Complex economic activities concentrate in large cities. Pierre-Alexandre Balland, Cristian Jara-Figueroa, Sergio G. Petralia, Mathieu P. A. Steijn, David L. Rigby & César A. Hidalgo. Nature Human Behaviour volume 4, pages 248–254. January 13 2020. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-019-0803-3
Abstract: Human activities, such as research, innovation and industry, concentrate disproportionately in large cities. The ten most innovative cities in the United States account for 23% of the national population, but for 48% of its patents and 33% of its gross domestic product. But why has human activity become increasingly concentrated? Here we use data on scientific papers, patents, employment and gross domestic product, for 353 metropolitan areas in the United States, to show that the spatial concentration of productive activities increases with their complexity. Complex economic activities, such as biotechnology, neurobiology and semiconductors, concentrate disproportionately in a few large cities compared to less--complex activities, such as apparel or paper manufacturing. We use multiple proxies to measure the complexity of activities, finding that complexity explains from 40% to 80% of the variance in urban concentration of occupations, industries, scientific fields and technologies. Using historical patent data, we show that the spatial concentration of cutting-edge technologies has increased since 1850, suggesting a reinforcing cycle between the increase in the complexity of activities and urbanization. These findings suggest that the growth of spatial inequality may be connected to the increasing complexity of the economy.
Saturday, March 21, 2020
Universal Sex Differences in Mate Preferences Are Robust: Men, more than women, prefer attractive, young mates, and women, more than men, prefer older mates with financial prospects
Sex Differences in Mate Preferences Across 45 Countries: A Large-Scale Replication. Kathryn V. Walter et al. Psychological Science, March 20, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797620904154
Abstract: Considerable research has examined human mate preferences across cultures, finding universal sex differences in preferences for attractiveness and resources as well as sources of systematic cultural variation. Two competing perspectives—an evolutionary psychological perspective and a biosocial role perspective—offer alternative explanations for these findings. However, the original data on which each perspective relies are decades old, and the literature is fraught with conflicting methods, analyses, results, and conclusions. Using a new 45-country sample (N = 14,399), we attempted to replicate classic studies and test both the evolutionary and biosocial role perspectives. Support for universal sex differences in preferences remains robust: Men, more than women, prefer attractive, young mates, and women, more than men, prefer older mates with financial prospects. Cross-culturally, both sexes have mates closer to their own ages as gender equality increases. Beyond age of partner, neither pathogen prevalence nor gender equality robustly predicted sex differences or preferences across countries.
Keywords: mate preferences, sex differences, cross-cultural studies, evolutionary psychology, biosocial role theory, open data, preregistered
Abstract: Considerable research has examined human mate preferences across cultures, finding universal sex differences in preferences for attractiveness and resources as well as sources of systematic cultural variation. Two competing perspectives—an evolutionary psychological perspective and a biosocial role perspective—offer alternative explanations for these findings. However, the original data on which each perspective relies are decades old, and the literature is fraught with conflicting methods, analyses, results, and conclusions. Using a new 45-country sample (N = 14,399), we attempted to replicate classic studies and test both the evolutionary and biosocial role perspectives. Support for universal sex differences in preferences remains robust: Men, more than women, prefer attractive, young mates, and women, more than men, prefer older mates with financial prospects. Cross-culturally, both sexes have mates closer to their own ages as gender equality increases. Beyond age of partner, neither pathogen prevalence nor gender equality robustly predicted sex differences or preferences across countries.
Keywords: mate preferences, sex differences, cross-cultural studies, evolutionary psychology, biosocial role theory, open data, preregistered
At all ages, women have longer happy and unhappy lives than men, but the proportion of life spent in a happy state is greater among ment than among women
Subjective Well-being: Long and Happy Lives. Aïda Solé-Auró. In: Jagger C., Crimmins E., Saito Y., De Carvalho Yokota R., Van Oyen H., Robine JM. (eds) International Handbook of Health Expectancies. International Handbooks of Population, vol 9, Springer Mar 19 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37668-0_19
Abstract: While longevity is important, most people want to live lives that are healthy and happy as well as long. This chapter concentrates on links between the length of life and quality of life including subjective well-being, life satisfaction and happiness. The chapter reviews the determinants of happiness across places, particularly among high-income countries, and across time with the aim of elucidating how individual, social and contextual characteristics are linked to the length of life with well-being and happiness.
Keywords: Quality of life Subjective well-being Happiness Longevity
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At all ages, women have longer happy and unhappy lives than men, but the proportion of life spent in a happy state is greater among ment than among women
Abstract: While longevity is important, most people want to live lives that are healthy and happy as well as long. This chapter concentrates on links between the length of life and quality of life including subjective well-being, life satisfaction and happiness. The chapter reviews the determinants of happiness across places, particularly among high-income countries, and across time with the aim of elucidating how individual, social and contextual characteristics are linked to the length of life with well-being and happiness.
Keywords: Quality of life Subjective well-being Happiness Longevity
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At all ages, women have longer happy and unhappy lives than men, but the proportion of life spent in a happy state is greater among ment than among women
Friday, March 20, 2020
Motivated misremembering (to see oneself more generous than really is) occurs chiefly for individuals whose choices violate their own fairness standards, irrespective of how high or low those standards are
Carlson, Ryan W., Michel Marechal, Bastiaan Oud, Ernst Fehr, and Molly Crockett. 2018. “Motivated Misremembering of Selfish Decisions.” PsyArXiv. July 23. doi:10.31234/osf.io/7ck25
Abstract: People often prioritize their own interests, but also like to see themselves as moral. How do individuals resolve this tension? One way to both pursue personal gain and preserve a moral self-image is to misremember the extent of one’s selfishness. Here, we test this possibility. Across five experiments (N=3190), we find that people tend to recall being more generous in the past than they actually were, even when they are incentivized to recall their decisions accurately. Crucially, this motivated misremembering effect occurs chiefly for individuals whose choices violate their own fairness standards, irrespective of how high or low those standards are. Moreover, this effect disappears under conditions where people no longer perceive themselves as responsible for their fairness violations. Together, these findings suggest that when people’s actions fall short of their personal standards, they may misremember the extent of their selfishness, thereby potentially warding off threats to their moral self-image
Abstract: People often prioritize their own interests, but also like to see themselves as moral. How do individuals resolve this tension? One way to both pursue personal gain and preserve a moral self-image is to misremember the extent of one’s selfishness. Here, we test this possibility. Across five experiments (N=3190), we find that people tend to recall being more generous in the past than they actually were, even when they are incentivized to recall their decisions accurately. Crucially, this motivated misremembering effect occurs chiefly for individuals whose choices violate their own fairness standards, irrespective of how high or low those standards are. Moreover, this effect disappears under conditions where people no longer perceive themselves as responsible for their fairness violations. Together, these findings suggest that when people’s actions fall short of their personal standards, they may misremember the extent of their selfishness, thereby potentially warding off threats to their moral self-image
Children can employ genetic explanations in principled ways as early as 7 years of age but such explanations are used to account for a wider range of features by adults
Meyer, M., Roberts, S. O., Jayaratne, T. E., & Gelman, S. A. (2020). Children’s beliefs about causes of human characteristics: Genes, environment, or choice? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. Mar 2020. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000751
Abstract: To what extent do our genes make us nice, smart, or athletic? The explanatory frameworks we employ have broad consequences for how we evaluate and interact with others. Yet to date, little is known regarding when and how young children appeal to genetic explanations to understand human difference. The current study examined children’s (aged 7–13 years) and adults’ explanations for a set of human characteristics, contrasting genetic attributions with environmental and choice-based attributions. Whereas most adults and older children offered an unprompted genetic explanation at least once on an open-ended task, such explanations were not seen from younger children. However, even younger children, once trained on the mechanism of genes, endorsed genetic explanations for a range of characteristics—often in combination with environment and choice. Moreover, only adults favored genetic explanations for intelligence and athleticism; children, in contrast, favored environment and choice explanations for these characteristics. These findings suggest that children can employ genetic explanations in principled ways as early as 7 years of age but also that such explanations are used to account for a wider range of features by adults. Our study provides some of the first evidence regarding the ways in which genetic attributions emerge and change starting in early childhood.
Abstract: To what extent do our genes make us nice, smart, or athletic? The explanatory frameworks we employ have broad consequences for how we evaluate and interact with others. Yet to date, little is known regarding when and how young children appeal to genetic explanations to understand human difference. The current study examined children’s (aged 7–13 years) and adults’ explanations for a set of human characteristics, contrasting genetic attributions with environmental and choice-based attributions. Whereas most adults and older children offered an unprompted genetic explanation at least once on an open-ended task, such explanations were not seen from younger children. However, even younger children, once trained on the mechanism of genes, endorsed genetic explanations for a range of characteristics—often in combination with environment and choice. Moreover, only adults favored genetic explanations for intelligence and athleticism; children, in contrast, favored environment and choice explanations for these characteristics. These findings suggest that children can employ genetic explanations in principled ways as early as 7 years of age but also that such explanations are used to account for a wider range of features by adults. Our study provides some of the first evidence regarding the ways in which genetic attributions emerge and change starting in early childhood.
Female Orgasm and Overall Sexual Function and Habits: A little less than half of the women reported that penis size is important, whereas more than a third reported that it is not
Shaeer O, Skakke D, Giraldi A, et al. Female Orgasm and Overall Sexual Function and Habits: A Descriptive Study of a Cohort of U.S. Women. J Sex Med 2020;XX:XXX–XXX. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsxm.2020.01.029
Abstract
Introduction: Few studies have investigated women's experiences with orgasm and the factors that they cite as important for their orgasmic function and sexual behavior related to foreplay and sexual stimulation.
Aim: To investigate and describe overall sexual function in a cohort of North American women, with a special focus on orgasmic function, satisfaction, triggers, risk factors, and sexual behavior.
Methods: A total of 303 women aged 18–75 years completed a 100-questionnaire survey, which included the Female Sexual Function Index (FSFI) questionnaire and questions on orgasmic function, duration of sexual activity, sexual behaviors and relationship, and the partner’s sexual function. Statistical analysis was performed using SPSS to illuminate factors affecting sexual function.
Outcomes: The main outcome measures are FSFI score, satisfaction with sexual life, ability to reach orgasm, orgasm frequency, preferred sexual stimulation, and sexual habits.
Results: FSFI scores, which were calculated for the 230 women who reported having had a steady male sex partner in the preceding 6 months, showed that 41% of the 230 women were at risk for female sexual dysfunction (a cutoff less than 26.55) and 21% were dissatisfied with their overall sexual life. Almost 90% of the overall cohort reported good emotional contact with their partner, that their partner was willing to have sex, satisfaction with the partner’s penis size (wherever applicable), and good erectile function and ejaculatory control of their partner (wherever applicable). 81% of the overall cohort claimed to be sexually active. Around 70% (70–72) did reach orgasm frequently, but around 10% never did so. Vaginal intercourse was reported by 62% of the overall cohort as the best trigger of orgasm, followed by external stimulation from the partner (48%) or themselves (37%). External stimulation was reported to be the fastest trigger to orgasm.
Clinical Implications: The knowledge on how women reach orgasm and how it is related to the partners' willingness to have sex and other factors can be incorporated in the clinical work.
Strengths & Limitations: The use of a validated questionnaire and the relative large number of participants are strengths of the study. Limitations are the cross-sectional design, the lack of a sexual distress measure, and a possible selection bias.
Conclusion: Most women in the overall cohort were satisfied overall with their sexual life and partner-related factors, even though 41% (of those who cited a steady sex male partner) were at risk for female sexual dysfunction. Most women did reach orgasm through different kinds of stimulation. Correlation was good between preferred and performed sexual activities and positions.
Key Words: Female Sexual FunctionFemale Sexual DysfunctionFemale OrgasmFemale Sexual Function Index (FSFI)Orgasm Risk FactorSexual Stimulation
Abstract
Introduction: Few studies have investigated women's experiences with orgasm and the factors that they cite as important for their orgasmic function and sexual behavior related to foreplay and sexual stimulation.
Aim: To investigate and describe overall sexual function in a cohort of North American women, with a special focus on orgasmic function, satisfaction, triggers, risk factors, and sexual behavior.
Methods: A total of 303 women aged 18–75 years completed a 100-questionnaire survey, which included the Female Sexual Function Index (FSFI) questionnaire and questions on orgasmic function, duration of sexual activity, sexual behaviors and relationship, and the partner’s sexual function. Statistical analysis was performed using SPSS to illuminate factors affecting sexual function.
Outcomes: The main outcome measures are FSFI score, satisfaction with sexual life, ability to reach orgasm, orgasm frequency, preferred sexual stimulation, and sexual habits.
Results: FSFI scores, which were calculated for the 230 women who reported having had a steady male sex partner in the preceding 6 months, showed that 41% of the 230 women were at risk for female sexual dysfunction (a cutoff less than 26.55) and 21% were dissatisfied with their overall sexual life. Almost 90% of the overall cohort reported good emotional contact with their partner, that their partner was willing to have sex, satisfaction with the partner’s penis size (wherever applicable), and good erectile function and ejaculatory control of their partner (wherever applicable). 81% of the overall cohort claimed to be sexually active. Around 70% (70–72) did reach orgasm frequently, but around 10% never did so. Vaginal intercourse was reported by 62% of the overall cohort as the best trigger of orgasm, followed by external stimulation from the partner (48%) or themselves (37%). External stimulation was reported to be the fastest trigger to orgasm.
