Individual-level differences in negativity biases in news selection. Sarah Bachleda et al. Personality and Individual Differences, November 23 2019, 109675. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2019.109675
Abstract: Literatures across the social sciences highlight the tendency for humans to be more attentive to negative information than to positive information. We focus here on negativity biases in news selection (NBNS) and suggest that this bias varies across individuals and contexts. We introduce a survey-based measure of NBNS which is used to explore the correlates of negative news bias in surveys in the U.S., Canada, and Sweden. We find that some respondents are more prone to NBNS than others. There is evidence of contextual effects, but panel data suggests that some of the individual-level differences persist over time. NBNS likely reflects some combination of long-term personality differences and short-term situational factors, and is systematically related to a number of economic and political attitudes.
Keywords: Political communicationPersonality differencesNews consumptionNegativity bias
1. Durable versus context-driven individual-level variation in
negativity biases
"including Lilienfeld and
Latzman's (2014) finding that although conservatives are more responsive to negative information on average, both conservatives and
liberals respond to negative information when it poses a threat to their
partisan identity; or Federico, Johnston and Lavine's (2014) finding that
evidence of negativity biases will be conditional on political engagement."
6. Discussion
There is reason to expect that individual-level variation in negativity biases has an important and durable impact on individuals’ news
media use, as well as on a range of economic and political attitudes.
This paper has taken a first step toward measuring a negativity bias in
news selection. We find that while on balance there is a bias towards
negativity, there are individual-level differences. These differences appear to be partly pre-dispositional; that is, they appear to be durable,
demonstrated both by correlations with demographic, partisan and
personality measures, and by within-respondent correlations across
time. We also find that these individual-level differences are correlated
with a variety of economic and political attitudes.
We take these results as evidence of the potential importance of
negativity biases in news selection (NBNS) in understanding attitudes
about governments, the economy, and other politically and economically-relevant attitudes. We also suspect that NBNS moderates the impact of news content – those who are high in NBNS may select into a
rather different information stream than those who are low in NBNS,
which could subsequently shape their political perspectives. Although
this application of the measure is not tested here, we thus see disentangling the relationship between political news selection and political
preferences as an important avenue for future research.
There is also potential for work that explores the degree to which
more nuanced variation in tone – i.e., not just positive or negative, but
gradations across that range – matters for story selection and measures
of negativity biases. Our headlines do not vary in tone much within the
negative and positive categories (see Appendix Fig. 2); this was done by
design. But past work has suggested nonlinearities in negativity biases
(e.g., Ito and Cacioppo, 2005), and these could be more fully explored
using headlines that vary systematically in degrees of positivity or negativity.
Finally, an exploration of the relationship between NBNS and other
measures of negativity biases will be critical for future work. Given that
other more standard measures of negativity biases are primarily labbased, we have not examined them in the survey data used here.
However, understanding the extent to which NBNS is a domain-specific
negativity bias, versus the consequence of a more domain-general bias,
requires further research. Our results provide only a first step in this
direction. In doing so, however, we regard the preceding analyses as a
first signal that individual-level differences in news preferences may be
one way in which personality differences are relevant to political attitudes and behavior.
Samples
U.S. Sample
Data for the U.S. study were collected as part of an online panel survey from a sample provided by Qualtrics, which recruited subjects using
ClearVoice research. ClearVoice maintains a standing panel of survey respondents who were recruited to the platform through a combination of
targeted emails, advertisements, and website intercepts. These individuals then opt-in to taking surveys and are recruited to participate in individual
studies either by email or by clicking on a dashboard link. ClearVoice sent emails to 61,865 panelists with the goal of recruiting a broad national
sample of at least 3,667 Americans to participate in the study.
Swedish Sample
Data for the first Swedish sample come from the Citizen Panel (original Swedish name: Medborgarpanelen – MP), which is a panel survey fielded
online by the Laboratory of Opinion Research (LORE). Specifically, the data come from Citizen Panel 16 (MP16), which was fielded between June 9
and June 30, 2015. The panel used a mixed sampling design whereby 84 percent of the gross sample were opt-in and the remaining 16 percent were
probability based. The panel wave included five separate modules and our data come from module 3 (Negativity Biases). This module yielded 12,867
complete responses for an AAPOR participation rate (RR5) of 92%.
Data for the second Swedish sample also come from the Citizen Panel. Specifically, the data come from Citizen Panel 29 (MP29), which was
fielded between March 22 and April 16, 2018. The panel used a mixed sampling design whereby 76 percent of the gross sample were opt-in and the
remaining 24 percent were probability based. The panel wave included five separate modules and our data come from module 2 (Negativity Biases in
News Selection). Additional information about the Citizen Panels can be found at http://lore.gu.se/surveys/citizen.
Canadian Sample
The Canadian data come from the 2015 Canadian Election Study. Full documentation for the study can be found at: http://ces-eec.arts.ubc.ca/
english-section/surveys/. The study was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
Sunday, November 24, 2019
Saturday, November 23, 2019
From 2018... Seven deadly sins of potential romantic partners: dealbreakers in mating preferences
From 2018... Seven deadly sins of potential romantic partners: dealbreakers in mating preferences. Mihály Berkics, Zsófia Csajbók. Conference: 13th Conference of the European Human Behaviour and Evolution Association At: Pécs, Hungary, April 2018. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325961275
Abstract
Objective. Most of the research on mate preferences has focused on what people desire in a partner, and not on dealbreakers, i.e. what traits make people reject a potential mate. Recently, Jonason et al (2015) published a multi-study paper presenting extensive research on dealbreakers, emphasizing their importance. However, their items loaded on a single factor, so they turned to sorting the items by independent coders into face-valid categories to establish more distinguished facets of dealbreakers. The goal of the present research is to identify dealbreakers in a large sample with factor-analytic methods.
Methods. In Study 1, potential dealbreakers were collected with open-ended questions from a sample of 173 participants. Based on their responses, in Study 2 a closed-ended questionnaire was compiled and administered to a large sample (N = 2,445) of heterosexual respondents (48% female), who had to rate each dealbreaker trait according to how likely it would make the participant reject a potential partner. First exploratory, then confirmatory factor analyses were performed on these ratings. Participants also rated themselves on 23 desirable traits representing 7 factors of mate preferences (from Csajbók & Berkics, 2017).
Results. Seven factors of dealbreakers were confirmed: loserness, hostility, bad hygiene, arrogance, ugliness, overattachment, and abusiveness. Women in general were more selective, i.e. they were more likely to reject prospective partners with undesirable traits, except for ugliness, where males scored higher. Individual differences were also found, as participants' ratings of themselves predicted which dealbreakers they found to be more or less repulsive.
Conclusions. Dealbreakers can be measured as factors just as desirable traits in a potential mate. This offers a more nuanced method to study sex and individual differences with regards to what traits make people reject a candidate when looking for a partner.
Abstract
Objective. Most of the research on mate preferences has focused on what people desire in a partner, and not on dealbreakers, i.e. what traits make people reject a potential mate. Recently, Jonason et al (2015) published a multi-study paper presenting extensive research on dealbreakers, emphasizing their importance. However, their items loaded on a single factor, so they turned to sorting the items by independent coders into face-valid categories to establish more distinguished facets of dealbreakers. The goal of the present research is to identify dealbreakers in a large sample with factor-analytic methods.
Methods. In Study 1, potential dealbreakers were collected with open-ended questions from a sample of 173 participants. Based on their responses, in Study 2 a closed-ended questionnaire was compiled and administered to a large sample (N = 2,445) of heterosexual respondents (48% female), who had to rate each dealbreaker trait according to how likely it would make the participant reject a potential partner. First exploratory, then confirmatory factor analyses were performed on these ratings. Participants also rated themselves on 23 desirable traits representing 7 factors of mate preferences (from Csajbók & Berkics, 2017).
Results. Seven factors of dealbreakers were confirmed: loserness, hostility, bad hygiene, arrogance, ugliness, overattachment, and abusiveness. Women in general were more selective, i.e. they were more likely to reject prospective partners with undesirable traits, except for ugliness, where males scored higher. Individual differences were also found, as participants' ratings of themselves predicted which dealbreakers they found to be more or less repulsive.
Conclusions. Dealbreakers can be measured as factors just as desirable traits in a potential mate. This offers a more nuanced method to study sex and individual differences with regards to what traits make people reject a candidate when looking for a partner.
Human belief formation is sensitive to social rewards and punishments, such that beliefs are sometimes formed based on unconscious expectations of their likely effects on other agents
Socially Adaptive Belief. Daniel Williams. Nov 2019. Forthcoming in Mind and Language. https://www.academia.edu/40935572/Socially_Adaptive_Belief
Abstract: I outline and defend the hypothesis that human belief formation is sensitive to social rewards and punishments, such that beliefs are sometimes formed based on unconscious expectations of their likely effects on other agents - agents who frequently reward us when we hold ungrounded beliefs and punish us when we hold reasonable ones. After clarifying this phenomenon and distinguishing it from other sources of bias in the psychological literature, I argue that the hypothesis is plausible on theoretical grounds: in a species with substantial social scrutiny of beliefs, forming beliefs in a way that is sensitive to their likely effects on other agents leads to practical success. I then show how the hypothesis accommodates and unifies a range of psychological phenomena, including confabulation and rationalisation, positive illusions, and identity protective cognition.
My comments: I would add to all this that if one is in the group of those not so easily influenced by other agents' punishments/rewards it is due to "excessive" weight to internal reputation (e.g., being uncomfortable with oneself if one bends to the consensus vision when one believes the data is not clear in support of the others' views or even is against the consensus).
---
5. Conclusion
The core claim of this paper has been simple: the way in which we form beliefs is sensitive to their effects on other agents. I have argued that this hypothesis is plausible on theoretical grounds in light of distinctive characteristics of human social life, and I have identified several putative examples of this phenomenon in a range of different areas. These three examples are not supposed to be exhaustive. Collectively, however, they illustrate important features of human cognition that theorists from a range of different fields have sought to illuminate by appeal to the influence of social incentives on belief formation. As I have noted, some of these examples are more controversial than others. My aim in this paper has not been to conclusively vindicate SAB but to render it plausible in the hope that this might spur future research on this phenomenon. To that end, I will conclude by noting three important areas for future research.
First, it would be beneficial in future work to have a more formal taxonomy of the various ways in which social motives influence belief formation. These motives are heterogeneous: to be socially and sexually desirable, to build, maintain, and strengthen relationships and alliances, to attain social dominance and prestige, and so on. It would be useful to have a more systematic understanding of how this diverse array of complex social goals guides the way in which we seek out and process information. Second, I have not addressed in any detail the psychological mechanisms and processes that underlie socially adaptive belief formation. A more rigorous treatment in the future should rectify this. As I noted in Section 3.1, motivated cognition in general is facilitated by a variety of different strategies and there is no reason to think that socially adaptive belief formation would be different. Nevertheless, the treatment of this topic here has been shallow. Remedying this defect is a crucial task for future work in both philosophy and psychology.
Finally, and most importantly, future research should focus on a more rigorous examination of the evidence for and against SAB. Importantly, there are really two issues here. First, although I have tried to explain why SAB offers a plausible explanation of the phenomena outlined in Section 4, I have also noted that in most cases there are competing explanations of such phenomena that make no reference to social incentives: for example, the second-order ignorance widely thought to drive confabulation, the purely personal hedonic and motivational benefits of positive illusions, and the combination of in-group trust and unfortunate epistemic circumstances alleged to underpin the relationship between group identity and ungrounded beliefs. Future work should search for more effective ways of adjudicating such controversies. To take only one example, SAB makes a straightforward prediction: manipulating people’s expectations about the social consequences of candidate beliefs should influence the way in which they seek out and process information.8 Future experimental work should look for ways to test this prediction.
Just as important, however, is a more theoretical question that I have largely ignored throughout this paper: even granting that social incentives influence the way in which we seek out and process information, why treat the cognitive attitudes that result from such incentives as beliefs? 9 Many philosophers and psychologists have sought to draw a distinction between different kinds of cognitive attitudes that are often subsumed under the general term “belief.”10 Although none of the distinctions such theorists have drawn that I am aware of align straightforwardly with the difference between socially adaptive beliefs and ordinary world-modelling beliefs that I have outlined here, one might nevertheless worry that the functional properties of the former are sufficiently different from the latter to warrant status as a different kind of cognitive attitude. To take only the most obvious example, socially adaptive beliefs are typically much less responsive to evidence than ordinary beliefs. If one individuates cognitive attitudes by their functional properties, doesn’t this threaten the idea that they constitute the same kind of attitude?
From my perspective, this line of argument is better thought of as a potential clarification of SAB than a critique. After all, implicit in the theoretical argument of Section 2 is that one should expect socially adaptive beliefs to function differently from ordinary world-modelling beliefs. That is, insofar as their function is to elicit desirable responses from other agents, one would expect their functional properties to be adapted to this function. For example, one would expect agents to shield socially adaptive beliefs from counter-evidence, to be emotionally invested in such beliefs, to advertise them to others, to be reluctant to draw implications from such beliefs that are not themselves socially adaptive, and to be reluctant to act on such beliefs outside of social contexts. Indeed, I noted in Section 3 that beliefs that we are less likely to act on are the prime candidates for the influence of motivational influences such as social goals. If one concludes from such functional differences that socially adaptive beliefs are not really beliefs at all but rather a different kind of cognitive attitude merely masquerading as beliefs, that would be an important theoretical clarification of SAB.
Nevertheless, it is a notoriously difficult philosophical question how to functionally individuate beliefs (and psychological kinds more generally), and there are equally persuasive considerations for treating socially adaptive cognitive attitudes as a kind of belief. For example, they guide sincere verbal assertions, which is plausibly the most important cue used by ordinary people for belief ascription (Rose et al. 2014), and the functional differences just outlined are themselves differences of degree, not kind. Agents do in fact act on the kinds of socially adaptive attitudes outlined in Section 4, they do use them in reasoning, and they are not literally impervious to counterevidence. Further, the appeal to motivational influences is intended to explain the functional differences between motivated beliefs and non-motivated beliefs without appealing to a difference of kind in the relevant cognitive attitudes. A drug addict motivated to deny her drug problem, for example, also harbours beliefs with fundamentally different functional properties to ordinary beliefs (Pickard 2016). Rather than explaining such functional differences by introducing a distinct cognitive attitude, it is plausibly more illuminating to explain them in terms of the way in which a single kind of cognitive attitude adapts to the influence of the agent’s motivations. It may be that something similar should be said about socially adaptive beliefs.
These brief remarks barely scratch the surface of this complex issue. For a fully satisfying understanding of the way in which the contents of our minds are shaped by the structure of our social worlds, however, this is an issue that must be addressed in future work.
Abstract: I outline and defend the hypothesis that human belief formation is sensitive to social rewards and punishments, such that beliefs are sometimes formed based on unconscious expectations of their likely effects on other agents - agents who frequently reward us when we hold ungrounded beliefs and punish us when we hold reasonable ones. After clarifying this phenomenon and distinguishing it from other sources of bias in the psychological literature, I argue that the hypothesis is plausible on theoretical grounds: in a species with substantial social scrutiny of beliefs, forming beliefs in a way that is sensitive to their likely effects on other agents leads to practical success. I then show how the hypothesis accommodates and unifies a range of psychological phenomena, including confabulation and rationalisation, positive illusions, and identity protective cognition.
My comments: I would add to all this that if one is in the group of those not so easily influenced by other agents' punishments/rewards it is due to "excessive" weight to internal reputation (e.g., being uncomfortable with oneself if one bends to the consensus vision when one believes the data is not clear in support of the others' views or even is against the consensus).
---
5. Conclusion
The core claim of this paper has been simple: the way in which we form beliefs is sensitive to their effects on other agents. I have argued that this hypothesis is plausible on theoretical grounds in light of distinctive characteristics of human social life, and I have identified several putative examples of this phenomenon in a range of different areas. These three examples are not supposed to be exhaustive. Collectively, however, they illustrate important features of human cognition that theorists from a range of different fields have sought to illuminate by appeal to the influence of social incentives on belief formation. As I have noted, some of these examples are more controversial than others. My aim in this paper has not been to conclusively vindicate SAB but to render it plausible in the hope that this might spur future research on this phenomenon. To that end, I will conclude by noting three important areas for future research.
First, it would be beneficial in future work to have a more formal taxonomy of the various ways in which social motives influence belief formation. These motives are heterogeneous: to be socially and sexually desirable, to build, maintain, and strengthen relationships and alliances, to attain social dominance and prestige, and so on. It would be useful to have a more systematic understanding of how this diverse array of complex social goals guides the way in which we seek out and process information. Second, I have not addressed in any detail the psychological mechanisms and processes that underlie socially adaptive belief formation. A more rigorous treatment in the future should rectify this. As I noted in Section 3.1, motivated cognition in general is facilitated by a variety of different strategies and there is no reason to think that socially adaptive belief formation would be different. Nevertheless, the treatment of this topic here has been shallow. Remedying this defect is a crucial task for future work in both philosophy and psychology.
Finally, and most importantly, future research should focus on a more rigorous examination of the evidence for and against SAB. Importantly, there are really two issues here. First, although I have tried to explain why SAB offers a plausible explanation of the phenomena outlined in Section 4, I have also noted that in most cases there are competing explanations of such phenomena that make no reference to social incentives: for example, the second-order ignorance widely thought to drive confabulation, the purely personal hedonic and motivational benefits of positive illusions, and the combination of in-group trust and unfortunate epistemic circumstances alleged to underpin the relationship between group identity and ungrounded beliefs. Future work should search for more effective ways of adjudicating such controversies. To take only one example, SAB makes a straightforward prediction: manipulating people’s expectations about the social consequences of candidate beliefs should influence the way in which they seek out and process information.8 Future experimental work should look for ways to test this prediction.
Just as important, however, is a more theoretical question that I have largely ignored throughout this paper: even granting that social incentives influence the way in which we seek out and process information, why treat the cognitive attitudes that result from such incentives as beliefs? 9 Many philosophers and psychologists have sought to draw a distinction between different kinds of cognitive attitudes that are often subsumed under the general term “belief.”10 Although none of the distinctions such theorists have drawn that I am aware of align straightforwardly with the difference between socially adaptive beliefs and ordinary world-modelling beliefs that I have outlined here, one might nevertheless worry that the functional properties of the former are sufficiently different from the latter to warrant status as a different kind of cognitive attitude. To take only the most obvious example, socially adaptive beliefs are typically much less responsive to evidence than ordinary beliefs. If one individuates cognitive attitudes by their functional properties, doesn’t this threaten the idea that they constitute the same kind of attitude?
