Saturday, February 25, 2023

So-called "positive psychology" has a negative track record in scientific soudness

The critiques and criticisms of positive psychology: A systematic review. Llewellyn E. van Zyl et al. The Journal of Positive Psychology, Feb 23 2023. https://doi.org/10.1080/17439760.2023.2178956

Abstract: The purpose of this systematic literature review was to explore the current critiques and criticisms of positive psychology and to provide a consolidated view of the main challenges facing the third wave of research. The review identified 32 records that posed 117 unique criticisms and critiques of various areas of the discipline. These could be grouped into 21 categories through conventional content analysis, culminating in six overarching themes or ‘broad criticisms/critiques’. The findings suggested that positive psychology (a) lacked proper theorizing and conceptual thinking, (b) was problematic as far as measurement and methodologies were concerned, (c) was seen as a pseudoscience that lacked evidence and had poor replication, (d) lacked novelty and self-isolated itself from mainstream psychology, (e) was a decontextualized neoliberalist ideology that caused harm, and (f) was a capitalistic venture. We briefly reflect on the findings and highlight the opportunities these criticisms and critiques present.

Keywords: Criticisms of positive psychologycritiqueschallengesopportunitiespositive psychologyThird Wave Positive Psychology

Discussion and future directions

This systematic literature review aimed to explore the contemporary critiques and criticisms posed of the discipline and to provide a consolidated view of the main challenges facing the third wave of positive psychology. The review identified 32 records that posed 117 unique criticisms and critiques of various areas of the discipline. These could be grouped into 21 categories through conventional content analysis, culminating in six overarching themes or ‘broad criticisms/critiques’. The findings discussed in the previous section suggested that positive psychology (a) lacked proper theorizing and conceptual thinking, (b) was problematic as far as measurement and methodologies were concerned, (c) was seen as a pseudoscience that lacked evidence and had poor replication, (d) lacked novelty and self-isolated from mainstream psychology, (e) was a decontextualized neo-liberalist ideology that caused harm, and (f) was a capitalistic venture (cf., Figure 2). We briefly reflect on the findings and highlight future directions in the discussion below.

Getting to the root(s) of the problem: improper theorizing and poor measurement/methods

Although the relative importance of the six broad criticisms/critiques was difficult to determine, each of the 32 records highlighted problems relating to improper theorizing and conceptual thinking within positive psychology and issues with its measurement and (research) methodologies. It can be argued that these two issues are the proverbial root cause of problems in positive psychology.

Our first finding showed that most critics believed that positive psychology lacked proper theorizing and conceptual thinking. According to them, positive psychology lacked a unified metatheory that grounded the philosophy underpinning the science and failed to provide a clear set of ideas or criteria regarding how positive psychological phenomena had to be conceptualized, examined, and approached. These criticisms and the limitations to theory development are neither new nor neglected by positive psychologists (Van Zyl & Rothmann, Citation2022; Wissing, Citation2021). Positive psychological scientists have had widespread debates on the epistemological, ontological, and axiological beliefs driving the discipline (cf., Diener, Citation2012; Lomas & Ivtzan, Citation2016; M. Seligman, Citation2018; Waterman, Citation2013; Wissing, Citation2021). These philosophical debates have aimed to create widespread consensus on the world views of positive psychology to determine the most appropriate methods, terminologies, and types of theories required to move the discipline forward (cf., Wissing, Citation2021). Over time, these philosophical debates about the view of positive psychology of human nature and the real world (ontology), beliefs regarding how knowledge is generated/validated (epistemology), and views of what it values or what is considered desirable/undesirable (axiology) have become more ‘tangible’ (Wissing, Citation2021). Recently, Ciarrochi et al. (Citation2022), Wissing (Citation2021), Lomas et al. (Citation2021), and M. Seligman (Citation2018), and others started to clarify the philosophical position of positive psychology, presented clearer guidelines for theory development, highlighted the methods/approaches required to advance the field, and set guidelines on how to address paradigmatic issues.

For example, Seligman’s (Citation2011, p. 13) PERMA framework of well-being (Positive emotions, Engagement, positive Relationships, Meaning, and Accomplishments) received widespread criticism from scholars. Critics argued that PERMA was not a theory of well-being, but rather just a listing of factors that had been shown to be related to well-being (Wong & Roy, Citation2018), that there was no theoretical justification for why these factors related/had to be included (Donaldson et al., Citation2022), that PERMA did not attribute any unique variance in general well-being frameworks, and that it was redundant (Goodman et al., Citation2018). In response, M. Seligman (Citation2018) contended that PERMA was not a framework of what well-being was, but rather a set of elements required to facilitate well-being. He, furthermore, indicated that PERMA was not an exhaustive framework and that it could be expanded. In line with the propositions of Kuhn (Citation1970) and Wallis (2000) on theory development, M. Seligman (Citation2018) proposed six criteria required for expanding the PERMA framework: (a) new elements had to directly relate to well-being, (b) an element had to be pursued in its own right and not as a means to pursue another, (c) new elements had to lead to developmental interventions, (d) all factors had to be parsimonious, (e) PERMA had to be open and flexible to new developments, and (f) each new element had to be independently defined and measured. M. Seligman’s (Citation2018) response and criteria, thus, provided a basis for scientific advancement, as they ‘addressed a number of the criteria underpinning the creation of robust theories: clarifying the purpose of the theory (through highlighting that it’s an approach to rather than of well-being), highlighting what additional types of approaches/elements are needed for its expansion, setting specific criteria for theory development and evaluation and inviting further theorizing’ (Donaldson et al., Citation2022, p. 5).

Similarly, Lomas et al. (Citation2021) presented more explicit criteria for the types of theories, methods, and approaches needed to facilitate scientific advancement in the third wave of positive psychology. They argued that positive psychology had to broaden its scope by developing more contextually relevant theories and employing more systems-informed and cultural/linguistic approaches to theory development (and creating ethical guidelines) and had to expand its methods by employing more qualitative/mixed-method methodologies, using implicit assessment tools, and using more advanced computational approaches to analyze data. Expanding on this narrative, Wissing (Citation2021) postulated the types of holistic perspectives that were required in positive psychology and how contextually specific approaches to positive phenomena had to be approached, as well as highlighting the value of interdisciplinary work. She also highlighted the importance of embedding the theories and methods of positive psychology within its meta-assumptions. Wissing (Citation2021), additionally, laid the foundation for creating more clarity in the world views of positive psychology (ontology, epistemology, and axiology), proposed criteria for expanding its empirical context, identified the types of measurements required, and highlighted the importance of investing in emerging focus domains. Similarly, Pawelski (Citation2016) attempted to provide a descriptive overview of what constituted ‘positive’ in positive psychology and highlighted the six discrete meanings underpinning this from prior research.

Taken together, it was clear that positive psychology researchers had taken heed of prior critiques and had made active attempts to clarify the metatheoretical assumptions of positive psychology. Despite the progress, there are still a number of matters requiring clarity. Positive psychology should attempt to clarify its metaphysical perspective of reality, present a consolidated view of ontological/epistemological/axiological beliefs, clarify and create consensus as to what is considered ‘positive’, address consistencies in and between theories, and develop its own theory of human development. Furthermore, the field should move beyond the positivist paradigm and the accompanying reductionist way of thinking. There is value in adopting either a postpositivist or constructive-interpretivist perspective when exploring/explaining positive psychological phenomena (Wong, Citation2011). Multiple realities exist, and researchers/practitioners cannot be entirely objective or void of bias. Therefore, acknowledging this limitation and appreciating the presence of multiple perspectives and how one’s own biases affect the interpretation of the world may lead to more robust theories and methods (Friedman & Brown, Citation2018). Moreover, specific attention needs to be given to creating ethical decision-making models that inform and evaluate judgements about the values and future priorities of the discipline (Friedman & Brown, Citation2018). Positive psychology should also refrain from reporting and exaggerating sensationalist claims and should acknowledge limitations of important findings (especially when communicated in the public domain).

In addition, positive psychology can apply what has been learnt in other areas, such as the psychology of religion and spirituality, where these problems have largely been resolved. Scholars in the psychology of religion and spirituality present vastly different philosophical world views; yet the field has begun to coalesce around a ‘multi-level interdisciplinary paradigm’ of spirituality (Emmons & Paloutzian, Citation2003; Paloutzian & Park, Citation2005). Here, the aim is to appreciate the unique value each different approach toward spirituality and religion brings to explaining psychological phenomena and allowing for researchers from other domains to operationalize their concepts within this broader framework. This approach will recognize that positive psychology is indeed a ‘psychology’, but will encourage researchers to explore their constructs at different levels of abstraction. It will also allow researchers to compare their findings to, and collaborate more actively with, those from adjacent fields (e.g., anthropology, historical sciences, neurosciences, evolutionary biology, sociology, theology). These adjacent fields have specialized knowledge that explains human flourishing in different ways, and more holistic views can be developed through active collaboration. For positive psychology, this approach will allow for positive psychology researchers’ contributions to be valued (most notably at the individual level) and yet urge researchers to take a broader view of where their work fits into the wider efforts to understand human flourishing better. Therefore, this approach will be non-reductive and will recognize that explaining a phenomenon at one level does not explain it away from others.