Clinical Implications: The knowledge on how women reach orgasm and how it is related to the partners' willingness to have sex and other factors can be incorporated in the clinical work.
Strengths & Limitations: The use of a validated questionnaire and the relative large number of participants are strengths of the study. Limitations are the cross-sectional design, the lack of a sexual distress measure, and a possible selection bias.
Conclusion: Most women in the overall cohort were satisfied overall with their sexual life and partner-related factors, even though 41% (of those who cited a steady sex male partner) were at risk for female sexual dysfunction. Most women did reach orgasm through different kinds of stimulation. Correlation was good between preferred and performed sexual activities and positions.
Key Words: Female Sexual FunctionFemale Sexual DysfunctionFemale OrgasmFemale Sexual Function Index (FSFI)Orgasm Risk FactorSexual Stimulation
Being fun: An overlooked indicator of childhood social status
Being fun: An overlooked indicator of childhood social status. Brett Laursen Robert L. Altman William M. Bukowski Li Wei. Journal of Personality, March 7 2020. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12546
Objective: The present study concerns an overlooked trait indicator of childhood peer status: Being fun. The study is designed to identify the degree to which being fun is uniquely associated with the peer status variables of likeability and popularity.
Method: Two studies of children in grades 4 to 6 (ages 9 to 12) are reported. The first involved 306 girls and 305 boys attending school in northern Colombia. The second involved 363 girls and 299 boys attending school in southern Florida. Students completed similar peer nomination inventories, once in the first study and twice (8 weeks apart) in the second.
Results: In both studies, being fun was positively correlated with likeability and popularity. In the second study, being fun predicted subsequent changes in likeability and popularity, after controlling for factors known to be related to each. Initial likeability and popularity also predicted subsequent changes in perceptions of being fun.
Conclusions: Anecdotal evidence suggests that children are intensely focused on having fun. The findings indicate that this focus extends beyond the immediate rewards that fun experiences provide; some portion of peer status is uniquely derived from the perception that one is fun to be around.
Objective: The present study concerns an overlooked trait indicator of childhood peer status: Being fun. The study is designed to identify the degree to which being fun is uniquely associated with the peer status variables of likeability and popularity.
Method: Two studies of children in grades 4 to 6 (ages 9 to 12) are reported. The first involved 306 girls and 305 boys attending school in northern Colombia. The second involved 363 girls and 299 boys attending school in southern Florida. Students completed similar peer nomination inventories, once in the first study and twice (8 weeks apart) in the second.
Results: In both studies, being fun was positively correlated with likeability and popularity. In the second study, being fun predicted subsequent changes in likeability and popularity, after controlling for factors known to be related to each. Initial likeability and popularity also predicted subsequent changes in perceptions of being fun.
Conclusions: Anecdotal evidence suggests that children are intensely focused on having fun. The findings indicate that this focus extends beyond the immediate rewards that fun experiences provide; some portion of peer status is uniquely derived from the perception that one is fun to be around.
From 2018... Musically induced chills: Variously described as thrills, frisson, or skin orgasms
From 2018... A survey into the experience of musically induced chills: Emotions, situations and music. Scott Bannisterv. Psychology of Music, September 24, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1177/0305735618798024
Abstract: Musically induced chills, an emotional response accompanied by gooseflesh, shivers and tingling sensations, are an intriguing aesthetic phenomenon. Although chills have been linked to musical features, personality traits and listening contexts, there exists no comprehensive study that surveys the general characteristics of chills, such as emotional qualities. Thus, the present research aimed to develop a broad understanding of the musical chills response, in terms of emotional characteristics, types of music and chill-inducing features, and listening contexts. Participants (N = 375) completed a survey collecting qualitative responses regarding a specific experience of musical chills, with accompanying quantitative ratings of music qualia and underlying mechanisms. Participants could also describe two more “chills pieces”. Results indicate that chills are often experienced as a mixed and moving emotional state, and commonly occur in isolated listening contexts. Recurring musical features linked to chills include crescendos, the human voice, lyrics, and concepts such as unity and communion in the music. Findings are discussed in terms of theories regarding musical chills, and implications for future empirical testing of the response.
Keywords: chills, emotion, listening, meaning, peak experiences, qualitative
Abstract: Musically induced chills, an emotional response accompanied by gooseflesh, shivers and tingling sensations, are an intriguing aesthetic phenomenon. Although chills have been linked to musical features, personality traits and listening contexts, there exists no comprehensive study that surveys the general characteristics of chills, such as emotional qualities. Thus, the present research aimed to develop a broad understanding of the musical chills response, in terms of emotional characteristics, types of music and chill-inducing features, and listening contexts. Participants (N = 375) completed a survey collecting qualitative responses regarding a specific experience of musical chills, with accompanying quantitative ratings of music qualia and underlying mechanisms. Participants could also describe two more “chills pieces”. Results indicate that chills are often experienced as a mixed and moving emotional state, and commonly occur in isolated listening contexts. Recurring musical features linked to chills include crescendos, the human voice, lyrics, and concepts such as unity and communion in the music. Findings are discussed in terms of theories regarding musical chills, and implications for future empirical testing of the response.
Keywords: chills, emotion, listening, meaning, peak experiences, qualitative
Dunning-Kruger & How to Know You Are Not One of Them
How to Tell If You’re a Dunning Cougar - We’re all at risk. Jessica Wildfire. Medium, Feb 5 2020. https://medium.com/swlh/how-to-tell-if-youre-a-dunning-cougar-5396a92c1581
There was this one guy at work, who I wanted to like. He was friendly and outgoing, when he was in a good mood. He had potential. But he couldn’t quit giving himself compliments. He paused mid-sentence to pay tribute to himself. He talked down to his students.
Sometimes he stopped class to talk about how great he was. He always used himself as an example of what to do.
It was painful to watch.
I was scared to give him advice. It always made him angry. His face turned lipstick pink. He clammed up. He got defensive. You had to back way down. One time he told me I didn’t know what I was doing.
This was a problem, given that technically I was his boss. The good news? I figured out how to get rid of my dunning cougar without firing him. I convinced him he was too good to work for me.
What’s a dunning cougar?
It’s something I made up. I got tired of describing arrogant idiots as “someone who suffers from the Dunning-Kruger Effect.”
That’s a chalky mouthful.
The Dunning-Kruger effect was developed by a Cornell psychologist and an NYU professor in the 1990s. They studied a phenomenon that’s plagued human history, and drug it out into the daylight.
Simply put:
The less you know, the more you over-estimate your abilities.
But there’s a problem. The more confidence you show, the more risk you run of turning into what you despise.
So how do you know for sure you’re not one of them?
1. You don’t have to tell anyone how amazing you are
If you’re good at something, people will tell you. They’ll tell other people on your behalf. They’ll come to you for advice. They’ll ask for favors. It feels good to be appreciated for what you do well.
That’s not arrogance. It’s human.
2. You’re grateful for compliments
An honest compliment from someone you respect sustains you for a long time. It makes you want to do even better.
If you feel grateful for compliments you receive on your hard work, then you’re probably not a dunning cougar.
But if you are a dunning cougar, compliments have the opposite effect. They make you complacent and lazy.
They also whet your appetite for more compliments.
3. You feel true shame when you mess up
Shame is a powerful teacher. You feel it when you know you could’ve done better, and chose not to.
A truly good person doesn’t hide from their shame. They face it, and make a plan to change their behavior.
Dunning cougars run from accountability.
If you face the music, you’re not one of them. It actually feels pretty good to admit when you did something wrong, and face the consequences — without making a big production out of it.
4. You ask for advice from the right people
Dunning cougars hate advice. They want to pretend like they know everything already, which keeps them trapped where they are. They’ll pretend to ask for help, when they secretly want validation.
Asking for real advice means you’ve got the guts to listen to it, including some things you don’t want to hear.
So if you actually want to get better at what you do, it means you know you’re not brilliant. That’s a good sign.
5. You consider other things more important than yourself
We all have our selfish moments. But dunning cougars can’t see past them. They think they can run the show. Everything’s about them.
They should be in charge, but they can’t explain why.
Someone with only the minimum training and skills suffer from an inflated sense of self. If they could stop broadcasting their own prowess for a second, they’d see a much bigger universe.
A healthy mind puts themselves second or third sometimes. They put their entitlement and pride in the backseat.
6. You look up to someone else
Dunning cougars might pay lip service to the idea of role models and influence. But they just talk the talk, because they know it makes them look good. They draw their heroes from a hat.
Why not? They’re already the best.
They might look up to someone who’s dead, because they think they already are that person.
They think they’re a reincarnation of someone great.
They find someone famous who exhibits some of the traits they claim to have, and then compare themselves to that person.
That’s not how role models work….
Anyone who doesn’t suffer from this effect actually knows they aren’t the best at what they do. They always consider someone else slightly better, even if it’s only at a few things.
7. You never tell yourself “That looks easy…”
Maybe that’s ambitious. It’s better to say you catch yourself when you start looking at someone else’s job and think it must not be that hard or complicated. It’s always harder than it looks.
Someone who’s great at their job makes it look easy. Failing to grasp that is the signature move of dunning cougars.
Hopefully, you see something that looks super easy and think, “There has to be something I’m not catching…”
8. You double-check yourself
There’s a difference between second-guessing yourself and double-checking yourself. Second-guessing implies a lack of confidence.
Double-checking means you know what you need to do, and you’re just making sure you didn’t make a dumb mistake.
You know those happen to everyone.
You’re confirming your original perceptions. You think you did something the right way, but you want to make extra sure.
Dunning cougars lack this trait entirely. They assume they did everything right the first time, because they’re amazing.
It’s a real pain to deal with…
9. You hesitate to throw around superlatives
Dunning cougars love phrases like “the absolute best,” and “the best you’ve ever seen,” and “top of my field.”
They always compare their skills to someone else.
Someone with an accurate sense of their abilities never describes themselves that way, even if others do.
They prefer phrases like, “very good,” and “sufficient.” They want to be known for consistent quality and dependability. They know that being “the best” usually involves a level of personal taste and preference.
10. You’re curious about things
Dunning cougars never get better at their jobs because they think they don’t need do. The opposite of that is someone who realizes they can always get better at what they do.
If they run out of challenges, they start doing something else. They rarely sit back on their throne and preen. If you’re excited about learning and improving, then you’re not a dunning cougar.
We all have our moments
Just about everyone has their Dunning-Kruger moments. We underestimate the difficulty of a new skill. We overrate our intelligence.
It’s fine. Effective people quickly learn the limits of their skill and start working, leveling up as they go. Every notch in your confidence should carve another one in humility.
Dunning cougars remain trapped.
They can’t break out of the prison of their egos. Their brash overconfidence might get them far in life, but never as far as they could’ve gone if they’d just listened to someone for a second.
There was this one guy at work, who I wanted to like. He was friendly and outgoing, when he was in a good mood. He had potential. But he couldn’t quit giving himself compliments. He paused mid-sentence to pay tribute to himself. He talked down to his students.
Sometimes he stopped class to talk about how great he was. He always used himself as an example of what to do.
It was painful to watch.
I was scared to give him advice. It always made him angry. His face turned lipstick pink. He clammed up. He got defensive. You had to back way down. One time he told me I didn’t know what I was doing.
This was a problem, given that technically I was his boss. The good news? I figured out how to get rid of my dunning cougar without firing him. I convinced him he was too good to work for me.
What’s a dunning cougar?
It’s something I made up. I got tired of describing arrogant idiots as “someone who suffers from the Dunning-Kruger Effect.”
That’s a chalky mouthful.
The Dunning-Kruger effect was developed by a Cornell psychologist and an NYU professor in the 1990s. They studied a phenomenon that’s plagued human history, and drug it out into the daylight.
Simply put:
The less you know, the more you over-estimate your abilities.
But there’s a problem. The more confidence you show, the more risk you run of turning into what you despise.
So how do you know for sure you’re not one of them?
1. You don’t have to tell anyone how amazing you are
If you’re good at something, people will tell you. They’ll tell other people on your behalf. They’ll come to you for advice. They’ll ask for favors. It feels good to be appreciated for what you do well.
That’s not arrogance. It’s human.
2. You’re grateful for compliments
An honest compliment from someone you respect sustains you for a long time. It makes you want to do even better.
If you feel grateful for compliments you receive on your hard work, then you’re probably not a dunning cougar.
But if you are a dunning cougar, compliments have the opposite effect. They make you complacent and lazy.
They also whet your appetite for more compliments.
3. You feel true shame when you mess up
Shame is a powerful teacher. You feel it when you know you could’ve done better, and chose not to.
A truly good person doesn’t hide from their shame. They face it, and make a plan to change their behavior.
Dunning cougars run from accountability.
If you face the music, you’re not one of them. It actually feels pretty good to admit when you did something wrong, and face the consequences — without making a big production out of it.
4. You ask for advice from the right people
Dunning cougars hate advice. They want to pretend like they know everything already, which keeps them trapped where they are. They’ll pretend to ask for help, when they secretly want validation.
