Negativity Bias in Motive Attribution: We once again found that participants expected protagonists to be more likely than they were themselves to pursue courses of action that they considered morally bad

The Worst-Motive Fallacy: A Negativity Bias in Motive Attribution. Joel Walmsley, Cathal O’Madagain. Psychological Science, October 21, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797620954492

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1319146646610022401

Abstract: In this article, we describe a hitherto undocumented fallacy—in the sense of a mistake in reasoning—constituted by a negativity bias in the way that people attribute motives to others. We call this the “worst-motive fallacy,” and we conducted two experiments to investigate it. In Experiment 1 (N = 323), participants expected protagonists in a variety of fictional vignettes to pursue courses of action that satisfy the protagonists’ worst motive, and furthermore, participants significantly expected the protagonist to pursue a worse course of action than they would prefer themselves. Experiment 2 (N = 967) was a preregistered attempted replication of Experiment 1, including a bigger range of vignettes; the first effect was not replicated for the new vignettes tested but was for the original set. Also, we once again found that participants expected protagonists to be more likely than they were themselves to pursue courses of action that they considered morally bad. We discuss the worst-motive fallacy’s relation to other well-known biases as well as its possible evolutionary origins and its ethical (and meta-ethical) consequences.

Keywords: cognitive bias, motives, attribution, meta-ethics, experimental philosophy, moral intuitions, moral judgment, open data, open materials, preregistered

General Discussion

The results of our experiments suggest that the tendency against which Hanlon’s razor warns is, in fact, a real tendency in our judgments of other people’s motives. Across a range of contexts, we found evidence that people were inclined to expect that agents are motivated primarily by the worst of the reasons that they have for a given action and that people expect others to be motivated by worse reasons than they are motivated by themselves. Although we were unable to replicate this effect for a broader range of vignettes than we considered in Experiment 1 (the first four from Experiment 1 plus an additional eight), it was replicated for the original vignettes when these were analyzed separately. Additionally, it is clear that there was a difference in the new vignettes, which could explain this failure: Participants rated the good motives as more extreme than the bad motives in the new vignettes. This difference may have counteracted any tendency to be biased to expect the agent to act primarily on the worse motive. We also found that in all cases, participants expected the agents in the story to be more likely to act on the motives that they found more extreme, as we suspected we might when we set up our study. And finally, the second effect we reported, in which participants expected other people to be more likely to pursue actions that they consider bad than they would prefer to do themselves, was replicated for all of the vignettes in Experiment 2.

The worst-motive fallacy fits naturally within the family of general negativity biases mentioned in the Background section, because it suggests, in effect, that we are also negatively biased in our moral evaluation of other people’s motives. Plausibly, we consider the worst reasons for actions to be the main motives because of our more general tendency to place greater focus on negative stimuli rather than positive, coupled with a more pronounced tendency to evaluate other people’s characters more negatively than we do our own.

We think that the worst-motive fallacy may arise because of the adaptive advantages that are gained from paying more attention to negative rather than positive aspects of other people’s behavior, the wisdom of which is recommended by another common folk aphorism⁵: “Hope for the best but prepare for the worst.” A cognitive bias may be selected for when the errors in which it results are less costly than erring in the opposite direction (Haselton & Nettle, 2006). In general, the evolutionary story goes, it is more advantageous to pay attention to negative aspects of our environment and thereby avoid harm, even if that means failing to notice positive aspects and thereby missing good opportunities. In the context of the worst-motive fallacy, although being overly suspicious of other people’s motives may incur the cost of failing to take up cooperative opportunities, the cost of naively entering cooperative partnerships with malicious actors may be higher. It will therefore be more advantageous to err on the side of falsely believing that other people have bad motives than to risk falsely believing that they have good motives.

Given the evolutionary account proposed here, several follow-up studies using similar methods could be conducted to explore the boundary conditions of the effect we have identified. For example, one might expect to find an in-group/out-group effect that leads to more benign interpretations of other people’s motives when they are relatives or when more is known about the protagonist’s history, prior behavior, or decision-making context. If we are generally predisposed to treat other people with suspicion, then it seems plausible that this would extend to an increased negativity bias when it comes to out-group attribution of motives. Such an effect would likely manifest along depressingly familiar prejudicial lines of gender, race, nationality, class, and so on.

Conclusion

What about those philosophical theories, considered at the outset, that appeal to an agent’s motives in the assessment of the morality of actions? The present study suggests that we should be cautious about appealing to our assessment of other people’s motives to judge the morality of their actions. The negativity bias we have uncovered casts doubt on the practicalities of any meta-ethical theory that recommends that our moral evaluation of other people’s actions should be rooted in our assessment of their motives. Similarly, the robust effect of extremeness (i.e., the fact that people are more likely to attribute a motive when it is further away from morally neutral in either direction) gives us a further reason to be wary. Given two competing motives that we have reason to believe an agent has in mind, it seems we are likely to consider not only the bad motive to be the main motive but also the more morally extreme motive to be the main motive. Although such meta-ethical theories could still be correct that, objectively, actors’ motives play an essential role in the goodness of their actions, they should nonetheless carry a user warning, as it were, that our subjective assessment of those motives may be far less reliable than is generally supposed.

These are matters for future investigation beyond the scope of this article. Our present focus has been to formally identify this unnoticed fallacy and to demonstrate for the first time that there is a tendency for people actually to commit it. Of course, the reader might suspect that our main motive in writing the present article was something else again: to publish in a top-ranking, peer-reviewed journal for the purposes of fame, glory, and career advancement. We suggest, however, that to suppose this would be to commit a fallacy, whose cause is a demonstrably commonplace cognitive bias.

Envy of the Rich Is One Reason That Americans Favor Reducing Income Inequality, Specially Among Republicans

Evans, MDR, and Jonathan Kelley. 2020. “Envy of the Rich Is One Reason That Americans Favor Reducing Income Inequality.” SocArXiv. October 22. doi:10.31235/osf.io/bazvm

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1319134528019968000

Abstract

Research question: Why do some Americans evaluate income inequality as too high whereas others do not? Does envy of the rich (the desire to "chop the top"), matter to these evaluations, even above and beyond other well-known influences? We explore this issue by extending a standard model of social-structural and political influences on inequality aversion/ desire to reduce income inequality to include self-reported income envy (and including perceived self-interest as a control variable).

Key findings: (1) Envy of the rich has a moderately strong relationship with seeing the current income distribution as too unequal: The total effect of envy on inequality aversion is positive and moderately strong. (2) This effect persists unchanged after taking family political and stratification background, demographics, and current social class/stratification position into account. (3) It persists when we also control perceived economic self-interest in inequality reduction. (4) Part of the effect is indirect through political party preference, but the direct effect of envy remains moderately important even when party is taken into account (5) The effect is strong among Republicans, but absent among Democrats.

