We find that meta-analytic effect sizes are significantly different from replication effect sizes; the differences are systematic & m-a effect sizes are almost three times as large as replication effect sizes

Comparing meta-analyses and preregistered multiple-laboratory replication projects. Amanda Kvarven, Eirik Strømland & Magnus Johannesson. Nature Human Behaviour, December 23 2019. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-019-0787-z

Abstract: Many researchers rely on meta-analysis to summarize research evidence. However, there is a concern that publication bias and selective reporting may lead to biased meta-analytic effect sizes. We compare the results of meta-analyses to large-scale preregistered replications in psychology carried out at multiple laboratories. The multiple-laboratory replications provide precisely estimated effect sizes that do not suffer from publication bias or selective reporting. We searched the literature and identified 15 meta-analyses on the same topics as multiple-laboratory replications. We find that meta-analytic effect sizes are significantly different from replication effect sizes for 12 out of the 15 meta-replication pairs. These differences are systematic and, on average, meta-analytic effect sizes are almost three times as large as replication effect sizes. We also implement three methods of correcting meta-analysis for bias, but these methods do not substantively improve the meta-analytic results.

From the open version, OSF.io (17 studies then, 15 studies in the final version):

Discussion

To summarize our findings, we find that there is a significant difference between the metaanalytic effect size and the replication effect size for 12 of the 17 studies (70.6%), and
suggestive evidence for a difference in two additional studies. These differences are systematic
– the meta-analytic effect size is larger than the replication effect for all these studies- and on
average for all the 17 studies the estimated effect sizes are about 3 times as large in the metaanalyses. Interestingly, the relative difference in estimated effect sizes is of at least the same
magnitude as that observed between replications and original studies in the RP:P and other
similar systematic replication projects5,6,10. Publication bias and selective reporting in original
studies has been suggested as possible reasons for the low reproducibility in RP:P and other
replication projects, and our results suggest that these biases are not eliminated by the use of
meta-analysis.
To test further whether meta-analyses reduce the influence of publication bias or
selective reporting, we compare the average unweighted effect size of the original studies to the
meta-analyses. We were able to obtain effect sizes of the original studies converted to Cohen’s
D for all original studies except one where the standard deviation was unavailable.41 We were
additionally able to compute a valid standard error for 14 out of 17 original studies. The average
unweighted effect size of these 14 original studies is 0.561, which is about 42% higher than the
average unweighted effect size of 0.395 of the same 14 studies in the meta-analyses. These
point estimates are consistent with meta-analyses reducing the effect sizes estimated in original
studies somewhat, and in formal meta-analytic models the estimated difference between the
original effect and the summary effect in the meta-analysis varies between 0.089 and 0.166.
These estimated differences are not statistically significant but suggestive of a difference in all
three cases using our criterion for statistical significance. (see Supplementary Table 3 for
details). Further work on larger samples are needed to more conclusively test if meta-analytic
effect sizes differ from original effect sizes.
In a previous related study in medicine, 12 large randomized, controlled trials published
in four leading medical journals were compared to 19 meta-analyses published previously on
the same topics.24 They compared several clinical outcomes between the studies and found a
significant difference between the meta-analyses and the large clinical trials for 12% of the
comparisons. They did not provide any results for the pooled overall difference between metaanalyses and large clinical trials, but from graphically inspecting the results there does not
appear to be a sizeable systematic difference. Those previous results for medicine are thus
different from our findings. This could reflect a genuine difference between psychology and
medicine, but it could also reflect that even large clinical trials in medicine are subject to
selective reporting or publication bias or that large clinical trials with null results are published
in less prestigious journals.
Although we believe the most plausible interpretation of our results is that metaanalyses overestimate effect sizes on average in our sample of studies, there are other possible
explanations. In testing a specific scientific hypothesis in an experiment there can be
heterogeneity in the true effect size due to several sources. The true effect size can vary between
different populations (sample heterogeneity) and the true effect size can vary between different
experimental designs to test the hypothesis (design heterogeneity). If the exact statistical test
used or the inclusion/exclusion criteria of observations included in the analysis differ, this will
yield a third source of heterogeneity in estimated effect sizes (test heterogeneity). In the
multiple lab replications included in our study the design and statistical tests used is held
constant across the labs, whereas the samples vary across labs. The effect sizes across labs will
therefore vary due to sample heterogeneity, but not due to design or test heterogeneity. In the
meta-analyses the effect sizes can vary across the included studies due to sample, design- and
test heterogeneity. Sample, design or test heterogeneity could potentially explain our results.
For sample heterogeneity to explain our results, the replications need to have been
conducted in samples with on average lower true effect sizes than the samples included in the
studies in the meta-analyses. We find this explanation for our results implausible. The Many
Labs studies estimate the sample heterogeneity and only find small or moderate heterogeneity
in effect sizes7-9
. In the recent Many Labs 2 study the average heterogeneity measured as the
standard deviation in the true effect size across labs (Tau) was 0.048
. This can be compared to
the measured difference in meta-analytic and replication effect sizes in our study of 0.232-0.28
for the three methods.
For design or test heterogeneity to explain our results it must be the case that replication
studies select experimental designs or tests producing lower true effect sizes than the average
design and test included to test the same hypotheses in meta-analyses. For this to explain our
results the design and test heterogeneity in meta-analyses would have to be substantial and the
“replicator selection” of weak designs needs to be strong. This potential explanation of our
results would imply a high correlation between design and test heterogeneity in the metaanalysis and the observed difference in the meta-analytic and replication effect sizes; as a larger
design and test heterogeneity increases the scope for “replicator selection”. To further shed
some light on this possibility we were able to obtain information about the standard deviation
in true effect sizes across studies (Tau) for ten of the meta-analyses in our sample; Tau was
reported directly for two of these meta-analyses and sufficient information was provided in the
other eight meta-analyses so that we could estimate Tau. The mean Tau was 0.30 in these ten
meta-analyses with a range from 0.00 to 0.735. This is likely to be an upper bound on the design
and test heterogeneity as the estimated Tau also includes sample heterogeneity. While this is
consistent with a sizeable average design and test heterogeneity in the meta-analyses, it also
needs to be coupled with strong “replicator selection” to explain our results. To test for this, we
estimated the correlation between the Tau of these ten meta-analyses and the difference in the
meta-analytic and replication effect sizes. The Spearman correlation was -0.1879 (p=0.6032)
and the Pearson correlation was -0.3920 (p=0.2626), showing no sign of the observed
differences in effect sizes to be related to the scope for “replicator selection”. In fact, the
estimated correlation is in the opposite direction than the direction predicted by the “replicator
selection” mechanism. This tentative finding departs from a recent meta-research paper that
attributes reproducibility failures in Psychology to heterogeneity in the underlying effect
sizes.25Further work with larger samples is needed on this to more rigorously test for “replicator
selection”. It should also be noted that the pooled replication rate across Many Labs 1-3 is
53%, which is in line with the replication rate observed in three large scale systematic
replication project that should not be prone to “replicator selection” (the Reproducibility
Project: Psychology10, the Experimental Economics Replication Project5 and the Social
Sciences Replication project6
). This suggests no substantial “replicator selection” in the Many
Labs studies that form the majority of our sample.
Another caveat about our results concerns the representativity of our sample. The
inclusion of studies was limited by the number of pre-registered multiple labs replications
carried out so far, and for which of these studies we could find a matching meta-analysis. Our
sample of 17 studies should thus not be viewed as being representative of meta-analysis in
psychology or in other fields. In particular, the relative effect between the original studies and
replication studies for the sample of studies included in our analysis is somewhat larger than
the one observed in previous replication projects5,6,10 – indicating that our sample could be a
select sample of psychological studies where selective reporting is particularly prominent. In
the future the number of studies using our methodology can be extended as more pre-registered
multiple labs replications become available and as the number of meta-analyses continue to
increase. We also encourage others to test out our methodology for evaluating meta-analyses
on an independent sample of studies.
We conclude that meta-analyses produce substantially larger effect sizes than
replication studies in our sample. This difference is largest for replication studies that fail to
reject the null hypothesis, which is in line with recent arguments about a high false positive rate
of meta-analyses in the behavioral sciences20. Our findings suggest that meta-analyses is
ineffective in fully adjusting inflated effect sizes for publication bias and selective reporting. A
potentially effective policy for reducing publication bias and selective reporting is preregistering analysis plans prior to data collection. There is currently a strong trend towards
increased pre-registration in psychology22. This has the potential to increase both the credibility
of original studies, but also of meta-analyses, making meta-analysis a more valuable tool for
aggregating research results. Future meta-analyses may thus produce effect sizes that are closer
to the effect sizes in replication studies.

