We judge our own true selves, our authentic and fundamental nature, to be better than that of others

My True Self is Better Than Yours: Comparative Bias in True Self Judgments. Yiyue Zhang, Mark Alicke. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, May 26, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167220919213

Abstract: Researchers have assumed that people judge their own true selves, or their authentic and fundamental nature, to be no better than that of others. This assumption conflicts with self-enhancement perspectives, and with studies on comparative biases in self and social judgment, which assume that people tend to view their characteristics and life prospects more favorably than those of others. The five studies in this article demonstrate that comparative bias operates in self versus other true self comparisons, both with regard to traits (Studies 1–3), and morally relevant behaviors (Studies 4 and 5). Implications for the true and authentic self constructs are discussed.

Keywords: self/identity, self-concept, social comparison, judgment and decision making

Research relying on measures of feelings toward the opposing “Party” vastly overstates levels of partisan animosity in the American public; we need to distinguish between attitudes toward party elites & ordinary partisans

Who Do You Loathe? Feelings toward Politicians vs. Ordinary People in the Opposing Party
Jon Kingzette. Journal of Experimental Political Science, May 26 2020. https://doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2020.9Published

Abstract: Scholars, the media, and ordinary people alike express alarm at the apparent loathing between Democrats and Republicans in the mass public. However, the evidence of such loathing typically comes from survey items that measure attitudes toward the Democratic and Republican Parties, rather than attitudes toward ordinary partisans. Using a nationally representative survey, I find that Democrats and Republicans have substantially more positive feelings toward ordinary people belonging to the opposing party than they do toward politicians in the opposing party and the opposing party itself. These results indicate that research relying on measures of feelings toward the opposing “Party” vastly overstates levels of partisan animosity in the American public and demonstrate the need to distinguish between attitudes toward party elites and ordinary partisans in future research.

The difference between dealmakers & dealbreakers was larger among women (error management theory) & sex differences in responses were dependent on individual differences in psychopathy, sociosexuality, & disgust

Should I stay or should I go: Individual differences in response to romantic dealmakers and dealbreakers. Peter K. Jonason, Kaitlyn P. White, Laith Al-Shawaf. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 164, 1 October 2020, 110120. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.110120

Highlights
• Researched change in romantic interest when learning dealmakers and dealbreakers
• Greater sex difference in dealbreakers than dealmakers
• Dealbreakers caused more change than dealmakers in women, equivalent change in men.
• Sociosexuality and psychopathy associated with less change to dealbreakers
• Mating success and extraversion associated with more change to dealmakers

Abstract: People glean key information about their potential mates during the early phases of courtship. Here (N = 261) we investigated how much learning “dealmaker” (i.e., positive) and “dealbreaker” (i.e., negative) information changed men and women's interest in potential romantic partners. We derived hypotheses from prospect theory and error management theory about loss aversion and how personality traits may enable people's sexual agendas. We found that dealbreakers and dealmakers both influenced participants' level of interest, but this effect was larger for dealbreakers (i.e., prospect theory). We found that the difference between dealmakers and dealbreakers was larger among women (i.e., error management theory) and that sex differences in responses to dealbreakers and dealmakers were fully mediated by individual differences in psychopathy, sociosexuality, and disgust. Our discussion focuses on the utility of an evolutionary framework in studying the early stages of relationship formation.

Keywords: Mate choicePersonalitySex differencesError management theoryLoss aversion

Vegetarians were 3 to 6 times more likely to have vegetarian friends than omnivores were, & 12 times more likely to have romantic partners who were vegetarians than omnivores were

Nezlek, John B., Marzena Cypryanska, and catherine forestell. 2020. “Dietary Similarity of Friends and Lovers: Vegetarianism, Omnivorism, and Personal Relationships.” OSF Preprints. May 25. doi:10.31219/osf.io/vs3z5

Abstract: In a series of studies conducted in the USA and Poland, we found that vegetarianism can serve as a basis for the formation of personal relationships. Consistent with research on the similarity-attraction effect, we found that vegetarians were more likely than omnivores to have friends and lovers who were vegetarians. In study 1, vegetarians reported that their diets were a more important part of their identities than omnivores did. In studies 2, 3, and 4, we found that vegetarians were three to six times more likely to have vegetarian friends than omnivores were. In study 4 we found that vegetarians were twelve times more likely to have romantic partners who were vegetarians than omnivores were. These results suggest that following a vegetarian or an omnivorous diet is an important influence on an individual’s choice of relational partners, possibly because dietary choice is part of an individual’s social identity.

Role of individual differences for development and manifestation of wisdom, approaches to wisdom development and training, & cultural, subcultural, and social-contextual differences

Grossmann, Igor, Nic M. Weststrate, Monika Ardelt, Justin P. Brienza, Mengxi Dong, Michel Ferrari, Marc A. Fournier, et al. 2020. “The Science of Wisdom in a Polarized World: Knowns and Unknowns.” PsyArXiv. May 26. doi:10.1080/1047840X.2020.1750917

Abstract: Interest in wisdom in the cognitive sciences, psychology, and education has been paralleled by conceptual confusions about its nature and assessment. To clarify these issues and promote consensus in the field, wisdom researchers met in Toronto in July of 2019, resolving disputes through discussion. Guided by a survey of scientists who study wisdom-related constructs, we established a common wisdom model, observing that empirical approaches to wisdom converge on the morally-grounded application of metacognition to reasoning and problem-solving. After outlining the function of relevant metacognitive and moral processes, we critically evaluate existing empirical approaches to measurement and offer recommendations for best practices. In the subsequent sections, we use the common wisdom model to selectively review evidence about the role of individual differences for development and manifestation of wisdom, approaches to wisdom development and training, as well as cultural, subcultural, and social-contextual differences. We conclude by discussing wisdom’s conceptual overlap with a host of other constructs and outline unresolved conceptual and methodological challenges.

Character strengths as wisdom in disguise?

The last several decades have not only seen the emergence of the psychometric base to the wisdom construct, but also a proliferation of potentially related constructs. Psychological scientists so far have not considered the conceptual and psychometric relationship of such constructs to wisdom. Below we provide two examples. This list is not exhaustive and questions below may be applied broadly.

