A Daily Diary Investigation of the Link Between Television Watching and Positive Affect. Deniz Bayraktaroglu et al. Journal of Happiness Studies, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10902-018-9989-8
Abstract: Past research has shown a negative relationship between time spent watching television (TV) and several indicators of hedonic well-being—including positive affect (PA). However, cross-sectional designs employed in most of these studies do not allow for inferences regarding the direction of the link between TV watching and PA. Present research aimed to address this gap by using daily diary data from a large national sample of U.S. adults (N = 1668, age = 33–83 years). Respondents reported time spent watching TV as well as PA for eight consecutive days. Results of multilevel modeling analyses showed that duration of TV watching on the previous day did not significantly predict changes in PA on the next day. However, PA on the previous day significantly predicted decreases in duration of TV watching the following day. The results held after controlling for factors known to predict duration of TV watching and PA (i.e., age, gender, income level, employment status, marital status, health status, and personality traits). The present research goes beyond past cross-sectional work by shedding light on the direction of the link between TV watching and PA. Our findings indicate that watching TV does not seem to diminish PA—as critics of TV proclaim—but individuals seem to watch TV to a greater extent whenever they experience reduced PA.
Friday, April 27, 2018
Exposure to More Female Peers Widens the Gender Gap in STEM Participation
Exposure to More Female Peers Widens the Gender Gap in STEM Participation. Anne Ardila Brenøe, Ulf Zölitz. University of Zurich Department of Economics Working Paper No. 285. https://sites.google.com/view/aabrenoe/research
Abstract: This paper investigates how high school gender composition affects students’ participation in STEM college studies. Using Danish administrative data, we exploit idiosyncratic within-school variation in gender composition. We find that having a larger proportion of female peers reduces women’s probability of enrolling in and graduating from STEM programs. Men’s STEM participation increases with more female peers present. In the long run, women exposed to more female peers earn less because they (1) are less likely to work in STEM occupations, and (2) have more children. Our findings show that the school peer environment has lasting effects on occupational sorting and the gender wage gap.
Abstract: This paper investigates how high school gender composition affects students’ participation in STEM college studies. Using Danish administrative data, we exploit idiosyncratic within-school variation in gender composition. We find that having a larger proportion of female peers reduces women’s probability of enrolling in and graduating from STEM programs. Men’s STEM participation increases with more female peers present. In the long run, women exposed to more female peers earn less because they (1) are less likely to work in STEM occupations, and (2) have more children. Our findings show that the school peer environment has lasting effects on occupational sorting and the gender wage gap.
Bored like Hell: Religiosity reduces boredom and tempers the quest for meaning
van Tilburg, W. A. P., Igou, E. R., Maher, P. J., Moynihan, A. B., & Martin, D. G. (2018). Bored like Hell: Religiosity reduces boredom and tempers the quest for meaning. Emotion. Advance online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/emo0000439
Abstract: Boredom involves a lack meaning. Conversely, religiosity offers people a sense of meaning. Accordingly, we proposed that by imbuing a sense of meaningfulnesss, religiosity leads people to experience less boredom. Furthermore, we hypothesized and tested that by reducing boredom, religiosity indirectly inhibits the search for meaningful engagement. In Study 1, following boring tasks, religious people experienced lower levels of boredom and were less motivated to search for meaning than nonreligious people. We found in Study 2 that religious (vs. non- or less religious) people reported higher perceived meaning in life, which was associated with a reduced tendency to feel bored, and with a reduced need to search for meaning in life. Study 3 confirmed that the meaning in life associated with religiosity was associated with reduced state boredom. Religious participants were again less inclined to search for meaning, which was explained by the relatively low levels of boredom that religious (vs. nonreligious) participants experienced.
Abstract: Boredom involves a lack meaning. Conversely, religiosity offers people a sense of meaning. Accordingly, we proposed that by imbuing a sense of meaningfulnesss, religiosity leads people to experience less boredom. Furthermore, we hypothesized and tested that by reducing boredom, religiosity indirectly inhibits the search for meaningful engagement. In Study 1, following boring tasks, religious people experienced lower levels of boredom and were less motivated to search for meaning than nonreligious people. We found in Study 2 that religious (vs. non- or less religious) people reported higher perceived meaning in life, which was associated with a reduced tendency to feel bored, and with a reduced need to search for meaning in life. Study 3 confirmed that the meaning in life associated with religiosity was associated with reduced state boredom. Religious participants were again less inclined to search for meaning, which was explained by the relatively low levels of boredom that religious (vs. nonreligious) participants experienced.
Thursday, April 26, 2018
Small numbers are processed on a linear scale, while large numbers are processed on a logarithmic one. Due to this, financial analysts are more optimistic about small price stocks than about large price stocks even after controlling for differences in risk factors
Behavioral bias in number processing: Evidence from analysts’ expectations. Tristan Roger, Patrick Roger, Alain Schatt. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 149, May 2018, Pages 315-331. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.02.026
Highlights
• Research in neuropsychology shows that the human brain processes small and large numbers differently.
• Small numbers are processed on a linear scale, while large numbers are processed on a logarithmic scale.
• We show that financial analysts process small prices and large prices differently.
• Analysts are more optimistic about small price stocks than about large price stocks even after controlling for differences in risk factors.
• A deeply-rooted behavioral bias in number processing drives analysts return expectations.
Abstract: Research in neuropsychology shows that individuals process small and large numbers differently. Small numbers are processed on a linear scale, while large numbers are processed on a logarithmic scale. In this paper, we show that financial analysts process small prices and large prices differently. When they are optimistic (pessimistic), analysts issue more optimistic (pessimistic) target prices for small price stocks than for large price stocks. Our results are robust when controlling for the usual risk factors such as size, book-to-market, momentum, profitability and investments. They are also robust when we control for firm and analyst characteristics, or for other biases such as the 52-week high bias, the preference for lottery-type stocks and positive skewness, and the analyst tendency to round numbers. Finally, we show that analysts become more optimistic after stock splits. Overall, our results suggest that a deeply-rooted behavioral bias in number processing drives analysts’ return expectations.
Highlights
• Research in neuropsychology shows that the human brain processes small and large numbers differently.
• Small numbers are processed on a linear scale, while large numbers are processed on a logarithmic scale.
• We show that financial analysts process small prices and large prices differently.
• Analysts are more optimistic about small price stocks than about large price stocks even after controlling for differences in risk factors.
• A deeply-rooted behavioral bias in number processing drives analysts return expectations.
Abstract: Research in neuropsychology shows that individuals process small and large numbers differently. Small numbers are processed on a linear scale, while large numbers are processed on a logarithmic scale. In this paper, we show that financial analysts process small prices and large prices differently. When they are optimistic (pessimistic), analysts issue more optimistic (pessimistic) target prices for small price stocks than for large price stocks. Our results are robust when controlling for the usual risk factors such as size, book-to-market, momentum, profitability and investments. They are also robust when we control for firm and analyst characteristics, or for other biases such as the 52-week high bias, the preference for lottery-type stocks and positive skewness, and the analyst tendency to round numbers. Finally, we show that analysts become more optimistic after stock splits. Overall, our results suggest that a deeply-rooted behavioral bias in number processing drives analysts’ return expectations.
Individuals with low cognitive ability are less likely to support equal rights for same-sex couples, regardless of education and other confounds
The cognitive roots of prejudice towards same-sex couples: An analysis of an Australian national sample. Francisco Perales. Intelligence, Volume 68, May–June 2018, Pages 117–127. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2018.03.012
Highlights
• We examine the links between cognitive ability & prejudice towards same-sex couples.
• We use a large Australian national sample (n = 11,564) & 3 separate ability measures.
• High cognitive ability leads to lower prejudice, net of a large set of confounds.
• Results hold across different ability measures & are strongest for verbal ability.
• Education partially mediates, but does not moderate, the effect of ability.