Religion quantified as affiliation, but not religiosity, was related to negative migrant attitudes; Muslims have more negative attitudes toward migrants than Christians

Religion and Prejudice Toward Immigrants and Refugees: A Meta-Analytic Review. Christine Deslandes & Joel R. Anderson. The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, Volume 29, 2019 - Issue 2, Feb 15 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/10508619.2019.1570814

ABSTRACT: Religion is often a driving force in negative attitudes; however, in the specific case of migrant-based attitudes, research has produced conflicting findings. That is, religion can paradoxically facilitate either tolerance or intolerance toward this group. In light of these inconsistent findings, we conducted a meta-analytic review to estimate the effect size of this relationship with two major aims—first, to explore differences as a function of how religion was operationalised, and second, to explore differences in the target migrant-type (e.g., differences in religion-based attitudes toward immigrants and refugees/asylum seekers). Our search strategy was applied to PsycINFO, EBSCO Psychology and Behavioural Sciences Collection, Web of Science, PsycEXTRA, and ProQuest Central for peer-reviewed English language studies and made calls for unpublished data through relevant professional bodies. This search strategy yielded 37 records (including 43 studies; N = 472,688). Religion was quantified in two ways: either as categorical religious affiliations (k = 60) or as individual differences in self-reported religiosity (k = 30). The meta-analyses revealed that religion quantified as affiliation, but not religiosity, was related to negative migrant attitudes. Specifically, religiously affiliated samples report more negative attitudes than nonreligious affiliated samples, and this effect was often stronger when the target groups were refugees rather than immigrants. In addition, analyses revealed that Muslims have more negative attitudes toward migrants than Christians. Religiosity was unrelated to negative attitudes. These findings are discussed in light of rising antimigrant attitudes.

Check also Cowling, Misha M., Joel Anderson, and Rose Ferguson. 2019. “Prejudice-relevant Correlates of Attitudes Towards Refugees: A Meta-analysis.” OSF Preprints. January 16. doi:10.1093/jrs/fey062

Abstract: This paper meta-analyses the available data on attitudes towards refugees and asylum seekers, with the aim of estimating effect sizes for the relationships between these attitudes and prejudice-relevant correlates. Seventy studies (Ntotal = 13,720) were located using systematic database searches and calls for unpublished data. In the case of demographic factors, being male, religious, nationally identified, politically conservative, and less educated were associated with negative attitudes (Fisher’s zs = 0.11, 0.17, 0.18, 0.21, & -0.16, respectively). For ideological factors, increases in right-wing authoritarianism and socialdominance orientations correlated with negative attitudes, while the endorsement of macro (but not micro) justice principles were associated with positive attitudes (Fisher’s zs = 0.50, 0.50, -0.29, & 0.00 respectively). Perceptions of refugees as symbolic and realistic threats were the strongest correlates of negative attitudes (Fisher’s zs = 0.98, & 1.11, respectively). These findings have contributed to the growing body of knowledge that endeavors to understand the antecedents of refugee-specific prejudice, and are discussed in light of the global refugee crisis. 

In large part, the wish to change personality did not predict actual change in the desired direction; & desired increases in Extraversion, Agreeableness & Conscientiousness corresponded with decreases

From Desire to Development? A Multi-Sample, Idiographic Examination of Volitional Personality Change. Erica Baransk et al. Journal of Research in Personality, December 26 2019, 103910. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2019.103910

Highlights
• In large part, individuals’ volitional personality change desires did not predict actual change in the desired direction.
• Desired increases in Extraversion, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness corresponded with decreases in corresponding traits.
• Participants perceived more change than actually occurred.
• Decreases in Emotional Stability predicted perceptions of personality change.

Abstract: Using an idiographic-nomothetic methodology, we assessed individuals’ ability to change their personality traits without therapeutic or experimental involvement. Participants from internet and college populations completed trait measures and reported current personality change desires. Self-reported traits as well as perceptions of trait change were collected after 1-year (Internet) and 6-months (College). In large part, volitional personality change desires did not predict actual change. When desires did predict change, (a) desired increases in Extraversion, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness corresponded with decreases in corresponding traits, (b) participants perceived more change than actually occurred, and (c) decreases in Emotional Stability predicted perceptions of personality change. Results illustrate the difficulty in purposefully changing one’s traits when left to one’s own devices.

Keywords: Volitional personality changeIdiographic-nomotheticPersonality development


From Baranski's 2018 PhD Thesis https://escholarship.org/content/qt6pk2h81f/qt6pk2h81f.pdf?t=pexwxu:

Volitional personality change across 58 countries

First, on average across 58 countries, 61.38% participants report that they are
currently trying to change an aspect of their personalities. The sheer number of people
around the world that are trying to accomplish personality change goals is in and of itself
notable. Indeed only eight countries had percentages lower than 50%. Nevertheless, there
was substantial variation across countries in the percentage of individuals who were
attempting this change. Specifically, country proportion of volitional personality change
attempts ranged from 84.75% (Indonesia) to 28.07% (Israel).
In an attempt to explain this variation, I first related country-level variables to
countries’ proportion of volitional personality change. In countries with high employment
rates, a higher proportion of individuals report trying to change their personalities. It may
be the case that workplace demands inspire individuals to attempt to improve their
personalities in ways that would be beneficial to workplace success. In support of this
possibility, previous research in lifespan development indicates success in the workforce
(e.g., being detailed oriented and dependable) is related to high levels of
conscientiousness (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Tett & Burnett, 2003). It may be the case,
therefore, that individuals beginning a new job or adding new responsibilities to an
existing position may be intentionally increasing levels of conscientiousness to meet their
new workplace demands. Also, low levels of country-level subjective health was related
to high proportions of volitional personality change. One possible explanation for this
relationship is that individuals residing in countries with low averages of self-reported
health might be inspired to work towards feeling better in all areas of their lives. In other
words, in an attempt to improve low wellbeing evidenced by their subjective health
ratings, individuals may seek to be more emotionally stable (to improve psychological
well-being) or conscientious (to improve self-care).
I next investigated what predicted volitional personality change on the individual
level. Across the majority of countries, individuals with high levels of negative
emotionality and its facets (i.e., anxiety, depression and emotionality) and low levels of
both subjective and interdependent happiness tended to report currently trying to change
an aspect of their personalities. There was also a trend for individuals high in openness
(driven by intellect) to also report volitional personality change, albeit less consistently
across countries. These results imply that individuals who have negative emotions yet are
highly intellectual tend to want to change an aspect of their personalities. In other words,
individuals who are thinking deeply about their own negative personality traits or general
wellbeing, tend to be report changing something about their personalities.
 The aforementioned findings cue us in to who is trying to change their
personalities around the world. The next question to examine, then, is what exactly it is
people want to change. Similar to individuals across US states, the majority of
participants from our international sample indicated that they were trying to be more
emotionally stable, conscientious, extraverted and agreeable. Again replicating analyses
from our US sample, facet level analyses revealed that a proportion of responses that fell
in to each category, some categories varied more than others. For instance, the degree of
variation for increased emotional stability was nearly a fourth of that for increased
extraversion. Indeed, the lowest proportion of individuals with an volitional personality
attempt to increase emotional stability is 14.55% (Hong Kong), whereas the lowest
proportion for attempts to increase extraversion across countries was 3.37% (Croatia).
The latter finding may be explained by already high levels of extraversion for Croatian
participants – who had among the highest levels of this trait relative to the other countries
included in the analyses.
 Finally, I assessed the relationship between current personality traits and specific
volitional personality change attempts. For extraversion, agreeableness,
conscientiousness and negative emotionality, there were strong relationships between
current trait levels and corresponding volitional personality change traits. For instance,
individuals with low levels of extraversion tended to report that they were currently
trying to increase levels of extraversion (driven by attempts to increase levels of
sociability). Like analyses across US states, these patterns did not vary across countries.
The one exception, however, was negative emotionality which did vary in its relationship
to attempts to increase emotional stability across countries. Indeed, looking at these
relationships by country reveals that in some countries there is a positive relationship
between current levels of negative emotionality and the attempt to increase emotional
stability, and in others there is a strong positive relationship. For example, in Slovakia,
those who reported a current attempt to increase emotional stability tended to have low
levels of negative emotionality, whereas in New Zealand, individuals who report trying to
increase levels of emotional stability tend to be high in negative emotionality. It seems to
be the case that in some countries, negative emotionality prompts volitional personality
change in the same way it does with other traits (e.g., high negative emotionality
prompting attempts to be more emotionally stable), yet in others, low levels of negative
emotionality prompts individuals to be even more emotionally stable.

