When Liberals Become Progressives. By Greg Weiner
The New York Times, April 14, 2018, on Page A19 of the New York edition
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/opinion/moynihan-liberals-progressives-lost.html
Mr. Weiner was a senior aide to Senator Bob Kerrey before becoming a political scientist.
photo: Daniel Patrick Moynihan in the Capitol in 1995. He forthrightly described himself as a liberal, while today the label “progressive” is becoming more common.CreditDavid Scull/The New York Times
WORCESTER, Mass. — On the night of his election to the Senate in 1976, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York, declared: “I ran as a liberal. I was elected as a liberal.” This month, discussing her campaign for the Democratic nomination for governor of New York, Cynthia Nixon called for “progressive change.” The distinction matters.
In recent decades, the label “progressive” has been resurrected to replace “liberal,” a once vaunted term so successfully maligned by Republicans that it fell out of use. Both etymologically and ideologically, the switch to “progressive” carries historical freight that augurs poorly for Democrats and for the nation’s polarized politics.
Historical progressivism is an ideology whose American avatars, like Woodrow Wilson, saw progress as the inevitable outcome of human affairs. Of course, liberals and conservatives believe that their policies will result in positive outcomes, too. But it is another thing to say, as American Progressives did, that the contemporary political task was to identify a destination, grip the wheel and depress the accelerator.
The basic premise of liberal politics, by contrast, is the capacity of government to do good, especially in ameliorating economic ills. Nothing structurally impedes compromise between conservatives, who hold that the accumulated wisdom of tradition is a better guide than the hypercharged rationality of the present, and liberals, because both philosophies exist on a spectrum.
A liberal can believe that government can do more good or less, and one can debate how much to conserve. But progressivism is inherently hostile to moderation because progress is an unmitigated good. There cannot be too much of it. Like conservative fundamentalism, progressivism contributes to the polarization and paralysis of government because it makes compromise, which entails accepting less progress, not merely inadvisable but irrational. Even when progressives choose their targets strategically — Hillary Clinton, for example, called herself “a progressive who likes to get things done” — the implication is that progress is the fundamental goal and that its opponents are atavists.
Unlike liberalism, progressivism is intrinsically opposed to conservation. It renders adhering to tradition unreasonable rather than seeing it, as the liberal can, as a source of wisdom. The British philosopher Roger Scruton calls this a “culture of repudiation” of home and history alike. The critic of progress is not merely wrong but a fool. Progressivism’s critics have long experienced this as a passive-aggressive form of re-education.
Because progress is an unadulterated good, it supersedes the rights of its opponents. This is evident in progressive indifference to the rights of those who oppose progressive policies in areas like sexual liberation.
This is one reason progressives have alienated moderate voters who turned to Donald Trump in 2016. The ideology of progress tends to regard the traditions that have customarily bound communities and which mattered to Trump voters alarmed by the rapid transformation of society, as a fatuous rejection of progress. Trump supporters’ denunciation of “political correctness” is just as often a reaction to progressive condescension as it is to identity politics.
Where liberalism seeks to ameliorate economic ills, progressivism’s goal is to eradicate them. Moynihan recognized this difference between Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, which he always supported — as exemplified by his opposition to Clinton-era welfare reform — and Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society, which he sympathetically criticized. The New Deal alleviated poverty by cutting checks, something government does competently even if liberals and conservatives argued over the size of the checks. The Great Society partook more of a progressive effort to remake society by eradicating poverty’s causes. The result, Moynihan wrote, was the diversion of resources from welfare and jobs to “community action” programs that financed political activism.
This ideology of progress naturally aggrandizes the fastest route to the future, which is one reason progressivism has historically elevated the presidency to the center of the American regime. This insistence on progress based solely on reason also explains the doomed progressive aspiration, dating to the early 20th century, for “scientific legislation,” which seeks to transform the political into the rational. Yet policymaking in a republic is not, and should not be, purely rational. Constitutional institutions like the separation of powers instead require that policies develop gradually and command wide consensus — at least under normal circumstances.
But neither liberalism nor conservatism opposes rationality. Conservatism holds that accumulated tradition is a likelier source of wisdom than the cleverest individual at any one moment. It fears the tyranny of theory that cannot tolerate dissent. Liberalism defends constitutionalism. One of the finest traditions of 20th-century liberalism was the Cold War liberal who stood for social amelioration and against Soviet Communism. This genus — including Moynihan, Senator Henry Jackson and the longtime labor leader Lane Kirkland — was often maligned by progressives.
One cannot, of course, make too much of labels. But democracy is conducted with words, and progressivism, by its very definition, makes progress into an ideology. The appropriate label for those who do not believe in the ideology of progress but who do believe in government’s capacity to do good is “liberal.” They would do well, politically as well as philosophically, to revive it.
Greg Weiner is a political scientist at Assumption College and the author, most recently, of “American Burke: The Uncommon Liberalism of Daniel Patrick Moynihan.”
Tuesday, April 17, 2018
Among women, enjoyment of sexualization made them to see themselves as more heterosexual, more attractive, more open to unconventional sex acts, and having greater sentimentality about romantic relationships
Enjoyment of Sexualization and Feminism: Relationships with Sexual Self-Schema and Psychosexual Health. Michael Barnett, Idalia Maciel, Mallory Gerner. Sexuality & Culture, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12119-018-9515-5
Abstract: Feminists have debated whether enjoyment of sexualization (ES)—when women find sexualized attention from men rewarding—represents empowerment or patriarchal oppression. The purpose of this study was to investigate the psychosexual correlates of ES—sexual self-schema (SSS) and psychosexual health—among heterosexual college women (n = 754) and men (n = 389). Among women, ES was associated with a SSS in which women saw themselves as more heterosexual, more attractive, more open to unconventional sex acts, and having greater sentimentality about romantic relationships. Regarding psychosexual health, ES was not linked with general self-esteem but was associated with higher sexual esteem and lower sexual depression. Among men, ES was not related to SSS or psychosexual health. Overall, among women, ES was linked with positive outcomes, and it may represent women conforming to societal norms and using sexualized attention in order to obtain romantic intimacy. Rather than internalized misogyny, ES may represent an open approach to sexuality in which women take advantage of their sexualized position in society for their own empowerment.
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Based upon our results, we cannot indicate whether ES is or is not a response to oppression, but it appears that for some women, it may be a strategic response that may have some beneficial outcomes. Our results seem to support the particular feminist view that ES may be a reflection of an open view of sexuality that allows for a sense of empowerment. More importantly, it may reflect women’s sense of awareness of their sexualized roles in society, and rather than falling victim to it, they have decided to use this awareness for their own benefit.
Abstract: Feminists have debated whether enjoyment of sexualization (ES)—when women find sexualized attention from men rewarding—represents empowerment or patriarchal oppression. The purpose of this study was to investigate the psychosexual correlates of ES—sexual self-schema (SSS) and psychosexual health—among heterosexual college women (n = 754) and men (n = 389). Among women, ES was associated with a SSS in which women saw themselves as more heterosexual, more attractive, more open to unconventional sex acts, and having greater sentimentality about romantic relationships. Regarding psychosexual health, ES was not linked with general self-esteem but was associated with higher sexual esteem and lower sexual depression. Among men, ES was not related to SSS or psychosexual health. Overall, among women, ES was linked with positive outcomes, and it may represent women conforming to societal norms and using sexualized attention in order to obtain romantic intimacy. Rather than internalized misogyny, ES may represent an open approach to sexuality in which women take advantage of their sexualized position in society for their own empowerment.
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Based upon our results, we cannot indicate whether ES is or is not a response to oppression, but it appears that for some women, it may be a strategic response that may have some beneficial outcomes. Our results seem to support the particular feminist view that ES may be a reflection of an open view of sexuality that allows for a sense of empowerment. More importantly, it may reflect women’s sense of awareness of their sexualized roles in society, and rather than falling victim to it, they have decided to use this awareness for their own benefit.
"A great deal of the public outcry against fake news, echo chambers and polarization on social media is itself based on misinformation"
Rolf Degen summarizes (https://twitter.com/DegenRolf): "A great deal of the public outcry against fake news, echo chambers and polarization on social media is itself based on misinformation."
Review of Barbera, Pablo and Tucker, Joshua A. and Guess, Andrew and Vaccari, Cristian and Siegel, Alexandra and Sanovich, Sergey and Stukal, Denis and Nyhan, Brendan (2018) Social media, political polarization, and political disinformation: a review of the scientific literature. William + Flora Hewlett Foundation, California. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/87402/
Abstract: The following report is intended to provide an overview of the current state of the literature on the relationship between social media; political polarization; and political “disinformation,” a term used to encompass a wide range of types of information about politics found online, including “fake news,” rumors, deliberately factually incorrect information, inadvertently factually incorrect information, politically slanted information, and “hyperpartisan” news. The review of the literature is provided in six separate sections, each of which can be read individually but that cumulatively are intended to provide an overview of what is known — and unknown — about the relationship between social media, political polarization, and disinformation. The report concludes by identifying key gaps in our understanding of these phenomena and the data that are needed to address them.
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The current conventional wisdom on the impact of misinformation is mostly based on journalistic reports documenting its spread during the 2016 election. Some of the earliest reporting on this topic was produced by Craig Silverman of Buzzfeed News. In a series of articles published around the time of the election, he demonstrated that engagement on Facebook was higher for fake content than for stories from major news outlets. Additional reporting by other outlets corroborated these initial findings (see e.g., Higgins et al. 2016; Rogers & Bromwich 2016; Timberg 2016). Overall, these reports paint a picture of the online news ecosystem in which misinformation and hyperpartisan stories are shared at rates comparable to news stories by mainstream media outlets, reaching millions of people.
This evidence has provided new fuel to the debate on the internet and social media as ideological echo chambers. The prevailing narrative is that online misinformation is amplified in partisan communities of like-minded individuals, where it goes unchallenged due to ranking algorithms that filter out any dissenting voice (see e.g., Pariser 2011; del Vicario et al. 2016). One of the leading proponents of this view is Cass Sunstein, who in his most recent book, #Republic, warns that balkanized online speech markets represent new threats to democracy because they are a breeding ground for informational cascades of “fake news” and conspiracy theories (Sunstein 2017). The outcome of this process, he argues, would be a society that is ill-informed and increasingly segregated and polarized along partisan lines, making political compromise increasingly unlikely.
However, the consensus in the scholarly literature is not as clear as these accounts would suggest. Boxell et al. (2017) show that, even if mass political polarization has grown in recent times, this increase has been largest among citizens least likely to use the internet and social media. Their results reveal that “the internet explains a small share of the recent growth in polarization” (p. 10612). Bakshy et al. (2015) and Barberá (N.d.) find that Facebook and Twitter users are exposed to a surprisingly high level of diverse views. Wojcieszak and Mutz (2009) provide similar evidence of frequent cross-cutting political exchanges in online discussion spaces. Survey data collected by the Pew Research Center (Duggan & Smith 2016) show that most users report being exposed to a variety of viewpoints on social media. Forty percent of social media users across different countries report being exposed to a diverse range of sources, according to data from 2017 Reuters Institute Digital News Report (Newman et al. 2017). Finally, regarding the spread of misinformation, Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) find that even if “fake news” stories were widely shared during the 2016 election, the average American saw, at most, several of them on social media.
Put together, this body of work challenges the conventional wisdom, but in many ways raises more questions than it answers. Even if average cross-cutting exposure is relatively high on average, there may be pockets of individuals who are indeed fully embedded in politically homogeneous communities, for whom online consumption of information could lead to increased extremism. Given the nearly universal presence of journalists on social media, messages shared on these platforms could have indirect effects even among the offline population. We also know little about the long-term consequences of online news consumption on political disaffection, civic knowledge, political participation, and social capital.
There is a clear need for further research addressing the questions above. In trying to structure the discussion of what is known and not yet known within this research agenda, it is useful to consider three potential mechanisms by which online consumption of political information could be impacting political processes: (1) changes in the volume of information being consumed, (2) the (diversity of) sources of such political content, and (3) how it is framed. The following sections discuss the effect of exposure to (mis)information online in key societal outcomes by focusing on how research on these three mechanisms helps resolve the tension between theory and empirics described above, and informs our knowledge of such broader questions.
Review of Barbera, Pablo and Tucker, Joshua A. and Guess, Andrew and Vaccari, Cristian and Siegel, Alexandra and Sanovich, Sergey and Stukal, Denis and Nyhan, Brendan (2018) Social media, political polarization, and political disinformation: a review of the scientific literature. William + Flora Hewlett Foundation, California. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/87402/
Abstract: The following report is intended to provide an overview of the current state of the literature on the relationship between social media; political polarization; and political “disinformation,” a term used to encompass a wide range of types of information about politics found online, including “fake news,” rumors, deliberately factually incorrect information, inadvertently factually incorrect information, politically slanted information, and “hyperpartisan” news. The review of the literature is provided in six separate sections, each of which can be read individually but that cumulatively are intended to provide an overview of what is known — and unknown — about the relationship between social media, political polarization, and disinformation. The report concludes by identifying key gaps in our understanding of these phenomena and the data that are needed to address them.
---
The current conventional wisdom on the impact of misinformation is mostly based on journalistic reports documenting its spread during the 2016 election. Some of the earliest reporting on this topic was produced by Craig Silverman of Buzzfeed News. In a series of articles published around the time of the election, he demonstrated that engagement on Facebook was higher for fake content than for stories from major news outlets. Additional reporting by other outlets corroborated these initial findings (see e.g., Higgins et al. 2016; Rogers & Bromwich 2016; Timberg 2016). Overall, these reports paint a picture of the online news ecosystem in which misinformation and hyperpartisan stories are shared at rates comparable to news stories by mainstream media outlets, reaching millions of people.