Asking for real advice means you’ve got the guts to listen to it, including some things you don’t want to hear.
So if you actually want to get better at what you do, it means you know you’re not brilliant. That’s a good sign.
5. You consider other things more important than yourself
We all have our selfish moments. But dunning cougars can’t see past them. They think they can run the show. Everything’s about them.
They should be in charge, but they can’t explain why.
Someone with only the minimum training and skills suffer from an inflated sense of self. If they could stop broadcasting their own prowess for a second, they’d see a much bigger universe.
A healthy mind puts themselves second or third sometimes. They put their entitlement and pride in the backseat.
6. You look up to someone else
Dunning cougars might pay lip service to the idea of role models and influence. But they just talk the talk, because they know it makes them look good. They draw their heroes from a hat.
Why not? They’re already the best.
They might look up to someone who’s dead, because they think they already are that person.
They think they’re a reincarnation of someone great.
They find someone famous who exhibits some of the traits they claim to have, and then compare themselves to that person.
That’s not how role models work….
Anyone who doesn’t suffer from this effect actually knows they aren’t the best at what they do. They always consider someone else slightly better, even if it’s only at a few things.
7. You never tell yourself “That looks easy…”
Maybe that’s ambitious. It’s better to say you catch yourself when you start looking at someone else’s job and think it must not be that hard or complicated. It’s always harder than it looks.
Someone who’s great at their job makes it look easy. Failing to grasp that is the signature move of dunning cougars.
Hopefully, you see something that looks super easy and think, “There has to be something I’m not catching…”
8. You double-check yourself
There’s a difference between second-guessing yourself and double-checking yourself. Second-guessing implies a lack of confidence.
Double-checking means you know what you need to do, and you’re just making sure you didn’t make a dumb mistake.
You know those happen to everyone.
You’re confirming your original perceptions. You think you did something the right way, but you want to make extra sure.
Dunning cougars lack this trait entirely. They assume they did everything right the first time, because they’re amazing.
It’s a real pain to deal with…
9. You hesitate to throw around superlatives
Dunning cougars love phrases like “the absolute best,” and “the best you’ve ever seen,” and “top of my field.”
They always compare their skills to someone else.
Someone with an accurate sense of their abilities never describes themselves that way, even if others do.
They prefer phrases like, “very good,” and “sufficient.” They want to be known for consistent quality and dependability. They know that being “the best” usually involves a level of personal taste and preference.
10. You’re curious about things
Dunning cougars never get better at their jobs because they think they don’t need do. The opposite of that is someone who realizes they can always get better at what they do.
If they run out of challenges, they start doing something else. They rarely sit back on their throne and preen. If you’re excited about learning and improving, then you’re not a dunning cougar.
We all have our moments
Just about everyone has their Dunning-Kruger moments. We underestimate the difficulty of a new skill. We overrate our intelligence.
It’s fine. Effective people quickly learn the limits of their skill and start working, leveling up as they go. Every notch in your confidence should carve another one in humility.
Dunning cougars remain trapped.
They can’t break out of the prison of their egos. Their brash overconfidence might get them far in life, but never as far as they could’ve gone if they’d just listened to someone for a second.
Missed connections & embarrassing confessions: Using big data to examine sex differences in sexual omission (men regretted more lost opportunities) & commission regret (women regretted more commission)
Webster, G. D., Smith, C. V., Orozco, T., Jonason, P. K., Gesselman, A. N., & Greenspan, R. L. (2020). Missed connections and embarrassing confessions: Using big data to examine sex differences in sexual omission and commission regret. Evolutionary Behavioral Sciences, Mar 2020. https://doi.org/10.1037/ebs0000199
Abstract: Error management theory (EMT; Haselton & Buss, 2000) draws on parental investment theory (Trivers, 1972) and signal detection to make novel predictions about human cognitive biases and their adaptive implications. EMT predicts that heterosexual men overperceive sexual interest from women, whereas women underperceive honest signals of relationship commitment from men. In turn, sexual strategies theory (Buss & Schmitt, 1993) predicts that men may experience more regret over romantic or sexual omission (missed opportunities), whereas women may experience more regret over romantic or sexual commission (regretting past decisions). We tested these predictions using craigslist’s missed connections (personal ads posted by people on craigslist.org seeking to contact someone they saw briefly in public) and FMyLife.com’s (FML) love and intimacy sections (embarrassing incidents that people experience and choose to share online anonymously). We recorded missed connections for men seeking women and women seeking men in all 50 U.S. states at 3 time points (N > 61,000). We also recorded FMLs posted by men and women over a 3-year span (N > 3,500). Consistent with EMT, parental investment theory, and sexual strategies theory, men were more likely to post missed connections (sexual or romantic omission regret), whereas women were more likely to post in FML’s love and intimacy sections (sexual or romantic commission regret). We discuss EMT’s broad theoretical implications for psychology.
Abstract: Error management theory (EMT; Haselton & Buss, 2000) draws on parental investment theory (Trivers, 1972) and signal detection to make novel predictions about human cognitive biases and their adaptive implications. EMT predicts that heterosexual men overperceive sexual interest from women, whereas women underperceive honest signals of relationship commitment from men. In turn, sexual strategies theory (Buss & Schmitt, 1993) predicts that men may experience more regret over romantic or sexual omission (missed opportunities), whereas women may experience more regret over romantic or sexual commission (regretting past decisions). We tested these predictions using craigslist’s missed connections (personal ads posted by people on craigslist.org seeking to contact someone they saw briefly in public) and FMyLife.com’s (FML) love and intimacy sections (embarrassing incidents that people experience and choose to share online anonymously). We recorded missed connections for men seeking women and women seeking men in all 50 U.S. states at 3 time points (N > 61,000). We also recorded FMLs posted by men and women over a 3-year span (N > 3,500). Consistent with EMT, parental investment theory, and sexual strategies theory, men were more likely to post missed connections (sexual or romantic omission regret), whereas women were more likely to post in FML’s love and intimacy sections (sexual or romantic commission regret). We discuss EMT’s broad theoretical implications for psychology.
Engagement in social distancing/handwashing was most strongly predicted by the perceived likelihood of personally being infected, rather than likelihood of infection transmission or its severity
Wise, Toby, Tomislav D. Zbozinek, Giorgia Michelini, Cindy C. Hagan, and Dean Mobbs. 2020. “Changes in Risk Perception and Protective Behavior During the First Week of the COVID-19 Pandemic in the United States.” PsyArXiv. March 19. doi:10.31234/osf.io/dz428
Abstract: By mid-March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic spread to over 100 countries and all 50 states in the US. Government efforts to minimize the spread of disease emphasized behavioral interventions, including raising awareness of the disease and encouraging protective behaviors such as social distancing and hand washing, and seeking medical attention if experiencing symptoms. However, it is unclear to what extent individuals are aware of the risks associated with the disease, how they are altering their behavior, factors which could influence the spread of the virus to vulnerable populations. We characterized risk perception and engagement in preventative measures in 1591 United States based individuals over the first week of the pandemic (March 11th-16th 2020) and examined the extent to which protective behaviors are predicted by individuals’ perception of risk. Over 5 days, subjects demonstrated growing awareness of the risk posed by the virus, and largely reported engaging in protective behaviors with increasing frequency. However, they underestimated their personal risk of infection relative to the average person in the country. We found that engagement in social distancing and handwashing was most strongly predicted by the perceived likelihood of personally being infected, rather than likelihood of transmission or severity of potential transmitted infections. However, substantial variability emerged among individuals, and using data-driven methods we found a subgroup of subjects who are largely disengaged, unaware, and not practicing protective behaviors. Our results have implications for our understanding of how risk perception and protective behaviors can facilitate early interventions during large-scale pandemics.
Abstract: By mid-March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic spread to over 100 countries and all 50 states in the US. Government efforts to minimize the spread of disease emphasized behavioral interventions, including raising awareness of the disease and encouraging protective behaviors such as social distancing and hand washing, and seeking medical attention if experiencing symptoms. However, it is unclear to what extent individuals are aware of the risks associated with the disease, how they are altering their behavior, factors which could influence the spread of the virus to vulnerable populations. We characterized risk perception and engagement in preventative measures in 1591 United States based individuals over the first week of the pandemic (March 11th-16th 2020) and examined the extent to which protective behaviors are predicted by individuals’ perception of risk. Over 5 days, subjects demonstrated growing awareness of the risk posed by the virus, and largely reported engaging in protective behaviors with increasing frequency. However, they underestimated their personal risk of infection relative to the average person in the country. We found that engagement in social distancing and handwashing was most strongly predicted by the perceived likelihood of personally being infected, rather than likelihood of transmission or severity of potential transmitted infections. However, substantial variability emerged among individuals, and using data-driven methods we found a subgroup of subjects who are largely disengaged, unaware, and not practicing protective behaviors. Our results have implications for our understanding of how risk perception and protective behaviors can facilitate early interventions during large-scale pandemics.
Thursday, March 19, 2020
Possibility that individual groups of dopamine cells make a unique contribution to the processing of reward and aversion: Non-canonical dopamine pathways are excited in response to aversive stimuli
Aversion hot spots in the dopamine system. Jeroen P H Verharen, Yichen Zhu, Stephan Lammel. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, Volume 64, October 2020, Pages 46-52. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2020.02.002
Highlights
• DA neurons show high levels of anatomical and functional heterogeneity.
• Role for projection-defined DA neurons in processing aversive stimuli.
• Identification of aversive hot spots in vNAcMed, TS, mPFC, BLA.
Abstract: Through the development of optogenetics and other viral vector-based technologies, our view of the dopamine system has substantially advanced over the last decade. In particular, progress has been made in the reclassification of dopamine neurons based on subtypes displaying specific projections, which are associated with different features at the anatomical, molecular and behavioral level. Together, these discoveries have raised the possibility that individual groups of dopamine cells make a unique contribution to the processing of reward and aversion. Here, we review recent studies that have identified non-canonical dopamine pathways that are excited in response to aversive stimuli, including dopamine projections to the ventromedial shell of the nucleus accumbens, prefrontal cortex, tail of the striatum, and amygdala.
Highlights
• DA neurons show high levels of anatomical and functional heterogeneity.
• Role for projection-defined DA neurons in processing aversive stimuli.
• Identification of aversive hot spots in vNAcMed, TS, mPFC, BLA.
Abstract: Through the development of optogenetics and other viral vector-based technologies, our view of the dopamine system has substantially advanced over the last decade. In particular, progress has been made in the reclassification of dopamine neurons based on subtypes displaying specific projections, which are associated with different features at the anatomical, molecular and behavioral level. Together, these discoveries have raised the possibility that individual groups of dopamine cells make a unique contribution to the processing of reward and aversion. Here, we review recent studies that have identified non-canonical dopamine pathways that are excited in response to aversive stimuli, including dopamine projections to the ventromedial shell of the nucleus accumbens, prefrontal cortex, tail of the striatum, and amygdala.
Decision-making competence may tap not only into fluid intelligence but also into motivation, emotion regulation, and experience (or crystallized intelligence)
Decision-Making Competence: More Than Intelligence? Wändi Bruine de Bruin, Andrew M. Parker, Baruch Fischhoff. Current Directions in Psychological Science, March 18, 2020
https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721420901592
Abstract: Decision-making competence refers to the ability to make better decisions, as defined by decision-making principles posited by models of rational choice. Historically, psychological research on decision-making has examined how well people follow these principles under carefully manipulated experimental conditions. When individual differences received attention, researchers often assumed that individuals with higher fluid intelligence would perform better. Here, we describe the development and validation of individual-differences measures of decision-making competence. Emerging findings suggest that decision-making competence may tap not only into fluid intelligence but also into motivation, emotion regulation, and experience (or crystallized intelligence). Although fluid intelligence tends to decline with age, older adults may be able to maintain decision-making competence by leveraging age-related improvements in these other skills. We discuss implications for interventions and future research.
Keywords: decision-making competence, individual differences, cognitive ability
https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721420901592
Abstract: Decision-making competence refers to the ability to make better decisions, as defined by decision-making principles posited by models of rational choice. Historically, psychological research on decision-making has examined how well people follow these principles under carefully manipulated experimental conditions. When individual differences received attention, researchers often assumed that individuals with higher fluid intelligence would perform better. Here, we describe the development and validation of individual-differences measures of decision-making competence. Emerging findings suggest that decision-making competence may tap not only into fluid intelligence but also into motivation, emotion regulation, and experience (or crystallized intelligence). Although fluid intelligence tends to decline with age, older adults may be able to maintain decision-making competence by leveraging age-related improvements in these other skills. We discuss implications for interventions and future research.
Keywords: decision-making competence, individual differences, cognitive ability
Cuijpers and colleagues conducted a meta-analysis to answer the question whether psychotherapies (primarily CBT) for depression have comparable outcomes in all age groups across the life span
The Age of Depression and Its Treatments. Stefan G. Hofmann. JAMA Psychiatry, March 18, 2020. doi:10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2020.0158
Full text, references, etc., at the DOI above.