Data and methods: Data are from the International Social Science Survey Round 20, USA 2016-2017, a representative US national sample (N=1,778 in the main wave and 2496 in two developmental waves). Methods include descriptive statistics; CFA for scale construction; OLS and multilevel regression analysis; and SEM to check causal issues.

Theoretical implications: Attitude towards income inequality, also called inequality aversion or norm on income inequality, is the offspring of many parents; envy is one of the generative influences, in addition to structural and political roots of public opinion and policy-relevant attitudes. Support for redistribution, therefore, encompasses not only a desire for social cohesion through mechanical solidarity based on equality of condition, not only a self-interested desire to reap some of the redistributed riches, not only a fixed political commitment to this goal, but also an envy component, specifically among people on the right of politics.

Reward devaluation theory (RDT) posits that some depressed individuals avoid positivity due to its previous association with adverse or disappointing outcomes

Negative affect interference and fear of happiness are independently associated with depressive symptoms. D. Gage Jordan  Amanda C. Collins  Matthew G. Dunaway  Jenna Kilgore  E. Samuel Winer. Journal of Clinical Psychology, October 20 2020. https://doi.org/10.1002/jclp.23066

Abstract

Objectives: Reward devaluation theory (RDT) posits that some depressed individuals avoid positivity due to its previous association with negative outcomes. Behavioral indicators of avoidance of reward support RDT, but self‐report indicators have yet to be examined discriminantly. Two candidate self‐report measures were examined in relation to depression: negative affect interference (NAI), or the experience of negative affect in response to positivity, and fear of happiness, a fear of prospective happiness.

Method: Participants completed measures assessing NAI, fear of happiness scale, and depression online via Amazon's Mechanical Turk at three time points (N = 375). Multilevel modeling examined the relationship between NAI, fear of happiness, and depressive symptoms longitudinally.

Results: NAI and fear of happiness were both positively associated with depressive symptoms. They both uniquely predicted depressive symptoms when included within the same model.

Conclusions: These findings suggest that different conceptualizations of positivity avoidance are uniquely associated with depressive symptoms.

Fear of Happiness

A phenomenon relevant to negative affect interference that has been studied in relation to depressive symptoms specifically is fear of happiness (Gilbert et al., 2012, 2014; Joshanloo et al., 2013). As noted above, positive emotions, such as safeness, joy, and happiness, may not necessarily be experienced as pleasurable in clinical populations, but rather as frightening (Şar et al., 2019). Positive emotions may be associated with previous, negative experiences and have resulted in disappointment or adverse outcomes, thus the prospect of experiencing happiness itself may result in negative emotions (Joshanloo & Weijers, 2014). The experience of negative emotions may be more intense than positive emotion, which may result in individuals being aversive of positive emotions (Baumeister et al., 2001). Moreover, individuals may have a “taboo” on happiness as they believe that bad things happen when one is happy or that happiness never lasts (Arieti & Bemporad, 1980). The repeated disappointment of positivity and association with previous, negative experiences over time may lead one to be aversive of happiness and therefore have reduced hope. Thus, the diminished levels of hope related to positive experiences may result in one developing or maintaining depressive symptoms (Bloore et al., 2020). In sum, some individuals hold negative views about positive emotions and may thus actively avoid experiencing them due to their association with negativity.

Examining Negative Affect Interference and Fear of Happiness Through the Lens of RDT

The most basic evidence as to why individuals may avoid and devalue positive emotions and happiness comes from meta-analyses of the dot-probe task (Winer & Salem, 2016). As noted briefly above, these meta-analyses demonstrate that depressed individuals discriminantly avoid positive information in comparison to neutral information on the dot-probe task, and that this pattern is the opposite of the approach-related reward biases that individuals without symptoms of psychopathology demonstrate (Pool et al., 2016). The main tenet of RDT posits that individuals avoid positive emotions because they are frightened of, disgusted by, or disturbed by previous experiences where positive expectations such as hopefulness resulted in ultimate disappointment. However, behavioral indicators, such as an attentional bias against positivelyvalenced stimuli, may not capture all features of this specific devaluative process outlined by RDT. As such, the constructs of negative affect interference and fear of happiness are highly relevant to advancing understanding of these phenomenological components of RDT. For example, consider the role negative affect interference may play for someone who is depressed. The depressed individual may attempt to upregulate their positive affect by engaging in physical/sensory pleasures (e.g., walking on the beach). When attempting to engage in such activities, however, this individual may concurrently experience guilt, self-criticalness, or even shame as a result (e.g., “what’s the point of even trying?”). As negative affect interferes with attempts to engage in pleasurable activities, the likelihood of engaging in similar activities in the future diminishes. The negative affect interference construct, then, may provide insight regarding a possible devaluative process associated with depression, in line with the main tenet of RDT; in other words, that positivity comes to serve as a marker for negative feelings. A similar process can take place as one comes to fear happiness. As noted previously, a happiness-averse individual would hold negative views about positivity as a result of prior experiences (e.g., where initial hope or excitement ultimately led to disappointment). In sum, RDT suggests that experiences that are potentially index by negative affect interference and fear of happiness are causing or maintaining symptoms of depression, such as anhedonia. However, these constructs have yet to be evaluated together in a single study. The concepts of negative affect interference and fear of happiness thus are not only related to depressive symptoms, but when viewed through the lens of RDT, would be most likely to evidence avoidance; however, to our knowledge, there is no work that has examined these constructs together and whether they are independently related to depressive symptoms. Therefore, the present study sought to examine whether these potential routes of avoidance of positivity are independently associated with depressive symptoms when entered into the same model. To accomplish this, we assessed these variables at three separate time points spanning the course of approximately nine months, investigating the extent to which these means of restricting positive affect (i.e., fear of happiness and negative affect interference), relate to depressive symptoms in a longitudinal sample. We hypothesized that both negative affect interference and fear of happiness would be significantly associated with depressive symptoms, replicating previous findings (DePierro et al., 2018; Gilbert et al., 2012, 2014). Additionally, as an exploratory analysis, we examined the extent to which fear of happiness and negative affect interference were associated with depressive symptoms when entered as independent variables into a linear mixed (multilevel) model to further evaluate their capacity to predict depressive symptoms independently. Further, given these constructs were measured at various time points, we were also able to examine the trajectories of these variables, determining the extent to which they were stable over the course of the study. 