This evidence has provided new fuel to the debate on the internet and social media as ideological echo chambers. The prevailing narrative is that online misinformation is amplified in partisan communities of like-minded individuals, where it goes unchallenged due to ranking algorithms that filter out any dissenting voice (see e.g., Pariser 2011; del Vicario et al. 2016). One of the leading proponents of this view is Cass Sunstein, who in his most recent book, #Republic, warns that balkanized online speech markets represent new threats to democracy because they are a breeding ground for informational cascades of “fake news” and conspiracy theories (Sunstein 2017). The outcome of this process, he argues, would be a society that is ill-informed and increasingly segregated and polarized along partisan lines, making political compromise increasingly unlikely.
However, the consensus in the scholarly literature is not as clear as these accounts would suggest. Boxell et al. (2017) show that, even if mass political polarization has grown in recent times, this increase has been largest among citizens least likely to use the internet and social media. Their results reveal that “the internet explains a small share of the recent growth in polarization” (p. 10612). Bakshy et al. (2015) and Barberá (N.d.) find that Facebook and Twitter users are exposed to a surprisingly high level of diverse views. Wojcieszak and Mutz (2009) provide similar evidence of frequent cross-cutting political exchanges in online discussion spaces. Survey data collected by the Pew Research Center (Duggan & Smith 2016) show that most users report being exposed to a variety of viewpoints on social media. Forty percent of social media users across different countries report being exposed to a diverse range of sources, according to data from 2017 Reuters Institute Digital News Report (Newman et al. 2017). Finally, regarding the spread of misinformation, Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) find that even if “fake news” stories were widely shared during the 2016 election, the average American saw, at most, several of them on social media.
Put together, this body of work challenges the conventional wisdom, but in many ways raises more questions than it answers. Even if average cross-cutting exposure is relatively high on average, there may be pockets of individuals who are indeed fully embedded in politically homogeneous communities, for whom online consumption of information could lead to increased extremism. Given the nearly universal presence of journalists on social media, messages shared on these platforms could have indirect effects even among the offline population. We also know little about the long-term consequences of online news consumption on political disaffection, civic knowledge, political participation, and social capital.
There is a clear need for further research addressing the questions above. In trying to structure the discussion of what is known and not yet known within this research agenda, it is useful to consider three potential mechanisms by which online consumption of political information could be impacting political processes: (1) changes in the volume of information being consumed, (2) the (diversity of) sources of such political content, and (3) how it is framed. The following sections discuss the effect of exposure to (mis)information online in key societal outcomes by focusing on how research on these three mechanisms helps resolve the tension between theory and empirics described above, and informs our knowledge of such broader questions.
Monday, April 16, 2018
The Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on Small Business: small loans fell 9pct in large banks, and double that in small banks, and has not partially recovered in eight years until regulatory easing was announced recently
The Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on Small Business. Michael D. Bordo, John V. Duca. NBER Working Paper No. 24501, www.nber.org/papers/w24501
There are concerns that the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) has impeded small business lending. By increasing the fixed regulatory compliance requirements needed to make business loans and operate a bank, the DFA disproportionately reduced the incentives for all banks to make very modest loans and reduced the viability of small banks, whose small-business share of [commercial and industrial loans, C&I loans] is generally much higher than that of larger banks. Despite an economic recovery, the small loan share of C&I loans at large banks and banks with $300 or more million in assets has fallen by 9 percentage points since the DFA was passed in 2010, with the magnitude of the decline twice as large at small banks. Controlling for cyclical effects and bank size, we find that these declines in the small loan share of C&I loans are almost all statistically attributed to the change in regulatory regime. Examining Federal Reserve survey data, we find evidence that the DFA prompted a relative tightening of bank credit standards on C&I loans to small versus large firms, consistent with the DFA inducing a decline in small business lending through loan supply effects. We also empirically model the pace of business formation, finding that it had downshifted around the time when the DFA and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act were announced. Timing patterns suggest that business formation has more recently ticked higher, coinciding with efforts to provide regulatory relief to smaller banks via modifying rules implementing the DFA. The upturn contrasts with the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which appears to persistently restrain business formation
There are concerns that the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) has impeded small business lending. By increasing the fixed regulatory compliance requirements needed to make business loans and operate a bank, the DFA disproportionately reduced the incentives for all banks to make very modest loans and reduced the viability of small banks, whose small-business share of [commercial and industrial loans, C&I loans] is generally much higher than that of larger banks. Despite an economic recovery, the small loan share of C&I loans at large banks and banks with $300 or more million in assets has fallen by 9 percentage points since the DFA was passed in 2010, with the magnitude of the decline twice as large at small banks. Controlling for cyclical effects and bank size, we find that these declines in the small loan share of C&I loans are almost all statistically attributed to the change in regulatory regime. Examining Federal Reserve survey data, we find evidence that the DFA prompted a relative tightening of bank credit standards on C&I loans to small versus large firms, consistent with the DFA inducing a decline in small business lending through loan supply effects. We also empirically model the pace of business formation, finding that it had downshifted around the time when the DFA and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act were announced. Timing patterns suggest that business formation has more recently ticked higher, coinciding with efforts to provide regulatory relief to smaller banks via modifying rules implementing the DFA. The upturn contrasts with the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which appears to persistently restrain business formation
Current evidence does not support that losses tend to be any more impactful than gains; why acceptance of loss aversion as a general principle remains pervasive and persistent among social scientists?
The Loss of Loss Aversion: Will It Loom Larger than Its Gain? David Gal, Derek D Rucker. Journal of Consumer Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1002/jcpy.1047
Abstract: Loss aversion, the principle that losses loom larger than gains, is among the most widely accepted ideas in the social sciences. The first part of this article introduces and discusses the construct of loss aversion. The second part of this article reviews evidence in support of loss aversion. The upshot of this review is that current evidence does not support that losses, on balance, tend to be any more impactful than gains. The third part of this article aims to address the question of why acceptance of loss aversion as a general principle remains pervasive and persistent among social scientists, including consumer psychologists, despite evidence to the contrary. This analysis aims to connect the persistence of a belief in loss aversion to more general ideas about belief acceptance and persistence in science. The final part of the article discusses how a more contextualized perspective of the relative impact of losses versus gains can open new areas of inquiry that are squarely in the domain of consumer psychology.
Check also Acceptable losses: the debatable origins of loss aversion. Eldad Yechiam. Psychological Research, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/04/acceptable-losses-debatable-origins-of.html
Abstract: Loss aversion, the principle that losses loom larger than gains, is among the most widely accepted ideas in the social sciences. The first part of this article introduces and discusses the construct of loss aversion. The second part of this article reviews evidence in support of loss aversion. The upshot of this review is that current evidence does not support that losses, on balance, tend to be any more impactful than gains. The third part of this article aims to address the question of why acceptance of loss aversion as a general principle remains pervasive and persistent among social scientists, including consumer psychologists, despite evidence to the contrary. This analysis aims to connect the persistence of a belief in loss aversion to more general ideas about belief acceptance and persistence in science. The final part of the article discusses how a more contextualized perspective of the relative impact of losses versus gains can open new areas of inquiry that are squarely in the domain of consumer psychology.
Check also Acceptable losses: the debatable origins of loss aversion. Eldad Yechiam. Psychological Research, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/04/acceptable-losses-debatable-origins-of.html
Acceptable losses: the debatable origins of loss aversion
Acceptable losses: the debatable origins of loss aversion. Eldad Yechiam. Psychological Research, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00426-018-1013-8
Abstract: It is often claimed that negative events carry a larger weight than positive events. Loss aversion is the manifestation of this argument in monetary outcomes. In this review, we examine early studies of the utility function of gains and losses, and in particular the original evidence for loss aversion reported by Kahneman and Tversky (Econometrica 47:263–291, 1979). We suggest that loss aversion proponents have over-interpreted these findings. Specifically, the early studies of utility functions have shown that while very large losses are overweighted, smaller losses are often not. In addition, the findings of some of these studies have been systematically misrepresented to reflect loss aversion, though they did not find it. These findings shed light both on the inability of modern studies to reproduce loss aversion as well as a second literature arguing strongly for it.
Abstract: It is often claimed that negative events carry a larger weight than positive events. Loss aversion is the manifestation of this argument in monetary outcomes. In this review, we examine early studies of the utility function of gains and losses, and in particular the original evidence for loss aversion reported by Kahneman and Tversky (Econometrica 47:263–291, 1979). We suggest that loss aversion proponents have over-interpreted these findings. Specifically, the early studies of utility functions have shown that while very large losses are overweighted, smaller losses are often not. In addition, the findings of some of these studies have been systematically misrepresented to reflect loss aversion, though they did not find it. These findings shed light both on the inability of modern studies to reproduce loss aversion as well as a second literature arguing strongly for it.
Dissimilarity in psychopathy was related to lower women's relationship quality; similarity in narcissism predicted higher relationship quality in women and men; similarity on high level of Machiavellianism is detrimental to relationship quality
The effects of similarity in the dark triad traits on the relationship quality in dating couples. Igor Kardum et al. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 131, 1 September 2018, Pages 38–44. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2018.04.020
Highlights
• Similarities in Dark Triad were examined as predictors of relationship quality.
• Profile similarity and polynomial regression analysis were used.
• Dissimilarity in psychopathy was related to lower women's relationship quality.
• Similarity in narcissism predicted higher relationship quality in women and men.
• Similarity on high level of Machiavellianism is detrimental to relationship quality.
Abstract: The study examined the effects of similarity in the Dark Triad (DT) traits on women and men's relationship quality (RQ) by using profile similarity (PS) and polynomial regression analysis (PRA) as the methods for the assessment of partners' similarity. Participants were 100 young adult heterosexual dating couples. The effects of similarity in the DT traits on RQ were somewhat different depending on different methods used as well as whether we considered women or men's RQ. PRA showed that dissimilarity in psychopathy was related to lower women's RQ, while similarity at high levels of Machiavellianism to lower RQ in women and men. Additionally, women's RQ decreased more sharply when partners were similar at high levels of Machiavellianism. PS in narcissism was associated with higher RQ in women and men. This study suggests that different methods of assessment of (dis)similarity could add to the more thorough understanding of the associations between personality traits and relationship outcomes.
Keywords: Dark Triad traits; Personality similarity; Relationship quality; Polynomial regression; Profile similarity
Highlights
• Similarities in Dark Triad were examined as predictors of relationship quality.
• Profile similarity and polynomial regression analysis were used.
• Dissimilarity in psychopathy was related to lower women's relationship quality.
• Similarity in narcissism predicted higher relationship quality in women and men.
• Similarity on high level of Machiavellianism is detrimental to relationship quality.
Abstract: The study examined the effects of similarity in the Dark Triad (DT) traits on women and men's relationship quality (RQ) by using profile similarity (PS) and polynomial regression analysis (PRA) as the methods for the assessment of partners' similarity. Participants were 100 young adult heterosexual dating couples. The effects of similarity in the DT traits on RQ were somewhat different depending on different methods used as well as whether we considered women or men's RQ. PRA showed that dissimilarity in psychopathy was related to lower women's RQ, while similarity at high levels of Machiavellianism to lower RQ in women and men. Additionally, women's RQ decreased more sharply when partners were similar at high levels of Machiavellianism. PS in narcissism was associated with higher RQ in women and men. This study suggests that different methods of assessment of (dis)similarity could add to the more thorough understanding of the associations between personality traits and relationship outcomes.
Keywords: Dark Triad traits; Personality similarity; Relationship quality; Polynomial regression; Profile similarity
A leftward perceptual asymmetry when judging the attractiveness of visual patterns
A leftward perceptual asymmetry when judging the attractiveness of visual patterns. Paul Rodway, Astrid Schepman, Becky Crossley & Jennifer Lee. Laterality: Asymmetries of Body, Brain and Cognition, https://doi.org/10.1080/1357650X.2018.1461897
ABSTRACT: Perceptual judgements concerning the magnitude of a stimulus feature are typically influenced more by the left side of the stimulus than by the right side. This research examined whether the leftward bias also applies to judgements of the attractiveness of abstract visual patterns. Across four experiments participants chose between two versions of a stimulus which either had an attractive left side or an attractive right side. Experiments 1 and 2 presented artworks and experiments 3 and 4 presented wallpaper designs. In each experiment participants showed a significant bias to choose the stimulus with an attractive left side more than the stimulus with an attractive right side. The leftward bias emerged at age 10/11, was not caused by a systematic asymmetry in the perception of colourfulness or complexity, and was stronger when the difference in attractiveness between the left and right sides was larger. The results are relevant to the aesthetics of product and packaging design and show that leftward biases extend to the perceptual judgement of everyday items. Possible causes of the leftward bias for attractiveness judgements are discussed and it is suggested that the size of the bias may not be a measure of the degree of hemispheric specialization.
KEYWORDS: Pseudoneglect, aesthetics, asymmetry, activation model, chimeric
ABSTRACT: Perceptual judgements concerning the magnitude of a stimulus feature are typically influenced more by the left side of the stimulus than by the right side. This research examined whether the leftward bias also applies to judgements of the attractiveness of abstract visual patterns. Across four experiments participants chose between two versions of a stimulus which either had an attractive left side or an attractive right side. Experiments 1 and 2 presented artworks and experiments 3 and 4 presented wallpaper designs. In each experiment participants showed a significant bias to choose the stimulus with an attractive left side more than the stimulus with an attractive right side. The leftward bias emerged at age 10/11, was not caused by a systematic asymmetry in the perception of colourfulness or complexity, and was stronger when the difference in attractiveness between the left and right sides was larger. The results are relevant to the aesthetics of product and packaging design and show that leftward biases extend to the perceptual judgement of everyday items. Possible causes of the leftward bias for attractiveness judgements are discussed and it is suggested that the size of the bias may not be a measure of the degree of hemispheric specialization.