Intellectual humility. Several constructs have recently emerged under the umbrella rubric of character strengths and virtues (e.g., Bleidorn & Denissen, 2015; Fleeson, Furr, Jayawickreme, Meindl, & Helzer, 2014; Peterson & Seligman, 2004) , which include a range of characteristics such as courage, gratitude (e.g., DeSteno, Li, Dickens, & Lerner, 2014; McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons, & Larson, 2001) , compassion (Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010) and forgiveness (McCullough, 2000) . Some of these constructs have their roots in the virtue theory and Christian theology, and have become popular within the positive psychology movement (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014) . One character strength that has received a great deal of attention concerns (intellectual) humility (e.g., Leary et al., 2017; Stellar et al., 2018; Van Tongeren, Davis, Hook, & Witvliet, 2019) , defined as the “ability to accurately acknowledge one’s limitations and abilities and (b) an interpersonal stance that is other-oriented rather than self-focused” (Van Tongeren et al., 2019) . Intellectual humility was the focus of Socrates' definition of wisdom and the overlap of this conceptual definition with the common wisdom model is striking, raising the question about the distinctiveness of humility from wisdom, and the discriminant validity of the extant measures. Indeed, several of the most common measures aiming to capture the common wisdom model (Table 1) include intellectual humility as a central facet. Moreover, features of humility and wisdom are listed among the 28 measurable character strengths (Peterson & Seligman, 2004) . Undoubtedly, intellectual humility is an important concept in a time of ever increasing political polarization (Haidt & Lukianoff, 2018; Leary et al., 2017) . The question that remains open concerns its uniqueness beyond the PMC components it shares with the common wisdom model advanced in the present target article. If it is just a facet of the same broader construct, researchers studying humility and wisdom may benefit from insights from respective fields, including concerns with measurement levels and usability of the self-report scales (see Section 3). After all, most humility instruments so far appear to involve abstract self-ratings, even though the process they arguably aim to capture concern is meta-cognitive and thereby is not easily amendable to abstract self-beliefs (Brienza et al., 2018; Grossmann, Dorfman, et al., 2020) . Abstract self-beliefs may be self-deceiving or used for purposes of impression management (Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004; Kihlstrom, Eich, Sandbrand, & Tobias, 2000; T. D. Wilson & Bar-Anan, 2008) , raising questions whether a person claiming that they are “much more humble than you would understand” accurately expresses their humility.

Open-mindedness. A related characteristic that has experienced a resurgence in scientific interest concerns open-mindedness. The construct itself is not new and can be traced to theories by Carl Rogers and others (e.g., Rogers, 1954) . Indeed, the initial intent of the openness factor of the OCEAN model of personality has included open-mindedness (for review, John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008 , esp. Table 4.2). However, whereas openness/open-mindedness in personality research has been conceptually defined as a description of “the breadth, depth, originality, and complexity of an individual’s mental and experiential life” (John et al., 2008) , there appears to be no unified definition of open-mindedness neither as a character strength nor as a thinking disposition. Some scholars define and proceed to measure it as intellectual flexibility and openness to diverse viewpoints in the process of making a decision (Fujita, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 2007; Price, Ottati, Wilson, & Kim, 2015) . Others define it almost identically to the definition of humility above, as “an intellectual quality displayed by someone who recognizes that her belief could be wrong, so her mind is subject to change” (Spiegel, 2012) . And yet others define open-minded thinking as “the disposition to weigh new evidence against a favored belief heavily (or lightly), the disposition to spend a great deal of time (or very little) on a problem before giving up, or the disposition to weigh heavily the opinions of others in forming one's own” (Baron, 1985 , p. 15; also see Stanovich & West, 1997). The conceptual confusion concerning open-mindedness is particularly evident in the puzzling observations that open-minded thinking appears to be positively related to political polarization about climate change (Kahan & Corbin, 2016) : If the definition of open-mindedness involves openness to diverse viewpoints and a potential of one being wrong, one ought to expect less polarization among more open-minded individuals! Similar to the concept of humility, this conceptual confusion raises questions about the meaning of the term, as well as the overlap with the definition of wisdom as a morally-grounded PMC. Researchers on open-mindedness may benefit from the present discussion of the common wisdom model, which may provide a roadmap for conceptual and methodological clarification of the open-mindedness construct, as well.

Overall, bodies of research on character strength and thinking dispositions have not sufficiently clarified the relationship to psychological characteristics of wisdom. Is wisdom one of many virtues linked to creativity, open-mindedness, perspective, and innovation, and distinct from humility, prudence, or justice (Peterson & Seligman, 2004) ? Both the common wisdom model advanced here and the relevant psychometric evidence are inconsistent with this perspective: The common wisdom model involves psychological characteristics of humility, prudence, as well as moral aspirations concerning justice and fairness. An alternative possibility advanced in Aristotelian and Thomistic virtue ethics is that wisdom (or prudence) represents a cardinal meta-virtue allowing one to discern which actions to pursue in concrete circumstances one may be experiencing (e.g., Darnell et al., 2019; Schwartz & Sharpe, 2006) . In relationship to thinking dispositions or character strengths, wisdom may be represented as a tool allowing one to figure out which of the character traits are more relevant in a given situation. This perspective is consistent with the common wisdom framework advanced here, with PMC oriented towards discerning the fit between one’s dispositions, one’s goals, and the features of a given situation. However, this “cardinal virtue” perspective requires measurement of the fit between one’s tendencies and the situational demands across multiple diagnostic situations, to estimate whether PMC indeed allows one to flexibly switch between different behaviors to optimally fit the context of a new situation. No psychometric instruments for the assessment of character strengths (e.g., Fleeson, Furr, Jayawickreme, Meindl, & Helzer, 2014) , thinking dispositions (e.g., Baron, 2019; Perkins, Jay, & Tishman, 1993; Stanovich & West, 2002) or wisdom (Staudinger & Glück, 2011) have so far even attempted to assess relevant characteristics within such “strategy-situation fit” framework.

Toward a psychological and cognitive science of wisdom

Beyond individual differences in character strengths and thinking dispositions, the common wisdom model as morally-grounded PMC also has implications for research on consciousness and artificial intelligence. We review possible connections and a range of unanswered questions below.

Consciousness. Within the body of research on consciousness, some researchers have suggested three different levels of awareness (e.g., Pinard, 1992; Schooler, 2002), including unconscious processes, basic conscious processes, and meta-conscious processes. At the implicit or enacted level of consciousness, experience is embedded in the actions one is experiencing. At the explicit level of consciousness, the person engages in conscious processing of the phenomena. At the third, meta-conscious level, the person deliberately and consciously takes charge of their cognitive functioning (Damasio, 1999; Pinard, 1992; Proust, 2013; Winkielman & Schooler, 2011) -- i.e., one becomes aware of the content of one’s conscious processes in ways that become increasingly transparent. The concept of meta-consciousness shares a great deal in common with the meta-cognitive components central to the empirical conceptualizations of wisdom (see Figure 1). Both require a perspectival appreciation of one’s conscious experience (e.g., experience of the inadequacy of one’s explanations of a given concept). Moreover, theoretical and empirical work on meta-consciousness suggests that the processes triggering meta-consciousness (Winkielman & Schooler, 2011) may be relevant for boosting wisdom as well. At the same time, the lack of moral grounding for the concept of meta-consciousness, compared to its centrality to the common wisdom model, raises the questions about the limits of the conceptual overlap. Is meta-consciousness a necessary, but not sufficient aspect of wisdom? If meta-consciousness is necessary for wisdom, can wisdom ever become habitual or automatic? Are the individuals prone to mind-wandering more or less likely to think wisely? Answers to these questions can help better understand the concept of wisdom from a cognitive science perspective, including the role of implicit, automatic, and physiological processes.

Artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence (AI) research typically aims to develop “rational,” intelligent agents, a quality attributed to devices that adaptively react to the environment and take actions that maximize their chances of successfully achieving their goals (Russell & Norvig, 2016) . Notably, AI is often attributed to those qualities that machine devices have not yet mastered – an observation often described as the Tesler’s Theorem (Hofstadter, 1980 , p. 601) or the AI effect (McCorduck, 2004) . Given the steady AI advances in the domains of speech comprehension, language translations, and human-superior performance on strategic games such as chess or Go, a question arises: Will AI at some point be able to acquire wisdom? The development of “wise” AI systems is of special relevance in the time of ethical debates concerning the use of AI and machine-learning approaches to human-machine interactions, autonomous cars, political advertising, and criminal court decisions. For some time, AI researchers have recognized the hierarchy of Data, Information, Knowledge, and Wisdom (DIKW), in which data represent measurements or symbols, information is the application of data to answer questions, knowledge depends on the context of question and answer, and wisdom depends on values. Indeed, there is a growing recognition that values need to be incorporated into the development of AI (Conn, 2017) . On the surface, advances in AI-based knowledge representation, expert systems, and planning suggest that some aspects of human wisdom may be approximated via the AI. At the same time, the ideal of a goal-oriented, rational agent central to the AI research (Russell & Norvig, 2016) can be idiosyncratic to the common characteristics of a wise person: Under many circumstances, a wise person may choose a socially conscious, reasonable option, rather than preference-maximizing rational option (Rawls, 1971; Toulmin, 2001) . This characterization of a wise person is not idiosyncratic, as it is shared among laypeople across a range of contemporary societies (Grossmann, Eibach, et al., 2020) . Whether AI researchers can go beyond the maxim of goal-oriented optimization and to simulate psychological characteristics of wisdom in the context of ill-defined problems remains an open question. How will AI be able to integrate the influx of multi-model streams of information with moral aspirations as suggested by Asimov’s zeroth law or robotics (1986) ? Without doubt, “wise” AI requires discerning where, when, and to what degree to apply different rules for processing information, but it also requires optimization towards resolution of certain trade-offs (e.g., trade-offs between general and context-specific strategies). Perhaps a first step in testing the viability of a “wise” AI will be contingent on the development of systems capable to effectively simulate PMC common to psychological wisdom in the context of complex, social issues.

Women overestimated the thinness that men prefer in a partner and men overestimated the heaviness and muscularity that women prefer in a partner

Misperceptions of opposite‐sex preferences for thinness and muscularity. Xue Lei  David Perrett. British Journal of Psychology, May 25 2020. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjop.12451

Abstract: Thin and muscular have been characterized as ideals for women and men, respectively. Little research has investigated whether men and women have accurate perceptions of opposite‐sex preferences of thinness and muscularity. Further, no study has explored whether opposite‐sex perceptions of thinness and muscularity preferences differ for short‐term and long‐term relationships. The present study set out to address these questions. We used interactive 3D human models to represent bodies varying in size (body mass index/BMI weight scaled by height) and body composition. University‐aged (18–31) White European heterosexual men and women were asked to choose their own and ideal body shape, the ideal body shape for a short‐ and a long‐term partner, and the body shape they thought the opposite‐sex would most like for short‐ and long‐term partners. Women overestimated the thinness that men prefer in a partner and men overestimated the heaviness and muscularity that women prefer in a partner. These misperceptions were more exaggerated for short‐term relationships than for long‐term relationships. The results illustrate the importance of investigating misperceptions of opposite‐sex preferences and raise the possibility that correcting misperceptions might have utility in reducing body dissatisfaction or eating disorders.

Caveats

It is worth noting that although the BMI and Fat% of the own ideal and preferred partner bodies are within the healthy range, the values may not truly represent realistic human figures. The body models used in the current study were generated through a mobile app. The extent to which the models accurately reflect the body weight and muscularity of real human bodies remains unclear. Compared with previous findings (Stephen & Perera, 2014; Tovée, Reinhardt, Emery, & Cornelissen, 1998), the ideal female body figure found in the current study is heavier in terms of BMI. For example, the associated BMI of the attractive female bodies or faces found in previous studies was as low as 17 (Stephen & Perera, 2014), and the highest was around 20 (Tovée et al. , 1998). The BMI of women’s ideal body figure in the present study is around 21 and this figure is even higher for men’s preference, which is around 22. Clearly, the ideal female body size is higher in the current study than in previous studies. By the same token, the ideal male body size might also be higher compared to previous work. The discrepancy of the most attractive BMI between the current and previous studies might be due to the different stimuli used. The 3D human body models used in the current study might appear thinner than 2D human body’s photographs used in previous studies given the same BMI. In fact, one previous study has found that BMI of the most desirable 3D male faces is higher than that of the 2D male faces (Lei et al. , 2018). Future study comparing the accuracy of perception of weight from 2D and 3D images might provide more understanding.

Previously, studies examining preferences of body size mainly used line drawings or photographs of different individuals; few used controlled interactive photographs or model images. Even though some studies used real individual body images, body composition was not taken into consideration. Future studies exploring the body weight and shape that are attractive in men and women should use realistic photographs of human bodies and control for other body parameters that influence physical attractiveness like waist to hip ratio. Nonetheless, even though the absolute values of BMI and Fat% of the preferred male and female bodies may not truly represent the most attractive figures of men and women in real life, the aim of the present study was to compare preferences between the two sexes. Thus, the accuracy of the representations of human body models should not affect the misperceptions of opposite‐sex preferences found here.

In addition, the current study used body fat percentage rather than muscle mass as the measurement of muscularity (Holzleitner & Perrett, 2016; Sturman, Stephen, Mond, Stevenson, & Brooks, 2017). We note that a low body fat percentage does not necessarily equate to a high muscularity, particularly when BMI is low (e.g. <20). Nevertheless, the results suggest that men’s underestimation of the body fat percentage women desire accompanies the overestimation of heaviness (BMI ~ 27) that men believe women prefer. Hence, it is appropriate to conclude that men overestimate muscularity that women prefer. We hope that future studies will be able to use of muscle mass to measure preferences for male muscularity.