Despite these opportunities to develop the philosophy and theorizing underpinning positive psychology, it is unreasonable of critics to assume that complete consensus on all philosophical issues within the discipline can be reached. Critics should consider how fields such as personality psychology operate with theoretical perspectives built on vastly different philosophical foundations. There are fundamental differences in how Freud, Rogers, Skinner, Klein, and others viewed human nature and, thus, presented vastly different approaches to understanding personality development (Allen, Citation2000). Despite these vast differences, scholars do not argue that personality psychology is ‘fundamentally flawed due to a lack of consensus or irreconcilable differences’ in the approaches. Most personality psychologists seem to appreciate ideological pluralism and build on the findings and limitations of other approaches (Cloninger, Citation2009; Strack, Citation2005). For example, the emphasis of behaviorism on overt behavior emerged partially in response to the psychoanalytic view of people as only driven by unobservable unconscious processes (Strack, Citation2005). Similarly, humanistic perspectives partly emerged in response to the behaviorist view of people as merely stimulus-response organisms. These different approaches drew from, and built on, elements of their predecessors.

Our second finding showed that critics highlighted issues with the measurement of positive psychological constructs and with the research methodologies the discipline favored. From the literature, it was clear that critics argued that positive psychology showed poor operationalization and measurement of its constructs, employed flawed research methodologies, over relied on empiricism/positivism, and failed to employ more robust research approaches. These critiques are not unfounded and have been widely acknowledged by positive psychological scientists (e.g., Disabato et al., Citation2019; Donaldson et al., Citation2022; Lomas et al., Citation2021; Van Zyl & Rothmann, Citation2022; Wissing, Citation2021). It is well established that popular positive psychological measuring instruments tend to produce different factorial models, with varying internal consistency ranges between studies and contexts (cf., Disabato et al., Citation2019; Van Zyl & Ten Klooster, Citation2022). For example, the Mental Health Continuum – Short Form (Keyes, Citation2002) and the Grit-O Scale (Duckworth et al., Citation2007) have produced at least 10 different factorial structures, inconsistent findings regarding the factorial equivalence between groups, and reliability indicators ranging from poor to acceptable in different contexts. Furthermore, to ensure acceptable levels of model-data fit, authors have been required to make significant modifications to the factorial structures (e.g., item parceling; Van Zyl & Ten Klooster, Citation2022). Positive psychological researchers have also acknowledged that not all popular psychometric instruments employed robust psychometric test construction principles during their initial development (Van Zyl & Rothmann, Citation2022; Wissing, Citation2021). For example, Van Zyl et al. (Citation2022) highlighted that Govindji and Linley’s (Citation2007) popular strength use and strengths knowledge scales were comprised of a set of self-generated items that had not been pilot-tested, that no evidence as to their face validity was presented, that they only used a single sample and sample population (university students) that were used to ‘validate’ the instrument, and that the items were only subjected to simple principal component analysis. Similarly, Lomas et al. (Citation2021) and Wissing (Citation2021) acknowledged that the discipline favored quantitative research and positivist approaches and relied heavily on self-report measures and cross-sectional over longitudinal designs to investigate claims.

Although the validity of these claims is not disputed, it is important to note that (a) positive psychology is still a relatively new field and (b) these problems plague the entire psychological discipline. First, it is normal for research into new areas or domains to employ ‘quick and dirty’ measures and cross-sectional studies during the first wave of research on novel topics. This practice serves to provide an initial glimpse into previously unstudied or unexplored phenomena. Journal editors are interested in novel work and will tend to overlook methodological simplicity if a study offers new insights or ‘fresh’ ideas. However, as more scientific research on the novel topic starts accumulating, more nuanced research questions emerge. Here, the same simple methodologies and ‘quick and dirty’ measures will not suffice. For this reason, more sophisticated measures and methods will be employed and, eventually, preferred by the scientific community. Over time, methodological standards will progressively be raised. Therefore, the criticisms in this regard do not highlight a fundamental flaw unique to positive psychology, but rather highlight the discourse of the normal scientific enterprise in the early stages. Second, these methods and approaches are not unique to positive psychology. Recent systematic literature reviews regarding the methods and approaches employed in psychology showed that over 90% of publications in psychology were quantitative, most favoring the positivistic approach (Scholtz et al., Citation2020Citation2021; Wilhelmy & Köhler, Citation2022). In their review, Scholtz et al. (Citation2020) showed that only 4.7% of the publications employed a qualitative design and even fewer mixed- or multi-methods. Furthermore, they showed that most publications used cross-sectional and non-experimental research designs, with only 3.9% being longitudinal. These authors also reported that most studies in psychology employed some form of self-report questionnaire (76.8%) to measure psychological phenomena. Similar trends were found in all subdisciplines of psychology, ranging from organizational and social psychology to educational psychology (Coetzee & Van Zyl, Citation2013; McCrudden et al., Citation2019; Sassenberg & Ditrich, Citation2019; Scholtz et al., Citation2021; Wilhelmy & Köhler, Citation2022). Similarly, Reynolds and Livingston (Citation2021) noted that poor test construction processes and practices were apparent in all subdisciplines of psychology, exacerbated by the rapid development of new assessment technologies and analytical approaches.

Given that measurement and methodology are crucial elements for advancing a discipline, positive psychological researchers should be more rigorous in developing and validating new psychometric instruments. There is a need to develop stricter guidelines for developing and validating new instruments and adapting and validating existing methods for new contexts. All positive psychological assessment measures should comply with the International Test Commission (Citation2017) and the European Federation of Psychologists’ Associations (European Federation of Psychologists’ Associations, Citation2013) guidelines on test construction, adaption, and validation, as well as the ISO standards for assessment methods and procedures (International Organization for Standardization, Citation2011). In addition, newly developed psychometric instruments should be subjected to more scrutiny by reviewers and editors, as these are key to addressing issues in the field. Multi-study designs should be favored by following conventional standards in psychometric test development. Separate studies should be used to explore the factorial structure, confirm its factorial validity, explore its factorial equivalence, and establish its predictive validity. Besides this, more attention should be paid to establishing face, discriminant, predictive, and incremental validity of new measures. Given that positive psychology suffers from the ‘jingle-jangle’ fallacy, both researchers and reviewers should be more critical of the unique contribution each new construct or assessment measure makes. As Goodman et al. (Citation2018) point out, there is a significant overlap in psychological constructs, and new constructs do not necessarily explain any new variance in well-being. Furthermore, new psychometric tests should show evidence of their cross-cultural fairness and be developed in line with local traditions and values. Similarly, more innovative analytical approaches should be considered, which compensate for the limitations of current assessment practices (Van Zyl & Ten Klooster, Citation2022). These can include exploratory structural equation modelling (which compensates and controls for differences in the interpretation of items), Bayesian confirmatory factor analysis, machine learning approaches, and the like. There is also an opportunity to develop more objective positive psychological assessment measures to assess positive states/traits/behaviors through kinetic measures, motion capture systems, accelerometers, eye trackers, speech analysis, hormonal endocrinal responses (e.g., cortisol, alpha-amylase), central brain activity (e.g., through electroencephalograms, neuroimaging, electric/magnetic stimulation, connectomes), contextual/attentional measures (e.g., electromagnetic articulography indexing, motion capture systems), and arousal systems (e.g., galvanic skin response, facial electromyography; Cipresso & Immekus, Citation2017). There should additionally be greater focus on incorporating new developments in natural language processing, meta-data mining (e.g., web scraping), and machine learning as methods to assess positive characteristics.

In terms of research methodologies, we echo the calls of Lomas et al. (Citation2021) and Wissing (Citation2021), who state that positive psychology should employ more robust designs (e.g., longitudinal or experimental designs) and approaches such as qualitative, mixed-method, and experimental research. Although these methods and approaches are not entirely absent from the field, they are vastly overshadowed by cross-sectional studies and quantitative research. The overreliance on cross-sectional designs likely feeds the perception that causal inferences are too often inappropriately made within positive psychology. This is a fair concern, even if it applies less to the science itself and more to the exaggerated interpretations of research results often made within the popular psychology literature.

Positive psychologists should, therefore, move away from the reductionist way of thinking by engaging in more phenomenological work as a means of understanding, rather than explaining, psychological experiences. Mixed-method approaches can help explain how and why (or why not) certain factors relate and provide a means to self-correct theories. Here, journals should attempt to showcase these designs and highlight their value to the discipline by calling for more special issues on the topic. Finally, more robust research designs should be utilized. Cross-sectional designs should be limited to exploring ideas, or multiple cross-sectional studies should be published in the same paper to confirm hypotheses. The value of cross-sectional research can be enhanced by using multiple measurement methods and especially by developing and deploying more objective measures to assess positive states, traits, and behaviors.

Growing concerns: a pseudoscience lacking novelty, and self-isolation from general psychology

Stemming from the two roots of the problem, critics had growing concern regarding the status of positive psychology as a science and its relevance to the broader nomological psychological network.

Our third finding showed that positive psychology was seen as a pseudoscience that lacked evidence and showed poor replicability. Critics argued that positive psychology presented (false) claims that were not supported by empirical evidence and that its benefits were vastly exaggerated. Positive psychology was said to be rife with confirmation bias and not self-correcting (i.e., continued adherence to theories that had been empirically discredited rather than updating theoretical assumptions and moving forward). Academic research was focused on generating superficial knowledge, which presented obvious conclusions. The findings also highlighted critics’ belief that positive psychological research findings could not be replicated.

Although some of these critiques have merit, the overarching idea that positive psychology is a pseudoscience is questionable. Curd and Psillos (Citation2014) define a pseudoscience as a set of beliefs, assumptions, statements, or practices about a particular phenomenon that is claimed to be factual and scientific, yet incompatible with the scientific method. According to Curd and Psillos (Citation2014), positive psychology can only be considered a pseudoscience if it meets eight criteria:

  1. It is unfalsifiable (i.e., employing vague, exaggerated, or untestable claims; unable to prove it wrong). Although there are inconsistencies in terminology and theories (as discussed above), positive psychological constructs are, for the most part, clearly defined, with specific indicators/components. Given the ‘over reliance on empiricism’ noted by the critics, mentioned in the previous section, it is clear that hypotheses can be tested and accepted/not accepted.