KEYWORDS: Pseudoneglect, aesthetics, asymmetry, activation model, chimeric
Does Activism in Social Science Explain Conservatives’ Distrust of Scientists?
Does Activism in Social Science Explain Conservatives’ Distrust of Scientists? Nathan Cofnas, Noah Carl, Michael A. Woodley of Menie. The American Sociologist, March 2018, Volume 49, Issue 1, pp 135–148. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12108-017-9362-0
Abstract: Data from the General Social Survey suggest that conservatives have become less trustful of scientists since the 1970s. Gauchat argues that this is because conservatives increasingly see scientific findings as threatening to their worldview. However, the General Social Survey data concern trust in scientists, not in science. We suggest that conservatives’ diminishing trust in scientists reflects the fact that scientists in certain fields, particularly social science, have increasingly adopted a liberal-activist stance, seeking to influence public policy in a liberal direction.
Conclusion
Gauchat claimed that conservatives had less trust in "science" than liberals. We observed that he found only that they have less trust in scientists, not science, and that there is independent evidence that conservative distrust is directed toward what McCright et al. (2013) call "impact scientists" (e.g., social scientists) rather than "production scientists." We provided evidence that leading social scientists and social science organizations misrepresent research in order to influence public policy in a liberal direction, tolerate censorship of work that challenges liberal beliefs, uncritically accept dubious scientific findings that paint conservatives in an unflattering light, and practice a variety of forms of discrimination against conservative scholars. Conservatives’ recognition of this reality could explain why only 38% of conservatives in 2010, compared with 50% of liberals, said that they had "great deal of confidence" in "the scientific community" (Gauchat 2012).
Losing the trust of conservatives may not ne the only bad consequence of liberal activism in social science. Science itself is harmed. As Weber (2009:146) warned, "whenever the man of science introduces his personal value judgement, a full understanding of the facts ceases." Today, social science is facing a "replication crisis" (Open Science Collaboration 2015): Many findings that were thought to be firmly established are turning out not to be replicable when tested more carefully. It is noteworthy that a significant number of the effects that are falling victim to the replication crisis either supported liberalism or were somehow unflattering to conservatives. "Stereotype threat" is perhaps the most striking example. Since stereotype threat was proposed to explain gaps in the test scores of blacks and Whites more than two decades ago (Steele and Aronson 1995), it has become one of the primary liberal explanations for group differences in performance and has spawned many thousands of follow-up studies. Yet it may turn out that it was all a mistake—a consequence of publication bias and questionable research methods (Ganley et al. 2013; Jussim 2015). Other studies that could not be replicated,while not being explicitly anti-conservative, subtly support liberal ideas or cast conservatives in a bad light. For example, studies that could not be replicated include one where people "increased their endorsement of a current social system after being exposed to money" and another where Americans became more conservative after seeing a U.S. flag (Yong 2013). The former makes money seem to be bad thing, in line with liberal skepticism of capitalism. The latter suggests that conservatism is a primal reaction to tribal symbols. Virtually none of the non-replicable effects were at all favorable to conservatism. This suggests that findings that might favor conservatism are scrutinized much more carefully than those that favor liberalism—if they are not censored or rejected for explicitly moral reasons (e.g., Gardner 2001; Sternberg 2005).
In the past few years, a number of social scientists, led by Jonathan Haidt, have called upon social scientists to diversify the field and make a conscious effort to root out liberal bias (Duarte et al. 2015). We conclude with a prediction: If social scientists begin counteracting liberal activism, the trend of lowering conservative trust in scientists will reverse.
Abstract: Data from the General Social Survey suggest that conservatives have become less trustful of scientists since the 1970s. Gauchat argues that this is because conservatives increasingly see scientific findings as threatening to their worldview. However, the General Social Survey data concern trust in scientists, not in science. We suggest that conservatives’ diminishing trust in scientists reflects the fact that scientists in certain fields, particularly social science, have increasingly adopted a liberal-activist stance, seeking to influence public policy in a liberal direction.
Conclusion
Gauchat claimed that conservatives had less trust in "science" than liberals. We observed that he found only that they have less trust in scientists, not science, and that there is independent evidence that conservative distrust is directed toward what McCright et al. (2013) call "impact scientists" (e.g., social scientists) rather than "production scientists." We provided evidence that leading social scientists and social science organizations misrepresent research in order to influence public policy in a liberal direction, tolerate censorship of work that challenges liberal beliefs, uncritically accept dubious scientific findings that paint conservatives in an unflattering light, and practice a variety of forms of discrimination against conservative scholars. Conservatives’ recognition of this reality could explain why only 38% of conservatives in 2010, compared with 50% of liberals, said that they had "great deal of confidence" in "the scientific community" (Gauchat 2012).
Losing the trust of conservatives may not ne the only bad consequence of liberal activism in social science. Science itself is harmed. As Weber (2009:146) warned, "whenever the man of science introduces his personal value judgement, a full understanding of the facts ceases." Today, social science is facing a "replication crisis" (Open Science Collaboration 2015): Many findings that were thought to be firmly established are turning out not to be replicable when tested more carefully. It is noteworthy that a significant number of the effects that are falling victim to the replication crisis either supported liberalism or were somehow unflattering to conservatives. "Stereotype threat" is perhaps the most striking example. Since stereotype threat was proposed to explain gaps in the test scores of blacks and Whites more than two decades ago (Steele and Aronson 1995), it has become one of the primary liberal explanations for group differences in performance and has spawned many thousands of follow-up studies. Yet it may turn out that it was all a mistake—a consequence of publication bias and questionable research methods (Ganley et al. 2013; Jussim 2015). Other studies that could not be replicated,while not being explicitly anti-conservative, subtly support liberal ideas or cast conservatives in a bad light. For example, studies that could not be replicated include one where people "increased their endorsement of a current social system after being exposed to money" and another where Americans became more conservative after seeing a U.S. flag (Yong 2013). The former makes money seem to be bad thing, in line with liberal skepticism of capitalism. The latter suggests that conservatism is a primal reaction to tribal symbols. Virtually none of the non-replicable effects were at all favorable to conservatism. This suggests that findings that might favor conservatism are scrutinized much more carefully than those that favor liberalism—if they are not censored or rejected for explicitly moral reasons (e.g., Gardner 2001; Sternberg 2005).
In the past few years, a number of social scientists, led by Jonathan Haidt, have called upon social scientists to diversify the field and make a conscious effort to root out liberal bias (Duarte et al. 2015). We conclude with a prediction: If social scientists begin counteracting liberal activism, the trend of lowering conservative trust in scientists will reverse.
Sunday, April 15, 2018
Men desire their opposite sex partners to have sex with same-sex individuals, and if possible to already have experience. Women do not desire men with same-sex attraction
Same-sex attraction and contact in an opposite sex partner: Exploring sex, religiosity, porn consumption and participation effects. Menelaos Apostolou, Christoforos Christoforou. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 131, 1 September 2018, Pages 26–30. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2018.04.017
Highlights
• Finds that men desire opposite sex partners who experience same-sex attractions
• Finds that men desire their opposite sex partners to have sex with same-sex individuals
• Finds that men indicate a stronger desire for same-sex contacts where they would also participate
• Finds that sex differences in desires persist after controlling for confounding variables
Abstract; It has been recently argued that heterosexual men, as opposed to heterosexual women, find same-sex attraction and contact desirable in a partner. The current paper employs an online sample of 775 heterosexual participants in order to examine this sex difference and assess its evolutionary implications. Results showed that just over half of heterosexual men preferred some level of same-sex attraction and contact in a female partner. On the other hand, the vast majority of heterosexual women did not prefer same-sex attraction and contact in a partner. This sex difference remained significant after controlling for religiosity and porn consumption. In addition, it was found that men preferred same-sex attraction and contact more in a short-term than in a long-term partner. Moreover, men indicated a stronger preference for their partners to engage in same-sex contacts where they would also participate, than to engage in same-sex contacts without themselves participating. It was also found that men did not consider same-sex attraction to be an important selection criterion for a partner.
Keywords: Same-sex attraction; Male choice hypothesis; Homosexuality; Religiosity; Porn consumption
Highlights
• Finds that men desire opposite sex partners who experience same-sex attractions
• Finds that men desire their opposite sex partners to have sex with same-sex individuals
• Finds that men indicate a stronger desire for same-sex contacts where they would also participate
• Finds that sex differences in desires persist after controlling for confounding variables
Abstract; It has been recently argued that heterosexual men, as opposed to heterosexual women, find same-sex attraction and contact desirable in a partner. The current paper employs an online sample of 775 heterosexual participants in order to examine this sex difference and assess its evolutionary implications. Results showed that just over half of heterosexual men preferred some level of same-sex attraction and contact in a female partner. On the other hand, the vast majority of heterosexual women did not prefer same-sex attraction and contact in a partner. This sex difference remained significant after controlling for religiosity and porn consumption. In addition, it was found that men preferred same-sex attraction and contact more in a short-term than in a long-term partner. Moreover, men indicated a stronger preference for their partners to engage in same-sex contacts where they would also participate, than to engage in same-sex contacts without themselves participating. It was also found that men did not consider same-sex attraction to be an important selection criterion for a partner.
Keywords: Same-sex attraction; Male choice hypothesis; Homosexuality; Religiosity; Porn consumption
Individuals low in self-control are more likely to respond immediately to any signal from their smartphone, while agreeable individuals are more likely to hold back.
Low self-control capacity is associated with immediate responses to smartphone signals. Sebastian Berger, Annika M. Wys1, Daria Knoch. Computers in Human Behavior, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2018.04.031
Highlights
1 The research investigates people’s self-control capacity and their smartphone use.
2 Behavior was measured in a field setting using actual responses to signals.
3 Self-control capacity explains heterogeneity in reactions to smartphone signals.
4 This research can help to design appropriate protective mechanisms or interventions.
Abstract: The ubiquitous use of smartphones has not only led to unprecedented levels of connectivity, but also raised the question about potentially problematic side effects such as phone-use while driving or phone-caused inattention in work or private settings. This raises the question about psychological mechanisms underlying this potentially self-damaging use. The present research addresses this question by showing how heterogeneity in people’s self-control capacity explains behavioral differences in smartphone use. Specifically, we show that self-control capacity can be used to estimate whether a person immediately responds to a smartphone signal she receives. Thus, our research helps to identify personal characteristics that lead to a better understanding of problematic smartphone use and can potentially help to design appropriate protective mechanisms or interventions that target self-control capacity.
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
Highlights
1 The research investigates people’s self-control capacity and their smartphone use.
2 Behavior was measured in a field setting using actual responses to signals.
3 Self-control capacity explains heterogeneity in reactions to smartphone signals.
4 This research can help to design appropriate protective mechanisms or interventions.
Abstract: The ubiquitous use of smartphones has not only led to unprecedented levels of connectivity, but also raised the question about potentially problematic side effects such as phone-use while driving or phone-caused inattention in work or private settings. This raises the question about psychological mechanisms underlying this potentially self-damaging use. The present research addresses this question by showing how heterogeneity in people’s self-control capacity explains behavioral differences in smartphone use. Specifically, we show that self-control capacity can be used to estimate whether a person immediately responds to a smartphone signal she receives. Thus, our research helps to identify personal characteristics that lead to a better understanding of problematic smartphone use and can potentially help to design appropriate protective mechanisms or interventions that target self-control capacity.
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
Poverty in US Same-Sex Households: more likely to be in poverty than those headed by different-sex married couples
Poverty in US Lesbian and Gay Couple Households. Alyssa Schneebaum & M. V. Lee Badgett. Feminist Economics, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13545701.2018.1441533
ABSTRACT: Poverty is a widely researched topic in economics. However, despite growing research on the economic lives of lesbians and gay men in the United States since the mid 1990s, very little is known about poverty in same-sex couple households. This study uses American Community Survey data from 2010 to 2014 to calculate poverty rates for households headed by different-sex versus same-sex couples. Comparing households with similar characteristics, the results show that those headed by same-sex couples are more likely to be in poverty than those headed by different-sex married couples. Despite that overall disadvantage, a decomposition of the poverty risk shows that same-sex couples are protected from poverty by their higher levels of education and labor force participation, and their lower probability of having a child in the home. Lastly, the role of gender – above and beyond sexual orientation – is clear in the greater vulnerability to poverty for lesbian couples.
KEYWORDS: Poverty, same-sex couples, sexual orientation, lesbian, gay, bisexual
JEL Codes: I32, D31, J16
ABSTRACT: Poverty is a widely researched topic in economics. However, despite growing research on the economic lives of lesbians and gay men in the United States since the mid 1990s, very little is known about poverty in same-sex couple households. This study uses American Community Survey data from 2010 to 2014 to calculate poverty rates for households headed by different-sex versus same-sex couples. Comparing households with similar characteristics, the results show that those headed by same-sex couples are more likely to be in poverty than those headed by different-sex married couples. Despite that overall disadvantage, a decomposition of the poverty risk shows that same-sex couples are protected from poverty by their higher levels of education and labor force participation, and their lower probability of having a child in the home. Lastly, the role of gender – above and beyond sexual orientation – is clear in the greater vulnerability to poverty for lesbian couples.
KEYWORDS: Poverty, same-sex couples, sexual orientation, lesbian, gay, bisexual
JEL Codes: I32, D31, J16
It is the broad Conservative Syndrome that correlates negatively with cognitive abilities, and religiosity is only a part of it. Cognitive ability is becoming an increasingly important predictor of social conservatism
Conservative Syndrome and the understanding of negative correlations between religiosity and cognitive abilities. Lazar Stankov, Jihyun Lee. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 131, 1 September 2018, Pages 21–25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2018.04.016
Abstract: We present new data about the correlation between religiosity and cognitive abilities. At the individual level of analysis the correlation is r = −0.199 and at the country level of analysis the correlation is r = −0.420 with a test of fluid intelligence and r = −0.536 with PISA 2015 science scores. These correlations can be reduced by partialling out measures of traditional values, power distance and conservatism/liberalism. They can also be reduced by partialling out economic and political indices. Our findings indicate that it is the broad Conservative Syndrome that correlates negatively with cognitive abilities, and religiosity is only a part of it. Cognitive ability is becoming an increasingly important predictor of social conservatism.
