Guatemalan university students: Men held more traditional attitudes about gender and the family than did women on all measures; gender differences on all scales were mediated by cynicism and religiosity

Social Axioms Mediate Gender Differences in Gender Ideologies Among Guatemalan University Students. Sandra Elizabeth Luna-Sánchez et al. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, November 5, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/00220221211049543

Abstract: Gender role ideologies are embedded in cultural values and assumptions about life. Women’s greater endorsement of egalitarian beliefs may stem from gender differences in world views as indexed by social axioms. The purpose of this study was to examine potential mediators of gender differences in gender ideologies among university students in Guatemala, a country where traditional views are prevalent. Participants, 2,134 university students from nine campuses in different regions of Guatemala (43% male, 85% emerging adults), completed a Social Axioms Scale, along with three culturally relevant measures of gender ideology: the Historic-Sociocultural Premises Scale (HSCP) and the Machismo Measure that taps both traditional machismo and caballerismo (gentlemanliness). Consistent with previous research in other countries, men held more traditional attitudes about gender and the family than did women on all measures. Gender differences on all scales were mediated by cynicism and religiosity. Fate control mediated the gender differences in traditional machismo and the HSCP. These findings suggest that Guatemalan women and men through socialization, cultural demands, and life experiences develop gender-specific ways of viewing the world, and their attitudes about gender roles are shaped by those worldviews. The achievement of gender equality, a U.N. sustainable development goal, may require attention to the underlying world views of women and men.

Keywords: social axioms, cultural world views, gender differences in gender ideologies, machismo, Guatemala

Negative Emotion Decision-Making Dynamics: Amygdala-Prefrontal Pathways show that, behaviorally, girls exhibit higher response caution & more effective evidence accumulation, boys show more impulsive response

Developmental Sex Differences in Negative Emotion Decision-Making Dynamics: Computational Evidence and Amygdala-Prefrontal Pathways. Jiahua Xu et al. Cerebral Cortex, bhab359, October 13 2021, https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhab359

Abstract: Sex differences in human emotion and related decision-making behaviors are recognized, which can be traced back early in development. However, our understanding of their underlying neurodevelopmental mechanisms remains elusive. Using developmental functional magnetic resonance imaging and computational approach, we investigated developmental sex differences in latent decision-making dynamics during negative emotion processing and related neurocognitive pathways in 243 school-aged children and 78 young adults. Behaviorally, girls exhibit higher response caution and more effective evidence accumulation, whereas boys show more impulsive response to negative facial expression stimuli. These effects parallel sex differences in emotion-related brain maturity linking to evidence accumulation, along with age-related decrease in emotional response in the basolateral amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) in girls and an increase in the centromedial amygdala (CMA) in boys. Moreover, girls exhibit age-related decreases in BLA–MPFC coupling linked to evidence accumulation, but boys exhibit increases in CMA–insula coupling associated with response caution. Our findings highlight the neurocomputational accounts for developmental sex differences in emotion and emotion-related behaviors and provide important implications into the neurodevelopmental mechanisms of sex differences in latent emotional decision-making dynamics. This informs the emergence of sex differences in typical and atypical neurodevelopment of children’s emotion and related functions.

Keywords: children, development, emotion, sex dimorphism, task fMRI

It was women, not men, who were more likely to report being aroused by aggression, mostly consensual; & were also more likely to report actively seeking for aggression and wanting to see more aggression in mainstream pornography

Who Seeks Aggression in Pornography? Findings from Interviews with Viewers. Eran Shor. Archives of Sexual Behavior, Nov 8 2021. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-021-02053-1

Abstract: Despite the recent proliferation of research on aggression in pornography, we still know relatively little about the preferences and perceptions of viewers themselves. In particular, very little research has examined how women who watch pornography feel when encountering aggression toward women. To explore this question, we conducted interviews with 122 regular pornography viewers (61 women, 60 men, and 1 gender-diverse). Quantitative and qualitative analyses of the data show that the majority of both men and women reported that they did not enjoy aggressive content. However, in contrast to common conceptions among most scholars and pundits, it was women, not men, who were more likely to report being aroused by aggression, mainly consensual aggression toward women, which was perceived as pleasurable. Women were also more likely to report actively seeking for aggression and wanting to see more aggression in mainstream pornography. These findings challenge long-held radical feminist views regarding the preferences of both women and men and offer new insights on the relationship between gender and sexual fantasies.

Interviewees from Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Costa Rica, France, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Korea, Lebanon, Mauritius, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Syria, the United Kingdom, the United States, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.

Like-minded political discussion are rare, and the readiness to engage in them is more strongly determined by personality than by ideology or the means of communication

The Role of Personality in Political Talk and Like-Minded Discussion. Shelley Boulianne, Karolina Koc-Michalska. The International Journal of Press/Politics, March 17, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161221994096

Abstract: Political discussion is a key mechanism for the development of reasoned opinions and political knowledge, but online political discussion has been characterized as uncivil, intolerant, and/or ideologically homogeneous, which is detrimental to this development. In this paper, we examine the role of personality in various forms of political talk—online and offline—as well as like-minded discussion. Based on a 2017 survey conducted in the United Kingdom, United States, and France, we find that people who are open-minded and extraverted are more likely to engage in political talk but less likely to engage in like-minded discussion. Individuals who are older, less educated, introverted, and conscientious are more likely to find themselves in like-minded discussions, both online and on social media. Like-minded discussion is rare; personality, rather than ideology, predicts whether people engage in this form of political talk in online and offline modes. Our findings challenge the role of social media in the creation of like-minded discussion. Instead, we should look to the role of individual attributes, such as personality traits, which create a disposition that motivates the use of social media (and offline networks) to cultivate like-minded discussion.