Sports: Tendency to attribute personal success to internal factors & personal failure to external ones, & a tendency to attribute team success to factors within the team & failure to factors outside the team

Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Self-Serving Attribution Biases in the Competitive Context of Organized Sport, Mark S. Allen et al. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, December 25, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167219893995

Abstract: This meta-analysis explored the magnitude of self-serving attribution biases for real-world athletic outcomes. A comprehensive literature search identified 69 studies (160 effect sizes; 10,515 athletes) that were eligible for inclusion. Inverse-variance weighted random-effects meta-analysis showed that sport performers have a tendency to attribute personal success to internal factors and personal failure to external factors (k = 40, standardized mean difference [SMD] = 0.62), a tendency to attribute team success to factors within the team and team failure to factors outside the team (k = 23, SMD = 0.63), and a tendency to claim more personal responsibility for team success and less personal responsibility for team failure (k = 4, SMD = 0.28). There was some publication bias and heterogeneity in computed averages. Random effects meta-regression identified sample sex, performance level, and world-region as important moderators of pooled mean effects. These findings provide a foundation for theoretical development of self-serving tendencies in real-world settings.

Keywords: group processes, judgment, meta-regression, self-serving bias, sport psychology

What makes a good liar? The relationship between cognitive and personality assessments’ and lying ability using traditional and strategic interview approaches

Atkinson, Dominick Joseph, "What makes a good liar? The relationship between cognitive and personality assessments’ and lying ability using traditional and strategic interview approaches" (2019). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. 17392. https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/17392

ABSTRACT: Over the past several decades, scholars have sought to better understand and refine the process of detecting deception (see Vrij, 2015). However, considerably less research has focused on identifying the characteristics and abilities of effective liars. The purpose of the present project was to begin to examine individual differences in lying ability and identify skills and traits of more successful liars. Participants in this study lied or told the truth under various conditions and then naïve observers judged the veracity of those statements. Overall, participants did not demonstrate good calibration between confidence in their ability and performance on the task. Additionally, some individual difference measures (e.g., working memory capacity, task switching ability, and Machiavellianism) were found to be related to the ability to lie well while others (e.g., inhibitory control, narcissism, and psychopathy) were not. Additionally, good liars were not affected by new strategic interview approaches (e.g., reverse order recall) as performance during control phases of interviews was related to performance during strategic phases. The relationships between confidence, ability, personality traits, cognitive abilities, and strategic interviewing approaches was examined.

Keywords: interview, lying, deception, individual differences



APPENDIX B: MACHIAVELLIANISM PERSONALITY SCALE
Responses are on a 5 point Likert scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree).

1. I believe that lying is necessary to maintain a competitive advantage over others (A)
2. The only good reason to talk to others is to get information that I can use to my own benefit (A)
3. I am willing to be unethical if I believe it will help me succeed (A)
4. I am willing to sabotage the efforts of other people if they threaten my own goals (A)
5. I would cheat if there was a low chance of getting caught (A)
6. I like to give the orders in interpersonal situations (DC)
7. I enjoy having control over other people (DC)
8. I enjoy being able to control the situation (DC)
9. Status is a good sign of success in life (DS)
10. Accumulating wealth is an important goal for me (DS)
11. I want to be rich and powerful someday (DS)
12. People are only motivated by personal gain (DO)
13. I dislike committing to groups because I don’t trust others (DO)
14. Team members backstab each other all the time to get ahead (DO)
15. If I show any weakness at work, other people will take advantage of it (DO)
16. Other people are always planning ways to take advantage of the situation at my expense (D)

Subscales: A: Amorality, DC: Desire for Control, DS: Desire for Status, DO: Distrust of Others.


APPENDIX C: NARCISSISTIC GRANDIOSITY SCALE Narcissistic Grandiosity Scale (Crowe et al. 2016) Rate yourself on the following adjectives on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely)

1. Perfect
2. Extraordinary
3. Superior
4. Heroic
5. Omnipotent
6. Unrivalled
7. Authoritative
8. Glorious
9. Prestigious
10. Acclaimed
11. Prominent
12. High-Status
13. Brilliant
14. Dominant
15. Envied
16. Powerful


APPENDIX D: TRIARCHIC PSYCHOPATHY MEASURE (Patrick, Fowles, & Krueger, 2009)
This questionnaire contains statements that different people might use to describe themselves. For each statement, select the choice that describes you best. There are no right or wrong answers; just choose the answer that best describes you (Items are responded to on a 4-point Likert scale).

1. I’m optimistic more often than not.
2. How other people feel is important to me.
3. I often act on immediate needs.
4. I have no strong desire to parachute out of an airplane.
5. I’ve often missed things I promised to attend.
6. I would enjoy being in a high-speed chase.
7. I am well equipped to deal with stress.
8. I don’t mind if someone I dislike gets hurt.
9. My impulsive decisions have caused problems with loved ones.
10. I get scared easily.
11. I sympathize with others’ problems.
12. I have missed work without bothering to call in.
13. I’m a born leader.
14. I enjoy of good physical fight.
15. I jump into things without thinking.
16. I have a hard time making things turn out the way that I want.
17. I return insults.
18. I’ve gotten in trouble because I missed too much school.
19. I have a knack for influencing people.
20. It doesn’t bother me to see someone else in pain.
21. I have good control over myself.
22. I function well in new situations, even when unprepared.
23. I enjoy pushing people around sometimes.
24. I have taken money from someone’s purse or wallet without asking.
25. I don’t’ think of myself as talented.
26. I taunt people just to stir things up.
27. People often abuse my trust.
28. I’m afraid of far fewer things than most people.
29. I don’t any point in worrying if what I do hurts someone else.
30. I keep appointments that I make.
31. I often get bored quickly and lose interest.
32. I can get over things that would traumatize others.
33. I am sensitive to the feelings of others.
34. I have conned people to get money from them.
35. It worries me to go into an unfamiliar situation without knowing all the details.
36. I don’t have much sympathy for people.
37. I get in trouble for not considering the consequences of my actions.
38. I can convince people to do what I want.
39. For me, honesty really is the best policy.
40. I’ve injured people to see them in pain.
41. I don’t like to take the lead in groups.
42. I sometimes insult people on purpose to get a reaction from them.
43. I have taken items from a store without paying for them.
44. It’s easy to embarrass me.
45. Things are more fun if a little danger is involved.
46. I have a hard time waiting patiently for things I want.
47. I stay away from physical danger as much as I can.
48. I don’t care much if what I do hurts others.
49. I have lost a friend because of irresponsible things I’ve done.
50. I don’t stack up well against most others.
51. Others have told me they are concerned about my lack of self-control.
52. It’s easy for me to relate to other people’s emotions.
53. I have robbed someone.
54. I never worry about making a fool of myself with others.
55. It doesn’t bother me when people around me are hurting.
56. I have had problems at work because I was irresponsible.
57. I’m not very good at influencing people.
58. I have stolen something out of a vehicle.