From my perspective, this line of argument is better thought of as a potential clarification of SAB than a critique. After all, implicit in the theoretical argument of Section 2 is that one should expect socially adaptive beliefs to function differently from ordinary world-modelling beliefs. That is, insofar as their function is to elicit desirable responses from other agents, one would expect their functional properties to be adapted to this function. For example, one would expect agents to shield socially adaptive beliefs from counter-evidence, to be emotionally invested in such beliefs, to advertise them to others, to be reluctant to draw implications from such beliefs that are not themselves socially adaptive, and to be reluctant to act on such beliefs outside of social contexts. Indeed, I noted in Section 3 that beliefs that we are less likely to act on are the prime candidates for the influence of motivational influences such as social goals. If one concludes from such functional differences that socially adaptive beliefs are not really beliefs at all but rather a different kind of cognitive attitude merely masquerading as beliefs, that would be an important theoretical clarification of SAB.
Nevertheless, it is a notoriously difficult philosophical question how to functionally individuate beliefs (and psychological kinds more generally), and there are equally persuasive considerations for treating socially adaptive cognitive attitudes as a kind of belief. For example, they guide sincere verbal assertions, which is plausibly the most important cue used by ordinary people for belief ascription (Rose et al. 2014), and the functional differences just outlined are themselves differences of degree, not kind. Agents do in fact act on the kinds of socially adaptive attitudes outlined in Section 4, they do use them in reasoning, and they are not literally impervious to counterevidence. Further, the appeal to motivational influences is intended to explain the functional differences between motivated beliefs and non-motivated beliefs without appealing to a difference of kind in the relevant cognitive attitudes. A drug addict motivated to deny her drug problem, for example, also harbours beliefs with fundamentally different functional properties to ordinary beliefs (Pickard 2016). Rather than explaining such functional differences by introducing a distinct cognitive attitude, it is plausibly more illuminating to explain them in terms of the way in which a single kind of cognitive attitude adapts to the influence of the agent’s motivations. It may be that something similar should be said about socially adaptive beliefs.
These brief remarks barely scratch the surface of this complex issue. For a fully satisfying understanding of the way in which the contents of our minds are shaped by the structure of our social worlds, however, this is an issue that must be addressed in future work.
These studies showed that being alone with others was worse for people’s affective outcomes and sense of belonging than being completely alone, contrary to hypotheses
Being alone with others: A unique form of social contact and its impact on momentary positve affect. Karin Sobocko. PhD Thesis, 2019. https://curve.carleton.ca/system/files/etd/bfbbd316-51d1-4c7d-9f75-77001610c855/etd_pdf/04c82a9d7323d33a0e71e705c6358d9d/sobocko-beingalonewithothersauniqueformofsocialcontact.pdf
Abstract
Social relationships are essential to human well-being. Although people receive the most benefit
from interactions with others who are close to them (Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe, & Ryan,
2000), the need for human contact can also be satisfied through minimal interactions with others
(Sandstrom & Dunn, 2014a, 2014b). This dissertation extended the research regarding the
benefits of contact with acquaintances by proposing that being alone with others, i.e. being
around others without verbally interacting with them, could be an alternative way of satisfying
the need for social contact and improving positive affect. In an experience sampling study (N =
453), being alone with others was associated with similar positive (PA) and negative affect (NA),
and lower sense of belonging, than being completely alone. Additional results supported
existing research associating the best affective outcomes with interactions with close others, and
higher positive affect after talking to acquaintances than not talking to them (Sandstrom & Dunn,
2014a). A second study was designed to test: whether merely sharing a space with others
produces a higher sense of belonging; whether this belongingness could explain better outcomes
of being alone with others compared to being alone; whether effects depend on performing the
same task as others. Participants (N = 265) were randomly assigned to watch a pleasant video:
alone, together with a confederate, or alone when a confederate was doing something else. I
found no differences in the amplification of PA and sense of belonging, or in reduction of NA
between the social conditions; however, these outcomes were also not different in the alone
condition. Sharing a space with others, regardless of simultaneously performing a task together,
did not lead to better outcomes than being alone. Trait introversion-extraversion was also
explored, and two main trends were found in both studies: extraverts reported higher PA and
sense of belonging than introverts in all situations, and introverts and extraverts reported similar
amplifications of affective states in different social and experimental conditions. Overall, both
studies revealed that being alone with others was worse for people’s affective outcomes and
sense of belonging than being completely alone, contrary to hypotheses.
Not surprisingly, humans receive the most benefit from interactions with others who are familiar to them, such as family members or close friends (Mehl et al., 2010; Reis et al., 2000; Vittengl & Holt, 1998; Wheeler et al., 1983). Recent studies by Sandstrom and Dunn (2014a, 2014b) indicated that engaging in weak-tie interactions, i.e. interactions with people with whom we do not share a close or intimate connection, can lead to positive outcomes. In one of their studies, people at a coffee shop were asked to engage in small talk, smiling, and eye contact with the barista, while others were asked to make their visit as efficient as possible by talking only if necessary. As predicted, the more interactive group showed significantly larger improvements in their momentary positive affect and sense of belonging than the efficient group (Sandstrom & Dunn, 2014a). This finding is especially significant for contemporary ultra-individualistic societies, since it shows that people can satisfy their need for human contact and increase their momentary positive affect through even minimal interactions with others who are weakly connected to them, i.e. with people they do not know well. Irrespective of the above findings, and whether due to personality traits, psychological disorders, or the worry of breaking unwritten social rules, some people choose to be around others less frequently. For example, introverts report, on average, spending less time in social situations (Asendorph & Wilpers, 1998; Lucas, Le, & Dyrenforth, 2008), speaking less (Mehl, Gosling, & Pennebaker, 2006), and overall enjoying solitude more than extraverted people (Burger, 1995; Long, Seburn, Averill, & More, 2003). However, recent research has shown that when introverts were asked to act extraverted, i.e. act bold, assertive, or talkative, they experienced an increase in their momentary positive affect without any short-term negative effects of this counterdispositional behaviour (Fleeson, Malanos, & Achille, 2002; McNiel & Fleeson, 2006; McNiel, Lowman, & Fleeson, 2010; Sandstrom & Dunn, 2014a; Smillie, 2013; Wilt, Noftle, Fleeson, & Spain, 2012; Zelenski, Santoro, & Whelan, 2012; Zelenski et al., 2013). Overall, acting in more extraverted ways seem to be enjoyable to all people, regardless of their levels of extraversion-introversion trait, but introverts tend to underpredict how well they would feel acting extraverted, which leads to them avoiding social situations more often (Zelenski et al., 2013). As seen so far, although in general people benefit from social contact, such contact can be hindered for various reasons (e.g., fatigue, personality), which could prevent people from experiencing the boost in positive affect associated with being around others. Hence, the purpose of this dissertation is to test a minimal form of social contact, which may be less bothersome to some people, yet it could still improve their positive affect and sense of belonging. Specifically, being alone with others, i.e. being around people weakly tied to us, who we do not know well, or being around total strangers, without verbally interacting with them, could provide enough social contact to increase our momentary positive affect. Studying the alone with others social situation is unique because the scarce existing research regarding minimal social contact and the resulting affective outcomes is predominantly characterized by an inclusion of an element of verbal interaction (e.g., Sandstrom & Dunn, 2014a, 2014b). It is important to acknowledge that the amplification of momentary positive affect resulting from being alone with others was not expected to surpass positive affect stemming from verbally interacting with others, especially others we love, trust, and who offer us their support. However, I wanted to test whether people, who did not verbally interact with each other, would still be able to experience belongingness simply by sharing a physical space and being close to others, and whether this alternative way of satisfying the need for social contact would also improve their positive affect. Said another way, does being physically near others feel better than being alone?
Abstract
Social relationships are essential to human well-being. Although people receive the most benefit
from interactions with others who are close to them (Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe, & Ryan,
2000), the need for human contact can also be satisfied through minimal interactions with others
(Sandstrom & Dunn, 2014a, 2014b). This dissertation extended the research regarding the
benefits of contact with acquaintances by proposing that being alone with others, i.e. being
around others without verbally interacting with them, could be an alternative way of satisfying
the need for social contact and improving positive affect. In an experience sampling study (N =
453), being alone with others was associated with similar positive (PA) and negative affect (NA),
and lower sense of belonging, than being completely alone. Additional results supported
existing research associating the best affective outcomes with interactions with close others, and
higher positive affect after talking to acquaintances than not talking to them (Sandstrom & Dunn,
2014a). A second study was designed to test: whether merely sharing a space with others
produces a higher sense of belonging; whether this belongingness could explain better outcomes
of being alone with others compared to being alone; whether effects depend on performing the
same task as others. Participants (N = 265) were randomly assigned to watch a pleasant video:
alone, together with a confederate, or alone when a confederate was doing something else. I
found no differences in the amplification of PA and sense of belonging, or in reduction of NA
between the social conditions; however, these outcomes were also not different in the alone
condition. Sharing a space with others, regardless of simultaneously performing a task together,
did not lead to better outcomes than being alone. Trait introversion-extraversion was also
explored, and two main trends were found in both studies: extraverts reported higher PA and
sense of belonging than introverts in all situations, and introverts and extraverts reported similar
amplifications of affective states in different social and experimental conditions. Overall, both
studies revealed that being alone with others was worse for people’s affective outcomes and
sense of belonging than being completely alone, contrary to hypotheses.
Not surprisingly, humans receive the most benefit from interactions with others who are familiar to them, such as family members or close friends (Mehl et al., 2010; Reis et al., 2000; Vittengl & Holt, 1998; Wheeler et al., 1983). Recent studies by Sandstrom and Dunn (2014a, 2014b) indicated that engaging in weak-tie interactions, i.e. interactions with people with whom we do not share a close or intimate connection, can lead to positive outcomes. In one of their studies, people at a coffee shop were asked to engage in small talk, smiling, and eye contact with the barista, while others were asked to make their visit as efficient as possible by talking only if necessary. As predicted, the more interactive group showed significantly larger improvements in their momentary positive affect and sense of belonging than the efficient group (Sandstrom & Dunn, 2014a). This finding is especially significant for contemporary ultra-individualistic societies, since it shows that people can satisfy their need for human contact and increase their momentary positive affect through even minimal interactions with others who are weakly connected to them, i.e. with people they do not know well. Irrespective of the above findings, and whether due to personality traits, psychological disorders, or the worry of breaking unwritten social rules, some people choose to be around others less frequently. For example, introverts report, on average, spending less time in social situations (Asendorph & Wilpers, 1998; Lucas, Le, & Dyrenforth, 2008), speaking less (Mehl, Gosling, & Pennebaker, 2006), and overall enjoying solitude more than extraverted people (Burger, 1995; Long, Seburn, Averill, & More, 2003). However, recent research has shown that when introverts were asked to act extraverted, i.e. act bold, assertive, or talkative, they experienced an increase in their momentary positive affect without any short-term negative effects of this counterdispositional behaviour (Fleeson, Malanos, & Achille, 2002; McNiel & Fleeson, 2006; McNiel, Lowman, & Fleeson, 2010; Sandstrom & Dunn, 2014a; Smillie, 2013; Wilt, Noftle, Fleeson, & Spain, 2012; Zelenski, Santoro, & Whelan, 2012; Zelenski et al., 2013). Overall, acting in more extraverted ways seem to be enjoyable to all people, regardless of their levels of extraversion-introversion trait, but introverts tend to underpredict how well they would feel acting extraverted, which leads to them avoiding social situations more often (Zelenski et al., 2013). As seen so far, although in general people benefit from social contact, such contact can be hindered for various reasons (e.g., fatigue, personality), which could prevent people from experiencing the boost in positive affect associated with being around others. Hence, the purpose of this dissertation is to test a minimal form of social contact, which may be less bothersome to some people, yet it could still improve their positive affect and sense of belonging. Specifically, being alone with others, i.e. being around people weakly tied to us, who we do not know well, or being around total strangers, without verbally interacting with them, could provide enough social contact to increase our momentary positive affect. Studying the alone with others social situation is unique because the scarce existing research regarding minimal social contact and the resulting affective outcomes is predominantly characterized by an inclusion of an element of verbal interaction (e.g., Sandstrom & Dunn, 2014a, 2014b). It is important to acknowledge that the amplification of momentary positive affect resulting from being alone with others was not expected to surpass positive affect stemming from verbally interacting with others, especially others we love, trust, and who offer us their support. However, I wanted to test whether people, who did not verbally interact with each other, would still be able to experience belongingness simply by sharing a physical space and being close to others, and whether this alternative way of satisfying the need for social contact would also improve their positive affect. Said another way, does being physically near others feel better than being alone?
Contrary to the hypotheses derived from extant literature, atheists, non-religious, and religious participants did not significantly differ on measures of cardiovascular reactivity or recovery
Comparing Atheist, Non-Religious, And Religious Peoples' Cardiovascular Reactivity: A Laboratory Stressor. Rolf A. Ritchie's PhD Thesis, Dec 2019. https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession=bgsu15730518157556&disposition=inline
Abstract: Atheists and the non-religious have historically been excluded from cardiovascular research assessing the relation between religion and reactivity. Researchers have suggested that atheists and the non-religious ought to have increased cardiovascular reactivity and decreased recovery following a stressor. The primary theoretical justifications for this hypothesized difference are atheists/non-religious lack religious coping resources or that they are exposed to minority stress. However, few previous studies have incorporated atheists, had adequate methodology to explore this relation, or used measures designed to appropriately categorize atheist/non-religious participants. In order to explore this relation, 61 participants were recruited and using the Non-Religious Non-Spiritual Scale, were separated into three groups: atheist, nonreligious, or religious. Participants were then exposed to a social stressor to elicit cardiovascular reactivity. Heart rate, high-frequency heart rate variability, and blood pressure were recorded during the experimental procedure. Results indicated that contrary to the hypotheses derived from extant literature, atheists, non-religious, and religious participants did not significantly differ on measures of cardiovascular reactivity or recovery.
Abstract: Atheists and the non-religious have historically been excluded from cardiovascular research assessing the relation between religion and reactivity. Researchers have suggested that atheists and the non-religious ought to have increased cardiovascular reactivity and decreased recovery following a stressor. The primary theoretical justifications for this hypothesized difference are atheists/non-religious lack religious coping resources or that they are exposed to minority stress. However, few previous studies have incorporated atheists, had adequate methodology to explore this relation, or used measures designed to appropriately categorize atheist/non-religious participants. In order to explore this relation, 61 participants were recruited and using the Non-Religious Non-Spiritual Scale, were separated into three groups: atheist, nonreligious, or religious. Participants were then exposed to a social stressor to elicit cardiovascular reactivity. Heart rate, high-frequency heart rate variability, and blood pressure were recorded during the experimental procedure. Results indicated that contrary to the hypotheses derived from extant literature, atheists, non-religious, and religious participants did not significantly differ on measures of cardiovascular reactivity or recovery.
21% of the pedestrians in an urban setting in Belgium violate traffic lights; presences of ush buttons and worn off zebra markings increase the frequency of violations
Non-compliance with pedestrian traffic lights in Belgian cities. Kevin Diependaele. Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and Behaviour, Volume 67, November 2019, Pages 230-241. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trf.2016.11.017
Highlights
• 21% of the pedestrians in an urban setting in Belgium violate traffic lights.
• There is large variability; percentages below 15% and above 30% are no exceptions.
• Higher traffic volume and complexity reduce the frequency of red-light running.
• Gap acceptance theory can account for the effect of traffic volume and complexity.
• Push buttons and worn off zebra markings increase the frequency of violations.
• Auxiliary signals, either visual or auditory, have a lowering effect on violations.
Abstract: The frequency of red light running was investigated across the nine most populated cities in Belgium. The results show that approximately 21% of the pedestrians violate the lights. There is, however, large variability in the frequency of violations depending on the specific context. Traffic volumes, motorized as well as pedestrian volumes, and situational characteristics that are generally associated with higher traffic complexity (rush hours, number of driving directions, number of lanes per driving direction and the presence of a tram or bus lane) have a lowering effect. A number of technical characteristics of the pedestrian crossing were also found to exert a significant influence: push buttons and worn off zebra markings increase the frequency of violations. On the other hand, auxiliary signals, either visual or auditory, have a positive effect.
Keywords: PedestriansRed light runningBelgium
5.5. Push buttons
Fig. 4 illustrates the effects of situational characteristics which are not clearly associated with motorized traffic volumes and apply to the technical design of the pedestrian crossing. The first effect of this kind concerns push buttons: when push buttons are present, we see a significantly higher degree of red light violations by pedestrians. One could argue that this is due to the fact that these locations are associated with a lower overall pedestrian volume (see top left panel in Fig. 4). With fewer pedestrians passing, the chance of arriving during a red phase will on average be higher because a green phase only occurs when pedestrians make a request. Red light violations may thus be observed more frequently than in the absence of push buttons without any inherent effect of push buttons on the willingness to commit red light violations among pedestrians. The above explanation nevertheless also predicts a clear effect on the phase frequency, i.e., a reduced number of phases per time unit for crossings equipped with push buttons. Such an effect is not evident in the data. In the light of this, it is important to consider the alternative explanation that in many cases, the presence and functional characteristics of push buttons are not transparent enough for pedestrians. In Belgium, several different designs of push buttons exist with heterogeneous functional characteristics. Waiting times after requests are generally not transparent. The lack of transparent information about waiting times has indeed been shown to exert a strong negative influence on safe crossing behaviour by pedestrians (e.g., Eccles et al., 2007; Markowitz et al., 2006; Schlabbach, 2010).
5.7. Visibility of zebra markings
The last effect concerns the visibility of the zebra marking. It appears that pedestrians are more inclined to commit red light violations when zebra markings are in bad condition (i.e., the paint is worn off; see Fig. 5). This effect is intriguing, as it cannot be linked to marked differences in pedestrian and/or vehicle traffic volumes which could explain the degree of wear and tear. An interesting hypothesis is that the effect illustrates the interaction of physical spaces and social norms. Keizer, Lindenberg, and Steg (2008), for instance, provided several demonstrations of so-called ‘‘spreading of disorder” phenomena.