Conclusion

In conclusion, using models of human bodies with various levels of BMI and Fat%, the current study revealed that misperceptions of opposite‐sex preferences exist in young men and women. In particular, women tend to overestimate the thinness of female bodies that men prefer, and men tend to overestimate the muscularity of male bodies that women prefer. Moreover, these misperceptions are more exaggerated for short‐term relationships. Women mistakenly believe that men would like thinner women for short‐term than for long‐term relationships, while men misperceive that women would like more muscular men for short‐term than for long‐term relationships. Future research on body image should evaluate the influence that misperceptions of opposite‐sex preference have on body dissatisfaction and other body image related psychological problems.

Logically incompatible conspiracy beliefs may show a high correlation in subjects

Imhoff, Roland, and Pia Lamberty. 2020. “A Bioweapon or a Hoax? The Link Between Distinct Conspiracy Beliefs About the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak and Pandemic Behavior.” PsyArXiv. April 14. doi:10.31234/osf.io/ye3ma

Abstract: Exploring the association of distinct conspiracy beliefs (COVID-19 is a hoax; SARS-Cov-2 was human-made) with pandemic-related behavior.

General Discussion

We observed similarly problematic correlates of two distinct conspiracy beliefs concerning the coronavirus pandemic. Depending on whether COVID-19 was believed to be a hoax or the SARS-Cov-2 human-made participants indicated less compliance with selfreported infection-reducing containment-related behavior and more engagement in selfreported self-centered prepping behavior targeting not a reduction of the infection rate but personal benefits in the crisis. Although these associations seem relatively straight-forward, it is important to note that previous research has pointed to the danger of conspiracy beliefs but has dedicated less attention to potentially distinct relations of different kinds of conspiracy beliefs. These distinct associations notwithstanding, our results also provide strong support for the general notion that even logically incompatible conspiracy beliefs show a high correlation and are both positively associated with a general mindset of conspiracy mentality.

Adding to the robustness of the findings, another study conducted within the German context (reported in the Supplement) closely replicated this general pattern. This seems noteworthy as another dataset from the German context failed to find strong relations between conspiracy endorsement and hygiene measures (Pummerer & Sassenberg, 2020).


Limitations and further research

As arguably the most important limitation of our research, all findings are crosssectional correlations and thus mute with regard to causality. Although it seems plausible that people adapt their behavior according to how they see and perceive the world, it is also conceivable that people behave in a certain way (for no or other reasons) and adapt their worldview as a justification after the fact. Another clear limitation is that these studies were conducted in a time of rapidly changing world events and thus might not have undergone the amount of planning and detailed pre-registration as generally desirable for any kind of research question (Scheel, 2020). Applying a stricter alpha level (e.g., p = .005; for a discussion see Benjamin et al., 2018) would yield the negative impact of hoax belief on selfreported containment-related behavior in the UK non-significant after including all control variables. Trusting in the readers’ intuition to interpret the results we refrain here from forcing a binary significant- non-significant decision on these data but merely point to the substantially weaker data pattern in the UK compared to the US.

Conditionability of 'voluntary' and 'reflexive-like' behaviors, with special reference to elimination behavior: It seems promising to promote studies on latrine training in cattle

Conditionability of 'voluntary' and 'reflexive-like' behaviors, with special reference to elimination behavior in cattle. Neele Dirksen. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews. May 24 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.05.006

Highlights
• Indiscriminate excretion by cattle is a source of environmental pollution.
• No successful toilet training in cattle yet.
• Various brain centres, the ANS and the SNS are involved in the control of elimination.
• Toilet training of cattle should be possible using operant conditioning techniques.

Abstract: Typically, cattle urinate and defecate with little or no control over time and place. The resulting excreta contributes to a range of adverse effects on the environment and the animals themselves. These adverse effects could be substantially ameliorated if livestock could be toilet trained. Toilet training requires an animal to suppress impending voiding (a reflexive-like behavior), move to a latrine (voluntary behavior) and reinitiate voiding. Here, we review the neurophysiological processes and learning mechanisms regulating toileting. The suppression and initiation of voiding occur primarily via the coordinated activity of smooth and striated anal and urinary sphincter muscles. The autonomic and somatic nervous systems, along with central processes, regulate these muscles. In several mammalian species, voluntary control of the sphincters has been demonstrated using classical and/or operant conditioning. In this review, we demonstrate that the neurophysiological and behavioral regulation of voiding in cattle is likely to be similarly conditionable. The management of excreta deposition in cattle could have major benefits for reducing livestock greenhouse gas emissions and improving animal health/welfare.

Keywords: Neurophysiological control of eliminationtoilet trainingcattleclassical conditioningoperant conditioning

6. Summarizing conclusion and practical outlook

We have described the neurophysiology of voiding reflexes and have shown that there are both voluntary and involuntary responses involved in initiation and control of voiding. Regarding the conditionability of voiding, we have described how operant methodologies are mainly applicable to modifying voluntary behavior and classical methodologies are mainly applicable to changing involuntary behavior although there is potential for these to crossover. Further, we have argued that because many voluntary behaviors need to be trained in successful toileting and because involuntary behavior is also susceptible to operant conditioning, operant conditioning is likely to be the main tool for training latrine use in cattle.

For successful latrine training, animals must learn to recognize the impending need to void (Element a), withhold urination/defecation until reaching the latrine, void (Element b) and then leave the toilet.

It is well known that cattle must learn many tasks in farming systems, and these are often self-taught (or by social learning) or trained with little input from the animal carers. For example, cattle learn autonomously the location of essential resources in the living environment, and how to operate equipment such as automatic feeders, water dispensers and entry to automatic milking systems (Wechsler and Lea, 2007). Furthermore, various studies have shown that it is possible to use operant conditioning to teach cows to move reliably to a certain place after prompting with visual (Kiley-Worthington and Savage, 1978), acoustic (Kiley-Worthington and Savage, 1978; Wredle et al., 2004, 2006) or vibrational signal (Seo et al., 2002) that serve as discriminative stimuli.

Therefore, cattle have a ready propensity to learn to move to specific locations, which is an important element in training latrine use. Cattle appear to be able to learn to associate urination with a specific location (Vaughan et al., 2014a), and another study found that cattle appear to have an awareness of an association between their elimination behavior and rewards (Whistance et al., 2009). These observations mean that the second part of latrine training (voiding in a specific location) should also be achievable. In practical situations, it would be important for an animal to leave the latrine area after voiding. Leaving the toileting area is an operant response, and, therefore, it should be readily trainable, as for movement into the latrine. Although reflexes are often classically conditioned, the results with other species suggest that latrine training with operant conditioning would seem to be more promising. As continence is controlled not only by the detrusor muscle and internal (smooth muscle) urethral sphincter of the urinary bladder (both under involuntary control) but also by the external urogenital sphincter (striated muscles), which is under voluntary control (Arya and Weissbart, 2017), it is likely that operant rather than classical conditioning procedures will be more useful for latrine training. Therefore, it seems promising to promote studies on latrine training in cattle, particularly using operant conditioning methodology.