APPENDIX G: LIST OF OPINIONS FOR OPINION TASK (from Deeb et al. 2018)

In this next task you will be asked to argue both for an against an opinion that you hold. First, please take a moment to rate how much you agree with the following statements:

1. Women should have the right to have an abortion.
2. Capital punishment (i.e., the death penalty) should be a legal option in judicial systems for serious crimes.
3. CCTV cameras in streets and public areas is a good thing.
4. The US immigration laws should be much tougher for anyone wanting to live in the US.
5. I am firmly atheist (don’t believe in God).
6. Banning smoking in public places is a good thing.
7. Euthanasia should be a lawful option in the terminally ill.
8. Obese people should pay for their own healthcare.
9. It is right that animals are used for experimentation in medical research.
10. Governments should allow polygamy (marriage to more than one spouse).
11. Sex before marriage is morally wrong.
12. Couple should not live together before being married.
13. I support the Democratic Party.
14. Arranged marriages should not be allowed.
15. Telling your children that Santa Claus exists is wrong.
16. I generally agree with Donald Trump’s remarks.
17. I would not mind if the President of my country was female.
18. If is okay for the minimum age for purchasing alcohol to be 18 years.
19. The inclusion policy at schools, wherein children with behavioral problems are kept in mainstream school classrooms, is a good thing.
20. I support the Republican Party.
21. Governments should allow the use of marijuana for personal use.
22. The refugees’ crisis will have an increased negative influence on the United States.

Note: Ratings will be on a 1-7 Likert Scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree.

Cold-blooded women can detect lies with greater accuracy than other women; less empathic women are less affected by emotional contagion and thus may be more able to focus on non-emotional cues

Cold-blooded women can detect lies with greater accuracy than other women. Geoffrey Duran, François-Xavier Cécillon, Thibaut Sansorgné & George A. Michael. The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology, Volume 30, 2019 - Issue 3, Dec 26 2018. https://doi.org/10.1080/14789949.2018.1560488

ABSTRACT: Lies are notoriously difficult to detect. But it appears that some people are better at accomplishing this task than others even though the factors contributing to deception detection accuracy are not well understood. This study explored the influence of empathy on the detection of deception as a function of the detectors’ gender while dark personality traits were statistically controlled. Eighty men and 80 women were requested to judge whether individuals viewed in videos were giving their true opinion or not on current debatable issues (50% truthful and 50% deceptive narratives). Judges were divided into four groups according to their gender and their degree of empathy, as assessed using the Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Empathy. It was found that women with lower levels of empathy distinguished false from true opinions better than women with higher empathy, whereas no such difference was found in men. These results suggest that the degree of empathy in women influences their ability to detect deception and supports recent studies showing that emotional skills negatively affect deception detection ability. We suggest that less empathic women are less affected by emotional contagion and thus may be more able to focus on non-emotional cues that might reveal deception.

KEYWORDS: Empathy, gender, deception detection

Check also Atkinson, Dominick Joseph, "What makes a good liar? The relationship between cognitive and personality assessments’ and lying ability using traditional and strategic interview approaches" (2019). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. 17392. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/12/what-makes-good-liar-relationship.html

And Our experiments support the widely documented poor ability of humans to detect lies holds for both self-selected and instructed liars:

Human Lie-Detection Performance: Does Random Assignment versus Self-Selection of Liars and Truth-Tellers Matter? Karl Ask, Sofia Calderon, Erik Mac Giolla. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, December 25 2019. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/12/our-experiments-support-widely.html

And Personality traits of a good liar: A systematic review of the literature. Monica Semrad, Bridie Scott-Parker, Michael Nagel. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 147, 1 September 2019, Pages 306-316. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/05/we-still-have-no-tests-to-determine.html

Our experiments support the widely documented poor ability of humans to detect lies holds for both self-selected and instructed liars

Human Lie-Detection Performance: Does Random Assignment versus Self-Selection of Liars and Truth-Tellers Matter? Karl Ask, Sofia Calderon, Erik Mac Giolla. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, December 25 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2019.10.002

Deception research has been criticized for its common practice of randomly allocating senders to truth-telling and lying conditions. In this study, we directly compared receivers’ lie-detection accuracy when judging randomly assigned versus self-selected truth-tellers and liars. In a trust-game setting, senders were instructed to lie or tell the truth (random assignment; n = 16) or were allowed to choose to lie or tell the truth of their own accord (self-selection; n = 16). In a sample of receivers (N = 200), we tested two alternative hypotheses, predicting opposite effects of random assignment (vs. self-selection) on receivers’ lie-detection accuracy. Accuracy rates did not differ significantly as a function of veracity assignment, failing to support the claim that random assignment of liars and truth-tellers alters the detectability of deception. Equivalence tests indicated that, while a small effect of random assignment cannot be ruled out, moderate (or larger) effect sizes are unlikely.

Keywords: DeceptionLie detectionRandom assignmentSelf-selectionDetection strategy

General Audience Summary: In everyday communication, people typically decide whether to lie or to tell the truth of their own accord. In most studies on lie detection, however, researchers instruct individuals to lie or tell the truth on a random basis. This approach has received critique from experts in the field, because it does not reflect what happens in real life. Since self-selected and instructed liars and truth-tellers differ in several ways (e.g., motivation, proficiency of lying), the two modes of veracity assignment may give rise to different cues to truth and deception. In the current study, we tested whether random assignment, as compared with self-selection, improves or impairs people's ability to detect deception. Liars and truth-tellers (senders) tried to convince participants (receivers) to trust them with their money, promising cooperation and financial gain in return. Half of the senders had been randomly assigned to lie or tell the truth, whereas the other half had chosen to lie or tell the truth of their own accord. We tested two competing hypotheses: First, on the assumption that it prevents good liars from choosing to lie (and poor liars from choosing not to lie), random assignment would improve receivers’ ability to detect lies. Second, on the assumption that there are detectable differences between senders who are likely to lie when given the opportunity and those unlikely to lie, random assignment would make such differences uninformative and impair receivers’ ability to detect lies. Our results did not support any of the hypotheses (lie-detection accuracy was near chance level in all experimental conditions), thus failing to support the claim that random assignment of liars and truth-tellers alters the detectability of deception. Instead, they indicate that the widely documented poor ability of humans to detect lies holds for both self-selected and instructed liars.

Mandatory conscription for French men: Service increases voter turnout by approximately 7 pct points; we observe no support for a change in preferences of former conscripts

Military Service and Political Behavior: Evidence from France. Etienne Fize, Charles Louis-Sidois. European Economic Review, December 24 2019, 103364. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.103364

Abstract: We investigate the impact of compulsory military service on turnout and political preferences. Exploiting the suspension of mandatory conscription for French men, we observe a significant and positive impact of military service on turnout. We estimate that the service increases turnout by approximately 7 percentage points. We also investigate the impact of conscription on political preferences. When we control for selection into the military service, we observe no support for a change in preferences of former conscripts.

Keywords: VotingTurnoutPolitical BehaviorMilitary Service

Those with political attitudes similar to Trump’s showed increased liking of him with exposure to his tweets; opposite for those with dissimilar attitudes; all were unaware that the tweets affected their views

Paravati, E., Naidu, E., Gabriel, S., & Wiedemann, C. (2019). More than just a tweet: The unconscious impact of forming parasocial relationships through social media. Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice, Dec 2019. https://doi.org/10.1037/cns0000214

Abstract: Although past work suggests that having a parasocial relationship with a celebrity can affect attitudes toward that celebrity, no work has yet examined if people are consciously aware that this is occurring and if this can explain the effects of Twitter on attitudes about Donald Trump. The current research examined the psychological mechanisms and attitudinal consequences of engaging with Donald Trump on Twitter and the degree to which people were consciously aware of the effects of their parasocial bond on their attitudes. Across an experiment (N = 243) and two correlational studies (N = 373; N = 384), we found that participants with preexisting political attitudes similar to Trump’s showed increased liking of Trump with exposure to his Twitter feed. Those effects were mediated by a parasocial bond. In other words, when people with a political ideology similar to Trump’s read his Twitter feed, they felt like they knew him personally (i.e., formed a parasocial relationship with him), which predicted them liking him even more. Conversely, people with political ideologies not similar to Trump’s liked him less when exposed to his tweets. Importantly, individuals were unaware that engaging with Trump on Twitter was affecting their views of him. Implications for how the unconscious formation of parasocial relationships may affect attitude polarization and political processes in the modern world are discussed.