  2. Collection of evidence is improper (i.e., relying heavily on testimonials; cherry-picking confirming evidence/ignoring disconfirming results). The progress of positive psychology has relied heavily on empiricism and scientism. Although this has resulted in other issues as discussed above, it does support the idea that findings and assumptions are based on scientific evidence that attempts to confirm/disconfirm results. Furthermore, several journals are focused explicitly on collating scientific evidence on positive psychology, along with various societies aimed at disseminating information.

  3. It lacks openness to scrutiny by others. Several authors from adjacent or even unrelated fields (e.g., physics) have scrutinized positive psychological research, processes, and practices. For example, N. J. L. Brown et al. (Citation2013) criticized the analytical strategy used to establish the critical positivity ratio. This, in turn, led to Fredrickson (Citation2013) partially retracting the original paper and responding to the critique. Furthermore, journals such as Frontiers in Psychology (Positive Psychology) invite reviewers from different paradigmatic perspectives to evaluate positive psychological research.

  4. Theory progression is absent (i.e., not self-correcting). This element can, however, not entirely be refuted. Positive psychology does not easily self-correct. For example, despite the paper on the critical positivity ratio being partially retracted, authors are still debating the relevance of the ratio. The original paper continues to garner citations, and the original claims are still positioned as fact in new studies (Friedman and Brown, Citation2018). Van Zyl and Rothmann (Citation2022) argue that researchers rely heavily on ‘contextual factors’ to justify or explain negative results and, therefore, do not self-correct or update existing theories.

  5. Confirmation bias exists (i.e., favoring findings that confirm one’s prior beliefs/assumptions). Confirmation bias is present in all fields of psychology and, therefore, also present in positive psychology. Fairly few studies have been published that show negative results, and there is evidence of data being interpreted to favor inherent beliefs.

  6. It makes exaggerated or extraordinary claims. This element was heavily present during the first decade of the existence of positive psychology and was criticized by both academics and society (cf., Coyne et al., Citation2010). However, during the last decade, scientists have become more cautious about the presentation and interpretation of their results. Yet the problem is quite prolific in the popular psychological press, where findings are taken out of context or over exaggerated, and where causation is often inferred or implied when reporting on correlational research. The problem, therefore, seems to be related to the dissemination of findings to a broader audience rather than the science itself.

  7. It lacks peer review. The vast majority of the journals publishing positive psychological research subject claims to extensive peer review.

  8. Replication of results is poor. The entire discipline of psychology is faced with a replication crisis, and positive psychology is not immune (cf., Efendic & Van Zyl, Citation2019; Maxwell et al., Citation2015). For example, it has been a struggle to replicate findings on the effectiveness of popular positive psychological intervention studies such as the gratitude visit, as well as the three good things exercise, in contexts outside of the USA (Wong & Roy, Citation2018). A number of issues underpin the poor replication of positive psychology: (a) reliance on small, underpowered samples, (b) publication bias, (c) questionable research practices such as p-hacking, (d) a lack of transparency in research practices, and (e) publication pressure and poor funding (Efendic & Van Zyl, Citation2019).

Although there is some justification for the claims made by critics, positive psychology does not seem to conform to the definition of a pseudoscience. There are, however, several areas that warrant further exploration and development. In respect of the lack of replicability and managing confirmation bias, positive psychological journals should actively drive the implementation of open science practices (cf., Van Zyl, Citation2019). Positive psychological journals should consider implementing the transparency and open science promotion guidelines (cf., Nosek et al., Citation2015). These guidelines provide journals with minimum standards for (a) citations plans, (b) data transparency, (c) analytical methods transparency, (d) research materials transparency, (e) research design transparency, (f) pre-registration of studies, (g) pre-registration of analysis plans, and (h) information on how to encourage replication studies (Nosek et al., Citation2015). At a minimum, journals should require authors to submit their raw data and their statistical codes as part of the review process as well as encourage the submission of null results/replication studies. This will allow for more transparency in the theory building and testing process. In addition, journals and editors should encourage pre-registration of studies to reduce ‘analytical flexibility’ and other systematic biases. Pre-registering study protocols may reduce the occurrence of questionable research practices such as HARKing, p-hacking, data fabrication, and the like (Nosek et al., Citation2015; Van Zyl, Citation2019; Van Zyl & Junker, Citation2019). Furthermore, to enhance the quality of peer review, positive psychology journals should consider experimenting with open or collaborative peer review processes. According to Efendic and Van Zyl (Citation2019), collaborative peer review facilitates an open and active dialogue between stakeholders (reviewers/editors/authors) from the original design of a study through to the final submitted manuscript. A collaborative review allows authors to actively engage with reviewers/editors to clarify expectations and discuss content in a meaningful fashion. This reduces reviewer biases, provides opportunities for professional development, ensures transparent feedback, and enhances the quality of the overall manuscript (Dobele, Citation2015; Miller, Citation2006). It is also suggested that the editorial boards of the various top positive psychology journals meet annually to discuss publication trends, share best-practice guidelines, and develop shared strategies to enhance the quality of positive psychological research for the coming year.

Our fourth finding showed that positive psychology lacked novelty and self-isolated from mainstream psychology. Critics contended that positive psychology brought nothing new to the proverbial table and that it willfully created a divide between ‘negative’ psychology and the study of ‘optimal human functioning’ to justify the reason for its existence. In response to these claims, Seligman (Citation2011) confirmed that studying human strengths and virtues was not new and acknowledged the historical origins of the discipline. Seligman (Citation2011) maintained that the origins of ‘positive psychology’ could be traced back to the contributions of William James, Abraham Maslow, Albert Bandura, Carl Rogers, and Victor Frankl (to name a few). The call for a new science with regard to positive experiences, characteristics, and institutions did not disregard these contributions, but rather brought them to the fore and emphasized the need for further development (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, Citation2000). This renewed focus on studying what was right, rather than wrong, led to significant contributions to our understanding of well-being and the factors facilitating/undermining it (Seligman, Citation2019). Seligman (Citation2019) argued that positive psychology had produced several unique insights such as that (a) optimists lived longer and healthier lives than pessimists and were less likely to die from cardiovascular disease, (b) women who showed genuine smiles at 18 reported higher levels of marital satisfaction later in life, (c) environmental factors only contributed around 15% of the variance in well-being/happiness, (d) self-discipline and grit were stronger predictors of academic performance than IQ, (e) happy teenagers earned substantially more income 15 years later than their unhappy peers, (f) those who pursued meaningful life experiences had a distinctive genetic profile, and (g) mindfulness interventions could lead to increased resilience. Therefore, positive psychology had played an essential role in advancing our understanding of the human condition.

However, as rightfully stated by critics, Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi’s (Citation2000) call did create a fictitious divide between traditional psychological approaches and positive psychology. This led to several adverse outcomes, as discussed above. This criticism was acknowledged by Seligman (Citation2011Citation2019), who stated that the intent was not to create a divide, but rather to focus more on understanding positive states, traits, behaviors, and institutions. Nevertheless, the discipline has moved beyond this fictitious divide during the last decade. According to Wong (Citation2011), Lomas et al. (Citation2021), and Wissing (Citation2021), positive psychology has started to recognize the value of ‘the negative’ as a means of facilitating positive experiences and that suffering is essential for the development of strengths, happiness, and well-being; consequently, there is a better alignment with mainstream psychological approaches. More recent theoretical frameworks, such as Bohlmeijer and Westerhof’s (Citation2021) model for sustainable mental health, actively incorporate mental illness, dysfunctional cognitions, emotions, and behaviors as part of its ‘positive framework’.

Despite these advancements, there are still some challenges to consider. According to Joseph (Citation2021), despite two decades of debate, there is still no clarity or consensus on the relationship between humanistic psychology and positive psychology. Although various attempts have been made to consolidate the differences and facilitate a more integrative perspective, humanistic psychologists remain critical of positive psychology, and vice versa. Furthermore, most positive psychological interventions and therapy models are built on principles of cognitive-behavioral therapy; yet the discipline does not actively acknowledge this. It, thus, gains value through incorporating approaches that ‘work well’ in other domains in terms of its own theoretical and intervention frameworks. Positive psychology can be further enriched by incorporating more of what can be learnt from other psychological approaches or domains such as systems sciences (M’Pherson, Citation1974), depth psychology (Staude, Citation1976), and evolutionary psychology (Cosmides & Tooby, Citation2013). Moreover, positive psychology should attempt to explore opportunities to incorporate developments from adjacent domains such as the neurosciences, decision sciences, environmental studies, economic sciences, and computer sciences.

Branching out: a harmful decontextualized neo-liberal ideology and capitalistic venture

The criticisms and critiques branched out into two additional areas. Our fifth and sixth findings showed that positive psychology was a decontextualized neo-liberal ideology that caused harm and that it was presented as little more than a capitalistic venture. Positive psychology is classified as a neo-liberalist ideology, where optimal functioning and success are seen as an individual enterprise and a consequence of one’s own life choices. This neo-liberal ideology positions Western values as ‘universal’ and superimposes these onto other cultures. It neglects the role of culture, social context, and the environment in understanding positive phenomena. This, in turn, pathologizes normal human behavior, marginalizes groups, reinforces (gender/cultural) stereotypes, creates stigma, and causes harm.