Depression is a serious and common mental health problem. Although a number of psychological and pharmacological treatments are available for this serious psychiatric condition, there is still a lot of room for improvement. As is true for virtually all mental disorders, the most common and comparatively most effective form of psychological treatment for depression is cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT).1
To advance and understand the treatments for this disorder, it is important to know when, how, and for whom a treatment works. In line with such a personalized approach to therapy, in this issue of JAMA Psychiatry, Cuijpers and colleagues2 conducted a meta-analysis to answer the question whether psychotherapies (primarily CBT) for depression have comparable outcomes in all age groups across the life span. Based on a meta-analytic review of 366 randomized clinical trials, this study found that treatments were less effective in children and adolescents compared with adults. The authors called for better psychological treatments in children and adolescents.
What might account for the observed results? What factors might have accounted for these findings aside from age? If age was in fact the primary reason for the results, why is psychotherapy in children and adolescents less effective? Is it possible that depression in children and adolescents is more severe and treatment resistant than the other age groups? These are the questions I will address in this commentary.
As is true for all meta-analyses, decisions have to be made that might have influenced the results. The study2 allowed different treatment formats, including individual sessions, group therapy, telephone consultations, and guided self-help treatments through the internet. It is quite reasonable to assume that the treatment formats are not used to the same extent by all age groups. Children are unlikely to use self-help guides, and very young children and older adults might be less likely to use the internet for their treatments than young adults, for example. We also know that some of these treatment formats are not as effective as others. Self-help guides, for example, may not be as effective as face-to-face treatments. This difference in treatment use might be an alternative explanation for the pattern of results.
There is also a well-known age-by-sex difference in the prevalence of depression.3 Until age 13 years, depression is equally common among boys and girls. After that age, depression becomes a lot more common in women and girls than men and boys. Therefore, any differences in the treatments between different age groups could also be attributable to differences in sex proportions between these groups. Similar arguments could be made for differences in socioeconomic status, social support, and even culture.
Finally, the number of studies included in the various age-group categories differ dramatically, with 242 studies examining middle-aged adults and only 13 studies examining children and 10 studies examining older adults.2 Not surprisingly, the 95% CI was a lot smaller for the treatment effect size for studies of the middle-aged adults compared with the treatment effect sizes of studies of the children and older adults. This may have also contributed to the pattern of results. Meta-analyses are powerful tools that need to be handled with great care.
Assuming that the findings2 are not explained by an artifact of some other variable, such as treatment use or sex, what could the results mean? Is it possible that depression is not the same disorder for all age groups? The DSM-5 distinguishes major depressive disorder, persistent depressive disorder (dysthymia), disruptive mood dysregulation disorder, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, substance/medication-induced depressive disorder, depressive disorder due to another medical condition, other specified depressive disorder, and unspecified depressive disorder. For all of these categories, age is a factor, and children with mood disorders have posed a number of diagnostic challenges. Perhaps one of the most controversial issues during the development of the DSM-5 was the diagnosis of bipolar disorder in children. To attempt to avoid the overdiagnosis of and treatment for bipolar disorder in children, the DSM-5 created a new diagnosis: disruptive mood dysregulation disorder. This diagnosis typically describes children 12 years or younger who show persistent irritability and frequent episodes of extreme behavioral dyscontrol.
There are other obvious age-associated differences in mood disorders. Children are much less likely to use substances of abuse than adults. Yet, we know that a large number of substances of abuse, such as some prescribed medications, as well as several medical conditions, can be associated with depressionlike phenomena. This fact is recognized in the diagnoses of substance/medication-induced depressive disorder and depressive disorder due to another medical condition. These patients will obviously require an intervention that also addresses the substance or medication to effectively target the depression. It is unclear how many patients in the meta-analysis met criteria for a substance-associated depression. Those patients were unlikely to be children.
The DSM-5 recognizes that in children and adolescents, the mood may be irritable and cranky rather than sad.4 A more chronic form of depression is diagnosed when the mood disturbance continues for at least 2 years in adults but only 1 year in children. Age further defines different subtypes of dysthymia, based on whether the onset is early (before age 21 years) or late (after age 21 years). These differences in age at onset and time course are fairly arbitrary, but they emphasize the importance of age when making a diagnosis.
Of particular relevance in the context of the study is the onset specifier. This specifier was in large part the result of studies conducted by Akiskal,5 who proposed that early-onset dysthymia is a low-grade characterological form of depression that develops gradually, whereas late-life dysthymia is an acute and more severe form of the disorder.
Although the early-onset vs late-onset specifier was not included for major depressive disorder, it has been suggested that a similar distinction should also be made for this disorder.6 Accordingly, early-onset chronic major depression might be a more severe form and associated with greater comorbidities than the late-onset subtype. This would explain why treatments are less effective in early-onset subtype of the disorder and therefore also in children and adolescents.
It is unclear why age appears to distinguish different forms of depressive states. It is quite possible that hormonal changes, and especially the influence of estrogen and testosterone on brain function and development among girls around puberty, might explain some of the results.7 Other possible explanations might be associated with the physical changes that occur during sexual maturity and the associated social conflicts and stress around gender roles.3 Whatever the reason, age (and sex) is a critical factor that needs to be considered for the diagnosis and treatment of depression. It is quite possible that we are dealing with different disorders, depending on the age and sex of the patient.8 Therefore, the same treatment might not be equally effective for all individuals at all ages. This questions the idea that depression is a monolithic entity and supports the call for a paradigm shift toward precision medicine in psychiatry.
Full text, references, etc., at the DOI above.
Depression is a serious and common mental health problem. Although a number of psychological and pharmacological treatments are available for this serious psychiatric condition, there is still a lot of room for improvement. As is true for virtually all mental disorders, the most common and comparatively most effective form of psychological treatment for depression is cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT).1
To advance and understand the treatments for this disorder, it is important to know when, how, and for whom a treatment works. In line with such a personalized approach to therapy, in this issue of JAMA Psychiatry, Cuijpers and colleagues2 conducted a meta-analysis to answer the question whether psychotherapies (primarily CBT) for depression have comparable outcomes in all age groups across the life span. Based on a meta-analytic review of 366 randomized clinical trials, this study found that treatments were less effective in children and adolescents compared with adults. The authors called for better psychological treatments in children and adolescents.
What might account for the observed results? What factors might have accounted for these findings aside from age? If age was in fact the primary reason for the results, why is psychotherapy in children and adolescents less effective? Is it possible that depression in children and adolescents is more severe and treatment resistant than the other age groups? These are the questions I will address in this commentary.
As is true for all meta-analyses, decisions have to be made that might have influenced the results. The study2 allowed different treatment formats, including individual sessions, group therapy, telephone consultations, and guided self-help treatments through the internet. It is quite reasonable to assume that the treatment formats are not used to the same extent by all age groups. Children are unlikely to use self-help guides, and very young children and older adults might be less likely to use the internet for their treatments than young adults, for example. We also know that some of these treatment formats are not as effective as others. Self-help guides, for example, may not be as effective as face-to-face treatments. This difference in treatment use might be an alternative explanation for the pattern of results.
There is also a well-known age-by-sex difference in the prevalence of depression.3 Until age 13 years, depression is equally common among boys and girls. After that age, depression becomes a lot more common in women and girls than men and boys. Therefore, any differences in the treatments between different age groups could also be attributable to differences in sex proportions between these groups. Similar arguments could be made for differences in socioeconomic status, social support, and even culture.
Finally, the number of studies included in the various age-group categories differ dramatically, with 242 studies examining middle-aged adults and only 13 studies examining children and 10 studies examining older adults.2 Not surprisingly, the 95% CI was a lot smaller for the treatment effect size for studies of the middle-aged adults compared with the treatment effect sizes of studies of the children and older adults. This may have also contributed to the pattern of results. Meta-analyses are powerful tools that need to be handled with great care.
Assuming that the findings2 are not explained by an artifact of some other variable, such as treatment use or sex, what could the results mean? Is it possible that depression is not the same disorder for all age groups? The DSM-5 distinguishes major depressive disorder, persistent depressive disorder (dysthymia), disruptive mood dysregulation disorder, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, substance/medication-induced depressive disorder, depressive disorder due to another medical condition, other specified depressive disorder, and unspecified depressive disorder. For all of these categories, age is a factor, and children with mood disorders have posed a number of diagnostic challenges. Perhaps one of the most controversial issues during the development of the DSM-5 was the diagnosis of bipolar disorder in children. To attempt to avoid the overdiagnosis of and treatment for bipolar disorder in children, the DSM-5 created a new diagnosis: disruptive mood dysregulation disorder. This diagnosis typically describes children 12 years or younger who show persistent irritability and frequent episodes of extreme behavioral dyscontrol.
There are other obvious age-associated differences in mood disorders. Children are much less likely to use substances of abuse than adults. Yet, we know that a large number of substances of abuse, such as some prescribed medications, as well as several medical conditions, can be associated with depressionlike phenomena. This fact is recognized in the diagnoses of substance/medication-induced depressive disorder and depressive disorder due to another medical condition. These patients will obviously require an intervention that also addresses the substance or medication to effectively target the depression. It is unclear how many patients in the meta-analysis met criteria for a substance-associated depression. Those patients were unlikely to be children.
The DSM-5 recognizes that in children and adolescents, the mood may be irritable and cranky rather than sad.4 A more chronic form of depression is diagnosed when the mood disturbance continues for at least 2 years in adults but only 1 year in children. Age further defines different subtypes of dysthymia, based on whether the onset is early (before age 21 years) or late (after age 21 years). These differences in age at onset and time course are fairly arbitrary, but they emphasize the importance of age when making a diagnosis.
Of particular relevance in the context of the study is the onset specifier. This specifier was in large part the result of studies conducted by Akiskal,5 who proposed that early-onset dysthymia is a low-grade characterological form of depression that develops gradually, whereas late-life dysthymia is an acute and more severe form of the disorder.
Although the early-onset vs late-onset specifier was not included for major depressive disorder, it has been suggested that a similar distinction should also be made for this disorder.6 Accordingly, early-onset chronic major depression might be a more severe form and associated with greater comorbidities than the late-onset subtype. This would explain why treatments are less effective in early-onset subtype of the disorder and therefore also in children and adolescents.
It is unclear why age appears to distinguish different forms of depressive states. It is quite possible that hormonal changes, and especially the influence of estrogen and testosterone on brain function and development among girls around puberty, might explain some of the results.7 Other possible explanations might be associated with the physical changes that occur during sexual maturity and the associated social conflicts and stress around gender roles.3 Whatever the reason, age (and sex) is a critical factor that needs to be considered for the diagnosis and treatment of depression. It is quite possible that we are dealing with different disorders, depending on the age and sex of the patient.8 Therefore, the same treatment might not be equally effective for all individuals at all ages. This questions the idea that depression is a monolithic entity and supports the call for a paradigm shift toward precision medicine in psychiatry.
Women rate sin stocks as less morally appropriate investment propositions and feel considerably less comfortable investing in controversial (but not conventional) stocks; sex differences are substantial
Niszczota, Paweł, and Michal Bialek. 2020. “Women Oppose Sin Stocks More Than Men Do.” PsyArXiv. March 18. doi:10.31234/osf.io/7a4cq
Abstract: We experimentally test whether men and women differ in their propensity to hold morally controversial (“sin”) stocks. Participants (N = 335) were recruited via Mechanical Turk and rated the moral appropriateness and level of comfort resulting from holding controversial and conventional stocks. Results show that women rate sin stocks as less morally appropriate investment propositions and feel considerably less comfortable investing in controversial (but not conventional) stocks. Sex differences in sin stock tolerance were substantial (d = .60) and remained significant after accounting for differences in investment knowledge and risk tolerance. We propose differences in deontological inclinations in men and women as a likely explanation for the observed effect, and discuss two important outcomes of these differences.
Abstract: We experimentally test whether men and women differ in their propensity to hold morally controversial (“sin”) stocks. Participants (N = 335) were recruited via Mechanical Turk and rated the moral appropriateness and level of comfort resulting from holding controversial and conventional stocks. Results show that women rate sin stocks as less morally appropriate investment propositions and feel considerably less comfortable investing in controversial (but not conventional) stocks. Sex differences in sin stock tolerance were substantial (d = .60) and remained significant after accounting for differences in investment knowledge and risk tolerance. We propose differences in deontological inclinations in men and women as a likely explanation for the observed effect, and discuss two important outcomes of these differences.
Does having children increase environmental concern? Testing parenthood effects with longitudinal data from the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study
Does having children increase environmental concern? Testing parenthood effects with longitudinal data from the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study. Taciano L. Milfont ,Wouter Poortinga,Chris G. Sibley. PLOS , March 18, 2020https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230361
Abstract: Having children is a transformative experience and may change the way people think about the future. Parents invest time, energy and resources to ensure the survival and reproductive success of offspring. Having children may also induce environmental concerns and investments in actions aimed at guaranteeing the quality of natural resources available to offspring. However, there is limited empirical support for this parenthood effect, and little is known about how environmental attitudes and behaviour change over time following the birth of a child. This pre-registered study uses data from the first seven waves (2009–2015) of the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study—a longitudinal national probability study of social attitudes, personality, and health outcomes—with multilevel interrupted time series analysis. Respondents’ belief in the reality and causes of climate change, sacrifices to standard of living to protect the environment, and changes in daily routine to protect the environment did not change significantly following the birth of a child; and nor were there changes in the underlying trends of attitudes or pre-birth anticipation effects. The study further found no gender differences in the attitudinal effects of childbirth. Additional exploratory analyses suggest that becoming a parent for the first time may increase beliefs in the reality of climate change but does not appear to change other environmental attitudes. Overall, our findings provide little empirical evidence for parenthood effects on environmentalism.