Commitment readiness: People vary in their sense of when they think the time is right to be involved in a committed relationship

It’s About Time: Readiness, Commitment, and Stability in Close Relationships. Christopher R. Agnew, Benjamin W. Hadden, Kenneth Tan. Social Psychological and Personality Science, February 20, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550619829060

Abstract: Timing matters in relationships. People vary in their sense of when they think the time is right to be involved in a committed relationship. We propose and examine the construct of commitment readiness and its role in predicting important relationship outcomes including commitment level, maintenance processes, and stability among involved intimates. Data from five independent samples obtained with various methods revealed, as hypothesized, that readiness (a) predicts commitment, maintenance processes, and actions toward ending a relationship; (b) serves to moderate commitment in predicting maintenance processes (self-disclosure, accommodation, sacrifice); and (c) serves to moderate commitment in predicting leave behavior, with those reporting both higher commitment and higher readiness being more likely to enact maintenance behaviors and least likely to enact leave behavior. We discuss the importance of considering one’s readiness for commitment within ongoing involvements.

Keywords: relationship receptivity, relationship timing, commitment readiness, commitment level, investment model

General Discussion

Among currently involved individuals, we examined commitment readiness,
the extent to which a person feels that the time
is right for a committed involvement and found evidence in
support of hypotheses. Higher readiness was associated with
higher commitment to a relationship, cross-sectionally, longitudinally, and day-to-day within individuals. Moreover, by
controlling for commitment at one time point, results speak
to the temporal precedence of readiness in shaping future
increases in commitment. Further, these findings were independent of investment model variables, such that the prospective effects of readiness on commitment are unique from
satisfaction, alternatives, and investments.
Readiness also predicted maintenance beyond commitment,
between individuals, and on a daily basis. Readiness was
uniquely associated with more self-disclosure. Although not
associated with overall accommodation, readiness was associated with less neglect and exit strategies. It was also associated
with less loyalty, suggesting that although individuals who
were more ready engaged in less destructive responses to conflict, they do not passively wait for things to get better. Readiness also largely bolstered the effects of commitment on
maintenance.
With data from three longitudinal studies, readiness was
also associated with lower likelihood of leaving one’s relationship, and readiness moderated the effects of commitment level
on leave behavior. This moderation emerged such that high
readiness bolstered the effect of commitment on leave behavior, whereas low readiness appears to undermine the effects
of commitment on leave behavior. These findings suggest that
although commitment to a specific partner is necessary for successfully maintaining a relationship, individuals are aided also
by feeling ready at a given time for commitment.
Consistent with relationship receptivity theory, readiness
serves both to increase commitment level across time and to
augment the effect of commitment on maintenance cognitions
and behaviors, including stay/leave behavior months later.
Experiencing high levels of both commitment and readiness
promotes maintenance, whereas lacking in either ingredient
appears to undermine stability. Although readiness is theoretically and empirically separable from level of commitment, one
might expect that being in a relationship elevates one’s sense of
readiness, possibly as a function of self-perception. One might
also expect that how successful a relationship is—how satisfying, and so on—might inform a sense that one is ready to maintain a commitment to that relationship. However, even if a
relationship might be particularly rewarding in and of itself,
it might still detract from other aspects of one’s life by taking
time from personal pursuits (e.g., VanderDrift & Agnew,
2014). Tension between the relationship and other domains
of life should play into how ready one feels for commitment.
Strengths of these studies include the use of measures of
both maintenance cognitions and behaviors, as well as actual
leave behavior. Further, by using a mixture of crosssectional, daily diary, and longer longitudinal studies, we were
able to investigate the scope of how readiness shapes relationship functioning. Readiness appears to be important for both
day-to-day relationship maintenance and for prospectively predicting stability. Limitations include samples consisting largely
of young adults who generally reported high levels of readiness, limiting both the age range and variability in readiness
among participants. We also concentrated on the individual
level and obtained measures of readiness from only one member of a dyad. A dyadic study would provide valuable data on
how actor and partner effects of readiness might be associated
with maintenance behaviors and stability. Moreover, one could
examine whether individuals accurately perceive partners’ levels of readiness and whether successful enactment of maintenance behaviors by one partner leads both the partner and
oneself to feeling more ready the next day.
Future research on readiness could go in a number of directions. One could examine associations between how ready an
individual thinks they are and their knowledge of factors that
have been shown to be strongly linked to relationship stability.
It is possible that some people who report that they are ready
for commitment have little idea of the kinds of cognitions and
behaviors necessary to sustain an involvement. One might
expect, then, that a sense of readiness would need to be paired
with a realistic sense of what it actually takes to keep a relationship going for readiness effects to be robust. Relatedly, the perception that one is capable of enacting the kinds of prosocial
behaviors shown to sustain relationships (Rusbult & Agnew,
2010) may also influence the extent to which one’s readiness
is associated with consequential outcomes. Experimental
manipulation of readiness, including priming it, is also ripe for
research. Moreover, gathering perceptions from social network
members of involved intimates may also shed light on whether
a given member of a couple is truly ready for commitment. Discrepancies in perceived readiness between a person involved in
a relationship and how their network perceives them might
yield findings consistent with past research showing that
“outsiders” possess perceptions that are particularly diagnostic
of relationship outcomes (Agnew, Loving, & Drigotas, 2001).
Finally, readiness appears to be an important yet heretofore
neglected construct. Therefore, its antecedents surely matter.
What gives rise to a sense of being ready for a committed relationship? Relationship receptivity theory provides several suggestions for answering this important question, but answers
await future research.

Philosophy seems to attract less happy students and then makes them less happy; bad scores on positive relations with others, personal growth, using strengths, savoring, gratitude

Are Philosophers Happy? Dan Weijers. University of Waikato, Auckland. Dec 10 2019. https://researchcommons.waikato.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10289/13326/Are%20philosophers%20happy.pdf

 Philosophers reported statistically significantly “worse” scores on all of these (and better on none):

 Positive relations with others

 Personal growth

 Environmental mastery

 Using strengths

 Pleasure and meaning paths to happiness

 Gratitude

 Savoring (sensing, absorption, behavioral expression, counting blessings)

 Flow

Gay men are disliked more than lesbian women in all countries tested; significant association between gender norm endorsement & sexual prejudice across countries (but is absent or reversed in China)

Predictors of Attitudes Toward Gay Men and Lesbian Women in 23 Countries. Maria Laura Bettinsoli, Alexandra Suppes, Jaime L. Napier. Social Psychological and Personality Science, December 23, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550619887785

Abstract: Dominant accounts of sexual prejudice posit that negative attitudes toward nonheterosexual individuals are stronger for male (vs. female) targets, higher among men (vs. women), and driven, in part, by the perception that gay men and lesbian women violate traditional gender norms. We test these predictions in 23 countries, representing both Western and non-Western societies. Results show that (1) gay men are disliked more than lesbian women across all countries; (2) after adjusting for endorsement of traditional gender norms, the relationship between participant gender and sexual prejudice is inconsistent across Western countries, but men (vs. women) in non-Western countries consistently report more negative attitudes toward gay men; and (3) a significant association between gender norm endorsement and sexual prejudice across countries, but it was absent or reversed in China, India, and South Korea. Taken together, this work suggests that gender and sexuality may be more loosely associated in some non-Western contexts.