Lastly, we included the other subscales of the HDIS, positive emotionality (PE) and hedonic deficits (HD), to further assess whether fear of happiness and negative affect interference would discriminate from constructs that are viewed as similar but different in important ways by RDT. More specifically, PE reflects a frequency of experienced positive affect, whereas HD specifically refers to a general inability to experience positive feelings (Frewen, Dean, et al., 2012). Anhedonic experiences likely share a great deal of overlap with fear of happiness and negative affect interference; indeed, fearing a prospective positive event may appear as avolition due to the individual actively avoiding the event. However, understanding the unique predictability of fear of happiness and negative affect interference compared to general anhedonic symptoms could provide evidence that may ultimately inform future treatments or conceptualizations of depression. For example, hallmark treatments for depression have often focused on reducing negative affect and/or assuming the depressed patient suffers from an inability to experience positive affect (Beck & Bredemeier, 2016). Further, current nosology also simply emphasizes a “markedly diminished interest” in activities (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), possibly conflating distinct experiences that can result in this loss of interest (Winer et al., 2019). Understanding the processes associated with fearing and actively avoiding positivity and showing that these experiences are unique from mere reduced positive affect or an inability to experience positivity would allow for a more nuanced understanding of how depressive symptoms develop, as well as possibly inform novel interventions that target these fears or avoidance. Thus, we wished to examine if fear of happiness and NAI would discriminate from PE and HD, which do not index phenomena that are as precisely theoretically relevant to avoidance of positivity as stipulated by RDT. Moreover, we also wished to examine whether the fear of happiness and NAI were similar enough that only one would be predictive of depressive symptoms, or if one or both explained enough unique variance to be independently predictive. 

Women consistently showed higher concerns for Care, Fairness, & Purity in their moral judgements; sex differences in moral judgements were larger in individualist & gender-equal societies with more flexible social norms

Sex differences in moral judgements across 67 countries. Mohammad Atari, Mark H. C. Lai and Morteza Dehghani. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. October 21 2020. https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2020.1201

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1318822286921732101

Abstract: Most of the empirical research on sex differences and cultural variations in morality has relied on within-culture analyses or small-scale cross-cultural data. To further broaden the scientific understanding of sex differences in morality, the current research relies on two international samples to provide the first large-scale examination of sex differences in moral judgements nested within cultures. Using a sample from 67 countries (Study 1; n = 336 691), we found culturally variable sex differences in moral judgements, as conceptualized by Moral Foundations Theory. Women consistently scored higher than men on Care, Fairness, and Purity. By contrast, sex differences in Loyalty and Authority were negligible and highly variable across cultures. Country-level sex differences in moral judgements were also examined in relation to cultural, socioeconomic, and gender-equality indicators revealing that sex differences in moral judgements are larger in individualist, Western, and gender-equal societies. In Study 2 (19 countries; n = 11 969), these results were largely replicated using Bayesian multi-level modelling in a distinct sample. The findings were robust when incorporating cultural non-independence of countries into the models. Specifically, women consistently showed higher concerns for Care, Fairness, and Purity in their moral judgements than did men. Sex differences in moral judgements were larger in individualist and gender-equal societies with more flexible social norms. We discuss the implications of these findings for the ongoing debate about the origin of sex differences and cultural variations in moral judgements as well as theoretical and pragmatic implications for moral and evolutionary psychology.

4. General discussion

Given the pressing need for more conclusive empirical studies of sex differences in moral judgements, we examined women's and men's moral judgements using a high-powered design, and also investigated country-level correlates of sex differences in moral judgements in two consecutive studies. The current research is the first large-scale, cross-cultural investigation to empirically test multivariate sex differences in moral judgements nested within cultures. In Study 1, we examined the role of sex in moral judgements in 67 cultures using a large online sample. Further, in our country-level analysis, we examined the role of country-level cultural, socioeconomic, and gender-related indices in the magnitude of sex differences in moral judgements across cultures. In Study 2, we replicated these findings across 19 countries, by secondary analysis of completely independent data from locally administered, translated versions of the MFQ.

At the broadest level, Study 1 had three major findings: (i) three moral foundations of Care, Fairness, and Purity show systematic sex differences across cultures, with women scoring higher in all three cases, (ii) in more collectivist, non-WEIRD, and male-biased (higher sex ratio) cultures, sex differences in Care become smaller, and (iii) sex differences in Loyalty and Authority are quite variable across cultures. Relying on multivariate sex differences (i.e. Mahalanobis' D and its disattenuated bias-corrected statistic, see [27]) in moral judgements, the present multivariate effect sizes were found to be substantially larger than previously estimated sex differences in moral judgements (e.g. [3,34]) and the median effect size in individual differences research [65]. These multivariate effect sizes of sex differences were substantially larger in individualist and gender-equal countries. Study 2 largely replicated these findings. In particular, (i) women scored reliably higher than men on Care, Fairness, and Purity, (ii) sex differences in Care and Purity were substantially smaller in collectivist and male-biased (higher sex ratio) cultures, and (iii) sex differences in Loyalty and Authority were quite variable across cultures. These replicated findings support the notion that in more egalitarian Western (or Westernized) cultures, women and men tend to diverge in their Care concerns; and that in societies where the number of men for each woman is higher, sex differences in morality (particularly Care) drop substantially [4] which is consistent with the literature on sex ratio and its psychological implications [31]. In these contexts, men are more likely to focus on family values, long-term relationships, parenting, and caring for offspring since opportunities for short-term mating is scarce.

These culturally variable sex differences in moral foundations have implications for the origin of sex differences in psychology and evolutionary human sciences. First, the magnitude of sex differences, operationalized by multivariate (or global) difference effect size [33], was larger than previously thought, typically relying on univariate effect size, Cohen's d [3,66]. Second, these effects are considerably variable across cultural contexts, thus mono-cultural studies in research on sex differences can be misleading. For example, by looking at sex differences in Loyalty in the USA versus China, one would reach opposite conclusions. Third, these findings can be used to empirically compare (and refine) theoretical perspectives on culturally variable sex differences, hence contributing to a cumulative science of psychology of gender. Women's higher emphasis on Care and Purity judgements may be related to their parental care systems and disgust sensitivity, extensively researched in evolutionary psychology [67,68]. However, our findings regarding sex differences in Loyalty and Authority (i.e. negligible in size and highly variable across cultures) indicate that motivations for ingroup loyalty and hierarchical social structures are not substantially different between women and men across cultures. This finding is in line with evolutionary anthropological research examining sex differences in political leadership in small-scale egalitarian societies indicating that sex differences in leadership and coordination of ingroup members are not directly a product of differences in motivation for status and leadership, but an indirect product of sex differences in cooperation strategies, access to schooling, and sexual division of labour [69]. Furthermore, our results demonstrate that women and men value loyalty to their social networks and respecting authorities almost to the same extent; however, ‘social networks’ can mean different things for women and men. It is important to women to invest resources in creating and maintaining supportive social networks in order to protect themselves and their offspring [70]. For men, it can sometimes be attractive to invest their resources in forming coalitions to engage in intergroup aggression, as the spoils of an intergroup victory enhance their mating opportunities substantially [71]. Thus, men might be keener than women to take on leadership roles during intergroup competitions. In the case of Loyalty and Authority (which show large cultural variability in sex differences, from men scoring higher than women, to no difference, to women scoring higher than men), cultural evolution can be the key driving force which accounts for the diversity of cultural norms among populations. Cultural evolution is typically ‘faster’ than biological evolution and can be spread in a population in very few generations. It has been suggested that the legal and political systems that govern societies are themselves outcomes of cultural evolution [72,73], as it has eventuated over human history.