The idea is related to the so-called ‘‘Broken window theory” in criminology (Kelling & Wilson, 1982) and entail that public spaces that are unorganized and show traces of decay and criminal activity facilitate illegal and anti-social behaviour. The classical example is that people are more inclined to litter in a poorly maintained public space. Keizer et al. argue that spreading of disorder can also translate itself into very subtle phenomena such as traffic rule violations. In the present context, it was certainly not the case that poorly visible zebra markings were always associated with a generally ill-maintained area. More specific underlying dynamics could be that pedestrians associate poor investments in traffic infrastructure with low levels of police enforcement or even low risk levels.
Highlights
• 21% of the pedestrians in an urban setting in Belgium violate traffic lights.
• There is large variability; percentages below 15% and above 30% are no exceptions.
• Higher traffic volume and complexity reduce the frequency of red-light running.
• Gap acceptance theory can account for the effect of traffic volume and complexity.
• Push buttons and worn off zebra markings increase the frequency of violations.
• Auxiliary signals, either visual or auditory, have a lowering effect on violations.
Abstract: The frequency of red light running was investigated across the nine most populated cities in Belgium. The results show that approximately 21% of the pedestrians violate the lights. There is, however, large variability in the frequency of violations depending on the specific context. Traffic volumes, motorized as well as pedestrian volumes, and situational characteristics that are generally associated with higher traffic complexity (rush hours, number of driving directions, number of lanes per driving direction and the presence of a tram or bus lane) have a lowering effect. A number of technical characteristics of the pedestrian crossing were also found to exert a significant influence: push buttons and worn off zebra markings increase the frequency of violations. On the other hand, auxiliary signals, either visual or auditory, have a positive effect.
Keywords: PedestriansRed light runningBelgium
5.5. Push buttons
Fig. 4 illustrates the effects of situational characteristics which are not clearly associated with motorized traffic volumes and apply to the technical design of the pedestrian crossing. The first effect of this kind concerns push buttons: when push buttons are present, we see a significantly higher degree of red light violations by pedestrians. One could argue that this is due to the fact that these locations are associated with a lower overall pedestrian volume (see top left panel in Fig. 4). With fewer pedestrians passing, the chance of arriving during a red phase will on average be higher because a green phase only occurs when pedestrians make a request. Red light violations may thus be observed more frequently than in the absence of push buttons without any inherent effect of push buttons on the willingness to commit red light violations among pedestrians. The above explanation nevertheless also predicts a clear effect on the phase frequency, i.e., a reduced number of phases per time unit for crossings equipped with push buttons. Such an effect is not evident in the data. In the light of this, it is important to consider the alternative explanation that in many cases, the presence and functional characteristics of push buttons are not transparent enough for pedestrians. In Belgium, several different designs of push buttons exist with heterogeneous functional characteristics. Waiting times after requests are generally not transparent. The lack of transparent information about waiting times has indeed been shown to exert a strong negative influence on safe crossing behaviour by pedestrians (e.g., Eccles et al., 2007; Markowitz et al., 2006; Schlabbach, 2010).
5.7. Visibility of zebra markings
The last effect concerns the visibility of the zebra marking. It appears that pedestrians are more inclined to commit red light violations when zebra markings are in bad condition (i.e., the paint is worn off; see Fig. 5). This effect is intriguing, as it cannot be linked to marked differences in pedestrian and/or vehicle traffic volumes which could explain the degree of wear and tear. An interesting hypothesis is that the effect illustrates the interaction of physical spaces and social norms. Keizer, Lindenberg, and Steg (2008), for instance, provided several demonstrations of so-called ‘‘spreading of disorder” phenomena.
The idea is related to the so-called ‘‘Broken window theory” in criminology (Kelling & Wilson, 1982) and entail that public spaces that are unorganized and show traces of decay and criminal activity facilitate illegal and anti-social behaviour. The classical example is that people are more inclined to litter in a poorly maintained public space. Keizer et al. argue that spreading of disorder can also translate itself into very subtle phenomena such as traffic rule violations. In the present context, it was certainly not the case that poorly visible zebra markings were always associated with a generally ill-maintained area. More specific underlying dynamics could be that pedestrians associate poor investments in traffic infrastructure with low levels of police enforcement or even low risk levels.
Relative to themselves, people believe that an identically paying other will get more enjoyment from the same experience, but an identically enjoying other will pay more for the same experience
Overestimating the valuations and preferences of others. Jung, Minah H. Moon, Alice Nelson, Leif D. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. Nov 2019. https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2019-69146-001
Abstract: People often make judgments about their own and others’ valuations and preferences. Across 12 studies (N = 17,594), we find a robust bias in these judgments such that people overestimate the valuations and preferences of others. This overestimation arises because, when making predictions about others, people rely on their intuitive core representation of the experience (e.g., is the experience generally positive?) in lieu of a more complex representation that might also include countervailing aspects (e.g., is any of the experience negative?). We first demonstrate that the overestimation bias is pervasive for a wide range of positive (Studies 1–5) and negative experiences (Study 6). Furthermore, the bias is not merely an artifact of how preferences are measured (Study 7). Consistent with judgments based on core representations, the bias significantly reduces when the core representation is uniformly positive (Studies 8A–8B). Such judgments lead to a paradox in how people see others trade off between valuation and utility (Studies 9A–9B). Specifically, relative to themselves, people believe that an identically paying other will get more enjoyment from the same experience, but paradoxically, that an identically enjoying other will pay more for the same experience. Finally, consistent with a core representation explanation, explicitly prompting people to consider the entire distribution of others’ preferences significantly reduced or eliminated the bias (Study 10). These findings suggest that social judgments of others’ preferences are not only largely biased, but they also ignore how others make trade-offs between evaluative metrics.
General Discussion
People are sometimes called upon to assess the preferences of others, assessments which
we find to be prone to persistent biases. Across several studies, we find that across various
measures of valuation and utility (i.e., WTP (willingness to pay), enjoyment, and willingness-to-wait), people believe
that others have more intense experiences than they themselves do (Studies 1-8). We propose
that this overestimation of others stems from a narrow focus on the primary dimension of the
option being evaluated (e.g., a trip to Rio De Janeiro is generally thought to be positive, shaving
your head is generally thought to be negative). But this only involves estimations of others. Selfassessments are further informed by the subtle vagaries of personal preferences, reducing the
total preference intensity (e.g., Rio De Janeiro is encumbered by its hard-to-pronounce local
language, and a shaved head is buoyed by the opportunity it affords for a novel scalp tattoo).
Thus, personal evaluations are more moderate than are the estimates of the evaluations of others.
This intuition is strong enough that it is applied even when the target of comparison is
explicitly similar to the self (Studies 9A-9B). When asked to evaluate someone with an identical
WTP, people think that person will anticipate more enjoyment; and when evaluating someone
with identical anticipated enjoyment, people think that person will have a higher WTP. In
combination, people can demonstrate the paradoxical belief that others are willing to pay more
for the same level of enjoyment (when asked about someone identical in enjoyment) or that
others are willing to pay less for the same level of enjoyment (when asked about someone
identical in WTP). Finally, explicitly prompting people to think about the full distribution of
others’ possible valuations significantly interrupted the intuitive process of overestimation based
on the core representation of objects being considered (Study 10).
Relation to Previous Research
Why do people have such persistent judgmental errors when estimating the evaluations of
others? After all, people are not blind to the evaluations of others. People frequently observe the
choices of others, and at least occasionally, are told something about the preferences which led to
those choices. Research indicates that judgments about values and preferences are often
inherently automatic (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kahneman, 2003;
Simmons & Nelson, 2006, 2018; Sloman, 1996). Understanding the trade-offs between
evaluative metrics (e.g., a longer wait versus a higher price), however, is more complicated (e.g.,
Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988). When reporting their own evaluations, people have the
benefits of each metric being accessible and generally reliable, and consequently, evaluative
trade-offs are more likely to be consistent. When predicting the evaluations of others, on the
other hand, people do not have the same basis of knowledge. Without knowledge of how other
people trade off between evaluative metrics, people appear to ignore them altogether.
Consequently, they use intuitive but incomplete heuristics that people experience things more
intensely, which can be misapplied in the case of similar others (i.e., those who would like a
good as much as they would or would pay as much for a good than they would).
Previous research in judgment and decision-making documents abundant evidence that
people do not always hold stable preferences but construct them on the spot when they are
making decisions (Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 1998; Fischhoff, 2013; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson,
1992; Slovic, 1995). If preferences are partially constructed for the self, they might be entirely
constructed when judging others. Studies 9A-9B demonstrate that while people’s own valuation
of a good remains stable, their beliefs about others’ valuation of the same good reverse
depending on how they are asked about others’ valuation. More specifically, people believed that
others derived simultaneously more and less utility from the same goods than they did.
The overestimation bias we document also offers a new approach to understanding the
endowment effect and why selling prices tend to exceed buying prices. Previous research has
largely focused on a “pain-of-losing” account for this phenomenon, which proposes that people
feel significantly more pain when selling their good than others feel when acquiring the same
good (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). Another
explanation more recently put forth by Weaver and Frederick (2012) hypothesizes that instead
sellers and buyers use different reference prices. Sellers typically focus on market prices in
determining their selling price, whereas buyers typically focus on their own valuation. Because
market prices tend to be higher than people’s valuations (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991)
and both parties are averse to bad deals, selling prices tend to exceed buying prices. Our
overestimation bias account suggests that in addition to these explanations, people’s expectation
that others derive more value from goods might also contribute to a discrepancy in buying and
selling prices. In particular, sellers may believe that buyers would value the good more than they
themselves would, leading them to set higher selling prices.
Alternative accounts for the overestimation bias
This paper reports 12 experiments showing the existence, robustness, and consequence of
the overestimation bias. We also conducted a handful of additional investigations to try to
understand the forces that may moderate the expression of our effects. Though these studies do
not authoritatively answer why people overestimate others’ valuation, in combination they may
provide some hints. We review two of those investigations, and report them in further detail in
the Supplemental Materials.
> Others with Extreme Preferences.
Study 9A introduced the matching paradigm as a
strong tactic for controlling how people generate an exemplar when estimating the evaluation of
others. An alternative approach, we thought, might be to simply heighten the salience of some
comparison others who are more or less positive about the same stimulus. If people are
spontaneously thinking of an enthusiastic consumer, then forcing them to consider the behavior
of an unenthusiastic consumer might change their estimate. We examined this exceptional other
account in two additional studies described in detail in the Supplemental Materials.
First, in Study S8 (N = 807), we recruited people who self-identified as having extreme
preferences to investigate whether the overestimation bias would persist. Specifically, we
recruited self-identified fans of Star Wars movies and asked them to estimate either: (a) the
average Star Wars fan’s or (b) the average US person’s evaluations of a Star Wars product.
Though these Star Wars fans rationally understood that the average US person’s evaluation of a
Star Wars product would be less extreme than their own, their overestimation emerged when
considering the average Star Wars fan, assuming that the average Star Wars fan would evaluate
the product more positively than they themselves would.
Second, in Study S9 (N = 1214), we used the match paradigm in Study 9A with an
additional factor (Other). In addition to examining how people view identical others (i.e., those
matched on either enjoyment or WTP), we explored people’s estimations for either: (a) a person
who had greater preference for the product (i.e., would pay $5 more than they would for the
product [Higher WTP Other] or would enjoy the product 5 units more than they would [Higher
Enjoyment Other]), or (b) a person who had lesser preference for the product (i.e., would pay $5
less than they would for the product [Lower WTP Other] or would enjoy the product 5 units less
than they would [Lower Enjoyment Other]). By our reasoning, it is possible that explicitly
considering a less enthusiastic consumer would disrupt people’s intuitions for their preferences,
thereby eliminating overestimation. We first replicated the paradoxical results of Study 9A when
people considered identical others: People assumed both that those matched on enjoyment would
pay more for the product than they would, but also that those matched on WTP would enjoy the
product more than they would. But importantly, people asked to consider lower enjoyment others
(i.e., those who would enjoy the product 5 units less than they would) rationally assumed that
those others would pay less for the product than they would, and people asked to consider lower
WTP others (i.e., those who would pay $5 less than they would for the product) rationally
assumed that those others would enjoy the product less than they would.
Together, the results from these two supplemental studies bolster our finding in Studies
9A-9B that the bias cannot be fully explained by the salience of others with extreme preferences
or the extremity of one’s own preferences. When people explicitly consider others who are less
positive towards a product, people display rational responses. However, when considering
average others or those who should have similar preferences, the overestimation bias persists.
Although people often inaccurately predict others’ preferences, they are more likely to be
accurate about the relative difference between their own and others’ preferences of certain
experiences. For instance, if a parent were asked how much they and others would like their
child’s drawing, they would no doubt recognize that their liking of the drawing would be greater
than that of others. Or if people are explicitly told that someone likes a product less than they
themselves do, this also appears to disrupt the reliance on intuitive core representations. The
results in Study 10 are consistent with this logic: People can more accurately predict others’
preferences when they are explicitly prompted to consider others whose preferences are not
consistent with the core representation of a stimulus. Therefore, people are capable of
understanding others’ preferences, but they do not spontaneously consider and integrate the
entire distribution of possible preferences unless they are explicitly compelled to do so.
The combination of the above points, does highlight an interesting parallel account; one
that we can articulate with some clarity, but one that our present findings can neither perfectly
rule out, nor perfectly rule in.10 In our theorizing, the prospective visitor to Rio De Janeiro
forecasts a positive experience encumbered by a small number of idiosyncratic negative
experiences. That person, when judging others, starts with the core representation of the
experience (i.e., that a visit to Rio De Janeiro is enjoyable), and that confidence in that initial
intuition means that they do not adjust from there. Accordingly, whereas personal assessments of
Rio De Janeiro are somewhat middling, others are perceived to be more positive. The alternative
account focuses not on the mixture of experience within an individual that moves a high rating to
a lower rating, but rather the mixture of experiences across people that produces many positive
evaluations, but also some idiosyncratically individually low ratings for generally positive
stimuli. Consider again the person evaluating the trip to Rio De Janeiro. On average, that person
is probably positive (say, an 85 on a 101-point scale), but some people might be quite negative
(perhaps they are actively avoiding irritating in-laws back in Brazil), and give an extremely low
evaluation of the potential visit. The average person and the negative person both have equal
weight in the overall true average, but they might not have equal weight in how people form their
perceptions of the average other. In essence, it may be the case that people are fully capable of
integrating both the core representation of a prospect with the more unusual negative features;
they accurately recognize that most people think that Ipanema beach is beautiful, and they
accurately recognize that most people are nevertheless bothered by the risk for potential theft,
but they fail to capture that for some people the latter factor is so significant that it overwhelms
the former. That is, they accurately perceive the experiences of others, but they do not consider
all of those experiences when estimating the average experience.
There is merit to this account. First, even for very positive stimuli, there are always a
number of participants whose valuations are quite low. Consider, just as an example, the density
plot for WTP for a movie ticket from Study 1. The mean is not low, but the distribution is hardly
normal, and a sizable fraction of participants (26.4%) say that they are willing to pay $0. Perhaps
it is exactly that segment of the population that people are failing to identify when constructing
their averages. The distributions generated by participants in Study 10 partially challenge the
extreme version of that possibility. Participants generated very accurate representations of other
people’s WTP (albeit less accurate for other people’s enjoyment), but still showed the overall
bias. Still, it may be the case that people are capable of bringing the full and accurate
representation of the distribution to mind, but they do not do so unless prompted.
For now, we remain agnostic. It could be the case that the core representation of a
positive product or experience creates an intuition that biases predictions about everyone
upward, or it may be the case that creates a mental sample that is biased by selecting out those
people who are uncharacteristically negative. Some of our data seems more consistent with one,
but none of it is so consistent to eliminate the possibility of the other. We think that future
research can hopefully untangle those (and we hope that we are the researchers who do so).
Abstract: People often make judgments about their own and others’ valuations and preferences. Across 12 studies (N = 17,594), we find a robust bias in these judgments such that people overestimate the valuations and preferences of others. This overestimation arises because, when making predictions about others, people rely on their intuitive core representation of the experience (e.g., is the experience generally positive?) in lieu of a more complex representation that might also include countervailing aspects (e.g., is any of the experience negative?). We first demonstrate that the overestimation bias is pervasive for a wide range of positive (Studies 1–5) and negative experiences (Study 6). Furthermore, the bias is not merely an artifact of how preferences are measured (Study 7). Consistent with judgments based on core representations, the bias significantly reduces when the core representation is uniformly positive (Studies 8A–8B). Such judgments lead to a paradox in how people see others trade off between valuation and utility (Studies 9A–9B). Specifically, relative to themselves, people believe that an identically paying other will get more enjoyment from the same experience, but paradoxically, that an identically enjoying other will pay more for the same experience. Finally, consistent with a core representation explanation, explicitly prompting people to consider the entire distribution of others’ preferences significantly reduced or eliminated the bias (Study 10). These findings suggest that social judgments of others’ preferences are not only largely biased, but they also ignore how others make trade-offs between evaluative metrics.
General Discussion
People are sometimes called upon to assess the preferences of others, assessments which
we find to be prone to persistent biases. Across several studies, we find that across various
measures of valuation and utility (i.e., WTP (willingness to pay), enjoyment, and willingness-to-wait), people believe
that others have more intense experiences than they themselves do (Studies 1-8). We propose
that this overestimation of others stems from a narrow focus on the primary dimension of the
option being evaluated (e.g., a trip to Rio De Janeiro is generally thought to be positive, shaving
your head is generally thought to be negative). But this only involves estimations of others. Selfassessments are further informed by the subtle vagaries of personal preferences, reducing the
total preference intensity (e.g., Rio De Janeiro is encumbered by its hard-to-pronounce local
language, and a shaved head is buoyed by the opportunity it affords for a novel scalp tattoo).
Thus, personal evaluations are more moderate than are the estimates of the evaluations of others.