Keywords: sexual prejudice, homonegativity, LGB, gender, gender norms

Vegetarians are more pro-social than omnivores, tend to have more liberal political views, & do not appear to be as well-adjusted as omnivores (which may be the result of status as a social minority)

Vegetarianism as a Social Identity. John B Nezlek, Catherine A Forestell. Current Opinion in Food Science, December 20 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cofs.2019.12.005

Abstract: Food choice can be a way for people to express their ideals and identities. In particular, for those who identify as vegetarian, this label is more than just a set of dietary preferences. Choosing to follow a plant-based diet shapes one’s personal and social identity and is likely to influence a person’s values, attitudes, beliefs, and well-being. The available data suggest that vegetarians are more pro-social than omnivores and tend to have more liberal political views. Nevertheless, vegetarians do not appear to be as well-adjusted as omnivores, which may be the result of their status as a social minority. Despite the attention vegetarianism has received, more research is needed to understand the antecedents, correlates, consequences, and socio-cultural contexts of vegetarianism.

Conclusions, limitations, and future directions

There is little doubt that vegetarianism is a social identity and that it is more than a mere dietary choice. Moreover, similar to other social identities being a vegetarian has implications for the values, beliefs, and attitudes people hold. In turn the values, beliefs, and attitudes vegetarians hold have implications for their behavior (broadly defined) and for their well-being.

Nevertheless, the existing research suffers from important limitations. Conceptually, not enough attention has been paid to possible differences among types of vegetarians, including differences in why people are vegetarians. Some research suggests that vegans are meaningfully different from other types of vegetarians [e.g., 18, 39, 41], but more attention needs to be paid to possible differences between vegetarians who have similar eating habits but different reasons for being vegetarians. For example, two people may be lactoovo vegetarians, but one may do so for health reasons whereas another does so for ecological reasons. Although Plante et al. [24] found that different motives can lead to different behavioral outcomes, they suggest that future research should investigate possible moderator variables (e.g., length of time identifying as a vegetarian), establish better validated measures of vegetarian motivations, and employ behavioral outcomes rather than relying solely on self-report.

The empirical database is also limited geographically. Most of the research on vegetarianism as a social identity has been done in Western and Northern Europe (e.g., Germany and the Netherlands), the US and Canada, and Australasia. Relatively little has been done in Latin America, Southern, Central, or Eastern Europe, Asia (Western, Central, or Eastern), parts of Oceania other than Australasia, and Africa. Given that existing research suggests that being a vegetarian is associated with holding more pro-social socio-political attitudes and with reduced mental health in Western cultures, it is important to determine if such relationships exist outside of the capitalist democracies that have been studied to date. For example, Jin, Kandula, Kanaya, and Talegwkar [46] found that South Asian immigrants to the US who were vegetarians were less likely to be depressed than their relatives who were omnivores. This may have been because vegetarians were not social minorities in the communities in which these immigrants resided.

Contrary to the trends in some of the countries in which vegetarianism as a social identity has been studied, meat consumption is on the rise in some countries that have enjoyed recent improvements in their economies [47]. Although a decrease in meat consumption may not indicate an increase in vegetarianism, despite the risks involved in using trends in meat consumption as proxies for trends in vegetarianism, it seems unlikely that an increase in meat consumption could be accompanied by an increase in vegetarianism. Such trends suggest that understanding vegetarianism and its antecedents, correlates, and consequences needs to take into account the socio-cultural contexts within which people are living.

Reducing meat consumption has become an important sustainability goal, and there has been an increase in campaigns across the globe to dissuade consumers from consuming animal-based products, particularly eating meat. The effectiveness of such advocacy may depend on the social identity of the advocates and how they communicate their message [48]. Thus it will be important to consider social identity theory to develop effective messages to increase meat-eaters’ willingness to reduce meat consumption.

Related to changing attitudes about meat consumption is what the popular press sometimes refers to as “vegetarian activism.” Given differences in the centrality of diet based identities [18], a more accurate term would probably be “vegan activism.” although even this distinction cannot be supported by any research. Putting aside definitional issues, there is virtually no research on vegetarian activism per se. Nevertheless, there is a body of research showing that minorities can influence majorities [49], and given this, it is possible that vegetarians can influence the dietary practices of omnivores [48], although how successful such efforts will be remains to be seen.

Finally, there are issues of causation. Why do people decide to become vegetarians? How do such decisions unfold? What are the causal relationships among the values, beliefs and attitudes that define contemporary vegetarianism? In terms of substantive questions such as relationships between diet and well-being and between diet and pro-sociality, are people with lower well-being more likely to become vegetarians than people who are higher in well-being, and are more pro-social people likely to become vegetarians than people who are less pro-social? Such questions have not been the focus of systematic empirical research and cannot be answered conclusively. Although much is known, much more needs to be known.

Check also Gender Differences in Vegetarian Identity: How Men and Women Construe Meatless Dieting. Daniel L.Rosenfeld. Food Quality and Preference, November 28 2019, 103859. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/11/could-they-be-lying-vegetarian-women.html

And Taste and health concerns trump anticipated stigma as barriers to vegetarianism. Daniel L.Rosenfeld, A. JanetTomiyama. Appetite, Volume 144, January 1 2020, 104469. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2019/09/vegetarian-diets-may-be-perceived-as.html

And Relationships between Vegetarian Dietary Habits and Daily Well-Being. John B. Nezlek, Catherine A. Forestell & David B. Newman. Ecology of Food and Nutrition, https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/10/vegetarians-reported-lower-self-esteem.html

And Psychology of Men & Masculinity: Eating meat makes you sexy / Conformity to dietary gender norms and attractiveness. Timeo, S., & Suitner, C. (2018). Eating meat makes you sexy: Conformity to dietary gender norms and attractiveness. Psychology of Men & Masculinity, 19(3), 418-429. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/06/psychology-of-men-masculinity-eating.html

And Baby Animals Less Appetizing? Tenderness toward Baby Animals and Appetite for Meat. Jared Piazza, Neil McLatchie & Cecilie Olesen. Anthrozoös, Volume 31, 2018 - Issue 3, Pages 319-335. https://www.bipartisanalliance.com/2018/05/presenting-images-of-baby-animals.html

We perceive typefaces, type families, & type styles to have ideological qualities; there is also affective polarization (typefaces are seen favorably when perceiving them as sharing our ideological orientation)

What’s in a Font?: Ideological Perceptions of Typography. Katherine Haenschen & Daniel J. Tamul. Communication Studies, Dec 20 2019. https://doi.org/10.1080/10510974.2019.1692884

ABSTRACT: Although extensive political communication research considers the content of candidate messages, scholars have largely ignored how those words are rendered – specifically, the typefaces in which they are set. If typefaces are found to have political attributes, that may impact how voters receive campaign messages. Our paper reports the results of two survey experiments demonstrating that individuals perceive typefaces, type families, and type styles to have ideological qualities. Furthermore, partisanship moderates subjects’ perceptions of typefaces: Republicans generally view typefaces as more conservative than Independents and Democrats. We also find evidence of affective polarization, in that individuals rate typefaces more favorably when perceived as sharing their ideological orientation. Results broaden our understanding of how meaning is conveyed in political communication, laying the groundwork for future research into the functions of typography and graphic design in contemporary political campaigns. Implications for political practitioners are also discussed.

KEYWORDS: Political communication, ideology, partisanship, typeface, graphic design

Associations of physical attractiveness on sexual victimization were very strong; for example, highly attractive boys were five times more likely than other boys to have experienced child sexual abuse

Beauty is in the eye of the offender: Physical attractiveness and adolescent victimization. Jukka Savolainen, Jonathan R. Brauer, Noora Ellonen. Journal of Criminal Justice, December 24 2019, 101652. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2019.101652

Abstract
Objectives: This research considered physical attractiveness as a potentially victimogenic individual characteristic. Based on target congruence, the theoretical model predicts direct effects of physical attractiveness on violent victimization and, based on routine activities theory, indirect effects on both violent and non-violent victimization.