Keywords: Religiosity; Conservative Syndrome; Cognitive ability
Abstract: We present new data about the correlation between religiosity and cognitive abilities. At the individual level of analysis the correlation is r = −0.199 and at the country level of analysis the correlation is r = −0.420 with a test of fluid intelligence and r = −0.536 with PISA 2015 science scores. These correlations can be reduced by partialling out measures of traditional values, power distance and conservatism/liberalism. They can also be reduced by partialling out economic and political indices. Our findings indicate that it is the broad Conservative Syndrome that correlates negatively with cognitive abilities, and religiosity is only a part of it. Cognitive ability is becoming an increasingly important predictor of social conservatism.
Keywords: Religiosity; Conservative Syndrome; Cognitive ability
Saturday, April 14, 2018
Widespread associations between trait conscientiousness and thickness of brain cortical regions
Widespread associations between trait conscientiousness and thickness of brain cortical regions. Gary J. Lewis et al. NeuroImage, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2018.04.033
Highlights
• We investigated relationships between personality and neuroanatomy.
• Participants (N = 578) completed an MRI scan and Big Five personality trait measures.
• Conscientiousness was positively related to cortical thickness in a range of regions.
• These included: parahippocampal, fusiform, and cingulate gyri, and frontal cortex.
• No other Big Five trait was associated with our brain measures.
Abstract: The neural correlates of human personality have been of longstanding interest; however, most studies in the field have relied on modest sample sizes and few replicable results have been reported to date. We investigated relationships between personality and brain gray matter in a sample of generally healthy, older (mean age 73 years) adults from Scotland drawn from the Lothian Birth Cohort 1936. Participants (N = 578) completed a brain MRI scan and self-reported Big Five personality trait measures. Conscientiousness trait scores were positively related to brain cortical thickness in a range of regions, including bilateral parahippocampal gyrus, bilateral fusiform gyrus, left cingulate gyrus, right medial orbitofrontal cortex, and left dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. These associations – most notably in frontal regions – were modestly-to-moderately attenuated by the inclusion of biomarker variables assessing allostatic load and smoking status. None of the other personality traits showed robust associations with brain cortical thickness, nor did we observe any personality trait associations with cortical surface area and gray matter volume. These findings indicate that brain cortical thickness is associated with conscientiousness, perhaps partly accounted for by allostatic load and smoking status.
Keywords: Personality; Conscientiousness; Cortical thickness; Brain; Neuroanatomy; Allostatic load
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
Highlights
• We investigated relationships between personality and neuroanatomy.
• Participants (N = 578) completed an MRI scan and Big Five personality trait measures.
• Conscientiousness was positively related to cortical thickness in a range of regions.
• These included: parahippocampal, fusiform, and cingulate gyri, and frontal cortex.
• No other Big Five trait was associated with our brain measures.
Abstract: The neural correlates of human personality have been of longstanding interest; however, most studies in the field have relied on modest sample sizes and few replicable results have been reported to date. We investigated relationships between personality and brain gray matter in a sample of generally healthy, older (mean age 73 years) adults from Scotland drawn from the Lothian Birth Cohort 1936. Participants (N = 578) completed a brain MRI scan and self-reported Big Five personality trait measures. Conscientiousness trait scores were positively related to brain cortical thickness in a range of regions, including bilateral parahippocampal gyrus, bilateral fusiform gyrus, left cingulate gyrus, right medial orbitofrontal cortex, and left dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. These associations – most notably in frontal regions – were modestly-to-moderately attenuated by the inclusion of biomarker variables assessing allostatic load and smoking status. None of the other personality traits showed robust associations with brain cortical thickness, nor did we observe any personality trait associations with cortical surface area and gray matter volume. These findings indicate that brain cortical thickness is associated with conscientiousness, perhaps partly accounted for by allostatic load and smoking status.
Keywords: Personality; Conscientiousness; Cortical thickness; Brain; Neuroanatomy; Allostatic load
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
Political conservatism is negatively associated with an individual’s rating of sociology as being scientific; and is more negative among those with more education
Politics and the Perceived Boundaries of Science: Activism, Sociology, and Scientific Legitimacy. Christopher P. Scheitle. Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2378023118769544
Abstract: Research has suggested that public confidence in the scientific community has become politicized, but it is not clear that liberals and conservatives disagree on the more fundamental question of what counts as being scientific. An analysis of General Social Survey data finds that political conservatism is negatively associated with an individual’s rating of sociology as being scientific. This association is not found when examining ratings of economics or biology. Education moderates this association, as the gap between liberals’ and conservatives’ ratings of sociology’s scientific-ness is greater among those with more education. Although research has demonstrated that trust in the scientific community has become politicized, these findings demonstrate that the perceived boundaries of science can also be influenced by political ideology.
Keywords: science, sociology, politics, conservatism, liberalism
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
Abstract: Research has suggested that public confidence in the scientific community has become politicized, but it is not clear that liberals and conservatives disagree on the more fundamental question of what counts as being scientific. An analysis of General Social Survey data finds that political conservatism is negatively associated with an individual’s rating of sociology as being scientific. This association is not found when examining ratings of economics or biology. Education moderates this association, as the gap between liberals’ and conservatives’ ratings of sociology’s scientific-ness is greater among those with more education. Although research has demonstrated that trust in the scientific community has become politicized, these findings demonstrate that the perceived boundaries of science can also be influenced by political ideology.
Keywords: science, sociology, politics, conservatism, liberalism
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
Friday, April 13, 2018
Greater effort increases perceived value in an invertebrate
Czaczkes, T. J., Brandstetter, B., di Stefano, I., & Heinze, J. (2018). Greater effort increases perceived value in an invertebrate. Journal of Comparative Psychology, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/com0000109
Abstract: Expending effort is generally considered to be undesirable. However, both humans and vertebrates will work for a reward they could also get for free. Moreover, cues associated with high-effort rewards are preferred to low-effort associated cues. Many explanations for these counterintuitive findings have been suggested, including cognitive dissonance (self-justification) or a greater contrast in state (e.g., energy or frustration level) before and after an effort-linked reward. Here, we test whether effort expenditure also increases perceived value in ants, using both classical cue-association methods and pheromone deposition, which correlates with perceived value. In 2 separate experimental setups, we show that pheromone deposition is higher toward the reward that requires more effort: 47% more pheromone deposition was performed for rewards reached via a vertical runway (high effort) compared with ones reached via a horizontal runway (low effort), and deposition rates were 28% higher on rough (high effort) versus smooth (low effort) runways. Using traditional cue-association methods, 63% of ants trained on different surface roughness, and 70% of ants trained on different runway elevations, preferred the high-effort related cues on a Y maze. Finally, pheromone deposition to feeders requiring memorization of one path bifurcation was up to 29% higher than to an identical feeder requiring no learning. Our results suggest that effort affects value perception in ants. This effect may stem from a cognitive process, which monitors the change in a generalized hedonic state before and after reward.
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
Abstract: Expending effort is generally considered to be undesirable. However, both humans and vertebrates will work for a reward they could also get for free. Moreover, cues associated with high-effort rewards are preferred to low-effort associated cues. Many explanations for these counterintuitive findings have been suggested, including cognitive dissonance (self-justification) or a greater contrast in state (e.g., energy or frustration level) before and after an effort-linked reward. Here, we test whether effort expenditure also increases perceived value in ants, using both classical cue-association methods and pheromone deposition, which correlates with perceived value. In 2 separate experimental setups, we show that pheromone deposition is higher toward the reward that requires more effort: 47% more pheromone deposition was performed for rewards reached via a vertical runway (high effort) compared with ones reached via a horizontal runway (low effort), and deposition rates were 28% higher on rough (high effort) versus smooth (low effort) runways. Using traditional cue-association methods, 63% of ants trained on different surface roughness, and 70% of ants trained on different runway elevations, preferred the high-effort related cues on a Y maze. Finally, pheromone deposition to feeders requiring memorization of one path bifurcation was up to 29% higher than to an identical feeder requiring no learning. Our results suggest that effort affects value perception in ants. This effect may stem from a cognitive process, which monitors the change in a generalized hedonic state before and after reward.
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
Achievement is often attributed to natural talent (naturals) or hard work (strivers). There is a preference for naturals over strivers when evaluating professionals, but strivers are preferred when the target appeared to be an ordinary person
Contextual and personal determinants of preferring success attributed to natural talent or striving. Christina M. Brown, Nicole S. Troy, Katie R. Jobson , Jennifer K. Link. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2018.03.017
Highlights
• Achievement is often attributed to natural talent (naturals) or hard work (strivers).
• Past research has found a preference for naturals over strivers.
• We replicated the bias among experienced perceivers evaluating professional targets.
• Conversely, strivers were preferred when the target appeared to be an ordinary person.
• We observed a new naturalness bias: Strivers are assumed to have natural talent.
Abstract: Evidence to date has established a preference for successful individuals whose achievements are attributed to natural talent (“naturals”) rather than focused effort (“strivers”). Across six studies, we discovered a reversal of the bias depending on contextual and personal factors. Strivers, rather than naturals, are favored when evaluating ordinary people. This preference is particularly strong among perceivers who have experience in the performance domain, and it replicates across different domains and participant populations. Strivers are also preferred as cooperative partners and are expected to perform better on novel, unrelated tasks. The direction of the preference for naturals versus strivers can be traced to a combination of the perceiver's experience and the target's professional status. Specifically, a naturalness bias was only present among experienced perceivers evaluating professional targets. On the other hand, a more implicit form of the naturalness bias was observed in attributions made about the target's achievement, such that strivers were assumed to have natural talent more than naturals were assumed to have worked diligently.
Keywords: Natural talent; Naturals; Strivers; Naturalness bias; Essentialism
Highlights
• Achievement is often attributed to natural talent (naturals) or hard work (strivers).
• Past research has found a preference for naturals over strivers.
• We replicated the bias among experienced perceivers evaluating professional targets.
• Conversely, strivers were preferred when the target appeared to be an ordinary person.
• We observed a new naturalness bias: Strivers are assumed to have natural talent.
Abstract: Evidence to date has established a preference for successful individuals whose achievements are attributed to natural talent (“naturals”) rather than focused effort (“strivers”). Across six studies, we discovered a reversal of the bias depending on contextual and personal factors. Strivers, rather than naturals, are favored when evaluating ordinary people. This preference is particularly strong among perceivers who have experience in the performance domain, and it replicates across different domains and participant populations. Strivers are also preferred as cooperative partners and are expected to perform better on novel, unrelated tasks. The direction of the preference for naturals versus strivers can be traced to a combination of the perceiver's experience and the target's professional status. Specifically, a naturalness bias was only present among experienced perceivers evaluating professional targets. On the other hand, a more implicit form of the naturalness bias was observed in attributions made about the target's achievement, such that strivers were assumed to have natural talent more than naturals were assumed to have worked diligently.
Keywords: Natural talent; Naturals; Strivers; Naturalness bias; Essentialism
In jobs that require substantial amounts of interpersonal interaction a large beauty premium exists. In jobs where attractiveness seems unlikely to truly enhance productivity (like working with information and data) there is no premium
Beauty, Job Tasks, and Wages: A New Conclusion about Employer Taste-Based Discrimination. Todd R. Stinebrickner, Ralph Stinebrickner, Paul J. Sullivan. NBER Working Paper No. 24479
www.nber.org/papers/w24479
We use novel data from the Berea Panel Study to reexamine the labor market mechanisms generating the beauty wage premium. We find that the beauty premium varies widely across jobs with different task requirements. Specifically, in jobs where existing research such as Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) has posited that attractiveness is plausibly a productivity enhancing attribute—those that require substantial amounts of interpersonal interaction—a large beauty premium exists. In contrast, in jobs where attractiveness seems unlikely to truly enhance productivity—jobs that require working with information and data—there is no beauty premium. This stark variation in the beauty premium across jobs is inconsistent with the employer-based discrimination explanation for the beauty premium, because this theory predicts that all jobs will favor attractive workers. Our approach is made possible by unique longitudinal task data, which was collected to address the concern that measurement error in variables describing the importance of interpersonal tasks would tend to bias results towards finding a primary role for employer taste-based discrimination. As such, it is perhaps not surprising that our conclusions about the importance of employer taste-based discrimination are in stark contrast to all previous research that has utilized a similar conceptual approach.
www.nber.org/papers/w24479
We use novel data from the Berea Panel Study to reexamine the labor market mechanisms generating the beauty wage premium. We find that the beauty premium varies widely across jobs with different task requirements. Specifically, in jobs where existing research such as Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) has posited that attractiveness is plausibly a productivity enhancing attribute—those that require substantial amounts of interpersonal interaction—a large beauty premium exists. In contrast, in jobs where attractiveness seems unlikely to truly enhance productivity—jobs that require working with information and data—there is no beauty premium. This stark variation in the beauty premium across jobs is inconsistent with the employer-based discrimination explanation for the beauty premium, because this theory predicts that all jobs will favor attractive workers. Our approach is made possible by unique longitudinal task data, which was collected to address the concern that measurement error in variables describing the importance of interpersonal tasks would tend to bias results towards finding a primary role for employer taste-based discrimination. As such, it is perhaps not surprising that our conclusions about the importance of employer taste-based discrimination are in stark contrast to all previous research that has utilized a similar conceptual approach.