Clearly not all of positive psychology is fairly captured in these critiques, yet it is a substantial enough problem within the field that these concerns are often raised, and by multiple voices. Marecek and Cristopher (Citation2018) stated that positive psychology had positioned itself as an ‘indigenous psychology’, where positive experiences, characteristics, and phenomena were deemed to be universally relevant and applicable. However, it failed to incorporate indigenous knowledge, social contexts, or cultural perspectives in the pursuit of explaining positive experiences or phenomena (Hendriks et al., Citation2019; Wissing, Citation2021). There are significant differences in how collectivistic and individualistic cultures view mental health and well-being (cf., Hendriks et al., Citation2019); yet the Western model is positioned to be universally applicable (Van Zyl & Rothmann, Citation2022). For example, in African and Eastern cultures, well-being is approached as a function of social contexts (e.g., family functioning, community well-being), whereas in individualistic cultures, the pursuit of well-being is placed solely on the individual (Hendriks et al., Citation2019). Therefore, positive psychological theories, psychometric instruments, and interventions may not be applicable to non-Western cultures (Hendriks et al., Citation2019; Lomas et al., Citation2021; Wissing, Citation2021). This may reinforce cultural stereotypes and create unrealistic expectations about mental health and well-being, which, in turn, may cause significant harm, create stigma, and marginalize certain groups (Hendriks et al., Citation2019; Thompson, Citation2018; Van Zyl & Rothmann, Citation2022).

This critique highlights the need for more culturally relevant or ‘indigenous’ perspectives on positive psychological phenomena that incorporate local traditions, values, and perspectives and present an opportunity for more cross-cultural and cross-national studies in positive psychological phenomena. Echoing the calls of Lomas et al. (Citation2021) and Wissing (Citation2021), there is, thus, a need to further develop a positive cross-cultural psychology, where the specific focus should be on creating more holistic indigenous positive psychological theories, methods, and interventions. Specific attention should also be given to investigating the unique experiences of marginalized or under-represented societal groups (e.g., expatriates and the LGBTQ community) and developing tailored solutions to their unique problems. Here, more participatory action-research-based approaches can be used to allow members of these marginalized communities to co-construct theories, approaches, measures, and solutions alongside academic researchers. Creating a more inclusive culture, where participants are seen as ‘co-developers’ of theories/methods/solutions, can generate unique perspectives on the problems marginalized communities face. Similarly, it is also imperative for positive psychology to create its own ethical research and intervention guidelines to mitigate the potential harm that its theories, methods, and interventions can cause (cf., Jarden et al., Citation2021).

Finally, our results showed that positive psychology was also seen as a capitalistic venture that aimed to commercialize ‘positivity’ as a means to further facilitate individualism, consumerism, and the medicalization of positive experiences. Critics argued that positive psychology created a market of ‘impossible dreams’ that set unrealistic expectations of what a ‘good life’ entailed. It facilitated the medicalization of positive phenomena and, thus, created a market for test developers, consultants, and practitioners to capitalize on people’s ‘pathological unhappiness’.

Although the commercialization of positive psychology cannot be disputed, it is important to reflect on the nature of its intent. No economic, social, or political system, whether it be socialism, capitalism, or communism, is ‘good’ or ‘evil’ by design (Hoppe, Citation1989). The intent driving the system and its implications for society define whether economic, social, or political policies are harmful or beneficial to its constituents (Hoppe, Citation1989). The commercialization of positive psychological tools and techniques indicates their popularity in practice and usefulness to society. Commercial drivers around positive psychological tools and techniques seem to be centered on scalability, with the intent to increase access to valuable resources that can facilitate ‘the good life’ (cf., Richter et al., Citation2021). Scalability requires innovation, physical resources (e.g., information technology (IT) infrastructure), the automation of processes/practices, and people to design content/systems/services. The scalability of a product or service increases accessibility, limits barriers to access, and decreases costs for consumers (Jabłoński & Jabłoński, Citation2020). However, these come at a cost, as the physical resources driving them are finite. So the commercialization of positive psychological tools and techniques helps to facilitate the development of positive states, traits, and behaviors cost-effectively.

It should also be noted that the access to, and the scalability of, positive psychological tools and techniques are not just facilitated by practitioners and industry. Various non-profit organizations, professional societies, and academic institutions provide access to positive psychological tools and techniques at no charge. For example, the Greater Good Science Center aims to provide individuals with easily useable tools and self-development activities to facilitate the development of positive states, traits, and behaviors. Similarly, the University of Pennsylvania provides free access to many positive psychological assessment measures (such as the VIA Signature Strengths Inventory) to help individuals identify their strengths and positive experiences. There are also a number of free (or partially free) apps such as Headspace, Happify, ThinkUp, Happy Habits, and the like that have been developed along with academic institutions to facilitate positive states and behaviors (Feldman, Citation2017). Research entities such as the Optentia in South Africa and the University of Pennsylvania provide free lectures/webinars/workshops, tools, and techniques to upskill practitioners and empower individuals to facilitate their personal growth. There is, thus, a balance between the ‘paid’ and ‘free’ services that aim to increase accessibility to positive psychological tools and techniques.

However, as long as there is a high demand for positive psychological tools, techniques, and interventions, there will always be a gap between what science supports and what practitioners are designing/communicating/implementing (Jarden et al., Citation2021). The challenge for the discipline is, consequently, to (a) work to close the gap by continuing to develop and test interventions, (b) educate practitioners on science/practice integration using the scientist/practitioner or clinical/scholar models of training, (c) urge adherence to the relevant ethical codes (American Psychological Association, American Educational Research Association, etc.) that govern the practice/application of psychology, and (d) educate the public to help them tell the difference between evidence-based practice and quackery.

Limitations and recommendations

Despite attempts to ensure a relevant and rigorous systematic review, there are still a number of limitations to consider. First, confirmation bias may be present, given the nature of this project and that all the authors self-identify as ‘positive psychologists’. To reduce bias, a clear search protocol was established, and specific strategies were implemented (e.g., multiple evaluators/raters were used, inter-rater reliability was calculated, multiple searches were conducted, etc.). Second, no ‘grey literature’ was included in the search protocol. Future research could employ artificial-intelligence-assisted systematic literature review tools to help manage potential biases (cf., Van De Schoot et al., Citation2021). Third, only including academic literature that had been subjected to traditional quality standards and peer review may have led to the exclusion of popular psychology press books/chapters/texts and dissertations/theses that may have presented alternative critiques from different perspectives. Therefore, excluding grey literature may have presented a biased (only academic) view of the criticisms/critiques of positive psychology. Future research could consider conducting a systematic review of grey literature to determine practitioners’ perspectives on the issues within positive psychology. In the fourth place, although the best-practice guidelines for systematic reviews were followed and numerous strategies were considered to ensure that all possible relevant texts were included, there is a possibility that several important manuscripts may have been excluded. For example, Joseph’s (Citation2021) paper was not originally included, as our search and key terms were not present in the title, keywords, or abstract. Finally, the relative importance of the six themes was not established. Although a deductive, theory-driven approach was used to position issues with theory and measurement as the root cause of the other problems, their relative importance was not established. Future research could employ a heuristic iterative classification process with a number of academics and practitioners to determine the relative importance of these criticisms and to generate more holistic solutions to these problems.

One of the weird things about Britain, despite its being the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution, is that its financial infrastructure was for a long time remarkably backward; the Dutch did it better

How the Dutch Did it Better. Anton Howes. Age of Invention Blog, Feb 17 2023. https://antonhowes.substack.com/p/age-of-invention-how-the-dutch-did

Excerpts:

One of the weird things about Britain, despite its being the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution, is that its financial infrastructure was for a long time remarkably backward. Its “Financial Revolution”, by which both people and the state began to borrow at ever lower interest rates, only really took off in the early eighteenth century — long after London’s extraordinary growth in 1550-1650, when it had suddenly expanded eightfold to become one of Europe’s most important commercial hubs. Indeed, even for much of the late seventeenth century, England lacked many of the most basic financial institutions that had been used for decades and decades by their most important rival and trading partner, the Dutch Republic.

I was especially intrigued when I stumbled across a discussion of Dutch policies and customs, written up in around 1665 by the young merchant Josiah Child, and published a few years later: a kind of wishlist of many of the things that made the Dutch so wealthy, and which the English continually failed to emulate:1

- The Dutch councils of state and war always included merchants who had experience of trading and living abroad — Child was perhaps just angling for some influence here, but for all that merchants were getting more influential, in England they were not actually in charge.

- Gavel-kind succession laws, whereby all children got an equal share of their parents’ estates, rather than it all going to the eldest. English primogeniture, by contrast, apparently left a lot of gentlemen’s younger sons having to become apprenticed to merchants.

- High regulatory standards for goods. A barrel of Dutch-packed herring or cod would apparently be accepted by buyers just by viewing the marks, without having to open them up to check. English-packed goods, by contrast, were rarely trusted because the fish would turn out to be rotten or even missing — the English regulators’ stamps of approval were reputedly given to anyone who would pay.

- Encouragement for inventors of new products, techniques, and import trades, who received rewards from the state, and not just temporary monopoly patents.

- Ships, called fluyt, which were cheaper to build, required fewer sailors, and were easier to handle. Despite being only very lightly armed, they sailed in fleets for protection, when necessary being convoyed by ships of war. English trading ships, by contrast, were each heavily armed, but with those cannon taking up room and weight that could have been used for carrying merchandise.

- Education of all children, even girls, in arithmetic and keeping accounts. As Child put it, this infused in the Dutch “a strong aptitude, love, and delight” for commerce. It also meant that husbands and wives were real partners in many businesses — something that impressed almost all foreign visitors to the Netherlands.