This intuition is strong enough that it is applied even when the target of comparison is
explicitly similar to the self (Studies 9A-9B). When asked to evaluate someone with an identical
WTP, people think that person will anticipate more enjoyment; and when evaluating someone
with identical anticipated enjoyment, people think that person will have a higher WTP. In
combination, people can demonstrate the paradoxical belief that others are willing to pay more
for the same level of enjoyment (when asked about someone identical in enjoyment) or that
others are willing to pay less for the same level of enjoyment (when asked about someone
identical in WTP). Finally, explicitly prompting people to think about the full distribution of
others’ possible valuations significantly interrupted the intuitive process of overestimation based
on the core representation of objects being considered (Study 10).
Relation to Previous Research
Why do people have such persistent judgmental errors when estimating the evaluations of
others? After all, people are not blind to the evaluations of others. People frequently observe the
choices of others, and at least occasionally, are told something about the preferences which led to
those choices. Research indicates that judgments about values and preferences are often
inherently automatic (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kahneman, 2003;
Simmons & Nelson, 2006, 2018; Sloman, 1996). Understanding the trade-offs between
evaluative metrics (e.g., a longer wait versus a higher price), however, is more complicated (e.g.,
Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988). When reporting their own evaluations, people have the
benefits of each metric being accessible and generally reliable, and consequently, evaluative
trade-offs are more likely to be consistent. When predicting the evaluations of others, on the
other hand, people do not have the same basis of knowledge. Without knowledge of how other
people trade off between evaluative metrics, people appear to ignore them altogether.
Consequently, they use intuitive but incomplete heuristics that people experience things more
intensely, which can be misapplied in the case of similar others (i.e., those who would like a
good as much as they would or would pay as much for a good than they would).
Previous research in judgment and decision-making documents abundant evidence that
people do not always hold stable preferences but construct them on the spot when they are
making decisions (Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 1998; Fischhoff, 2013; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson,
1992; Slovic, 1995). If preferences are partially constructed for the self, they might be entirely
constructed when judging others. Studies 9A-9B demonstrate that while people’s own valuation
of a good remains stable, their beliefs about others’ valuation of the same good reverse
depending on how they are asked about others’ valuation. More specifically, people believed that
others derived simultaneously more and less utility from the same goods than they did.
The overestimation bias we document also offers a new approach to understanding the
endowment effect and why selling prices tend to exceed buying prices. Previous research has
largely focused on a “pain-of-losing” account for this phenomenon, which proposes that people
feel significantly more pain when selling their good than others feel when acquiring the same
good (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Thaler, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). Another
explanation more recently put forth by Weaver and Frederick (2012) hypothesizes that instead
sellers and buyers use different reference prices. Sellers typically focus on market prices in
determining their selling price, whereas buyers typically focus on their own valuation. Because
market prices tend to be higher than people’s valuations (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991)
and both parties are averse to bad deals, selling prices tend to exceed buying prices. Our
overestimation bias account suggests that in addition to these explanations, people’s expectation
that others derive more value from goods might also contribute to a discrepancy in buying and
selling prices. In particular, sellers may believe that buyers would value the good more than they
themselves would, leading them to set higher selling prices.
Alternative accounts for the overestimation bias
This paper reports 12 experiments showing the existence, robustness, and consequence of
the overestimation bias. We also conducted a handful of additional investigations to try to
understand the forces that may moderate the expression of our effects. Though these studies do
not authoritatively answer why people overestimate others’ valuation, in combination they may
provide some hints. We review two of those investigations, and report them in further detail in
the Supplemental Materials.
> Others with Extreme Preferences.
Study 9A introduced the matching paradigm as a
strong tactic for controlling how people generate an exemplar when estimating the evaluation of
others. An alternative approach, we thought, might be to simply heighten the salience of some
comparison others who are more or less positive about the same stimulus. If people are
spontaneously thinking of an enthusiastic consumer, then forcing them to consider the behavior
of an unenthusiastic consumer might change their estimate. We examined this exceptional other
account in two additional studies described in detail in the Supplemental Materials.
First, in Study S8 (N = 807), we recruited people who self-identified as having extreme
preferences to investigate whether the overestimation bias would persist. Specifically, we
recruited self-identified fans of Star Wars movies and asked them to estimate either: (a) the
average Star Wars fan’s or (b) the average US person’s evaluations of a Star Wars product.
Though these Star Wars fans rationally understood that the average US person’s evaluation of a
Star Wars product would be less extreme than their own, their overestimation emerged when
considering the average Star Wars fan, assuming that the average Star Wars fan would evaluate
the product more positively than they themselves would.
Second, in Study S9 (N = 1214), we used the match paradigm in Study 9A with an
additional factor (Other). In addition to examining how people view identical others (i.e., those
matched on either enjoyment or WTP), we explored people’s estimations for either: (a) a person
who had greater preference for the product (i.e., would pay $5 more than they would for the
product [Higher WTP Other] or would enjoy the product 5 units more than they would [Higher
Enjoyment Other]), or (b) a person who had lesser preference for the product (i.e., would pay $5
less than they would for the product [Lower WTP Other] or would enjoy the product 5 units less
than they would [Lower Enjoyment Other]). By our reasoning, it is possible that explicitly
considering a less enthusiastic consumer would disrupt people’s intuitions for their preferences,
thereby eliminating overestimation. We first replicated the paradoxical results of Study 9A when
people considered identical others: People assumed both that those matched on enjoyment would
pay more for the product than they would, but also that those matched on WTP would enjoy the
product more than they would. But importantly, people asked to consider lower enjoyment others
(i.e., those who would enjoy the product 5 units less than they would) rationally assumed that
those others would pay less for the product than they would, and people asked to consider lower
WTP others (i.e., those who would pay $5 less than they would for the product) rationally
assumed that those others would enjoy the product less than they would.
Together, the results from these two supplemental studies bolster our finding in Studies
9A-9B that the bias cannot be fully explained by the salience of others with extreme preferences
or the extremity of one’s own preferences. When people explicitly consider others who are less
positive towards a product, people display rational responses. However, when considering
average others or those who should have similar preferences, the overestimation bias persists.
Although people often inaccurately predict others’ preferences, they are more likely to be
accurate about the relative difference between their own and others’ preferences of certain
experiences. For instance, if a parent were asked how much they and others would like their
child’s drawing, they would no doubt recognize that their liking of the drawing would be greater
than that of others. Or if people are explicitly told that someone likes a product less than they
themselves do, this also appears to disrupt the reliance on intuitive core representations. The
results in Study 10 are consistent with this logic: People can more accurately predict others’
preferences when they are explicitly prompted to consider others whose preferences are not
consistent with the core representation of a stimulus. Therefore, people are capable of
understanding others’ preferences, but they do not spontaneously consider and integrate the
entire distribution of possible preferences unless they are explicitly compelled to do so.
The combination of the above points, does highlight an interesting parallel account; one
that we can articulate with some clarity, but one that our present findings can neither perfectly
rule out, nor perfectly rule in.10 In our theorizing, the prospective visitor to Rio De Janeiro
forecasts a positive experience encumbered by a small number of idiosyncratic negative
experiences. That person, when judging others, starts with the core representation of the
experience (i.e., that a visit to Rio De Janeiro is enjoyable), and that confidence in that initial
intuition means that they do not adjust from there. Accordingly, whereas personal assessments of
Rio De Janeiro are somewhat middling, others are perceived to be more positive. The alternative
account focuses not on the mixture of experience within an individual that moves a high rating to
a lower rating, but rather the mixture of experiences across people that produces many positive
evaluations, but also some idiosyncratically individually low ratings for generally positive
stimuli. Consider again the person evaluating the trip to Rio De Janeiro. On average, that person
is probably positive (say, an 85 on a 101-point scale), but some people might be quite negative
(perhaps they are actively avoiding irritating in-laws back in Brazil), and give an extremely low
evaluation of the potential visit. The average person and the negative person both have equal
weight in the overall true average, but they might not have equal weight in how people form their
perceptions of the average other. In essence, it may be the case that people are fully capable of
integrating both the core representation of a prospect with the more unusual negative features;
they accurately recognize that most people think that Ipanema beach is beautiful, and they
accurately recognize that most people are nevertheless bothered by the risk for potential theft,
but they fail to capture that for some people the latter factor is so significant that it overwhelms
the former. That is, they accurately perceive the experiences of others, but they do not consider
all of those experiences when estimating the average experience.
There is merit to this account. First, even for very positive stimuli, there are always a
number of participants whose valuations are quite low. Consider, just as an example, the density
plot for WTP for a movie ticket from Study 1. The mean is not low, but the distribution is hardly
normal, and a sizable fraction of participants (26.4%) say that they are willing to pay $0. Perhaps
it is exactly that segment of the population that people are failing to identify when constructing
their averages. The distributions generated by participants in Study 10 partially challenge the
extreme version of that possibility. Participants generated very accurate representations of other
people’s WTP (albeit less accurate for other people’s enjoyment), but still showed the overall
bias. Still, it may be the case that people are capable of bringing the full and accurate
representation of the distribution to mind, but they do not do so unless prompted.
For now, we remain agnostic. It could be the case that the core representation of a
positive product or experience creates an intuition that biases predictions about everyone
upward, or it may be the case that creates a mental sample that is biased by selecting out those
people who are uncharacteristically negative. Some of our data seems more consistent with one,
but none of it is so consistent to eliminate the possibility of the other. We think that future
research can hopefully untangle those (and we hope that we are the researchers who do so).
Friday, November 22, 2019
The Negativity Bias, Revisited: Evidence from Neuroscience Measures and an Individual Differences Approach
The Negativity Bias, Revisited: Evidence from Neuroscience Measures and an Individual Differences Approach. Catherine J. Norris. Social Neuroscience, Nov 21 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/17470919.2019.1696225
Abstract: Past research has provided support for the existence of a negativity bias, the tendency for negativity to have a stronger impact than positivity. Theoretically, the negativity bias provides an evolutionary advantage, as it is more critical for survival to avoid a harmful stimulus than to pursue a potentially helpful one. The current paper reviews the theoretical grounding of the negativity bias in the Evaluative Space Model, and presents recent findings using a multilevel approach that further elucidate the mechanisms underlying the negativity bias and underscore the importance of the negativity bias for human functioning.
Keywords: ERPs, fMRI, neuroticism, personality, gender, age
Abstract: Past research has provided support for the existence of a negativity bias, the tendency for negativity to have a stronger impact than positivity. Theoretically, the negativity bias provides an evolutionary advantage, as it is more critical for survival to avoid a harmful stimulus than to pursue a potentially helpful one. The current paper reviews the theoretical grounding of the negativity bias in the Evaluative Space Model, and presents recent findings using a multilevel approach that further elucidate the mechanisms underlying the negativity bias and underscore the importance of the negativity bias for human functioning.
Keywords: ERPs, fMRI, neuroticism, personality, gender, age
We find that affective arousal increases the amount & the severity of self-disclosure, and that self-disclosure is also increased by physiological arousal; often-thought-about thoughts are more likely to be disclosed
Arousal increases self-disclosure. Brent Coker, Ann L. McGill. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 87, March 2020, 103928. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2019.103928
Abstract: This research tests the hypothesis that arousal increases self-disclosure. We find that affective arousal increases the amount (study 1) and the severity (study 2) of self-disclosure, and that self-disclosure is also increased by physiological arousal (study 3). We further explore the moderating effect of thought frequency on the arousal-disclosure relationship, finding that often-thought-about thoughts are more likely to be disclosed than less thought-about thoughts. This research has practical importance in terms of understanding when and why people self-disclose personal information, and enriches our understanding of the theoretical relationship between arousal and information sharing.
Abstract: This research tests the hypothesis that arousal increases self-disclosure. We find that affective arousal increases the amount (study 1) and the severity (study 2) of self-disclosure, and that self-disclosure is also increased by physiological arousal (study 3). We further explore the moderating effect of thought frequency on the arousal-disclosure relationship, finding that often-thought-about thoughts are more likely to be disclosed than less thought-about thoughts. This research has practical importance in terms of understanding when and why people self-disclose personal information, and enriches our understanding of the theoretical relationship between arousal and information sharing.
In 2010, Fanelli reported a positive result rate of 91.5% for psychology papers; these authors found only 42.65% positive results papers in the Registered Reports they reviewed
Scheel, A. M. (2019, March 12). Positive result rates in psychology: Registered Reports compared to the conventional literature. ZPID (Leibniz Institute for Psychology Information). https://doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.2390
Abstract
Background: Several studies have found the scientific literature in psychology to be characterised by an exceptionally high rate of publications that report 'positive' results (supporting their main research hypothesis) on the one hand, and notoriously low statistical power on the other (Sterling, 1959; Fanelli, 2010; Maxwell, 2004). These findings are at odds with each other and likely reflect a tendency to under-report negative results, through mechanisms such as file-drawering, publication bias, and 'questionable research practices' like p-hacking and HARKing. A strong bias against negative results can lead to an inflated false positive rate and inflated effect sizes in the literature, making it difficult for researchers to build on previous work and increasing the risk of ineffective or harmful 'evidence-based' applications and policies. In 2013, Registered Reports (RRs) were developed as a new publication format to reduce under-reporting of negative results by mitigating file-drawering, publication bias, and questionable research practices: Before collecting and analysing their data, authors submit a protocol containing their hypotheses and methods to a journal, where it gets reviewed and, if successful, receives 'in-principle acceptance' which guarantees publication once the results are in, regardless of the outcome. Given their bias-reducing safeguards, we should expect a lower positive result rate in RRs compared to the non-RR literature, but to date no structured comparison of RRs and non-RRs has been offered.
Objectives: Fanelli (2010) presented a simple method to assess the positive result rate in a large sample of publications. We used his method to replicate his results for the (non-RR) psychology literature since 2013 and compare it to all published RRs in psychology.
Hypothesis: Using Fanelli's method, we tested the hypothesis that published RRs in psychology have a lower positive result rate than non-RRs in psychology published in the same time range (2013-2018). We would reject this hypothesis if the difference between RRs and non-RRs were found to be significantly smaller than 6%. Method: To obtain the non-RR sample, we applied Fanelli's (2010) sampling strategy: We searched all journals listed in the 'Psychiatry/Psychology' category of the Essential Science Indicators database for the phrase 'test* the hypothes*' and picked a random sample of 150 publications of all search results, deviating from Fanelli only in restricting the year of publication to 2013-2018. To obtain the RR sample, we relied on a list of published RRs curated by the Center for Open Science (https://www.zotero.org/groups/479248/osf/items/collectionKey/KEJP68G9?) which at the time had 152 entries, and excluded all publications that were not in psychology or not certainly RRs, leaving 81 publications. The positive result rate was determined by identifying the first hypothesis mentioned in the abstract or full text and coding whether it was (fully or partially) supported or not supported, and then for each group calculating the proportion of papers that reported support. Methods and analyses were preregistered at https://osf.io/s8e97/.
Results: Eight non-RRs and 13 RRs were excluded because they either did not test a hypothesis or could not be coded for other reasons, leaving 142 non-RRs and 68 RRs. The positive result rate was 95.77% for non-RRs and 42.65% for RRs. The proportion difference was significantly different from zero (one-sided Fisher's exact test, alpha = .05), p < .0001, and not significantly smaller than our smallest effect size of interest of 6% in an equivalence test, Z = -7.564, p > .999. For an exploratory analysis we also coded whether or not a paper contained a replication of previous work and found that none of the non-RRs, but two thirds (42/68) of the RRs did. The positive result rate for replication RRs was slightly lower (35.71%) than for original RRs (53.85%), but this difference was not significant, p = .112.
Conclusions and implications: In 2010, Fanelli reported a positive result rate of 91.5% for the field of psychology. Using the same method, we found a rate of 95.77% for the time between 2013 and 2018, suggesting that the rate has not gone down in recent years. In contrast, with only 42.65% the new population of Registered Reports shows a strikingly lower positive result rate than the non-RR literature. This difference may be somewhat smaller when focussing only on original work, but the RR population is currently too small to draw strong conclusions about any differences between replication and original studies. Our conclusions are limited by the different sampling procedures for RRs and non-RRs and by the observational nature of our study, which did not allow us to account for potential confounding factors. Nonetheless, our results are in line with the assumption that RRs reduce under-reporting of negative results and provide a first estimate for the difference between this new population of studies and the conventional literature.
Abstract
Background: Several studies have found the scientific literature in psychology to be characterised by an exceptionally high rate of publications that report 'positive' results (supporting their main research hypothesis) on the one hand, and notoriously low statistical power on the other (Sterling, 1959; Fanelli, 2010; Maxwell, 2004). These findings are at odds with each other and likely reflect a tendency to under-report negative results, through mechanisms such as file-drawering, publication bias, and 'questionable research practices' like p-hacking and HARKing. A strong bias against negative results can lead to an inflated false positive rate and inflated effect sizes in the literature, making it difficult for researchers to build on previous work and increasing the risk of ineffective or harmful 'evidence-based' applications and policies. In 2013, Registered Reports (RRs) were developed as a new publication format to reduce under-reporting of negative results by mitigating file-drawering, publication bias, and questionable research practices: Before collecting and analysing their data, authors submit a protocol containing their hypotheses and methods to a journal, where it gets reviewed and, if successful, receives 'in-principle acceptance' which guarantees publication once the results are in, regardless of the outcome. Given their bias-reducing safeguards, we should expect a lower positive result rate in RRs compared to the non-RR literature, but to date no structured comparison of RRs and non-RRs has been offered.
Objectives: Fanelli (2010) presented a simple method to assess the positive result rate in a large sample of publications. We used his method to replicate his results for the (non-RR) psychology literature since 2013 and compare it to all published RRs in psychology.
Hypothesis: Using Fanelli's method, we tested the hypothesis that published RRs in psychology have a lower positive result rate than non-RRs in psychology published in the same time range (2013-2018). We would reject this hypothesis if the difference between RRs and non-RRs were found to be significantly smaller than 6%. Method: To obtain the non-RR sample, we applied Fanelli's (2010) sampling strategy: We searched all journals listed in the 'Psychiatry/Psychology' category of the Essential Science Indicators database for the phrase 'test* the hypothes*' and picked a random sample of 150 publications of all search results, deviating from Fanelli only in restricting the year of publication to 2013-2018. To obtain the RR sample, we relied on a list of published RRs curated by the Center for Open Science (https://www.zotero.org/groups/479248/osf/items/collectionKey/KEJP68G9?) which at the time had 152 entries, and excluded all publications that were not in psychology or not certainly RRs, leaving 81 publications. The positive result rate was determined by identifying the first hypothesis mentioned in the abstract or full text and coding whether it was (fully or partially) supported or not supported, and then for each group calculating the proportion of papers that reported support. Methods and analyses were preregistered at https://osf.io/s8e97/.