Participants rated the fictitious politician’s public approval & perceived character as higher if the politician was a member of their own political party than if the politician was a member of the another one
Judging scandal: Standards or bias in politics. Erin D. Solomon, Jana M. Hackathorn & David Crittendon. The Journal of Social Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1080/00224545.2018.1453468
ABSTRACT: As the number of political scandals rises, we examined the circumstances that might influence how a politician would be judged as a result of a scandal. Specifically, we hypothesized that ingroup bias theory and shifting standards theory would produce different patterns of judgements. In two studies, we found support for the ingroup bias theory, such that participants rated the fictitious politician’s public approval and perceived character as higher if the politician was a member of their own political party (i.e. their ingroup) than if the politician was a member of the another political party (i.e. their outgroup). These results may explain, in part, why people may judge politicians involved in scandal more or less harshly depending on whether they are an ingroup member or outgroup member.
KEYWORDS: infidelity, ingroup bias, political scandal, shifting standards, social identity theory
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Rolf Degen https://twitter.com/DegenRolf: A politician involved in a sex scandal is always judged more harshly if he/she is from the other side of the political aisle - no matter how people view sex outside marriage in general.
ABSTRACT: As the number of political scandals rises, we examined the circumstances that might influence how a politician would be judged as a result of a scandal. Specifically, we hypothesized that ingroup bias theory and shifting standards theory would produce different patterns of judgements. In two studies, we found support for the ingroup bias theory, such that participants rated the fictitious politician’s public approval and perceived character as higher if the politician was a member of their own political party (i.e. their ingroup) than if the politician was a member of the another political party (i.e. their outgroup). These results may explain, in part, why people may judge politicians involved in scandal more or less harshly depending on whether they are an ingroup member or outgroup member.
KEYWORDS: infidelity, ingroup bias, political scandal, shifting standards, social identity theory
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Rolf Degen https://twitter.com/DegenRolf: A politician involved in a sex scandal is always judged more harshly if he/she is from the other side of the political aisle - no matter how people view sex outside marriage in general.
We prefer to delegate a moral task to a human, despite that machine errors are not perceived significantly different from human errors and the level of trust toward machines and toward humans does not differ significantly
Rage Against the Machine: Automation in the Moral Domain. Jan Gogoll, Matthias Uhl. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2018.04.003
Highlights
• We are the first to experimentally investigate delegation to machines in the moral domain
• Subjects prefer to delegate a moral task to a human
• Delegators were rewarded less for delegating to a machine
• Machine errors are not perceived significantly different from human errors
• Level of trust toward machines and toward humans does not differ significantly
Abstract: The introduction of ever more capable autonomous systems is moving at a rapid pace. The technological progress will enable us to completely delegate to machines processes that were once a prerogative for humans. Progress in fields like autonomous driving promises huge benefits on both economical and ethical scales. Yet, there is little research that investigates the utilization of machines to perform tasks that are in the moral domain. This study explores whether subjects are willing to delegate tasks that affect third parties to machines as well as how this decision is evaluated by an impartial observer. We examined two possible factors that might coin attitudes regarding machine use—perceived utility of and trust in the automated device. We found that people are hesitant to delegate to a machine and that observers judge such delegations in relatively critical light. Neither perceived utility nor trust, however, can account for this pattern. Alternative explanations that we test in a post-experimental survey also do not find support. We may thus observe an aversion per se against machine use in the moral domain.
Highlights
• We are the first to experimentally investigate delegation to machines in the moral domain
• Subjects prefer to delegate a moral task to a human
• Delegators were rewarded less for delegating to a machine
• Machine errors are not perceived significantly different from human errors
• Level of trust toward machines and toward humans does not differ significantly
Abstract: The introduction of ever more capable autonomous systems is moving at a rapid pace. The technological progress will enable us to completely delegate to machines processes that were once a prerogative for humans. Progress in fields like autonomous driving promises huge benefits on both economical and ethical scales. Yet, there is little research that investigates the utilization of machines to perform tasks that are in the moral domain. This study explores whether subjects are willing to delegate tasks that affect third parties to machines as well as how this decision is evaluated by an impartial observer. We examined two possible factors that might coin attitudes regarding machine use—perceived utility of and trust in the automated device. We found that people are hesitant to delegate to a machine and that observers judge such delegations in relatively critical light. Neither perceived utility nor trust, however, can account for this pattern. Alternative explanations that we test in a post-experimental survey also do not find support. We may thus observe an aversion per se against machine use in the moral domain.
Thursday, April 12, 2018
People living in more religious U.S. counties spend less on grocery purchases and make fewer unplanned purchases
Religious shoppers spend less money. Didem Kurt, J. Jeffrey Inman, Francesca Gino. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2018.03.019
Highlights
• People living in more religious U.S. counties spend less on grocery purchases and make fewer unplanned purchases.
• Unplanned grocery spending decreases with religiosity measured at the individual-level.
• A religious prime lowers people’s unplanned grocery spending.
• Religiosity has an indirect effect on unplanned grocery spending through frugality.
Abstract: Although religion is a central aspect of life for many people across the globe, there is scant research on how religion affects people's non-religious routines. In the present research, we identify a frequent consumption activity that is influenced by religiosity: grocery shopping. Using both field and laboratory data, we find that grocery spending decreases with religiosity. Specifically, we document that people who live in more religious U.S. counties spend less money on groceries and make fewer unplanned purchases. We also demonstrate this negative relationship by measuring religiosity at the individual level and employing a religious prime. That is, the more religious people are, the less willing they are to follow through on novel purchase opportunities that arise during their grocery shopping trips. This effect is consistent with the account that many religions emphasize the value of being prudent with money. Additional analysis supports our predicted indirect effect of religiosity on spending through frugality.
Keywords: Religion; Money; Frugality; Consumption; Unplanned purchases
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
Highlights
• People living in more religious U.S. counties spend less on grocery purchases and make fewer unplanned purchases.
• Unplanned grocery spending decreases with religiosity measured at the individual-level.
• A religious prime lowers people’s unplanned grocery spending.
• Religiosity has an indirect effect on unplanned grocery spending through frugality.
Abstract: Although religion is a central aspect of life for many people across the globe, there is scant research on how religion affects people's non-religious routines. In the present research, we identify a frequent consumption activity that is influenced by religiosity: grocery shopping. Using both field and laboratory data, we find that grocery spending decreases with religiosity. Specifically, we document that people who live in more religious U.S. counties spend less money on groceries and make fewer unplanned purchases. We also demonstrate this negative relationship by measuring religiosity at the individual level and employing a religious prime. That is, the more religious people are, the less willing they are to follow through on novel purchase opportunities that arise during their grocery shopping trips. This effect is consistent with the account that many religions emphasize the value of being prudent with money. Additional analysis supports our predicted indirect effect of religiosity on spending through frugality.
Keywords: Religion; Money; Frugality; Consumption; Unplanned purchases
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
Participants demonstrated a strong motivation to engage in shared experiences. At the same time, participants did not experience a commensurate increase in hedonic value or emotional amplification, suggesting that the social value of shared experiences does not derive from their hedonic value
Jolly, Eshin, Diana Tamir, Bethany Burum, and Jason Mitchell 2018. “Wanting Without Enjoying: The Social Value of Sharing Experiences”. PsyArXiv. April 12. doi:10.17605/OSF.IO/B3ZJU
Abstract: Social connection can be a rich source of happiness. Humans routinely go out of their way to seek out social connection and avoid social isolation. However, research has yet to explain the proximal forces that motivate people to share experiences with others. Here we used a novel experience-sharing and decision-making paradigm to understand the value of shared experiences. In seven experiments, across Studies 1 and 2, participants demonstrated a strong motivation to engage in shared experiences. At the same time, participants did not experience a commensurate increase in hedonic value or emotional amplification, suggesting that the social value of shared experiences does not derive from their hedonic value. In Study 3 we measured participants’ beliefs about the reasons people engage in shared experiences. Participants reported being motivated by the desire to forge a social connection; they did not report being motivated by the emotional benefits of a shared experience. Together, these findings suggest that the desire to share an experience may be distinct from the subjective experience of achieving that state. Individuals are driven to connect with others even when the act of doing so is no more enjoyable or emotionally evocative.
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
Abstract: Social connection can be a rich source of happiness. Humans routinely go out of their way to seek out social connection and avoid social isolation. However, research has yet to explain the proximal forces that motivate people to share experiences with others. Here we used a novel experience-sharing and decision-making paradigm to understand the value of shared experiences. In seven experiments, across Studies 1 and 2, participants demonstrated a strong motivation to engage in shared experiences. At the same time, participants did not experience a commensurate increase in hedonic value or emotional amplification, suggesting that the social value of shared experiences does not derive from their hedonic value. In Study 3 we measured participants’ beliefs about the reasons people engage in shared experiences. Participants reported being motivated by the desire to forge a social connection; they did not report being motivated by the emotional benefits of a shared experience. Together, these findings suggest that the desire to share an experience may be distinct from the subjective experience of achieving that state. Individuals are driven to connect with others even when the act of doing so is no more enjoyable or emotionally evocative.
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
By 3 years of age, children tattle about rule violations they observe, even as unaffected bystanders; they tattled on the transgressor more when the transgressor had caused harm than no harm
Young children tattle to enforce moral norms. Meltem Yucel, Amrisha Vaish. Social Development, https://doi.org/10.1111/sode.12290
Abstract: By 3 years of age, children tattle about rule violations they observe, even as unaffected bystanders. It is argued that tattling is one way in which children enforce norms and that in the long term, it helps sustain co‐operation (e.g., Vaish, Missana, & Tomasello, 2011). However, an alternative explanation could be that children are worried that the victim might blame them and so feel the need to inform the victim about who caused the harm. The present study aimed to tease these possibilities apart. Children observed a puppet either causing harm to another puppet (e.g., destroying their artwork) or no harm (e.g., destroying a different object). Importantly, the situation was constructed such that children knew they could not be blamed for the transgressions. Nonetheless, 3‐year‐old children tattled on the transgressor more when the transgressor had caused harm than no harm. Thus, young children's tattling about third‐party moral transgressions seems to be aimed at enforcing norms. An additional, exploratory goal of this study was to examine the relation between children's temperament and norm enforcement. Temperamental shyness negatively correlated with children's protesting and tattling behavior, though more research is needed to better understand the role of temperament in early norm enforcement.
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
Abstract: By 3 years of age, children tattle about rule violations they observe, even as unaffected bystanders. It is argued that tattling is one way in which children enforce norms and that in the long term, it helps sustain co‐operation (e.g., Vaish, Missana, & Tomasello, 2011). However, an alternative explanation could be that children are worried that the victim might blame them and so feel the need to inform the victim about who caused the harm. The present study aimed to tease these possibilities apart. Children observed a puppet either causing harm to another puppet (e.g., destroying their artwork) or no harm (e.g., destroying a different object). Importantly, the situation was constructed such that children knew they could not be blamed for the transgressions. Nonetheless, 3‐year‐old children tattled on the transgressor more when the transgressor had caused harm than no harm. Thus, young children's tattling about third‐party moral transgressions seems to be aimed at enforcing norms. An additional, exploratory goal of this study was to examine the relation between children's temperament and norm enforcement. Temperamental shyness negatively correlated with children's protesting and tattling behavior, though more research is needed to better understand the role of temperament in early norm enforcement.
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
Mothers' voices became significantly lower-pitched and more monotonous during the first year postpartum compared to during pregnancy or before
Women's voice pitch lowers after pregnancy. Katarzyna Pisanski, Kavya Bhardwaj, David Reby. Evolution and Human Behavior, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2018.04.002
Abstract: Women's voice pitch (the perceptual correlate of fundamental frequency, F0) varies across the menstrual cycle and lowers after menopause, and may represent a putative signal of women's fertility and reproductive age. Yet, despite dramatic changes in women's sex hormone levels and bodies during and after pregnancy, previous between-subject and case studies have not found systematic changes in F0 due to pregnancy. Here, we tracked within-individual variation in 20 mothers' voices during their first pregnancy, as well as up to 5 years before conception and 5 years postpartum. Voice recordings from 20 age-matched nulliparous women were measured as a control. Linear Mixed Models indicated that F0 mean, range and variation changed significantly following pregnancy in mothers, controlling for age at time of recording, whereas we did not observe any F0 changes across corresponding timeframes in our sample of nulliparous controls. Mothers' voices became significantly lower-pitched and more monotonous during the first year postpartum compared to during pregnancy or before. These F0 parameters did not decrease within-individuals over a 5-year period prior to conception above and beyond the effects of ageing. Although voice pitch decreased following pregnancy, mothers' F0 parameters reverted after the first year postpartum, approaching pre-pregnancy levels. Our results demonstrate that pregnancy has a transient and perceptually salient masculinizing effect on women's voices.
Keywords: Pregnant; Fundamental frequency; Sex hormones; Vocal communication; Nulliparous
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
Abstract: Women's voice pitch (the perceptual correlate of fundamental frequency, F0) varies across the menstrual cycle and lowers after menopause, and may represent a putative signal of women's fertility and reproductive age. Yet, despite dramatic changes in women's sex hormone levels and bodies during and after pregnancy, previous between-subject and case studies have not found systematic changes in F0 due to pregnancy. Here, we tracked within-individual variation in 20 mothers' voices during their first pregnancy, as well as up to 5 years before conception and 5 years postpartum. Voice recordings from 20 age-matched nulliparous women were measured as a control. Linear Mixed Models indicated that F0 mean, range and variation changed significantly following pregnancy in mothers, controlling for age at time of recording, whereas we did not observe any F0 changes across corresponding timeframes in our sample of nulliparous controls. Mothers' voices became significantly lower-pitched and more monotonous during the first year postpartum compared to during pregnancy or before. These F0 parameters did not decrease within-individuals over a 5-year period prior to conception above and beyond the effects of ageing. Although voice pitch decreased following pregnancy, mothers' F0 parameters reverted after the first year postpartum, approaching pre-pregnancy levels. Our results demonstrate that pregnancy has a transient and perceptually salient masculinizing effect on women's voices.