With regard to cultural variation of sex differences based on cultural, socioeconomic, and gender-related variables, the findings suggested that women and men are more different in their moral judgements in gender-egalitarian societies compared with less egalitarian ones. Notably, however, these results cannot be used to infer any causal relationships between gender equality and the magnitude of sex differences since the data are cross-sectional. Even in countries with gender-equal outcomes (high Gender Gap Index), where women and men have equal access to health and education, entrenched gender norms about moral phenomena persist. Moreover, these findings tell us nothing about individuals' experience of gender inequality and their moral judgements [44]. These findings are consistent with evolutionary psychological research on sex differences across cultures. These results, on the other hand, are in contrast with the original predictions of the social role theory [21]. Notably, social role theory has explicitly incorporated cultural evolutionary components into the theory [20], advocating that ‘biological characteristics affect the efficient performance of many activities in society, they underlie central tendencies in the division of labour’. However, this theory's prediction of women and men being more similar in gender-egalitarian societies was not supported here.

Of note, while the present work is not a test of MFT itself, the theoretical limitations of MFT should be noted. MFT's evolutionary roots have been argued to be ad hoc rather than theory-driven. While Graham et al. [7] provide an evolutionary function for each of the foundations, the theory itself has been developed without a clear a priori evolutionary model. The theory of ‘morality-as-cooperation’ [74], for example, argues that morality consists of a collection of biological and cultural solutions to the problems of cooperation recurrent in humans' evolutionary history, proposing seven moral domains (family, group, reciprocity, heroism, deference, fairness, and property) which are considered morally good across cultural contexts [74]. Future research is encouraged to replicate and extend the present findings using modern evolutionary theories of morality using corresponding measures [75]. In addition, MFQ has limitations. MFQ measures a pre-specified set of features that are relevant for moral judgement. More specifically, this questionnaire focuses on abstract judgements about what is part of the moral domain, rather than direct moral decision-making. Another limitation of the present studies is their samples. Study 1's sample is a convenience sample from an online platform and Study 2 is a secondary analysis of different samples coming from a relatively heterogeneous set of countries, collected using different procedures. Hence, future studies are encouraged to replicate these findings using more representative sampling procedures across diverse sets of cultures, including small-scale societies.

A goal scored just before halftime has greater value than other goals provided it is scored by the home team

Are goals scored just before halftime worth more? An old soccer wisdom statistically tested. Henrich R. Greve ,Jo Nesbø,Nils Rudi,Marat Salikhov. PLoS One, October 20, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0240438

Abstract: There is an old soccer wisdom that a goal scored just before halftime has greater value than other goals. Many dismiss this old wisdom as just another myth waiting to be busted. To test which is right we have analysed the final score difference through linear regression and outcome (win, draw, loss) through logistic regression. We use games from many leagues, control for the halftime score, comparing games in which a goal was scored after 1 minute remained of regulation time with games in which it was scored before the 44th minute. Our main finding is that the home team scoring just before halftime influence these outcomes to its advantage, compared with scoring earlier with the same halftime score. We conclude that a goal scored just before halftime has greater value than other goals provided it is scored by the home team. In other words; the wisdom may be old, but it’s still wise.

Discussion and conclusion

This study is a follow-up and correction of three earlier studies that directly or indirectly looked at the empirical value of goals just before half time [1, 13, 14], one of which found evidence that certain timings of previous goals influenced final game outcomes beyond the goal itself [1]. In particular, Baert and Amez’s study [1], the most recently published and the one closest to our study, found weak negative effects for home team goals just before halftime, contrary to the common belief that the goals just before halftime are particularly beneficial. We conducted this analysis again using larger datasets and more familiar teams, as we relied on the top level national leagues, and found the opposite result. Home team goals just before the halftime gave a greater advantage than home team goals at other times, whereas for away team goals the timing had the opposite directional effect—not with statistical significance. These findings are conclusive.

So why is a goal just before halftime more important?

It is not within the scope of this paper to answer that question, but a promising start is to listen to the insiders of the game. It is interesting that all the coaches, players and fans we interviewed emphasized the psychological effect, the mental boost and positive energy that a late goal brought to the locker room during the break—even the interviewees who did not believe in the extra effect of goals just before halftime(!). Does positive energy—however that is defined—and a feeling of having been rewarded, produce better results than the opposite feeling? And if so, why is it better to have a break right after that reward instead of continuing playing? Maybe it isn’t. Maybe any goals give the “mental boost” that the experts we interviewed suggest. The nature of a boost is that it is temporary, so let’s imagine it lasts for the next ten minutes. In that case the boost after an early goal will have evaporated when it’s time for the break, while the same goal scored just before the break will mean that the scoring team—if it can contain all or some of this “boost” during the break—have a relative advantage when the second half starts. Conversely, the team conceding a late goal enters the locker room on a negative note. Does this this negative feeling settle during the halftime break, whereas it would dissipate if they could continue playing? Does it trigger unwise coaching decisions? Our findings suggest that it is problematic for the away team conceding a late goal.

Clearly, the following sequence of events underlies the findings. The goal is scored just before halftime, and the teams enter the locker room without much play following the goal and with a fresh memory of the goal. In the locker room, the team is assembled in a meeting rather than spread out on the pitch as they would be during play, and the coach makes play adjustments and motivates players. The team then re-enters the pitch and starts playing. Somewhere in this sequence of events a home-team advantage is created if it has scored just before the halftime. We view the motivational effect as the most likely source.

Our findings and the sentiment of football players and coaches can be combined to form theoretical implications. There is indeed an emotional impact of performance outcomes, and this impact is processed and stored differently when it is considered during a break and when there is no subsequent break, but rather continued effort without close interaction of team and coach. The gain in motivation for a team that has just received positive feedback through scoring a goal can indeed lead to improved performance and a win through a cognitive confirmation bias or through conservation of emotions [5–8]. This finding is important theoretically because there is yet little work on how such motivational effects linger under some circumstances and dissipate under other circumstances. More research should be conducted to examine this relationship.

There are also implications to related situations in soccer. The players’ and coaches’ emphasis on a mental boost are related to another old soccer wisdom. It is commonly believed that a team is particularly vulnerable to being scored against in the first few minutes after having scored a goal. The underlying reasoning is again the mental boost of the scoring team, which can lead to less cautious play. We are not aware of tests of this effect, but if it were found to be true, it would add to a body of evidence that successes yield confidence and some degree of inadvertent risk taking, for better or for worse.

The finding has applied implications for sports, and more generally for organizations with easily measurable performance outcomes. If the performance in the preceding active period after a success is a trade-off between the mental boost (being offensive, aggressive) and being over-confident (systematically underestimating risk), but a cool-off period (a break) will preserve more of the mental boost than the over-confidence, then it suggests it is tactically wise—in businesses and sports where striking a balance between being aggressive and defensive in decision making is essential—to reward success with breaks. Would rewarding decision making employees’ success with an instant holiday instead of a financial bonus be more beneficial for the company? This counter-intuitive approach (in basketball and handball normally players who have been making poor shot-decisions are given a break, not the “hot hands”) may somewhat cool off the hands of hot-handed decision makers, but—paying more dividend if the above is true—cool down their eagerness to go for too risky shots.