This review is mainly concerned with the feasibility of latrine training of cattle from a neurophysiological and learning theory point of view. The next obvious steps are to test the ability of cattle to learn the full latrine training process and the potential for practical implementation. To ensure ready applicability of latrine training on farms, ideally, the training should be undertaken with minimal input from the animal caretakers. One possibility would be to link remotely-detected signs of voiding initiation (e.g., changes in tail position), movement toward a latrine and voiding in a latrine with remotely activated reward presentation. A number of technologies could be utilized for such purposes including thermal imaging, machine vision and machine learning which have been used, for example, in the automated detection of parturient and other behaviors in a range of species including cattle (Miller et al. 2020; Wurtz et al., 2019) and for the automated training of rodents (e.g., Poddar et al., 2013).

If feces and urine were voided into latrines, the alleys and cubicles in the barn would much less soiled, which means that the hooves and udder would have reduced exposure to high levels of bacteria on the floor surfaces, thereby contributing to improved animal health (Santman-Berends et al., 2016; Sarjokari et al., 2013). In addition, alleys would no longer need to be cleaned as much, providing labor and cost savings (Brantas, 1968; Chapinal et al., 2013; Somers et al., 2005). Furthermore, the environmental aspect of this approach should not be forgotten. The use of latrines would help to mitigate the emission of greenhouse gases such as N2O and NH3 by making it possible to collect and separate feces and urine (van Dixhoorn et al., 2017).

We have provided solid evidence that toilet training is within the learning capacities of cattle. Our motivation for writing the review is to provide a resource to inspire researchers to explore innovative methods to reduce some of the deleterious effects of cattle farming on climate change and animal health and welfare.

Rolf Degen summarizing... Love is half blind: Long term romantic relationships are cemented by willful ignorance of the the better half's unflattering sides

Murray, Samuel, Ph.D., and Peter Finocchiaro. 2020. “These Confabulations Are Guaranteed to Save Your Marriage! Toward a Teleological Theory of Confabulation.” PsyArXiv. May 25. doi:10.31234/osf.io/huywk

Abstract: Confabulation is typically understood to be dysfunctional. But this understanding neglects the phenomenon's potential benefits. In fact, we think that the benefits of non-clinical confabulation provide a better foundation for a general account of confabulation. In this paper, we start from these benefits to develop a social teleological account of confabulation. Central to our account is the idea that confabulation manifests a kind of willful ignorance. By understanding confabulation in this way, we can provide principled explanations for the difference between clinical and non-clinical cases of confabulation and the extent to which confabulation is rational.

Sanctification and Cheating Among Emerging Adults

Sanctification and Cheating Among Emerging Adults. Paige McAllister, Elena Henderson, Meghan Maddock, Krista Dowdle, Frank D. Fincham & Scott R. Braithwaite. Archives of Sexual Behavior volume 49, pages1177–1188, Mar 16 2020. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-020-01657-3

Abstract: Cheating—a general term for extradyadic romantic or sexual behavior that violates expectations in a committed romantic relationship—is common and leads to a number of poor outcomes. Religion has historically influenced conceptions of romantic relationships, but societal attitudes about religion are in flux as many seek to retain spirituality even as affiliations with formal religion decrease. The present study evaluated a potential predictor of cheating that is more spiritual than formally religious, the “psychospiritual” concept of relationship sanctification (i.e., the idea that one’s relationship itself is sacred). In a sample of college students in committed relationships (N = 716), we found that higher levels of self-reported relationship sanctification were associated with a lower likelihood of both physical and emotional cheating even when accounting for plausible alternate explanations (general religiosity, problematic alcohol use, and trait self-control). This association was mediated via permissive sexual attitudes; specifically, higher levels of sanctification were associated with less permissive sexual attitudes which, in turn, predicted a lower likelihood of emotional and physical cheating.

Long‐term potentiation serves as one of the mechanisms affording learning and memory storage in neuronal circuits

The history of long‐term potentiation as a memory mechanism: Controversies, confirmation, and some lessons to remember. Hans C. Dringenberg. Hippocampus, May 22 2020. https://doi.org/10.1002/hipo.23213

ABSTRACT: The discovery of long‐term potentiation (LTP) provided the first, direct evidence for long‐lasting synaptic plasticity in the living brain. Consequently, LTP was proposed to serve as a mechanism for information storage among neurons, thus providing the basis for the behavioral and psychological phenomena of learning and long‐term memory formation. However, for several decades, the LTP‐memory hypothesis remained highly controversial, with inconsistent and contradictory evidence providing a barrier to its general acceptance. This review summarizes the history of these early debates, challenges, and experimental strategies (successful and unsuccessful) to establish a link between LTP and memory. Together, the empirical evidence, gathered over a period of about four decades, strongly suggests that LTP serves as one of the mechanisms affording learning and memory storage in neuronal circuits. Notably, this body of work also offers some important lessons that apply to the broader fields of behavioral and cognitive neuroscience. As such, the history of LTP as a learning mechanism provides valuable insights to neuroscientists exploring the relations between brain and psychological states.

Investment in stocks led to a more right‐leaning outlook merit & deservingness, personal responsibility, & equality, & a shift to the right on policy questions, driven by decreasing distrust of markets

How Markets Shape Values and Political Preferences: A Field Experiment. Yotam Margalit  Moses Shayo. American Journal of Political Science, May 22 2020. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12517

Abstract: How does engagement with markets affect socioeconomic values and political preferences? A long line of thinkers has debated the nature and direction of such effects, but claims are difficult to assess empirically because market engagement is endogenous. We designed a large field experiment to evaluate the impact of financial markets, which have grown dramatically in recent decades. Participants from a national sample in England received substantial sums they could invest over a 6‐week period. We assigned them into several treatments designed to distinguish between different theoretical channels of influence. Results show that investment in stocks led to a more right‐leaning outlook on issues such as merit and deservingness, personal responsibility, and equality. Subjects also shifted to the right on policy questions. These results appear to be driven by growing familiarity with, and decreasing distrust of markets. The spread of financial markets thus has important and underappreciated political ramifications.