Abstract: There are well-known correlations between low cognitive ability and support of prejudicial or non-egalitarian attitudes. This paper adds to existing knowledge by providing the first analyses of the associations between cognitive ability and attitudes towards LGBT issues in a non-US sample (Australia), comparing these across three measures of cognitive ability, and examining the separate, joint and interactive effects of education and cognitive ability. Findings from a high-quality, national Australian dataset (n = 11,564) indicate that individuals with low cognitive ability are less likely to support equal rights for same-sex couples. This pattern holds in the presence of confounds, is consistent across measures of ability, and is more pronounced for verbal ability. Education and cognitive ability affect attitudes through similar channels, but retain independent effects.
Keywords: Cognitive ability; LGBT issues; Intergroup prejudice; Same-sex couples; Socio-political attitudes
Highlights
• We examine the links between cognitive ability & prejudice towards same-sex couples.
• We use a large Australian national sample (n = 11,564) & 3 separate ability measures.
• High cognitive ability leads to lower prejudice, net of a large set of confounds.
• Results hold across different ability measures & are strongest for verbal ability.
• Education partially mediates, but does not moderate, the effect of ability.
Abstract: There are well-known correlations between low cognitive ability and support of prejudicial or non-egalitarian attitudes. This paper adds to existing knowledge by providing the first analyses of the associations between cognitive ability and attitudes towards LGBT issues in a non-US sample (Australia), comparing these across three measures of cognitive ability, and examining the separate, joint and interactive effects of education and cognitive ability. Findings from a high-quality, national Australian dataset (n = 11,564) indicate that individuals with low cognitive ability are less likely to support equal rights for same-sex couples. This pattern holds in the presence of confounds, is consistent across measures of ability, and is more pronounced for verbal ability. Education and cognitive ability affect attitudes through similar channels, but retain independent effects.
Keywords: Cognitive ability; LGBT issues; Intergroup prejudice; Same-sex couples; Socio-political attitudes
Higher psychopathy scores were associated with decreased concerns about preventing harm and promoting justice. Individuals higher in psychopathic traits did not evidence deficits in moral judgement
Relations among psychopathy, moral competence, and moral intuitions in student and community samples. Jeremy G. Gay, Michael J. Vitacco, Amy Hackney, Courtney Beussink, Scott O. Lilienfeld. Legal and Criminological Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1111/lcrp.12128
Abstract
Purpose: The nature of moral decision‐making in those with pronounced psychopathic traits has been passionately debated, both in scientific literature and in the public policy arena. Research investigating the relationship between psychopathic traits and moral decision‐making capacities has been largely inconclusive. However, recent research suggests individuals with elevated psychopathic traits may exhibit abnormal moral intuitions regarding the prevention of harm (Harm) and promotion of fairness (Fairness). Although moral intuitions are widely assumed to be related to moral judgement, no research has simultaneously examined the relations among psychopathy, moral intuition, and moral judgement.
Methods: We hypothesized that psychopathic traits would not be directly related to moral judgement outcomes but would be indirectly related by way of Harm and Fairness moral intuitions. To test these hypotheses, 121 undergraduate students and 205 community residents, across two studies, completed measures of psychopathy, moral intuitions, and moral judgement.
Results: Higher psychopathy scores were associated with decreased concerns about preventing harm and promoting justice across both samples. Individuals higher in psychopathic traits did not evidence deficits in moral judgement.
Conclusions: Our findings indicate that, although individuals with elevated psychopathic traits may organize their sense of morality differently, they can accurately discern moral from immoral decisions.
Abstract
Purpose: The nature of moral decision‐making in those with pronounced psychopathic traits has been passionately debated, both in scientific literature and in the public policy arena. Research investigating the relationship between psychopathic traits and moral decision‐making capacities has been largely inconclusive. However, recent research suggests individuals with elevated psychopathic traits may exhibit abnormal moral intuitions regarding the prevention of harm (Harm) and promotion of fairness (Fairness). Although moral intuitions are widely assumed to be related to moral judgement, no research has simultaneously examined the relations among psychopathy, moral intuition, and moral judgement.
Methods: We hypothesized that psychopathic traits would not be directly related to moral judgement outcomes but would be indirectly related by way of Harm and Fairness moral intuitions. To test these hypotheses, 121 undergraduate students and 205 community residents, across two studies, completed measures of psychopathy, moral intuitions, and moral judgement.
Results: Higher psychopathy scores were associated with decreased concerns about preventing harm and promoting justice across both samples. Individuals higher in psychopathic traits did not evidence deficits in moral judgement.
Conclusions: Our findings indicate that, although individuals with elevated psychopathic traits may organize their sense of morality differently, they can accurately discern moral from immoral decisions.
Refined models say that selection favors our looking for new partners while in relationships and to allow our partners to do the same. Non‐looking is only expected to evolve if there is an extremely large cost associated with being left by your partner
Can Strategic Ignorance Explain the Evolution of Love? Adam Bear, David G. Rand. Topics in Cognitive Science, https://doi.org/10.1111/tops.12342
Abstract: People's devotion to, and love for, their romantic partners poses an evolutionary puzzle: Why is it better to stop your search for other partners once you enter a serious relationship when you could continue to search for somebody better? A recent formal model based on “strategic ignorance” suggests that such behavior can be adaptive and favored by natural selection, so long as you can signal your unwillingness to “look” for other potential mates to your current partner. Here, we re‐examine this conclusion with a more detailed model designed to capture specific features of romantic relationships. We find, surprisingly, that devotion does not typically evolve in our model: Selection favors agents who choose to “look” while in relationships and who allow their partners to do the same. Non‐looking is only expected to evolve if there is an extremely large cost associated with being left by your partner. Our results therefore raise questions about the role of strategic ignorance in explaining the evolution of love.
Abstract: People's devotion to, and love for, their romantic partners poses an evolutionary puzzle: Why is it better to stop your search for other partners once you enter a serious relationship when you could continue to search for somebody better? A recent formal model based on “strategic ignorance” suggests that such behavior can be adaptive and favored by natural selection, so long as you can signal your unwillingness to “look” for other potential mates to your current partner. Here, we re‐examine this conclusion with a more detailed model designed to capture specific features of romantic relationships. We find, surprisingly, that devotion does not typically evolve in our model: Selection favors agents who choose to “look” while in relationships and who allow their partners to do the same. Non‐looking is only expected to evolve if there is an extremely large cost associated with being left by your partner. Our results therefore raise questions about the role of strategic ignorance in explaining the evolution of love.
Individuals employed in jobs requiring product promotion were less trusting than individuals employed in other jobs—particularly jobs in which honesty is highly expected
Mandates of Dishonesty: The Psychological and Social Costs of Mandated Attitude Expression. Marko Pitesa, Zen Goh, Stefan Thau. Organization Science, https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2017.1190
Abstract: This paper explains and tests empirically why people employed in product promotion are less willing to trust others. Product promotion is a prototypical setting in which employees are mandated to express attitudes that are often not fully sincere. On the basis of social projection theory, we predicted that organizational agents mandated to express insincere attitudes project their self-perceived dishonesty onto others and thus become more distrustful. An initial large-scale, multi-country field study found that individuals employed in jobs requiring product promotion were less trusting than individuals employed in other jobs—particularly jobs in which honesty is highly expected. We then conducted two experiments in which people were tasked with promoting low-quality products and either were allowed to be honest or were asked to be positive (as would be expected of most salespeople). We found that mandated attitude expression reduced willingness to trust, and this effect was mediated by a decrease in the perceived honesty of the self, which, in turn, reduced the perceived honesty of other people. Our research suggests that the widely used practice of mandating attitude expression has the effect of undermining an essential ingredient of economic functioning—trust.
