., 2017). In victims, a decrease in well-being might be a result of feeling the partner’s dissatisfaction or represent a causal factor increasing their likelihood of being cheated on. Unhappiness has been associated with poor outcomes in social life in previous research (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005; Stavrova & Luhmann, 2016). Hence, a decrease in personal well-being might make the future victim less attractive, contributing to the infidelity of the partner.

Second, in contrast to what most previous research on other negative interpersonal events (e.g., divorce, widowhood) indicated (Denissen et al., 2018; Lucas, 2007; Luhmann et al., 2012), infidelity events were not followed by steady recovery patterns. Although we detected small rebound effects with respect to some of the outcome variables, neither victims nor perpetrators were able to return to their initial levels of well-being. Potentially, the guilt and social disapproval associated with infidelity renders this event particularly difficult to recover from.

Third, puzzled by the lack of recovery patterns, we explored potential sources of between-individuals heterogeneity in responses to infidelity. We found that individuals who were more (vs. less) committed to the relationship before the event tended to experience a stronger deterioration in well-being after cheating or being cheated on. Their less committed counterparts, on the other hand, seemed to report an upward well-being trend following infidelity. This pattern is consistent with the expectancy violation theory (Burgoon, 1993): Higher commitment could be associated with higher relationship expectations and stronger disappointment when the expectations are violated.

Interestingly, our exploratory analyses detected one more group of participants who seem to recover and even thrive after infidelity, other than individuals with low relationship commitment: unfaithful women. Women (vs. men) are more likely to mention relationship dissatisfaction as a reason for their affair (Barta & Kiene, 2005), and prior research has shown that acts of infidelity committed because of relationship problems can lead to positive psychological outcomes (Beltrán-Morillas et al., 2020). Potentially, women’s affairs are more likely to be a result of partner dissatisfaction, and consequently, the affair may be a wake-up call for their partners, leading to positive behavioral change. These findings add to the small literature exploring the conditions in which infidelity might have positive consequences (Beltrán-Morillas et al., 2020; Thompson et al., 2021).

Finally, the inclusion of actor and partner outcomes in both victim and perpetrator samples resulted in several potentially interesting observations. Negative well-being consequences (i.e., post-event baseline change) appeared more common in perpetrators who reported cheating themselves (i.e., actor well-being in the perpetrator sample) than in perpetrators whose partner reported cheating (i.e., partner well-being in the victim sample) and in victims (see Figs. 2 and 3). Although this could be partially explained by differences in power (for sensitivity analyses, see the Supplemental Material), the nature of infidelity—disclosed versus secret—could have played a role, too. Disclosed infidelity was presumably more common in the victim sample (as it was reported by the victims) than in the perpetrator sample (as it was reported by the perpetrators). This is consistent with the perpetrator sample being almost twice as large as the victim sample, where secret affairs were probably unreported.

Potentially, perpetrators are more negatively affected by infidelity when it is kept secret (i.e., actor effects in the perpetrator sample) versus disclosed (i.e., partner effects in the victim sample). Disclosing infidelity can help some couples find a solution to the relationship problems that led to infidelity in the first place (Atkins et al., 2005). The higher share of secret affairs in the perpetrator sample versus victim sample could also explain why perpetrators and their partners had chronically lower personal and relationship well-being, relative to the control sample, whereas neither victims of infidelity nor their partners differed from the control sample (selection effects; see Fig. 1). It should be noted that in the absence of the explicit information regarding infidelity disclosure rates, this interpretation remains speculative. Future research should test to what extent the perpetrator-victim differences in the present study are a result of differences in disclosure versus perpetrator/victim status.

