The positive correlation between contradictory conspiracy beliefs mostly reflects that disbelieving one conspiracy theory predicts an increased likelihood of disbelieving a contradictory one

Just Dead, Not Alive: Reconsidering Belief in Contradictory Conspiracy Theories. Jan-Willem van Prooijen et al. Psychological Science, April 11, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1177/09567976231158570

Abstract: A well-established finding is that beliefs in contradictory conspiracy theories (e.g., Princess Diana was murdered vs. faked her own death) are positively correlated. This is commonly interpreted as evidence that people systematically believe blatant inconsistencies. Here, we propose that the field has insufficiently acknowledged a compelling alternative explanation: Disbelieving both conspiracy theories also yields a positive correlation. In four preregistered studies (total N = 7,641 adults), online participants evaluated 28 sets of contradictory conspiracy theories. Although the positive correlation was replicated in all cases, this was mostly due to participants who believed the official versions of these events (e.g., Princess Diana died in a car accident). Among participants who disbelieved these official stories, the correlation was inconsistent at best. A mini meta-analysis revealed a negative correlation among these participants, which was particularly due to the dead-or-alive cases. Apparently, researchers should reconsider the notion of systematic belief in contradictory conspiracy theories.

General Discussion

The results of four preregistered studies in three countries, along with a meta-analysis, yielded the following conclusions. First, beliefs in contradictory conspiracy theories are positively correlated, replicating the basic finding of Wood and colleagues (2012). Second, this correlation is mostly attributable to the participants in the sample who believe the official version of events (Studies 1–4) and to a lesser extent those who feel unsure what happened (Study 2). Among participants who disbelieve the official version of events, the positive correlation emerges sporadically but inconsistently. In a meta-analysis, the correlation among these participants was negative, particularly for dead-or-alive cases. Altogether, the positive correlation between contradictory conspiracy beliefs mostly reflects that disbelieving one conspiracy theory predicts an increased likelihood of disbelieving a contradictory one.

Some of the correlations among participants who disbelieved the official version of these events were underpowered (e.g., the Osama bin Laden case; Studies 3 and 4); moreover, some of the conspiracy theories yielded very low levels of belief (e.g., the theory that Princess Diana faked her own death; Studies 1 and 4). Note that both of these issues speak against (and not in favor of) systematic belief in contradictory conspiracy theories. An underpowered correlation implies that only a small proportion of the sample disbelieved the official version of a particular case to begin with (Imhoff et al., 2022; Sutton & Douglas, 2022). Likewise, extremely low levels of belief on one of the items implies that few participants actually believe both contradictory conspiracy theories. And yet a positive overall correlation between contradictory conspiracy theories consistently emerged.

The current findings are limited to the populations and specific conspiracy theories investigated here, and future research may expand to different cultures and contradictory conspiracy theories. Moreover, our findings do not imply that people who believe contradictory conspiracy theories do not exist (see also Lukic et al., 2019; Miller, 2020; Petrović & Žeželj, 2022). Our data also contained participants who believed contradictory conspiracy theories, as well as other inconsistencies (i.e., believed the official version plus a conspiracy theory), although in low proportions (see Tables S1–S4 in the Supplemental Material). Instead, our findings suggest that researchers have overestimated the predictability and prevalence of such inconsistencies in a conspiratorial mindset.

This insight raises important new questions. For instance, to what extent is the correlation between conspiracy beliefs that are not mutually incompatible (often seen as reflecting a conspiratorial mindset) actually due to people who disbelieve both conspiracy theories? It is quite plausible that, among conspiracy theorists, the strength of this association is weaker than commonly assumed. More generally, the current studies underscore the methodological point that taking correlations at face value—without carefully examining underlying response distributions—can yield misguided conclusions.

This research domain hence should reconsider the notion of systematic belief in contradictory conspiracy theories. Certainly, many conspiracy theories are epistemically irrational in that they are based on weak evidence, pseudoscience, motivated reasoning, and unreliable sources. Moreover, most conspiracy theories do more harm than good for society (e.g., Douglas et al., 2019; Jolley & Douglas, 2014; Jolley et al., 2019; van der Linden, 2015; van Prooijen et al., 2022). That does not mean, however, that believing a person was murdered increases the likelihood of believing that same person faked their own death. It is time for the research field of conspiracy theories to accept the obvious: When people believe a person is dead, they are not more likely to believe that same person is still alive.

Feeling younger than one really is only makes one happier up to a certain threshold: Among 40-year old adults the greatest life satisfaction was reported when they felt about 18 years old

Blöchl, Maria, Steffen Nestler, and David Weiss. 2020. “A Limit of the Subjective Age Bias: Feeling Younger to a Certain Degree, but No More, Is Beneficial for Life Satisfaction.” PsyArXiv. January 22. doi:10.31234/osf.io/pfxqh

Abstract: The majority of adults feels considerably younger than their chronological age. Numerous studies suggest that maintaining a younger subjective age is linked to greater life satisfaction. However, whether there is a limit beyond which feeling younger becomes detrimental is not well understood. Here, we use response surface analysis to examine the relationships between subjective age, chronological age, and life satisfaction in in a large sample spanning adulthood (N= 7,356; 36 –89 years). We find that there is a limit to feeling younger: People who feel younger by a certain amount, but not more, have the highest levels of life satisfaction. In addition, our findings suggest that the discrepancy between subjective and chronological age at which life satisfaction is highest increases across the adult age span. Taken together, these findings reveal that beyond a certain point, feeling younger than one’s chronological age may be psychologically harmful.