Within the field of management, one of the best-known research streams on this effect documents top management hubris, or belief in own infallibility [21, 22]. Within the field of finance, it is well-documented that prior success in investing leads to over-confidence and increased risk-taking among regular and professional investors [23, 24]. Both of these findings can be connected to research such as ours because they may be instances of decision-makers experiencing the same kind of mental boost as soccer players, either for a short time or for a longer duration. In both management and finance, the economic consequences of the resulting behaviors are significant, as they have been related to significant risk taking and losses in actions such as mergers and acquisitions (of firms) and transactions in financial markets.

One caution is that we cannot determine whether our findings originate in the scoring team or the conceding team. However, success as a temporary mental boost is well-documented in general, so in that respect soccer players are not special. Loss of motivation after disappointments is also a general effect. An interesting feature of the halftime effect that could be applicable broadly is that a break after a confidence-boosting event seems to be beneficial. If this also holds true for other types of work, a counter-intuitive implication is that a recently successful decision maker will do better when forced to have a cooling off period before making more decisions involving risk. Such practices may also be beneficial beyond sports, such as in the management and finance.

More broadly, our findings suggest a need for new research with a different focus than past work. Researchers have learnt much about the effects of failure on the human mind [25, 26], so it is now time for more research on the effects of success.

We found that participants considered it more permissible to harm a few animals to save a greater number of animals than to harm a few humans to save a greater number of humans

Caviola, L., Kahane, G., Everett, J. A. C., Teperman, E., Savulescu, J., & Faber, N. S. (2020). Utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people? Harming animals and humans for the greater good. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. Oct 2020. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000988

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1318580172967284739

Abstract: Most people hold that it is wrong to sacrifice some humans to save a greater number of humans. Do people also think that it is wrong to sacrifice some animals to save a greater number of animals, or do they answer such questions about harm to animals by engaging in a utilitarian cost-benefit calculation? Across 10 studies (N = 4,662), using hypothetical and real-life sacrificial moral dilemmas, we found that participants considered it more permissible to harm a few animals to save a greater number of animals than to harm a few humans to save a greater number of humans. This was explained by a reduced general aversion to harm animals compared with humans, which was partly driven by participants perceiving animals to suffer less and to have lower cognitive capacity than humans. However, the effect persisted even in cases where animals were described as having greater suffering capacity and greater cognitive capacity than some humans, and even when participants felt more socially connected to animals than to humans. The reduced aversion to harming animals was thus also partly due to speciesism—the tendency to ascribe lower moral value to animals due to their species-membership alone. In sum, our studies show that deontological constraints against instrumental harm are not absolute but get weaker the less people morally value the respective entity. These constraints are strongest for humans, followed by dogs, chimpanzees, pigs, and finally inanimate objects.

Partial support for hypothesis that women pursuing short-term relationships would engage in appearance enhancement tactics that increase the attractiveness of their bodies more than their faces, reflecting men's priorities

Cloud, J. M., & Perilloux, C. (2020). The relationship between mating context and women’s appearance enhancement strategies. Evolutionary Behavioral Sciences, Oct 2020. https://doi.org/10.1037/ebs0000242

Abstract: Previous research has indicated that men tend to prioritize facial over bodily attractiveness in long-term mating contexts but shift in the opposite direction in short-term mating contexts. The current study extended this research to test whether women adjust their appearance enhancement practices in ways that reflect men’s relative priorities. In particular, we hypothesized that women pursuing short-term relationships would report engaging in appearance enhancement tactics that increase the attractiveness of their bodies more than their faces, whereas the opposite should be true for women pursuing long-term relationships. Using an act nomination procedure, we identified the most common practices women engage in to enhance the attractiveness of their faces and bodies. From this list, a separate sample of women selected the 10 tactics they considered to be most important to increasing their own physical attractiveness and reported how much time, money, and effort they invest in enhancing the appearance of their faces and bodies. Results partially supported our hypothesis: Women’s inclination toward short-term mating was positively correlated with the percentage of body-related tactics chosen but did not correlate with the amount of time, money, or effort they reported spending on facial or bodily appearance enhancement. These results provide preliminary support for the proposal that women internalize men’s priorities for facial versus bodily attractiveness in different mating contexts, though more work is needed to determine the extent to which this occurs.

Physical pain in certain social situations makes people smile; the distress induced smile, at least for males in informal social situations, is a goal dependent impulsive behaviour that communicates appeasement & non-hostility

The Distress Smile and its Cognitive Antecedents. Aditya Singh & Jaison A. Manjaly. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, Oct 19 2020. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10919-020-00345-z

Rolf Degen's take: https://twitter.com/DegenRolf/status/1318530696080773120

Abstract: This paper investigates the paradoxical finding that physical pain in certain social situations makes people smile. A number of models have been proposed to explain emotional behaviour, and we tested some important predictions they make regarding the mental antecedents and cognitive properties that could characterize such distress smiles, specifically ones that occur in informal and non-serious social situations. We assessed impulsivity and controllability of the smile, its accompanying emotions, dependence on effortful appraisal, communicative functions, and whether it is goal dependent or stimulus driven. To do this we made students receive and induce physical pain to each other on the upper arm, and varied the following conditions in which the pain was administered: social distance between participants, hierarchical relation between the participants, attentional load, and instructions to make no movements. We also assessed the presence of happiness and amusement (or mirth), and whether they were correlated with the distress smiles. We concluded that the distress induced smile, at least for males in informal social situations, is a goal dependent impulsive behaviour that communicates appeasement and non-hostility.

One of Friedrich Hayek’s most important arguments pointed to the epistemic advantages of the price system, which incorporates the information held by numerous, dispersed, uncoordinated people

Sunstein, Cass R., Hayekian Behavioral Economics (October 19, 2020). SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3714750

Abstract: One of Friedrich Hayek’s most important arguments pointed to the epistemic advantages of the price system, which incorporates the information held by numerous, dispersed people. Like John Stuart Mill, Friedrich Hayek also offered an epistemic argument on behalf of freedom of choice. He emphasized that outsiders know much less than choosers do, which means that interferences with personal freedom, by those outsiders, will make choosers worse off. A contemporary challenge to that epistemic argument comes from behavioral economics, which has uncovered an assortment of reasons why choosers err, and also pointed to possible distortions in the price system. But even if those findings are accepted, what should outsiders do? How should they proceed? A neo-Hayekian approach would seek to reduce the knowledge problem by asking not what outsiders want, but what individual choosers actually do under epistemically favorable conditions. In practice, that question can be disciplined by asking five subsidiary questions: (1) What do consistent choosers, unaffected by self-evidently irrelevant factors, end up choosing? (2) What do informed choosers choose? (3) What do active choosers choose? (4) In circumstances in which people are free of behavioral biases, including (say) present bias or unrealistic optimism, what do they choose? (5) What do people choose when their viewscreen is broad, and they do not suffer from limited attention? These kinds of questions can be answered empirically. An ongoing program of research, coming from a diverse assortment of people, explores these questions, and can be seen to be producing a form of Hayekian behavioral economics – Hayekian in the sense that it can claim to be respectful of Hayek’s fundamental concerns. These conclusions are illustrated with reference to the controversy over fuel economy standards, with an acknowledgement that on broadly Hayekian grounds, the best approach might be to inform consumers of potential savings, while using a corrective tax to control externalities.