Results: Eight non-RRs and 13 RRs were excluded because they either did not test a hypothesis or could not be coded for other reasons, leaving 142 non-RRs and 68 RRs. The positive result rate was 95.77% for non-RRs and 42.65% for RRs. The proportion difference was significantly different from zero (one-sided Fisher's exact test, alpha = .05), p < .0001, and not significantly smaller than our smallest effect size of interest of 6% in an equivalence test, Z = -7.564, p > .999. For an exploratory analysis we also coded whether or not a paper contained a replication of previous work and found that none of the non-RRs, but two thirds (42/68) of the RRs did. The positive result rate for replication RRs was slightly lower (35.71%) than for original RRs (53.85%), but this difference was not significant, p = .112.
Conclusions and implications: In 2010, Fanelli reported a positive result rate of 91.5% for the field of psychology. Using the same method, we found a rate of 95.77% for the time between 2013 and 2018, suggesting that the rate has not gone down in recent years. In contrast, with only 42.65% the new population of Registered Reports shows a strikingly lower positive result rate than the non-RR literature. This difference may be somewhat smaller when focussing only on original work, but the RR population is currently too small to draw strong conclusions about any differences between replication and original studies. Our conclusions are limited by the different sampling procedures for RRs and non-RRs and by the observational nature of our study, which did not allow us to account for potential confounding factors. Nonetheless, our results are in line with the assumption that RRs reduce under-reporting of negative results and provide a first estimate for the difference between this new population of studies and the conventional literature.
Credibility, communication, and climate change: Lifestyle inconsistency and do-gooder derogation
Credibility, communication, and climate change: How lifestyle inconsistency and do-gooder derogation impact decarbonization advocacy. Gregg Sparkman, Shahzeen Z. Attari. Energy Research & Social Science, Volume 59, January 2020, 101290. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2019.101290
Abstract: The present research examines two distinct pitfalls for advocates aiming to motivate others to use renewable energy and reduce their carbon footprint. Recent research has found that science communicators and advocates may be judged for inconsistency between their behavior and advocacy—where information that an advocate's lifestyle has a large carbon footprint can undermine their appeals to live more sustainably or support policies to address climate change. Conversely, in other advocacy domains, research on do-gooder derogation has found that exemplary behavior among advocates can lead people to feel defensive about their own shortcomings and reject the exemplar and their cause. Do environmental advocates have to worry about both do-gooder derogation and behavior-advocacy inconsistency? Further, do different types of advocates have to worry about these pitfalls equally? To answer these questions, we use an online survey in the United States (N = 2362) to contrast the effectiveness of advocacy from peers and from experts across three levels of sustainable lifestyles: not sustainable, somewhat sustainable, and highly sustainable. We find strong evidence for the negative effects of behavior-advocacy inconsistency for both neighbors and experts, albeit much larger impacts for experts. Further, we also find partial evidence for do-gooder derogation for neighbors and experts: highly sustainable advocates were not more influential than somewhat sustainable ones—instead they were marginally worse. Overall, these results suggest that advocates, especially experts, are most credible and influential when they adopt many sustainable behaviors in their day-to-day lives, so long as they are not seen as too extreme.
4. Discussion
These results show that both experts and neighbors suffered from behavior-advocacy inconsistency effects: when advocates lived unsustainable lifestyles, there were less successful at encouraging others to sign up for a residential renewable energy program. However, behavior-advocacy inconsistency effects were significantly worse for experts than neighbors. It appears that people are more forgiving of neighbors’ unsustainable lifestyles than of experts’ shortcomings—perhaps because we hold experts to higher standards for behavior-advocacy consistency than we hold peers. This also appears to be true for perceptions of advocates’ credibility.
Further, these data find that living a highly sustainable lifestyle (buying renewable energy, having an extremely efficient home, completely avoiding flying, and eating no meat or cheese) does not make advocates even more effective than living a somewhat sustainable lifestyle (buying renewable energy, having a fairly energy efficient home, and making substantial efforts to curb meat eating and flying). In fact, disclosing one's highly sustainable lifestyle amid giving others an appeal to change may run the risk of raising do-gooder derogation, where advocates’ exemplary lifestyles may make others’ feel defensive about their own shortcoming leading them to dislike the advocate and their cause. As such, we found that highly sustainable advocates were marginally less effective at increasing interest in the renewable energy program and no more credible than somewhat sustainable ones. Those who were somewhat sustainable fared well and do not appear to have suffered from concerns about behavior-advocacy inconsistency or do-gooder derogation. It's also possible that participants saw less of a contrast between themselves and the somewhat sustainable advocate: participants may have believed they were more sustainable than unsustainable advocates, and less sustainable than the highly sustainable advocate. If true, somewhat sustainable advocates may also benefit from perceptions of greater similarity, and therefore serve more easily as a social model [14]. Indeed, in a post hoc analysis we find that somewhat sustainable advocates are perceived to be slightly less socially distant than highly sustainable advocates (d = 0.11, see the Supplemental Material).
Experts appear to be judged more harshly, as their efforts suffer more greatly from behavior-advocacy inconsistency. This is unfortunate given that experts, with their wealth of knowledge and dedication to the topic, hold an irreplaceable role in increasing understanding by disseminating science and in advocacy for action on climate change. Notably, advocacy itself may not be problematic for climate change experts. Scientists, academics, and others can advocate for climate related policies and solutions in a number of ways [43], and are able to do so without hurting their credibility to the public [44] or their colleagues [45]. Research suggests that experts may be able to make substantial reductions to their footprint, such as reducing flying, without adversely affecting their academic success [46]. However, if experts involved in advocacy are unwilling to live somewhat sustainable lives, they may have trouble avoiding negative effects of behavior-advocacy inconsistency. By comparison, neighbors experienced much weaker behavior-advocacy inconsistency effects. In fact, for neighbors there was no significant difference between being highly sustainable and being unsustainable for participant's interest in adopting renewable energy. This may present a silver lining to these findings: non-professionals, no matter their lifestyle, can still be fairly effective advocates for decarbonization.
4.1. Limitations & future directions
In the present research we examined behavior-advocacy inconsistency effects and do-gooder derogation effects in the context of someone self-disclosing their personal actions. While self-disclosure is not uncommon for advocates of sustainability [47], [48], in other contexts the targets of advocacy may come to learn about an advocate's sustainable practices through their own inquiry, a third party, or some other indirect means. For example, after the release of “An Inconvenient Truth” Al Gore came under attack for his household energy consumption from a series of news articles attempting to impugn his reputation and the sincerity of his cause [49]. It is possible that our results would differ if the information about the advocate's lifestyle were learned through some other means or method. Future research is needed to assess whether the form and source of disclosure about an advocate's lifestyle impacts the results found here.
The operationalization of do-gooders used in the present work required the advocate stating both the criteria for living sustainability (references to home energy, diet, and flying) as well as their excellent performance relevant to that criteria. However, participants may lack personal knowledge about how these behaviors correspond to sustainability. For instance, participants may have been unaware that dietary choices have a substantial impact on the environment. If participants felt great uncertainty about whether these actions were actually important to sustainability, they may not have experienced any negative social comparison to do-gooders. Therefore, one possibility is that do-gooder derogation may be more prominent in cases where people already understand the importance of or care about the domain and behavior their performance is being compared on.
The study design used here relies on asking all our participants to envision highly similar vignettes in order to control for all aspects beyond those we seek to manipulate. This ensures strong internal validity, but raises questions regarding external validity and generalizability. In particular, our approach does not assess actual behavior change and instead assesses self-reported interest in the vignettes which may differ from real-world behavior. Further, a survey experiment is limited in terms of providing realistic experiences with advocates. In particular, a fictional peer may not adequately resemble the vivid information people would have in real life about one's neighbors. Therefore, it's possible that rich social interactions that come with real social ties may produce different and potentially stronger results than those found here. Similarly, envisioning attending a talk may differ from actually attending a presentation in ways that meaningfully change the results observed here. The present research lays the groundwork for studies seeking to assess such phenomenon in the field which can provide greater confidence in how they generalize to real-world experiences.
While the present research examined an important outcome, interest in a residential renewable energy program, it is possible that results may differ for other sustainable behaviors. For instance, past research on eliminating meat consumption has found stronger evidence for do-gooder derogation than we found in the present context [24]. Therefore, the relative strength of behavior-advocacy inconsistency and do-gooder derogation may vary across different domains of sustainability. Further research is needed to explore how behavior-advocacy inconsistency effects and do-gooder derogation may differ depending on the behavior in question.
We also need to better understand how to overcome behavior-advocacy inconsistency concerns and do-gooder derogation. Recent research on advocacy for decarbonization policies finds that when advocates indicate that they have reduced their carbon footprint from a previously high footprint, credibility is restored [10], i.e., advocates are judged on their current carbon footprint and not their past footprint. More generally, information about others changing has been shown to be inspirational [50], and help resolve a variety of psychological barriers that prevent personal change [51]. In the advocacy context, it may also be helpful address threats to one's self image from comparisons to do-gooders. Specifically, if advocates indicate they have changed and had to improve over time, they may present themselves not as perfect exemplars, but as people who have not always acted ideally, much like the audience they're addressing. Exploring the consequences of advocates disclosing that they changed may thus be a fruitful direction for future research.
Abstract: The present research examines two distinct pitfalls for advocates aiming to motivate others to use renewable energy and reduce their carbon footprint. Recent research has found that science communicators and advocates may be judged for inconsistency between their behavior and advocacy—where information that an advocate's lifestyle has a large carbon footprint can undermine their appeals to live more sustainably or support policies to address climate change. Conversely, in other advocacy domains, research on do-gooder derogation has found that exemplary behavior among advocates can lead people to feel defensive about their own shortcomings and reject the exemplar and their cause. Do environmental advocates have to worry about both do-gooder derogation and behavior-advocacy inconsistency? Further, do different types of advocates have to worry about these pitfalls equally? To answer these questions, we use an online survey in the United States (N = 2362) to contrast the effectiveness of advocacy from peers and from experts across three levels of sustainable lifestyles: not sustainable, somewhat sustainable, and highly sustainable. We find strong evidence for the negative effects of behavior-advocacy inconsistency for both neighbors and experts, albeit much larger impacts for experts. Further, we also find partial evidence for do-gooder derogation for neighbors and experts: highly sustainable advocates were not more influential than somewhat sustainable ones—instead they were marginally worse. Overall, these results suggest that advocates, especially experts, are most credible and influential when they adopt many sustainable behaviors in their day-to-day lives, so long as they are not seen as too extreme.
4. Discussion
These results show that both experts and neighbors suffered from behavior-advocacy inconsistency effects: when advocates lived unsustainable lifestyles, there were less successful at encouraging others to sign up for a residential renewable energy program. However, behavior-advocacy inconsistency effects were significantly worse for experts than neighbors. It appears that people are more forgiving of neighbors’ unsustainable lifestyles than of experts’ shortcomings—perhaps because we hold experts to higher standards for behavior-advocacy consistency than we hold peers. This also appears to be true for perceptions of advocates’ credibility.
Further, these data find that living a highly sustainable lifestyle (buying renewable energy, having an extremely efficient home, completely avoiding flying, and eating no meat or cheese) does not make advocates even more effective than living a somewhat sustainable lifestyle (buying renewable energy, having a fairly energy efficient home, and making substantial efforts to curb meat eating and flying). In fact, disclosing one's highly sustainable lifestyle amid giving others an appeal to change may run the risk of raising do-gooder derogation, where advocates’ exemplary lifestyles may make others’ feel defensive about their own shortcoming leading them to dislike the advocate and their cause. As such, we found that highly sustainable advocates were marginally less effective at increasing interest in the renewable energy program and no more credible than somewhat sustainable ones. Those who were somewhat sustainable fared well and do not appear to have suffered from concerns about behavior-advocacy inconsistency or do-gooder derogation. It's also possible that participants saw less of a contrast between themselves and the somewhat sustainable advocate: participants may have believed they were more sustainable than unsustainable advocates, and less sustainable than the highly sustainable advocate. If true, somewhat sustainable advocates may also benefit from perceptions of greater similarity, and therefore serve more easily as a social model [14]. Indeed, in a post hoc analysis we find that somewhat sustainable advocates are perceived to be slightly less socially distant than highly sustainable advocates (d = 0.11, see the Supplemental Material).
Experts appear to be judged more harshly, as their efforts suffer more greatly from behavior-advocacy inconsistency. This is unfortunate given that experts, with their wealth of knowledge and dedication to the topic, hold an irreplaceable role in increasing understanding by disseminating science and in advocacy for action on climate change. Notably, advocacy itself may not be problematic for climate change experts. Scientists, academics, and others can advocate for climate related policies and solutions in a number of ways [43], and are able to do so without hurting their credibility to the public [44] or their colleagues [45]. Research suggests that experts may be able to make substantial reductions to their footprint, such as reducing flying, without adversely affecting their academic success [46]. However, if experts involved in advocacy are unwilling to live somewhat sustainable lives, they may have trouble avoiding negative effects of behavior-advocacy inconsistency. By comparison, neighbors experienced much weaker behavior-advocacy inconsistency effects. In fact, for neighbors there was no significant difference between being highly sustainable and being unsustainable for participant's interest in adopting renewable energy. This may present a silver lining to these findings: non-professionals, no matter their lifestyle, can still be fairly effective advocates for decarbonization.
4.1. Limitations & future directions
In the present research we examined behavior-advocacy inconsistency effects and do-gooder derogation effects in the context of someone self-disclosing their personal actions. While self-disclosure is not uncommon for advocates of sustainability [47], [48], in other contexts the targets of advocacy may come to learn about an advocate's sustainable practices through their own inquiry, a third party, or some other indirect means. For example, after the release of “An Inconvenient Truth” Al Gore came under attack for his household energy consumption from a series of news articles attempting to impugn his reputation and the sincerity of his cause [49]. It is possible that our results would differ if the information about the advocate's lifestyle were learned through some other means or method. Future research is needed to assess whether the form and source of disclosure about an advocate's lifestyle impacts the results found here.
The operationalization of do-gooders used in the present work required the advocate stating both the criteria for living sustainability (references to home energy, diet, and flying) as well as their excellent performance relevant to that criteria. However, participants may lack personal knowledge about how these behaviors correspond to sustainability. For instance, participants may have been unaware that dietary choices have a substantial impact on the environment. If participants felt great uncertainty about whether these actions were actually important to sustainability, they may not have experienced any negative social comparison to do-gooders. Therefore, one possibility is that do-gooder derogation may be more prominent in cases where people already understand the importance of or care about the domain and behavior their performance is being compared on.
The study design used here relies on asking all our participants to envision highly similar vignettes in order to control for all aspects beyond those we seek to manipulate. This ensures strong internal validity, but raises questions regarding external validity and generalizability. In particular, our approach does not assess actual behavior change and instead assesses self-reported interest in the vignettes which may differ from real-world behavior. Further, a survey experiment is limited in terms of providing realistic experiences with advocates. In particular, a fictional peer may not adequately resemble the vivid information people would have in real life about one's neighbors. Therefore, it's possible that rich social interactions that come with real social ties may produce different and potentially stronger results than those found here. Similarly, envisioning attending a talk may differ from actually attending a presentation in ways that meaningfully change the results observed here. The present research lays the groundwork for studies seeking to assess such phenomenon in the field which can provide greater confidence in how they generalize to real-world experiences.
While the present research examined an important outcome, interest in a residential renewable energy program, it is possible that results may differ for other sustainable behaviors. For instance, past research on eliminating meat consumption has found stronger evidence for do-gooder derogation than we found in the present context [24]. Therefore, the relative strength of behavior-advocacy inconsistency and do-gooder derogation may vary across different domains of sustainability. Further research is needed to explore how behavior-advocacy inconsistency effects and do-gooder derogation may differ depending on the behavior in question.
We also need to better understand how to overcome behavior-advocacy inconsistency concerns and do-gooder derogation. Recent research on advocacy for decarbonization policies finds that when advocates indicate that they have reduced their carbon footprint from a previously high footprint, credibility is restored [10], i.e., advocates are judged on their current carbon footprint and not their past footprint. More generally, information about others changing has been shown to be inspirational [50], and help resolve a variety of psychological barriers that prevent personal change [51]. In the advocacy context, it may also be helpful address threats to one's self image from comparisons to do-gooders. Specifically, if advocates indicate they have changed and had to improve over time, they may present themselves not as perfect exemplars, but as people who have not always acted ideally, much like the audience they're addressing. Exploring the consequences of advocates disclosing that they changed may thus be a fruitful direction for future research.
Thursday, November 21, 2019
Women that align masturbation stimulation activities with partnered sex are more likely to experience orgasm & enhanced orgasmic pleasure, with sexual relationship satisfaction playing an important role in this process
Rowland DL, Hevesi K, Conway GR, et al. Relationship Between Masturbation and Partnered Sex in Women: Does the Former Facilitate, Inhibit, or Not Affect the Latter? J Sex Med 2019;XX:XXX–XXX. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsxm.2019.10.012
Abstract
Introduction: The relationship between masturbation activities and their effect on partnered sex is understudied.
Aim: The aim of this study was to assess the alignment of activities between masturbation and partnered sex, and to determine whether different levels of alignment affect orgasmic parameters during partnered sex.
Methods: 2,215 women completed an online survey about activities during masturbation and reasons for orgasmic difficulty during masturbation, and these were compared with activities and reasons for orgasmic difficulty during partnered sex.
Main Outcome Measure: Degree of alignment between masturbation activities and partnered sex activities was used to predict sexual arousal difficulty, orgasmic probability, orgasmic pleasure, orgasmic latency, and orgasmic difficulty during partnered sex.
Results: Women showed only moderate alignment regarding masturbation and partnered sex activities, as well as reasons for masturbation orgasmic difficulty and reasons for partnered sex orgasmic difficulty. However, those that showed greater alignment of activities showed better orgasmic response during partnered sex and were more likely to prefer partnered sex over masturbation.