Keywords: Pregnant; Fundamental frequency; Sex hormones; Vocal communication; Nulliparous
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
Species with more pronounced sexual dimorphism, indicating the highest levels of male investment in reproduction, had estimated extinction rates that were ten times higher than those of the species with the lowest investment. Sexual selection can be a substantial risk factor for extinction
High male sexual investment as a driver of extinction in fossil ostracods. Maria João Fernandes Martins, T. Markham Puckett, Rowan Lockwood, John P. Swaddle & Gene Hunt. Nature (2018), doi:10.1038/s41586-018-0020-7
Abstract: Sexual selection favours traits that confer advantages in the competition for mates. In many cases, such traits are costly to produce and maintain, because the costs help to enforce the honesty of these signals and cues1. Some evolutionary models predict that sexual selection also produces costs at the population level, which could limit the ability of populations to adapt to changing conditions and thus increase the risk of extinction2,3,4. Other models, however, suggest that sexual selection should increase rates of adaptation and enhance the removal of deleterious mutations, thus protecting populations against extinction3, 5, 6. Resolving the conflict between these models is not only important for explaining the history of biodiversity, but also relevant to understanding the mechanisms of the current biodiversity crisis. Previous attempts to test the conflicting predictions produced by these models have been limited to extant species and have thus relied on indirect proxies for species extinction. Here we use the informative fossil record of cytheroid ostracods—small, bivalved crustaceans with sexually dimorphic carapaces—to test how sexual selection relates to actual species extinction. We show that species with more pronounced sexual dimorphism, indicating the highest levels of male investment in reproduction, had estimated extinction rates that were ten times higher than those of the species with the lowest investment. These results indicate that sexual selection can be a substantial risk factor for extinction.
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
Abstract: Sexual selection favours traits that confer advantages in the competition for mates. In many cases, such traits are costly to produce and maintain, because the costs help to enforce the honesty of these signals and cues1. Some evolutionary models predict that sexual selection also produces costs at the population level, which could limit the ability of populations to adapt to changing conditions and thus increase the risk of extinction2,3,4. Other models, however, suggest that sexual selection should increase rates of adaptation and enhance the removal of deleterious mutations, thus protecting populations against extinction3, 5, 6. Resolving the conflict between these models is not only important for explaining the history of biodiversity, but also relevant to understanding the mechanisms of the current biodiversity crisis. Previous attempts to test the conflicting predictions produced by these models have been limited to extant species and have thus relied on indirect proxies for species extinction. Here we use the informative fossil record of cytheroid ostracods—small, bivalved crustaceans with sexually dimorphic carapaces—to test how sexual selection relates to actual species extinction. We show that species with more pronounced sexual dimorphism, indicating the highest levels of male investment in reproduction, had estimated extinction rates that were ten times higher than those of the species with the lowest investment. These results indicate that sexual selection can be a substantial risk factor for extinction.
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
Wednesday, April 11, 2018
Lower life satisfaction, the lack of a committed relationship, and feelings of loneliness contribute to predicting the frequency of using porn among men. For females, consumption even increases in committed relationships and rather indicates a comparably high level of life satisfaction than dissatisfaction
Gender Differences in Escapist Uses of Sexually Explicit Internet Material: Results from a German Probability Sample. Mathias Weber et al. Sexuality & Culture, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12119-018-9518-2
Abstract: The intensity of using sexually explicit internet material (SEIM) is contingent on users’ gender. However, gender differences in the motivations for watching SEIM have not yet been comprehensively explored. Drawing on a representative survey of German internet users, we therefore analyze how women and men use SEIM to satisfy escapist needs. Lower life satisfaction, the lack of a committed relationship, and feelings of loneliness contribute to predicting the frequency of using SEIM among men. Loneliness likewise fosters the consumption of SEIM among women, yet the effect is less pronounced. For female internet users, consumption of SEIM even increases in committed relationships and rather indicates a comparably high level of life satisfaction than dissatisfaction with life circumstances. Gender hence substantially moderates the connection between need structures and the consumption of SEIM.
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
Abstract: The intensity of using sexually explicit internet material (SEIM) is contingent on users’ gender. However, gender differences in the motivations for watching SEIM have not yet been comprehensively explored. Drawing on a representative survey of German internet users, we therefore analyze how women and men use SEIM to satisfy escapist needs. Lower life satisfaction, the lack of a committed relationship, and feelings of loneliness contribute to predicting the frequency of using SEIM among men. Loneliness likewise fosters the consumption of SEIM among women, yet the effect is less pronounced. For female internet users, consumption of SEIM even increases in committed relationships and rather indicates a comparably high level of life satisfaction than dissatisfaction with life circumstances. Gender hence substantially moderates the connection between need structures and the consumption of SEIM.
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
People’s rare compared with their common interests are especially potent to elicit interpersonal attraction
Sharing Rare Attitudes Attracts. Hans Alves. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167218766861
Abstract: People like others who share their attitudes. Online dating platforms as well as other social media platforms regularly rely on the social bonding power of their users’ shared attitudes. However, little is known about moderating variables. In the present work, I argue that sharing rare compared with sharing common attitudes should evoke stronger interpersonal attraction among people. In five studies, I tested this prediction for the case of shared interests from different domains. I found converging evidence that people’s rare compared with their common interests are especially potent to elicit interpersonal attraction. I discuss the current framework’s theoretical implications for impression formation and impression management as well as its practical implications for improving online dating services.
Keywords: attitudes, similarity, attraction, frequency
Abstract: People like others who share their attitudes. Online dating platforms as well as other social media platforms regularly rely on the social bonding power of their users’ shared attitudes. However, little is known about moderating variables. In the present work, I argue that sharing rare compared with sharing common attitudes should evoke stronger interpersonal attraction among people. In five studies, I tested this prediction for the case of shared interests from different domains. I found converging evidence that people’s rare compared with their common interests are especially potent to elicit interpersonal attraction. I discuss the current framework’s theoretical implications for impression formation and impression management as well as its practical implications for improving online dating services.
Keywords: attitudes, similarity, attraction, frequency
Strategically harmed & failed to enhance the reputations of other women who threatened their romantic prospects directly (by flirting with their romantic mates) & indirectly (by being attractive or provocatively dressed)
Competitive reputation manipulation: Women strategically transmit social information about romantic rivals. Tania Reynolds, Roy F. Baumeister, Jon K. Maner. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2018.03.011
Highlights
• Women transmit same-sex romantic rivals' social information strategically.
• Women harm reputations of attractive, flirtatious, and provocatively dressed women.
• Competitive women transmit more reputation-harming information about other women.
• Women damage rivals' reputations but do not report explicitly disliking them.
Abstract: Researchers have suggested that women compete with same-sex peers using indirect social tactics. However, the specific predictors and mechanisms of this form of female intrasexual competition are less well understood. We propose that one mechanism by which women harm rivals' social opportunities is through selectively transmitting reputation-relevant social information. Moreover, we contend that this behavior is designed to undermine the romantic and social appeal of same-sex romantic rivals who are perceived to be threatening. Evidence from five studies suggests that women's dissemination of social information is strategic and reliably predicted by various cues of romantic rival threat: attempts at mate poaching (Study 1), physical attractiveness (Studies 2 and 3), and provocative clothing (Studies 4 and 5). Women strategically harmed and failed to enhance the reputations of other women who threatened their romantic prospects directly (by flirting with their romantic partners) and indirectly (by being attractive or provocatively dressed). Women's dispositional levels of competitiveness also predicted their information transmission: highly competitive women (both generally and in romantic domains specifically) disclosed more reputation-damaging information than did less competitive women. Furthermore, women transmitted reputation-harming information about female targets independent of how much they explicitly liked those targets, suggesting a disconnect between women's intentions and their gossip behavior. Irrespective of the gossiper's intentions, pilot data confirmed that social harm is likely to befall the women targeted by the transmission of reputation-damaging social information.
Keywords: Gossip; Intrasexual competition; Indirect aggression; Competitiveness; Reputation
Highlights
• Women transmit same-sex romantic rivals' social information strategically.
• Women harm reputations of attractive, flirtatious, and provocatively dressed women.
• Competitive women transmit more reputation-harming information about other women.
• Women damage rivals' reputations but do not report explicitly disliking them.
Abstract: Researchers have suggested that women compete with same-sex peers using indirect social tactics. However, the specific predictors and mechanisms of this form of female intrasexual competition are less well understood. We propose that one mechanism by which women harm rivals' social opportunities is through selectively transmitting reputation-relevant social information. Moreover, we contend that this behavior is designed to undermine the romantic and social appeal of same-sex romantic rivals who are perceived to be threatening. Evidence from five studies suggests that women's dissemination of social information is strategic and reliably predicted by various cues of romantic rival threat: attempts at mate poaching (Study 1), physical attractiveness (Studies 2 and 3), and provocative clothing (Studies 4 and 5). Women strategically harmed and failed to enhance the reputations of other women who threatened their romantic prospects directly (by flirting with their romantic partners) and indirectly (by being attractive or provocatively dressed). Women's dispositional levels of competitiveness also predicted their information transmission: highly competitive women (both generally and in romantic domains specifically) disclosed more reputation-damaging information than did less competitive women. Furthermore, women transmitted reputation-harming information about female targets independent of how much they explicitly liked those targets, suggesting a disconnect between women's intentions and their gossip behavior. Irrespective of the gossiper's intentions, pilot data confirmed that social harm is likely to befall the women targeted by the transmission of reputation-damaging social information.
Keywords: Gossip; Intrasexual competition; Indirect aggression; Competitiveness; Reputation
Young adults have only moderate insight into their face recognition ability, but those who have been previously informed of their exceptional performance estimate their FRA accurately
Bobak AK, Mileva VR & Hancock PJB (2018) Facing the facts: Naive participants have only moderate insight into their face recognition and face perception abilities (Forthcoming), The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology.
Abstract: A reliable self-report measure to assess the broad spectrum of face recognition ability (FRA) from developmental prosopagnosia (DP) to super-recognition (SR) would make a valuable contribution to initial screening of large populations. We examined performance of 96 naive participants and seven SRs, using a range of face and object processing tasks and a newly developed 20-item questionnaire, the Stirling Face Recognition Scale (SFRS). Overall, our findings suggest that young adults have only moderate insight into their FRA, but those who have been previously informed of their (exceptional) performance, the SRs, estimate their FRA accurately. Principal Component Analysis of SFRS yielded two components. One loads on questions about low ability and correlates with perceptual tasks and one loads on questions about high FRA and correlates with memory for faces. We recommend that self-report measures of FRA should be used in addition to behavioural testing, to allow for cross-study comparisons, until new, more reliable instruments of self-report are developed. However, self-report measures should not be solely relied upon to identify highly skilled individuals. Implications of these results for theory and applied practice are discussed.
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
Abstract: A reliable self-report measure to assess the broad spectrum of face recognition ability (FRA) from developmental prosopagnosia (DP) to super-recognition (SR) would make a valuable contribution to initial screening of large populations. We examined performance of 96 naive participants and seven SRs, using a range of face and object processing tasks and a newly developed 20-item questionnaire, the Stirling Face Recognition Scale (SFRS). Overall, our findings suggest that young adults have only moderate insight into their FRA, but those who have been previously informed of their (exceptional) performance, the SRs, estimate their FRA accurately. Principal Component Analysis of SFRS yielded two components. One loads on questions about low ability and correlates with perceptual tasks and one loads on questions about high FRA and correlates with memory for faces. We recommend that self-report measures of FRA should be used in addition to behavioural testing, to allow for cross-study comparisons, until new, more reliable instruments of self-report are developed. However, self-report measures should not be solely relied upon to identify highly skilled individuals. Implications of these results for theory and applied practice are discussed.
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
Tuesday, April 10, 2018
Buying well‐being: Spending behavior and happiness
Buying well‐being: Spending behavior and happiness. Lara B. Aknin, Dylan Wiwad, Katherine B. Hanniball. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12386
Abstract: The relationship between money and happiness is complex. While a large literature demonstrates a small but significant positive association between overall income and well‐being, a relatively new area of research explores the emotional consequences of everyday spending choices. Here we review this recent but rapidly growing area of investigation. We begin by briefly summarizing the link between money and happiness. Then, through the lens of 2 dominant models of human happiness, we suggest that seemingly inconsequential spending choices may provide an underappreciated and underutilized route to greater well‐being. Finally, we review new empirical evidence demonstrating that individuals can use their disposable income to increase their happiness by investing in experiential (rather than material) purchases, more free time, routine, self‐expression, and generosity.
Abstract: The relationship between money and happiness is complex. While a large literature demonstrates a small but significant positive association between overall income and well‐being, a relatively new area of research explores the emotional consequences of everyday spending choices. Here we review this recent but rapidly growing area of investigation. We begin by briefly summarizing the link between money and happiness. Then, through the lens of 2 dominant models of human happiness, we suggest that seemingly inconsequential spending choices may provide an underappreciated and underutilized route to greater well‐being. Finally, we review new empirical evidence demonstrating that individuals can use their disposable income to increase their happiness by investing in experiential (rather than material) purchases, more free time, routine, self‐expression, and generosity.