News consumption from both traditional and social media increases exposure to fake news stories, which further decreases people’s trust in the mainstream media

Antecedents and consequences of fake news exposure: a two-panel study on how news use and different indicators of fake news exposure affect media trust. Sangwon Lee, Homero Gil de Zúñiga, Kevin Munger. Human Communication Research, April 8 2023, hqad019, https://doi.org/10.1093/hcr/hqad019

Abstract: Despite abundant studies on “fake news,” the long-term consequences have been less explored. In this context, this study examines the dynamic relationship between traditional and social news media use, fake news exposure—measured as perceived fake news exposure and exposure to actual fake news stories, and mainstream media trust. We found interesting patterns across two U.S. panel survey studies. First, we found that exposure to fake news—regardless of how we measured it—decreased people’s trust in the mainstream media. Yet, we also found that while both social media and traditional news use were positively associated with exposure to actual fake news stories, only social media news use was positively associated with perceived fake news exposure. This finding implies that while many people believe that social media is the culprit of fake news exposure, traditional news use may also contribute to people’s exposure to popular fake news stories.

The gender gap in aspirations for tech jobs is considerably larger in high schools serving the Jewish majority than in those serving the Arab/Palestinian minority

The gendering of tech selves: Aspirations for computing jobs among Jewish and Arab/Palestinian adolescents in Israel. Jason Budge et al. Technology in Society, April 8 2023, 102245. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2023.102245

Abstract: This study uses original survey data to compare aspirations for computing jobs (“tech aspirations”) between students in Arabic- and Hebrew-language school sectors in Israel. Analogous to “paradoxical” patterns previously documented in cross-national studies, results show a smaller gender gap in tech aspirations in schools serving the Arab/Palestinian minority population. The strongest predictor of tech aspirations is students’ personal identification with computing workers, but this “tech identity” cannot account for sectoral differences in the aspirations gender gap because it is stronger for boys than girls in both sectors. Although mathematics affinity and academic instrumentalism are both greater in the Arabic-language school sector, these social-psychological variables also have limited power to explain sectoral differences in tech aspirations. The belief that computer science is for boys, by contrast, positively affects tech aspirations of Jewish but not Palestinian boys, suggesting that variability in the tech gender gap may partly reflect group-specific effects of gender stereotyping. Results underscore the importance of an intersectional approach for understanding the social-psychological drivers of STEM aspirations and how they vary across social groups.

Keywords: GenderComputingSTEMEducationIsrael

7. Conclusion

The main purpose of this study is to interrogate the social-psychological drivers of contextual variability in the gendering of tech fields. Building on cross-national analyses that have compared countries with different levels of gender liberalism (Stoet and Geary 2018) and differently gendered STEM orientations [19], we use original survey data to compare the gendering of STEM aspirations across ethno-religiously distinct school sectors within a single national educational system. We are thereby able to hold constant differences across countries and educational systems that often confound cross-national studies.

Results show that the gender gap in Israeli ninth-graders’ aspirations for jobs in computing and information technology (“tech”) is considerably larger in high schools serving the Jewish majority than in those serving the Arab/Palestinian minority. This finding evokes parallels with cross-national analyses showing smaller STEM gender gaps in less affluent societies [6,8] and within-country studies showing smaller STEM gender gaps in colleges with smaller percentages of white students in the United States [56].

Not surprisingly, the strongest overall predictor of Israeli adolescents’ aspirations for a career in computing is identification with tech workers (“tech identity”). Students who reported feeling similar to computer programmers were more than nine times more likely to report aspiring to a tech job than students who did not. Although causation undoubtedly runs in both directions, this strong association between supports arguments that a sense of belonging, or “fitting in,” is crucial to recruitment and retention of women and other underrepresented groups in STEM fields [20,38,39,57].

Variation in tech identity cannot explain contextual differences in the STEM gender gap, however. This is because girls in both Arab/Palestinian and Jewish school sectors are less likely than boys to identify with tech workers, and because effects of tech identity on aspirations do not vary by gender or sector. Affinity for mathematics and academic instrumentalism are also unable to account for contextual differences in the tech-aspirations gender gap, although both traits are stronger among Palestinian than Jewish students.

The only social-psychological indicator with some power to explain the observed cross-sectoral variability is tech gender stereotyping. Although the belief that computer science is “for boys” shows no significant association with students’ tech aspirations overall, it does have group-specific effects that emerge when the relationship is allowed to vary interactively with gender and school sector. Specifically, we find that believing in the masculine nature of computer science increases tech aspirations of Jewish but not Arab/Palestinian boys. This relationship requires further investigation. As suggested above, it may be attributable to the cultural association of computer science with Jewish military service and to the better tech career opportunities open to Jewish men. More generally, we would suggest that the male-labeling of Israeli tech fields reflects a hegemonic masculinity that is specifically Jewish and therefore less personally salient to Arab/Palestinian students. This underscores the importance of an intersectional approach for understanding the social-psychological drivers of STEM aspirations, and the multiple masculinities (and femininities) that may shape the gendering of these fields across contexts [58,59].