Abstract: Having children is a transformative experience and may change the way people think about the future. Parents invest time, energy and resources to ensure the survival and reproductive success of offspring. Having children may also induce environmental concerns and investments in actions aimed at guaranteeing the quality of natural resources available to offspring. However, there is limited empirical support for this parenthood effect, and little is known about how environmental attitudes and behaviour change over time following the birth of a child. This pre-registered study uses data from the first seven waves (2009–2015) of the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study—a longitudinal national probability study of social attitudes, personality, and health outcomes—with multilevel interrupted time series analysis. Respondents’ belief in the reality and causes of climate change, sacrifices to standard of living to protect the environment, and changes in daily routine to protect the environment did not change significantly following the birth of a child; and nor were there changes in the underlying trends of attitudes or pre-birth anticipation effects. The study further found no gender differences in the attitudinal effects of childbirth. Additional exploratory analyses suggest that becoming a parent for the first time may increase beliefs in the reality of climate change but does not appear to change other environmental attitudes. Overall, our findings provide little empirical evidence for parenthood effects on environmentalism.
Discussion
Past correlational research has demonstrated that greater levels of pro-environmental engagement is associated with generativity and legacy concerns [16, 18], and higher levels of future thinking and endorsement of other-focused personal values [20, 21]. Experimental studies have also shown that priming individuals to envision their everyday life in the future [19], or to describe what they want to be remembered for by future generations [18] led to an increase in pro-environmental engagement. One logical extension of these findings showing an effect of other-focus and future-focus on environmental protection is to examine whether becoming a parent would influence one’s pro-environmental engagement. Parental investment in offspring should include considerations of the availability and quality of the natural environmental necessary for the survival and reproductive success of offspring.
Despite the theoretical and intuitive appeal of parenthood effects on environmentalism, a recent longitudinal study testing whether parenthood would increase pro-environmental engagement did not provide empirical support [22]. In the present study, we employed a distinct longitudinal dataset to test the hypothesis over up to six years. Across six dependent variables, we did not observe a single significant attitudinal effect related to the birth of a child. That is, we did not find any change in pro-environmental tendencies from before to after the birth of a child, and there were no changes in the underlying trends in pro-environmental tendencies either. In addition, the study found no gender differences in the attitudinal effects of childbirth. That is, null results in mean-level and slope-level effects were found for both mothers and fathers. Additional exploratory analyses suggest that becoming a parent for the first time may increase beliefs in the reality of climate change, but no effects were found for the other five environmental measures; and these effects for new parents must be interpreted with caution, as they were rendered non-significant when correcting for multiple comparisons.
Our findings provide little empirical evidence for parenthood effects on environmentalism, supporting the findings observed by Thomas and colleagues [22]. Together, analyses of two large, high-quality longitudinal datasets explicitly testing whether having children increase pro-environmental engagement do not seem to confirm intuitive predictions of parenthood effects. However, there are still a number of methodological and theoretical considerations to be kept in mind when interpreting the results.
Testing for parenthood effects as outlined in this paper requires a properly-sized longitudinal dataset of sufficient length. While the NZAVS is a high-quality longitudinal dataset with a large sample size (the sample contains over 23,000 unique individuals and more than 78,000 measurement occasions), there were only a limited number of childbirths, in particular of firstborns (of the 1,522 childbirths, around 400 were firstborns). That may not be sufficient to detect what are most likely modest effects. Another consideration is the age of mothers and fathers. The median age of women giving birth to a child is 30 in New Zealand and range between 13 and 53 [35]. The average age fathers is slightly higher (33 years), and around one in 100 babies has a father aged 50 years or over [36]. The average age of our sample is relatively high (i.e., 43.5 years at the time of Wave 1), meaning that many women in the sample are beyond childbearing age.
In addition, while the dataset included multiple waves of data collection and therefore was able to not only detect sudden mean-level but also more gradual slope-level changes before and after childbirth, the analyses were constricted to a six-year period. It is possible that the effect of parenthood on pro-environmental engagement is delayed over a longer period, and that (even) more measurement points are required to detect effects. Environmental attitudes and behaviour following childbirth may also have a U-shaped pattern. Initially, the impact of childbirth on environmental engagement may be negative because of pressures of looking after a young child, which then is followed by an increase in pro-environmental intentions/behaviour to ensure an environmental legacy is left for offspring. Indeed, Thomas et al. [22] observed detrimental effects of having a new-born child in the frequency of three behaviours (i.e., ‘wear more clothes instead of more heating’, ‘use public transport instead of car’ and ‘carshare with others’) that are harder to perform when parenting efforts takes precedent over other concerns. As discussed by Thomas et al. in relation to other findings [12, 23, 37], the pressing concerns of new parents is to dedicate time, resources and energy for the immediate health and wellbeing of offspring, which should outweigh broader and longer-term concerns regarding environmental sustainability. It is possible that parental investment would start to include environmental considerations once the more immediate pressures of parenthood subside, and more measurement points are needed to capture longer-term patterns than were available in this study. Non-linear and delayed effects associated with having are a distinct possibility, as argued here, and should therefore be tested as part of future research using longitudinal datasets of sufficient length.
Major life events that are planned or at least can be anticipated may produce effects in preparation for the event. Indeed, childbirth has been associated with a number of anticipatory psychological and behavioural effects [24, 26, 27, 38]. Anticipatory effects may bias the findings and can be missed with an insufficient number of pre-event measurements. In this study we modelled anticipatory effects in environmental attitudes and self-reported behavioural changes. Limited evidence was found for pre-birth changes, although there was a small but significant negative effect in reported changes in people’s daily environmental routines. This may indicate that possible negative changes in environmental habits may already be initiated in advance of the birth of a child. These anticipatory effects need to be studied in more detail because they may dampen or mask changes that new parents may make in response to the birth of a child.
Another reason for the absence of parenthood effects in this study may be that they only occur in specific groups. For example, Thomas and colleagues [22] found that parents with already high environmental concern show a small increase in the desire to act more sustainably after the birth of their first child. In the current paper we examined possible moderators, such as gender and parenthood status (i.e., whether participants already had a child or not), but there are other socio-demographic, psychological, and situational factors to consider. It is possible that, for example, socio-economic status and (pre-existing) environmental values may moderate potential parenthood effects. Economic circumstances may prevent new parents from making pro-environmental changes, and effects may be the most pronounced for those who are already concerned about the environment, and climate change in particular. Future research could study this in more detail, although other analytical techniques may be needed to study moderation effects as noted below.
In relation to the previous point, parenthood effects on environmentalism is based on the idea that the birth of a child enhances a parent’s legacy motivation. This is a yet untested assumption, mainly because legacy motivation measures have not been available in longitudinal datasets. Previous research has shown that a motivation to leave a positive legacy can be leveraged to increase engagement with climate change and other environmental problems [18], but it is still unclear whether this is also happening in response to having a child. There has been a call to understand environmentally relevant behaviour from a multilevel perspective to examine individual and contextual factors [39], and we extend this call by employing a multilevel analysis to examine changes over the life course. We believe theorising in the field will benefit from datasets that allows examination of developmental trajectories of environmental attitudes and behaviour and how they change as a result of major life events and transitions.
In this study we used a multilevel interrupted time series approach to study abrupt and more gradual changes before and after childbirth. This design is increasingly used in public health intervention [30] and life transition [24] research, as it allows the explicit modelling of the time-dependent nature of outcomes. Our study illustrates the implementation of this analytical strategy in the environmental domain, and previous studies have also used interrupted time series analysis to evaluate intervention outcomes of “natural experiments” with environmental consequences [40, 41]. As with any analytical technique there are limitations. Life transitions are usually associated with a number of changes, and those who experience a transition may be different from those who do not. Parenthood is usually planned in advance, and previous studies have shown that people without children and parents-to-be differ in socio-economic, social, and psychological characteristics (e.g., in personality see [42, 43]). While we were able to control for anticipation effects and for the socio-demographic variables of gender, age, ethnicity and socio-economic deprivation, biases may still occur due to selection effects. Not all participants may have the same propensity to have a child in a particular period, and this may produce or obscure an effect [43, 44].
Different techniques can be used to control for potential selection effects. A propensity score matching approach [44] can be used to match prospective parents with non-parents that have similar baseline characteristics. Balancing characteristics that determine the propensity to experience a specific event or an intervention has become widespread in life transition research to avoid biased treatment effects [5, 24, 27, 45, 46]. It would be necessary to explore propensity effects with further moderation analyses and to increase confidence in the evidence so far that there are no changes in environmental attitudes and behaviour following childbirth.
In conclusion, we examined whether the birth of a new chid increased climate change beliefs and pro-environmental attitudes and behavioural intentions of parents. Overall, our longitudinal analysis shows no mean-level or rate-change effects in the environmental measures examined, disconfirming predictions of parenthood effect on environmentalism. There were no changes observed in either mothers or fathers, similarly disconfirming gender or ‘parental role’ interpretations of possible parenthood effects [1]. While there was a small effect indicating that becoming a parent for the first time may increase beliefs in the reality of climate change, these effects should be considered preliminary given the exploratory nature of those analyses and the fact this becomes statistically non-significant when correcting for multiple comparison. The study contributes to theoretical and methodological advances in environmental decision-making research but should be expanded upon with further analyses to address uncertainties about the specific temporal pattern of effects and potential selection and anticipation effects in becoming a parent. We hope possible parenthood effects on environmentally relevant variables continue to be explored in future studies.
#TheDress is perceived by some people as black and blue while others perceive it as white and gold. We have previously shown that the first encounter with #TheDress strongly biases its perception
How stable is perception in #TheDress and #TheShoe? Leila Drissi-Daoudi et al. Vision Research, Volume 169, April 2020, Pages 1-5. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.visres.2020.01.007
Abstract: #TheDress is perceived by some people as black and blue while others perceive it as white and gold. We have previously shown that the first encounter with #TheDress strongly biases its perception. This percept remained stable during the experiment, suggesting a role of one-shot learning. #TheShoe is another image that elicits similar bimodal color percepts. Here, we investigated how percepts change over time in both #TheShoe and #TheDress. First, we show that the important role of one-shot learning, which we found for #TheDress extends to #TheShoe. Similarly to our previous results with the dress, hiding large parts of the image with occluders biased the percept of the shoe. The percept did not change for the majority of observers when the occluders were removed. Second, we investigated if and how percepts switch over a time course of 14 days. We found that although some observers experienced percept switches, the percept was largely stable for most observers.
Keywords: #TheDress#TheShoeContextual processingOne-shot learningPerceptual dynamics
Abstract: #TheDress is perceived by some people as black and blue while others perceive it as white and gold. We have previously shown that the first encounter with #TheDress strongly biases its perception. This percept remained stable during the experiment, suggesting a role of one-shot learning. #TheShoe is another image that elicits similar bimodal color percepts. Here, we investigated how percepts change over time in both #TheShoe and #TheDress. First, we show that the important role of one-shot learning, which we found for #TheDress extends to #TheShoe. Similarly to our previous results with the dress, hiding large parts of the image with occluders biased the percept of the shoe. The percept did not change for the majority of observers when the occluders were removed. Second, we investigated if and how percepts switch over a time course of 14 days. We found that although some observers experienced percept switches, the percept was largely stable for most observers.
Keywords: #TheDress#TheShoeContextual processingOne-shot learningPerceptual dynamics
Wednesday, March 18, 2020
Increase in health anxiety in university student samples 1985-2017; the annual percentage of Internet users was not predictive of mean health anxiety
Three decades of increase in health anxiety: Systematic review and meta-analysis of birth cohort changes in university student samples from 1985 to 2017. Amanda Kosic et al.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.janxdis.2020.102208
Highlights
• It is hypothesised that health anxiety has increased over the past decades.
• We reviewed birth cohort health anxiety in university student samples 1985–2017.
• Student mean score on the Illness Attitudes Scales (IAS) increased by 4.61 points
• The annual percentage of Internet users was not predictive of mean health anxiety.
• Findings were robust, at least with regard to undergraduate samples.
Abstract: Health anxiety can be defined as a multifaceted trait that is primarily characterised by a fear of, or preoccupation with, serious illness. Whereas low levels of health anxiety can be helpful, clinically significant levels are associated with personal suffering and substantial societal costs. As general anxiety is probably on the rise, and the Internet has increased access to health-related information, it is commonly speculated that health anxiety has increased over the past decades. We tested this hypothesis based on a systematic review and meta-analysis of birth cohort mean health anxiety in Western university student samples from 1985 to 2017. Sixty-eight studies with 22 413 student participants were included. The primary analysis indicated that the mean score on the Illness Attitudes Scales had increased by 4.61 points (95 % CI: 1.02, 8.20) from 1985 to 2017. The percentage of general population Internet users in the study year of data collection was not predictive of student mean health anxiety. In conclusion, this study corroborates the hypothesis of an increase in health anxiety, at least in the student population, over the past decades. However, this increase could not be linked to the introduction of the Internet.