Keywords: trust; mandated attitude expression; product promotion; social projection
Abstract: This paper explains and tests empirically why people employed in product promotion are less willing to trust others. Product promotion is a prototypical setting in which employees are mandated to express attitudes that are often not fully sincere. On the basis of social projection theory, we predicted that organizational agents mandated to express insincere attitudes project their self-perceived dishonesty onto others and thus become more distrustful. An initial large-scale, multi-country field study found that individuals employed in jobs requiring product promotion were less trusting than individuals employed in other jobs—particularly jobs in which honesty is highly expected. We then conducted two experiments in which people were tasked with promoting low-quality products and either were allowed to be honest or were asked to be positive (as would be expected of most salespeople). We found that mandated attitude expression reduced willingness to trust, and this effect was mediated by a decrease in the perceived honesty of the self, which, in turn, reduced the perceived honesty of other people. Our research suggests that the widely used practice of mandating attitude expression has the effect of undermining an essential ingredient of economic functioning—trust.
Keywords: trust; mandated attitude expression; product promotion; social projection
Is self-promotion evaluated more positively if it is accurate? It is, but modest claims are evaluated even more positively than self-promotional claims
Is self-promotion evaluated more positively if it is accurate? Reexamining the role of accuracy and modesty on the perception of self-promotion. Erin M. O’Mara, Benjamin R. Kunz, Angela Receveur & Sierra Corbin. Self and Identity, https://doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2018.1465846
Abstract: The present research sought to conceptually replicate and extend previous research showing that accurate self-promotional claims were associated with more favorable interpersonal evaluations than inaccurate claims, but that modest self-claims were evaluated most favorably. Across two experiments we found consistent evidence that a self-promotional claim paired with information that substantiates the claim is associated with more favorable interpersonal evaluations compared to when the claim is unsubstantiated. Despite proposed generational increases in narcissism and public venues for self-promotion, we found that that modest claims are evaluated even more positively than self-promotional claims. The discussion emphasizes the contribution of these findings to an understanding of the consequences of self-promotion.
Keywords: Self-promotion, modesty, self-enhancement, self-superiority, impression management
Abstract: The present research sought to conceptually replicate and extend previous research showing that accurate self-promotional claims were associated with more favorable interpersonal evaluations than inaccurate claims, but that modest self-claims were evaluated most favorably. Across two experiments we found consistent evidence that a self-promotional claim paired with information that substantiates the claim is associated with more favorable interpersonal evaluations compared to when the claim is unsubstantiated. Despite proposed generational increases in narcissism and public venues for self-promotion, we found that that modest claims are evaluated even more positively than self-promotional claims. The discussion emphasizes the contribution of these findings to an understanding of the consequences of self-promotion.
Keywords: Self-promotion, modesty, self-enhancement, self-superiority, impression management
Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote
Status threat, not economic hardship, explains the 2016 presidential vote. Diana C. Mutz. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, April 23, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1718155115
Significance: Support for Donald J. Trump in the 2016 election was widely attributed to citizens who were “left behind” economically. These claims were based on the strong cross-sectional relationship between Trump support and lacking a college education. Using a representative panel from 2012 to 2016, I find that change in financial wellbeing had little impact on candidate preference. Instead, changing preferences were related to changes in the party’s positions on issues related to American global dominance and the rise of a majority–minority America: issues that threaten white Americans’ sense of dominant group status. Results highlight the importance of looking beyond theories emphasizing changes in issue salience to better understand the meaning of election outcomes when public preferences and candidates’ positions are changing.
Abstract: This study evaluates evidence pertaining to popular narratives explaining the American public’s support for Donald J. Trump in the 2016 presidential election. First, using unique representative probability samples of the American public, tracking the same individuals from 2012 to 2016, I examine the “left behind” thesis (that is, the theory that those who lost jobs or experienced stagnant wages due to the loss of manufacturing jobs punished the incumbent party for their economic misfortunes). Second, I consider the possibility that status threat felt by the dwindling proportion of traditionally high-status Americans (i.e., whites, Christians, and men) as well as by those who perceive America’s global dominance as threatened combined to increase support for the candidate who emphasized reestablishing status hierarchies of the past. Results do not support an interpretation of the election based on pocketbook economic concerns. Instead, the shorter relative distance of people’s own views from the Republican candidate on trade and China corresponded to greater mass support for Trump in 2016 relative to Mitt Romney in 2012. Candidate preferences in 2016 reflected increasing anxiety among high-status groups rather than complaints about past treatment among low-status groups. Both growing domestic racial diversity and globalization contributed to a sense that white Americans are under siege by these engines of change.
Significance: Support for Donald J. Trump in the 2016 election was widely attributed to citizens who were “left behind” economically. These claims were based on the strong cross-sectional relationship between Trump support and lacking a college education. Using a representative panel from 2012 to 2016, I find that change in financial wellbeing had little impact on candidate preference. Instead, changing preferences were related to changes in the party’s positions on issues related to American global dominance and the rise of a majority–minority America: issues that threaten white Americans’ sense of dominant group status. Results highlight the importance of looking beyond theories emphasizing changes in issue salience to better understand the meaning of election outcomes when public preferences and candidates’ positions are changing.
Abstract: This study evaluates evidence pertaining to popular narratives explaining the American public’s support for Donald J. Trump in the 2016 presidential election. First, using unique representative probability samples of the American public, tracking the same individuals from 2012 to 2016, I examine the “left behind” thesis (that is, the theory that those who lost jobs or experienced stagnant wages due to the loss of manufacturing jobs punished the incumbent party for their economic misfortunes). Second, I consider the possibility that status threat felt by the dwindling proportion of traditionally high-status Americans (i.e., whites, Christians, and men) as well as by those who perceive America’s global dominance as threatened combined to increase support for the candidate who emphasized reestablishing status hierarchies of the past. Results do not support an interpretation of the election based on pocketbook economic concerns. Instead, the shorter relative distance of people’s own views from the Republican candidate on trade and China corresponded to greater mass support for Trump in 2016 relative to Mitt Romney in 2012. Candidate preferences in 2016 reflected increasing anxiety among high-status groups rather than complaints about past treatment among low-status groups. Both growing domestic racial diversity and globalization contributed to a sense that white Americans are under siege by these engines of change.
Subjective well-being across education levels: More educated people require better circumstances to be equally satisfied, and as expectations are met the net effect on life satisfaction is negligible
Great Expectations: Education and Subjective Wellbeing. Ingebjørg Kristoffersen. Journal of Economic Psychology, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2018.04.005
Highlights
• The study investigates subjective wellbeing across education levels.
• A novel method is used to capture and decompose these differences.
• More educated people require better circumstances to be equally satisfied.
• As expectations are met the net effect on life satisfaction is negligible.
• Different results emerge within specific domains of life.
Abstract: This paper examines the association between education and subjective wellbeing. The evidence on this relationship is scarce, inconsistent and poorly understood, and reports of a negative association are common. Such results may appear counter-intuitive, but are in fact consistent with the idea that education is associated with higher expectations with respect to life circumstances. Consequently, education may be associated with greater subjective wellbeing only insofar as the ability to meet (or exceed) expectations is improved. This paper uses panel data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey to evaluate the evidence for differences in reference points across education levels, and to determine the overall association between education and subjective wellbeing. The results of the analysis confirm moderate rightward drifts across education levels for satisfaction with life in general, which are ‘neutralised’ by observed differences in actual circumstances. Other patterns emerge within specific life domains. Positive overall associations are observed for satisfaction with financial circumstances and health, while negative overall associations are observed for satisfaction with work and the amount of leisure time.
Keywords: Education; Subjective Wellbeing; Happiness; Satisfaction; Expectations; Adaptation
Highlights
• The study investigates subjective wellbeing across education levels.
• A novel method is used to capture and decompose these differences.
• More educated people require better circumstances to be equally satisfied.
• As expectations are met the net effect on life satisfaction is negligible.
• Different results emerge within specific domains of life.