Results support arguments that exposure to different sociocultural environments during the formative adolescent years is likely to influence high school students’ career aspirations. The different gendering of student aspirations and course-taking that results from different school exposures constitutes the school environment that shapes attitudes, aspirations, and abilities of subsequent student cohorts. In other words, the social psychological variables considered here constitute both inputs and outcomes in school-to-student feedback loops that produce distinct institutional gender regimes. Of course, Jewish and Palestinian students bring to school many preexisting beliefs about gender and about tech. Future research, ideally in-depth interviews and participant observation, should explore the interplay of tech gender cultures in schools, families, and the broader Jewish and Arab/Palestinian communities. Contextual variability in the linkage between career aspirations and career outcomes warrants further research as well. While previous U.S.-based research indicates that aspirations are generally highly predictive of occupational outcomes [60], the strength of this relationship likely varies across social groups with different access to public child-care resources, higher education, and employment opportunities.

The uneven gendering of STEM fields revealed here and elsewhere suggests that gender segregation is more complex and multifaceted than is typically represented by unidimensional modernization accounts. While it is by now well established that women's representation in tech does not increase with economic development, more research is needed to isolate the macro-level forces driving contextual variability in this and other forms of gender inequality. Previous comparative research on the STEM gender gap suggests possible causal effects of socioeconomic precarity (versus material security), individualist (versus collectivist) cultural values, and institutional differences in school tracking policies (Mann et al., 2015; [23,47].

Understanding the sociocultural factors that reduce STEM access of women and other historically marginalized populations is not only important for advancing basic social justice and equity. Research shows that diversifying scientific and technical fields can promote national prosperity, productivity, innovation, and the development of more broadly accessible and democratic technology (Page 2017; [61,62].

The Unpredictability of Individual-level Longevity: Fitting 8 machine learning algorithms using 35 sociodemographic predictors to generate individual-level predictions of age of death

Breen, Casey, and Nathan Seltzer. 2023. “The Unpredictability of Individual-level Longevity.” SocArXiv. April 8. doi:10.31235/osf.io/znsqg

Abstract: How accurately can age of death be predicted using basic sociodemographic characteristics? We test this question using a large-scale administrative dataset combining the complete count 1940 Census with Social Security death records. We fit eight machine learning algorithms using 35 sociodemographic predictors to generate individual-level predictions of age of death for birth cohorts born at the beginning of the 20th century. We find that none of these algorithms are able to explain more than 1.5% of the variation in age of death. Our results suggest mortality is inherently unpredictable and underscore the challenges of using algorithms to predict major life outcomes.

The ideal qualities that people wanted in a partner remained fairly stable over the long term, but the importance of status and resources increased over time

Stability and Change of Individual Differences in Ideal Partner Preferences Over 13 Years. Julie C. Driebe et al. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, April 8, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672231164757

Abstract: Ideal partner preferences for traits in a partner are said to be stable cognitive constructs. However, longitudinal studies investigating the same participants’ ideals repeatedly have so far been limited to relatively short retest intervals of a maximum of 3 years. Here, we investigate the stability and change of ideals across 13 years and participants’ insight into how ideals have changed. A total of 204 participants (M = 46.2 years, SD = 7.4, 104 women) reported their ideals at two time points. We found a mean rank-order stability of r = .42 and an overall profile stability of r = .73 (distinctive r = .53). Some ideals changed over time, for example, increased for status-resources in relation to age and parenthood. We found some but varying insight into how ideals had changed (mean r = .20). Results support the idea of ideals being stable cognitive constructs but suggest some variability related to the demands of different life stages.

Discussion

In this study, employing unique longitudinal data across 13 years, we investigated stability (i.e., retest and profile correlations) and change (i.e., mean-level changes) of ideal partner preferences, and whether individuals possess insight into how their preferences have changed (i.e., correlations of perceived changes with actual changes).

Stability and Change in Ideal Partner Preferences

Regarding our first hypothesis (H1), our results suggested considerable overall stability of participants’ ideals of r = .42, corresponding to a medium-sized to large effect (Cohen, 2013; Gignac & Szodorai, 2016). This stability is smaller than coefficients obtained after 5 months (Gerlach et al., 2019) yet roughly comparable to coefficients found after 3 years (Bleske-Rechek & Ryan, 2015). These results are in a range that has previously been reported for the rank-order stability of personality traits (around r = .60 for a retest interval of 6.7 years, Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000; r = .33 for an interval of 11 years in a more diverse sample, Atherton et al., 2022). However, when compared with a meta-analysis by Anusic and Schimmack (2016), our results are comparable with the retest correlation of affect and self-esteem found after 13 years in a group of 30-year-olds but smaller compared to the retest correlation of broad personality dimensions after 13 years in a group of 30-year-olds. Our results, together with the stability coefficients reported for partner preferences across shorter intervals (e.g., (Fletcher et al., 1999, 2000; Gerlach et al., 2019; Shackelford et al., 2005), are in line with the finding that the strongest declines in stability coefficients are found in the first years after assessment (Anusic & Schimmack, 2016; Costa et al., 2019). The fact that our retest correlations do not further decrease even over such a long timespan suggests that individual differences in ideal partner preferences contain a sizable trait component (Anusic & Schimmack, 2016). However, this stability seems to be more comparable to constructs such as self-esteem (as opposed to broader personality domains), which has been shown to be more susceptible to external influences.