Limitations and future directions

The reliance on large-scale panel data resulted in many benefits: It allowed us to identify a high number (~1,000) of infidelity events, track them for several years before and after infidelity, and compare the relationship trajectories of participants who experienced infidelity with a large control sample of individuals who did not (~1,500). However, the reliance on these secondary data restricted our ability to influence sampling (e.g., Germany) and measurement decisions, resulting in several limitations. The lack of information regarding whether the infidelity has come to light or not is one of them (as discussed above). In addition, the phrasing of the infidelity measure (“extra-marital affair”) could have left room for different interpretations (e.g., extradyadic sex vs. an online flirt) and included consensual nonmonogamous relationships. Comparing the effects of different infidelity types as well as examining whether changes in different aspects of relationship functioning could lead to different types of infidelity could be an interesting endeavor for future studies.

Things become more valuable to us merely by virtue of the fact that we possess them

Owning leads to valuing: Meta-analysis of the mere ownership effect. Michał Białek, Yajing Gao, Donna Yao, Gilad Feldman. European Journal of Social Psychology, November 2 2022. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2889

Abstract: Mere ownership effect is the phenomenon that people tend to value what they own more than what they do not own. This classic effect is considered robust, yet effect sizes vary across studies, and the effect is often confused for or confounded with other classic phenomena, such as endowment or mere exposure effects. We conducted a pre-registered meta-analysis of 26 samples published before 2019 (N = 3024), which resulted in psychological ownership on valuing effect of g ∼ 0.57 [0.46, 0.69]. Suggestive moderator analyses supported the use of replica as the strongest moderators. Mere ownership effects were different from the null across all moderator categories and in most publication bias adjustments. We consider this as suggestive evidence that psychological owning leads to valuing, yet caution that much more research is needed. All materials, data, and codes are available on https://osf.io/fdyqw/.

The female vulva is flat in pornography, lacking the natural labial protrusion; these authors think that, based on the impact these images have on women’s psychological wellbeing, pornographers should consider diversifying their actresses

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Consistent with an evolutionary approach to understanding revenge, the results show that men were twice as likely to report fantasies of direct/overt acts of revenge than were women

Fantasies of Revenge: An Evolutionary and Individual Differences Account. Stephen M. Yoshimura and Susan Boon. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, November 1, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1177/02762366221133322

Abstract: In this study, we examine the descriptive qualities of revenge fantasies and test evolutionary and individual-difference accounts for the experience of them. Participants recalled and described a revenge fantasy, and rated its recency, duration, intensity, and the frequency with which they fantasized about revenge overall. They also completed measures of narcissistic entitlement and vengefulness. Consistent with an evolutionary approach to understanding revenge, the results show that men were twice as likely to report fantasies of direct/overt acts of revenge than were women. Vengefulness and narcissistic entitlement did not relate to whether the fantasized revenge act was direct/overt or indirect/covert, but related to the frequency and intensity of participants’ revenge fantasies and the affective experiences participants reported while thinking of them. The findings add specificity to the three-phase model of revenge (Yoshimura & Boon, 2018), and reveal areas of potential growth in research on revenge, in general, and revenge fantasies specifically.

Authors say: Regulation must not result in censorship; however, freedom of speech does not include the right to amplification of that speech (!?)

The psychological drivers of misinformation belief and its resistance to correction. Ullrich K. H. Ecker, Stephan Lewandowsky, John Cook, Philipp Schmid, Lisa K. Fazio, Nadia Brashier, Panayiota Kendeou, Emily K. Vraga & Michelle A. Amazeen. Nature Reviews Psychology volume 1, pages 13–29, Jan 12 2022. https://www.nature.com/articles/s44159-021-00006-y

Abstract: Misinformation has been identified as a major contributor to various contentious contemporary events ranging from elections and referenda to the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Not only can belief in misinformation lead to poor judgements and decision-making, it also exerts a lingering influence on people’s reasoning after it has been corrected — an effect known as the continued influence effect. In this Review, we describe the cognitive, social and affective factors that lead people to form or endorse misinformed views, and the psychological barriers to knowledge revision after misinformation has been corrected, including theories of continued influence. We discuss the effectiveness of both pre-emptive (‘prebunking’) and reactive (‘debunking’) interventions to reduce the effects of misinformation, as well as implications for information consumers and practitioners in various areas including journalism, public health, policymaking and education.