Clinical Implications: Women tend to use less conventional techniques for arousal during masturbation compared with partnered sex. Increasing alignment between masturbation and partnered sexual activities may lead to better arousal and orgasmic response, and lower orgasmic difficulty.
Strength & Limitations: The study was well-powered and drew from a multinational population, providing perspective on a long-standing unanswered question. Major limitations were the younger age and self-selection of the sample.
Conclusion: Women that align masturbation stimulation activities with partnered sex activities are more likely to experience orgasm and enhanced orgasmic pleasure, with sexual relationship satisfaction playing an important role in this process.
Check also An Examination of the Sexual Double Standard Pertaining to Masturbation and the Impact of Assumed Motives. Katherine R. Haus, Ashley E. Thompson. Sexuality & Culture, November 2 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/11/an-examination-of-sexual-double.html
Also The majority (94.5%) of women indicated having masturbated at least once in their life; reported masturbating 2 or 3 times a week (26.8%) or once (26.3%); it is not “a partner substitute”, but rather is a stress coping & relaxation strategy:
Abstract
Introduction: The relationship between masturbation activities and their effect on partnered sex is understudied.
Aim: The aim of this study was to assess the alignment of activities between masturbation and partnered sex, and to determine whether different levels of alignment affect orgasmic parameters during partnered sex.
Methods: 2,215 women completed an online survey about activities during masturbation and reasons for orgasmic difficulty during masturbation, and these were compared with activities and reasons for orgasmic difficulty during partnered sex.
Main Outcome Measure: Degree of alignment between masturbation activities and partnered sex activities was used to predict sexual arousal difficulty, orgasmic probability, orgasmic pleasure, orgasmic latency, and orgasmic difficulty during partnered sex.
Results: Women showed only moderate alignment regarding masturbation and partnered sex activities, as well as reasons for masturbation orgasmic difficulty and reasons for partnered sex orgasmic difficulty. However, those that showed greater alignment of activities showed better orgasmic response during partnered sex and were more likely to prefer partnered sex over masturbation.
Clinical Implications: Women tend to use less conventional techniques for arousal during masturbation compared with partnered sex. Increasing alignment between masturbation and partnered sexual activities may lead to better arousal and orgasmic response, and lower orgasmic difficulty.
Strength & Limitations: The study was well-powered and drew from a multinational population, providing perspective on a long-standing unanswered question. Major limitations were the younger age and self-selection of the sample.
Conclusion: Women that align masturbation stimulation activities with partnered sex activities are more likely to experience orgasm and enhanced orgasmic pleasure, with sexual relationship satisfaction playing an important role in this process.
Check also An Examination of the Sexual Double Standard Pertaining to Masturbation and the Impact of Assumed Motives. Katherine R. Haus, Ashley E. Thompson. Sexuality & Culture, November 2 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/11/an-examination-of-sexual-double.html
Also The majority (94.5%) of women indicated having masturbated at least once in their life; reported masturbating 2 or 3 times a week (26.8%) or once (26.3%); it is not “a partner substitute”, but rather is a stress coping & relaxation strategy:
Masturbatory Behavior in a Population Sample of German Women. Andrea Burri, Ana Carvalheira. The Journal of Sexual Medicine, May 30 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/05/the-majority-945-of-women-indicated.html
These findings suggest that rising narcissism is not a global trend and not evident even in societies that share many cultural and social commonalities with the US
Narcissism over time in Australia and Canada: A cross-temporal meta-analysis. Takeshi Hamamura, Chelsea A. Johnson, Michelle Stankovic. Personality and Individual Differences, November 21 2019, 109707. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2019.109707
Abstract: The literature on whether narcissism is increasing in the United States has been controversial. The notion of rising narcissism and self-focused culture, however, has shaped the public understanding of generational differences within and outside the United States. The current research examined whether narcissism has increased over time in two Western countries, Australia and Canada. A temporal meta-analysis (k = 102, n = 24,990) found no evidence of rising narcissism. Findings from these two countries showed a different temporal pattern, with narcissism decreasing in Canada particularly after 2008, suggesting the possible effects of economic recession in tempering narcissism. An analysis of the subscale scores performed on a subset of the data, following a measurement equivalent analysis, corroborated this interpretation. These findings suggest that rising narcissism is not a global trend and not evident even in societies that share many cultural and social commonalities with the United States.
The dataset used, the processing code (R language) and references for the data in the CSV file are available at https://osf.io/37pe6
Abstract: The literature on whether narcissism is increasing in the United States has been controversial. The notion of rising narcissism and self-focused culture, however, has shaped the public understanding of generational differences within and outside the United States. The current research examined whether narcissism has increased over time in two Western countries, Australia and Canada. A temporal meta-analysis (k = 102, n = 24,990) found no evidence of rising narcissism. Findings from these two countries showed a different temporal pattern, with narcissism decreasing in Canada particularly after 2008, suggesting the possible effects of economic recession in tempering narcissism. An analysis of the subscale scores performed on a subset of the data, following a measurement equivalent analysis, corroborated this interpretation. These findings suggest that rising narcissism is not a global trend and not evident even in societies that share many cultural and social commonalities with the United States.
The dataset used, the processing code (R language) and references for the data in the CSV file are available at https://osf.io/37pe6
Assessing U.S. Racial and Gender Differences in Happiness, 1972–2016
Assessing U.S. Racial and Gender Differences in Happiness, 1972–2016: An Intersectional Approach. Jason L. Cummings. Journal of Happiness Studies, November 21 2019. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10902-019-00103-z
Abstract: This study assesses trends and differentials in happiness among the U.S. population. Using data from the General Social Survey, 1972–2016 and the intersectionality paradigm to guide this work, I find that happiness differentials across gender and race are generally converging; however, patterns are quite complex and contingent on group membership (i.e. gender, race). Black women for instance, present a consistent pattern of improvement in happiness across decades, while White women display a persistent pattern of decline. In contrast, Black men experienced a discernable pattern of improvement in happiness between the 1970s and 1990s, followed by a leveling off in the early-2000s. White men experienced moderate gains in happiness between the 1970s and 1990s, but after the Great Recession/Obama Era, White male happiness followed a pattern of unprecedented decline, with the “happiness advantage” they once enjoyed (as a group) over Black men and women largely vanishing. In fact, although advantaged White men in the general population (i.e. financially satisfied) were about as happy as their White female and African–American female peers after the Great Recession, disadvantaged White men who were financially dissatisfied were less likely to report the same sentiment when compared to their White female and Black female peers who were similarly disadvantaged. Taking these patterns in account, I conclude with a discussion of what these patterns demonstrate regarding the changing nature of racial and gender inequality in the United States, past and present.
Keywords: Happiness Subjective well-being Intersectionality Race Gender SES Financial satisfaction Great recession Unemployment
Abstract: This study assesses trends and differentials in happiness among the U.S. population. Using data from the General Social Survey, 1972–2016 and the intersectionality paradigm to guide this work, I find that happiness differentials across gender and race are generally converging; however, patterns are quite complex and contingent on group membership (i.e. gender, race). Black women for instance, present a consistent pattern of improvement in happiness across decades, while White women display a persistent pattern of decline. In contrast, Black men experienced a discernable pattern of improvement in happiness between the 1970s and 1990s, followed by a leveling off in the early-2000s. White men experienced moderate gains in happiness between the 1970s and 1990s, but after the Great Recession/Obama Era, White male happiness followed a pattern of unprecedented decline, with the “happiness advantage” they once enjoyed (as a group) over Black men and women largely vanishing. In fact, although advantaged White men in the general population (i.e. financially satisfied) were about as happy as their White female and African–American female peers after the Great Recession, disadvantaged White men who were financially dissatisfied were less likely to report the same sentiment when compared to their White female and Black female peers who were similarly disadvantaged. Taking these patterns in account, I conclude with a discussion of what these patterns demonstrate regarding the changing nature of racial and gender inequality in the United States, past and present.
Keywords: Happiness Subjective well-being Intersectionality Race Gender SES Financial satisfaction Great recession Unemployment
Reaching Consensus in Polarized Moral Debates: Consensus was influenced by participants with a moderate view but high confidence
Reaching Consensus in Polarized Moral Debates. Joaquin Navajas et al. Current Biology, November 21 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2019.10.018
Highlights
• We asked two live crowds to deliberate about polarized moral issues (e.g., abortion)
• In small groups, they sought consensus on the acceptability of controversial actions
• Consensus was influenced by participants with a moderate view but high confidence
• Group ratings and changes of mind suggest that people adopted a mediation process
Summary: The group polarization phenomenon is a widespread human bias with no apparent geographical or cultural boundaries [1]. Although the conditions that breed extremism have been extensively studied [2, 3, 4, 5], comparably little research has examined how to depolarize attitudes in people who already embrace extreme beliefs. Previous studies have shown that deliberating groups may shift toward more moderate opinions [6], but why deliberation is sometimes effective although other times it fails at eliciting consensus remains largely unknown. To investigate this, we performed a large-scale behavioral experiment with live crowds from two countries. Participants (N = 3,288 in study 1 and N = 582 in study 2) were presented with a set of moral scenarios and asked to judge the acceptability of a controversial action. Then they organized in groups of three and discussed their opinions to see whether they agreed on common values of acceptability. We found that groups succeeding at reaching consensus frequently had extreme participants with low confidence and a participant with a moderate view but high confidence. Quantitative analyses showed that these “confident grays” exerted the greatest weight on group judgements and suggest that consensus was driven by a mediation process [7, 8]. Overall, these findings shed light on the elements that allow human groups to resolve moral disagreement.
Highlights
• We asked two live crowds to deliberate about polarized moral issues (e.g., abortion)
• In small groups, they sought consensus on the acceptability of controversial actions
• Consensus was influenced by participants with a moderate view but high confidence
• Group ratings and changes of mind suggest that people adopted a mediation process
Summary: The group polarization phenomenon is a widespread human bias with no apparent geographical or cultural boundaries [1]. Although the conditions that breed extremism have been extensively studied [2, 3, 4, 5], comparably little research has examined how to depolarize attitudes in people who already embrace extreme beliefs. Previous studies have shown that deliberating groups may shift toward more moderate opinions [6], but why deliberation is sometimes effective although other times it fails at eliciting consensus remains largely unknown. To investigate this, we performed a large-scale behavioral experiment with live crowds from two countries. Participants (N = 3,288 in study 1 and N = 582 in study 2) were presented with a set of moral scenarios and asked to judge the acceptability of a controversial action. Then they organized in groups of three and discussed their opinions to see whether they agreed on common values of acceptability. We found that groups succeeding at reaching consensus frequently had extreme participants with low confidence and a participant with a moderate view but high confidence. Quantitative analyses showed that these “confident grays” exerted the greatest weight on group judgements and suggest that consensus was driven by a mediation process [7, 8]. Overall, these findings shed light on the elements that allow human groups to resolve moral disagreement.
Most People Think They Are More Pro-Environmental than Others: A Demonstration of the Better-than-Average Effect in Perceived Pro-Environmental Engagement
Most People Think They Are More Pro-Environmental than Others: A Demonstration of the Better-than-Average Effect in Perceived Pro-Environmental Behavioral Engagement. Magnus Bergquist. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, Nov 21 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/01973533.2019.1689364
Abstract: People tend to perceive themselves as better than average in various contexts. In this article I test if the better-than-average effect (BTAE) also holds for pro-environmental behavioral engagement. Experiment 1 supported that the majority of participants report to be more pro-environmental than others, using a large representative sample. Experiment 2 validated these findings in 3 additional cultures (United States, United Kingdom, and India) and showed that BTAE held for both abstract (other Americans) and concrete (my friends) comparisons. Experiment 3 found that participants overestimated both how “much” and how “often” they engage in pro-environmental actions. Finally, Experiment 4 found weak support for the hypothesis that inducing BTAE are inhibiting future pro-environmental behaviors.
General discussion
The present research aimed to test if people perceive themselves as more pro-environmental than others, a hypothesis often discussed (e.g., Clayton et al., 2015; Gifford, 2011) yet not previously tested empirically. Four studies consistently demonstrated the BTAE in pro-environmental behaviors, using 4,042 participants. The data clearly support a self-serving bias causing people to overestimate their own climate change mitigation, suggesting that most people perceive themselves as more pro-environmental than others. The BTAE of pro-environmental behaviors was validated in four countries (Sweden, India, United Kingdom, and United States) and was found to hold for nine of 10 pro-environmental behaviors and for both abstract (other Americans) and concrete (my friends) reference groups. Study 4 tested the hypothesis that self-serving biases serve as a barrier for future pro-environmental engagement. Data showed that inducing people to perceive themselves as better than average (in terms of pro-environmental engagement) had negligible effects on pro-environmental obligations and weak effects on intentions for future pro-environmental engagement. Although a weak effect could have important practical implications, as the BTAE in pro-environmental behaviors might be a barrier for future behavior (Gifford, 2011), these results should be interpreted with caution and validated by future research.
Validity and implications of the BTAE
The aim of this research was to test the validity and implications of the BTAE. Studies 1–3 focused on validity: assessing external, internal, and content validity by testing if the BTAE would generalize across countries, pro-environmental behaviors, and reference groups and would hold across operationalization’s and methodological variations. Hence, both applied and theoretical aspects of the BTAE were tested. In the light of the “replication crisis” (Nelson, Simmons, & Simonsohn, 2018; Open Science Collaboration, 2015), replicating well-established effects (such as the BTAE) is important for validity—that is, to gain accumulated knowledge on boundaries, generalizations, and implications of psychological effects.
Variability in the BTAE
The strength of the BTAE varied across countries, showing the strongest effect in India (85.7%) followed by the United Kingdom (72%) and the United States (63.7%). The weakest effect was observed in the Swedish sample (51.3%). One explanation, as discussed in Study 2, is that the interpretation of pro-environmental behaviors differed across cultures. Content analyses comparing the Indian versus the U.S.-American sample support this assumption. Yet it is unclear if and how such differences can explain the variance in the BTAE. Another possible explanation is that the BTAE of pro-environmental behaviors is affected by values and attitudes that might differ between the countries. Yet data from the World Values Survey cannot provide sufficient support for this explanation (Ingelhart et al., 2014), showing no noticeable differences between relevant values (i.e., “Looking after the environment … care for nature and save life resources”) in Sweden (M = 2.46, SD = 1.2) versus India (M = 2.54, SD = 1.6). Similarly, the majority of participants prioritized “protecting the environment” over “economic growth” in both countries (Sweden = 65.2%, India = 69.8%). A third explanation might be linked to cross-cultural differences in response biases. Van de Vijver and Poortinga (1997) warned against interpreting intergroup differences in cross-cultural research without examining equivalence. Indeed, several studies have observed substantial differences in response biases such as extreme response styles and acquiescent responding across countries (e.g., Harzing, 2006; Johnson, Kulesa, Cho, & Shavitt, 2005; Smith, 2004). However, further research is necessary to explore the mechanisms underlying these differences in more detail (Johnson et al., 2005). In sum, although the BTAE of pro-environmental behaviors was validated across countries, it remains unclear why the strength of the BTAE varies between countries.
Reference group
Alicke and Govorun (2005) suggested that the BTAE decreases when comparing oneself to a “real person” rather than a more abstract concept (i.e., “other Swedes”). Past research has shown that the BTAE was reduced when asking students to compare themselves with “the person sitting next to them” rather than “the average college student” (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995). Therefore, Study 2 tested two reference groups with different level of abstraction “Americans” (abstract group), and “your friends” (concrete group). Results showed highly similar results of the BTAE in the two reference groups (63.7% vs. 62.1% above average). Given that participants are thinking about different reference groups when being asked about “my friends” versus “other Americans” and that these groups differ in their level of pro-environmental engagement, it is noticeable that people still overestimate their own pro-environmental engagement in relation to their “friends.”
BTAE as a psychological barrier
Study 4 was designed to test the hypothesis that the BTAE is a psychological barrier for climate change mitigation (Gifford, 2011). This hypothesis was derived from the research on negative spillover effects, predicting that a first moral behavior might “license” a subsequent immoral behavior (e.g., Blanken et al., 2015). It should be noted that research has also demonstrated positive spillover effects, where a first pro-environmental action encourages subsequent pro-environmental actions (e.g., Nilsson et al., 2017; Truelove et al., 2014). This hypothesis is also in line with a self-valuation hypothesis, increasing self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977), which has been demonstrated to predict behavioral intentions (Ajzen, 1985, 1991). Therefore, one explanation for the weak negative effect on pro-environmental intention is that a dual-process of both negative and positive spillover effects is at work. It could be that the BTAE is fostering pro-environmental intentions for some people while undermining pro-environmental intentions for others. Another explanation for the weak negative effect on intentions is based on the suggestion that the BTAE is a form of availability heuristics (see the following discussion). More specifically, if performing a behavior with a high frequency makes that behavior cognitively available, and thus increases the BTAE, frequency should also moderate the BTAE as a psychological barrier, making high-frequency behaviors more influential than low-frequency behaviors. Past research has identified a number of potential moderators driving the positive versus negative spillovers (e.g., Nilsson et al., 2017; Truelove et al., 2014). Future research should examine if and which moderators might cause the BTAE to foster versus undermine subsequent pro-environmental engagement.
The mechanisms of the BTAE
What are the psychological mechanism driving the BTAE? When analyzing the data from Study 2, the frequency of behavioral engagement was strongly positively correlated with the BTAE effect size. One interpretation of this finding is that performing a specific behavior with a high frequency is interpreted as also performing that behavior more frequently than others. This suggests that the BTAE is driven by the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), as people may be influenced by how cognitively available a certain behavior is when evaluating relative performance. Future research should further examine if the availability heuristic can explain the BTAE.
Limitations
As a first limitation, cultural comparison was confounded with means of assessing pro-environmental behavior. In the Indian sample, pro-environmental behaviors were assessed by open-ended questions, whereas predefined questions were used in the U.S. and U.K. samples. Could the differences in the BTAE between cultures have been influenced by the measurement method? Although open-ended versus predefined measurements were not used within the same sample, Study 2 reported an effect of 63.7% above the median, which was similar to Study 3 with an effect of 58.7% to 63.2% above the median. Studies 2 and 3 both used a U.S.-American sample, whereas pro-environmental behaviors were assessed by predefined questions in Study 2 and open-ended questions in Study 3, suggesting that the BTAE was not affected by using open-ended compared to predefined questions.