Abstract: This paper examines the association between education and subjective wellbeing. The evidence on this relationship is scarce, inconsistent and poorly understood, and reports of a negative association are common. Such results may appear counter-intuitive, but are in fact consistent with the idea that education is associated with higher expectations with respect to life circumstances. Consequently, education may be associated with greater subjective wellbeing only insofar as the ability to meet (or exceed) expectations is improved. This paper uses panel data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey to evaluate the evidence for differences in reference points across education levels, and to determine the overall association between education and subjective wellbeing. The results of the analysis confirm moderate rightward drifts across education levels for satisfaction with life in general, which are ‘neutralised’ by observed differences in actual circumstances. Other patterns emerge within specific life domains. Positive overall associations are observed for satisfaction with financial circumstances and health, while negative overall associations are observed for satisfaction with work and the amount of leisure time.
Keywords: Education; Subjective Wellbeing; Happiness; Satisfaction; Expectations; Adaptation
Wednesday, April 25, 2018
Issues such as how much inequality of income to tolerate, or how much pollution to tolerate, represent issues of clashing values, not the inability to process information, nor the lack of information, nor the failure to show wisdom
How to Think Rationally about World Problems. Keith E. Stanovich. Journal of Intelligence 2018, 6(2), 25; doi:10.3390/jintelligence6020025.
Abstract: I agree with the target essay that psychology has something to offer in helping to address societal problems. Intelligence has helped meliorate some social problems throughout history, including the period of time that is covered by the Flynn effect, but I agree with Sternberg that other psychological characteristics may be contributing as well, particularly increases in rationality. I also believe that increasing human rationality could have a variety of positive societal affects at levels somewhat smaller in grain size than the societal problems that Sternberg focuses on. Some of the societal problems that Sternberg lists, however, I do not think would be remedied by increases in rationality, intelligence, or wisdom, because remedy might be the wrong word in the context of these issues. Issues such as how much inequality of income to tolerate, how much pollution to tolerate, and how much we should sacrifice economic growth for potential future changes in global temperature represent issues of clashing values, not the inability to process information, nor the lack of information, nor the failure to show wisdom.
Keywords: rationality; intelligence; world problems; meliorism
Check also:
In self-judgment, the "best option illusion" leads to Dunning-Kruger (failure to recognize our own incompetence). In social judgment, it leads to the Cassandra quandary (failure to identify when another person’s competence exceeds our own): The best option illusion in self and social assessment. David Dunning. Self and Identity, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/04/in-self-judgment-best-option-illusion.html
People are more inaccurate when forecasting their own future prospects than when forecasting others, in part the result of biased visual experience. People orient visual attention and resolve visual ambiguity in ways that support self-interests: "Visual experience in self and social judgment: How a biased majority claim a superior minority." Emily Balcetis & Stephanie A. Cardenas. Self and Identity, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/04/people-are-more-inaccurate-when.html
Can we change our biased minds? Michael Gross. Current Biology, Volume 27, Issue 20, 23 October 2017, Pages R1089–R1091. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/can-we-change-our-biased-minds.html
People believe that future others' preferences and beliefs will change to align with their own:
Kahan, Dan M. and Landrum, Asheley and Carpenter, Katie and Helft, Laura and Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, Science Curiosity and Political Information Processing (August 1, 2016). Advances in Political Psychology, Forthcoming; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 561. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816803
The Partisan Brain: An Identity-Based Model of Political Belief. Jay J. Van Bavel, Andrea Pereira. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/02/the-tribal-nature-of-human-mind-leads.html
The Parties in our Heads: Misperceptions About Party Composition and Their Consequences. Douglas J. Ahler, Gaurav Sood. Aug 2017, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/01/we-tend-to-considerably-overestimate.html
The echo chamber is overstated: the moderating effect of political interest and diverse media. Elizabeth Dubois & Grant Blank. Information, Communication & Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/01/the-echo-chamber-is-overstated.html
Processing political misinformation: comprehending the Trump phenomenon. Briony Swire, Adam J. Berinsky, Stephan Lewandowsky, Ullrich K. H. Ecker. Royal Society Open Science, published on-line March 01 2017. DOI: 10.1098/rsos.160802, http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/4/3/160802
Competing cues: Older adults rely on knowledge in the face of fluency. By Brashier, Nadia M.; Umanath, Sharda; Cabeza, Roberto; Marsh, Elizabeth J. Psychology and Aging, Vol 32(4), Jun 2017, 331-337. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/07/competing-cues-older-adults-rely-on.html
Stanley, M. L., Dougherty, A. M., Yang, B. W., Henne, P., & De Brigard, F. (2017). Reasons Probably Won’t Change Your Mind: The Role of Reasons in Revising Moral Decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/reasons-probably-wont-change-your-mind.html
Science Denial Across the Political Divide — Liberals and Conservatives Are Similarly Motivated to Deny Attitude-Inconsistent Science. Anthony N. Washburn, Linda J. Skitka. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 10.1177/1948550617731500. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/liberals-and-conservatives-are.html
Biased Policy Professionals. Sheheryar Banuri, Stefan Dercon, and Varun Gauri. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8113. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/08/biased-policy-professionals-world-bank.html
Dispelling the Myth: Training in Education or Neuroscience Decreases but Does Not Eliminate Beliefs in Neuromyths. Kelly Macdonald et al. Frontiers in Psychology, Aug 10 2017. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/08/training-in-education-or-neuroscience.html
Individuals with greater science literacy and education have more polarized beliefs on controversial science topics. Caitlin Drummond and Baruch Fischhoff. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 114 no. 36, pp 9587–9592, doi: 10.1073/pnas.1704882114, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/individuals-with-greater-science.html
Expert ability can actually impair the accuracy of expert perception when judging others' performance: Adaptation and fallibility in experts' judgments of novice performers. By Larson, J. S., & Billeter, D. M. (2017). Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 43(2), 271–288. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/06/expert-ability-can-actually-impair.html
Public Perceptions of Partisan Selective Exposure. Perryman, Mallory R. The University of Wisconsin - Madison, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2017. 10607943. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/citizens-believe-others-especially.html
The Myth of Partisan Selective Exposure: A Portrait of the Online Political News Audience. Jacob L. Nelson, and James G. Webster. Social Media + Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/the-myth-of-partisan-selective-exposure.html
Echo Chamber? What Echo Chamber? Reviewing the Evidence. Axel Bruns. Future of Journalism 2017 Conference. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/echo-chamber-what-echo-chamber.html
Fake news and post-truth pronouncements in general and in early human development. Victor Grech. Early Human Development, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/fake-news-and-post-truth-pronouncements.html
Consumption of fake news is a consequence, not a cause of their readers’ voting preferences. Kahan, Dan M., Misinformation and Identity-Protective Cognition (October 2, 2017). Social Science Research Network, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/consumption-of-fake-news-is-consequence.html
Abstract: I agree with the target essay that psychology has something to offer in helping to address societal problems. Intelligence has helped meliorate some social problems throughout history, including the period of time that is covered by the Flynn effect, but I agree with Sternberg that other psychological characteristics may be contributing as well, particularly increases in rationality. I also believe that increasing human rationality could have a variety of positive societal affects at levels somewhat smaller in grain size than the societal problems that Sternberg focuses on. Some of the societal problems that Sternberg lists, however, I do not think would be remedied by increases in rationality, intelligence, or wisdom, because remedy might be the wrong word in the context of these issues. Issues such as how much inequality of income to tolerate, how much pollution to tolerate, and how much we should sacrifice economic growth for potential future changes in global temperature represent issues of clashing values, not the inability to process information, nor the lack of information, nor the failure to show wisdom.