 

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Summary and future directions

Psychological research has built solid foundational knowledge of how people decide what is true and false, form beliefs, process corrections, and might continue to be influenced by misinformation even after it has been corrected. However, much work remains to fully understand the psychology of misinformation.

First, in line with general trends in psychology and elsewhere, research methods in the field of misinformation should be improved. Researchers should rely less on small-scale studies conducted in the laboratory or a small number of online platforms, often on non-representative (and primarily US-based) participants255. Researchers should also avoid relying on one-item questions with relatively low reliability256. Given the well-known attitude–behaviour gap — that attitude change does not readily translate into behavioural effects — researchers should also attempt to use more behavioural measures, such as information-sharing measures, rather than relying exclusively on self-report questionnaires93,94,95. Although existing research has yielded valuable insights into how people generally process misinformation (many of which will translate across different contexts and cultures), an increased focus on diversification of samples and more robust methods is likely to provide a better appreciation of important contextual factors and nuanced cultural differences7,82,205,257,258,259,260,261,262,263.

Second, most existing work has focused on explicit misinformation and text-based materials. Thus, the cognitive impacts of other types of misinformation, including subtler types of misdirection such as paltering (misleading while technically saying the truth)95,264,265,266, doctored images267, deepfake videos268 and extreme patterns of misinformation bombardment223, are currently not well understood. Non-text-based corrections, such as videos or cartoons, also deserve more exploration269,270.

Third, additional translational research is needed to explore questions about causality, including the causal impacts of misinformation and corrections on beliefs and behaviours. This research should also employ non-experimental methods230,231,271, such as observational causal inference (research aiming to establish causality in observed real-world data)272, and test the impact of interventions in the real world145,174,181,207. These studies are especially needed over the long term — weeks to months, or even years — and should test a range of outcome measures, for example those that relate to health and political behaviours, in a range of contexts. Ultimately, the success of psychological research into misinformation should be linked not only to theoretical progress but also to societal impact273.

Finally, even though the field has a reasonable understanding of the cognitive mechanisms and social determinants of misinformation processing, knowledge of the complex interplay between cognitive and social dynamics is still limited, as is insight into the role of emotion. Future empirical and theoretical work would benefit from development of an overarching theoretical model that aims to integrate cognitive, social and affective factors, for example by utilizing agent-based modelling approaches. This approach might also offer opportunities for more interdisciplinary work257 at the intersection of psychology, political science274 and social network analysis275, and the development of a more sophisticated psychology of misinformation.

U.S. freshmen hold systematically incorrect beliefs about the relationship between majors and occupations; students appear to stereotype majors, greatly exaggerating the likelihood that they lead to their most distinctive jobs

What Jobs Come to Mind? Stereotypes about Fields of Study. John J. Conlon, Dev Patel. October 30, 2022. https://johnjconlon17.github.io/website/Conlon_Patel_stereotypes.pdf

Abstract: How do students form beliefs about how their future career will depend on their choice of college major? Using both nationally representative survey data and surveys that we administered among undergraduates at the Ohio State University, we document that U.S. freshmen hold systematically incorrect beliefs about the relationship between majors and occupations. Students appear to stereotype majors, greatly exaggerating the likelihood that they lead to their most distinctive jobs (e.g., counselor for psychology, journalist for journalism, teacher for education). A stylized model of major choice suggests that stereotyping boosts demand for “risky” majors: ones with rare stereotypical careers and low-paying alternative jobs. In a field experiment among the same Ohio State sample, providing statistical information on career frequencies to first-year college students has significant effects on their intended majors (and, less precisely, on their choices of which classes to enroll in), with larger effects on students considering risky majors. Finally, we present a model of belief formation in which stereotyping arises as a product of associative memory. The same model predicts—and the survey data confirm—that students also overestimate rare non-stereotypical careers and careers that are concentrated within particular majors. The model also generates predictions regarding role model effects, with students exaggerating the frequency of career-major combinations held by people they are personally close to.