Keywords: Big Five personality traits, political discussion, political talk, like-minded discussion, echo chamber

Discussion

This paper examines how personality affects the filtering process related to political discussion. Personality impacts the propensity to discuss politics, use social media, and engage in like-minded discussion on social media. Several steps are required to understand like-minded discussion on social media: (1) consider the biases in who talks politics (81.57 percent of our pooled sample, as per Table 2), (2) consider the filtering of social media adoption (76.82 percent of our pooled sample), (3) consider the subset of people who talk politics on social media (43.99 percent of our pooled sample of social media users), and (4) consider the few people who engage in like-minded discussion (9.41 percent of a pooled sample of social media talkers). Approximately one in ten respondents engages in like-minded discussion; this incidence rate is consistent for offline and online forms. So we ask, what is the role of personality throughout this filtering process? This question is answered with our annotation of Figure 2.

Figure 2. Summary of findings about personality and political discussion.

Note. Diagonal-dashed arrows are filtering arrows and straight arrows depict causal effects among key variables in the analysis. O = openness, C = conscientious, Ex = extraversion, A = agreeable, Es = emotional stability.

Openness impacts whether an individual talks politics online and offline and whether they use social media. The filtering process has three stages. In the first stage, people who are open-minded are more likely to talk politics (any mode). In the second stage, people who are open-minded adopt social media use. In the third stage, people who are open-minded are less likely to engage in like-minded discussion. The coefficient did not reach statistical significance at the p < .05 level. Openness has a stronger and more consistent impact than ideology. The existing literature (Table 1) features ten tests of the relationship between openness and political discussion. Of these, four tests for openness on political discussion are significant, which suggests a relationship but hardly offers conclusive results (Table 1). These other studies from the existing literature do not consider the mode of discussion and few consider personality and like-minded discussion. Yet, we offer consistent findings about the importance of openness using our pooled cross-national sample.

We find that extraversion is also important. As mentioned, the existing research features ten tests of the relationship between extraversion and political discussion of which five are significant (Table 1). Extraversion has mixed support related to political discussion in general; extraversion influences talk on social media, but not offline. However, extraversion is a strong and consistent predictor of like-minded discussion on social media and offline. In terms of understanding like-minded discussion on social media, extraversion seems to be the strongest and most consistent personality trait. We replicate this finding in the country-specific results.

Existing research (Table 1) suggests that agreeableness is important (four of ten tests are significant), yet the findings are not consistently positive or negative but rather highly divergent. In our study, agreeableness matters for social media adoption but does not offer direct effects on the likelihood of talking politics. However, as mentioned, assessing agreeableness poses challenges because this trait is strongly correlated with conscientiousness and extraversion (see prior literature review and Supplementary Information file). Correlation issues with these personality traits may pose a challenge when trying to determine their independent effects. We included all traits in our models to reflect existing research (Table 1).

Our paper distinguishes between offline discussion and online discussion through social media. Openness predicts both modes of discussion, suggesting the two modes might be combined into a single, hybrid discussion measure (Chadwick 2013). However, combining these modes would blur some important findings about social media and the role of personality in filtering social media-based discussion. In particular, extraversion and conscientiousness predict social media use, then social media-based discussion, then like-minded discussion on social media. The effects of these personality traits might disappear if the modes are combined into a single measure of political discussion as these measures do not have the same predictive value in relation to offline discussion (general). Also, age and political ideology predict online but not offline forms of discussion. Combining these modes would hide these ideological and age differences in patterns of participation. Age is a consistent predictor of online political discussion (Brundidge 2010; Evans and Ulbig 2012; Huber et al. 2019; Kim and Baek 2018; Stromer-Galley 2002). Finally, females are more likely to participate in offline political talk, but less likely to talk on social media (also see: Evans and Ulbig 2012; Huber et al. 2019; Stromer-Galley 2002). These gender differences would be missed in a combined measure of political discussion. All of these differences have implications with respect to the quality and representativeness of online discussion. We still have more research to do on this topic, given the low explained variance in our models as well as those models summarized in Table 1.

Like-minded discussion may have both positive and negative impacts. Mondak (2010: 115) explains that “conversations with like-minded others may offer reassurance and support, but such conversations do nothing to broaden the person's perspectives.” Discussions with people of differing viewpoints are expected to increase political tolerance (Nir 2017) and perhaps decrease attitude polarization (Grönlund et al. 2015; Mutz 2006). Personality shapes the propensity to engage in homogeneous discussion networks (Hibbing et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2013; Mondak et al. 2010). We have contributed to scholarship by testing the role of personality in an online discussion. Our findings suggest that like-minded discussion networks cannot be solely attributed to social media use. An individual's personality affects whether they use social media (Correa et al. 2010; Jenkins-Guarnieri et al. 2012; Ryan and Xenos 2011) and how they use social media. People who are introverted, close-minded, and conscientious will use social media to form discussion networks where their ideas will not be challenged. Indeed, when it comes to like-minded discussion, we find that personality matters more than political ideology.