Keywords: rationality; intelligence; world problems; meliorism
Check also:
In self-judgment, the "best option illusion" leads to Dunning-Kruger (failure to recognize our own incompetence). In social judgment, it leads to the Cassandra quandary (failure to identify when another person’s competence exceeds our own): The best option illusion in self and social assessment. David Dunning. Self and Identity, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/04/in-self-judgment-best-option-illusion.html
People are more inaccurate when forecasting their own future prospects than when forecasting others, in part the result of biased visual experience. People orient visual attention and resolve visual ambiguity in ways that support self-interests: "Visual experience in self and social judgment: How a biased majority claim a superior minority." Emily Balcetis & Stephanie A. Cardenas. Self and Identity, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/04/people-are-more-inaccurate-when.html
Can we change our biased minds? Michael Gross. Current Biology, Volume 27, Issue 20, 23 October 2017, Pages R1089–R1091. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/can-we-change-our-biased-minds.html
People believe that future others' preferences and beliefs will change to align with their own:
The Belief in a Favorable Future. Todd Rogers, Don Moore and Michael Norton. Psychological Science, Volume 28, issue 9, page(s): 1290-1301, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/people-believe-that-future-others.html
Kahan, Dan M. and Landrum, Asheley and Carpenter, Katie and Helft, Laura and Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, Science Curiosity and Political Information Processing (August 1, 2016). Advances in Political Psychology, Forthcoming; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 561. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816803
Abstract: This paper describes evidence suggesting that science curiosity counteracts politically biased information processing. This finding is in tension with two bodies of research. The first casts doubt on the existence of “curiosity” as a measurable disposition. The other suggests that individual differences in cognition related to science comprehension - of which science curiosity, if it exists, would presumably be one - do not mitigate politically biased information processing but instead aggravate it. The paper describes the scale-development strategy employed to overcome the problems associated with measuring science curiosity. It also reports data, observational and experimental, showing that science curiosity promotes open-minded engagement with information that is contrary to individuals’ political predispositions. We conclude by identifying a series of concrete research questions posed by these results.Facebook news and (de)polarization: reinforcing spirals in the 2016 US election. Michael A. Beam, Myiah J. Hutchens & Jay D. Hmielowski. Information, Communication & Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/03/our-results-also-showed-that-facebook.html
The Partisan Brain: An Identity-Based Model of Political Belief. Jay J. Van Bavel, Andrea Pereira. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/02/the-tribal-nature-of-human-mind-leads.html
The Parties in our Heads: Misperceptions About Party Composition and Their Consequences. Douglas J. Ahler, Gaurav Sood. Aug 2017, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/01/we-tend-to-considerably-overestimate.html
The echo chamber is overstated: the moderating effect of political interest and diverse media. Elizabeth Dubois & Grant Blank. Information, Communication & Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/01/the-echo-chamber-is-overstated.html
Processing political misinformation: comprehending the Trump phenomenon. Briony Swire, Adam J. Berinsky, Stephan Lewandowsky, Ullrich K. H. Ecker. Royal Society Open Science, published on-line March 01 2017. DOI: 10.1098/rsos.160802, http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/4/3/160802
Competing cues: Older adults rely on knowledge in the face of fluency. By Brashier, Nadia M.; Umanath, Sharda; Cabeza, Roberto; Marsh, Elizabeth J. Psychology and Aging, Vol 32(4), Jun 2017, 331-337. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/07/competing-cues-older-adults-rely-on.html
Stanley, M. L., Dougherty, A. M., Yang, B. W., Henne, P., & De Brigard, F. (2017). Reasons Probably Won’t Change Your Mind: The Role of Reasons in Revising Moral Decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/reasons-probably-wont-change-your-mind.html
Science Denial Across the Political Divide — Liberals and Conservatives Are Similarly Motivated to Deny Attitude-Inconsistent Science. Anthony N. Washburn, Linda J. Skitka. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 10.1177/1948550617731500. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/liberals-and-conservatives-are.html
Biased Policy Professionals. Sheheryar Banuri, Stefan Dercon, and Varun Gauri. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8113. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/08/biased-policy-professionals-world-bank.html
Dispelling the Myth: Training in Education or Neuroscience Decreases but Does Not Eliminate Beliefs in Neuromyths. Kelly Macdonald et al. Frontiers in Psychology, Aug 10 2017. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/08/training-in-education-or-neuroscience.html
Individuals with greater science literacy and education have more polarized beliefs on controversial science topics. Caitlin Drummond and Baruch Fischhoff. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 114 no. 36, pp 9587–9592, doi: 10.1073/pnas.1704882114, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/individuals-with-greater-science.html
Expert ability can actually impair the accuracy of expert perception when judging others' performance: Adaptation and fallibility in experts' judgments of novice performers. By Larson, J. S., & Billeter, D. M. (2017). Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 43(2), 271–288. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/06/expert-ability-can-actually-impair.html
Public Perceptions of Partisan Selective Exposure. Perryman, Mallory R. The University of Wisconsin - Madison, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2017. 10607943. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/citizens-believe-others-especially.html
The Myth of Partisan Selective Exposure: A Portrait of the Online Political News Audience. Jacob L. Nelson, and James G. Webster. Social Media + Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/the-myth-of-partisan-selective-exposure.html
Echo Chamber? What Echo Chamber? Reviewing the Evidence. Axel Bruns. Future of Journalism 2017 Conference. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/echo-chamber-what-echo-chamber.html
Fake news and post-truth pronouncements in general and in early human development. Victor Grech. Early Human Development, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/fake-news-and-post-truth-pronouncements.html
Consumption of fake news is a consequence, not a cause of their readers’ voting preferences. Kahan, Dan M., Misinformation and Identity-Protective Cognition (October 2, 2017). Social Science Research Network, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/consumption-of-fake-news-is-consequence.html
In self-judgment, the "best option illusion" leads to Dunning-Kruger (failure to recognize our own incompetence). In social judgment, it leads to the Cassandra quandary (failure to identify when another person’s competence exceeds our own)
The best option illusion in self and social assessment. David Dunning. Self and Identity, https://doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2018.1465460
Abstract: I discuss the best option illusion, the tendency for people to select what they believe is the most reasonable option when solving problems or deciding on a course of action. Such a strategy is straightforward, sensible and difficult to quibble with, but occasionally the seemingly best option turns out to be anything but—leading to systematic errors and problems that must be identified, addressed, and managed. Specifically, people are more likely to be surprised in a negative direction than a positive one, give themselves positive credit for wrong answers, and stick to their answers far more than they should after exposure to contrary evidence. In self-judgment, the illusion leads to the Dunning-Kruger effect, in which people fail to recognize their own incompetence. In social judgment, it leads to the Cassandra quandary, in which people fail to identify when another person’s competence exceeds their own.
Keywords: Self-assessment, confidence, overconfidence, Dunning-Kruger effect, social judgment
---
The Cassandra bias is that people often have adequate expertise to accurately recognize true incompetence among their peers, in that the competence of anyone who chooses differently from the self is suspect. However, people fail to have adequate expertise to reliably identify peers who demonstrate superior experience. In short, when highly competent people choose differently from the self, those differences are, again, read as potential incompetence when they really reflect the exact opposite (Dunning, 2018c). In sum, people often lack the competence necessary to recognize competence or excellence that outstrips their own. They fail to have the virtuosity necessary to recognize a true virtuoso. As Sir Arthur Conan Doyle put it, in the guise of his famous character Sherlock Holmes, mediocrity recognizes nothing above itself. As a consequence, the best and the brightest often hide in plain sight.
In recent work, we have shown that Sir Arthur Conan Doyle is right. Study participants take tests in logical reasoning, numerical reasoning, financial literacy, or chess expertise, for example, and then are asked to assess the performances of other people chosen to represent gross incompetence to perfect skill. Respondents are relatively good at judging poor performers, overestimating the performance of the worst two performers they see by roughly 15%. However, they underestimate the top two performers they see by almost twice that—29% (Dunning & Cone, 2018). The degree of this underestimation was so profound that if converted to a metaphorical IQ scale, the very top performer in each study is judged to be operating at only an IQ of 104 for that particular skill, when in fact that person operates at a skill-specific level near a “genius” IQ of 134.