Discussion

Financial markets have an increasing presence in countries throughout the world. From the stock market tickers on the TV screens at the local store, through the ups and downs in people's pension savings, to the torrent of tweets of the current U.S. president about the Dow Jones' performance, more and more people are exposed to financial markets. However, little is known about the political ramifications of this trend. This article presents the first experimental analysis of how mass exposure to financial markets affects social values and preferences over economic policies. We find that engagement with financial markets brings about a rightward shift in values and attitudes. This effect is quite general and, if anything, appears to be stronger among voters on the left. Furthermore, the effect is most pronounced when individuals invest in actual stocks rather than in nonfinancial assets, a pattern consistent with an Exposure Channel. The most likely mechanism underlying these shifts is growing familiarity with and decreasing distrust of markets. This is reflected in growing confidence in people's ability to successfully invest in the market.

These results suggest a rather inconspicuous effect of the growing financial sector on politics, an effect that goes beyond the visible and widely discussed channels of influence, such as large campaign contributions, lobbying activity, or the prominence of Goldman Sachs executives in the U.S. government. By encouraging a pro‐market social and political outlook, markets may engender a self‐sustaining dynamic whereby their growing reach leads to wider support for their further expansion.

Our findings suggest a link between growing trust in financial markets and more right‐leaning socioeconomic values. A pertinent question is whether the opposite effects also hold true. Put differently, would growing distrust in financial (or other) markets lead to a leftward shift? Exploiting instances when markets were tainted by scandals (e.g., Barclays' Libor manipulation, Enron, Madoff), future research may be able to isolate the effect of trust in markets on socioeconomic preferences.

This is a first attempt at evaluating experimentally the impact of exposure to investing in the stock market on social values. The volatility of the market during the experimental treatment was higher than average because of the Brexit. While of course both treatment and control groups experienced the same external conditions, it is an open question whether lower market volatility would have produced weaker or stronger effects. Assuming that greater market uncertainty tends to decrease trust in markets, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the results we report underestimate the magnitude of the general effect. Future replications of this type of study will help shed light on this conjecture.

The interpretation and policy implications of our results depend, to some extent, on one's ideological dispositions. Some might find it troubling, for example, that engagement in financial markets decreases participants' appreciation of the need for a social safety net and for regulation of markets. Others, however, may applaud the effect of market participation on the way people think about personal responsibility for individual choices and achievements. Some may also celebrate the reduced support for market regulation. Similarly, people may disagree in how they interpret the finding that exposure to investment activity generates confidence (or, perhaps, overconfidence) in financial markets as a savings vehicle for the masses, including for people's pensions.

This latter point speaks to a growing policy trend of governments encouraging citizens to invest in the stock market via subsidies and tax breaks. The United States, for example, seeks to encourage savings by allowing tax‐deferred retirement funds for those making investments in Roth IRAs. In 2017, the Israeli government replaced some of the traditional child‐rearing assistance funds with a savings plan for every child. Rather than receiving cash, parents receive funds that they can invest in various savings vehicles, such as mutual funds. To date, these policies were assessed and debated with respect to their economic effects. Our findings suggest that such policies may also have meaningful political repercussions.

Suicide terrorists may have been subject to over-theorization: Countries with higher share of deaths from suicide displayed higher incidences of suicide attacks but similar incidences of non- suicide ones

Varaine, Simon. 2020. “The Statistical Logic of Suicide Terrorism.” PsyArXiv. May 22. doi:10.31234/osf.io/sgfje

Abstract: The self-sacrifice of suicide terrorists is subject to sophisticated models of altruistic sacrifice. Yet, a simpler account is that it reflects common suicidal tendencies. This paper offers new micro and macro evidence supportive of this hypothesis. Study 1 compared a sample of suicide and non-suicide terrorists in the United States from 1948 to 2017. Results indicated that suicide terrorists were more likely to display various established suicidal risk factors including history of child abuse, absent parent/s and relationship troubles. Study 2 took advantage of the cross-national variations in suicidal tendencies to explain the incidence of suicide and non-suicide terrorist attacks worldwide from 1991 to 2014. Results revealed that countries with higher share of deaths from suicide displayed higher incidences of suicide attacks but similar incidences of non- suicide attacks. The decision of some terrorists to sacrifice their life may well have been subject to over-theorization.

Demonstrate Values: Behavioral Displays of Moral Outrage as a Cue to Long-term Mate Potential

Brown, Mitch, Lucas A. Keefer, Donald F. Sacco, and Faith L. Brown. 2020. “Demonstrate Values: Behavioral Displays of Moral Outrage as a Cue to Long-term Mate Potential.” PsyArXiv. May 22. doi:10.31234/osf.io/qc8sk

Abstract: Recent findings suggest that moral outrage serves an interpersonal function of signaling trustworthiness to others and such perceptions play a uniquely important role in identifying social opportunities. We conducted four studies investigating how behavioral displays of moral outrage are perceived in the specific context of mating. Results indicated participants (particularly women) found prospective mates espousing outrage more desirable for long-term mating (Study 1), and this perception of desirability was similarly inferred among same-sex raters (Study 2). We further replicated findings in Study 1, while additionally considering the basis of women’s attraction toward outraged behavior through candidate mediators (Studies 3 and 4). Although we found consistent evidence for the long-term desirability of outraged behavior, in addition, to trustworthiness, evidence remained mixed on the extent to which evaluations of a prospective mate’s outrage was the basis of effects. We frame results from complementary perspectives of trust signaling and sexual strategies theory.

Statistical occurrence of words about body parts in very different languages, nearly 4 billion native speakers: The body as extracted from language resembles the distorted human-like sensory homunculus

Guenther, Fritz, and Luca Rinaldi. 2020. “Cortical Maps Recovered from Language Statistics.” PsyArXiv. May 22. doi:10.31234/osf.io/eugfs

Abstract: Large-scale linguistic data is nowadays available in abundance. Here, we demonstrate that the surface-level statistical structure of language alone opens a window into how our brain represents the world. To this end, we examine the statistical occurrence of words referring to body parts in very different languages, covering nearly 4 billions of native speakers. Our findings indicate that the human body as extracted from language resembles the distorted human-like figure known as the sensory homunculus, whose form depicts the amount of cortical area dedicated to somatosensory functions of each body part. This links the way conceptual knowledge is represented and communicated in language to how the brain processes information from the sensory systems.

In Marx’s time, many competing sociological traditions and socialist political movements espoused similar ideas from different origin points; how did Marx emerge as preeminent?