As a final note, our data are limited to self-reports about political discussion—an issue that this field of research has addressed (Wojcieszak and Mutz 2009). We do not know if people truly abstain from political discussion, nor do we have an independently verified approach to measure the frequency of political discussion. Social media trace data would help to validate the estimates about frequency. However, social media data are limited for assessing like-minded discussion, as it is difficult to determine whether two discussion partners agree or disagree with each other's social media posts. For example, on Twitter, there is a “like” button but no “dislike” button. Facebook offers more nuances, albeit the “like” button is still the most popular response and does not suggest agreement so much as acknowledgment. Ideology is sometimes used as a proxy for this disagreement, but even ideological leanings are difficult to decipher in relation to the discussion of complex policy issues, such as immigration or the economy. Surveys are a valuable tool to supplement social media trace data as people can be asked about their agreement or disagreement with the topic. Future research should consider using a mixed-methods approach with a record of political discussion (such as social media trace data) as well as a survey of personality traits, policy positions, and reports about (dis)agreement. Our survey is an important contribution to the field, which has examined self-reports of offline discussion based on surveys or online discussion using social media trace data. We bridge these two modes but come to similar conclusions. Like-minded discussion is rare; personality, rather than ideology, predicts whether people engage in this form of political talk in online and offline modes.

Prior to proposing our research hypothesis and questions, we presented the findings of existing research. Research to date is based largely on American samples, yet international scholars have used the same theoretical claims for tests based on non-U.S. samples. Existing scholarship has not addressed whether we should expect cross-national differences in the relationship between personality and political discussion. As such, we proposed a research question, rather than a hypothesis. We find consistency in the importance of extraversion predicting like-minded discussion. Extraverts are less likely to engage in like-minded discussion. We replicate existing research about cross-national differences in political talk (Nir 2012; Vaccari and Valeriani 2018), but we offer new evidence about the importance of personality and perhaps culture in political discussion.

People told the most lies per social interaction over synchronous, distributed, and recordless media (the phone, video chat),; lying rates were also associated with aversive personality traits, plus antisocial, and relational deception motives

Revisiting the Relationship Between Deception and Design: A Replication and Extension of Hancock et al. David M Markowitz. Human Communication Research, hqab019, November 8 2021. https://doi.org/10.1093/hcr/hqab019

Abstract: Evidence published nearly 20 years ago suggested people tell more lies per social interaction via synchronous, distributed, and recordless media (the phone) versus relatively richer (face-to-face communication) and leaner media (email, instant messaging). With nontrivial changes to the size and variety of our media landscape, it is worth re-examining the relationship between deception and technology. Over 7 days, 250 participants reported their social interactions and lies across face-to-face communication, social media, texting, the phone, video chat, and email. Replicating Hancock, Thom-Santelli, and Ritchie (2004), people told the most lies per social interaction over synchronous, distributed, and recordless media (the phone, video chat), though the effects were small and between-person effects explained more variance than between-media effects. Lying rates were also associated with aversive personality traits, plus antisocial, and relational deception motives. Together, while media options have evolved, technological design features often remain stable and indicate deception rates. Theoretical contributions are discussed.

Wrongful convictions' awards: Average is $6.1 million ($1334/day of incarceration); initial incarceration is valued at over $50,000 for the first day; year one is valued at $1.5 million ($4000/day); marginal cost of the 10th year is $350,000 ($950/day)

Pain, suffering, and jury awards: A study of the cost of wrongful convictions. Mark A. Cohen. Criminology & Public Policy, November 8 2021. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12559

Research summary: This paper estimates the cost of wrongful convictions based on analysis of jury awards and settlements for individuals who were wrongfully convicted and incarcerated for crimes they did not commit. Key variables of interest are number of days spent in prison, days on probation, and demographics of wrongfully convicted and their families. The average “cost” of a wrongful conviction is estimated to be $6.1 million, or $1334 per day of incarceration, while the marginal cost decreases over time: initial incarceration is valued at over $50,000 for the first day; year one is valued at $1.5 million ($4000/day), while the marginal cost of the 10th year is estimated to be approximately $350,000 ($950/day).

Policy implications: State mandated compensation for wrongfully convicted individuals who oftentimes spend years in prison for crimes they did not commit is highly variable and in many cases bears little relationship to either the monetary or nonmonetary harms endured. In addition to providing benchmarks for more appropriate compensation, these estimates provide a foundation for future benefit-cost analyses of policies that might reduce wrongful convictions such as increased expenditures for DNA testing or indigent defense counsel.