Nonetheless, investigating participants’ profiles revealed that patterns of which traits individuals preferred more or less were surprisingly stable, with overall profile correlations exceeding r = .70. These profile stabilities were only slightly reduced when accounting for normative components (e.g., most people value warmth-trustworthiness more than status-resources) by employing distinct profile correlations. We take this high temporal consistency to suggest that—while individual dimensions may well be affected by external influences, resulting in only moderate stability—idiosyncratic patterns in what people value in a romantic partner may be a very stable individual difference characteristic, even when effects of what is normatively more versus less preferred are taken into account.

We then examined the relationship between parenthood and the stability of preferences. As put forward in hypothesis four (H4), we found that the stability of preferences for status-resources was lower in participants who became parents over the 13-year study period or who had intentions to become a parent at the time of the re-assessment, compared with participants without (the intention to have) children. We assumed that these shifts in partner preferences could be related to shifting priorities and efforts according to different life stages (cf. Del Giudice et al., 2016; Heckhausen et al., 2010, 2019), with parenthood potentially being of particular importance. As having a partner who is able to provide resources facilitates founding a family and raising children, (the decision to) becoming a parent may alter one’s preference for status-resources, explaining the lower stability. Yet, parenthood was also related to the stability of other preference dimensions, suggesting that the decision to become a parent has the potential to shake up how we picture our ideal partner more generally.

We also investigated mean-level changes in ideal partner preferences. In line with our second hypothesis (H2), participants placed higher importance on status-resources over time and this increasing preference was stronger for younger participants. Furthermore, although effects were small (Cohen’s d < 0.20), participants placed more importance on warmth-trustworthiness and less on vitality-attractiveness over time. Our third prediction (H3), an increase in family-orientation, was only partly supported: Over time, the preference for family-orientation only increased for younger individuals, yet compared with older participants, younger individuals already reported a higher preference for family-orientation at the initial assessment. Further exploration revealed that participants without children generally placed less importance on family-orientation, whereas the preference for family-orientation increased over time for those with children. While this might be a mere cohort effect, this finding could also be interpreted in light of age-graded opportunity structures and/or developmental deadlines (Wrosch & Heckhausen, 2005). For example, younger participants might picture themselves as likely to begin a family in the future, whereas older participants had already begun to ponder a possible life without children because they already considered themselves to be beyond the ideal age for having children, were pessimistic about finding a suitable partner for such an endeavor, or had already come to cherish a “childfree” lifestyle. Exploring mean-level changes in relation to the number of relationships participants had entered revealed that participants who entered more than one relationship over time reported an increased preference for warmth-trustworthiness and status-resources, whereas participants who entered only one relationship over time showed no significant increase in these preference dimensions. For the dimension status-resources, this may be due to having limited statistical power in these analyses, as participants who entered only one relationship descriptively showed an increased preference for status-resources. It can also be speculated that participants who entered more than one committed relationship after going through one or more break-ups may have realized that having a warm and trustworthy partner may be most vital for a relationship to last. Participants who entered only one committed relationship, however, may not have seen the necessity to update their preferences on this dimension.

In our study, we found considerable stability of preferences over 13 years. As such, our findings cannot explain the mixed findings in previous research on the link between preferences and relationship decisions. An alternative explanation for those mixed findings may be the relationship phase investigated (see Campbell & Stanton, 2014; Gerlach et al., 2019): studies that could not find a link between preferences and relationship decisions, for the most part, investigated the initial stage of getting to know each other (e.g., Eastwick & Finkel, 2008; Joel et al., 2017; Todd et al., 2007), whereas studies finding a relationship between preferences and relationship decisions often investigated already established relationships (e.g., Conroy-Beam & Buss, 2016; Park & MacDonald, 2019) or relationship formation (e.g., Campbell et al., 2016; Gerlach et al., 2019). However, our findings have important implications for future research investigating the association of ideal partner preferences and relationship decisions. First, the relatively high stability of preferences suggests that studies which investigate the association between preferences and relationship decisions do not necessarily need to constantly assess preferences over the investigated timespan. Instead, study designs in which preferences are initially assessed should suffice to investigate the link between these initial preferences and later relationship decisions. Second, a factor to consider when investigating longer timespans or populations more diverse as the typical student sample is that having children may alter preferences. Future studies investigating partner preferences may thus take into account the parenthood status of participants and the presence (vs. absence) of family formation goals more broadly.

Insight Into Preference Change

Over the 13-year study period, preferences for status-resources and warmth-trustworthiness increased and decreased for vitality-attractiveness—but were these changes mirrored in participants’ perceptions? Descriptively, participants perceived increases in their preference for warmth-trustworthiness and perceived decreases in their preference for vitality-attractiveness and status-resources. They also perceived increases in family orientation, intelligence, and humor and decreases in adventurousness-confidence and creativity. One interpretation of these perceived changes may be that participants believe to place more importance on dimensions that become more relevant with increasing age. For example, with increasing age, it may be adaptive to have a partner who is caring and oriented toward the family instead of a partner who is up for adventure and likes taking risks. Although objectively, having a high status and resources might also become more important when one gets older, participants may not perceive this change because they might have already achieved certain resources or status for themselves and may not realize that this increased standard of living has already shaped their preferences for a partner. Another possibility is that participants may answer in a socially desirable way: If participants do not want to admit that having a certain status and monetary resources is relevant to them, they might indicate that this dimension had become less relevant to them over time, while still ascribing considerable importance to it.