As a second limitation, when testing whether the BTAE affected pro-environmental obligation and intention in Study 4, order effects were not controlled for. Past research has shown that other compensatory behaviors, such as cognitive dissonance reduction strategies, are affected by order (e.g., Fointiat, Somat, & Grosbras, 2011; Gosling, Denizeau, & Oberlé, 2006). It should however be mentioned that these studies find that the first items are more influential than subsequent items. Therefore, in the present study, it would be predicted that obligations are weaker than intention. Yet we observed the opposite pattern, speaking against the influence of order effects. In any case, lack of randomization should be noted as a limitation in Study 4.
Worse than average
There are circumstances moderating or even reversing the effect. The BTAE may be moderated by both desirability and controllability, such as the effect holding for highly desirable traits but not for traits low in desirability, and that the effect is stronger for high controllable than low controllable traits (Alicke, 1985). It has been demonstrated that people view themselves as “worse than average” when evaluating their ability on difficult tasks (Moore, 2007). For example, students’ average rating of the likelihood of winning a trivia contest was 70% when the contest included easy quiz questions, whereas ratings dropped to only 6% for a contest including hard quiz questions (Kruger, 1999). Although we demonstrated the BTAE in nine of 10 pro-environmental behaviors, these were all everyday behaviors that are relatively easy to perform. Future research should test if the BTAE also holds when assessing “harder” pro-environmental actions.
Taken together, this article consistently demonstrates that the BTAE applies to pro-environmental behaviors; nevertheless, the evidence for the BTAE as a psychological barrier for future pro-environmental behaviors is weak and should be explored in future research. BTAE of pro-environmental behaviors was supported across four countries, testing 10 pro-environmental behaviors, and when assessing both closed- and open-ended questions as well as both concrete and abstract reference groups.
Abstract: People tend to perceive themselves as better than average in various contexts. In this article I test if the better-than-average effect (BTAE) also holds for pro-environmental behavioral engagement. Experiment 1 supported that the majority of participants report to be more pro-environmental than others, using a large representative sample. Experiment 2 validated these findings in 3 additional cultures (United States, United Kingdom, and India) and showed that BTAE held for both abstract (other Americans) and concrete (my friends) comparisons. Experiment 3 found that participants overestimated both how “much” and how “often” they engage in pro-environmental actions. Finally, Experiment 4 found weak support for the hypothesis that inducing BTAE are inhibiting future pro-environmental behaviors.
General discussion
The present research aimed to test if people perceive themselves as more pro-environmental than others, a hypothesis often discussed (e.g., Clayton et al., 2015; Gifford, 2011) yet not previously tested empirically. Four studies consistently demonstrated the BTAE in pro-environmental behaviors, using 4,042 participants. The data clearly support a self-serving bias causing people to overestimate their own climate change mitigation, suggesting that most people perceive themselves as more pro-environmental than others. The BTAE of pro-environmental behaviors was validated in four countries (Sweden, India, United Kingdom, and United States) and was found to hold for nine of 10 pro-environmental behaviors and for both abstract (other Americans) and concrete (my friends) reference groups. Study 4 tested the hypothesis that self-serving biases serve as a barrier for future pro-environmental engagement. Data showed that inducing people to perceive themselves as better than average (in terms of pro-environmental engagement) had negligible effects on pro-environmental obligations and weak effects on intentions for future pro-environmental engagement. Although a weak effect could have important practical implications, as the BTAE in pro-environmental behaviors might be a barrier for future behavior (Gifford, 2011), these results should be interpreted with caution and validated by future research.
Validity and implications of the BTAE
The aim of this research was to test the validity and implications of the BTAE. Studies 1–3 focused on validity: assessing external, internal, and content validity by testing if the BTAE would generalize across countries, pro-environmental behaviors, and reference groups and would hold across operationalization’s and methodological variations. Hence, both applied and theoretical aspects of the BTAE were tested. In the light of the “replication crisis” (Nelson, Simmons, & Simonsohn, 2018; Open Science Collaboration, 2015), replicating well-established effects (such as the BTAE) is important for validity—that is, to gain accumulated knowledge on boundaries, generalizations, and implications of psychological effects.
Variability in the BTAE
The strength of the BTAE varied across countries, showing the strongest effect in India (85.7%) followed by the United Kingdom (72%) and the United States (63.7%). The weakest effect was observed in the Swedish sample (51.3%). One explanation, as discussed in Study 2, is that the interpretation of pro-environmental behaviors differed across cultures. Content analyses comparing the Indian versus the U.S.-American sample support this assumption. Yet it is unclear if and how such differences can explain the variance in the BTAE. Another possible explanation is that the BTAE of pro-environmental behaviors is affected by values and attitudes that might differ between the countries. Yet data from the World Values Survey cannot provide sufficient support for this explanation (Ingelhart et al., 2014), showing no noticeable differences between relevant values (i.e., “Looking after the environment … care for nature and save life resources”) in Sweden (M = 2.46, SD = 1.2) versus India (M = 2.54, SD = 1.6). Similarly, the majority of participants prioritized “protecting the environment” over “economic growth” in both countries (Sweden = 65.2%, India = 69.8%). A third explanation might be linked to cross-cultural differences in response biases. Van de Vijver and Poortinga (1997) warned against interpreting intergroup differences in cross-cultural research without examining equivalence. Indeed, several studies have observed substantial differences in response biases such as extreme response styles and acquiescent responding across countries (e.g., Harzing, 2006; Johnson, Kulesa, Cho, & Shavitt, 2005; Smith, 2004). However, further research is necessary to explore the mechanisms underlying these differences in more detail (Johnson et al., 2005). In sum, although the BTAE of pro-environmental behaviors was validated across countries, it remains unclear why the strength of the BTAE varies between countries.
Reference group
Alicke and Govorun (2005) suggested that the BTAE decreases when comparing oneself to a “real person” rather than a more abstract concept (i.e., “other Swedes”). Past research has shown that the BTAE was reduced when asking students to compare themselves with “the person sitting next to them” rather than “the average college student” (Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak, & Vredenburg, 1995). Therefore, Study 2 tested two reference groups with different level of abstraction “Americans” (abstract group), and “your friends” (concrete group). Results showed highly similar results of the BTAE in the two reference groups (63.7% vs. 62.1% above average). Given that participants are thinking about different reference groups when being asked about “my friends” versus “other Americans” and that these groups differ in their level of pro-environmental engagement, it is noticeable that people still overestimate their own pro-environmental engagement in relation to their “friends.”
BTAE as a psychological barrier
Study 4 was designed to test the hypothesis that the BTAE is a psychological barrier for climate change mitigation (Gifford, 2011). This hypothesis was derived from the research on negative spillover effects, predicting that a first moral behavior might “license” a subsequent immoral behavior (e.g., Blanken et al., 2015). It should be noted that research has also demonstrated positive spillover effects, where a first pro-environmental action encourages subsequent pro-environmental actions (e.g., Nilsson et al., 2017; Truelove et al., 2014). This hypothesis is also in line with a self-valuation hypothesis, increasing self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977), which has been demonstrated to predict behavioral intentions (Ajzen, 1985, 1991). Therefore, one explanation for the weak negative effect on pro-environmental intention is that a dual-process of both negative and positive spillover effects is at work. It could be that the BTAE is fostering pro-environmental intentions for some people while undermining pro-environmental intentions for others. Another explanation for the weak negative effect on intentions is based on the suggestion that the BTAE is a form of availability heuristics (see the following discussion). More specifically, if performing a behavior with a high frequency makes that behavior cognitively available, and thus increases the BTAE, frequency should also moderate the BTAE as a psychological barrier, making high-frequency behaviors more influential than low-frequency behaviors. Past research has identified a number of potential moderators driving the positive versus negative spillovers (e.g., Nilsson et al., 2017; Truelove et al., 2014). Future research should examine if and which moderators might cause the BTAE to foster versus undermine subsequent pro-environmental engagement.
The mechanisms of the BTAE
What are the psychological mechanism driving the BTAE? When analyzing the data from Study 2, the frequency of behavioral engagement was strongly positively correlated with the BTAE effect size. One interpretation of this finding is that performing a specific behavior with a high frequency is interpreted as also performing that behavior more frequently than others. This suggests that the BTAE is driven by the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), as people may be influenced by how cognitively available a certain behavior is when evaluating relative performance. Future research should further examine if the availability heuristic can explain the BTAE.
Limitations
As a first limitation, cultural comparison was confounded with means of assessing pro-environmental behavior. In the Indian sample, pro-environmental behaviors were assessed by open-ended questions, whereas predefined questions were used in the U.S. and U.K. samples. Could the differences in the BTAE between cultures have been influenced by the measurement method? Although open-ended versus predefined measurements were not used within the same sample, Study 2 reported an effect of 63.7% above the median, which was similar to Study 3 with an effect of 58.7% to 63.2% above the median. Studies 2 and 3 both used a U.S.-American sample, whereas pro-environmental behaviors were assessed by predefined questions in Study 2 and open-ended questions in Study 3, suggesting that the BTAE was not affected by using open-ended compared to predefined questions.
As a second limitation, when testing whether the BTAE affected pro-environmental obligation and intention in Study 4, order effects were not controlled for. Past research has shown that other compensatory behaviors, such as cognitive dissonance reduction strategies, are affected by order (e.g., Fointiat, Somat, & Grosbras, 2011; Gosling, Denizeau, & Oberlé, 2006). It should however be mentioned that these studies find that the first items are more influential than subsequent items. Therefore, in the present study, it would be predicted that obligations are weaker than intention. Yet we observed the opposite pattern, speaking against the influence of order effects. In any case, lack of randomization should be noted as a limitation in Study 4.
Worse than average
There are circumstances moderating or even reversing the effect. The BTAE may be moderated by both desirability and controllability, such as the effect holding for highly desirable traits but not for traits low in desirability, and that the effect is stronger for high controllable than low controllable traits (Alicke, 1985). It has been demonstrated that people view themselves as “worse than average” when evaluating their ability on difficult tasks (Moore, 2007). For example, students’ average rating of the likelihood of winning a trivia contest was 70% when the contest included easy quiz questions, whereas ratings dropped to only 6% for a contest including hard quiz questions (Kruger, 1999). Although we demonstrated the BTAE in nine of 10 pro-environmental behaviors, these were all everyday behaviors that are relatively easy to perform. Future research should test if the BTAE also holds when assessing “harder” pro-environmental actions.
Taken together, this article consistently demonstrates that the BTAE applies to pro-environmental behaviors; nevertheless, the evidence for the BTAE as a psychological barrier for future pro-environmental behaviors is weak and should be explored in future research. BTAE of pro-environmental behaviors was supported across four countries, testing 10 pro-environmental behaviors, and when assessing both closed- and open-ended questions as well as both concrete and abstract reference groups.
An Evolutionary Perspective on Sexual Assault; plus recommendations for improving the effectiveness of sexual assault prevention programs with exercises to reduce the possibility of hostile/reactive aggression in high-risk men
An Evolutionary Perspective on Sexual Assault and Implications for Interventions. Mark Huppin, Neil M. Malamuth, Daniel Linz. Handbook of Sexual Assault and Sexual Assault Prevention pp 17-44, October 19 2019. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-23645-8_2
Abstract: Interventions to reduce sexual assault at institutions of higher learning often have not been shown to be effective and may actually do more harm than good with men at high risk for sexual aggression. We argue that to design more effective interventions, it is essential to incorporate knowledge about the risk factors increasing the likelihood of sexual aggression. The single best predictor of risk for being a perpetrator is being a male and the best predictor of being a victim is being a female. Understanding why this is so may be aided by an approach incorporating evolved psychological mechanisms calibrated by cultural, social, and developmental factors. We consider hypotheses regarding evolved mechanisms for both males and females. We review evidence supporting the hypothesis of specialized mechanisms in women designed to avoid or limit the costs of forced sex. There is also some supportive evidence for the possibility that for males, evolved mechanisms may be calibrated by factors such as perceived negative experiences with women to increase the likelihood of committing sexual aggression. We illustrate such a mechanism by focusing on sexual arousal to forced sex, which may serve as an approach emotion facilitating sexual aggression. In using both evolutionary and proximate analyses, we address not only the question of what characteristics predict male sexual aggression but also why are these the risk factors. Finally, we outline a series of recommendations for improving the effectiveness of sexual assault prevention programs, including exercises to reduce the possibility of hostile/reactive aggression in high-risk men.
Keywords: Sexual assault Sexual aggression Evolution Psychology Rape Adaptations Specialized mechanisms Hostile masculinity Psychological reactance Prevention programs Interventions
Sexual Aggression in Other Species
Also relevant to EP theories of sexual coercion is evidence of sexual aggression in other species. In fact, physical force, harassment, and other intimidation to obtain sex have been reported in many species. Based on a review of the literature on forced copulation among nonhumans, Lalumière, Harris, Quinsey, and Rice (2005) identified specific characteristics in those species that exhibit sexual coercion. Across all nonhuman species, forced copulation is always perpetrated by males on females. Despite the tendency of females in some species to be assertive in the mating process, the authors could not find one instance of a female forcing sex on a male. Further, males are more likely to target fertile than infertile females for forced copulation, and forced copulation does occasionally result in insemination, fertilization, and offspring. Also, males of most species tend not to engage solely in coercive sexual behaviors. Most males that engage in forced copulation at other times court females. Finally, Lalumière et al. (2005) recognized the role of individual differences in sexual coercion. Certain males are more likely than others to engage in forced copulation, and some males are more successful at sexual coercion than others. They conclude that sexual coercion (particularly in the form of forced copulation) "is a tactic used by some males under some conditions to increase reproduction" (p. 59).
A particularly interesting species to consider is the orangutan, one of the few nonhuman primates for which sexual coercion is common. There is evidence for two distinct classes of orangutan males: large or flanged males, who develop secondary sexual characteristics such as cheek pads and large throat sacs, and small or unflanged males. Both types are sexually mature, though the onset of sexual maturity can be highly variable. Large males typically weigh over 80 kg in the wild, about twice the size of the small males (Knott, 2009; Knott & Kahlenberg, 2007). Although both types resort to forced copulations, they are significantly more often used strategically by small males, who force more than 80% of their total copulations at some orangutan sites (although only about half or fewer of their copulations are forced at other sites, suggesting the role of environmental contingencies such as population density and sex ratio in the incidence of sexual aggression) (Knott, 2009; Knott & Kahlenberg, 2007).
In a study of chimpanzees, our closest genetic relatives, sexual coercion as long-term intimidation was positively associated with paternity, particularly among high-ranking males, suggesting that it is a strategy used to increase reproductive fitness (Feldman et al., 2014). Sexually coercive tactics toward a female also provide delayed mating benefits in chacma baboons, due in part to the fact that male aggression preferentially targets fertile females (Baniel, Cowlishaw, & Huchard, 2017). As the authors explain, .By repeatedly attacking females in the weeks preceding ovulation, males appear to increase their chances of monopolizing sexual access to females around ovulation, which in turn increases their probability of successful reproduction. (p. 2166). The authors were able to rule out several competing hypotheses for male sexual violence perpetration (e.g., cycling females are more aggressive than noncycling females; females prefer to mate with aggressive males).
Summary and Recommendations for Sexual Assault Interventions
7. Interventions that are effective for women and most men may show .boomerang. effects with high-risk males. In order to effectively change the behavior of these men, prevention programs should consider introducing exercises likely to reduce the possibility of hostile/reactive aggression.
To the extent that recurrent ancestral conditions existed such that for some men sexual coercion contributed to overall reproductive success, the psychological architecture of men today who have experienced relevant developmental adversity may be calibrated in a way that helps motivate sexual assault to obtain sex from an unwilling partner. What.s more, there is a real possibility that many current sexual assault prevention programs may be interacting with the psychological makeup of these high-risk males to create boomerang reactance effects.
Many high-risk men may experience current programs on college campuses as both manipulative and provocative. To these young men such intervention efforts are directed at supporting more positive treatment for a group, undergraduate women, who seem to them to already "get all the breaks." These programs may therefore threaten these men.s self-concept and perceived freedoms. Especially if they see intervention messages as condescending and therefore insulting, they may respond in anger and with greater support for aggression. From an EP perspective, if we conceive of sexual strategies within the framework of a coevolutionary "arms race" between men and women, it is unsurprising that messages suggesting or dictating to sexually coercive young men how they should behave toward women will be ineffective, especially if these men feel that they have something to lose from this (Mealey, 2003).
The evaluations of current sexual assault programs generally have not examined the impact on sexually aggressive men. If currently effective programs work at all for such men, they may do so only indirectly. For example, bystander intervention programs may reduce the ability of high-risk men to carry out an assault by changing the responses of the low-risk, less violent people around them. Any net positive effect, however, is most likely due to a change in the environment in which some assaults occur rather than by having an effect on the high-risk male himself.
An extensive critical review of the scientific literature on prevention efforts on U.S. college campuses was recently published by Newlands and O'Donohue (2016). In order to facilitate improvement, the authors made some recommendations for developing more rigorous research programs. Among them is the idea that attending to "differences between participants can elucidate what factors influence or moderate treatment success or failure" (p. 10). In light of growing evidence of boomerang reactance effects described below, whereby interventions may result in an increased probability that relatively high-risk males will endorse sexually violent attitudes and be willing to behave more aggressively after the intervention compared to before, attending specifically to men's individual risk profiles appears highly important.
For many years, based on repeated findings in various areas (e.g., alcohol consumption, home energy use), reviewers of public health campaigns have called attention to the possibility of adverse boomerang effects. As some reviewers have noted, "An obvious implication is that boomerang effects should be taken into account as one of the potential costs of launching a mass communication campaign" (Ringold, 2012, p. 27). Most relevant to the current focus, boomerang effects have been well documented in areas of interventions designed to change antisocial behaviors, including sexual and nonsexual violence (see, e.g., Byrne & Hart, 2016; Wilson, Linz, Donnerstein, & Stipp, 1992). For example, an analysis of the consequences of a domestic violence campaign that included multiple television and newspaper advertisements demonstrated such unintended effects (Keller, Wilkinson, & Otjen, 2010). One of the stated goals of the program was to change the attitudes and behaviors of potential perpetrators. Only women.s perception of the severity of domestic violence (e.g., "Domestic violence is a serious issue that requires government or police involvement") increased after the campaign, however. Perceptions of the severity of domestic violence actually substantially decreased for the men in the study.