- Low customs duties, but high consumption taxes. Very low customs duties, on both imports and exports, meant that it was often very profitable to trade with the Netherlands. The Dutch were famed for their many ships, and for their granaries bursting with grain, despite growing hardly any trees or crops themselves. To fund their state, they instead overwhelmingly relied on the gemene middelen — taxes on the sale of wine, beer, meat, fuel, candles, salt, soap, flour, cloth, and a host of other goods, with many of the higher rates reserved for expensive luxuries. Much like modern value-added taxes, these taxes on consumption raised revenue while preserving the all-important incentive to save and invest.

- Thrifty living — which, come to think of it, was probably related to the high consumption taxes, although Childs doesn’t seem to have noticed the connection. Dutch thrift was thought by the English to be especially useful because it allowed wage costs to be kept low — essential for maintaining competitiveness in international markets — while preventing the country having a trade deficit. The English always worried they were sending too much of their silver abroad to pay for French wines and other luxuries, but the Dutch appeared to have prevented this without resorting to import tariffs that might annoy trading partners and prompt retaliation.

- Religious toleration, which attracted all sorts of industrious immigrants to bring their families and wealth. (Incidentally, as I’ve mentioned before, this was also one of the key attractions of Livorno, set up by the Medici Dukes of Tuscany to be a major trading hub.)

- The use of the Law-Merchant, which meant that all controversies between merchants and tradesmen were decided in just 3 or 4 days’ time. England, rather strangely for such an increasingly commercial nation, did not develop merchant courts with a specific jurisdiction or a distinct body of merchant law — disputes instead had to be resolved in the royal common-law or equity courts, in the Admiralty court, or else abroad. The English courts, however, were often slow. Child complained that cases often took half a year, and often much longer. (Incidentally, slow and rotten justice in the Court of Chancery, the key equity court used by merchants in England, was one of the reasons Francis Bacon was impeached by Parliament and sacked as Lord Chancellor.)

- Transferrable bills of exchange — in other words, the circulation of credit notes as a currency. These were not properly supported by English laws, but allowed Dutch merchants to trade a lot more frequently. English merchants often had to wait some six months to a year before receiving all the coin from selling their foreign goods in London, so as to purchase goods again to make fresh trades. They spent much of their time chasing shopkeepers for payment. But the Dutch, by being able to easily buy and sell their credit notes, could “turn their stocks twice or thrice in trade”, immediately settling their accounts and making fresh purchases. (I intend to look into this in a lot more detail soon, as finding a way to bills of exchange transferrable in England appears to have been a major project for many of the mid-seventeenth-century inventors and improvers — after just a cursory glance, transferability was only secured in law as late as 1704.)

- Banks. Or rather, as Child actually put it, “BANKS”. In England many of the functions of banks gradually evolved from the practices of individual goldsmiths and the scriveners — legal clerks who specialised in property transfers and mortgages. There was certainly nothing so secure as the municipal Wisselbank of Amsterdam, established in 1609, which had various monopoly powers as a clearing-house for bills of exchange and was backed by a vault full of bullion. Nor the municipal Bank van Lening, established in 1614, which was a pawnbroker modelled on the Italian Monte di Pietà, or mounts of piety, designed to make small and low-cost loans to the poor.

- “PUBLIC REGISTERS” — again capitalised by Child — of all lands and houses sold or mortgaged. This item on the policy wishlist would not be ticked off for England until two centuries later, but the key advantage was to prevent lawsuits over land titles — still cited as a major problem even in the 1690s — and so make land more genuinely secure for mortgages.


Much more at the link above.

Friday, February 24, 2023

Comparing oneself on social media with those who are better off than oneself is a turn-off in every way, for men, women and people of all ages

A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Social Media Exposure to Upward Comparison Targets on Self-Evaluations and Emotions. Carly A. McComb,Eric J. Vanman &Stephanie J. Tobin. Media Psychology, Feb 23 2023. https://doi.org/10.1080/15213269.2023.2180647

Abstract: Social media have become a pervasive part of contemporary culture and are an essential part of the daily lives of an increasing number of people. Its popularity has brought unlimited opportunities to compare oneself with other people. This meta-analysis combined and summarized the findings of previous experimental research, with the aim of generating causal conclusions regarding the effects of exposure to upward comparison targets on self-evaluations and emotions in a social media context. We identified 48 articles involving 7679 participants through a systematic search and entered 118 effect sizes into a multilevel, random-effects meta-analysis. Analyses revealed an overall negative effect of upward social comparison relative to downward comparison and controls on social media users’ self-evaluations and emotions (g = −0.24, p < .001). Specifically, there were significant negative effects of upward comparison on each outcome variable: body image (g = −0.31, p < .001), subjective well-being (g = −0.19, p < .001), mental health (g = −0.21, p < .001) and self-esteem (g = −0.21, p < .001). This meta-analysis indicates that contrast is the dominant response to upward comparison on social media, which results in negative self-evaluations and emotions.


Thursday, February 23, 2023

Individuals with ADHD are less tolerant of other people’s political views and more prone to support the idea of silencing other opinions

ADHD and political participation: An observational study. Israel Waismel-Manor et al. PLOS One, February 21, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0280445

Abstract

Background and objective: Over the past decade, researchers have been seeking to understand the consequences of adult attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) for different types of everyday behaviors. In this study, we investigated the associations between ADHD and political participation and attitudes, as ADHD may impede their active participation in the polity.


Methods: This observational study used data from an online panel studying the adult Jewish population in Israel, collected prior the national elections of April 2019 (N = 1369). ADHD symptoms were assessed using the 6-item Adult ADHD Self-Report (ASRS-6). Political participation (traditional and digital), news consumption habits, and attitudinal measures were assessed using structured questionnaires. Multivariate linear regression analyses were conducted to analyze the association between ADHD symptoms (ASRS score <17) and reported political participation and attitudes.


Results: 200 respondents (14.6%) screened positive for ADHD based on the ASRS-6. Our findings show that individuals with ADHD are more likely to participate in politics than individuals without ADHD symptoms (B = 0.303, SE = 0.10, p = .003). However, participants with ADHD are more likely to be passive consumers of news, waiting for current political news to reach them instead of actively searching for it (B = 0.172, SE = 0.60, p = .004). They are also more prone to support the idea of silencing other opinions (B = 0.226, SE = 0.10, p = .029). The findings hold when controlling for age, sex, level of education, income, political orientation, religiosity, and stimulant therapy for ADHD symptoms.


Conclusions: Overall, we find evidence that individuals with ADHD display a unique pattern of political activity, including greater participation and less tolerance of others’ views, but not necessarily showing greater active interest in politics. Our findings add to a growing body of literature that examines the impact of ADHD on different types of everyday behaviors.


Discussion

Previous work suggests that genetic and biological factors might help explain some political behaviors [525559]. This study examines whether and how one of the most prevalent neuropsychiatric disorders, ADHD [5658], is correlated with measures of political participation and attitudes. We screened adult participants in a political participation study for ADHD symptomatology using the ASRS-6 screening questionnaire and compared political participation patterns and attitudes of participants who screened positive for ADHD to those of participants who screened negative. In our sample, where the prevalence of ADHD based on the ASRS-6 was 14.6%, we found that positive ADHD screening was associated with higher political participation through both physical and digital channels. However, while ADHD-positive participants tended to express their political opinions via social media, they did not report greater interest in politics or higher levels of active news consumption. Instead, the analysis demonstrated that individuals with ADHD symptoms are more likely to take a “political news will find me” approach. In this sense, our results align with previous work that finds that individuals who suffer from other health conditions in their daily lives tend to participate more regularly in political activity, such as contacting a politician or signing a petition [31].

Additionally, participants with ADHD symptoms were found to be less tolerant of other people’s views. Considering that participants with ADHD symptoms were not more likely to curb democratic norms as a whole, this might reflect their attentiveness rather than a broader democratic issue.

To the best of our knowledge, the impact of ADHD on political behavior has not previously been evaluated. However, a recent study has addressed the use of social media among patients with ADHD. Social media users with ADHD were found to be less agreeable, to post more often, and to use more negations, hedging, and swear words. ADHD is also correlated with addictive social media use [47]. Social media activity in general is rewarding for ADHD patients, as it provides immediate feedback and offers an easy distraction from other tasks. In this sense, political participation through social media platforms is equally rewarding for patients with ADHD.

Impatience and intolerance towards the opinion of others and/or willingness to interrupt others while speaking are also symptomatic of ADHD as defined by the DSM-V [5]. Our findings indicate that this trait is also applicable to the political arena, with participants who screened positive for ADHD displaying lower tolerance towards opposing opinions.

While there was no difference between the ADHD and non-ADHD groups in regard to the amount of political content they consume via popular news outlets, we found that participants with ADHD are more prone to consume news passively, waiting for it to “find them.” This implies, in turn, that these individuals tend to base their current political knowledge on information that is screened for them by others, or that is filtered and curated by social media algorithms. This finding, which was not previously reported, may have implications for how patients with ADHD perceive reality and their vulnerability to being captured by information bubbles.

Participants who were treated by stimulants did not differ from non-treated ADHD-positive participants in our study. A possible explanation for this finding is that pharmacological treatments for ADHD affect symptoms over a limited timeframe, even when long-acting agents are used. ADHD patients tend to take their medication in the morning, so as to manage their symptoms during working hours. However, they are more likely to post on social media at night [47]. As such, their political activity may take place largely at times of day when they are not medically treated.

Our study has four main limitations: First, it was performed on a small population in one specific political context (the state of Israel, which is considered highly polarized). It is, therefore, difficult to draw general conclusions regarding other countries. At the same time, attention disorders are common worldwide, and we hope that further research will this matter in other countries. Second, this study used a screening tool rather than a clinical diagnosis. Third, it is possible that individuals with ADHD will demonstrate a different pattern of responding to surveys. For example, they might lose interest in the middle of filing the survey, depending on the time of day. As no previous literature on this matter exists, our research was carried out using the conventional method without special adjustment for attention disorders. Forth, it examined political participation through self-reports.