Interestingly, around 50% of participants did not report that they changed their ideals, except for family orientation, where only 37% of participants believed that their preferences had not changed. These patterns dovetail with results by Sprecher and colleagues (2018): Around half of their sample perceived not to have changed their ideals, except for “good parenting potential,” a variable close to family orientation. This perception of no change may mirror the previously found stability of ideal partner preferences or changes may have occurred at a younger age (Bleske-Rechek & Ryan, 2015).

When investigating whether perceptions correspond to actual changes, overall, we found a small positive effect. Yet, insight varied considerably between the different dimensions: Participants had the most insight into family orientation and the least for status-resources and intelligence. Contradicting our fifth hypothesis (insight into changes for status-resources, H5.1), participants believed to have decreased in their preference, when in fact they increased over time. One possibility is that participants may perceive themselves in a biased self-enhancing manner via a similar process to what Robins et al. (2005) suggested to be the case for perceived changes in personality. Yet, in line with the second part of this prediction (H5.2), participants showed some insight into changes in their preference for vitality-attractiveness, although the perception of change appears stronger than the actual change. Interestingly, age and sex were not related to participants’ insight.

The present results for perceptions are in line with previous research (Bleske-Rechek et al., 2009) that found participants to predict that they would value intrinsic characteristics (i.e., warmth-trustworthiness, family orientation) more and appearance (i.e., vitality-attractiveness) less over time, suggesting that participants may be more oriented toward committed relationships over time. At the same time, perceptions of change were somewhat exaggerated and for the most part only achieved modest accuracy (family orientation being a notable exception), showing that perceptions do not necessarily correspond to actual changes. These results highlight the necessity to conduct longitudinal studies when one is interested in preference change and underscore that intraindividual processes should not be investigated in cross-sectional data: Self-perceptions of change do not reflect actual changes accurately enough to allow them to be used as a substitute.

Strengths

The longitudinal design of this study, covering 13 years, makes it unique among studies on the stability and change of partner preferences, which have so far investigated much shorter time periods. Even over this long timespan, we managed to rerecruit a sizable proportion of the initial sample, and participant retention was better than expected over such a large time interval. For example, while in the current study we found a retention rate of 59% after 13 years, Gerlach et al. (2019) reported a retention rate of more than five months of 64%, whereas a study by Gustavson et al. (2012) covering a time span of 15 years reported a retention rate of 44%. A special feature of our sample is that it is a community sample not restricted to the typical student population. In particular, our sample spanned a wide age range, allowing us to investigate intraindividual stability and change of preferences across a period when participants were still single until much later in life when they may have found a partner with whom they then had to decide whether to have children or not. Investigating this life stage may be of particular interest since it does not only involve the time in which participants start having a family but also a time in which important career decisions take place. Finally, we used comprehensive measures of participants’ ideals at both assessments and complementary indices to investigate their stability and change.

Limitations and Future Directions

Although our community sample was arguably more diverse than the typical student sample, it was still highly educated and came from a Western background. The generalizability of our results may be limited because preferences and their importance could not only vary by education but also across different cultures. For example, in a study involving samples from Taiwan, Lam et al. (2016) uncovered preference attributes referring to the extended family previously overlooked in Western samples. Furthermore, education might be related to how much importance individuals ascribe to attributes conducive to a partner’s career advancement (e.g., successful, ambitious). Future studies should strive to recruit participants with more diverse educational backgrounds, ideally also from non-Western countries (Henrich et al., 2010).

Furthermore, although the large retest period is unique and showed that ideal partner preferences contain a sizable trait component, life events may still be associated with a change in preferences. The fact that we only had two assessments available precludes an in-depth analysis of further factors that might have driven preference change. Future research should include multiple assessments of preferences and important events (e.g., parenthood; entering Gerlach et al., 2019 or ending relationships; experiences of romantic rejection and acceptance Charlot et al., 2020). Additional factors influencing changes in partner preferences may be the increased occurrence of specific life events in a persons’ social environment. For example, the importance of having a partner with a high family orientation may increase when more and more people in one’s environment are trying to or are indeed having a child (Keim et al., 2009). Another possible change in partner preferences may be that people lower their expectations after a long period of time not being able to find a partner (Gerlach et al., 2019). For example, people lower their standards regarding a partner’s physical attractiveness. Finally, a recent study has found divorce to be associated with changes in self-esteem (Bleidorn et al., 2021). Similarly, relationship dissolution may be a life event associated with changes in preferences. For example, after a relationship dissolution fraught with conflict, individuals may increase their preference for having a kind, trustworthy partner because they recently got to know the disagreeable side of their ex-partner. Future research with multiple assessments should also include participants’ perception of change to investigate what drives the accuracy of preference change perceptions and whether the perception of change may be associated with future dating or relationship decisions.

Finally, we deviated from our preregistered analytic plan in three analytic decisions (see S4). Therefore, only our hypotheses and design can be regarded as preregistered. In particular, the diverging assessment of initial ideals between the two samples led to larger problems than anticipated, which led us to the decision to analyze both samples separately and interpret results based on the BSDS only. Unfortunately, this also lowered our sample size, hence the power of our study, which is especially relevant for the analyses comparing participants with and without children. Furthermore, as the instruction for rating partner preferences was not completely identical across T1 and T2, we also checked for measurement invariance across the two time points according to the procedure as suggested by Mackinnon et al. (2022). We found scalar invariance partly supported, suggesting that participants may have interpreted our response scale slightly differently at T1 and T2. We therefore recommend future studies to adopt the exact same wording of their instructions at all assessments.