Magness, Phillip and Makovi, Michael, The Mainstreaming of Marx: Measuring the Effect of the Russian Revolution on Karl Marx’s Influence (April 17, 2020). SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3578840

Abstract: Today, Karl Marx is considered one of the preeminent social scientists of the last two centuries, and ranks among the most frequently assigned authors in university syllabi. However in Marx’s time, many competing sociological traditions and socialist political movements espoused similar ideas from different origin points. How did Marx emerge as preeminent? We hypothesize that the 1917 Russian Revolution is responsible for elevating Marx’s fame and intellectual following above his contemporary competitors. Using the synthetic control method and Google Ngram data, we construct a synthetic counterfactual for Marx’s citation patterns. This allows us to predict how often Marx would have been cited if the Russian Revolution had not happened. We find a significant treatment effect, meaning that Marx’s intellectual influence may be partly due to political accidents.

Keywords: Marx, Russian Revolution, Russian Civil War, socialism, synthetic control
JEL Classification: B14, B24, B31, B51, Z10

Our analysis suggests that an important part of the dissemination of fake news takes place through mainstream news media

Causes and consequences of mainstream media dissemination of fake news: literature review and synthesis. Yariv Tsfati et al. Annals of the International Communication Association, Volume 44, 2020 - Issue 2, May 19 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/23808985.2020.1759443

ABSTRACT: Research indicates that the reach of fake news websites is limited to small parts of the population. On the other hand, data demonstrate that large proportions of the public know about notable fake news stories and believe them. These findings imply the possibility that most people hear about fake news stories not from fake news websites but through their coverage in mainstream news outlets. Thus far, only limited attention has been directed to the role of mainstream media in the dissemination of disinformation. To remedy this, this article synthesizes the literature pertaining to understand the role mainstream media play in the dissemination of fake news, the reasons for such coverage and its influences on the audience.

KEYWORDS: Fake news, disinformation, fact checking

4. Implications: audience processing of news coverage of fake news

Thus far, our analysis suggests that an important part of the dissemination of fake news takes place through mainstream news media, and that journalistic role perceptions, news values, social validation, and the fact that news media institutions have the infrastructure both for the detection and for the correction of fake news stories are reasons why mainstream news media pay attention to fake news. In this section we will address the third research question, namely, what are the potential influences of mainstream news coverage of fake news on their audiences?

Important to remember is that for the most part, when mainstream media cover fake news stories, they do so with an explicit intention to correct the false information. Are journalists successful in their attempts to set the record straight? Is it possible that parts of the audience retain the wrong information despite the fact that news media had covered it as fake news? While no empirical research to date has examined precisely how people respond to media reports about fake news, quite a bit of research in psychology and adjacent areas has addressed the question of misinformation correction. While this research relates to misinformation in general (without distinguishing between misinformation and disinformation3) and the current article relates to a specific type of disinformation, we argue that it is possible to import the findings to the context of mainstream news correction of fake news. First, because the studies we cite below were mostly experimental and used invented scenarios and (dis)information. Second, because in the psychological studies on misinformation correction, participants were typically not presented with information regarding the motivation of the disseminator of the information, not knowing whether these disseminators knowingly and intentionally deceived. Similarly, information about the motivation of the disseminator or intentionality is not always available to audiences reading news media reports about fake news outside the lab.

While findings on the effects of the correction of misinformation are not fully consistent (Walter & Murphy, 2018), social psychological research has demonstrated time and again that retractions often fail to completely eliminate the influence of misinformation (Lewandowsky et al., 2012, p. 112). For example, a recent meta-analysis aggregating 32 studies (Walter & Tukachinsky, 2019) found evidence for the continued influence of misinformation, meaning that mis- or disinformation continued to shape people’s beliefs in the face of correction (r = -.05, p = .045).The findings suggest that after people are exposed to misinformation, corrective messages cannot fully revert people’s beliefs to baseline.

Theoretically, the empirical observation that exposure to correction does not always result in correct attitudes is argued to be the result of different information processing mechanisms. In order to comprehend a statement, people must at least temporarily accept it as true (Gilbert et al., 1993). From this perspective, believing even false information is part of processing it. The cognitive explanation for this argument states that when we encounter a report that tries to correct wrong information, for example that ‘Hillary Clinton is related to a pedophile ring’ is a wrong report, we first create a mental model that connects the nodes for ‘Hillary Clinton’ and ‘pedophile,’ and this mental model persists, especially in the absence of a complete and coherent alternative mental model. If the fake news item is reported with an explanation of why the fake news might be true or if the disinformation is consistent with an explanation that is already stored in other mental models (e.g. connecting, ‘Hillary Clinton’ with ‘crooked’), the psychological literature on misinformation suggests that eliminating the mental model will be particularly difficult (Anderson et al., 1980).

An extension of this cognitive explanation for the resilience of misinformation to correction is related to retrieval failures due to negation (Lewandowsky et al., 2012, p. 115). According to this explanation, ‘people encode negative memories by creating a positive memory with a negative tag’ (Walter & Tukachinsky, 2019, p. 8). That is, the statement ‘Hillary Clinton is not connected to pedophile ring’ is encoded as ‘Hillary Clinton, pedophile – not.’ The negation tag on the connection (‘not’) can however be forgotten or otherwise lost, especially for audiences suffering from impaired strategic memory or in situations of high cognitive load (Lewandowsky et al., 2012, p. 115). The ramification is that, for example, old people consuming news reports about fake news may retain the false information in spite of its negation (Wilson & Park, 2008), given the higher likelihood of suffering from strategic memory impairments in old age. In addition, if negations are lost in the retrieval process and thus confirm the misinformation, it stands to reason that corrective messages will be more effective if they attempt to debunk misinformation without explicitly negating it.

One advantage of news reports about fake news stories over the more thoroughly studied ‘fact checks’ or ‘adwatches’ is however that for the most part, there is no time lag between the delivery of misinformation and its correction. This is important, as the literature points out that corrections are less effective when time passes between exposure to misinformation and its negation (Walter & Tukachinsky, 2019, p. 15). With some notable exceptions, in which media organizations mistakenly fall prey to the fake news and report it as real news, the false ‘fake news’ information is reported by mainstream media together with a retraction. This explains why only a minority of respondents, around 30% in the U.S. (Frankovic, 2016; regarding Pizzagate) or 20% in Israel (regarding the wife of opposition leader Benny Gantz being a member of a pro-Palestinian group) believed widely reported fake news stories. However, it is also important to mention that only 29% in the U.S., and 22% in Israel, were sure that these are fake news stories. The modal audience response, in both cases, was thus uncertainty. This suggests that despite media refutations, sizeable shares of the audience deduce that there is a chance that the ‘fake’ information might be right. Thus, doubt (instead of an outright rejection) may be the undesirable consequence of mainstream news coverage of fake news.