Nonetheless, our findings provide insights into the possible effects of ADHD on political behavior. With growing recognition of the existence and impact of ADHD among adults, the effects of the disorder on all aspects of human life are beginning to unfold. Considering that political participation entails voluntary actions taken by individuals to influence public policy and those elected officials who shape those policies, and given that ADHD is correlated with weakened populations, it is important to understand both whether the voices of those with ADHD are heard, and how this segment of society affects the polity.

More broadly, as our understanding and acceptance of neurodiversity grows [59], we need to pay more attention to how various common neurodevelopmental disorders shape our society. The political arena in democratic societies is formed and shaped by all citizens, including “neuro-minorities,” and academic research should address their participation as part of an effort both to improve the social functioning of neurodivergent individuals and to enhance the political system for the benefit of all. Future research is needed to further validate and strengthen our findings, possibly using validated clinical diagnoses and evaluating digital political behaviors via actual inspection of participants’ social media accounts using automated approaches.

People want friends to be more prosocial toward oneself than toward others, and sometimes prefer friends who are more vicious than prosocial, for instance, toward one's enemies

Sometimes we want vicious friends: People have nuanced preferences for how they want their friends to behave toward them versus others. Jaimie Arona Krems et al. Evolution and Human Behavior, February 23 2023. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2023.02.008

Abstract: Intuition and research alike suggest that people prefer friends to be prosocial—particularly kind and trustworthy. Here, we examine these preferences in light of the fact that dyadic friendships are embedded in wider social networks. Because our friends recurrently interact with other people, and these friend-other interactions can have various positive and negative effects on us, people should possess distinct preferences not only for how our friends behave toward us but also for how friends behave toward different other people (e.g., strangers, rivals). In six studies (N = 1183; two pre-registered) with complementary designs and cross-national samples (U.S. community, U.S. student, India community), we find: (a) When the targets of best friends' behavior are not specified, people's friend preferences track how one wants friends to behave toward oneself. Replicating patterns found in past work, (b) people generally want friends to be kinder and more trustworthy than not. But (c) people also want friends to be more prosocial toward oneself than toward others, and (d) people sometimes prefer friends who are more vicious than prosocial, for instance, toward one's enemies. These findings challenge some long-held conclusions about friend preferences, expand the known range of traits preferred in close relationship partners, and enrich our understanding of what it means to deem people, for example, “kind,” as such evaluative personality concepts may by default be indexed to the self.

Introduction

Most work on close relationships, especially friendships, tends to focus on the dyad and thus on how people want to be treated by their dyadic partners (i.e., their friends) (Hall, 2012; Huang, Ledgerwood, & Eastwick, 2020; Sprecher & Regan, 2002; Wiseman, 1986). What matters is that one's friend treats one well. In line with such thinking, robust evidence suggests that people prefer friends who are, for example, kind to them and disfavor those who are vicious to them (e.g., Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li, 2007; Fehr, 1996; Hall, 2011, Hall, 2012; Perlman, Stevens, & Carcedo, 2014; Sprecher & Regan, 2002). Somewhat similarly to such ‘canonical’ findings, ‘cooperative accounts’ of partner choice might predict that what matters is a friend's overall prosociality—to oneself or others—and so people should prefer friends who are maximally prosocial (to oneself and others) (for reviews—but not necessarily support for—such accounts, see Barakzai & Shaw, 2018; Hess & Hagen, 2006).1

Here, we integrate adaptationist theories of friendship, which emphasize friends' roles in providing one another preferential social support (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009; Tooby & Cosmides, 1996), with our embedded dyad framework, and we test subsequent predictions about what people want in friends. Briefly, the embedded dyad framework emphasizes that dyads (e.g., friend pairs) exist embedded in wider and often densely interconnected social networks, wherein one's friends inevitably interact with other people (e.g., Basyouni & Parkinson, 2022; Dunbar, 2018, 2021). As implied by both this framework and adaptationist theories of friendship, friend-other interactions are not only a recurrent feature of the social landscape, but they can also have potentially profound effects on one's friends, one's friendships, and (thus) one's outcomes. Together, these lines of work suggest that friends should, on average, radiate positive effects on the self—both directly (via friend behavior toward the self) and also indirectly (via friend behavior toward others). If friends interacted only with oneself, then we would expect people to prefer friends who are maximally and solely prosocial. But because one's friends also interact with other people, including one's rivals, we suggest that people might sometimes prefer friends who behave with greater monstrousness than brotherly love—extending and sometimes challenging expectations from canonical work on friend preferences and cooperative accounts of partner choice.

Friends are associated with many benefits to health and happiness (see, e.g., Dunbar, 2018, 2021). Friends may have also helped one another solve several recurrent fitness challenges, from ensuring sufficient access to resources for survival to winning agonistic conflicts (e.g., DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009; Tooby & Cosmides, 1996; Williams, Krems, Ayers, & Rankin, 2022). But presumably, such benefits depend(ed) on securing good friends—those able and willing to help one meet one's needs. Friend preferences may thus play an important role in the formation of such friendships. Friend preferences are thought to guide people to invest their finite time and energy on attracting and maintaining friends who fit this bill (e.g., Conroy-Beam & Buss, 2016; Krems & Conroy-Beam, 2020; but see, Huang et al., 2020).

What do people want in friends? Theoretically, there are myriad preferences that people could prioritize in friends—intelligence, left-handedness, physical attractiveness, dislike of cats, formidability, detached earlobes (e.g., Benenson, 2014; Eisenbruch and Roney, 2020; Hall, 2011; Lewis et al., 2011; Lukaszewski, Simmons, Anderson, & Roney, 2016; Williams et al., 2022). But decades of research seem to paint a clear picture of people's friend preferences2: Although not an exhaustive list, people tend to most prefer friends who are kind and trustworthy (e.g., Andreoni & Bernheim, 2009; Barclay, 2016; Cottrell et al., 2007; Erikson, 1950, Erikson, 1964; Gurven & Winking, 2008; Hall, 2011; Hatfield, Traupmann, & Sprecher, 1984; Holmes & Rempel, 1989; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001; Shaw, DeScioli, & Olson, 2012; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). For example, people sometimes compete for friends by advertising their kindness (Barclay & Willer, 2007; Reis & Gruzen, 1976). People also value trustworthiness even over other desired traits, including intelligence and attractiveness (Cottrell et al., 2007).

Although less work examines traits disfavored in friends, people tend to eschew those who seem vicious or indifferent (e.g., Benenson, 2014; Hall, 2011, Hall, 2012; Shinada, Yamagishi, & Ohmura, 2004; Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973).3 For example, people not only prefer kind friends, but they also disfavor the appreciably unkind, such that disagreeable individuals tend to be befriended less (Jensen-Campbell, Knack, Waldrip, & Campbell, 2007; Nettle, 2006; Selfhout et al., 2010). People also strongly prioritize friends' reciprocation of valuation and caring. A lack of reciprocated care from friends can end relationships (Delton & Robertson, 2016; Delton et al., 2023; Kenny & La Voie, 1982; La Gaipa & Wood, 1981; Rose, 1984; Shaw, DeScioli, Barakzai, & Kurzban, 2017; Walster et al., 1973). Though more tentative, people might also disfavor exploitative or impartial friends. People detect and avoid cheaters (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1992), and, even as people consider impartiality a virtuous and desirable trait (Tyler, 2000), people consider friends' impartiality toward them undesirable (Shaw et al., 2017).

We additionally note that classic work in social psychology suggests that relationship partners tend to be similar, familiar, and nearby (Barry, 1970; Bornstein, 1989; Byrne, 1971; Newcomb & Svehla, 1937; Zajonc, 1968). This does not imply that these traits are necessarily prioritized in friendship formation, however (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2012).

Previous work in social psychology, relationship science, and related areas has often tended to focus on dyadic relationship processes (see, e.g., Basyouni & Parkinson, 2022; Dunbar, 2018; Fehr, 1996; Merrie, Krems, & Sznycer, n.d.). In line with this, friend preference research has tended to focus on the friend dyad, explicitly or implicitly. For example, participants might respond to items assessing how friends should behave toward oneself: “can make me laugh” (Oswald, Clark, & Kelly, 2004), “will cheer me up when I am sad” (Zarbatany, Conley, & Pepper, 2004), “really listens to what I have to say” (La Gaipa, 1987), “goes out of his/her way to help me” (Bank, 1994). Other friend preference measures—for example, asking about whether an ideal friend “is helpful” (e.g., Krems & Conroy-Beam, 2020; Williams et al., 2022)—could also be inferred as implicitly asking about ideal behavior toward oneself (e.g., “is helpful to me”; see Lukaszewski & Roney, 2010). In all, this work has generated a rich body of knowledge about friend preferences (see Hall, 2012), which we refer to as canonical preferences. Again, this work generally suggests that people prefer friends who are maximally prosocial (toward oneself) and eschew friends who are antisocial (toward oneself).

Another body of work on partner choice has focused on the importance of a partner's prosociality or cooperativeness. These cooperative accounts typically assert that people select partners (e.g., friends) based on the cooperative benefits they could provide (e.g., Baumard, André, & Sperber, 2013; Kenny, Mohr, & Levesque, 2001; Rand & Nowak, 2013), which can be gleaned from reputational information. On this view, people should prefer partners who have—and/or have reputations for—maximal prosociality—both toward oneself (direct reciprocity; e.g., preferring those kind to us) and others (indirect reciprocity; e.g., preferring those kind to others; for a review of cooperative accounts, see Hess & Hagen, 2006). Such accounts might additionally predict that people prefer friends who behave with minimal viciousness, indifference, or other dimensions of antisociality—again, toward oneself or others.