Social Class, Sex, and the Ability to Recognize Emotions: The Main Effect is in the Interaction

Social Class, Sex, and the Ability to Recognize Emotions: The Main Effect is in the Interaction. Susan A. Brener et al. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, April 4, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672231159775

Abstract: Previous research has demonstrated an inverse relation between subjective social class (SSC) and performance on emotion recognition tasks. Study 1 (N = 418) involved a preregistered replication of this effect using the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task and the Cambridge Mindreading Face-Voice Battery. The inverse relation replicated; however, exploratory analyses revealed a significant interaction between sex and SSC in predicting emotion recognition, indicating that the effect was driven by males. In Study 2 (N = 745), we preregistered and tested the interaction on a separate archival dataset. The interaction replicated; the association between SSC and emotion recognition again occurred only in males. Exploratory analyses (Study 3; N = 381) examined the generalizability of the interaction to incidental face memory. Our results underscore the need to reevaluate previous research establishing the main effects of social class and sex on emotion recognition abilities, as these effects apparently moderate each other.

The AI Effect: People rate distinctively human attributes as more essential to being human after learning about artificial intelligence advances

The AI Effect: People rate distinctively human attributes as more essential to being human after learning about artificial intelligence advances.Erik Santoro, Benoît Monin. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,Volume 107, July 2023, 104464. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2023.104464

Abstract: As news reports describing Artificial Intelligence (AI) proliferate, will people's perceptions of human nature change such that they rate distinctively human attributes as more essential? Five studies (N = 5111) demonstrate this “AI Effect.” Study 1 first establishes a two-part classification of human attributes used in subsequent studies, distinguishing human attributes that AI are perceived as capable of (“shared” attributes such as using logic or language) from ones that humans are seen as uniquely capable of (“distinctive” attributes such as having a personality or beliefs). Study 2 demonstrates the AI Effect: compared to reading an article about the attributes of trees, reading an article describing AI advances leads participants to rate distinctive attributes as more essential to being human. Study 3 tests whether this effect is due to anthropomorphizing a non-human entity. Study 4 considers the alternative that this effect is solely driven by demand. Study 5 shows that it is enough to simply mention AI advances to observe this effect. This research suggests that as people learn about increasingly sophisticated AI, conceptions of human nature may shift in reaction to regard what makes humans unique as more essential.

Each year governments worldwide spend an enormous amount of money subsidising businesses; researching the relationship between the allocation of government subsidies and total productivity for Chinese listed firms

China does not pick – or create – winners when giving subsidies to firms. Lee Branstetter, Guangwei Li,Mengjia Ren. CEPR, Mar 9 2023. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/china-does-not-pick-or-create-winners-when-giving-subsidies-firms

Abstract: Each year governments worldwide spend an enormous amount of money subsidising businesses. This column investigates the relationship between the allocation of government subsidies and total productivity for Chinese listed firms. The authors find little evidence that the Chinese government consistently ‘picks winners’. Firms’ ex-ante productivity is negatively correlated with subsidies received by firms, and subsidies appear to have a negative impact on firms’ ex-post productivity growth.

We conduct a two-stage analysis. In the first stage, we estimate standard Cobb-Douglas production functions separately by industry, and compute total factor productivity (TFP) for each firm in each year. In the second stage, we seek to understand the relationship between government subsidies and estimated TFP, using a number of different regression approaches.

Our analysis provides no evidence that the Chinese government consistently ‘picks winners’. There appears to be a statistically significant negative correlation between subsidies and TFP, and a robust positive correlation between subsidies and firm size (as measured by the firm's total assets) and between subsidies and net profit. These results indicate that, overall, subsidies are given to larger and more profitable, but less productive firms.

We also find little evidence that receiving a subsidy is correlated with subsequent growth in TFP. When we aggregate across subsidy types, total subsidies appear to have a statistically significant negative impact on subsequent TFP growth. When we disaggregate across subsidy types, we find that even subsidies given out in the name of R&D and innovation promotion or industrial and equipment upgrading have no measured, statistically significant positive effect on firms’ productivity growth.

On the other hand, receiving a subsidy does seem to be correlated with an increase in firms’ employment. When we aggregate across subsidy types, we find that current subsidies appear to have a positive impact on current employment levels, while the prior year’s subsidies seem to have a negative impact on current employment, potentially indicating that firms might be strategically manipulating employment numbers to get subsidies. In other words, firms are temporarily increasing hiring during the period when they receive subsidies, then cut back on employment during the next period. This is consistent with the view that political considerations might outweigh efficiency considerations in the allocation of direct subsidies in China.