Men’s concern about failing to meet masculine standards leads them to embrace policies & politicians that signal strength and toughness—or what we term political aggression

Precarious Manhood Predicts Support for Aggressive Policies and Politicians. Sarah H. DiMuccio, Eric D. Knowles. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, October 13, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167220963577

Abstract: Precarious manhood (PM) theory posits that males are expected to actively maintain their reputations as “real men.” We propose that men’s concern about failing to meet masculine standards leads them to embrace policies and politicians that signal strength and toughness—or what we term political aggression. Three correlational studies support this claim. In Study 1, men’s fear of failing to meet masculine expectations predicted their support for aggressive policies (e.g., the death penalty), but not policies lacking aggressive features (e.g., affirmative action). Studies 2 and 3 utilized Google searches to assess the relationship between regional levels of PM and real-world electoral behavior. The use of search terms related to masculine anxieties correlated with Donald Trump’s vote share in the 2016 general election (Study 2) and, confirming preregistered predictions, with Republican candidates’ vote shares in 2018 congressional elections (Study 3). We close by discussing potential sources of variation in PM.

Keywords: precarious manhood, masculinity, aggression, political attitudes, voting

An Alternative Account of Anti-Effeminacy Bias: Reputation Concerns and Lack of Coalitional Value Explain Honor-Oriented Men’s Reluctance to Befriend Feminine Men

An Alternative Account of Anti-Effeminacy Bias: Reputation Concerns and Lack of Coalitional Value Explain Honor-Oriented Men’s Reluctance to Befriend Feminine Men. Pelin Gul, Ayse K. Uskul. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, October 17, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167220963665

Abstract: Anti-effeminacy bias follows a specific pattern with men showing stronger anti-effeminacy bias against male targets than women. Previous explanations focused on men’s higher tendency to stigmatize feminine men as homosexual and motives to maintain a dominant group status. Here, we suggest that certain expressions of anti-effeminacy bias may rather be a manifestation of men’s reputation management motives for coalition formation, and be amplified among high (vs. low) masculine honor-oriented men. In three studies with samples from the United Kingdom and Turkey, we showed that men perceived feminine (vs. masculine) male targets as lower on coalitional value and were more reluctant to befriend them, yet this applied only to high (not low) honor-oriented men. Honor-oriented men’s friendship reluctance was mediated by concern with losing reputation by association with targets lacking coalitional value. These findings extend understanding of anti-effeminacy bias by drawing attention to men’s reputation concerns for coalitional reasons and individual differences.

Keywords: anti-effeminacy bias, friendship, coalitional psychology, masculine honor, reputation concerns

General Discussion

This research examined a novel mechanism through which men express anti-effeminacy bias, focusing on friendship reluctance as a particular expression. Drawing on the CVT (Winegard et al., 2016) and research on reputation management, we hypothesized that a large part of men’s reluctance to befriend feminine (vs. masculine) men is driven by concern with losing reputation by association with targets lacking masculine coalitional value (e.g., toughness, strength, dominance). Moreover, based on the masculine honor as an individual difference perspective (Saucier & McManus, 2014), we proposed this mechanism to be amplified among men who strongly endorse masculine honor ideals, as these are men who are dispositionally sensitive to protecting their own reputation.

Across three studies, using samples from the United Kingdom and Turkey, results provided support for our hypotheses. Study 1 showed that perceiving feminine (vs. masculine) targets as lacking coalitional value in masculine tasks (e.g., strength, toughness, dominance) explained men’s reluctance to befriend them. Studies 2 and 3 extended the coalitional value account by demonstrating that concern with reputation loss by association with feminine targets is another important mechanism through which men express anti-effeminacy bias. Importantly, all three studies showed that these relationships applied more strongly to men who endorsed high (vs. low) levels of masculine honor. Furthermore, Study 1 showed that findings were unique to men’s evaluation of male targets, but did not generalize to female perceivers or female targets, and Study 3 confirmed that feminine male targets were perceived as lacking coalitional value only with regard to tasks that require typically masculine traits and skills, but not those that would require other traits and skills. Finally, we ruled out alternative explanations for our findings by showing that perceived homosexuality did not predict men’s reluctance to befriend feminine targets (all studies), and that our proposed mechanism continued to hold after controlling for participants’ similarity to the targets and social dominance orientation (Studies 2 and 3).

Theoretical Contributions

The present research offers a significant contribution to our understanding of anti-effeminacy bias. The central finding of the present research is that certain expressions of anti-effeminacy bias such as friendship reluctance may be a manifestation of men’s reputation management concerns. Importantly, we found this to be the case only for high honor-oriented men. In contrast, in some cases, low honor-oriented men reported that being seen affiliated with a feminine (vs. masculine) man would even increase their reputation, and reported higher desire to befriend him. Unlike the predominant explanations of anti-effeminacy bias which were not designed to differentiate between individuals (precarious manhood hypothesis, see Bosson et al., 2012; status incongruity hypothesis, see Moss-Racusin et al., 2010), our findings highlight the importance of considering individual differences in dispositions and motives, and caution against treating men as a homogeneous group when examining anti-effeminacy bias.

Our research also contributes to the literature on masculine honor from an individual difference perspective. We showed that, despite the classification of Turkey and the United Kingdom as “honor” and “dignity” cultures, respectively, in both cultures, only high (not low) honor-oriented men’s reputation concern by association with feminine targets manifested as a tendency to avoid befriending them. These results are consistent with Shackelford’s (2005) suggestion that men in all cultures have the psychological mechanisms that promote attending to personal reputations, yet these mechanisms can be differentially activated depending on individuals’ own dispositions as well as the threats and opportunities afforded by particular social situations. Note that, however, our aim was not to test whether activation of reputation concerns and its manifestation as anti-effeminacy bias would generalize to men in all cultures. Such a test would require evidence from a diverse set of cultures.

In addition, our research showed that men who value masculine honor are not limited to protecting their reputation through aggressive and confrontational behaviors as most studies to date have shown (e.g., Barnes et al., 2012; Saucier et al., 2016; Vandello et al., 2008). Here, we have shown that men can also protect their reputation through subtle behaviors such as avoiding friendships with feminine men. Thus, our research directs attention to a different strategy through which men can protect their reputation in the everyday life, and adds to a limited number of studies investigating nonaggressive ways of maintaining reputation by individuals who value masculine honor ideals.