Participants in these studies also have more difficulty identifying top performers than bottom ones. In a study about financial literacy, participants were asked which of their peers they would approach for financial advice. Participants chose the person with a perfect score on a financial literacy quiz only 29% of the time, whereas they correctly identified the worst performer as the one to avoid 43% of the time. In another study, participants were asked to spot the worst or the best performer out of a group of three individuals. The skill was “global literacy,” and the peers being judged had completed a 12-item quiz on world affairs.Participants were quite good at spotting bad performers. When looking over a group in which two people scored 5 of the quiz and the last scored only 1, participants accurately identified the worst performer roughly 72% of the time. However, when the task was spotting the good performer, an entirely different picture emerged. When looking over a group in which one person had scored 11 on the quiz and the other two only 7, participants accurately identified the best performer only 25% of the time (Dunning & Cone, 2018).
[...]
But the most ironic set of judgments came from the study done on chess, which examined what could happen when the Cassandra quandary runs up against the Dunning-Kruger effect. High expert participants, those who did well on a quiz about chess strategy and also sported the highest official United States Chess Federation ratings, seemed largely sensible in their judgments about peers they could beat. When they looked over a peer who had done horribly on the chess quiz, they were absolutely certain they could beat that peer, but were only 50–50 about whether they could beat a peer who aced the quiz. Low expert participants, however, provided a set of estimates that did not seem so reasonable. They were only 60% sure they could beat the worst performing peer, but 70% sure they could beat the peer who aced the quiz. In short, they were more confident they could beat a peer showing a near grandmaster mind than did other participants who actually knew a good deal about chess (Dunning & Cone, 2018).
Check also
People are more inaccurate when forecasting their own future prospects than when forecasting others, in part the result of biased visual experience. People orient visual attention and resolve visual ambiguity in ways that support self-interests: "Visual experience in self and social judgment: How a biased majority claim a superior minority." Emily Balcetis & Stephanie A. Cardenas. Self and Identity, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/04/people-are-more-inaccurate-when.html
Can we change our biased minds? Michael Gross. Current Biology, Volume 27, Issue 20, 23 October 2017, Pages R1089–R1091. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/can-we-change-our-biased-minds.html
People believe that future others' preferences and beliefs will change to align with their own:
Kahan, Dan M. and Landrum, Asheley and Carpenter, Katie and Helft, Laura and Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, Science Curiosity and Political Information Processing (August 1, 2016). Advances in Political Psychology, Forthcoming; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 561. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816803
Facebook news and (de)polarization: reinforcing spirals in the 2016 US election. Michael A. Beam, Myiah J. Hutchens & Jay D. Hmielowski. Information, Communication & Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/03/our-results-also-showed-that-facebook.html
The Partisan Brain: An Identity-Based Model of Political Belief. Jay J. Van Bavel, Andrea Pereira. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/02/the-tribal-nature-of-human-mind-leads.html
The Parties in our Heads: Misperceptions About Party Composition and Their Consequences. Douglas J. Ahler, Gaurav Sood. Aug 2017, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/01/we-tend-to-considerably-overestimate.html
The echo chamber is overstated: the moderating effect of political interest and diverse media. Elizabeth Dubois & Grant Blank. Information, Communication & Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/01/the-echo-chamber-is-overstated.html
Processing political misinformation: comprehending the Trump phenomenon. Briony Swire, Adam J. Berinsky, Stephan Lewandowsky, Ullrich K. H. Ecker. Royal Society Open Science, published on-line March 01 2017. DOI: 10.1098/rsos.160802, http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/4/3/160802
Competing cues: Older adults rely on knowledge in the face of fluency. By Brashier, Nadia M.; Umanath, Sharda; Cabeza, Roberto; Marsh, Elizabeth J. Psychology and Aging, Vol 32(4), Jun 2017, 331-337. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/07/competing-cues-older-adults-rely-on.html
Stanley, M. L., Dougherty, A. M., Yang, B. W., Henne, P., & De Brigard, F. (2017). Reasons Probably Won’t Change Your Mind: The Role of Reasons in Revising Moral Decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/reasons-probably-wont-change-your-mind.html
Science Denial Across the Political Divide — Liberals and Conservatives Are Similarly Motivated to Deny Attitude-Inconsistent Science. Anthony N. Washburn, Linda J. Skitka. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 10.1177/1948550617731500. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/liberals-and-conservatives-are.html
Biased Policy Professionals. Sheheryar Banuri, Stefan Dercon, and Varun Gauri. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8113. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/08/biased-policy-professionals-world-bank.html
Dispelling the Myth: Training in Education or Neuroscience Decreases but Does Not Eliminate Beliefs in Neuromyths. Kelly Macdonald et al. Frontiers in Psychology, Aug 10 2017. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/08/training-in-education-or-neuroscience.html
Individuals with greater science literacy and education have more polarized beliefs on controversial science topics. Caitlin Drummond and Baruch Fischhoff. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 114 no. 36, pp 9587–9592, doi: 10.1073/pnas.1704882114, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/individuals-with-greater-science.html
Expert ability can actually impair the accuracy of expert perception when judging others' performance: Adaptation and fallibility in experts' judgments of novice performers. By Larson, J. S., & Billeter, D. M. (2017). Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 43(2), 271–288. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/06/expert-ability-can-actually-impair.html
Public Perceptions of Partisan Selective Exposure. Perryman, Mallory R. The University of Wisconsin - Madison, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2017. 10607943. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/citizens-believe-others-especially.html
The Myth of Partisan Selective Exposure: A Portrait of the Online Political News Audience. Jacob L. Nelson, and James G. Webster. Social Media + Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/the-myth-of-partisan-selective-exposure.html
Echo Chamber? What Echo Chamber? Reviewing the Evidence. Axel Bruns. Future of Journalism 2017 Conference. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/echo-chamber-what-echo-chamber.html
Fake news and post-truth pronouncements in general and in early human development. Victor Grech. Early Human Development, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/fake-news-and-post-truth-pronouncements.html
Consumption of fake news is a consequence, not a cause of their readers’ voting preferences. Kahan, Dan M., Misinformation and Identity-Protective Cognition (October 2, 2017). Social Science Research Network, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/consumption-of-fake-news-is-consequence.html
Abstract: I discuss the best option illusion, the tendency for people to select what they believe is the most reasonable option when solving problems or deciding on a course of action. Such a strategy is straightforward, sensible and difficult to quibble with, but occasionally the seemingly best option turns out to be anything but—leading to systematic errors and problems that must be identified, addressed, and managed. Specifically, people are more likely to be surprised in a negative direction than a positive one, give themselves positive credit for wrong answers, and stick to their answers far more than they should after exposure to contrary evidence. In self-judgment, the illusion leads to the Dunning-Kruger effect, in which people fail to recognize their own incompetence. In social judgment, it leads to the Cassandra quandary, in which people fail to identify when another person’s competence exceeds their own.
Keywords: Self-assessment, confidence, overconfidence, Dunning-Kruger effect, social judgment
---
The Cassandra bias is that people often have adequate expertise to accurately recognize true incompetence among their peers, in that the competence of anyone who chooses differently from the self is suspect. However, people fail to have adequate expertise to reliably identify peers who demonstrate superior experience. In short, when highly competent people choose differently from the self, those differences are, again, read as potential incompetence when they really reflect the exact opposite (Dunning, 2018c). In sum, people often lack the competence necessary to recognize competence or excellence that outstrips their own. They fail to have the virtuosity necessary to recognize a true virtuoso. As Sir Arthur Conan Doyle put it, in the guise of his famous character Sherlock Holmes, mediocrity recognizes nothing above itself. As a consequence, the best and the brightest often hide in plain sight.
In recent work, we have shown that Sir Arthur Conan Doyle is right. Study participants take tests in logical reasoning, numerical reasoning, financial literacy, or chess expertise, for example, and then are asked to assess the performances of other people chosen to represent gross incompetence to perfect skill. Respondents are relatively good at judging poor performers, overestimating the performance of the worst two performers they see by roughly 15%. However, they underestimate the top two performers they see by almost twice that—29% (Dunning & Cone, 2018). The degree of this underestimation was so profound that if converted to a metaphorical IQ scale, the very top performer in each study is judged to be operating at only an IQ of 104 for that particular skill, when in fact that person operates at a skill-specific level near a “genius” IQ of 134.