The illiterate Himba, Namibia, are more intuitive, more religious, happier, and less utilitarian than the French participants

A 21st century cognitive portrait of the Himba, a remote people of Namibia. Bastien Trémolière, Jules Davidoff, Serge Caparos. British Journal of Psychology, November 8 2021. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjop.12539

Abstract: This research sketches the cognitive portrait of the Himba, a remote population from Northern Namibia living in a non-industrial society almost completely devoid of modern artefacts. We compared the Himba sample to a French sample, exploring cognitive reflection, moral judgement, cooperative behaviour, paranormal beliefs, and happiness. We looked for both differences and similarities across cultures, and for the way cognitive functioning is associated with a range of demographic variables. Results showed some important group differences, with the Himba being more intuitive, more religious, happier, and less utilitarian than the French participants. Further, the predictors of these beliefs and behaviours differed between the two groups. The present results provide additional support to the recent line of research targeting cultural variations and similarities, and call for the need to expand psychology research beyond the Western world.

Females responding with greater self-protectiveness than males: Mount stronger immune responses to many pathogens; react to threats with greater fear, disgust and sadness; develop more threat-based clinical conditions than males

Self-Protection as an Adaptive Female Strategy. Joyce F. Benenson, Christine E. Webb and Richard W. Wrangham. Behavioral and Brain Sciences , accepted manuscript, Nov 8 2021. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X21002417

Abstract: Many male traits are well explained by sexual selection theory as adaptations to mating competition and mate choice, whereas no unifying theory explains traits expressed more in females. Anne Campbell's “staying alive” theory proposed that human females produce stronger self-protective reactions than males to aggressive threats because self-protection tends to have higher fitness value for females than males. We examined whether Campbell's theory has more general applicability by considering whether human females respond with greater self-protectiveness than males to other threats beyond aggression. We searched the literature for physiological, behavioral, and emotional responses to major physical and social threats, and found consistent support for females’ responding with greater self-protectiveness than males. Females mount stronger immune responses to many pathogens; experience a lower threshold to detect, and lesser tolerance of, pain; awaken more frequently at night; express greater concern about physically dangerous stimuli; exert more effort to avoid social conflicts; exhibit a personality style more focused on life's dangers; react to threats with greater fear, disgust and sadness; and develop more threat-based clinical conditions than males. Our findings suggest that in relation to threat human females have relatively heightened protective reactions compared to males. The pervasiveness of this result across multiple domains suggests that general mechanisms might exist underlying females’ unique adaptations. An understanding of such processes would enhance knowledge of female health and well-being.

Those assigned to restrict social media reported relatively few benefits (increased mindfulness, but not higher life satisfaction autonomy, competence, & self-esteem, and reduced loneliness & stress) & even some costs (more negative emotion)

Walsh, Lisa C., Annie Regan, Karynna Okabe-Miyamoto, and Sonja Lyubomirsky. 2021. “Does Putting Away Your Smartphone Make You Happier? the Effects of Restricting Digital Media and Social Media on Well-being.” PsyArXiv. November 8. doi:10.31234/osf.io/c3phw

Abstract: Both scientists and laypeople have become increasingly concerned about smartphones, especially their associated digital media (e.g., email, news, gaming, and dating apps) and social media (e.g., Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat). Recent correlational research links substantial declines in Gen Z well-being to digital and social media use, yet other work suggests the effects are small and unnoteworthy. To further disentangle correlation from causation and better elucidate the strength and direction of effects, we conducted a pre-registered 8-day experimental deprivation study with Gen Z individuals (N = 338). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: (1) restrict digital media use, (2) restrict social media use, (3) restrict water use (active control), or (4) restrict nothing (measurement-only control). Relative to controls, participants restricting digital media reported a variety of benefits, including higher life satisfaction, mindfulness, autonomy, competence, and self-esteem, and reduced loneliness and stress. In contrast, those assigned to restrict social media reported relatively few benefits (increased mindfulness) and even some costs (more negative emotion).

Common sense: The mobile internet AND old media polarized the Left, but not so much the Right; "what polarized the Right was…the polarization of the Left"

Mobile Internet and Political Polarization. Nikita Melnikov. November 1, 2021. https://b0ac9a84-177d-4e54-a19e-df525dfaf051.filesusr.com/ugd/87e482_9eb44ae506c446f9a0094db9a82bc610.pdf

Abstract: How has mobile internet affected political polarization in the United States? Using Gallup Daily Poll data covering 1,765,114 individuals in 31,499 ZIP codes between 2008 and 2017, I show that, after gaining access to 3G internet, Democratic voters became more liberal in their political views and increased their support for Democratic congressional candidates and policy priorities, while Republican voters shifted in the opposite direction. This increase in polarization largely did not take place among social media users. Instead, following the arrival of 3G, active internet and social media users from both parties became more pro-Democratic, whereas less-active users became more pro-Republican. This divergence is partly driven by differences in news consumption between the two groups: after the arrival of 3G, active internet users decreased their consumption of Fox News, increased their consumption of CNN, and increased their political knowledge. Polarization also increased due to a political realignment of voters: wealthy, well-educated people became more liberal; poor, uneducated people—more conservative.

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h/t Tyler Cowen (https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2021/11/mobile-internet-and-political-polarization.html), who comments:

My read of these results (not the author’s to be clear!) is that the mobile internet polarized the Left, but not so much the Right.  What polarized the Right was…the polarization of the Left, and not the mobile internet.

And please do note this sentence: “This increase in polarization largely did not take place among social media users.”  It seems that on-line versions of older school media did a lot of the work.

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My view from a Libertarian perspective: this is what anyone not polarized would have seen years ago. But it was very rude to say so.