Keywords: Birth cohortCross-temporal meta-analysisGenerationsHealth anxietyHypochondriasisStudents
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.janxdis.2020.102208
Highlights
• It is hypothesised that health anxiety has increased over the past decades.
• We reviewed birth cohort health anxiety in university student samples 1985–2017.
• Student mean score on the Illness Attitudes Scales (IAS) increased by 4.61 points
• The annual percentage of Internet users was not predictive of mean health anxiety.
• Findings were robust, at least with regard to undergraduate samples.
Abstract: Health anxiety can be defined as a multifaceted trait that is primarily characterised by a fear of, or preoccupation with, serious illness. Whereas low levels of health anxiety can be helpful, clinically significant levels are associated with personal suffering and substantial societal costs. As general anxiety is probably on the rise, and the Internet has increased access to health-related information, it is commonly speculated that health anxiety has increased over the past decades. We tested this hypothesis based on a systematic review and meta-analysis of birth cohort mean health anxiety in Western university student samples from 1985 to 2017. Sixty-eight studies with 22 413 student participants were included. The primary analysis indicated that the mean score on the Illness Attitudes Scales had increased by 4.61 points (95 % CI: 1.02, 8.20) from 1985 to 2017. The percentage of general population Internet users in the study year of data collection was not predictive of student mean health anxiety. In conclusion, this study corroborates the hypothesis of an increase in health anxiety, at least in the student population, over the past decades. However, this increase could not be linked to the introduction of the Internet.
Keywords: Birth cohortCross-temporal meta-analysisGenerationsHealth anxietyHypochondriasisStudents
Outgroup members are not thought to experience all secondary emotions less intensely; rather, they are thought to experience prosocial emotions less intensely but antisocial emotions more intensely
Enock, Florence, Steven Tipper, and Harriet Over. 2020. “No Convincing Evidence That Outgroup Members Are Dehumanised: Revisiting Trait and Emotion Attribution in Intergroup Bias.” PsyArXiv. March 18. doi:10.31234/osf.io/hm82y
Abstract: We challenge the prevalent claim that outgroup members are dehumanised. In study 1, we conducted a systematic content analysis of historical documents from Nazi Germany and showed that, even in these supposedly prototypical cases of extreme dehumanisation, victims are described in ways that only make sense when applied to humans. In studies 2a-c, we test Haslam’s influential dual model of dehumanisation. We show that outgroup members are thought to possess positive human attributes to a lesser extent but negative human attributes to a greater extent. In study 3, we test Leyens’ prominent infrahumanisation model and demonstrate that, contrary to a body of previous work, outgroup members are not thought to experience all secondary emotions less intensely. Rather, they are thought to experience prosocial emotions less intensely but antisocial emotions more intensely. In a final study, we question the hypothesised relationship between dehumanisation and modulation of prosocial behaviour. We demonstrate that describing someone in uniquely human terms can actually reduce prosociality towards them when those terms are antisocial. Taken together, these studies cast doubt on the claim that representing others as ‘less human’ holds explanatory power in the study of intergroup bias.
Abstract: We challenge the prevalent claim that outgroup members are dehumanised. In study 1, we conducted a systematic content analysis of historical documents from Nazi Germany and showed that, even in these supposedly prototypical cases of extreme dehumanisation, victims are described in ways that only make sense when applied to humans. In studies 2a-c, we test Haslam’s influential dual model of dehumanisation. We show that outgroup members are thought to possess positive human attributes to a lesser extent but negative human attributes to a greater extent. In study 3, we test Leyens’ prominent infrahumanisation model and demonstrate that, contrary to a body of previous work, outgroup members are not thought to experience all secondary emotions less intensely. Rather, they are thought to experience prosocial emotions less intensely but antisocial emotions more intensely. In a final study, we question the hypothesised relationship between dehumanisation and modulation of prosocial behaviour. We demonstrate that describing someone in uniquely human terms can actually reduce prosociality towards them when those terms are antisocial. Taken together, these studies cast doubt on the claim that representing others as ‘less human’ holds explanatory power in the study of intergroup bias.
Possible Fiscal Policies for Rare, Unanticipated, and Severe Viral Outbreaks
Possible Fiscal Policies for Rare, Unanticipated, and Severe Viral Outbreaks. Bill Dupor. St Louis Fed, Mar 17 2020. https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/economic-synopses/2020/03/17/possible-fiscal-policies-for-rare-unanticipated-and-severe-viral-outbreaks
Consumer spending in restaurants, travel, leisure, hospitality, and some retail trade sectors is falling because of precautions taken by businesses, households, and governments to reduce the spread of COVID-19. Social distancing and similar actions are reducing demand in some sectors.
The proper fiscal policy response in this situation is not necessarily to try to replace or stimulate that demand, given that the fall in demand is a natural byproduct of the caution.1 Rather, the proper policy response may look different from conventional stabilization policy. This essay asks: What should guide a fiscal authority in conducting macroeconomic policy in the event of a severe viral outbreak?
Below I describe some potential fiscal policies that may be appropriate. Two economic principles and one operational principle motivate these potential recommendations.
First, incentivize behavior to align with recognized public health objectives during the outbreak.
Second, avoid concentrating the individual financial burden of the outbreak or the policy response to the outbreak.
Third, implement these fiscal policies as quickly as possible, subject to some efficiency considerations.
At this point, experts are evaluating a wide range of scenarios for the trajectory of the virus in the United States. Some of these scenarios involve a substantial toll on Americans' health. If coordinated macroeconomic policies could help to slow the rate of transmission—by an amount that would reduce overloading U.S. hospitals and help buy time to find a vaccine—so that some of the negative health effects were reduced, this would be a major return on the federal dollars invested in such a program. The pay-off would be in addition to some of the standard business cycle mitigation that motivates standard fiscal interventions.
I describe a $197.1 billion proposal with the above issues in mind. Because some observers have advocated for tax rebates in response to COVID-19, and these could prove useful, I also add this component as an option. It increases the overall size of the fiscal intervention to nearly $350 billion.2 For comparison, the 2009 Recovery Act had a budget impact of about $815 billion.3
It is well understood that fiscal policy operates with a lag. Parts of a proposal such as the one outlined below might take several weeks to a few months to undergo CBO assessment and budget projections, the federal legislative process, and coordination between state, local, and federal officials to implement those fiscal policies. If the planning process were started now, legislators would have the option to vote for or against federal authorizations depending on whether the policies were deemed necessary up to the moment before a final vote was taken.
Consumer spending in restaurants, travel, leisure, hospitality, and some retail trade sectors is falling because of precautions taken by businesses, households, and governments to reduce the spread of COVID-19. Social distancing and similar actions are reducing demand in some sectors.
The proper fiscal policy response in this situation is not necessarily to try to replace or stimulate that demand, given that the fall in demand is a natural byproduct of the caution.1 Rather, the proper policy response may look different from conventional stabilization policy. This essay asks: What should guide a fiscal authority in conducting macroeconomic policy in the event of a severe viral outbreak?
Below I describe some potential fiscal policies that may be appropriate. Two economic principles and one operational principle motivate these potential recommendations.
First, incentivize behavior to align with recognized public health objectives during the outbreak.
Second, avoid concentrating the individual financial burden of the outbreak or the policy response to the outbreak.
Third, implement these fiscal policies as quickly as possible, subject to some efficiency considerations.
At this point, experts are evaluating a wide range of scenarios for the trajectory of the virus in the United States. Some of these scenarios involve a substantial toll on Americans' health. If coordinated macroeconomic policies could help to slow the rate of transmission—by an amount that would reduce overloading U.S. hospitals and help buy time to find a vaccine—so that some of the negative health effects were reduced, this would be a major return on the federal dollars invested in such a program. The pay-off would be in addition to some of the standard business cycle mitigation that motivates standard fiscal interventions.
I describe a $197.1 billion proposal with the above issues in mind. Because some observers have advocated for tax rebates in response to COVID-19, and these could prove useful, I also add this component as an option. It increases the overall size of the fiscal intervention to nearly $350 billion.2 For comparison, the 2009 Recovery Act had a budget impact of about $815 billion.3
It is well understood that fiscal policy operates with a lag. Parts of a proposal such as the one outlined below might take several weeks to a few months to undergo CBO assessment and budget projections, the federal legislative process, and coordination between state, local, and federal officials to implement those fiscal policies. If the planning process were started now, legislators would have the option to vote for or against federal authorizations depending on whether the policies were deemed necessary up to the moment before a final vote was taken.
Younger adults were self-biased, choosing to work more at higher effort levels for themselves, exerting less force into prosocial work; older people were more willing to put in effort for others
Lockwood, Patricia, Ayat Abdurahman, Anthony Gabay, Daniel Drew, Marin Tamm, Masud Husain, and Matthew A. J. Apps. 2020. “Ageing Increases Prosocial Motivation for Effort.” PsyArXiv. March 18. doi:10.31234/osf.io/8c5ra
Abstract: Social cohesion relies on prosociality in increasingly ageing populations. Helping others requires effort, yet how willing people are to exert effort to benefit ourselves and other people, and whether such behaviours shift across the lifespan, is poorly understood. Using computational modelling we tested the willingness to exert effort into self or other benefitting acts in younger (age 18-36) and older adults (55-84, total n=187). Participants chose whether to work and exert effort, (between 30-70% of maximum grip strength) for rewards (2-10 credits) accrued for themselves or prosocially for another. Younger adults were self-biased, choosing to work more at higher effort levels for themselves, but also superficial, exerting less force into prosocial work. Strikingly, compared to younger adults, older people were more willing to put in effort for others and exerted equal force for self and other. Increased prosociality in older people has important implications for human behaviour and societal structure.
Abstract: Social cohesion relies on prosociality in increasingly ageing populations. Helping others requires effort, yet how willing people are to exert effort to benefit ourselves and other people, and whether such behaviours shift across the lifespan, is poorly understood. Using computational modelling we tested the willingness to exert effort into self or other benefitting acts in younger (age 18-36) and older adults (55-84, total n=187). Participants chose whether to work and exert effort, (between 30-70% of maximum grip strength) for rewards (2-10 credits) accrued for themselves or prosocially for another. Younger adults were self-biased, choosing to work more at higher effort levels for themselves, but also superficial, exerting less force into prosocial work. Strikingly, compared to younger adults, older people were more willing to put in effort for others and exerted equal force for self and other. Increased prosociality in older people has important implications for human behaviour and societal structure.
Adults demonstrating lower personal on-line risk perceptions and higher third-person perceptions of risk than their adolescent counterparts
Asymmetrical third-person effects on the perceptions of online risk and harm among adolescents and adults. Sarah L. Buglass et al. Behaviour & Information Technology, Mar 17 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/0144929X.2020.1742380
ABSTRACT: Although research has identified a range of opportunities, risks, and harms related to online social networking, the public debate on online risks follows a set pattern by which members of older age groups (parents, regulators) hold a picture of members of younger age groups (teenagers, digital natives) at a uniformly high level of risk. Perceptions of online risk, however, are prone to third-person effects in which individuals perceive risks to be more apparent in others than themselves. This study investigated third-person effects across age groups to further our understanding of the set positions found in current public debate. Multivariate analysis was used to compare adolescent and adult users’ personal and third-person perceptions of common psycho-social risks associated with social networking engagement in a sample of 506 UK-based Facebook users (53% male; 13–77 years). Results indicated that rates of exposure to online vulnerabilities were similar for both age groups. However, differences in adult and adolescent perceptions of risk highlighted apparent mismatches between reported exposure to risk and an individual’s perceptions, with adults demonstrating lower personal perceptions and higher third-person perceptions of risk than their adolescent counterparts. The research considers the implications of risk perception on an individual’s online vulnerability.
KEYWORDS: Facebook, risk perception, online vulnerability, third-person effect, adolescent users, online networking
ABSTRACT: Although research has identified a range of opportunities, risks, and harms related to online social networking, the public debate on online risks follows a set pattern by which members of older age groups (parents, regulators) hold a picture of members of younger age groups (teenagers, digital natives) at a uniformly high level of risk. Perceptions of online risk, however, are prone to third-person effects in which individuals perceive risks to be more apparent in others than themselves. This study investigated third-person effects across age groups to further our understanding of the set positions found in current public debate. Multivariate analysis was used to compare adolescent and adult users’ personal and third-person perceptions of common psycho-social risks associated with social networking engagement in a sample of 506 UK-based Facebook users (53% male; 13–77 years). Results indicated that rates of exposure to online vulnerabilities were similar for both age groups. However, differences in adult and adolescent perceptions of risk highlighted apparent mismatches between reported exposure to risk and an individual’s perceptions, with adults demonstrating lower personal perceptions and higher third-person perceptions of risk than their adolescent counterparts. The research considers the implications of risk perception on an individual’s online vulnerability.
KEYWORDS: Facebook, risk perception, online vulnerability, third-person effect, adolescent users, online networking
Women in same-sex couples spend more time together, both alone and in total, than individuals in different-sex arrangements and men in same-sex couples, regardless of parenthood status
Same-Sex Couples’ Shared Time in the United States. Katie R. Genadek, Sarah M. Flood & Joan Garcia Roman. Demography (2020). Mar 17, https://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13524-020-00861-z.