Limitations and Future Research Directions

Limitations of this study included reliance of only self-report measures and the use of scenarios describing hypothetical target persons. Behavioral laboratory measures (e.g., sitting distance, eye contact) would help test whether participants’ behaviors coincide with their self-reported evaluations. Nevertheless, using scenarios enabled us to systematically vary the variable of primary interest—target’s gender expression—and provided important insights from two cultural groups into psychological mechanisms underlying anti-effeminacy bias.

Another limitation is that we used a single conceptualization of anti-effeminacy bias—unwillingness to be friends—which is often considered a voluntary association between people. Future studies may examine whether reputation concerns manifest in biased preferences when interacting with coworkers or kin, as well as other more direct expressions of anti-effeminacy bias such as punishment, exclusion, or derogation.

When assessing participants’ reputation concerns in Study 2, the outgroup members (male strangers) were not described as aggressive rivals who can cause harm to the participants. If these other male strangers were presented as outgroup aggressors, participants’ concern with losing reputation for formidability could become more salient and predict men’s reluctance to befriend feminine men. Thus, future research may find that depending on social situations, self-protection motives could also drive certain expressions of anti-effeminacy bias in addition to motives for coalition formation.

Our findings also have implications for understanding the functional basis of antigay bias. Previous research has suggested that homophobic attitudes and expressions are strategic attempts to prevent the risk of contamination from pathogens (see Filip-Crawford, & Neuberg, 2016). However, our research suggests that, at least to the extent that homosexual targets have visible cues of effeminacy, certain behavioral indicators of antigay bias (such as avoiding affiliation with gay men) may be strategic attempts to prevent reputation risk. Future research would benefit from studying different manifestations of antigay bias (avoidance vs. aggression) by manipulating the target’s sexual activity (gay vs. straight sex) and gender conformity (masculine vs. feminine appearance) to provide a more nuanced understanding of the psychological mechanisms underlying different types of antigay bias.

Our proposed mechanism of anti-effeminacy bias applied only to highly masculine honor-oriented men and was specific to coalitional value in traditionally masculine tasks which require traits such as strength, courage, toughness, and dominance. However, we would like to stress that masculine traits and skills are not the only ways men can bring coalitional value. There are as many valuable traits, skills, and abilities as there are many different types of teams and coalitions in society. What traits an academic or a business team would value in a man would be different than what a male rugby team would value in a teammate. As shown here in Study 3 and by Winegard et al. (2016), the coalitional value account did not hold when men evaluated the coalitional value of feminine targets in tasks whose success does not require masculine skills (business, chess, poetry). Accordingly, we assume that anti-effeminacy bias may become nonexistent in coalitional contexts in which success would require traits such as empathy, creativity, intellectual, and verbal abilities. Other than raising awareness about anti-effeminacy bias, creating and encouraging the existence of occupations and activities, which require a diverse set of socially important skills for achieving success other than traditional masculinity, may help reducing bias against feminine men. Future studies are needed to follow up on these suggestions and implications of the current research.

An analysis of 40 low-income and middle-income countries in the Asia-Pacific region: it is during early adolescence where marked gender inequalities in health and wellbeing consistently emerged

Gender inequalities in health and wellbeing across the first two decades of life: an analysis of 40 low-income and middle-income countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Elissa Kennedy et al. The Lancet Global Health, October 19, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X(20)30354-5

Summary

Background: By adulthood, gender inequalities in health and wellbeing are apparent. Yet, the timing and nature of gender inequalities during childhood and adolescence are less clear. We describe the emergence of gender inequalities in health and wellbeing across the first two decades of life.

Methods: We focused on the 40 low-income and middle-income countries in Asia and the Pacific. A measurement framework was developed around four key domains of wellbeing across the first two decades: health, education and transition to employment, protection, and a safe environment. Specific measurement constructs were then defined by considering gender indicator frameworks, the Sustainable Development Goals, indicator frameworks for child and adolescent health and wellbeing, and key stakeholder input. Available data were then mapped to define 87 indicators, subsequently populated using databases (UN agencies and the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study) and nationally representative surveys. Where possible, estimates in girls were compared with boys to report relative risks.

Findings: Although son preference is evident in some settings—as shown by higher than expected male-to-female sex ratios at birth in India, Vietnam, and China (all >1·10 compared with an expected ratio of 1·05) and excess mortality of girl children in some South Asian and Pacific nations—it is during early adolescence where marked gender inequalities consistently emerged. Adolescent girls face considerable disadvantage in relation to sexual and reproductive health (notably in South Asia and the Pacific), with high rates of child marriage (≥30% of women aged 20–24 years married before 18 years in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Afghanistan), fertility (≥65 livebirths per 1000 girls in Nauru, Laos, Afghanistan, Nepal, Marshall Islands, Bangladesh, Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea), and intimate partner violence (>20% in Timor Leste, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Myanmar). Despite educational parity in many countries, females aged 15–24 years were less likely than males to be in education, employment, or training in 17 of 19 countries for which data were available. Compared with girls, adolescent boys experienced excess all-cause mortality and substantially higher mortality due to unintentional injury, interpersonal violence, alcohol and other drugs, and suicide, and higher prevalence of harmful drinking and tobacco smoking.

Interpretation: These findings call for a focus on gender policy and programming in later childhood and early adolescence before gender inequalities become embedded.

Discussion

Son preference remains evident in some settings, signified by higher than expected male-to-female sex ratios at birth in India, Vietnam, and China (which might indicate prenatal sex determination and sex-selective abortion), and a higher than expected mortality among female children in some South Asian and Pacific nations. Gender inequalities in other indicators of wellbeing across early childhood were otherwise not observed; gains made in child mortality, undernutrition, and primary education have been, for the most part, equally shared by boys and girls in this region. Progress, however, has not continued through the second decade of life, with gender inequalities in wellbeing emerging most markedly and increasing during adolescence.

Adolescent girls continue to face considerable disadvantage in relation to sexual and reproductive health and rights, including protection from child marriage and intimate partner violence. Despite near universal commitments to end child marriage, a substantial proportion of girls in the Asia-Pacific region were married by age 18 years, and rates of adolescent childbearing remain high in many countries. Girls have poor access to modern contraception and experienced high rates of intimate partner and sexual violence. Discrimination and disadvantage affecting girls was most notable in South Asia, reflected in the highest rates of child marriage, adolescent births, intimate partner violence, and suicide mortality, and lower education participation and completion. Despite having achieved educational parity in many countries, girls are not transitioning to further training or employment at the same rate as boys. Unpaid domestic work, early parenthood, and care-giving responsibilities are likely to be important contributors to girls' unemployment, suggesting that despite improved education participation, girls commonly remain in traditional gender roles following school completion and experience profound gendered barriers to participation in paid employment.