Although conservatives had poorer quality work motivation and values than liberals, they were happier nonetheless

Conservatives Report Less Autonomous Work Motivation and Less Intrinsic Values than Liberals, but are Happier Nonetheless: The Explanatory Role of Psychological Need-Satisfaction. Kennon M. Sheldon. Journal of Happiness Studies, Apr 4 2023. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10902-023-00656-0

Abstract: Many studies have compared conservative and liberal personalities in terms of traits and cognitive styles. Fewer studies have compared the motivations and values of the two groups, and fewer still have used the perspective of self-determination theory. Using two large archival datasets (Ns = 16,058 university students and 4314 working lawyers), I tested the hypotheses that conservatives would score lower in autonomous work motivation (H1) and in relative intrinsic value orientation (H2), compared to liberals. Consistent support was found for these two hypotheses. Supporting H3, autonomous work motivation and intrinsic value orientation were positively correlated with subjective well-being (SWB), as is typical. Still, despite their seeming motivational vulnerabilities, conservatives reported more SWB and meaning in life than liberals, consistent with other recent studies (H4). Mediational analyses suggest that the conservative advantage in SWB can be partially explained by conservative advantages in relatedness and/or competence need-satisfaction.

Extradyadic relationships: Participants were highly satisfied with their affairs and expressed little moral regret; plus low relationship quality (i.e., satisfaction, love, commitment) is not a major driver of affairs

No Remorse: Sexual Infidelity Is Not Clearly Linked with Relationship Satisfaction or Well-Being in Ashley Madison Users. Dylan Selterman, Samantha Joel & Victoria Dale. Archives of Sexual Behavior, April 3 2023. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10508-023-02573-y

Abstract: Past research on extradyadic relationship experiences (including infidelity) often suffers from restricted sampling and retrospective accounts, which may have given researchers a distorted image of what it is like for people to have affairs. In this research, we shed light on the experiences people have during their affairs with a sample of registered users on Ashley Madison, a website geared toward facilitating infidelity. Our participants completed questionnaires about their primary (e.g., spousal) relationships, as well as personality traits, motivations to seek affairs, and outcomes. Findings from this study challenge widely held notions about infidelity experiences. Analyses revealed that participants were highly satisfied with their affairs and expressed little moral regret. A small subset of participants reported having consensually open relationships with their partners, who knew about their activity on Ashley Madison. In contrast to previous findings, we did not observe low relationship quality (i.e., satisfaction, love, commitment) to be a major driver of affairs and the affairs did not predict decreases in these relationship quality variables over time. That is, among a sample of individuals who proactively sought affairs, their affairs were not primarily motivated by poor dyadic/marital relationships, their affairs did not seem to have a strong negative impact on their relationships, and personal ethics did not play a strong role in people’s feelings about their affairs.

Discussion

Overall, the findings in this paper highlight the nuanced psychological nature of extradyadic behavior for Ashley Madison users. The descriptive results suggest that people’s experiences with affairs are counterintuitive and, at times, self-contradictory. On one hand, participants reported strong feelings of love toward their primary partners/spouses that would ostensibly impede them from cheating. On the other hand, they also derived considerable physical and emotional pleasure from their affairs and expressed little regret. There were also inconsistent expressions about the monogamous/exclusive nature of their relationships. A small percentage (< 15%) of our sample indicated that they were in consensually non-monogamous relationships, suggesting that they had their partners’ permission to use Ashley Madison to find paramours. However, many of these same participants indicated elsewhere in the survey that their relationships were exclusive or that they did not have an open relationship with their partners. Some participants’ inconsistencies may be because they have not had discussions with their partners about monogamy in their relationships, which is a common phenomenon that leads to misunderstandings and disagreements about infidelity (Warren et al., 2012). Regardless, similar patterns of results emerged whether the participants who reported being in CNM relationships were retained or excluded.

For a sample of people aspiring to have affairs, participants expressed high amounts of romantic love toward their partners, with moderate amounts of satisfaction and conflict, and many taking significant steps to improve their relationships (e.g., marital counseling). Moreover, participants also felt positively about themselves, scoring well on life satisfaction. These factors would ostensibly redirect people away from having affairs. Sexual satisfaction, or lack thereof, appeared to stand out as a variable of interest, with about half of participants saying they were not sexually active with their partners. Sexual dissatisfaction was the strongest motivator for those in our sample to pursue affairs. Our participants also reported high emotional and sexual satisfaction with their affairs, and little regret. In a sense, these results mirror the results from prior studies on attitudes and incidence of infidelity, which most people view disapprovingly, and yet, is commonly experienced.

Some, but not all our directional predictions, were supported by the data. Dyadic variables were not associated with infidelity. Relationship quality (satisfaction, intimacy, conflict) did not predict having affairs, nor did it predict affair regret, nor did it decrease as a function of whether participants had affairs. This challenges findings from some prior work which has shown relationship investment as a key predictor of infidelity in young adults (Drigotas et al., 1999), and that affairs are linked with decreased relationship quality outcomes. However, independent of affairs, relationship quality did (negatively) predict the likelihood of relationship dissolution over time, which is consistent with prior work.

Participants’ motivations for having affairs, which included dyadic factors like anger and sexual dissatisfaction, were linked with worse relationship quality at Time 1, while motivation for autonomy, a non-dyadic factor, was linked with better relationship quality. This is consistent with prior work showing that as people experience relationship deficits, their motivations for affairs reflect those deficits, and that infidelity motivations are not monolithic (Selterman et al., 2019). However, these motivation variables did not predict changes in relationship quality or life satisfaction over time for those who reported having affairs. This shows some preliminary evidence that relationship deficits precede infidelity motivations, but not the other way around. Separately, sexual dissatisfaction predicted an increased likelihood of relationship dissolution/divorce, while lack of love and situational factors were associated with remaining together. This shows how different motivations for infidelity are differentially associated with relationship stability in the long-term. Among those who reported affairs, sociosexuality and motivations for variety and autonomy were not associated with happiness or self-esteem. Sociosexuality did predict sexual satisfaction with affair partners, but autonomy predicted lower sexual satisfaction.