We derived additional predictions from an integration of our embedded dyad framework with adaptationist models of friendship. Briefly, this framework emphasizes that dyadic relationships (here, friendships) are embedded in wider networks, wherein one's friends inevitably interact with and have their own relationships with other people. These interactions can affect one's friends, one's friendships, and (thus) one's own outcomes in potentially profound ways—both positive and negative (e.g., Ackerman, Kenrick and Schaller, 2007; Barakzai and Shaw, 2018; Benenson, 2014; Jordan, Sommers, Bloom, & Rand, 2017; Klein & Milardo, 1993; Krems, Williams, Aktipis, & Kenrick, 2021; Krems, Williams, Merrie, Kenrick, & Aktipis, 2022; Owens, Shute, & Slee, 2000; Parker, Low, Walker, & Gamm, 2005; Shaw et al., 2017; Sugiyama, 2004).

This social complexity is also implied by adaptationist models of friendship, which emphasize friends as social insurance for times of illness, injury, or conflict. Consider a situation of drought and starvation; whereas strangers are unlikely to invest resources in a starving person, because that person looks like a bad bet for reciprocity, the starving person's friends might indeed share their finite resources with them even over others facing similar need (Tooby & Cosmides, 1996). By doing so, the sharing friend ensures the continued survival of a person who has a stake in their own welfare, and who would thus help them in their future times of trouble. Likewise, consider an agonistic conflict between Alex and Benji—both of whom are Cam's friends. According to the Alliance Hypothesis of Friendship, Cam should side with the friend who is more likely to take Cam's side in later conflicts, which ensures the continued survival of Cam's likeliest supporter (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009; DeScioli, Kurzban, Koch, & Liben-Nowell, 2011).

Taken together, the embedded dyad framework and these adaptationist models imply that the benefits of friendship depend, in part, on how much one's friends value oneself relative to others, and thus that a friend's behavior toward others can influence one's own outcomes. For example, if Cam takes Alex's side in the above dispute, Cam is also siding against Benji. If people are affected by friends' behavior toward the self and toward others, then people should possess preferences for how friends behave toward the self and toward others. Specifically, insofar as friends generally radiate positive effects on the self—not only directly (via how they behave toward oneself) but also indirectly (via how they behave toward others)—people's friend preferences should be systematically predictable, such that (1) the friendship value of a target to the self is a function of the effects the target has (or is expected to have) on the self, both directly and also indirectly, and (2) the value of a trait in the target (e.g., the value of a friend's viciousness) to the self depends on the net effects (direct and/or indirect) that trait will have on the self, which is affected by toward whom that trait is directed. In other words, good friends should benefit or at least not hinder us, even as via their behavior toward other people.

This leads to predictions that extend, deviate from, and sometimes run counter to other accounts and intuition (e.g., people always eschew vicious friends). For example, imagine that your friend Amani demonstrates trustworthiness—but she does so by keeping in confidence your enemy's secret plan to harm you. Meanwhile, your friend Blanca demonstrates viciousness—but does so by deterring your enemy from harming you. As this example illustrates, in addition to the obvious and important (direct) effects that interactions with our friends can have on us, our friends' interactions with other people can also have major (indirect) effects on us as well. Note that, if you evaluate Amani and Blanca as friends via (a) intuition, (b) the inferences one might draw from canonical findings, or (c) cooperative accounts, you might conclude that Amani (trustworthy) is a better friend than Blanca (vicious). If you consider, however, the net (both direct and indirect) effects that Amani and Blanca have on your welfare, you would reach the opposite conclusion.

Previous work on friend preferences and cooperative accounts of partner choice generate multiple and sometimes competing predictions about how people will want ideal best friends to behave, as compared to our novel embedded dyad perspective.

First, work on friend preferences has, either explicitly or implicitly, addressed self-directed friend preferences—or how people want friends to behave toward them (see, e.g., Hall, 2012). We thus test whether (1) asking people how they want friends to behave (target-unspecified friend preferences) generates the same pattern of responses as asking how people want friends to behave toward them (self-directed friend preferences) (for a similar examination of mate preferences, see Lukaszewski & Roney, 2010). If unspecified friend preferences track self-directed (more than other-directed) friend preferences, this would be consistent with our argument that people prefer friends to behave differently toward the self versus others.

Second, and in line with canonical findings, we expect that people will generally prefer friends to be kind and trustworthy (but not vicious or indifferent)—both toward oneself and toward most others, as people tend to attach positive value to the welfare of other community members. Specifically, (2) for target-unspecified, self-directed, and neutral target-directed (i.e., stranger-directed) preferences, we predict that people will prefer friends to be kind and trustworthy, but not vicious, indifferent, or otherwise antisocial. Yet we also predict that (3) people will want friends to behave more prosocially toward oneself than toward others. After all, preferential prosociality may be part of the function of friends (e.g., DeScioli & Kurzban, 2009).

Further, the difference in preferred prosociality toward the self versus a stranger should be exaggerated when comparing preferences for how friends should behave toward oneself versus one's rivals. Indeed, people have rivalries and enemyships—relationships defined by competition and hatred (Adams, 2005; Holt, 1989)—which can harm one's outcomes (Aktipis et al., 2018; Günsoy, Cross, Uskul, Adams, & Gercek-Swing, 2015; Wiseman & Duck, 1995). Such relationships are often perceived as zero-sum; people believe they can be harmed when their enemies benefit (e.g., from others' kindness) and benefit when enemies are harmed (e.g., from others' viciousness; Aronson & Cope, 1968; Pietraszewski, 2016; Shaw, 2013). For a friend to achieve positive indirect effects on the self, that friend should not be kind toward one's enemy; rather, that friend should perhaps direct some degree of viciousness toward one's enemy. Thus, in some instances, we expect to see preferences for viciousness—counter to intuition, unlike in canonical findings, and at odds with cooperative account predictions. We test if (4a) people want friends who are appreciably more vicious toward one's enemies than they are toward oneself. We also test a stronger version of this prediction—(4b) that people prefer friends who are more vicious than kind toward one's enemies.4

We test these predictions in a two-wave study, in studies with varying designs, and in two nations. Methods were approved by university Institutional Review Board (IRB). All manipulations, focal (and exploratory) measures, and exclusions are noted. Data and syntax are on Open Science Framework (OSF) at https://osf.io/xeg48/.


Wednesday, February 22, 2023

Rolf Degen summarizing... In stark contrast to men, women preferred the competitive strategy of "levelling," where gains are split equally when pitted against a higher-performing partner

Levelling as a Female-Biased Competitive Tactic. Joyce F. Benenson & Henry Markovits. Evolutionary Psychological Science, February 22 2023. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40806-023-00355-2

Abstract: Direct contests occur more frequently between men than between women. This produces the conclusion that men are more competitive than women. However, no sex differences have been found in other more indirect competitive tactics such as self-promotion and reputation derogation. Qualitative evidence further suggests that one competitive tactic, levelling, may be more commonly used by girls and women than by boys and men. Levelling initially was defined as occurring when several lower-ranked men physically overpowered a higher-ranked man. When institutional support backs equality, however, levelling can be effectively employed by a lower-ranked individual against a higher-ranked individual. Qualitative evidence with humans indicates that beginning in early childhood and continuing through adolescence, individual levelling is used by girls and women more than by boys and men. To empirically test whether individual levelling is more common among women than men, we modified a popular economic game to include a levelling option. In a pre-registered study, we asked 252 women and 258 men from four developed world regions to play the game for monetary compensation three times: with an equal-performing, higher-performing, and lower-performing partner. In each game, participants chose which tactic they wanted to employ: a winner-take-all contest, levelling, or working alone. Rational payoff-maximizing decisions should lead more participants to choose contests with lower-performing partners and to select levelling with higher-performing partners. No sex differences occurred in choice of contests with lower-performing partners, but more women than men employed levelling with higher-performing partners, supporting our hypothesis. Despite sex-biased preferences for competitive tactics, overall no sex differences arose in payoff maximizing decisions.


We find that winning more in the lottery increases the probability of meeting friends on most days, which is consistent with the complementary effect of income on the strength of social ties

Does money strengthen our social ties? longitudinal evidence of lottery winners. Joan Costa-Font and Nattavudh Powdthavee. Rationality and Society, February 21, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1177/10434631231159567

Abstract: We study the effect of lottery wins on the strength of social ties and its different types, including support networks, in the United Kingdom. On average, we find that winning more in the lottery increases the probability of meeting friends on most days, which is consistent with the complementary effect of income on the strength of social ties. The opposite is true with regards to social ties held for more instrumental reasons such as talking to neighbours. Winning more in the lottery also lessens an individual support network consistently with a substitution of income and support network. However, further robustness checks reveal that such average lottery effects are driven by individuals exhibiting very large wins only, thus suggesting that small to medium-sized wins (below £10k) may not be enough to change people’s social ties and support network in a substantial way.