Abstract: This study examines and compares shared time for same-sex and different-sex coresident couples using large, nationally representative data from the 2003–2016 American Time Use Survey (ATUS). We compare the total time that same-sex couples and different-sex couples spend together; for parents, the time they spend together with children; and for both parents and nonparents, the time they spend together with no one else present and the time they spend with others (excluding children). After we control for demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the couples, women in same-sex couples spend more time together, both alone and in total, than individuals in different-sex arrangements and men in same-sex couples, regardless of parenthood status. Women in same-sex relationships also spend a larger percentage of their total available time together than other couples, and the difference in time is not limited to any specific activity.
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In countries with high levels of gender inequality, women often walk faster than men in public places.
Abstract: This study examines and compares shared time for same-sex and different-sex coresident couples using large, nationally representative data from the 2003–2016 American Time Use Survey (ATUS). We compare the total time that same-sex couples and different-sex couples spend together; for parents, the time they spend together with children; and for both parents and nonparents, the time they spend together with no one else present and the time they spend with others (excluding children). After we control for demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the couples, women in same-sex couples spend more time together, both alone and in total, than individuals in different-sex arrangements and men in same-sex couples, regardless of parenthood status. Women in same-sex relationships also spend a larger percentage of their total available time together than other couples, and the difference in time is not limited to any specific activity.
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In countries with high levels of gender inequality, women often walk faster than men in public places.
Tuesday, March 17, 2020
Rolf Degen summarizing: Although people tend to forego larger future rewards in order to gain immediate pleasure, they sometimes willingly cherish the delay
Deliberating trade-offs with the future. Adam Bulley & Daniel L. Schacter. Nature Human Behaviour volume 4, pages238–247(2020), Mar 17. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-020-0834-9
Abstract: Many fundamental choices in life are intertemporal: they involve trade-offs between sooner and later outcomes. In recent years there has been a surge of interest into how people make intertemporal decisions, given that such decisions are ubiquitous in everyday life and central in domains from substance use to climate change action. While it is clear that people make decisions according to rules, intuitions and habits, they also commonly deliberate over their options, thinking through potential outcomes and reflecting on their own preferences. In this Perspective, we bring to bear recent research into the higher-order capacities that underpin deliberation—particularly those that enable people to think about the future (prospection) and their own thinking (metacognition)—to shed light on intertemporal decision-making. We show how a greater appreciation for these mechanisms of deliberation promises to advance our understanding of intertemporal decision-making and unify a wide range of otherwise disparate choice phenomena.
Abstract: Many fundamental choices in life are intertemporal: they involve trade-offs between sooner and later outcomes. In recent years there has been a surge of interest into how people make intertemporal decisions, given that such decisions are ubiquitous in everyday life and central in domains from substance use to climate change action. While it is clear that people make decisions according to rules, intuitions and habits, they also commonly deliberate over their options, thinking through potential outcomes and reflecting on their own preferences. In this Perspective, we bring to bear recent research into the higher-order capacities that underpin deliberation—particularly those that enable people to think about the future (prospection) and their own thinking (metacognition)—to shed light on intertemporal decision-making. We show how a greater appreciation for these mechanisms of deliberation promises to advance our understanding of intertemporal decision-making and unify a wide range of otherwise disparate choice phenomena.
How do teenagers perceive their intelligence? Narcissism, intellect, well-being and gender as correlates of self-assessed intelligence among adolescents
How do teenagers perceive their intelligence? Narcissism, intellect, well-being and gender as correlates of self-assessed intelligence among adolescents. Marcin Zajenkowski. Personality and Individual Differences, March 17 2020, 109978. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.109978
Abstract: Self-assessed intelligence (SAI) and its correlates have been extensively studied in adults. However, our understanding of how younger people perceive intelligence is limited. The current study aimed to fill this gap by investigating how SAI is associated with objective intelligence, gender, personality traits, and well-being in a sample (N = 428) of high-school students. The results revealed that SAI was not correlated with objectively measured intelligence (Raven's test); however, it was associated with other constructs. First, there were gender differences, i.e. boys' self-estimates of their intelligence were higher than that of girls. Furthermore, SAI was strongly related to grandiose narcissism and moderately related to the personality trait intellect. Additionally, high SAI was associated with high levels of well-being. Finally, SAI accounted for the link between narcissism and well-being as well as that between intellect and well-being. The lack of correlation between SAI and IQ score is consistent with previous findings suggesting that the conception of intelligence in adolescence differs from academic definitions of cognitive ability. On the other hand, the strong association between SAI and narcissism suggests that the concept of intelligence might primarily be a manifestation of boldness and a narcissistic attitude in adolescence.
Abstract: Self-assessed intelligence (SAI) and its correlates have been extensively studied in adults. However, our understanding of how younger people perceive intelligence is limited. The current study aimed to fill this gap by investigating how SAI is associated with objective intelligence, gender, personality traits, and well-being in a sample (N = 428) of high-school students. The results revealed that SAI was not correlated with objectively measured intelligence (Raven's test); however, it was associated with other constructs. First, there were gender differences, i.e. boys' self-estimates of their intelligence were higher than that of girls. Furthermore, SAI was strongly related to grandiose narcissism and moderately related to the personality trait intellect. Additionally, high SAI was associated with high levels of well-being. Finally, SAI accounted for the link between narcissism and well-being as well as that between intellect and well-being. The lack of correlation between SAI and IQ score is consistent with previous findings suggesting that the conception of intelligence in adolescence differs from academic definitions of cognitive ability. On the other hand, the strong association between SAI and narcissism suggests that the concept of intelligence might primarily be a manifestation of boldness and a narcissistic attitude in adolescence.
4. Discussion
The
current study examined how self-assessed intelligence is associated
with objective intelligence, gender, personality traits, and well-being
in a group of high-school students. The results indicated that most of
the SAI-related effects observed previously in adults can also be found
in adolescents. However, the most important difference was a lack of
correlation between self-assessed and objectively assessed intelligence,
given that prior meta-analytic investigation has shown these two
constructs to moderately overlap in adult populations (Freund & Kasten, 2012).
Moreover, previous studies have also found a positive relation between
objective cognitive abilities and self-assessed abilities in children
and adolescents (Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2010; Gold & Kuhn, 2017; Spinath et al., 2006).
However, as mentioned above, in these latter studies the participants
were asked to self-rate more narrow abilities rather than general
intelligence. Additionally, the study by Gold and Kuhn (2017)
included a slightly older sample than the one tested here. It should
also be acknowledged that in the present research a non-verbal IQ test
measuring fluid intelligence was used. According to the aforementioned
findings, a mature conception of intelligence as abstract thinking and
problem solving with both verbal and non-verbal material is formed
later, e.g. around college time (Chen et al., 1988; Nicholls et al., 1986).
It is possible then, that our participants' understanding of
intelligence differed from adult conceptions of intelligence.
Consequently, they may not have considered the skills required to
succeed in Raven's test to be key characteristics of intelligence.
Despite
the null correlation with objective intelligence, SAI displayed a
pattern of associations with other variables. Specifically, boys
self-rated their intelligence higher than girls self-rated theirs,
whereas there was no gender difference in objective intelligence. Adult
males similarly self-rate their intelligence higher than females
self-rate theirs, despite negligible gender differences in objective
general intelligence (Szymanowicz & Furnham, 2011). This effect has been described as the “male hubris, female humility” effect (Furnham, 2001).
Specifically, it has been proposed that people view intelligence as
male-normative and that gender differences in perceived intelligence may
stem from the differential socialization of males (encouraged to be
bold) and females (encouraged to be submissive) (Furnham, 2001).
Studies investigating estimations by individuals' family members
support this view. Typically, male family members (grandfathers,
fathers, and brothers) are perceived to have higher general intelligence
than that of their female counterparts (e.g. Furnham & Rawles, 1995). Moreover, parents tend to rate their sons' IQ as being higher than that of their daughters (Furnham & Gasson, 1998; Furnham, Reeves, & Budhani, 2002).
The current results suggest that this effect occurs relatively early
and might already be observed among 16-year olds. However, further
research is required to establish the exact developmental stage at which
gender differences in perceived intelligence are formed. For instance,
in a study by Furnham and Budhani (2002)
involving only a slightly younger sample (mean age 15.40 years,
SD = 0.95) than the one used here, there were no gender differences in
self-assessed general intelligence even though male self-estimations
were higher than females' on more narrow abilities, i.e. spatial and
mathematical ones.
In the present sample, SAI was
associated with two personality traits: narcissism and intellect.
Furthermore, narcissism explained the highest amount of variance in SAI.
This result is in line with recent findings showing narcissism to be
the strongest correlate of SAI among personality traits (Howard & Cogswell, 2018; Zajenkowski et al., 2019). The finding is interesting given that narcissism is essentially unrelated to objective IQ (Zajenkowski et al., 2019). Grandiose narcissism is a trait primarily defined by egocentrism, pronounced feelings of importance and entitlement (Campbell & Foster, 2007). People with high grandiose narcissism desire agentic attributes, such as dominance, sense of control, and social status (Campbell & Foster, 2007).
Because intelligence is a key asset for the attainment of such
attributes, narcissistic individuals are highly concerned with their
intelligence (Zajenkowski et al., 2019). It has been shown that positive self-views in the domain of intelligence help them to maintain positive feelings (Zajenkowski et al., 2019).
Additionally, narcissistic individuals view intelligence as a crucial
factor that influences mainly interpersonal success, i.e. popularity
among peers, social status, and relationship satisfaction (Zajenkowski et al., 2019).
Thus, intelligence appears to be an important resource in gaining other
people's admiration. The current results extend previous findings by
showing that the concept of intelligence is an important building block
of the narcissistic self-concept in young people. Even though the
concept of intelligence is not fully formed in adolescence, it is
already linked with a narcissistic attitude. This finding suggests that
in people's minds the two phenomena, i.e. thinking positively about
one's intelligence and narcissistic grandiosity, go together and that
their coexistence occurs at a relatively early developmental stage.
In
the present study, SAI was also positively associated with the trait
intellect, which is consistent with other research on adults (e.g. Zajenkowski & Matthews, 2019). However, in contrast with previous studies (DeYoung, Quilty, Peterson, & Gray, 2014; Zajenkowski et al., 2019),
intellect was unrelated to objective intelligence. According to DeYoung
and colleagues (2014), intellect is part of a broader trait of
openness/intellect and reflects intellectual engagement with semantic
and abstract information, enjoyment of cognitive activity, and one's
perceived cognitive abilities. Thus, to some extent intellect overlaps
with self-assessed abilities. However, it also contains a more specific
element related to intellectual curiosity. Zajenkowski et al. (2019)
suggested that this element might differentiate narcissism from
intellect in their relations with SAI. This view was supported by the
finding that individuals with high intellect report high motivation and
concentration on IQ tests, whereas highly narcissistic people do not
genuinely engage with demanding cognitive tests (Zajenkowski et al., 2019).
Thus, intellect seems to partially reflect a non-narcissistic attitude
towards SAI that might be linked with cognitive engagement.
Another
important finding of the current study concerns the positive link
between SAI and well-being. The authors of a recent meta-analysis of SAI
correlates have suggested that SAI could be regarded as a specific form
of self-efficacy (Howard & Cogswell, 2018).
Because modern jobs and work success rely on cognitive competence,
intelligence has become a highly valued characteristic in society and
one's self-worth is becoming increasingly dependent on one's
intellectual abilities. This line of reasoning may also be relevant to
the school environment, where the evaluation of cognitive performance is
an essential part of the education system. Thus, SAI appears to play a
central role in modern society and because of that may have an influence
on self-esteem and well-being. Certainly, the present study indicates
that the concept of intelligence is an important source of life
satisfaction among high-school students. Additionally, SAI also
accounted for the associations between narcissism and well-being and
between intellect and well-being. The mechanisms underlying both
findings might be different. Specifically, intellect, high intelligence
might facilitate cognitive engagement and because of that be a source of
pleasant feelings. In case of narcissism, it has been shown that
grandiose narcissists pursue agentic goals such as high social status
and believe that intelligence is a key attribute in attaining such goals
(Zajenkowski et al., 2019).
Therefore, intelligence inflated self-views enable grandiose
narcissists to experience positive feelings. It is possible that high
cognitive ability is linked to the sense of agency and social position
already among adolescent narcissists and because of that, it increases
their well-being. This hypothesis could be further examine by
investigating how narcissistic students are perceived by their peers.
Specifically, it would be interesting to explore whether one's
popularity depends on how other students evaluate his/her intelligence.
The
present study is not free of limitations. First, it used only one
measure of objective intelligence. Future research should therefore
include a wider range of IQ tests capturing other aspects of cognitive
ability (e.g. verbal) to deepen our knowledge of adolescents' insight
into their intelligence. In a similar vein, the measurement of SAI could
be extended to include more narrow abilities. Previous studies on SAI
using a multiple intelligence measures approach have produced
interesting and more nuanced findings on adolescents (Furnham & Budhani, 2002). Finally, the current study had more female than male participants; future samples should be more balanced in terms of gender.
Bilateral neural interactions, excitatory & inhibitory, are present across the motor network during unimanual movements; an increase in task difficulty requires more efficient communication between hemispheres
Are unimanual movements bilateral? Sabrina Chettouf et al. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, Volume 113, June 2020, Pages 39-50, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.03.002
Highlights
• Bilateral neural interactions, excitatory and inhibitory, are present across the motor network during unimanual movements.