Significant difference between gifted and non-gifted participants in terms of Openness to Experience in favor of gifted individuals; no significant differences in terms of extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, & neuroticism

Personality differences in gifted versus non-gifted individuals: A three-level meta-analysis. Uzeyir Ogurlu &Adnan Özbey. High Ability Studies, Nov 7 2021. https://doi.org/10.1080/13598139.2021.1985438

Abstract: Some research has investigated the big five personality dimensions among gifted individuals, but these individual studies have provided inconclusive results. The current meta-analysis examined the nature of the relationship between the big five dimensions and giftedness among individuals. Hedge’s unbiased g was used as the effect size metric, and a 3-level multilevel meta-analytic approach was applied, due to the dependency among the effect sizes obtained from the same study. The analyses used 82 effect sizes, from 13 published studies, and indicated that there was a significant difference between gifted and non-gifted participants in terms of Openness to Experience in favor of gifted individuals (g = .473, p = . 005, 95% CI [.199, .747]). However, there were no significant differences in terms of extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and neuroticism. The implications and limitations of the findings are discussed.

Keywords: Giftedpersonalitythe big five modelmeta-analysismultilevel

We find that the introduction of potatoes led to a sizeable and permanent reduction in conflict

From 2020... The Long-Run Effects of Agricultural Productivity on Conflict, 1400–1900. Murat Iyigun et al. November 24 2020. https://www.jorismueller.com/files/Agricultural_productivity_conflict_latest_draft.pdf

Abstract: This paper provides evidence of the long-run effects of a permanent increase in agricultural productivity on conflict. We construct a newly digitized and geo-referenced dataset of battles in Europe, the Near East, and North Africa from 1400–1900 CE and examine variation in agricultural productivity due to the introduction of potatoes from the Americas to the Old World after the Columbian Exchange. We find that the introduction of potatoes led to a sizeable and permanent reduction in conflict.

Keywords: Conflict, Natural Resources, Long-run Development.

JEL Classification: D74; O13; Q34

Sex significantly impacts the function of major depression-linked variants in vivo

Sex significantly impacts the function of major depression-linked variants in vivo. Bernard Mulvey, Din Selmanovic, Joseph D. Dougherty. bioRxiv, Nov 4 2021. https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2021.11.01.466849v1.full.pdf

Abstract: Genome-wide association studies have discovered blocks of common variants—likely transcriptional-regulatory—associated with major depressive disorder (MDD), though the 15 functional subset and their biological impacts remain unknown. Likewise, why depression occurs in females more frequently than males is unclear. We therefore tested the hypothesis that risk-associated functional variants interact with sex and produce greater impact in female brains. We  developed methods to directly measure regulatory variant activity and sex interactions using  massively parallel reporter assays (MPRAs) in the mouse brain in vivo, in a cell type-specific  20 manner. We measured activity of >1,000 variants from >30 MDD loci, identifying extensive sex by-allele effects in mature hippocampal neurons and suggesting sex-differentiated impacts of  genetic risk may underlie sex bias in disease. Unbiased informatics approaches indicated that  functional MDD variants recurrently disrupt sex hormone receptor binding sequences. We  confirmed this with MPRAs in neonatal brains, comparing brains undergoing the masculinizing  25 hormone surge to hormonally-quiescent juveniles. Our study provides novel insights into the  influence of age, biological sex, and cell type on regulatory-variant function, and provides a  framework for in vivo parallel assays to functionally define interactions between organismal variables like sex and regulatory variation.

One-Sentence Summary: Massively parallel assays in vivo identified extensive functional and 30 sex-interacting common variants in depression risk loci.

When women had no trait/financial information other than photos of potential mates, they showed mate-choice copying, not when they got personality trait or financial information (only for low-attractiveness and long-term potential mates)

Trait/Financial Information of Potential Male Mate Eliminates Mate-Choice Copying by Women: Trade-Off Between Social Information and Personal Information in Mate Selection. Xinge Liu, Cuihu Zhang, Xinlei Wang, Xinran Feng, Junhao Pan & Guomei Zhou. Archives of Sexual Behavior, Nov 2 2021. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10508-021-02044-2

Abstract: Mate-choice copying occurs when people rely on the mate choices of others (social information) to inform their own mate decisions. The present study investigated women’s strategic trade-off between such social learning and using the personal information of a potential mate. We conducted two experiments to investigate how mate-choice copying was affected by the personal information (e.g., trait/financial information, negative/positive valence of this information, and attractiveness) of a potential male mate in short-/long-term mate selection. The results demonstrated that when women had no trait/financial information other than photos of potential mates, they showed mate-choice copying, but when women obtained personality trait or financial situation information (no matter negative or positive) of a potential mate, their mate-choice copying disappeared; this effect was only observed for low-attractiveness and long-term potential partners. These results demonstrated human social learning strategies in mate selection through a trade-off between social information and personal information.

Carnivores have good spirits: In a survey of over 2000 adults following a “carnivore diet” (i.e., one that aims to avoid plant foods), health benefits and satisfaction were generally reported

Behavioral Characteristics and Self-reported Health Status Among 2029 Adults Consuming a “Carnivore Diet.” Belinda S Lennerz, Jacob T Mey, Owen H Henn, David S Ludwig. Current Developments in Nutrition, nzab133, Nov 2 2021. https://doi.org/10.1093/cdn/nzab133

Abstract

Background

The “carnivore diet,” based on animal foods and excluding most or all plant foods, has attracted recent popular attention. However, little is known about the health effects and tolerability of this diet, and concerns for nutrient deficiencies and cardiovascular disease risk have been raised.