Despite the advantage of simultaneously receiving the false information with its correction, a major problem with news coverage of fake news is that, in order to report about fake news stories, mainstream journalists have to repeat the false information. This is problematic, as repetition is known to be a major problem in attempts to correct disinformation (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Walter & Tukachinsky, 2019). This can be explained by the ‘mere exposure’-effect (Zajonc, 2001) and the ‘truth effect’ (Dechene et al., 2010), according to which mere exposure and repetition of statements increases the likelihood that statements are perceived as true. One key explanation is that repetition breeds familiarity and people tend to perceive familiar information as correct and trustworthy, given the sense of ease and processing fluency that accompanies familiar information (Schwarz et al., 2007; Dechene et al., 2010). As succinctly argued by Schwarz et al. (2016), ‘when thoughts flow smoothly, people nod along’ (p. 85). Repeating false information, even as part of a retraction or a correction, enhances its familiarity, and thus retractions can backfire. Remarkably, studies have also found that people infer the accuracy and consensus of an opinion from the number of times it has been repeated, even when the repeated expression is associated with only one person (Weaver et al., 2007; see also Dechene et al., 2010).

In addition to increasing the familiarity of wrong information, there are other reasons to believe that some audiences will retain the disinformation despite the fact that news media report about it as ‘fake news.’ Research on the psychology of truth assessment has for example found that people tend to believe not only familiar, but also simple and coherent statements (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). Media refutations of fake news stories may thus be less effective when the fake news story is clear and coherent, and the refutation complicated and detailed. In line with this logic, Walter et al. (2019) found that lexical complexity (calculated using such indicators as noun and verb variation) of fact-checking messages was negatively associated with correction of misinformation. Simply put, the more complex the correction, the less fluent the processing will be, and the less likely it is to be effective.

The literature also suggests that the richness of the incorrect mental model makes it harder to substitute it with a correct model (Walter & Tukachinsky, 2019). For example, a model connecting ‘Hillary’ with ‘pedophile’ and ‘pizzeria’ is richer than the model connecting just ‘Hillary’ and ‘pedophile.’ Creating an alternative mental model will necessitate including a coherent explanation for the pizzeria aspect of the story, which is a more mentally difficult task. Research also points out that simple refutations leave remnants of the misinformation untouched (Cappella et al., 2015). To fully remove the false linkages, more ‘enhanced’ refutations are needed, which engage emotions or offer causal linkages. While some news stories about fake news seem to offer refutations that include narratives that provide a fuller account of the misinformation, such coverage is typically found in magazines and other in-depth genres, that do not reach all the audience of mainstream news media.4

Congruence between the misinformation and audiences’ prior attitudes, beliefs and opinions also shapes audience retention of the misinformation from media reports about fake news, given findings demonstrating that the ability to correct misinformation is attenuated by audience's preexisting beliefs (Walter & Tukachinsky, 2019). Unsurprisingly, audiences who already view Hillary Clinton negatively will be more likely to accept a false story demonstrating her negative behavior, as well as more likely to resist corrective information that highlights her positive actions. These findings can be understood as an extension of the motivated reasoning approach – whereby people can process information either with accuracy goals (i.e. trying to reach the most accurate conclusion) or directional goals (i.e. trying to reach a conclusion that is consistent with their broader worldview; see Kunda, 1990). When it comes to value-laden beliefs and polarizing issues, research suggests that information is processed with directional rather than accuracy goals in mind.

Also important in this context is that news stories reporting about fake news in an attempt to correct misinformation are not necessarily perceived as more credible than the fake news they try to expose or correct. Audience trust in the mainstream media is low in many countries, and in about half of the countries studied in the World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys, it is decreasing (Hanitzsch et al., 2018; For a recent overview of research on media trust, see Strömbäck et al., 2020). Even in societies where media trust is high, such as the Philippines or Japan (Hanitzsch et al., 2018, Table 1), rather large segments of society (25% of adults or more) distrust the media. This is important since research has demonstrated that trusting audiences have a stronger tendency to accept media facts and narratives, compared to audience scoring low on trust in media (Ladd, 2012). In a situation in which news outlets try to refute an ideologically-congruent claim (and label it ‘fake news’), and when the audience member does not trust the media, it is thus possible that the retraction will fail or even backfire among large segments of the public, given that it comes from a non-credible source (the news media).

Compared with liberals and Democrats, conservatives and Republicans express more concern about autonomous vehicles and more support for restrictively regulating autonomous vehicles

The ideological divide in public perceptions of self-driving cars. Yilang Peng. Public Understanding of Science, May 20, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662520917339

Abstract: Applications in artificial intelligence such as self-driving cars may profoundly transform our society, yet emerging technologies are frequently faced with suspicion or even hostility. Meanwhile, public opinions about scientific issues are increasingly polarized along the ideological line. By analyzing a nationally representative panel in the United States, we reveal an emerging ideological divide in public reactions to self-driving cars. Compared with liberals and Democrats, conservatives and Republicans express more concern about autonomous vehicles and more support for restrictively regulating autonomous vehicles. This ideological gap is largely driven by social conservatism. Moreover, both familiarity with driverless vehicles and scientific literacy reduce respondents’ concerns over driverless vehicles and support for regulation policies. Still, the effects of familiarity and scientific literacy are weaker among social conservatives, indicating that people may assimilate new information in a biased manner that promotes their worldviews.

Keywords: political ideology, economic and social conservatism, risk perception, scientific literacy, self-driving cars

Coolidge Effect in Humans: Sex differences in preferences for sexual variety and novelty are a salient sex-specific evolved component of the repertoire of human mating strategies

Experimental Evidence for Sex Differences in Sexual Variety Preferences: Support for the Coolidge Effect in Humans. Susan M. Hughes, Toe Aung, Marissa A. Harrison, Jack N. LaFayette & Gordon G. Gallup Jr.. Archives of Sexual Behavior, May 20 2020. https://rd.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-020-01730-x

Abstract: We examined sex differences in preferences for sexual variety and novelty to determine whether the Coolidge effect plays a role in human sexuality. In two experimental studies that employed different manipulations, we found converging evidence that men showed a greater preference for variety in potential short-term mates than did women. In the first study, men (n = 281) were more likely than women (n = 353) to select a variety of mates when given the opportunity to distribute chances to have sex with different individuals in hypothetical situations. This sex difference was evident regardless of the targets’ attractiveness and age. Further, men found it more appealing if their committed romantic/sexual partners frequently changed their physical appearance, while women reported that they modified their physical appearance more frequently than did men, potentially appealing to male desires for novelty. In the second study, when participants were given a hypothetical dating task using photographs of potential short-term mates, men (n = 40) were more likely than women (n = 56) to select a novel person to date. Collectively, these findings lend support to the idea that sex differences in preferences for sexual variety and novelty are a salient sex-specific evolved component of the repertoire of human mating strategies.