Method: Using data from the 2013 wave of the Finnish Youth Victimization Survey (n = 5095) we estimated a structural equation model to examine the hypothesized associations. Physical attractiveness was measured using a novel self-report instrument asking respondents to report how other people react to their physical appearance.

Results: We found consistent support for the theoretically expected pathways. The direct and indirect associations of physical attractiveness on sexual victimization were particularly strong. For example, highly attractive boys were five times more likely than other boys to have experienced child sexual abuse.

Conclusions: Scholars and practitioners should consider physical attractiveness as an individual characteristic that may substantially increase the risk of interpersonal victimization, both directly and through its impact on routine activities. More research is needed to understand the mechanisms producing the observed associations.

Keywords: Physical attractiveness Victimization Routine activities Target congruence Finland Youth Child sexual abuse

We focus on a plausible evolutionary continuity between non-human and human primates’ economic behaviour; they show some capacity to barter and even proto-monetary organization

Are the roots of human economic systems shared with non-human primates? Elsa Addessi, Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, December 23 2019. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2019.12.026

Highlights
• Review of extant approaches to non-human primate economic behaviour in terms of several economic paradigms.
• We spell our definitional criteria for what can count of economic behaviour – an issue which is generally side-lined through the application of economic models to animal behaviour.
• We focus on a plausible evolutionary continuity between non-human and human primates’ economic behaviour.
• We report similar cognitive abilities and behavioural performances through a series of individual tasks. As far as individual decision-making is concerned, Prospect Theory is a predictive and biologically unifying model.
• We report behavioural differences between human and non-human primates and between distinct species of non-human primates in cooperative and competitive dyadic tasks (experimental games).
• We report and analyse laboratory and field-experiments showing symbolic activities linked to the use of intrinsically valueless tokens in trading activities.
• Some of these symbolic activities show the capacity to barter and even proto-monetary organization.
• We argue in favour of evolutionary precursors of complex human economic abilities present among non-human primates.
• We, however, point to the relative inability among non-human primates, to exert a joint control over combined cognitive computational and symbolic abilities, which may explain their non-having developing economic sophistication as well as humans.

Abstract: We review and analyze evidence for an evolutionary rooting of human economic behaviors and organization in non-human primates. Rather than focusing on the direct application of economic models that a priori account for animal decision behavior, we adopt an inductive definition of economic behavior in terms of the contribution of individual cognitive capacities to the provision of resources within an exchange structure. We spell out to what extent non-human primates’ individual and strategic decision behaviors are shared with humans. We focus on the ability to trade, through barter or token-mediated exchanges, as a landmark of an economic system among members of the same species. It is an open question why only humans have reached a high level of economic sophistication. While primates have many of the necessary cognitive abilities (symbolic and computational) in isolation, one plausible issue we identify is the limits in exerting cognitive control to combine several sources of information. The difference between human and non-human primates’ economies might well then be in degree rather than kind.

Teen childbearing leads to lower educational attainment, lower income, & greater use of welfare for individuals who come from counties with better socioeconomic conditions

Heterogeneous Consequences of Teenage Childbearing. Devon Gorry. Demography, volume 56, pages 2147–2168 (2019). https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13524-019-00830-1

Abstract: This study finds heterogeneous effects of teen childbearing on education and labor market outcomes across socioeconomic status and race. Using miscarriages to put bounds on the causal effects of teen childbearing, results show that teen childbearing leads to lower educational attainment, lower income, and greater use of welfare for individuals who come from counties with better socioeconomic conditions. However, there are no significant adverse effects for individuals who come from counties with worse socioeconomic conditions. Across race, teen childbearing leads to negative consequences for white teens but no significant negative effects for black or Hispanic and Latino teens.

V. Discussion

For teens from less educated and lower income counties and teens in minority groups, poor education and labor market outcomes are not a result of teen childbearing. Instead it is likely that teen childbearing is complimentary with poor labor market prospects and in these cases teen childbearing may encourage some young women in poor circumstances to get more education and attain better labor market outcomes than they otherwise would have.

It is important to understand this heterogeneity when targeting policy mechanisms directed at reducing teen childbearing. While previous work suggests that such policies may only have modest positive effects on teen outcomes, these results suggest that there could be large positive effects of reducing teen childbearing concentrated among teens who are relatively better off. However, teen pregnancy prevention policies will not help teens who come from poor socioeconomic backgrounds nor will they help black, Hispanic or Latino teens on average.

Thus, broad policies targeting all teen pregnancies may not help the populations that they intend to help most. Instead of focussing on reducing childbearing of poor and minority teens directly, results of this paper suggest that policymakers would be better off to first target the conditions that make teen childbearing an optimal choice.

Children: The genetic correlation between abuse & neglect was ρg = .73 (p = .02); common environmental variance increased as socioeconomic status (SES) decreased (p = .05)

Estimating the Heritability of Experiencing Child Maltreatment in an Extended Family Design. Katharina Pittner et al. Child Maltreatment, November 27, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077559519888587

Abstract: Child-driven genetic factors can contribute to negative parenting and may increase the risk of being maltreated. Experiencing childhood maltreatment may be partly heritable, but results of twin studies are mixed. In the current study, we used a cross-sectional extended family design to estimate genetic and environmental effects on experiencing child maltreatment. The sample consisted of 395 individuals (225 women; M age = 38.85 years, rangeage = 7–88 years) from 63 families with two or three participating generations. Participants were oversampled for experienced maltreatment. Self-reported experienced child maltreatment was measured using a questionnaire assessing physical and emotional abuse, and physical and emotional neglect. All maltreatment phenotypes were partly heritable with percentages for h 2 ranging from 30% (SE = 13%) for neglect to 62% (SE = 19%) for severe physical abuse. Common environmental effects (c 2) explained a statistically significant proportion of variance for all phenotypes except for the experience of severe physical abuse (c 2 = 9%, SE = 13%, p = .26). The genetic correlation between abuse and neglect was ρg = .73 (p = .02). Common environmental variance increased as socioeconomic status (SES) decreased (p = .05), but additive genetic and unique environmental variances were constant across different levels of SES.

Keywords: child maltreatment, genetics, etiology, families, risk factors, self-report

Discussion

This extended family study demonstrates that experiencing maltreatment during childhood is partly heritable. Heritability was not restricted to a specific type of maltreatment, and shared genetic factors contributed to abuse and neglect. Common and unique environmental factors explained a considerable proportion of phenotypic variance, and common environment had a greater effect on maltreatment in low-SES families.

Heritability estimates ranged from 30% for neglect to 62% for severe physical abuse. These findings suggest that child maltreatment is in part genetically mediated by child effects.

The finding that child factors contribute to maltreatment does not imply, however, that the responsibility for maltreatment perpetrated by parents lies with the child. It is the role of parents to respond appropriately to challenging child behavior, and they might need support to fulfill this role adequately in case of challenging child behaviors. Interventions may benefit from incorporating parent training that supports more effective strategies of responding to potentially challenging behavior. Results from earlier genetically informed studies (i.e., adoption and twin designs) provide support for an evocative role of externalizing problems in negative parenting and maltreatment (Marceau et al., 2013; O’Connor, Deater-Deckard, Fulker, Rutter, & Plomin, 1998; Schulz-Heik et al., 2010). The association between externalizing behavior and maltreatment may be bidirectional as maltreatment increases antisocial behavior over time, even when taking into account genetic effects (Jaffee, Caspi, Moffitt, & Taylor, 2004).