Objective

We obtained descriptive data on the nutritional practices and health status of a large group of carnivore diet consumers.

Methods: A social media survey was conducted March 30 to June 24, 2020 among adults self- identifying as consuming a carnivore diet ≥ 6 months. Survey questions interrogated motivation, dietary intake patterns, symptoms suggestive of nutritional deficiencies or other adverse effects, satisfaction, prior and current health conditions, anthropometrics, and laboratory data.

Results: A total of 2029 respondents (median age 44 years, 67% male), reported consuming a carnivore diet for 14 (interquartile range 9–20) months, motivated primarily by health reasons (93%). Red meat consumption was reported ≥ daily by 85%. Under 10% reported consuming vegetables, fruits or grains > monthly, and 37% denied vitamin supplement use. Prevalence of adverse symptoms was low (<1% to 5.5%). Symptoms included gastrointestinal (3.1–5.5%), muscular (4.0%), and dermatologic (1.1–1.9%). Participants reported high levels of satisfaction and improvements in overall health (95%), wellbeing (69–91%), various medical conditions (48–93%) and BMI (from 27.2 [23.5–31.9] to 24.3 [22.1–27.0] kg/m2). Among a subset reporting current lipids, LDL-cholesterol was markedly elevated (172 mg/dL), whereas HDL-cholesterol (68 gm/dL) and triglycerides (68 mg/dL) were optimal. Participants with diabetes reported benefits including reductions in BMI (4.3 kg/m2, 1.4–7.2), HbA1C (0.4%, 0–1.7), and diabetes medication use (84–100%).

Conclusions: Contrary to common expectations, adults consuming a carnivore diet experienced few adverse effects and instead reported health benefits and high satisfaction. Cardiovascular risk factors were variably affected. The generalizability of these findings and the long-term effects of this dietary pattern require further study.

Summary: In a survey of over 2000 adults following a “carnivore diet” (i.e., one that aims to avoid plant foods), health benefits and satisfaction were generally reported.

Keywords: low carbohydrate diet, ketogenic diet, meat, animal-based foods, micronutrients, obesity, diabetes, cardiovascular disease risk

Because firms are owned by risk-averse households, they exert more cognitive effort & make smaller input-choice mistakes in financial statements in aggregate downturns... macroeconomically attentive firms make smaller mistakes

Attention Cycles. Joel P. Flynn, Karthik A. Sastry. MIT, November 5, 2021. https://economics.mit.edu/files/20302

Abstract: Using data from US public firms’ regulatory filings and financial statements, we document that firms’ attention to macroeconomic conditions rises in downturns and that their propensity to make input-choice mistakes rises in booms. We explain these phenomena with a business-cycle model in which firms face a cognitive cost of making precise decisions. Because firms are owned by risk-averse households, there are greater incentives to deliver profits when aggregate consumption is low. Thus, firms exert more cognitive effort and make smaller input-choice mistakes in aggregate downturns. In the data, consistent with our model, financial markets punish mistakes more in downturns and macroeconomically attentive firms make smaller mistakes. When calibrated to match our firm-level evidence, attention cycles generate quantitatively significant asymmetric, state-dependent shock propagation and stochastic volatility of output growth.

Past-life memories represent a novel factor in Gender Nonconformity: Children who remembered a life involving a different natal sex were much more likely to exhibit Gender Nonconformity than children who remembered a same-sex life

From 2018... Childhood Gender Nonconformity and Children’s Past-Life Memories. Marieta Pehlivanova, Monica J. Janke, Jack Lee & Jim B. Tucker. International Journal of Sexual Health , Volume 30, 2018 - Issue 4, Pages 380-389, Nov 15 2018. https://doi.org/10.1080/19317611.2018.1523266

Abstract

Objectives: This study examines childhood gender nonconformity (GNC) in conjunction with the phenomenon in which young children describe memories of a purported previous life.

Methods: In a case-control study of 469 children reporting past-life memories, we used logistic regression to examine predictors of GNC, measured by documented gender nonconforming behaviors.

Results: Children who remembered a life involving a different natal sex were much more likely to exhibit GNC than children who remembered a same-sex life.

Conclusions: After exploring potential explanations, we conclude that past-life memories represent a novel factor that may be associated with the development of GNC.