Participants in these studies also have more difficulty identifying top performers than bottom ones. In a study about financial literacy, participants were asked which of their peers they would approach for financial advice. Participants chose the person with a perfect score on a financial literacy quiz only 29% of the time, whereas they correctly identified the worst performer as the one to avoid 43% of the time. In another study, participants were asked to spot the worst or the best performer out of a group of three individuals. The skill was “global literacy,” and the peers being judged had completed a 12-item quiz on world affairs.Participants were quite good at spotting bad performers. When looking over a group in which two people scored 5 of the quiz and the last scored only 1, participants accurately identified the worst performer roughly 72% of the time. However, when the task was spotting the good performer, an entirely different picture emerged. When looking over a group in which one person had scored 11 on the quiz and the other two only 7, participants accurately identified the best performer only 25% of the time (Dunning & Cone, 2018).
[...]
But the most ironic set of judgments came from the study done on chess, which examined what could happen when the Cassandra quandary runs up against the Dunning-Kruger effect. High expert participants, those who did well on a quiz about chess strategy and also sported the highest official United States Chess Federation ratings, seemed largely sensible in their judgments about peers they could beat. When they looked over a peer who had done horribly on the chess quiz, they were absolutely certain they could beat that peer, but were only 50–50 about whether they could beat a peer who aced the quiz. Low expert participants, however, provided a set of estimates that did not seem so reasonable. They were only 60% sure they could beat the worst performing peer, but 70% sure they could beat the peer who aced the quiz. In short, they were more confident they could beat a peer showing a near grandmaster mind than did other participants who actually knew a good deal about chess (Dunning & Cone, 2018).
Check also
People are more inaccurate when forecasting their own future prospects than when forecasting others, in part the result of biased visual experience. People orient visual attention and resolve visual ambiguity in ways that support self-interests: "Visual experience in self and social judgment: How a biased majority claim a superior minority." Emily Balcetis & Stephanie A. Cardenas. Self and Identity, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/04/people-are-more-inaccurate-when.html
Can we change our biased minds? Michael Gross. Current Biology, Volume 27, Issue 20, 23 October 2017, Pages R1089–R1091. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/can-we-change-our-biased-minds.html
Summary: A simple test taken by millions of people reveals that virtually everybody has implicit biases that they are unaware of and that may clash with their explicit beliefs. From policing to scientific publishing, all activities that deal with people are at risk of making wrong decisions due to bias. Raising awareness is the first step towards improving the outcomes.
People believe that future others' preferences and beliefs will change to align with their own:
The Belief in a Favorable Future. Todd Rogers, Don Moore and Michael Norton. Psychological Science, Volume 28, issue 9, page(s): 1290-1301, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/people-believe-that-future-others.html
Kahan, Dan M. and Landrum, Asheley and Carpenter, Katie and Helft, Laura and Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, Science Curiosity and Political Information Processing (August 1, 2016). Advances in Political Psychology, Forthcoming; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 561. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2816803
Abstract: This paper describes evidence suggesting that science curiosity counteracts politically biased information processing. This finding is in tension with two bodies of research. The first casts doubt on the existence of “curiosity” as a measurable disposition. The other suggests that individual differences in cognition related to science comprehension - of which science curiosity, if it exists, would presumably be one - do not mitigate politically biased information processing but instead aggravate it. The paper describes the scale-development strategy employed to overcome the problems associated with measuring science curiosity. It also reports data, observational and experimental, showing that science curiosity promotes open-minded engagement with information that is contrary to individuals’ political predispositions. We conclude by identifying a series of concrete research questions posed by these results.
Keywords: politically motivated reasoning, curiosity, science communication, risk perception
Facebook news and (de)polarization: reinforcing spirals in the 2016 US election. Michael A. Beam, Myiah J. Hutchens & Jay D. Hmielowski. Information, Communication & Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/03/our-results-also-showed-that-facebook.html
The Partisan Brain: An Identity-Based Model of Political Belief. Jay J. Van Bavel, Andrea Pereira. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/02/the-tribal-nature-of-human-mind-leads.html
The Parties in our Heads: Misperceptions About Party Composition and Their Consequences. Douglas J. Ahler, Gaurav Sood. Aug 2017, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/01/we-tend-to-considerably-overestimate.html
The echo chamber is overstated: the moderating effect of political interest and diverse media. Elizabeth Dubois & Grant Blank. Information, Communication & Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/01/the-echo-chamber-is-overstated.html
Processing political misinformation: comprehending the Trump phenomenon. Briony Swire, Adam J. Berinsky, Stephan Lewandowsky, Ullrich K. H. Ecker. Royal Society Open Science, published on-line March 01 2017. DOI: 10.1098/rsos.160802, http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/4/3/160802
Competing cues: Older adults rely on knowledge in the face of fluency. By Brashier, Nadia M.; Umanath, Sharda; Cabeza, Roberto; Marsh, Elizabeth J. Psychology and Aging, Vol 32(4), Jun 2017, 331-337. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/07/competing-cues-older-adults-rely-on.html
Stanley, M. L., Dougherty, A. M., Yang, B. W., Henne, P., & De Brigard, F. (2017). Reasons Probably Won’t Change Your Mind: The Role of Reasons in Revising Moral Decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/reasons-probably-wont-change-your-mind.html
Science Denial Across the Political Divide — Liberals and Conservatives Are Similarly Motivated to Deny Attitude-Inconsistent Science. Anthony N. Washburn, Linda J. Skitka. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 10.1177/1948550617731500. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/liberals-and-conservatives-are.html
Biased Policy Professionals. Sheheryar Banuri, Stefan Dercon, and Varun Gauri. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 8113. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/08/biased-policy-professionals-world-bank.html
Dispelling the Myth: Training in Education or Neuroscience Decreases but Does Not Eliminate Beliefs in Neuromyths. Kelly Macdonald et al. Frontiers in Psychology, Aug 10 2017. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/08/training-in-education-or-neuroscience.html
Individuals with greater science literacy and education have more polarized beliefs on controversial science topics. Caitlin Drummond and Baruch Fischhoff. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 114 no. 36, pp 9587–9592, doi: 10.1073/pnas.1704882114, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/individuals-with-greater-science.html
Expert ability can actually impair the accuracy of expert perception when judging others' performance: Adaptation and fallibility in experts' judgments of novice performers. By Larson, J. S., & Billeter, D. M. (2017). Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 43(2), 271–288. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/06/expert-ability-can-actually-impair.html
Public Perceptions of Partisan Selective Exposure. Perryman, Mallory R. The University of Wisconsin - Madison, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2017. 10607943. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/citizens-believe-others-especially.html
The Myth of Partisan Selective Exposure: A Portrait of the Online Political News Audience. Jacob L. Nelson, and James G. Webster. Social Media + Society, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/the-myth-of-partisan-selective-exposure.html
Echo Chamber? What Echo Chamber? Reviewing the Evidence. Axel Bruns. Future of Journalism 2017 Conference. http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/echo-chamber-what-echo-chamber.html
Fake news and post-truth pronouncements in general and in early human development. Victor Grech. Early Human Development, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/09/fake-news-and-post-truth-pronouncements.html
Consumption of fake news is a consequence, not a cause of their readers’ voting preferences. Kahan, Dan M., Misinformation and Identity-Protective Cognition (October 2, 2017). Social Science Research Network, http://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2017/10/consumption-of-fake-news-is-consequence.html
People are more inaccurate when forecasting their own future prospects than when forecasting others, in part the result of biased visual experience. People orient visual attention and resolve visual ambiguity in ways that support self-interests
Visual experience in self and social judgment: How a biased majority claim a superior minority. Emily Balcetis & Stephanie A. Cardenas. Self and Identity, https://doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2018.1466724
Abstract: People form beliefs of their own superiority relative to others to degrees that are implausible and statistically impossible. Is this the result of error in self or social judgment? We review evidence suggesting that people are more inaccurate when forecasting their own future prospects than when forecasting others. Moreover, we argue that such error when acting as a self rather than social psychologist is in part the result of biased visual experience. People orient visual attention and resolve visual ambiguity in ways that support self-interests. Because visual experience serves as one of the foundational stages of information processing, bias that emerges as people look at the world around them may propagate biased cognitive judgment without individuals’ awareness of the presence or source of such bias. Motivated cognition may in part be the result of motivated perception.