Cardaba, Brinol, Brandle, and Ruiz-SanRoman (2016) conducted research on the effects of anti-violence campaigns in different countries with different age populations. In one study, they found that individuals with relatively higher scores in trait aggressiveness showed a boomerang effect of anti-violence messages since they actually increased their favorability of attitudes toward violence. In contrast, the anti-violence campaigns were effective for those with relatively lower trait aggressiveness. In a second study, the intervention campaign again worked for the low trait-aggressive individuals but not for the high trait-aggressive participants. Another study reporting boomerang effects in the area of violence was conducted by Rivera, Santos, Brandle, and Cardaba (2016). The authors randomly assigned a large number of Italian students to participate in an intervention campaign designed to reduce participants. acceptance of violent video games. Participants were classified according to their relational lifestyle, consisting of four groups: e.g., "communicative" adolescents were more highly engaged in "civic values duties! in their communities than other groups; "meta-reflexive" adolescents had the lowest probability of seeking parents. support; whereas .fractured. adolescents had a higher probability of taking drugs than other groups and of engaging in other relatively delinquent behaviors. The group with a "fractured" or problematic lifestyle showed a boomerang effect, increasing their intent to play violent video games, whereas the other participants reduced their desire as a result of the intervention or there was a null effect. This finding is noteworthy as it is consistent with the idea in EP that sexually aggressive men can be "generalists" or "specialists," with implications for how different men might be expected to respond differently to the same sexual assault prevention program based on group membership.
We could not find any studies that specifically examined the impact of any elaborate interventions on high-risk males. The studies we did find all involved some form of intervention of less than one or two hours. One of these was a systematic experiment using a well-validated laboratory analogue of sexual aggression. In a community sample of American men, Bosson, Parrott, Swan, Kuchynka, and Schramm (2015) found that men low in sexism showed less aggressive tendencies following exposure to messages emphasizing norms of gender equality (e.g., most men approve of "men doing half of the housework and childcare"). Conversely, men high in hostile sexist attitudes showed a boomerang effect of increased sexually aggressive tendencies.
In a study of undergraduate men, Stephens and George (2009) examined the impact of a rape prevention intervention on low- vs. high-risk men. Risk level was determined by whether individuals had reported previously engaging in sexually aggressive behavior. The researchers found that men in general showed reductions in rape myth acceptance and an increase in victim empathy at a 5-week follow-up. Subgroup analyses, however, indicated that low-risk men were responsible for these findings. High-risk men showed no reliable attitudinal changes from the intervention. More alarmingly, high-risk men in the intervention group were more likely at follow- up to report higher sexually coercive behaviors than were high-risk men in a control group, although the sample size was small.
In another study that presented men a bystander sexual violence prevention program consisting of multifaceted training and skills development, outcome measures of rape myth acceptance and sexually coercive behavioral intentions were reduced among low-risk men (Elias-Lambert & Black, 2016). The program was relatively ineffective with high-risk men, however, leading the authors to conclude that .high-risk males may require a different type of prevention program that can help change the stubborn attitudes and habits they have developed. (p. 3229).
In order to avoid the possibility of boomerang effects, prevention programs should consider introducing exercises likely to reduce the perception of women as out-group threat. Using techniques such as self-affirmation and identity verification may be effective in this regard. These could be incorporated as part of a more comprehensive program for high-risk males, prior to the introduction of specific educational interventions. By moderating perceptions of out-group threat, these experiences can serve to mitigate hostile reactance.
According to self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), individuals have a fundamental motivation to protect their personal image. Self-threatening information is likely to elicit defensive responses such as rejecting the information, presenting counterarguments, or expressing resistance to change in order to restore one.s self-integrity. When one.s self-integrity is supported via self-affirmation, however, one can more carefully consider views and information that otherwise would be too threatening to accept (Cohen & Sherman, 2014; Sherman, 2013).
Self-affirmations have been found to increase positive other-directed feelings (Crocker, Niiya, & Mischkowski, 2008). They have been shown to have physiological bases for their desired effects by buffering neuroendocrine and psychological stress responses (Creswell et al., 2005) and by activating relevant brain-reward systems (Dutcher et al., 2016). By reducing defensive information processing, self-affirmations can increase the effectiveness of educational campaigns (Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000) via how campaigns are framed and embodied. To our knowledge, existing efforts to educate undergraduate students, and high-risk men specifically, about sexual violence prevention have not included these self-image maintenance processes. Because of this, these programs are more likely to have unintended, counterproductive consequences.
Similarly, research on identity verification has found that when the set of meanings in a situation does not match people.s internal standards, and someone else does not confirm or verify their identities, they can experience negative emotional arousal such as hostility (Cast & Burke, 2002). If the lack of verification persists, an individual ultimately may resort to tactics of physical or sexual aggression over others in order to reassert control over the environment (Stets, 1992).
Many current sexual assault prevention programs contain admonishments that may create hostility and lead to a diminished sense of control for high-risk men, such that a resort to sexual violence to compensate for this loss is possible. Identity-verification can serve to reduce or eliminate such backlash responses by creating feelings of positive arousal including high self-esteem and mastery (Burke & Stets, 1999; Cast & Burke, 2002), setting the stage, e.g., for approach behaviors to programmatic information such as increased perspective taking. Research from identity theory suggests that verifying high-risk men in areas affiliated with their aggressive personality, such as masculinity, athletics, or a personal identity related to the degree to which they see themselves as more or less controlling may be most likely to create the conditions for attitudinal and behavioral change (Stets & Burke, 1994), as part of a comprehensive educational program for change.
Abstract: Interventions to reduce sexual assault at institutions of higher learning often have not been shown to be effective and may actually do more harm than good with men at high risk for sexual aggression. We argue that to design more effective interventions, it is essential to incorporate knowledge about the risk factors increasing the likelihood of sexual aggression. The single best predictor of risk for being a perpetrator is being a male and the best predictor of being a victim is being a female. Understanding why this is so may be aided by an approach incorporating evolved psychological mechanisms calibrated by cultural, social, and developmental factors. We consider hypotheses regarding evolved mechanisms for both males and females. We review evidence supporting the hypothesis of specialized mechanisms in women designed to avoid or limit the costs of forced sex. There is also some supportive evidence for the possibility that for males, evolved mechanisms may be calibrated by factors such as perceived negative experiences with women to increase the likelihood of committing sexual aggression. We illustrate such a mechanism by focusing on sexual arousal to forced sex, which may serve as an approach emotion facilitating sexual aggression. In using both evolutionary and proximate analyses, we address not only the question of what characteristics predict male sexual aggression but also why are these the risk factors. Finally, we outline a series of recommendations for improving the effectiveness of sexual assault prevention programs, including exercises to reduce the possibility of hostile/reactive aggression in high-risk men.
Keywords: Sexual assault Sexual aggression Evolution Psychology Rape Adaptations Specialized mechanisms Hostile masculinity Psychological reactance Prevention programs Interventions
Sexual Aggression in Other Species
Also relevant to EP theories of sexual coercion is evidence of sexual aggression in other species. In fact, physical force, harassment, and other intimidation to obtain sex have been reported in many species. Based on a review of the literature on forced copulation among nonhumans, Lalumière, Harris, Quinsey, and Rice (2005) identified specific characteristics in those species that exhibit sexual coercion. Across all nonhuman species, forced copulation is always perpetrated by males on females. Despite the tendency of females in some species to be assertive in the mating process, the authors could not find one instance of a female forcing sex on a male. Further, males are more likely to target fertile than infertile females for forced copulation, and forced copulation does occasionally result in insemination, fertilization, and offspring. Also, males of most species tend not to engage solely in coercive sexual behaviors. Most males that engage in forced copulation at other times court females. Finally, Lalumière et al. (2005) recognized the role of individual differences in sexual coercion. Certain males are more likely than others to engage in forced copulation, and some males are more successful at sexual coercion than others. They conclude that sexual coercion (particularly in the form of forced copulation) "is a tactic used by some males under some conditions to increase reproduction" (p. 59).
A particularly interesting species to consider is the orangutan, one of the few nonhuman primates for which sexual coercion is common. There is evidence for two distinct classes of orangutan males: large or flanged males, who develop secondary sexual characteristics such as cheek pads and large throat sacs, and small or unflanged males. Both types are sexually mature, though the onset of sexual maturity can be highly variable. Large males typically weigh over 80 kg in the wild, about twice the size of the small males (Knott, 2009; Knott & Kahlenberg, 2007). Although both types resort to forced copulations, they are significantly more often used strategically by small males, who force more than 80% of their total copulations at some orangutan sites (although only about half or fewer of their copulations are forced at other sites, suggesting the role of environmental contingencies such as population density and sex ratio in the incidence of sexual aggression) (Knott, 2009; Knott & Kahlenberg, 2007).
In a study of chimpanzees, our closest genetic relatives, sexual coercion as long-term intimidation was positively associated with paternity, particularly among high-ranking males, suggesting that it is a strategy used to increase reproductive fitness (Feldman et al., 2014). Sexually coercive tactics toward a female also provide delayed mating benefits in chacma baboons, due in part to the fact that male aggression preferentially targets fertile females (Baniel, Cowlishaw, & Huchard, 2017). As the authors explain, .By repeatedly attacking females in the weeks preceding ovulation, males appear to increase their chances of monopolizing sexual access to females around ovulation, which in turn increases their probability of successful reproduction. (p. 2166). The authors were able to rule out several competing hypotheses for male sexual violence perpetration (e.g., cycling females are more aggressive than noncycling females; females prefer to mate with aggressive males).
Summary and Recommendations for Sexual Assault Interventions
7. Interventions that are effective for women and most men may show .boomerang. effects with high-risk males. In order to effectively change the behavior of these men, prevention programs should consider introducing exercises likely to reduce the possibility of hostile/reactive aggression.
To the extent that recurrent ancestral conditions existed such that for some men sexual coercion contributed to overall reproductive success, the psychological architecture of men today who have experienced relevant developmental adversity may be calibrated in a way that helps motivate sexual assault to obtain sex from an unwilling partner. What.s more, there is a real possibility that many current sexual assault prevention programs may be interacting with the psychological makeup of these high-risk males to create boomerang reactance effects.
Many high-risk men may experience current programs on college campuses as both manipulative and provocative. To these young men such intervention efforts are directed at supporting more positive treatment for a group, undergraduate women, who seem to them to already "get all the breaks." These programs may therefore threaten these men.s self-concept and perceived freedoms. Especially if they see intervention messages as condescending and therefore insulting, they may respond in anger and with greater support for aggression. From an EP perspective, if we conceive of sexual strategies within the framework of a coevolutionary "arms race" between men and women, it is unsurprising that messages suggesting or dictating to sexually coercive young men how they should behave toward women will be ineffective, especially if these men feel that they have something to lose from this (Mealey, 2003).
The evaluations of current sexual assault programs generally have not examined the impact on sexually aggressive men. If currently effective programs work at all for such men, they may do so only indirectly. For example, bystander intervention programs may reduce the ability of high-risk men to carry out an assault by changing the responses of the low-risk, less violent people around them. Any net positive effect, however, is most likely due to a change in the environment in which some assaults occur rather than by having an effect on the high-risk male himself.
An extensive critical review of the scientific literature on prevention efforts on U.S. college campuses was recently published by Newlands and O'Donohue (2016). In order to facilitate improvement, the authors made some recommendations for developing more rigorous research programs. Among them is the idea that attending to "differences between participants can elucidate what factors influence or moderate treatment success or failure" (p. 10). In light of growing evidence of boomerang reactance effects described below, whereby interventions may result in an increased probability that relatively high-risk males will endorse sexually violent attitudes and be willing to behave more aggressively after the intervention compared to before, attending specifically to men's individual risk profiles appears highly important.
For many years, based on repeated findings in various areas (e.g., alcohol consumption, home energy use), reviewers of public health campaigns have called attention to the possibility of adverse boomerang effects. As some reviewers have noted, "An obvious implication is that boomerang effects should be taken into account as one of the potential costs of launching a mass communication campaign" (Ringold, 2012, p. 27). Most relevant to the current focus, boomerang effects have been well documented in areas of interventions designed to change antisocial behaviors, including sexual and nonsexual violence (see, e.g., Byrne & Hart, 2016; Wilson, Linz, Donnerstein, & Stipp, 1992). For example, an analysis of the consequences of a domestic violence campaign that included multiple television and newspaper advertisements demonstrated such unintended effects (Keller, Wilkinson, & Otjen, 2010). One of the stated goals of the program was to change the attitudes and behaviors of potential perpetrators. Only women.s perception of the severity of domestic violence (e.g., "Domestic violence is a serious issue that requires government or police involvement") increased after the campaign, however. Perceptions of the severity of domestic violence actually substantially decreased for the men in the study.
Cardaba, Brinol, Brandle, and Ruiz-SanRoman (2016) conducted research on the effects of anti-violence campaigns in different countries with different age populations. In one study, they found that individuals with relatively higher scores in trait aggressiveness showed a boomerang effect of anti-violence messages since they actually increased their favorability of attitudes toward violence. In contrast, the anti-violence campaigns were effective for those with relatively lower trait aggressiveness. In a second study, the intervention campaign again worked for the low trait-aggressive individuals but not for the high trait-aggressive participants. Another study reporting boomerang effects in the area of violence was conducted by Rivera, Santos, Brandle, and Cardaba (2016). The authors randomly assigned a large number of Italian students to participate in an intervention campaign designed to reduce participants. acceptance of violent video games. Participants were classified according to their relational lifestyle, consisting of four groups: e.g., "communicative" adolescents were more highly engaged in "civic values duties! in their communities than other groups; "meta-reflexive" adolescents had the lowest probability of seeking parents. support; whereas .fractured. adolescents had a higher probability of taking drugs than other groups and of engaging in other relatively delinquent behaviors. The group with a "fractured" or problematic lifestyle showed a boomerang effect, increasing their intent to play violent video games, whereas the other participants reduced their desire as a result of the intervention or there was a null effect. This finding is noteworthy as it is consistent with the idea in EP that sexually aggressive men can be "generalists" or "specialists," with implications for how different men might be expected to respond differently to the same sexual assault prevention program based on group membership.
We could not find any studies that specifically examined the impact of any elaborate interventions on high-risk males. The studies we did find all involved some form of intervention of less than one or two hours. One of these was a systematic experiment using a well-validated laboratory analogue of sexual aggression. In a community sample of American men, Bosson, Parrott, Swan, Kuchynka, and Schramm (2015) found that men low in sexism showed less aggressive tendencies following exposure to messages emphasizing norms of gender equality (e.g., most men approve of "men doing half of the housework and childcare"). Conversely, men high in hostile sexist attitudes showed a boomerang effect of increased sexually aggressive tendencies.
In a study of undergraduate men, Stephens and George (2009) examined the impact of a rape prevention intervention on low- vs. high-risk men. Risk level was determined by whether individuals had reported previously engaging in sexually aggressive behavior. The researchers found that men in general showed reductions in rape myth acceptance and an increase in victim empathy at a 5-week follow-up. Subgroup analyses, however, indicated that low-risk men were responsible for these findings. High-risk men showed no reliable attitudinal changes from the intervention. More alarmingly, high-risk men in the intervention group were more likely at follow- up to report higher sexually coercive behaviors than were high-risk men in a control group, although the sample size was small.
In another study that presented men a bystander sexual violence prevention program consisting of multifaceted training and skills development, outcome measures of rape myth acceptance and sexually coercive behavioral intentions were reduced among low-risk men (Elias-Lambert & Black, 2016). The program was relatively ineffective with high-risk men, however, leading the authors to conclude that .high-risk males may require a different type of prevention program that can help change the stubborn attitudes and habits they have developed. (p. 3229).
In order to avoid the possibility of boomerang effects, prevention programs should consider introducing exercises likely to reduce the perception of women as out-group threat. Using techniques such as self-affirmation and identity verification may be effective in this regard. These could be incorporated as part of a more comprehensive program for high-risk males, prior to the introduction of specific educational interventions. By moderating perceptions of out-group threat, these experiences can serve to mitigate hostile reactance.
According to self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), individuals have a fundamental motivation to protect their personal image. Self-threatening information is likely to elicit defensive responses such as rejecting the information, presenting counterarguments, or expressing resistance to change in order to restore one.s self-integrity. When one.s self-integrity is supported via self-affirmation, however, one can more carefully consider views and information that otherwise would be too threatening to accept (Cohen & Sherman, 2014; Sherman, 2013).
Self-affirmations have been found to increase positive other-directed feelings (Crocker, Niiya, & Mischkowski, 2008). They have been shown to have physiological bases for their desired effects by buffering neuroendocrine and psychological stress responses (Creswell et al., 2005) and by activating relevant brain-reward systems (Dutcher et al., 2016). By reducing defensive information processing, self-affirmations can increase the effectiveness of educational campaigns (Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000) via how campaigns are framed and embodied. To our knowledge, existing efforts to educate undergraduate students, and high-risk men specifically, about sexual violence prevention have not included these self-image maintenance processes. Because of this, these programs are more likely to have unintended, counterproductive consequences.
Similarly, research on identity verification has found that when the set of meanings in a situation does not match people.s internal standards, and someone else does not confirm or verify their identities, they can experience negative emotional arousal such as hostility (Cast & Burke, 2002). If the lack of verification persists, an individual ultimately may resort to tactics of physical or sexual aggression over others in order to reassert control over the environment (Stets, 1992).
Many current sexual assault prevention programs contain admonishments that may create hostility and lead to a diminished sense of control for high-risk men, such that a resort to sexual violence to compensate for this loss is possible. Identity-verification can serve to reduce or eliminate such backlash responses by creating feelings of positive arousal including high self-esteem and mastery (Burke & Stets, 1999; Cast & Burke, 2002), setting the stage, e.g., for approach behaviors to programmatic information such as increased perspective taking. Research from identity theory suggests that verifying high-risk men in areas affiliated with their aggressive personality, such as masculinity, athletics, or a personal identity related to the degree to which they see themselves as more or less controlling may be most likely to create the conditions for attitudinal and behavioral change (Stets & Burke, 1994), as part of a comprehensive educational program for change.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