Men with pretty faces were perceived as—and tended to rate themselves—as less paternally involved

Bartlome, Ronja I., and Anthony J. Lee. 2023. “Facial Attractiveness, but Not Facial Masculinity, Is Used as a Cue to Paternal Involvement in Fathers.” PsyArXiv. February 21. doi:10.31234/osf.io/7pj8w

Abstract: Facial femininity in men is purportedly used as a cue by women as a signal of paternal involvement. However, evidence for this claim is questionable. Previous findings have shown that paternal involvement is linked to testosterone, but have not investigated facial masculinity directly, while other studies have found that facial masculinity is negatively associated with perceptions of paternal involvement but do not assess the accuracy of this judgement. Here, we assess whether facial masculinity in men is used as a cue to paternal involvement, and whether this cue is accurate. We collected facial photographs of 259 men (156 of which were fathers) who also completed self-report measures of paternal involvement. Facial images were then rated by a separate group of raters on facial masculinity, attractiveness, and perceived paternal involvement. Shape sexual dimorphism was also calculated from the images using geometric morphometrics. We found that facial masculinity was not associated with perceptions of paternal involvement, nor was it related with self-reported paternal involvement. Interestingly, facial attractiveness was negatively associated with perceptions of paternal involvement, and we found partial evidence that facial attractiveness was also negatively associated with self-reported paternal involvement. These findings challenge the hypothesis that sexual dimorphism is used as a cue to paternal involvement, and perhaps indicate that facial attractiveness is more important for this judgement instead.


Tuesday, February 21, 2023

The Nature of Long-Term Unemployment: Predictability, Heterogeneity and Selection

The Nature of Long-Term Unemployment: Predictability, Heterogeneity and Selection. Andreas I. Mueller & Johannes Spinnewijn. NBER Working Paper 30979, Feb 2023. DOI 10.3386/w30979

Abstract: This paper studies the predictability of long-term unemployment (LTU) and analyzes its main determinants using rich administrative data in Sweden. Compared to using standard socio-demographic variables, the predictive power more than doubles when leveraging the rich data environment. The largest gains come from adding job seekers' employment history prior to becoming unemployed. Applying our prediction algorithm over the unemployment spell, we show that dynamic selection into LTU explains at least half of the observed decline in job finding. While the within-individual declines are small on average, we find substantial heterogeneity in the individual-level declines and thus reject the commonly used proportional hazard assumption. Applying our prediction algorithm over the business cycle, we find that the cyclicality in average LTU risk is not driven by composition but rather by within-individual cyclicality and that individual rankings are relatively persistent across years. Finally, we evaluate the implications of our findings for the value of targeting unemployment policies and how these change over the unemployment spell and the business cycle.


Surprise for the authors: People are willing to enact and excuse inconsistency in their moral lives; we discuss how to reconcile this observation with the foundational social psychological principle that people hate inconsistency

Moral inconsistency. Daniel A. Effron, Beth Anne Helgason. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, February 21 2023. https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.aesp.2022.11.001

Abstract: We review a program of research examining three questions. First, why is the morality of people's behavior inconsistent across time and situations? We point to people's ability to convince themselves they have a license to sin, and we demonstrate various ways people use their behavioral history and others—individuals, groups, and society—to feel licensed. Second, why are people's moral judgments of others' behavior inconsistent? We highlight three factors: motivation, imagination, and repetition. Third, when do people tolerate others who fail to practice what they preach? We argue that people only condemn others' inconsistency as hypocrisy if they think the others are enjoying an “undeserved moral benefit.” Altogether, this program of research suggests that people are surprisingly willing to enact and excuse inconsistency in their moral lives. We discuss how to reconcile this observation with the foundational social psychological principle that people hate inconsistency.

Keywords: Behavioral ethicsMoral judgmentInconsistencyHypocrisyMoral licensingDishonestyPrejudice


Psychopathic Traits Are Associated with Mimicking Prosocial Personality Traits in Dating Contexts

The Chameleons of Dating: Psychopathic Traits Are Associated with Mimicking Prosocial Personality Traits in Dating Contexts. Kristopher J. Brazil, Destiny Cloutier, Nicole De Las Llagas, Samantha Grace McMahon, Victoria Benevides, Angela S. Book & Beth A. Visser. Evolutionary Psychological Science, February 20 2023. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40806-023-00356-1

Abstract: Psychopathic traits are associated with lower levels of Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, and Agreeableness from the HEXACO model, which capture antisocial traits. Yet, individuals with psychopathic traits—men in particular—appear to successfully acquire dating partners despite these traits. We examine in this paper whether men higher in psychopathic traits might shift their personality traits to mimic those that are more prosocial to appear more attractive to prospective dates. Participants were 165 heterosexual college men who completed the HEXACO and then watched a woman’s dating video. After the video, participants completed the HEXACO again with the instructions to be appealing to the woman in the video. Results showed that psychopathic traits were associated with greater increases in Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, and Agreeableness, and fewer increases in Extraversion across the HEXACO profiles. The observed increases in Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, and Agreeableness may represent men’s attempts at mimicking prosocial personality traits to appear more attractive as a potential partner. The findings suggest that psychopathic traits may affect men’s willingness to deceptively enhance prosocial personality traits, possibly as a means to appeal to prospective partners.


Monday, February 20, 2023

Rationing and Climate Change Mitigation: We argue that the rejection of markets, and a commitment to fair shares, is a key part of the value of rationing

Rationing and Climate Change Mitigation. Nathan Wood,Rob Lawlor & Josie Freear. Ethics, Policy & Environment, Feb 19 2023. https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2023.2166342

Abstract: In this paper, we argue that rationing has been neglected as a policy option for mitigating climate change. There is a broad scientific consensus that avoiding the most severe impacts of climate change requires a rapid reduction in global emissions. We argue that rationing could help states reduce emissions rapidly and fairly. Our arguments in this paper draw on economic analysis and historical research into rationing in the UK during (and after) the two world wars, highlighting success stories and correcting misconceptions. However, although the empirical details play an important role, the paper is primarily based on philosophical and ethical argument and policy analysis, particularly highlighting the normative assumptions behind policy choices.

We build on Hugh Upton’s work in healthcare ethics, rejecting a broader conception of rationing which conceals significant distinctions between policy options, obscuring the specific advantages of an egalitarian conception of rationing. While some argue for the modernisation of rationing, introducing tradable allowances, we argue that the rejection of markets, and a commitment to fair shares, is a key part of the value of rationing, and precisely what made rationing attractive to the public in the 1940s.


Keywords: Tradable energy quotasCarbon allowancesCarbon TaxEnergy justiceFairnessEquality

5. Objections and Replies

[...]

Keynes and Hayek recognized that there were concerns about the fairness of tax-based solutions, given that it would not be sufficient to tax the rich. For example, according to Bruce Caldwell, Keynes recognized that, if this was to be effective, the ‘tax would have to be extended to the working classes’ because

a tax on the rich would not sufficiently reduce expenditure, so it would not help with the problem of excess demand for consumption goods. (Caldwell & Caldwell, Citation1997 p. 34)

Caldwell states that Keynes tried to ‘soften this unpopular but inevitable truth’ with the ‘novel idea of “deferred pay” or “compulsory savings” provision’ (Caldwell & Caldwell, Citation1997). Instead of taking money away from people permanently, in taxation, money would be taken from people but put into savings that they would only be able to access after the war. This ingenious idea would limit people’s ability to consume but would not permanently deprive anyone of their money. In the case of climate change, however, it would not be clear when – if ever – we would be able to return people’s savings. But if this is what is necessary to make Keynes’ solution palatable, it should be clear that it is the tax-based solution, and not rationing, that becomes less attractive if a permanent solution is needed.

[...]

Low mood leads to the consumption of more negative information online which in turn leads to worse mood, and so on

Kelly, Christopher A., and Tali Sharot. 2023. “Knowledge-seeking Reflects and Shapes Well-being.” PsyArXiv. February 18. doi:10.31234/osf.io/yd6j5

Abstract: Humans are spending an increasing amount of time searching for knowledge online. It is thus imperative to examine whether and how this activity impacts well-being. Here, we test the hypothesis that the affective properties of the knowledge sought effect well-being, which in turn alters knowledge-seeking, forming a self-reinforcing loop. To that end, we quantified the affective properties of text in webpages participants (N = 947) chose to browse and related these to their well-being. We find that browsing more negative information was associated with worse mental-health and mood. By manipulating the webpages browsed and measuring mood and vice versa, we reveal that the relationship is causal and bi-directional. Moreover, when participants were made aware of the affective nature of webpages before browsing, they choose to access more positive and less negative webpages. These findings provide a potential method for assessing and enhancing human welfare in the digital age.


Sunday, February 19, 2023

Are women more empathetic than men? According to EEG estimations of sex/gender differences in empathic ability, it seems they are not

Are women more empathetic than men? Questionnaire and EEG estimations of sex/gender differences in empathic ability. Chenyu Pang, Wenxin Li, Yuqing Zhou, Tianyu Gao, Shihui Han. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, nsad008, Feb 18 2023. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsad008

Abstract: The debate regarding whether women are more empathetic than men has broad scientific, social, and clinical implications. However, previous independent questionnaires and brain imaging studies that tested different samples reported inconsistent results regarding sex/gender differences in empathic ability. We conducted three studies to investigate sex/gender differences in empathic ability using large-sample questionnaire and electroencephalography (EEG) measures. We showed that estimation of empathic ability using the interpersonal reactivity index questionnaire showed higher rating scores in women than men in all studies. However, our EEG measures of empathy, indexed by both phase-locked and non-phased locked neural responses to others' painful (vs. neutral) facial expressions, support a null hypothesis of the sex/gender difference in empathic ability. In addition, we showed evidence that priming social expectations of women and men's ability to share and care about others' feelings eliminated the sex/gender difference in questionnaire measures of empathic ability. Our large-sample EEG results challenge the notion of women's superiority in empathy that is built based on subjective questionnaire measures which are sensitive to social desirability. Our findings indicate that whether the notion of women’s superiority in empathic ability reflects a biological/social difference between women and men or a gender-role stereotype remains an open question.

Keywords: Electroencephalography, Empathy, Questionnaire, Sex/Gender, Social expectation