Participants’ romantic attraction, likelihood of selecting, and subsequent interpersonal outcomes with a dating partner almost exclusively depended on their perception of their dating partner’s mate value: the higher, the better. There was no evidence for the popular matching hypothesis
Wurst, Stefanie N., Sarah Humberg, and Mitja Back 2018. “Preprint of "the Impact of Mate Value in First and Subsequent Real-life Romantic Encounters"”. Open Science Framework. February 1. doi:10.17605/OSF.IO/ADEJ3
Abstract: We provide a first systematic investigation of the most prominent hypotheses about the impact of mate value on interpersonal attraction in real-life early-stage romantic encounters. Using Response Surface Analysis, we simultaneously examined how (a) people’s perception of their own mate value, (b) their perception of a potential partner’s mate value, and (c) the interplay between the two mate values impact initial romantic attraction and selection as well as subsequent interpersonal outcomes after selection. Data came from the “Date me for Science” speed-dating study (n = 398), in which participants who mutually selected each other at the speed-dating event were followed up with 3 assessments in the 6 weeks after the event to assess subsequent outcomes. Participants’ romantic attraction, likelihood of selecting, and subsequent interpersonal outcomes with a dating partner almost exclusively depended on their perception of their dating partner’s mate value: the higher, the better. There was no evidence for the popular matching hypothesis, which states that people feel attracted to and select dating partners whom they perceive to have a mate value similar to their own. Implications of these findings for theory and research on the impact of mate value on romantic attraction and selection are discussed.
Abstract: We provide a first systematic investigation of the most prominent hypotheses about the impact of mate value on interpersonal attraction in real-life early-stage romantic encounters. Using Response Surface Analysis, we simultaneously examined how (a) people’s perception of their own mate value, (b) their perception of a potential partner’s mate value, and (c) the interplay between the two mate values impact initial romantic attraction and selection as well as subsequent interpersonal outcomes after selection. Data came from the “Date me for Science” speed-dating study (n = 398), in which participants who mutually selected each other at the speed-dating event were followed up with 3 assessments in the 6 weeks after the event to assess subsequent outcomes. Participants’ romantic attraction, likelihood of selecting, and subsequent interpersonal outcomes with a dating partner almost exclusively depended on their perception of their dating partner’s mate value: the higher, the better. There was no evidence for the popular matching hypothesis, which states that people feel attracted to and select dating partners whom they perceive to have a mate value similar to their own. Implications of these findings for theory and research on the impact of mate value on romantic attraction and selection are discussed.
Participants reported lower need satisfaction and being more out of the loop after viewing unfamiliar, compared to familiar, musicians, celebrities and brand logos
Iannone, N. E., Kelly, J. R., & Williams, K. D. (2018). “Who’s that?”: The negative consequences of being out of the loop on pop culture. Psychology of Popular Media Culture, 7(2), 113-129. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/ppm0000120
Abstract: Being out of the loop is a form of partial ostracism in which one is excluded from a domain of information known by others. We investigate whether being out of the loop on a specific domain of information—pop culture—will lead to negative outcomes associated with more complete forms of ostracism. Participants reported lower need satisfaction and being more out of the loop after viewing unfamiliar, compared to familiar, musicians (Study 1) and celebrities (Study 2). Study 3 assessed a different form of pop culture stimuli—brand logos—and found the same results. Finally, Study 4 utilized an alternative method where participants were exposed to a variety of pop culture stimuli (e.g., movies, books, singers) and also included a non-pop culture-related control condition. Participants in the unfamiliar condition reported lower need satisfaction and feeling more out of the loop than participants in the familiar and control conditions. Across all 4 studies, feeling more out of the loop mediated the relationship between familiarity and need satisfaction level. Additionally, participants’ self-rated pop culture importance did not moderate the effect. Thus, seemingly innocuous reminders of being out of the cultural loop in everyday life are capable of eliciting negative psychological consequences.
Abstract: Being out of the loop is a form of partial ostracism in which one is excluded from a domain of information known by others. We investigate whether being out of the loop on a specific domain of information—pop culture—will lead to negative outcomes associated with more complete forms of ostracism. Participants reported lower need satisfaction and being more out of the loop after viewing unfamiliar, compared to familiar, musicians (Study 1) and celebrities (Study 2). Study 3 assessed a different form of pop culture stimuli—brand logos—and found the same results. Finally, Study 4 utilized an alternative method where participants were exposed to a variety of pop culture stimuli (e.g., movies, books, singers) and also included a non-pop culture-related control condition. Participants in the unfamiliar condition reported lower need satisfaction and feeling more out of the loop than participants in the familiar and control conditions. Across all 4 studies, feeling more out of the loop mediated the relationship between familiarity and need satisfaction level. Additionally, participants’ self-rated pop culture importance did not moderate the effect. Thus, seemingly innocuous reminders of being out of the cultural loop in everyday life are capable of eliciting negative psychological consequences.
A female fish that today doesn't need males to clone itself copulates with other species' males to stimulate embryonic development. Those males do that probably because the interactions of a sexual male and the female are observed by conspecific females and make that male more attractive
Male mate choice in Livebearing fishes: an overview. Ingo Schlupp. Current Zoology, zoy028, https://doi.org/10.1093/cz/zoy028
Abstract: Although the majority of studies on mate choice focus on female mate choice, there is growing recognition of the role of male mate choice, too. Male mate choice is tightly linked to two other phenomena, female competition for males, and ornamentation in females. In the current paper I review the existing literature on this in a group of fishes, Poeciliidae. In this group male mate choice appears to be based on differences in female quality, especially female size, which is a proxy for fecundity. Some males also have to choose between heterospecific and conspecific females in the unusual mating system of the Amazon molly. In this case, they typically show a preference for conspecific females. While male mate choice is relatively well documented for this family, female ornamentation and female competition are not.
Keywords: fecundity, sexual selection, female choice, Poecilia, Xiphophorus, Gambusia, guppy, binary choice test, preference function, female size
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Amazon mollies are an all-female, clonal species of fish of hybrid origin (Hubbs & Hubbs 1932, Schlupp & Riesch 2011). The maternal ancestor is the Atlantic molly P. mexicana and the paternal ancestor is the sailfin molly P. latipinna. The single, original hybridization apparently took place about 100.000 generations ago in an area near present-day Tampico [...]. Amazon mollies reproduce by gynogenesis, where sperm simply serves as stimulus for embryonic development, but is typically not incorporated into the offspring (Schlupp 2005) [...] The Amazon molly uses at least three species as sperm donors [...]
More importantly, this situation can be used to make very clear predictions relative to male mate choice. For males the fitness return for mating with Amazon mollies is very low. Even if the cost of mating is low or moderate, males should evolve to prefer conspecific females, or lower their cost by investing less into heterospecific copulations. Via mate copying, a process of using social information in mate choice (Varela et al. 2018, Witte et al. 2015), males gain an indirect fitness benefit offsetting some of the cost of heterospecific matings: the interactions of a sexual male and an Amazon molly are observed by conspecific females and make that male more attractive to conspecific females. Interestingly, males have also been shown to copy the mate choice of other males (Bierbach et al. 2011, Schlupp & Ryan 1997).
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
Abstract: Although the majority of studies on mate choice focus on female mate choice, there is growing recognition of the role of male mate choice, too. Male mate choice is tightly linked to two other phenomena, female competition for males, and ornamentation in females. In the current paper I review the existing literature on this in a group of fishes, Poeciliidae. In this group male mate choice appears to be based on differences in female quality, especially female size, which is a proxy for fecundity. Some males also have to choose between heterospecific and conspecific females in the unusual mating system of the Amazon molly. In this case, they typically show a preference for conspecific females. While male mate choice is relatively well documented for this family, female ornamentation and female competition are not.
Keywords: fecundity, sexual selection, female choice, Poecilia, Xiphophorus, Gambusia, guppy, binary choice test, preference function, female size
---
Amazon mollies are an all-female, clonal species of fish of hybrid origin (Hubbs & Hubbs 1932, Schlupp & Riesch 2011). The maternal ancestor is the Atlantic molly P. mexicana and the paternal ancestor is the sailfin molly P. latipinna. The single, original hybridization apparently took place about 100.000 generations ago in an area near present-day Tampico [...]. Amazon mollies reproduce by gynogenesis, where sperm simply serves as stimulus for embryonic development, but is typically not incorporated into the offspring (Schlupp 2005) [...] The Amazon molly uses at least three species as sperm donors [...]
More importantly, this situation can be used to make very clear predictions relative to male mate choice. For males the fitness return for mating with Amazon mollies is very low. Even if the cost of mating is low or moderate, males should evolve to prefer conspecific females, or lower their cost by investing less into heterospecific copulations. Via mate copying, a process of using social information in mate choice (Varela et al. 2018, Witte et al. 2015), males gain an indirect fitness benefit offsetting some of the cost of heterospecific matings: the interactions of a sexual male and an Amazon molly are observed by conspecific females and make that male more attractive to conspecific females. Interestingly, males have also been shown to copy the mate choice of other males (Bierbach et al. 2011, Schlupp & Ryan 1997).
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
Women & their mothers were strongly influenced by the physical attractiveness of target men & preferred the attractive & moderately attr. targets. Men with the most desirable personality profiles were rated more favorably only when they were at least moderately attractive
The Importance of Physical Attractiveness to the Mate Choices of Women and Their Mothers. Madeleine A. Fugère et al. Evolutionary Psychological Science. September 2017, Volume 3, Issue 3, pp 243–252. http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40806-017-0092-x
Abstract: Prior research investigating the mate preferences of women and their parents reveals two important findings with regard to physical attractiveness. First, daughters more strongly value mate characteristics connoting genetic quality (such as physical attractiveness) than their parents. Second, both daughters and their parents report valuing characteristics other than physical attractiveness most strongly (e.g., ambition/industriousness, friendliness/kindness). However, the prior research relies solely on self-report to assess daughters’ and parents’ preferences. We assessed mate preferences among 61 daughter-mother pairs using an experimental design varying target men’s physical attractiveness and trait profiles. We tested four hypotheses investigating whether a minimum level of physical attractiveness was a necessity to both women and their mothers and whether physical attractiveness was a more important determinant of dating desirability than trait profiles. These hypotheses were supported. Women and their mothers were strongly influenced by the physical attractiveness of the target men and preferred the attractive and moderately attractive targets. Men with the most desirable personality profiles were rated more favorably than their counterparts only when they were at least moderately attractive. Unattractive men were never rated as more desirable partners for daughters, even when they possessed the most desirable trait profiles. We conclude that a minimum level of physical attractiveness is a necessity for both women and their mothers and that when women and their parents state that other traits are more important than physical attractiveness, they assume potential mates meet a minimally acceptable standard of physical attractiveness.
Seems confirmation of this: Importance of physical attractiveness in dating behavior. Elaine Walster, Vera Aronson, Darcy Abrahams, Leon Rottman. December 1966, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 4(5):508-16. DOI10.1037/h0021188, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/17178647_Importance_of_physical_attractiveness_in_dating_behavior
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
Abstract: Prior research investigating the mate preferences of women and their parents reveals two important findings with regard to physical attractiveness. First, daughters more strongly value mate characteristics connoting genetic quality (such as physical attractiveness) than their parents. Second, both daughters and their parents report valuing characteristics other than physical attractiveness most strongly (e.g., ambition/industriousness, friendliness/kindness). However, the prior research relies solely on self-report to assess daughters’ and parents’ preferences. We assessed mate preferences among 61 daughter-mother pairs using an experimental design varying target men’s physical attractiveness and trait profiles. We tested four hypotheses investigating whether a minimum level of physical attractiveness was a necessity to both women and their mothers and whether physical attractiveness was a more important determinant of dating desirability than trait profiles. These hypotheses were supported. Women and their mothers were strongly influenced by the physical attractiveness of the target men and preferred the attractive and moderately attractive targets. Men with the most desirable personality profiles were rated more favorably than their counterparts only when they were at least moderately attractive. Unattractive men were never rated as more desirable partners for daughters, even when they possessed the most desirable trait profiles. We conclude that a minimum level of physical attractiveness is a necessity for both women and their mothers and that when women and their parents state that other traits are more important than physical attractiveness, they assume potential mates meet a minimally acceptable standard of physical attractiveness.
Seems confirmation of this: Importance of physical attractiveness in dating behavior. Elaine Walster, Vera Aronson, Darcy Abrahams, Leon Rottman. December 1966, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 4(5):508-16. DOI10.1037/h0021188, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/17178647_Importance_of_physical_attractiveness_in_dating_behavior
Abstract: It was proposed that an individual would most often expect to date, would try to date, and would like a partner of approximately his own social desirability. In brief, we attempted to apply level of aspiration theory to choice of social goals. A field study was conducted in which individuals were randomly paired with one another at a "Computer Dance." Level of aspiration hypotheses were not confirmed. Regardless of S's own attractiveness, by far the largest determinant of how much his partner was liked, how much he wanted to date the partner again, and how often he actually asked the partner out was simply how attractive the partner was. Personality measures such as the MMPI, the Minnesota Counseling Inventory, and Berger's Scale of Self- Acceptance and intellectual measures such as the Minnesota Scholastic Aptitude Test, and high school percentile rank did not predict couple compatability. The only important determinant of S's liking for his date was the date's physical attractiveness.
h/t: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf
Monday, April 9, 2018
While religiosity positively predicts the acceptance of creationist views and negatively predicts the acceptance of evolution, scientific reasoning ability does not predict religiosity, acceptance of creationist views, or acceptance of evolutionary theory
Scientific reasoning ability does not predict scientific views on evolution among religious individuals. Katie F. Manwaring et al. Evolution: Education and Outreach. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12052-018-0076-8
Abstract
Background: Acceptance of evolutionary theory varies widely and is often associated with religious background. Some have suggested there exists an additional relationship between scientific reasoning ability and the acceptance of evolutionary theory. In this study, we used structural equation modeling to test whether scientific reasoning ability predicts religiosity, acceptance of creationist views, or acceptance of evolution. We administered internet-based surveys to 724 individuals nationwide who self-describe as being religious and built a structural-equation model to test predictive abilities.