Keywords: Motivated cognition, self and social judgment, social perception, attention, ambiguity
Abstract: People form beliefs of their own superiority relative to others to degrees that are implausible and statistically impossible. Is this the result of error in self or social judgment? We review evidence suggesting that people are more inaccurate when forecasting their own future prospects than when forecasting others. Moreover, we argue that such error when acting as a self rather than social psychologist is in part the result of biased visual experience. People orient visual attention and resolve visual ambiguity in ways that support self-interests. Because visual experience serves as one of the foundational stages of information processing, bias that emerges as people look at the world around them may propagate biased cognitive judgment without individuals’ awareness of the presence or source of such bias. Motivated cognition may in part be the result of motivated perception.
Keywords: Motivated cognition, self and social judgment, social perception, attention, ambiguity
Differential Parenting and Authoritarianism: Unravelling Quasi‐Causal Environmental Effects via Phenotypic and Genetically Informed Multi‐Rater Models
Unravelling Quasi‐Causal Environmental Effects via Phenotypic and Genetically Informed Multi‐Rater Models: The Case of Differential Parenting and Authoritarianism. Alexandra Zapko‐Willmes, Rainer Riemann, Christian Kandler. European Journal of Personality, https://doi.org/10.1002/per.2144
Abstract: This study investigated the association between different experiences of parenting and individual right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA) using twin family data comprising self‐ and informant reports. We applied a design that allowed us to examine whether the link between retrospective assessments of parenting and current RWA is effectively environmental or whether the association is attributable to genetic influences. We hypothesized that an authoritarian parenting style (low responsiveness and high demandingness) provided by the parents is associated with higher offspring's RWA, and that this association is similar for both twin siblings as a function of their genetic relatedness and shared familial experiences—that is, genotype–environment correlation. A sample of 875 twins as well as 319 mothers and 268 fathers completed a questionnaire on twins' parental environment and their own authoritarian attitudes. Additionally, 1322 well‐informed peers assessed twins' RWA. Applying structural equation modelling, we found twins' experiences of parental responsiveness and demandingness to be positively associated with self‐reported and peer‐reported RWA. The correlation between responsiveness and RWA was similar for both twins due to their genetic similarity, whereas twin differences in demandingness were positively associated with twin differences in RWA, indicating quasi‐causal environmental effects. Implications for the interdependence between parenting and RWA are discussed.
Abstract: This study investigated the association between different experiences of parenting and individual right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA) using twin family data comprising self‐ and informant reports. We applied a design that allowed us to examine whether the link between retrospective assessments of parenting and current RWA is effectively environmental or whether the association is attributable to genetic influences. We hypothesized that an authoritarian parenting style (low responsiveness and high demandingness) provided by the parents is associated with higher offspring's RWA, and that this association is similar for both twin siblings as a function of their genetic relatedness and shared familial experiences—that is, genotype–environment correlation. A sample of 875 twins as well as 319 mothers and 268 fathers completed a questionnaire on twins' parental environment and their own authoritarian attitudes. Additionally, 1322 well‐informed peers assessed twins' RWA. Applying structural equation modelling, we found twins' experiences of parental responsiveness and demandingness to be positively associated with self‐reported and peer‐reported RWA. The correlation between responsiveness and RWA was similar for both twins due to their genetic similarity, whereas twin differences in demandingness were positively associated with twin differences in RWA, indicating quasi‐causal environmental effects. Implications for the interdependence between parenting and RWA are discussed.
Three categories of monogamy maintenance strategies to avoid relationship threats are commonly used: Proactive Avoidance (of attractive alternatives), Relationship Enhancement, and Low Self‐Monitoring and Derogation (in the face of extradyadic attraction). Not very successfully...
Ain’t misbehavin? Monogamy maintenance strategies in heterosexual romantic relationships. Brenda H. Lee, Lucia F. O'Sullivan. Personal Relationships, https://doi.org/10.1111/pere.12235
Abstract: Monogamy is a near universal expectation in intimate relationships in Western societies and is typically defined as sexual and romantic exclusivity to one partner. This research informs the paradox between monogamy intentions and high rates of infidelity. Monogamy maintenance (MM) strategies used in response to relationship threats posed by attraction to extradyadic others were identified and characterized. Across three samples, 741 U.S. adults in intimate relationships completed surveys addressing MM. Twenty‐four strategies emerged in three factors—Proactive Avoidance (of attractive alternatives), Relationship Enhancement, and Low Self‐Monitoring and Derogation (in the face of extradyadic attraction). All MM factors were commonly endorsed, yet were largely unsuccessful at forestalling infidelity.
---
The derogation of attractive alternatives was included in the preliminary MMI [MM inventory] both in the form of outward behaviors that may be perceived as rude or socially disengaging (e.g., “Intentionally ignored the looks from this other person when they were looking at me”; “Treated this other person rudely”), and in the form of self-directed talk (e.g., “Told myself that this other person was bad for me”; “Looked for unflattering things in this other person”). These strategies were intentional extensions of previously identified automatic responses to attractive others in experimental contexts—namely, inattention and hostility (Maner et al., 2009; Plant et al., 2010). The outward strategies directed toward the attractive other were infrequently endorsed, indicating that although individuals may engage in stronger forms of derogation with fleeting relationship threats, they typically derogate attractive others in the form of selfdirected talk within the social contexts of their lives.
Check also Attentional and evaluative biases help people maintain relationships by avoiding infidelity. McNulty, James K., Meltzer, Andrea L., Makhanova, Anastasia, Maner, Jon K. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Feb 12 , 2018, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/02/attentional-and-evaluative-biases-help.html
Abstract: Monogamy is a near universal expectation in intimate relationships in Western societies and is typically defined as sexual and romantic exclusivity to one partner. This research informs the paradox between monogamy intentions and high rates of infidelity. Monogamy maintenance (MM) strategies used in response to relationship threats posed by attraction to extradyadic others were identified and characterized. Across three samples, 741 U.S. adults in intimate relationships completed surveys addressing MM. Twenty‐four strategies emerged in three factors—Proactive Avoidance (of attractive alternatives), Relationship Enhancement, and Low Self‐Monitoring and Derogation (in the face of extradyadic attraction). All MM factors were commonly endorsed, yet were largely unsuccessful at forestalling infidelity.
---
The derogation of attractive alternatives was included in the preliminary MMI [MM inventory] both in the form of outward behaviors that may be perceived as rude or socially disengaging (e.g., “Intentionally ignored the looks from this other person when they were looking at me”; “Treated this other person rudely”), and in the form of self-directed talk (e.g., “Told myself that this other person was bad for me”; “Looked for unflattering things in this other person”). These strategies were intentional extensions of previously identified automatic responses to attractive others in experimental contexts—namely, inattention and hostility (Maner et al., 2009; Plant et al., 2010). The outward strategies directed toward the attractive other were infrequently endorsed, indicating that although individuals may engage in stronger forms of derogation with fleeting relationship threats, they typically derogate attractive others in the form of selfdirected talk within the social contexts of their lives.
Check also Attentional and evaluative biases help people maintain relationships by avoiding infidelity. McNulty, James K., Meltzer, Andrea L., Makhanova, Anastasia, Maner, Jon K. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Feb 12 , 2018, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/02/attentional-and-evaluative-biases-help.html
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