• An increase in task difficulty requires more efficient communication between hemispheres.
• Anatomical properties of transcallosal fiber tracts enable essential interhemispheric information exchange.
• Left (pre)motor areas play a key role in complex motor tasks.
Abstract: Motor control is a fundamental challenge for the central nervous system. In this review, we show that unimanual movements involve bi-hemispheric activation patterns that resemble the bilateral neural activation typically observed for bimanual movements. For unimanual movements, the activation patterns in the ipsilateral hemisphere arguably entail processes that serve to suppress interhemispheric cross-talk through transcallosal tracts. Improper suppression may cause involuntary muscle co-activation and as such it comes as no surprise that these processes depend on the motor task. Identifying the detailed contributions of local and global excitatory and inhibitory cortical processes to this suppression calls for integrating findings from various behavioral paradigms and imaging modalities. Doing so systematically highlights that lateralized activity in left (pre)motor cortex modulates with task complexity, independently of the type of task and the end-effector involved. Despite this lateralization, however, our review supports the idea of bi-hemispheric cortical activation being a fundamental mode of upper extremity motor control.
Keywords: UnimanualInterhemisphericMotor cortexMotor coordinationCorpus callosumBilateral activationElectroencephalography (EEG)Magnetoencephalography (MEG)Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)Structural MRI
Highlights
• Bilateral neural interactions, excitatory and inhibitory, are present across the motor network during unimanual movements.
• An increase in task difficulty requires more efficient communication between hemispheres.
• Anatomical properties of transcallosal fiber tracts enable essential interhemispheric information exchange.
• Left (pre)motor areas play a key role in complex motor tasks.
Abstract: Motor control is a fundamental challenge for the central nervous system. In this review, we show that unimanual movements involve bi-hemispheric activation patterns that resemble the bilateral neural activation typically observed for bimanual movements. For unimanual movements, the activation patterns in the ipsilateral hemisphere arguably entail processes that serve to suppress interhemispheric cross-talk through transcallosal tracts. Improper suppression may cause involuntary muscle co-activation and as such it comes as no surprise that these processes depend on the motor task. Identifying the detailed contributions of local and global excitatory and inhibitory cortical processes to this suppression calls for integrating findings from various behavioral paradigms and imaging modalities. Doing so systematically highlights that lateralized activity in left (pre)motor cortex modulates with task complexity, independently of the type of task and the end-effector involved. Despite this lateralization, however, our review supports the idea of bi-hemispheric cortical activation being a fundamental mode of upper extremity motor control.
Keywords: UnimanualInterhemisphericMotor cortexMotor coordinationCorpus callosumBilateral activationElectroencephalography (EEG)Magnetoencephalography (MEG)Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)Structural MRI
4. Discussion
The question whether unimanual movements have a bilateral neural representation comes with quite some history. For many years it has been considered textbook knowledge that movement execution with one hand is characterized by largely – if not entirely – contralateral activation in the brain. This idea dates back to the nineteenth century and is based on early studies on animal brains and/or human pathology using invasive electrical stimulation (Jackson et al., 1870; Schiff, 1859). Gustav Fritsch together with Eduard Hitzig (1870) and, independently, David Ferrier (1873) stimulated the cortex surface of different (anesthetized) mammals and evoked movements in different parts of the contralateral side of the body. These studies allowed researchers to identify ordered motor maps within this contralateral hemisphere, in particular by Clinton Woolsey and Wilder Penfield in non-human mammals and in humans, respectively (Penfield and Boldrey, 1937; Woolsey and Fairman, 1946). In fact, Penfield and Boldrey (1937) identified the human motor homunculus just anterior to central sulcus (M1), i.e. the representation of body parts in brain areas containing an ensemble of neurons that, when activated, result in motor output. Especially in finely controlled limb muscles (fingers, hands, arms, legs), but also in the tongue, are these areas relatively large. These seminal studies were followed by studies on the SMA, where muscle activation on the contralateral side of the body could be evoked through electrical stimulation, much like stimulation of M1 (Woolsey, 1952).
4.1. Crossed and uncrossed fibers
By now, pyramidal tracts are the best-studied efferent pathways of the cortical motor system (Davidoff, 1990; Nyberg‐Hansen and Rinvik, 1963; Woolsey et al., 1972). Most of these tracts are bilaterally symmetrical and the bulk of fibers cross over to the opposite side at the pyramidal decussation – figures vary between about 70%–90% that undergo this crossing but the majority of studies tend towards higher percentages though this depends on the end-effector under study. For example, primates’ hand and finger muscles seem to have more uncrossed fibers (Al Masri, 2011; Hong et al., 2010; Nathan et al., 1990)). The remaining fibers (∼10-30 %) do not cross before they reach the spinal cord (Carson, 2005). The presence of these non-crossing fibers underlies the appealing idea that the ipsilateral hemisphere is involved in movements not only at the contralateral side of the body, but also at the ipsilateral side as extensively outlined here. An example for a possible model including ipsilateral control, i.e. an alternative to the combination of interhemispheric excitation and intrahemispheric inhibition, is shown in Fig. 1, panel A. Interestingly, in a very recent paper Bundy and Leuthardt (2019) discussed the functional role of the ipsilateral hemisphere in motor control. They argued that the descending pathways primarily elicit movements and speculated about how the interaction through the CC may facilitate unimanual movements. And, they concluded that a balance between the excitatory and inhibitory function of interhemispheric interactions is mandatory for proper motor function. Our systematic review confirms these suggestions but also highlights that the story is not that simple. Our reading of the literature has identified three key findings that seem to underlie the hypothesized excitatory and inhibitory bilateral neural interactions, namely (a) the increase in task complexity of the unimanual task under investigation requires more efficient communication between hemispheres, (b) the anatomical properties of transcallosal fiber tracts enable this interhemispheric information exchange, and (c) the left (pre)motor areas play a key role when performing more complex motor tasks, irrespective of whether the left or right hand is being used.
In Fig. 1, we also depict another alternative, namely possible inhibitory cortico-cortical projections from S1 to M1 within a hemisphere (panel C). We added this model because of culminating evidence for synchronized or fine-tuned interactions between the periphery and S1 via feedback afferent pathways (see, e.g., Baker (2007) and references therein). Discussing this and other related animal studies in more detail is, however, beyond the scope of the current review.
4.2. Bilateral interaction
When executing a unimanual movement the human motor network shows consistent bilateral activation. This finding has been confirmed with all neuroimaging modalities reviewed here. It hence seems likely that inhibitory and faciliatory processes are needed to suppress the outflow of activity in the ipsilateral hemisphere to avoid bimanual motor (co-) activation.
TMS studies have revealed both an increase and a decrease in IHI. These conflicting IHI patterns might be explained by differences in experimental settings, especially the type of conditioning stimuli. The intensity of the stimuli could be adjusted to compensate for the increased MEP amplitude induced at the stimulus side because of the unimanual movements (Nelson et al., 2009; Sattler et al., 2012) and may hence yield a reduced IHI. By contrast, when conditioning stimuli are not adjusted to compensate for the stimulus-induced increase in MEP amplitude, IHI may increase (Hinder et al., 2010a, b; Liang et al., 2014; Uehara et al., 2014; Vercauteren et al., 2008). According to Brocke et al. (2008) these inhibitory processes are accompanied by measurable changes in the local neurovascular signal. As we summarized, unimanual movements are associated with BOLD activation in the contralateral and deactivation in the ipsilateral sensorimotor cortices. It has been suggested that this deactivation in the ipsilateral hemisphere could be caused by transcallosal inhibition involving GABAergic interneurons (Matsumura et al., 1992), an idea that might deserve future exploration.
BOLD changes of bilateral premotor areas seem strongly correlated with each other, as well as with the changes in M1 contralateral to the moving hand. This agrees with EEG and MEG assessments that revealed a decrease in both alpha and beta power, and an increase in coherence between bilateral premotor and sensorimotor cortices when performing unimanual movements. This bilateral coupling becomes more pronounced with increasing task complexity. There, symmetry appears broken in that left PM is especially active during both left- and right-hand complex movements. This is particularly interesting in view of the so-called ‘motor dominance theory’ that suggests that the left hemisphere is more capable than the right one to support motor activity; it hence might always be involved in motor execution, be that with the right or the left hand (Callaert et al., 2011; Ziemann and Hallett, 2001).
4.3. Task dependency
The direction and location of both inhibition and facilitation appears to depend on the motor task that is performed. Overall, an experimentally induced increase in task complexity, in particularly an increase in motor timing requirements, seems to be accompanied with more (efficient) communication between hemispheres. For unimanual movements we envision the following scenario when task complexity increases: Inhibition of the ipsilateral hemisphere likely increases, while inhibition of the contralateral hemisphere likely reverses into facilitation when the motor task becomes more challenging. Several research groups forwarded the idea that activation patterns of complex motor control operate at a ‘high level’ (Donoghue and Sanes, 1994; Gerloff et al., 1998a; Hummel et al., 2003; Manganotti et al., 1998; Sadato et al., 1996), but this level remains ill defined. Hummel et al. (2003) suggested that a task-complexity related increase in ipsilateral activation is not caused by motor memory load but by processing increasingly difficult transitions between movements. Interestingly, however, task-dependent activations, both excitatory and inhibitory, are not restricted to bilateral M1s, but are also present in other parts of the motor network, in particular in SMA and PM (Andres and Gerloff, 1999). The role of SMA in the preparation and performance of sequential movements has been demonstrated by, e.g., Gerloff et al. (1997), where stimulation with rTMS over SMA induced errors in motor performance in the more complex sequences. And, the role of left PM has been discussed above.
4.4. Outlook
4.4.1. Multimodal approaches
As highlighted in the Introduction, the CC is the main gateway for interhemispheric communication. A positive correlation was reported between the callosal thickness of the CC and the hand performance of the (right) dominant hand, but not of the (left) non-dominant hand (Kurth et al., 2013; Sehm et al., 2016). According to the aforementioned motor dominance theory one might speculate that this pattern of results will also be observed with left-handed participants. One could then assume that the left hemisphere is more involved in the support of motor activity and that the thickness of the CC is mainly related to the passage from left to right M1.
Stronger structural connectivity (higher FA) is associated with the reduction of unwanted mirror movements. Likewise, age-related atrophy implies weaker structural connectivity yielding stronger functional connectivity and poorer performance (Fling et al., 2012; Langan et al., 2010; Sullivan et al., 2010).
Earlier work investigated whether the CC exerts an inhibitory or excitatory role in the interhemispheric communication and concluded that there is evidence in the literature for both outcomes, although most studies support the excitatory function of the CC in interhemispheric communication (Bloom and Hynd, 2005; Carson, 2005; van der Knaap and van der Ham, 2011). As likewise hypothesized in the introduction, if transcallosal pathways are primarily excitatory and if the motor network shows (almost) symmetric, bilateral activation patterns while moving unimanually, then this indicates some type of intrahemispheric inhibition mediated through intrahemispheric pathways probably involving the premotor areas (Daffertshofer et al., 2005; Stinear and Byblow, 2002).
Combining the findings of multimodal approaches to study unimanual movements may help indeed to better understand how the brain enables the fine-tuned motor coordination that we are capable of. Still, several questions concerning the control of unilateral hand movements remain unanswered. Based on this review, we suggest that future research should investigate the role of the left hemisphere in greater detail, in particular the left PM. There is some evidence that this area plays a key role in the control of unimanual movements, but more research is needed, specifically with both left- and right-handed participants, to confirm this.
Only a few studies linked structural and functional connectivity in one experiment while performing unimanual movements (cf. Supplementary Material S2, Table 5). This is unfortunate because – as we outlined here – unimanual movements are likely to rely on the interhemispheric cross-talk through transcallosal tracts. We do suggest to intensify the research that combines different modalities as this may be key to unravel all the factors involved in unimanual motor control.
4.4.2. Integrating other populations
Our main aim was to specify the determinants and functional role of the often reported, bilateral activation patterns in the cortex during normal unimanual motor control in healthy humans. For this review we only included non-invasive studies, since invasive approaches may alter the normally functioning brain and, by this, the normal control of unimanual behavior. Yet, there is much to learn by combining our finding with the plenitude of studies in non-human primates, let alone studies on impaired motor control as observed in, e.g., stroke patients. For instance, Grefkes and Ward (2014) identified that lesions in M1 can lead to proportional changes in ventral PM activity. In fact, they argued that inactivation of either ipsi- or contralateral M1 or contralateral ventral PM deteriorates hand function recovery post stroke (there experimentally induced macaque monkeys). Interestingly, studies on partly hemiparetic stroke patients revealed unimanual movement of the affected (contralesional) side to display clearly bilateral neural activity. While this may indicate the ‘emergence’ of ipsilateral control to compensate motor impairment post stroke, one has to realize that motor learning of the non-affected side can limit the recovery of the affected one (Boddington and Reynolds, 2017; Dodd et al., 2017), which arguably speaks for a (dis-)balance of interhemispheric excitation versus intrahemispheric inhibition (Grefkes and Ward, 2014; Koch et al., 2016), as advocated here.
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