Results: We found that while religiosity positively predicts the acceptance of creationist views and negatively predicts the acceptance of evolution, scientific reasoning ability does not predict religiosity, acceptance of creationist views, or acceptance of evolutionary theory.
Conclusions: With a lack of any relationship between scientific reasoning ability and acceptance, an approach to evolution education that focuses on appealing to scientific reasoning may prove fruitless in changing student attitudes toward evolution; alternative teaching approaches regarding evolution are warranted.
Abstract
Background: Acceptance of evolutionary theory varies widely and is often associated with religious background. Some have suggested there exists an additional relationship between scientific reasoning ability and the acceptance of evolutionary theory. In this study, we used structural equation modeling to test whether scientific reasoning ability predicts religiosity, acceptance of creationist views, or acceptance of evolution. We administered internet-based surveys to 724 individuals nationwide who self-describe as being religious and built a structural-equation model to test predictive abilities.
Results: We found that while religiosity positively predicts the acceptance of creationist views and negatively predicts the acceptance of evolution, scientific reasoning ability does not predict religiosity, acceptance of creationist views, or acceptance of evolutionary theory.
Conclusions: With a lack of any relationship between scientific reasoning ability and acceptance, an approach to evolution education that focuses on appealing to scientific reasoning may prove fruitless in changing student attitudes toward evolution; alternative teaching approaches regarding evolution are warranted.
Tax revenue and public services under pirates and terrorists
The author believes he is doing something new... Anyway, it is a good summary of how ISIS financed the caliphate machinery.
The ISIS Files. By Rukmini Callimachi Photographs by Ivor Prickett
The New York Times, April 4, 2018
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/04/world/middleeast/isis-documents-mosul-iraq.html
1 revenue
The documents describe how it made money at every step in the supply chain: Before a single seed of grain, for example, was sown, the group collected rent for the fields it had confiscated. Then, when the crops were ready to be threshed, it collected a harvest tax.
It did not stop there.
The trucks that transported the grain paid highway tolls. The grain was stored in silos, which the militants controlled, and they made money when the grain was sold to mills, which they also controlled. The mills ground the grain into flour, which the group sold to traders.
Then the bags of flour were loaded onto trucks, which traversed the caliphate, paying more tolls. It was sold to supermarkets and shops, which were also taxed. So were the consumers who bought the finished product.
In a single 24-hour period in 2015, one of the spreadsheets in the briefcase shows, the Islamic State collected $1.9 million from the sale of barley and wheat.
Another table shows that the militants earned over $3 million in three months from gross flour sales in just three locations in Mosul.
The organization appeared intent on making money off every last grain — even crops that were damaged.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On just one day, according to another statement, it took in over $14,000 from wheat described as having been scorched in a bombing, and $2,300 from the sale of spoiled lentils and chickpeas. It also took in over $23,000 from grain that had been scraped off the bottom of a tank, according to one spreadsheet. <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
The Islamic State’s tax arm reached into every facet of life in Mosul. Households in Iraq were taxed 2,000 dinars per month (less than $2) for garbage collection, 10,000 dinars (about $8) for each 10 amperes of electricity, and another 10,000 for municipal water.
Businesses wishing to install a landline paid a 15,000-dinar (about $12) installation fee to the group’s telecommunications office, followed by a 5,000-dinar monthly maintenance fee.
Municipal offices charged for marriage licenses and birth certificates.
But perhaps the most lucrative tax was [the] zakat ... It is calculated at 2.5 percent of an individual’s assets, and up to 10 percent for agricultural production, according to Ms. Revkin, the Yale researcher. While some of these fees had been charged by the Iraqi and Syrian governments, the mandatory asset tax was a new development.
Ordinarily in Islamic practice, the zakat is a tithe used to help the poor. In the Islamic State’s interpretation, an act of charity became a mandatory payment, and while some of the funds collected were used to help needy families, the Ministry of Zakat and Charities acted more like a version of the Internal Revenue Service.
Most accounts of how the Islamic State became the richest terrorist group in the world focus on its black-market oil sales, which at one point brought in as much as $2 million per week, according to some estimates. Yet records recovered in Syria by Mr. Tamimi and analyzed by Ms. Revkin show that the ratio of money earned from taxes versus oil stood at 6:1.
Despite hundreds of airstrikes that left the caliphate pocked with craters, the group’s economy continued to function, fed by streams of revenue that could not be bombed under international norms: the civilians under their rule, their commercial activity and the dirt under their feet.
According to estimates from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the land that the militants seized was Iraq’s most fertile, and at the group’s height, the fields that were harvested accounted for 40 percent of the country’s annual wheat production and more than half of its barley crop. In Syria, the group at one point controlled as much as 80 percent of the country’s cotton crop, according to a study by the Paris-based Center for the Analysis of Terrorism.
It all added up to astonishing sums, as much as $800 million in annual tax revenue, according to the study.
...
Tax collection continued until the very end. At least 100 documents
labeled “Daily Gross Revenue” that showed incoming cash were dated November 2016, a month after the start of the coalition’s push to take back the city.
Even as tanks were rolling in and taking surrounding neighborhoods, the trade division continued to make money, pocketing $70,000 in a single sale.
2 public services
But on the same thoroughfares, Mr. Hamoud noticed something that filled him with shame: The streets were visibly cleaner than they had been when the Iraqi government was in charge.
Omar Bilal Younes, a 42-year-old truck driver whose occupation allowed him to crisscross the caliphate, noticed the same improvement. “Garbage collection was No. 1 under ISIS,” he said, flashing a thumbs-up sign.
The street sweepers hadn’t changed. What had was that the militants imposed a discipline that had been lacking, said a half-dozen sanitation employees who worked under ISIS and who were interviewed in three towns after the group was forced out.
“The only thing I could do during the time of government rule is to give a worker a one-day suspension without pay,” said Salim Ali Sultan, who oversaw garbage collection both for the Iraqi government and later for the Islamic State in the northern Iraqi town of Tel Kaif. “Under ISIS, they could be imprisoned.”
The ISIS Files. By Rukmini Callimachi Photographs by Ivor Prickett
The New York Times, April 4, 2018
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/04/04/world/middleeast/isis-documents-mosul-iraq.html
1 revenue
The documents describe how it made money at every step in the supply chain: Before a single seed of grain, for example, was sown, the group collected rent for the fields it had confiscated. Then, when the crops were ready to be threshed, it collected a harvest tax.
It did not stop there.
The trucks that transported the grain paid highway tolls. The grain was stored in silos, which the militants controlled, and they made money when the grain was sold to mills, which they also controlled. The mills ground the grain into flour, which the group sold to traders.
Then the bags of flour were loaded onto trucks, which traversed the caliphate, paying more tolls. It was sold to supermarkets and shops, which were also taxed. So were the consumers who bought the finished product.
In a single 24-hour period in 2015, one of the spreadsheets in the briefcase shows, the Islamic State collected $1.9 million from the sale of barley and wheat.
Another table shows that the militants earned over $3 million in three months from gross flour sales in just three locations in Mosul.
The organization appeared intent on making money off every last grain — even crops that were damaged.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
On just one day, according to another statement, it took in over $14,000 from wheat described as having been scorched in a bombing, and $2,300 from the sale of spoiled lentils and chickpeas. It also took in over $23,000 from grain that had been scraped off the bottom of a tank, according to one spreadsheet. <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
The Islamic State’s tax arm reached into every facet of life in Mosul. Households in Iraq were taxed 2,000 dinars per month (less than $2) for garbage collection, 10,000 dinars (about $8) for each 10 amperes of electricity, and another 10,000 for municipal water.
Businesses wishing to install a landline paid a 15,000-dinar (about $12) installation fee to the group’s telecommunications office, followed by a 5,000-dinar monthly maintenance fee.
Municipal offices charged for marriage licenses and birth certificates.
But perhaps the most lucrative tax was [the] zakat ... It is calculated at 2.5 percent of an individual’s assets, and up to 10 percent for agricultural production, according to Ms. Revkin, the Yale researcher. While some of these fees had been charged by the Iraqi and Syrian governments, the mandatory asset tax was a new development.
Ordinarily in Islamic practice, the zakat is a tithe used to help the poor. In the Islamic State’s interpretation, an act of charity became a mandatory payment, and while some of the funds collected were used to help needy families, the Ministry of Zakat and Charities acted more like a version of the Internal Revenue Service.
Most accounts of how the Islamic State became the richest terrorist group in the world focus on its black-market oil sales, which at one point brought in as much as $2 million per week, according to some estimates. Yet records recovered in Syria by Mr. Tamimi and analyzed by Ms. Revkin show that the ratio of money earned from taxes versus oil stood at 6:1.
Despite hundreds of airstrikes that left the caliphate pocked with craters, the group’s economy continued to function, fed by streams of revenue that could not be bombed under international norms: the civilians under their rule, their commercial activity and the dirt under their feet.
According to estimates from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the land that the militants seized was Iraq’s most fertile, and at the group’s height, the fields that were harvested accounted for 40 percent of the country’s annual wheat production and more than half of its barley crop. In Syria, the group at one point controlled as much as 80 percent of the country’s cotton crop, according to a study by the Paris-based Center for the Analysis of Terrorism.
It all added up to astonishing sums, as much as $800 million in annual tax revenue, according to the study.
...
Tax collection continued until the very end. At least 100 documents
labeled “Daily Gross Revenue” that showed incoming cash were dated November 2016, a month after the start of the coalition’s push to take back the city.
Even as tanks were rolling in and taking surrounding neighborhoods, the trade division continued to make money, pocketing $70,000 in a single sale.
2 public services
But on the same thoroughfares, Mr. Hamoud noticed something that filled him with shame: The streets were visibly cleaner than they had been when the Iraqi government was in charge.
Omar Bilal Younes, a 42-year-old truck driver whose occupation allowed him to crisscross the caliphate, noticed the same improvement. “Garbage collection was No. 1 under ISIS,” he said, flashing a thumbs-up sign.
The street sweepers hadn’t changed. What had was that the militants imposed a discipline that had been lacking, said a half-dozen sanitation employees who worked under ISIS and who were interviewed in three towns after the group was forced out.
“The only thing I could do during the time of government rule is to give a worker a one-day suspension without pay,” said Salim Ali Sultan, who oversaw garbage collection both for the Iraqi government and later for the Islamic State in the northern Iraqi town of Tel Kaif. “Under ISIS, they could be imprisoned.”
The Strengths of Wisdom Provide Unique Contributions to Improved Leadership, Sustainability, Inequality, Gross National Happiness, and Civic Discourse in the Face of Contemporary World Problems
The Strengths of Wisdom Provide Unique Contributions to Improved Leadership, Sustainability, Inequality, Gross National Happiness, and Civic Discourse in the Face of Contemporary World Problems. Igor Grossmann and Justin P. Brienza. J. Intell. 2018, 6(2), 22; doi:10.3390/jintelligence6020022
Abstract: We present evidence for the strengths of the intellectual virtues that philosophers and behavioral scientists characterize as key cognitive elements of wisdom. Wisdom has been of centuries-long interest for philosophical scholarship, but relative to intelligence largely neglected in public discourse on educational science, public policy, and societal well-being. Wise reasoning characteristics include intellectual humility, recognition of uncertainty, consideration of diverse viewpoints, and an attempt to integrate these viewpoints. Emerging scholarship on these features of wisdom suggest that they uniquely contribute to societal well-being, improve leadership, shed light on societal inequality, promote cooperation in Public Goods Games and reduce political polarization and intergroup-hostility. We review empirical evidence about macro-cultural, ecological, situational, and person-level processes facilitating and inhibiting wisdom in daily life. Based on this evidence, we speculate about ways to foster wisdom in education, organizations, and institutions.
Keywords: wisdom; reasoning; virtues; well-being; political polarization; culture; social class; egocentrism; leadership
Check also Grossmann, Igor, and Harrison Oakes. 2017. “Wisdom of Yoda and Mr. Spock: The Role of Emotions and the Self”. PsyArXiv. December 21. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/12/wiser-reasoning-appeared-in-conjunction.html
Abstract: We present evidence for the strengths of the intellectual virtues that philosophers and behavioral scientists characterize as key cognitive elements of wisdom. Wisdom has been of centuries-long interest for philosophical scholarship, but relative to intelligence largely neglected in public discourse on educational science, public policy, and societal well-being. Wise reasoning characteristics include intellectual humility, recognition of uncertainty, consideration of diverse viewpoints, and an attempt to integrate these viewpoints. Emerging scholarship on these features of wisdom suggest that they uniquely contribute to societal well-being, improve leadership, shed light on societal inequality, promote cooperation in Public Goods Games and reduce political polarization and intergroup-hostility. We review empirical evidence about macro-cultural, ecological, situational, and person-level processes facilitating and inhibiting wisdom in daily life. Based on this evidence, we speculate about ways to foster wisdom in education, organizations, and institutions.
Keywords: wisdom; reasoning; virtues; well-being; political polarization; culture; social class; egocentrism; leadership
Check also Grossmann, Igor, and Harrison Oakes. 2017. “Wisdom of Yoda and Mr. Spock: The Role of Emotions and the Self”. PsyArXiv. December 21. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/12/wiser-reasoning-appeared-in-conjunction.html
wiser reasoning appeared in conjunction with greater (vs. lower) emotionality, especially the recognition of a greater number of present emotions and greater balance of intensity across experienced emotions.And: Wisdom and how to cultivate it: Review of emerging evidence for a constructivist model of wise thinking. Igor Grossmann. European Psychologist, in press. Pre-print: http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/08/wisdom-and-how-to-cultivate-it-review.html
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