In the present study, we used a continuous variable of maltreatment ranging from “no maltreatment,” to “harsh parenting,” and to “maltreatment.” Most participants reported experiences of maltreatment at the lower end of the spectrum. Consequently, our findings may be restricted to more typical harsh parenting rather than maltreatment. However, we found that severe physical abuse seemed highly heritable, in contrast with an earlier twin study showing that harsh parenting, but not maltreatment, was heritable (Jaffee, Caspi, Moffitt, Polo-Tomas et al., 2004). Whereas Jaffee, Caspi, Moffitt, Polo-Tomas et al. (2004) assessed maltreatment up to the age of 5 years, the present study covered maltreatment to the end of adolescence, when individuals gain agency to shape their environment (Bergen, Gardner, & Kendler, 2007; Elkins, McGue, & Iacono, 1997), which may increase child-based genetic influences. Another explanation for the discrepancy might be that the present study used self-report, while in their twin study Jaffee, Caspi, Moffitt, Polo-Tomas et al. (2004) used mother report about the twins’ maltreatment histories, which may have led to an overestimation of shared environment because parents tend to perceive the environment of their children as more similar than the children themselves do (Wade & Kendler, 2000). Other studies using self-report measures also found experienced maltreatment to be partly heritable (Fisher et al., 2015; Schulz-Heik et al., 2009; South et al., 2015). Arguably, children may have a tendency to emphasize the difference between the way they themselves were treated and how their siblings were treated. However, since siblings completed the questionnaires independent of each other, it is unlikely that in our study, using self-report has strongly increased the similarity between siblings. Moreover, using a multi-informant approach that included parent reports when available, we see the same pattern of results with slightly higher estimates for heritability and common environment. This likely stems from a reduction of measurement error evident in the lower unique environment estimates.

Common and Unique Environment

The present findings suggest that similarity between siblings in terms of maltreatment experiences should not be attributed to genetic effects only but also to common environment. This points to the role of the family environment and is in line with studies showing that parental psychopathology, parenting stress, lack of social support, and larger family size are important risk factors for maltreatment. Low SES has repeatedly been shown to be associated with maltreatment (Euser et al., 2013; Sedlak et al., 2010; Slack, Holl, Mcdaniel, Yoo, & Bolger, 2004; Stith et al., 2009). In our study, SES was related to neglect. While some of these factors, such as family size, are difficult to change, addressing factors such as parenting stress and social support may have a particularly high payoff as they would benefit all children in the family.

For the etiology of maltreatment, it is important to not only understand what makes children growing up in the same family similar but also what makes them different in the experience of maltreatment—the unique environment (Plomin, 2011). We found an estimated influence of unique environment (including measurement error) of 29–42%, which concurs with previous studies (Fisher et al., 2015; Schulz-Heik et al., 2009). The importance of the unique environment points to the need for an individual child approach in addition to a family-centered approach when estimating risk. That is, it is important to improve the specific parent–child relationship. Nonetheless, specific unique environmental risk factors have remained elusive after taking measurement error into account (Deater-Deckard et al., 2001; Mullineauxa, Deater-Deckard, Petrillb, & Thompson, 2009). One suggested factor is that parents might perceive siblings as differently attractive or difficult, and thus trigger differential parenting (Burt, McGue, Iacono, & Krueger, 2006; Deater-Deckard, Smith, Ivy, & Petril, 2005; Feinberg & Hetherington, 2001; Reiss et al., 1995), which constitutes a potential target of intervention.

Genetic Correlation Between Abuse and Neglect

Our bivariate analysis indicates that the same common environmental factors are related to abuse and neglect. Approximately 50% of the genetic factors were overlapping, and the other 50% were uniquely related to abuse or neglect. This may suggest that some child factors put a child at risk of experiencing abuse but not of neglect and vice versa. Our findings illustrate why abuse and neglect often co-occur (Euser et al., 2013; Vachon, Krueger, Rogosch, & Cicchetti, 2015) notwithstanding etiological differences. Conversely, interventions may need to address abuse and neglect individually, even when they co-occur, since the heritable and unique environmental risk factors do not (fully) overlap.

Genotype × SES

Moreover, a genotype × SES interaction analysis demonstrated that in low-SES families, common environment explained more variance in experienced maltreatment than in high-SES families. Overall, low-SES families showed greater variance in experienced maltreatment, and our findings suggest that this can be attributed to common environment. Lower SES may add a range of common environmental factors negatively affecting child development. For instance, children from low-SES families experience more instability, more crowding at home, more pollution, and more danger in the neighborhood (Chen & Miller, 2013; Evans, 2004; Miller et al., 2009). Together, these factors may increase the risk of developing externalizing problems. On a population level, this suggests that fighting child poverty may have far-reaching preventive consequences.

Additive genetic variance, in absolute terms, remained stable across different levels of SES. Since overall variance decreased as SES increased, relative contribution of genetic variance component increased. Given the substantial effects of heritability this and previous studies have indicated, a more comprehensive exploration of environmental effects on heritability may uncover new intervention targets. A better understanding of the child traits mediating the heritable risk might offer insight into which environmental manipulations would be most effective in lowering heritable risk.

In order to interpret any variance component across a changing environment, it is important to consider changes in the other variance components. In a genotype-by-sex interaction study of physical activity behavior by Diego et al. (2015), the issue of the indeterminacy of environment-specific heritability was broached. The authors found that the heritability could be constant across an environmental contrast if the constituent variance components changed in the same direction and at the same rate. They also noted that it was theoretically possible that a nonconstant heritability across an environmental contrast could arise from a changing residual environment component in the face of a constant additive genetic variance. This concept is relevant to properly contextualizing our results with existing reports on the heritability of maltreatment. In particular, Schulz-Heik et al. (2009) and South, Schafer, and Ferraro (2015), respectively, reported a higher and lower proportion of the total phenotypic variance attributed to the shared environment relative to the heritability. Regarding our study, we can actually claim both scenarios because the shared environment variance component declined relative to a constant additive genetic variance from the low end of the SES spectrum to the high end.

Extended Family Design

For the current study, we decided to use an extended family design to add to the existing twin research. Extended family designs have more variability in genetic relatedness and common environment than twin designs. In addition, twins create a unique family constellation and parenting demands may be atypical when caring for two same-aged children (Olivennes, Golombok, Ramogida, & Rust, 2005). Consequently, results from twin studies may not be generalizable to typical family constellations.

Moreover, the extended family design decreases the confounding between genetic relatedness and shared environment compared to nuclear families (Almasy & Blangero, 2010; Diego, Kent, & Blangero, 2015). By including horizontal relationships (e.g., cousins, half-siblings), in addition to vertical relationships (e.g., grandparent–grandchild), a systematic correlation between genetic distance and age difference is eliminated. For instance, half-siblings and grandparent–grandchild pairs have the same genetic distance, but half-siblings tend to be similar in age whereas grandparent–grandchild pairs are not.

Limitations

A limitation of this study is the retrospective assessment of maltreatment; no conclusions about causality can therefore be drawn. For ethical reasons, research on maltreatment is generally incompatible with experimental designs except for intervention studies that combined with a prospective design can be highly informative. The present study assessed maltreatment retrospectively, and time between potential maltreatment and assessment varied. Moreover, estimates of unique environment should be interpreted with caution as it is impossible to disentangle unique environmental effects from measurement. It is interesting to note, however, that estimates of unique environment decreased when including parent reports for a multi-informant approach. This could point to a reduction in measurement error. Future research should strive to replicate these findings in a larger, representative sample and in other populations (e.g., non-Western). Estimates from quantitative genetic research are population-specific. Even if genetic variation is stable across populations (which we do not know), environmental variability will affect estimates for both heritability and environment because these estimates represent relative contributions (Plomin, 2018; Velden, 1997). Lastly, the present sample may have been too small to estimate moderator effects reliably (Glahn et al., 2010)—especially because the effect of SES on common environment was small and the moderation analysis was exploratory. Future studies should replicate the genotype × SES effect in larger samples as these findings suggest that environmental interventions can be particularly useful.

Implications

Ideally, interventions are based on empirically supported, theoretical frameworks of etiology. The current study suggests that such frameworks should incorporate the heritability of experiencing maltreatment and that interventions should address both heritable and environmental risk factors. More research is needed to determine how to best reduce those risk factors. Moreover, it would be useful to explore other environmental factors than SES and how they moderate heritability—preferably factors that can be the focus of interventions.