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Adolescent boys have greater all-cause mortality and substantially higher mortality due to unintentional injury, interpersonal violence, and alcohol and other drugs, and higher prevalence of harmful drinking and tobacco smoking. In all but some South Asian countries (Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan), boys also had substantially higher rates of suicide mortality than their female counterparts. Although rates of upper secondary school participation and completion were similar for boys and girls in most countries, boys were more likely to be out of school in several East and Southeast Asian and Pacific countries, and were more likely to be engaged in child labour and hazardous work.

Puberty is transformative in the health and development trajectories of girls and boys. While physical, hormonal, and neurodevelopmental pubertal processes contribute to biological sex differences in some health outcomes and risks, puberty is also characterised by an intensification of gender socialisation, during which gender identity, roles, and norms sharply diverge and take on increasing prominence.

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 These norms are consolidated during adolescence and profoundly shape the lives of adolescents, with consequences for health that extend into adulthood and for the next generation.

11

 Gender norms vary across sociocultural contexts; however, common gender stereotypes underpin disadvantage for both girls and boys across the Asia-Pacific region. Underlying patriarchal systems that reinforce gender norms assigning higher status and power to boys over girls, and reward hegemonic (dominant) constructs of masculinity, contribute to boys' risk taking, use of and exposure to violence, and poor care seeking. These same systems police restrictive feminine norms that limit girls' opportunities and agency, and increase vulnerability to harmful practices (such as child marriage), intimate partner violence, and poor sexual and reproductive health.

3

,  

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 Non-conformity with rigid norms can lead to sanctions and punishment, which also have negative health and wellbeing outcomes.

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These findings substantially extend our understanding of gender inequality during childhood and adolescence. They challenge the narrow focus on women in existing gender indicators, policies, and programmes, and draw attention to the need to prioritise adolescents, an age group where few investments have been made to date. This analysis also highlights the substantial regional and national variation in the impacts of gender inequality, emphasising the need for context-specific programming and policy. Such a response will require investments across many sectors. Action is required to prevent child marriage and adolescent pregnancy; remove policy, financial, and regulatory barriers limiting adolescents' access to sexuality education and sexual and reproductive health services; and reform workplaces to address gendered barriers that limit opportunities for girls to enter and remain in employment.

5

 Greater attention is also needed to understand and address harmful norms and constructs of masculinity, as these not only contribute to adverse health outcomes and risks for boys into adulthood, but also have profound impacts on girls' health and wellbeing.

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 By early adolescence, girls and boys have attitudes that support gender inequality, and these norms are strongly influenced, and enforced, by family, peers, and societal structures.

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 They are therefore amenable to intervention, with some evidence that gender-transformative approaches combining strategies at the individual, social, and structural level might promote equitable gender attitudes and related behaviours during adolescence.

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Measuring and monitoring gender inequality during these key formative years is crucial. Of the 54 gender-sensitive SDG indicators (defined by UN Women),

2

 only 13 relate specifically to childhood and adolescence and are focused largely on education, harmful practices affecting girls (child marriage, female genital mutilation), intimate partner and sexual violence, and child labour. A further 16 indicators related to poverty, employment, harassment, trafficking, homicide, and conflict call for disaggregation by sex and age. However, the extent to which these will be reported by both age and sex to allow for gender inequalities in this age group to be identified is unclear. Some key gender differences identified by this analysis (ie, suicide, injury, child mortality, alcohol use, and tobacco smoking) are not currently tracked as gender-sensitive indicators, nor do these SDG indicators explicitly require disaggregation by sex or age. Additionally, current summary measures of societal gender inequality, such as the GII and SIGI, primarily reflect disadvantage and discrimination against adult women. A small number of studies have shown that increasing societal gender inequality is associated with poor child health outcomes.

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,  

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,  

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 Although this analysis did not specifically explore the relationship between these indices and gender inequalities in first two decades of life, there was a suggestion that existing gender indices correspond to inequalities in sexual and reproductive health and rights and some indicators of education, but less so to health risk behaviour or injury that predominantly affect males. An index of gender inequality that is specific to children and adolescents represents an important research agenda.

This study has some limitations. We used modelled data to populate some indicators relating to health to improve data coverage, consistent with analyses in the Lancet Series;

34

,  

35

 however, wide uncertainty estimates for some indicators suggest poor-quality primary data and a heavy reliance on modelling, which might affect our estimated gender inequalities. Nonetheless, it is reassuring that the findings of figure 2 (based on modelled data) are consistent with figure 3 (based largely on primary data). Even with the inclusion of modelled data, some potentially relevant aspects of health and wellbeing were not able to be examined due to the lack of internationally agreed and defined indicators, or lack of data disaggregated by age and sex. These include individual-level measures of poverty, food security, menstrual health, conflict, freedom of movement and share of public spaces, harassment and discrimination, and feeling of safety. There were also fewer indicators available for children than adolescents, and fewer indicators for the domains of protection and safe environment than those of health and education. These gaps, and the limitations of quantitative data to describe gender inequality and its effects, have also been noted by other authors.

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 The reporting of national data did not allow for important gender inequalities at a subnational level to be identified, or for analysis of intersecting inequalities related to ethnicity, poverty, disability, migrant status, or sexual orientation. Additionally, because of the lack of indicators and national-level comparable data, estimates for individuals with non-cisgender or non-binary identity could not be included, despite the substantial discrimination experienced by young people with diverse gender identity.

3

This analysis has identified some important gender inequalities and trends emerging in the first two decades of life and further research is required to examine the drivers of gender inequality and gender socialisation, and the sociocultural context of gender norms and impacts in this diverse region. In the immediate term, the alignment of the reporting framework to UNICEF's strategic plan helps to inform gender-responsive programming for children and adolescents. Although the developed framework was specific to the Asia-Pacific region, the heterogeneity of this region in terms of development and societal gender inequality (appendix p 3), coupled with this region being home to more than half of the world's young people, underscores its global relevance.

The SDGs have brought attention to gender equality as a global human right and health and development priority. The current focus on girls' sexual and reproductive health and elimination of harmful practices is well justified, as data from the Asia-Pacific region show that much remains to be achieved. However, there is a need to broaden the measurement and response to gender inequality arising during the first two decades of life, with much greater attention to adolescence as well as the effects of harmful gender norms on boys. The indicators included in this analysis are harmonised with available data collection efforts and might therefore serve as a foundation to this task. Action is clearly required to address the gender norms and structural determinants that not only drive poor sexual and reproductive health for girls, but also contribute to girls' poor outcomes across other domains of health and wellbeing, and underpin the excess mortality and health risks experienced by adolescent boys. Gender inequality remains one of the most pervasive challenges in global health and development. Early adolescence, when gender socialisation intensifies and key gender inequalities emerge, presents a crucial opportunity to address harmful gender norms before they are crystallised, and to advance gender equality for all.