Keywords: Gender nonconformitygender identitychildrenadolescentsreincarnation memories

Past-life memories represent a novel factor in Gender Nonconformity: Children who remembered a life involving a different natal sex were much more likely to exhibit Gender Nonconformity than children who remembered a same-sex life

People agree with numerous myths about personality and personality testing, especially the idea that trauma greatly shapes personality and that personality cannot be measured

Myths and misconceptions about personality traits and tests. Adrian Furnham, Charlotte Robinson. Personality and Individual Differences, Volume 186, Part B, February 2022, 111381. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2021.111381

Abstract: This study examined the prevalence of myths about personality traits as set out in a book (Donnellan & Luca, 2021) and beliefs in the predictive validity of personality tests. In all, 616 participants completed a questionnaire in which they rated the extent to which they thought statements/facts about personality traits were true or false, and whether personality test scores could predict behaviours like health, wealth and marital satisfaction. In total, 12 of these myths were rated as true (definitely or partly) by the majority of the participants, particularly those that implied personality change and instability over time. Only six were rated as probably false, two as definitely false, and five as “Don't Know” by the majority of respondents. Overall, participants thought tests predicted leadership and depression best, and longevity and future earnings least well. There were a number of systematic individual correlates of these beliefs which indicated that participants' religious and political beliefs were related to these myths and misconceptions. Limitations of this, and similar studies, are noted, and implications are discussed.

Keywords: MisconceptionsMythsPersonalityTests

We find mean global aggregate damages in 2100 of 0.40% of GDP if global warming is limited to about 2 C, and a mean cost of 3.67% of GDP associated with global warming of 4 C

Global and regional aggregate damages associated with global warming of 1.5 to 4 °C above pre-industrial levels. R. Warren, C. Hope, D. E. H. J. Gernaat, D. P. Van Vuuren & K. Jenkins. Climatic Change volume 168, Article number: 24. Oct 22 2021. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-021-03198-7

Abstract: We quantify global and regional aggregate damages from global warming of 1.5 to 4 °C above pre-industrial levels using a well-established integrated assessment model, PAGE09. We find mean global aggregate damages in 2100 of 0.29% of GDP if global warming is limited to about 1.5 °C (90% confidence interval 0.09–0.60%) and 0.40% for 2 °C (range 0.12–0.91%). These are, respectively, 92% and 89% lower than mean losses of 3.67% of GDP (range 0.64–10.77%) associated with global warming of 4 °C. The net present value of global aggregate damages for the 2008–2200 period is estimated at $48.7 trillion for ~ 1.5 °C global warming (range $13–108 trillion) and $60.7 trillion for 2 °C (range $15–140 trillion). These are, respectively, 92% and 90% lower than the mean NPV of $591.7 trillion of GDP for 4 °C warming (range $70–1920 trillion). This leads to a mean social cost of CO2 emitted in 2020 of ~ $150 for 4 °C warming as compared to $30 at ~ 1.5 °C warming. The benefits of limiting warming to 1.5 °C rather than 2 °C might be underestimated since PAGE09 is not recalibrated to reflect the recent understanding of the full range of risks at 1.5 °C warming.

Discussion and conclusions

Analysis with a simple probabilistic integrated assessment model PAGE09 indicates the mean global aggregate damages in 2100 of the different scenarios and their uncertainty ranges. These are 0.29% of GDP (5–95% range 0.09–0.60%) from constraining warming to 1.5 °C with 66% probability, 0.40% of GDP (5–95% range 0.12–0.91%) from constraining it to 2 °C with 66% probability and 3.67% of GDP (5–95% range 0.64–10.77%) from allowing emissions to rise along a no-policy baseline, leading to a mean GMT rise of 4 °C in 2100. Warming associated with the NDCs allows mean global aggregate damages in 2100 to reach 1.70% of GDP (5–95% range 0.31–5.99%). The net present value of global aggregate damages for 2008–2200 is estimated at $48.7 trillion for ~1.5 °C global warming (5–95% range $13–108 trillion) and $60.7 trillion for 2 °C (5–95% range $15–140 trillion). Correspondingly, the mean net present value of avoided damages that would otherwise accrue by 2200, associated with limiting warming to 1.5 °C rather than 4 °C, is estimated as 543 trillion US$ (2010), as compared with 531 trillion due to limiting warming to 2 °C.

However, these damages are likely conservative because the damage functions described in Section 2.1 are based on literature published before 2009, mostly matching the IPCC Third Assessment Report (IPCC 2007). The overall assessment of risk from climate change with global warming finds greater risks for the same level of warming than in 2009 (IPCC 2014, 2018; Zommers et al. 2020). For example, between 2014 and 2018, the assessed levels of concern ‘increased for four of the five Reasons for Concern’ for global warming of 2 °C (IPCC 2018). Also, apart from the discontinuity sector, the damage functions in PAGE09 depend only on the climate in a particular year, so any dynamic damages, where damage accumulates due to indirect consequences of climate change in earlier years, is not yet included (Burke et al. 2015).

A further contribution to the potential for damages to be underestimated here is that damages associated with arctic feedbacks leading to the release of CO2 and CH4 from permafrost are excluded from this analysis. In parallel with our work, independent updates to the PAGE09 model were made. This includes the development of PAGE-ICE(Yumashev et al. 2019) to reflect non-linear transitions in arctic feedbacks (permafrost and albedo effect), the calibration of equilibrium climate sensitivity values to match IPCC AR5 and other earth system science models, changes in the treatment of regional cooling by sulphate aerosols, a revised carbon cycle consistent with recent literature (Joos et al. 2013) and the use of a fat-tailed distribution for sea level rise to represent possible contributions to sea level rise from melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet. The damage functions were also upgraded in PAGE-ICE to reflect a recent macro-econometric analysis of the effect of historic temperature shocks on economic growth in multiple countries (Burke et al. 2015).