The findings from our sample of Ashley Madison users paint a picture of infidelity experiences that does not follow key assumptions long held in the literature on close relationships. These assumptions include the notion that because infidelity is widely considered immoral and is sometimes linked with conflict and intimate partner violence, therefore those who choose to have affairs must have suboptimal relationships (Barta & Kiene, 2005; Thompson, 1983) or behave in significantly different ways compared to those who maintain sexual exclusivity. We did not observe a robust pattern in our data which would support these ideas. Relationship quality (satisfaction, conflict) was not systematically linked with having affairs. One possible explanation is that there are non-dyadic motivations for infidelity that stem from things like self-esteem, desire for variety, and situational factors, rather than from deficits in people’s marriages or partnerships (Selterman et al., 2019).

Furthermore, relationship quality did not predict feelings of regret after affairs in our sample, nor positive perceptions of alternative partners. Prior studies have pointed to factors such as commitment and interdependence are linked with motivations to derogate or devaluate potential alternatives (Johnson & Rusbult, 1989; Lydon et al., 2003; Miller, 1997). But our participants’ responses to items assessing their perceptions of alternatives (e.g., “Others on the site didn't seem like my type”) were not associated with measures of their marital/relationship quality. Put another way, we found weak evidence that relationship quality was linked with derogation of alternative partners. In addition, affair motivation variables stemming from dyadic elements (such as anger, lack of love, or sexual dissatisfaction) were paradoxically associated with greater concurrent relationship quality, and they did not predict changes in relationship quality or life satisfaction over time.

Circling back to one of the central questions we posed in our introduction, it may seem paradoxical that infidelity would be so widely frowned upon, and yet so common. Our results provide clues as to why extradyadic behavior is normative, in large part because the relationships of cheaters appear similar to the relationships of non-cheaters, at least in the eyes of the individuals who are committing infidelity (their partners may feel differently). Some people may pursue affairs even if their satisfaction is high or perceived conflict is low (Glass & Wright, 1985). Although this may be surprising to those who have long assumed key benefits to monogamous relationships, including higher satisfaction, those who study consensual non-monogamy recognize this alleged benefit is a myth (Conley et al., 2013, 2017). Monogamy comes with trade-offs, and relational or emotional outcomes are not universally positive.

In terms of strengths and limitations, we note several. We planned several analyses with our longitudinal data, anticipating that Sample C, which consisted of matched participants across T1 and T2, would be much larger. However, the matched Sample C was much smaller than the two cross-sectional samples A and B. Thus, we have more confidence in the conclusions from the cross-sectional data, and conversely, we urge caution against overextrapolation from our longitudinal findings (particularly with binary outcomes such as breakups at T2, which were quite underpowered) before they can be independently replicated. We suggest future studies extend on our work by further probing developmental antecedents and outcomes of infidelity.

Our sample reflects a population of middle-aged adults, most of whom are married, in contrast to young adult college students in dating relationships whose infidelities are more frequently studied in the literature. Our findings may generalize to populations of similar age and relationship status, but it may also be possible that Ashley Madison users are somehow different from those who have affairs through other means. Ashley Madison users are investing time, energy, and money into the pursuit of infidelity, whereas others may have affairs that originate more passively. Our sample was also skewed in terms of gender representation as most participants were men (84–90% across samples), which limited our ability to conduct analyses gender as a predictor of infidelity experiences. It may be the case that our findings generalize more to men who have affairs than to women or non-binary individuals.

Existing data suggest that most people who commit infidelity report having affairs with others that they already knew rather than through matchmaking apps (Labrecque & Whisman, 2017), although such services are growing in popularity especially in recent years (Dietzel et al., 2021; Wiederhold, 2021). The existing data do not yet support the idea that Ashley Madison users represent a distinct group relative to others who cheat, although we suggest treating this as an open question for which future research will bear evidence on. At this point, we recommend caution before overgeneralizing findings from Ashley Madison users to the wider population of affair-seekers. It may also be the case that Ashley Madison users are also meaningfully different from affair-seekers who use other internet platforms such as Second Love, although again, presently, we have no data to support this notion. Furthermore, whereas websites/apps such as Ashley Madison offer users additional opportunities to engage in affairs, we do not have data on relationship outcomes for these affairs compared to affairs that originate offline.

Separately, some of our participants indicated having a non-exclusive or consensually open relationship with their primary partners. This group of consensually non-monogamous folks who use websites like Ashley Madison (which facilitate affairs) may be different in some ways compared to others in open relationships who prefer other means of finding extradyadic partners. Some who practice ethical non-monogamy insist that their paramours either be single or in consensually open relationships themselves.

Infidelity remains highly socially stigmatized and there can even be legal consequences for marital adultery, which would theoretically serve as barriers to infidelity. In contexts where infidelity or non-monogamy more broadly are frowned upon, attitudes and experiences are likely to be more restricted, and our current study does not allow for such sociocultural comparisons. Finally, our data do not pertain to lifetime infidelity behaviors, so we did not address questions about developmental aspects of infidelity, either within persons or within relationships.