PAGE-ICE was subsequently used to estimate aggregate economic damages under different combinations of socioeconomic and climate change futures (Chen et al. 2020). Comparing the SSP2-based projections emerging from PAGE-ICE(Chen et al. 2020) vs PAGE09 reported here is interesting (Tables S4, S5, S7). At global warming of 2.5C in 2100, PAGE09 projects mean damages of 1.08% GDP (5-95% range 0.22–3.37), while PAGE-ICE projects damages of 6% GDP already at 2.7 °C (Chen et al. 2020)(Table S4). Similarly, PAGE09 estimates the mean NPV of damages in 2200 for warming of 2.5 °C at US$148 trillion (5-95% range $20–470), whereas at 2.7 °C, Chen et al. (2020) report US$569 trillion (5–95% range − 119–1722) including only damages to 2100 (Table S5). Inconsistencies notwithstanding, this represents a four-fold increase in damages comparable with the threefold increase emerging from the independent study of Hänsel et al. (2020).

The relatively small differences produced in PAGE09 between the damages associated with 1.5 rather than 2 °C global warming might be due to the PAGE09 damage function not yet well capturing the findings of IPCC (2018), and also the limited coverage of the effects of extreme weather events which will play an important role in determining aggregate damage. Nevertheless, these small increases represent a 41% increase in damages for the 2 °C scenarios with respect to the 1.5 °C scenario, increasing further to a 66% increase in Chen et al.(2020). Hence, the use of PAGE-ICE increases both the absolute damages avoided by limiting warming to lower temperatures and also increases the relative (percentage) increase.

Arent et al. (2014) review global aggregate damage estimates originating from various integrated assessment models, including various versions of FUND, DICE and PAGE and generally find aggregate damage estimates of between 1 and 3% of global GDP for global warming of 3 °C, while a more recent review (Tol 2018) finds similar values. A study with the integrated model DICE2016R2, which includes a blanket 25% uplift to damages to account for discontinuities (Nordhaus and Sztorc 2013), produces a year 2100 damage estimates of 2.0% of income at 3 °C and 7.9% of global income at a global temperature rise of 6 °C (Nordhaus 2018). This is similar to the PAGE09 mean estimate of 1.7% income at 3C warming (Table S1). It should be noted that the calibration of DICE2016R2 included output from PAGE09 as one of its calibration points (Nordhaus 2018), while an uncertainty analysis performed with DICE2016R2’s baseline scenario yielded damage ranges (within one standard deviation) of approximately 1.5–6% GDP for warming of 3.3–4.8 °C (see Fig. 7A, B in Nordhaus 2018).

More recently, further updates were made to the DICE2016R2 model (Hänsel et al. 2020), including changes to the carbon cycle, making it consistent with the IPCC Special Report on 1.5 °C warming (Rogelj et al. 2018), a recalibration to update the treatment of energy balance, the use of emerging literature to recalibrate the temperature-damage relationship, use of an exogenous pathway for non-CO2 forcing, the availability of negative emission technologies and the technologically feasible speed of decarbonisation. The utilised damage-temperature relationship (Howard and Sterner 2017) indicates damages of 6.69% of global GDP for a 3 °C global temperature rise while noting that there is empirical evidence for even larger damages (Burke et al. 2015)—increasing the damages by a factor of 3. DICE2016R2 now finds an optimal limit to global warming of 1.77 °C in 2100, producing a mean social cost of carbon dioxide in 2020 of 119US$/tCO2 (including all model updates) (Table S6) as compared with mean values of 30–43 $/tCO2 for 1.5–2 °C warming in 2100 here (Table 5 and Table S6), representing an approximately three-fold increase.

Both these comparisons indicate how recent updates in the understanding of the earth’s climate system and in the observation and projection of risks associated with global warming have had a profound effect on the estimates of associated economic damages. Updates to integrated assessment models have often lagged behind increases in scientific understanding, leading to these damages being underestimated in the past, as noted previously (Warren et al. 2006; Warren et al. 2010; Van Vuuren et al. 2011).

While Hänsel et al. (2020) and Chen et al. (2020) address many of the issues raised in those earlier publications, neither PAGE09 nor PAGE-ICE ‘explicitly model other known climatic tipping elements such as Amazon rainforest, boreal forest, coral reefs and El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO), as well as ocean acidification and climate-induced large-scale migration and conflict’ (Yumashev et al. 2019), while Hänsel et al. 2020 note that excluded factors include ‘tipping points, relative scarcity of non-market goods, and climate-induced migration’. Projected risks to biodiversity will interact, via loss of ecosystem services, with the projected risks estimated here, creating a risk cascade (Warren 2011). Such systemic linkages, and their consequences, are difficult to quantify. Hence, the projections provided here are likely conservative and in particular will not reflect the findings of IPCC (2018), which outline important reductions in climate change damages associated with limiting warming to 1.5 °C rather than 2 °C, for example, in terms of reduced damages on ecosystems, terrestrial and marine biodiversity and ocean acidification. This, together with ongoing improvements of understanding of climate change science and climate change-related risks, means that estimates of aggregate economic damages associated with climate change inevitably continue to fall short of a complete representation within integrated assessment models, and hence, even these latest projections probably still lead to underestimates of global aggregate economic damage associated with climate change that would be expected to actually occur.